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## *Partisan Change in Southern Legislatures, 1946-95*

What accounts for partisan change in southern legislatures between 1946 and 1995? I draw my hypothesis from general theories of partisan change and tailor them to the South based on history and previous research to explain the variance in southern Republican legislative strength. I estimate a pooled time series analysis of the eleven former Confederate states to test the path model. The model uses Democratic elite liberalism as an endogenous variable in order to determine the overall effect of several important independent variables including black population, black political influence, urbanization, white northern migration, and wealth. Determinants of state legislative partisan change include the following: secular forces such as wealth, urbanization, and migration; political forces such as presidential midterm losses, party organizational strength, and political scandal; party issue stances on race and general party ideology; changes in national party preferences that precede change at lower levels; and finally, rules governing the structure of political opportunity such as reapportionment and participation.

### **Studying Partisan Change in Southern Legislatures**

What accounts for the variation in Republican legislative strength in the South since 1946? To seek answers, we can examine the sources of state-level partisan change. Which type or types of variables impact state-level partisan change: socioeconomic, demographic, political, or cultural? What is the magnitude and direction of their impact? Does state partisan change occur rapidly in a single election, does it unfold slowly over many decades, or some combination of both? Are the causal factors affecting state partisan change found within, or external to, the state? And finally, is there such a thing as two-stage realignment with party change at the national level that precedes partisan change in the states?

Contradictory evidence complicates the answers to many of the above questions, both in general and as applied specifically to the South

(Swansbrough and Brodsky 1988). Further, a strong case can be made that state legislative party strength is one of the best measures of changing state partisanship over the long run. Survey responses most often reflect national attachment, as do election results for president and Congress. And gubernatorial campaigns are often decided as much on personal characteristics as they are on partisan affiliation.

Focusing on southern legislatures to investigate state party change also makes sense. V. O. Key (1949, 1955, 1959) provides a seminal connection between the study of southern politics, state politics, and partisan change. After Key's *Southern Politics* (1949), a long-standing tradition of southern exceptionalism in state politics developed and has been incorporated theoretically and methodologically by researchers investigating state-level partisanship (Brown 1995; Chubb 1988; Sundquist 1983).

However, most books written exclusively about southern politics have not focused primarily on GOP legislative gains, and instead have emphasized change at the presidential, congressional, gubernatorial, organizational, activist, or mass level (Baker et al. 1990; Bass and DeVries 1976; Black and Black 1987; Glaser 1996; Hadley and Bowman 1995; Havard 1972; Heard 1952; Lamis 1988, 1999; Seagull 1975; and Steed, Moreland, and Baker 1980). While researchers are beginning to pay more attention to Republican gains in southern legislatures (Aistrup 1996; Bullock and Rozell 1998; Jewett 1997; Lamis 1999), the potential for such increases has typically been downplayed (Black and Black 1987, 314; Scher 1992, 168–69; Van Wingen and Valentine 1988, 146–47). Given recent GOP legislative success in Dixie (Boulard 1995), the time is right to devote more research to the topic.

Most important, however, the uniqueness of the South or other regions is essential to clarifying the process of partisan change. Studies of realignment show that examining different regions separately brings out variation that might otherwise be masked (Bullock 1988, 569–73; Galderisi and Lyons 1987, 3). On the other hand, one should not read too much into the long-established tradition of southern exceptionalism (Steed, Moreland, and Baker 1990). Political explanations for southern behavior do not have to be idiosyncratic in nature. To the contrary, this research shows that it is appropriate and useful to apply a general theory of state party change to the South, with only a moderate amount of adjustment to the quantitative model based on historical experience and previous applied research.

The model developed here derives explanations from seven different theories of partisan change. *Critical alignment* holds that the bases of party support are altered dramatically and lastingly in a single



election due to the onset of a political, social, or economic crisis (Burnham 1970; Key 1955). *Secular realignment* suggests that partisan change unfolds over a long span of time due to changing socio-economic and demographic forces that influence group identification with a party (Barrilleaux 1986; Key 1959; Peltzman 1985). *Dealignment* focuses on the persistent decline in partisan attachment among the electorate over time due to generational replacement and cognitive mobilization (Beck 1977). *Issue evolution* highlights the role that salient policy cleavages can have on mass attachment when successfully exploited by the party elite during a critical moment, an abrupt short-term change, and over the long run to foster evolutionary change (Carmines and Stimson 1989). *Two-stage realignment* argues that party change happens in a top down fashion, with changes at higher offices preceding changes at lower levels (Bullock 1988; Sundquist 1983, chs. 12, 16). In addition, some form of state partisan change has also been tied to *political culture* (Elazar 1984; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) and to the structure of *political opportunity* (Schlesinger 1994).

While specific hypotheses explaining changes in southern Republican legislative strength are covered in the next section, crucial features of the model can be highlighted to show how application of the theories is adjusted for the southern experience. A key aspect of the model is that Democratic elite liberalism is entered as an endogenous variable expected to have a positive relationship with GOP legislative strength. This represents the conservative bias in the southern electorate that is certainly not found in the Northeast (Black and Black 1987; Sundquist 1983). The common ideological lament of the traditional Dixie conservative who has switched party allegiance, "I didn't leave the Democratic Party, the Party left me" makes sense in a regional context.

Modeling Democratic elite liberalism as an endogenous variable is critical to explicating the effect of several independent variables. For instance, black population and black political influence have positive effects on liberalism but negative direct effects on Republican legislative strength. Without modeling a path through Democratic elite liberalism, the overall effect of these variables would be unknown. This is crucial in the South to resolving the paradox of race as both a primary impetus and significant impediment to GOP growth. Black population may have the same directional impact in the Mountain West, but clearly does not have the same substantive impact as in the South, since relatively few African Americans live in the Rocky Mountain area (Galderisi and Lyons 1987).

Urbanization and proportional representation also operate directly on GOP legislative strength in one direction, and through Democratic elite liberalism in the other. In the southern states, urbanization has a positive direct effect on GOP strength, but has the opposite effect in the rest of the country because the bases of party support are different in the South than elsewhere (Brown 1995). The same can be said of the effect of one person, one vote redistricting. Throughout the country, *Baker v Carr* shifted power from rural to urban areas. In the South, this aided Republican legislative growth because the Democratic power base was in sparsely populated areas like the Florida Panhandle; in the Midwest, however, this ruling took power away from rural Republicans and transferred it to urban Democrats (Jewett 1997).

Several other variables have been found to have different effects on liberalism and/or partisan legislative strength in the South than they do in other parts of the country. These include wealth (Peltzman 1985), political culture (Elazar 1984), white northern migration (Brown 1988), and two-stage realignment (Bullock 1988).


Ultimately then, studying legislative partisan change in the South resolves some interesting applied questions pertaining to the region, and sheds light on underlying general theories of partisan change that apply everywhere. To accomplish these twin objectives, I will now describe the causal model and propose hypotheses consistent with theory, yet tailored to the South according to history and previous research.

#### **Partisan Change in the South: Literature Review and Hypotheses**

The major hypotheses, drawn from various theories and adjusted for the historical experience of the southern states, are outlined as a causal model in Figure 1.<sup>4</sup> Fourteen of the hypotheses (H1 to H14) propose explanations for Republican legislative strength, and six (H15 to H20) propose explanations for Democratic elite liberalism (which in turn affects legislative strength).

*H1: Black political influence is negatively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* Traditionally, southern politics has been dominated by the Democratic Party since the Reconstruction period after the Civil War, with only a few pockets of "mountain Republicans" in Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina showing any regular opposition at the state level (Key 1949, ch. 13). Key (1949) hypothesized that race was the most important factor that kept the South from becoming a competitive two-party region. By the early

FIGURE 1  
Causal Model: Explaining Variance in Southern Republican Legislative Strength



\*The hypothesized direct effect for each independent variable on Republican Legislative Strength is inside the text box.  
 \*For the first six variables, the hypothesized direct effect on Democratic Elite Liberalism is outside the text box.



1960s, blacks began to have a more proactive impact on southern politics (Matthews and Prothro, 1966). Changes in the structure of political opportunity aided African-American empowerment and altered state partisan gains in the South.

The 1962 Supreme Court ruling in *Baker v Carr* established the one person, one vote standard for reapportionment and changed the structure of political opportunity in the states (Myres 1970). Although it took years for many southern states to attain compliance with the ruling, the principal of proportionate redistricting affected the growth of Republican strength (O'Rourke 1980, ch. 3). Malapportionment favored rural areas, and in the South, rural areas were dominated by conservative, white Democrats (Jewett 1997). *Baker v Carr* transferred more political power to growing urban areas where increasing numbers of African Americans lived (Bass and DeVries 1976, ch. 1; Dixon 1971; Jewett 1997; Roady 1970). While *Baker v Carr* set the stage for increased black influence, two congressional acts made significant alterations to the structure of political opportunity as well.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 enfranchised large numbers of southern blacks and altered the base of support for the parties (Bass and DeVries 1976, ch. 3; Black and Black 1987, ch. 5; Lamis 1988, ch. 3; Scher 1992, ch. 8). The evolution of the Republican and Democratic elite position on the racial issue provided impetus for Republican gains among white southerners (Carmines and Stimson 1989). However, the overall effect of the black minority vote on party is moderated to the degree that newly enfranchised southern blacks identified with and supported the Democratic Party at all levels (Black and Black 1987, ch. 6; Lamis 1988, ch. 3). In the few southern states that track registration by party and race (like Florida and North Carolina) the percentage of black Democrats grows at a steady pace following 1965 (Jewett 1997). While black registration increases dramatically in the late 1960s, southern black political power is best understood as a steadily increasing influence exercised within the Democratic Party over the following decades (Jewett 1997).

*H2: Black population is negatively related to southern Republican legislative strength* Somewhat ironically, the directional impact of southern black population on southern party strength is seemingly unchanged over time even after enfranchisement. When blacks were excluded from the political process, Key's (1949) famous "Black Belt" hypothesis proposed a negative relationship between a state's black population and a state's Republican strength. After enfranchisement, even though the racial issue helps the GOP grow, there still appears to be a negative relationship between Republican strength and black

population since southern blacks have entered into coalitions that almost exclusively support the state Democratic Party (Lamis 1988, ch. 3; Glaser 1996). Although the state-level Democratic machinery in the South has a long history of racial exclusion and bigotry, the national Democratic Party is given credit for the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. Although a higher percentage of Republicans in Congress voted for these bills, the high profile opposition of 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater defined the GOP (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 37–51).

*H3: Hispanic (non-Cuban) population is negatively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* In several southern states, most notably Florida and Texas, ethnicity equals race in political importance as non-Cuban Hispanic support of the Democratic Party indicates (Jewett 1997).

*H4: Democratic elite liberalism is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* The national Democratic Party's move towards a progressive racial policy in the 1960s, coupled with the Republican abandonment of its progressive racial roots, resulted in large numbers of white southerners voting for Republican candidates (i.e., Bass and DeVries 1976, chs. 2, 3; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Glaser 1996; Hadley and Stanley 1990; Lamis 1988, ch. 3; Stanley 1987, ch. 7). Additional evidence suggests that there is a conservative advantage in southern public opinion that transcends racial and ethnic issues (Black and Black 1987, ch. 10; Moreland 1990b). This has caused a number of traditional conservative white southerners to abandon the Democratic Party as its elite became more liberal on a wide variety of issues (Carmines and Stanley 1990; Scher 1992, ch. 5). This trend is evident at the presidential (Black and Black 1992; Dent 1978), congressional (Shaffer 1982; Shannon 1972), and state legislative (Jewett 1997) levels.

*H5: The interaction of urbanization and proportional representation is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* Black and Black (1987, ch. 2) point out that urbanization is positively related to Republican strength, and others have found that urbanization in the South impacts party coalitions (Baker 1990). In fact, evidence suggests that the South is the only region where the bases of party support are divided between rural Democrats and urban Republicans (Brown 1995). However, as with race, it took an alteration in the structure of political opportunity to empower urban areas. *Baker v Carr* transferred more political power from rural areas to growing urban centers in the South (Bass and DeVries 1976, ch. 1; Dixon 1971; Jewett 1997; Roady 1970).



*H6: White northern migration, interacting with proportional representation, is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* White northern migration has a direct effect on southern Republican strength as newcomers provided the fledgling Republican Party with a base of support and continue to supply the GOP with fresh electoral troops (Black and Black 1987, ch. 1; Brown 1988, ch. 3; Moreland 1990a). But, it is not until the *Baker v Carr* decision that political power is shifted from rural areas to growing urban and suburban enclaves where a large number of white Republican migrants relocated (Bass and DeVries 1976, ch. 1; Dixon 1971; Jewett 1997; Roady 1970).

*H7: Wealth is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* Increases in state wealth, which have begun to converge with levels from other regions, have also been connected with southern Republican gains (Black and Black 1987, ch. 3; Peltzman 1985). Further, Brown (1995, 28) finds that the southern party cleavage along wealth is similar to that found in the other regions: low-income residents favor the Democrats and wealthier citizens favor the GOP.

*H8: Republican presidential coattails are positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* Generally, political forces such as presidential and gubernatorial coattails have been shown to affect partisan balance at the state legislative level (Campbell 1986; Chubb 1988). In the South, since the 1960s, popular Republican presidential candidates have enjoyed electoral success and helped Republicans gain strength statewide by employing a "Southern Strategy" designed to appeal to traditional southern beliefs on race, religion, economic conservatism, smaller federal government, and states' rights (Aistrup 1996; Black and Black 1992; Dent 1978; Seagull 1975).

*H9: Republican preference at higher level offices is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength at some lagged period.* In addition to their direct coattails in a particular election, popular GOP officials elected to higher office have had a more subtle effect on the Republican legislative strength. Over time, southerners turned towards Republican candidates in a seemingly top down hierarchical fashion. Partisan change started with presidential voting, moved down the ticket to congressional and gubernatorial contests, and finally emerged in state legislative races (Aistrup 1996; Bullock 1988; Sundquist 1983, chs. 12, 16).

*H10: The midterm effect (after the Republicans establish sufficient sustained legislative presence) is related to southern Republican legislative strength. In the two-year election following a presidential election, the Republicans should gain legislative seats when Democrats*

control the White House, and lose seats when the Republicans are in the Oval Office. Research on state partisan balance has shown that while popular presidential candidates help their party during the presidential election, their party then tends to lose seats during the following midterm election (Campbell 1986; Chubb 1988). In the South, it is logical to assume that the midterm effect for Republican legislators won't be evident until the 1970s when GOP membership is sufficient to perceive the effect.

*H11: Watergate is negatively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* The Watergate scandal proved to be a major electoral setback to GOP gains throughout the South (Bullock 1988, 567; Jewett 1997; Lamis 1988, 31; Scher 1992, 126).

*H12: GOP organizational strength is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* Party organization also seems to have some effect on electoral outcomes at both the state (Barrilleaux 1986; Cotter et al. 1984, ch. 5) and national level generally (Harrison 1994), and in the South in particular (Aistrup 1996; Hadley and Bowman 1995; Steed 1990). The level of state party organization varies widely across the country, but Republicans began organizing their state parties earlier than Democrats, and though the Democrats have made great strides, the GOP still has an organizational advantage in most states, particularly the southern ones (Baker et al. 1990; Cotter et al. 1984, 26-36; Hadley and Bowman 1995). Researchers suggest a connection between state party organizational strength and legislative strength in the South (Aistrup 1996; Bibby and Holbrook 1996, 88-89; Hadley and Bowman 1995).

*H13: Time (generational effect) is positively related to southern Republican legislative strength.* Some researchers have suggested that generational change in the southern electorate ultimately weakens the Democratic Party (Beck 1977; Beck and Lopatto 1982). In brief, they believe that the generation that came of voting age before 1946 contains the most reliable Democratic voters. However, over time, these elderly "yellow dog" Democrats are dying off and being replaced by a cohort much more inclined to identify as an independent voter or a Republican. In essence, the expectation is that the GOP should make gains simply due to the "grim reaper and the stork" (Green and Schickler 1996).

*H14: State political culture affects southern Republican legislative strength.* Elazar (1984) found that state political culture was a powerful predictor of many political and policy differences between states. While the South's subculture is historically labeled traditionalistic, there is some variation between the states. For example, Virginia, Florida, and Texas also have elements of the individualistic subculture,

and North Carolina has some moralistic leanings (Elazar 1984). Further, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993, 72), using a different conception of political culture, conclude that "political attitudes of American citizens vary in important ways on the basis of where in the United States they live."

*H15: White northern migration, interacting with proportional representation, is positively related to southern Democratic elite liberalism.* Migration has an indirect effect on Republican legislative strength by pulling the state Democratic Party in the liberal direction (Black and Black 1987, ch. 1; Brown 1988, ch. 3; Moreland 1990a). Many migrants from the Northeast tended to be liberal Democrats and over time shaped the southern Democratic Party in their own ideological image (Jewett 1997, 101–02). Once again the effect of migration is contingent on the implementation of one person, one vote. Before this ruling, new, mostly urban, residents typically had little influence on state politics.

*H16: Wealth is positively related to southern Democratic elite liberalism.* Changes in state wealth have been tied to alterations in ideological voting in Congress and to regional partisan realignment (Peltzman 1985). Increases in wealth in the South represent economic development and differentiation (Jewett 1997, 176). As the southern states begin to gain in wealth after World War II, a larger variety of economic interests arise. Over time, elected southern Democrats begin to respond to the lower economic status groups who are more liberal and seek redistribution (Peltzman 1985).

*H17: The interaction of proportional representation and urbanization is negatively related to southern Democratic elite liberalism.* While many northern states have a suburban–Republican/central city–Democratic dichotomy on party support, the South is actually split along an urban–Republican/rural Democratic cleavage (Brown 1995). Thus, while in many regions of the country increasing urbanization is often associated with Democratic elite liberalism, in the South it seems likely that these Republican-leaning areas pull the Democratic Party modestly in the conservative direction as it attempts to become more ideologically attractive to these urban voters. Again, the effect of urbanization on ideology is contingent on proportionate redistricting that brings fair political representation to the urban areas.

*H18: Black political influence is positively related to southern Democratic elite liberalism.* As blacks achieve some political power within the Democratic Party beginning in the late 1960s, and then make increasing gains in the following decades, they pull the party in the liberal direction (Black and Black 1987; Carmines and Stimson



1989; Shaffer 1982). Black power is contingent on two changes in the structure of political opportunity: civil rights legislation and proportional redistricting.

*H19: Black population is positively related to southern Democratic elite liberalism.* A state's black population clearly should have a positive effect on Democratic elite liberalism from the 1960s onward (Black and Black 1987; Carmines and Stimson 1989). In the earlier decades the expected effect is less clear. On the one hand, before the 1960s, states with large black populations may have Democratic officials who are more conservative (at least on racial issues) than states with smaller black populations due to racial backlash and perceived threat (Key 1949). On the other hand, over time, decreases in black population may be associated with conservatism in the Democratic Party due to less minority group pressure as many residents vote with their feet. Indeed Key's colleague, Alexander Heard (1952, 233), wrote that "most southern Negroes would continue to vote Democratic as long as that party remained generally more liberal than its rival." Further, Heard noted that ideological Democratic factions did not just split over "worries about civil rights for Negroes; they disagreed on labor legislation, economic controls, taxation, Federal jurisdiction, and many other domestic issues" (246-47).

A third possibility is that black population has no effect on Democratic liberalism since the political elite may largely ignore African Americans before the 1960s. And of course it may be that the relationship is not linear, and changes with the number of blacks in the state. Finally, it may even be a combination of a linear effect in the absence of effective black access to electoral institutions, and nonlinear in the presence of access. For instance, when black population has effective access to electoral institutions, elites may react to black political pressure by any of the following: responding positively to small black populations because white resistance is likely to be low; repressing and ignoring the wishes of moderate sized groups since white resistance is likely to be high; and, giving in to the demands of large groups because they present a powerful electoral force that can overcome white backlash (Bullock 1981; Ford 1997). Given the uncertainty, Occam's Razor suggests starting with the hypothesis of a linear positive effect, since it is the simplest one with some evidence for it during and after the 1960s.

*H20: State political culture affects southern Democratic elite liberalism.* It is plausible that differences in state political culture (Elazar 1984; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) may affect state party ideology.<sup>2</sup>

While fairly complete, the model does exclude some variables. Public opinion is certainly important in state politics and state partisanship (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) and dynamic state level measures have been developed that cover several decades (Berry et al. 1998). Unfortunately the best dynamic measurements are based on Congressional Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores and partisan divisions of state legislatures. I use both of these variables separately in the current model. The influence of the religious right may also be tied to Republican growth in the South, but no satisfactory state-level measure for the time period under study has been developed. However, to some degree, my hypotheses related to liberalism and Republican organization takes into account the effects of the religious right.

Now that I have derived the hypotheses, it is time to explain the operationalization of the variables and the methodology used to estimate the model.

### Measurement and Methodology

The primary dependent variable is state-level partisanship (*Republican Legislative Strength*) measured as the percentage of Republican-controlled seats in the lower chamber.<sup>1</sup> The other endogenous variable in the model is *Democratic Elite Liberalism*, operationalized as the state Democratic congressional delegation's ADA average score.<sup>2</sup> The six independent variables that affect Democratic elite liberalism and Republican legislative strength are listed next, followed by the remaining independent variables.

*Wealth*—State per capita personal income (PCPI) in current dollars (Florida State Policy Sciences data and Book of the States).

*White Northern Migration \* Proportional Representation*—Percentage of non-native whites born outside the South in the state multiplied by a dummy variable scored 0 until the state redistricts according to one person, one vote, and scored 1 thereafter (Census and various sources).<sup>3</sup>

*Urbanization \* Proportional Representation*—Percentage of urban residents in the state population multiplied by a dummy variable scored 0 until the state redistricts according to one person, one vote, and scored 1 thereafter (Census and various sources).

*Black Population*—Percentage of African Americans in the state population (Census).

*Black Political Influence*—Percentage of African Americans in the state multiplied by a dummy variable scored 0 until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, and scored 1 thereafter, and multiplied

by a counter variable scored 0 before state redistricting plans are found constitutional, and then 1 in that time period, 2 in the next, 3 in the next, . . . to N in the last (Census). In two states that track party registration and race over time, North Carolina and Florida, this variable is highly correlated (Pearson's  $r$  over .8) with the increasing percentage of black Democratic registrants.

*Political Culture*—Dummy variables scored 1 for a particular state and 0 for the others.

*Republican Presidential Coattails*—The Republican percentage of the state's two-party presidential vote in an election year and 0 in the off year (see Chubb 1988) (*America Votes*).

*Republican Organizational Strength*—The percent of congressional races in a state for which the Republican Party fields a candidate in each election year (*America Votes*). Other measures exist for party organizational strength based on surveys of state party officials. They are probably more comprehensive and precise measures of the concept (Aistrup 1996; Cotter et al. 1984; Hadley and Bowman 1995), but do not exist for the time period under study. In defense of the measure, as early as 1952 Heard (103) argued that the Republican Party's biggest organizational opportunity was encouraging candidates to run for office, despite the myriad of difficulties in recruiting prospects for seemingly hopeless and expensive undertakings. Heard (1952, 103) noted that in Dixie "the greatest stimulus to party growth lies in the continuous stream of serious candidates."

*Two-stage Realignment*—The percentage of Republican vote for congressional and gubernatorial races in a state lagged 16 years (Paul David 1972, as updated by William Claggett).<sup>6</sup> Several other lag periods were tried (6, 10, and 20 years), but 16 years provided the best fit.

*Watergate*—A dummy variable scored 0 until 1972/1973, before the resignation and pardon of Richard Nixon over Watergate, and scored 1 in 1974/1975 and thereafter.<sup>7</sup>

*Generational Effects*—A counter for time scored 1 starting in 1946/1947, 2 in 1948, 3 in 1950, 4 in 1952 . . . to N in the last time period (1994/1995).

*Midterm Effect*—Before 1976 scored 0 as most southern states did not have sufficient Republican legislative presence to allow a noticeable midterm effect. From 1976 on it is a dummy variable scored 1 when Republicans control the White House during a midterm election, -1 when a Democrat is president during a midterm election and 0 in presidential election years (see Chubb 1988).

*Hispanic Population*—The percentage of non-Cuban Hispanics in a state (Census).



I sought answers to the research questions by estimating a pooled time-series regression. Pooled time-series designs are becoming increasingly popular in state politics research. Pooled time series allow comparisons to be made over time and between cross sections (Stimson 1985). They also increase the number of observations. This makes it possible to find connections in the data that otherwise might escape detection, and also makes it possible to test a more complete model, which might not be the case where limited degrees of freedom significantly reduce the number of variables that can be entered (Sayrs 1989).

In the pooled time series here, the cross sectional units of analyses are the eleven former confederate states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The longitudinal unit of interest is each two-year period from 1946/1947 to 1994/1995.<sup>8</sup> This results in 275 cases to analyze (eleven states by 25 time periods). The models are estimated using version 7.0 of LIMDEP, which is designed for panel estimation and recognizes the pooled nature of the observations (Greene 1995, ch. 6).

Variable measurements are recorded at odd-year levels for the four states with only off-year elections (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia), and at even-year levels for the other seven. For instance, in the 1980–1981 biennial period, cumulative white northern migration is recorded at 1980 levels for seven states, and at 1981 levels for the other four states with isolated elections.<sup>9</sup>

Further, the only data-smoothing required among the three states with elections every four years (to make them “fit” the biennial cycle) is for Republican legislative strength in Louisiana. Over the last 20 years, in the “midterm” period, Republican strength is recorded as the average of the previous and subsequent elections. Alabama and Mississippi have actual change in their off years brought about by special elections or party switches among elected legislators. Virginia is on a two-year election cycle.

Now that variable measurements and the methodology have been explained, it is time to turn to analysis of the model. I first examined the hypotheses concerning Republican legislative strength, followed by those relating to Democratic elite liberalism. After that, I generated path coefficients for the independent variables that affect both GOP strength and Democratic elite liberalism.

### Explaining Southern Republican Legislative Strength: Pooled Analysis

Table 1 presents the results for two pooled regressions models estimated with OLS that seek to explain the variance in southern Republican legislative strength. Model 1 includes 13 variables of interest; Model 2 includes the 11 variables that produce the best model according to adjusted R-square, expected direction, and statistical significance. Both models explain about 74% of the variance in Republican percentage of the state house and have statistically significant F values.

In Model 1, 11 of the variables are statistically significant when estimated with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (Beck and Katz 1995a) and operate in the expected direction.<sup>10</sup> Only two of the variables fail to achieve statistical significance, and both are opposite the hypothesized direction. Republican presidential coattails are theorized to be positive, but here they are negative. A separate model that excludes the four states with isolated elections actually provides worse results. Another specification that puts coattails into play only since the 1970s (to account for the lack of GOP legislative presence in earlier periods) is not statistically significant. Nor is a model that uses updated Paul David numbers to include Republican vote percentages for each biennial cycle (akin to presidential popularity as opposed to coattails). It may be that Republican presidential effect works best at a multiyear lag as part of two-stage realignment. Indeed, the two-stage realignment variable remains statistically significant when including presidential Republican voting lagged 16 years.

Generational effects are also presumed to be positive but turn out to be negative and not significant. Thus, rather than time helping Republicans as the old New Deal coalition breaks apart, the results here suggest that time, by itself, does not influence Republican legislative strength.

Rather than discussing each of the other 11 variables in Model 1 and then separately for Model 2, the rational course seems to move on to Model 2 since the signs, coefficients, and significance levels for those 11 variables are very similar in each model. Model 2 simply excludes the time and presidential coattail variables since they do not operate in the expected direction, are not statistically significant, and excluding them improves adjusted R-square (.7444 in Model 2 versus .7438 in Model 1).

Overall, Model 2 provides support for 11 hypotheses concerning variance in Republican legislative strength. Democratic elite liberalism

TABLE 1  
Explaining the Republican Percentage of Southern State Houses  
(eleven states from 1946 to 1995, biennially)

Independent Variable	Hypothesized Sign	Model 1		Model 2	
		b (PCSE)*	P value	b (PCSE)	P value
Democratic elite liberalism	+	.0748 (.031)	.015	.0835 (.031)	.007
Black population	-	-.1600 (.079)	.043	-.1458 (.080)	.068
Black political influence	-	-.0134 (.008)	.079	-.0157 (.007)	.035
Hispanic population (non-Cuban)	-	-.3025 (.101)	.003	-.2918 (.102)	.004
Midterm election effect	-	-1.500 (.678)	.027	-1.431 (.685)	.037
White northern migration * proportional representation	+	.1083 (.041)	.009	.1156 (.039)	.003
Wealth (per capita personal income)	+	.0012 (.000)	.000	.0011 (.000)	.000
Urbanization * proportional representation	+	.1472 (.030)	.000	.1329 (.026)	.000
Two-stage realignment	+	.3234 (.058)	.000	.3260 (.057)	.000
Republican organizational strength	+	.0531 (.021)	.013	.0485 (.020)	.016
Watergate	-	-7.797 (1.42)	.000	-8.552 (1.41)	.000
GOP presidential contests	+	-.0177 (.018)	.313		
Time	+	-.2159 (.173)	.211		
Constant		.2362 (3.05)	.938	-1.407 (3.02)	.642
		N = 275 Adj. R <sup>2</sup> = .74		N = 275 Adj. R <sup>2</sup> = .74	

\*Panel corrected standard error.



has a positive but relatively mild effect: a 10% rise in average Democratic ADA scores results in a .8% increase in Republican strength; the beta (.11) is about one-fourth the size of the strongest variable in the model (which is wealth).<sup>11</sup> Black population has a negative relatively weak effect: a 1% rise in black population depresses Republican strength by .14%; the standardized regression coefficient (-.08) is only one-fifth as large as wealth. Black political influence within the Democratic Party has a negative ( $b = -.0157$ ), relatively moderate effect with a beta (-.14) about one-third the size of PCPL. Hispanic population has a relatively mild negative effect: a 1% increase in Hispanic (non-Cuban) population is associated with a .29% decrease in southern GOP state house members; the standardized regression coefficient (-.11) is about one-fourth the size of wealth.

As we see in Table 1, Model 2 also shows that the midterm effect operates as hypothesized but has the smallest relative effect (beta = -.05): since the 1970s, whenever Republicans control the Oval Office, they lose about 1.4% of legislative strength at the midterm election; when Democrats have the presidency, Republicans gain about 1.4%. White northern migration after the imposition of proportional redistricting has a positive mild effect: a 1% increase in the percentage of northern migrants translates into a .12% gain in Republican legislative membership; the beta (.10) is less than one-fourth the strength of wealth.<sup>12</sup> State wealth is the most important predictor in the model: a \$1,000 increase in PCPI results in a 1.1% boost in Republican percentage of southern state houses with a standardized coefficient of .46. Urbanization, after compliance with one person, one vote redistricting, is also a very strong predictor with a beta of .29: a 1% increase in urbanization aids Republican strength by .13%.<sup>13</sup>

Model 2 also provides strong evidence of two-stage realignment with this variable achieving the second highest standardized coefficient (.34): a 1% increase in Republican voting for congressional and gubernatorial offices at a 16-year lag results in a .33% increase in GOP southern legislative membership. Republican organization provides a relatively mild positive effect: a 1% increase in fielding Republican candidates to run for congressional office boosts Republican legislative membership by .05; the beta (.11) is about one-fourth of wealth. Finally, the Watergate scandal has a relatively large (beta = -.30) negative intercept effect causing an 8.5% decline in southern Republican state house strength in the elections following Nixon's resignation.

Autocorrelation diagnostics suggest that serial correlation may be at work in this pooled data set. Even with autocorrelation, the coefficient estimators remain unbiased and consistent; however, in a

sample, their efficiency is questionable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991, 227). Stimson (1985) argues that in many instances autocorrelation is a nuisance but not a real problem. Beck and Katz (1995a, 1995b) say that GLS corrections often do more harm than good, and that simple OLS estimates often work much better in practical situations. They suggest mitigating serial correlation by including a lagged dependent variable that turns the equation into a "difference" model. This is inappropriate, however, where levels of variables are of theoretical interest. In any event, since the entire population of southern states is being studied, efficiency is not a real worry in the presence of unbiased, consistent estimators.

However, as a point of comparison, the models are estimated again with GLS, which has been a fairly standard way to alleviate autocorrelation in the past (Sayrs 1989). The results (not shown) indicate that 9 out of the 11 variables found to be significant in Model 2 still operate in the expected direction and achieve reasonable levels of statistical significance.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the majority of hypotheses still receive support when controlling for autocorrelation. Further, since the data comprises the whole population of southern states, and OLS estimators seem to work quite well in many real world applications, more credence is given to the OLS models.

The only variable not included in Models 1 and 2 is political culture. Diagnostics suggest that entering separate state dummies into the model is unnecessary. Put simply, a fixed effects or constant coefficients model assumes that the effects of the independent variables are the same for each cross section of the pooled data (Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985). In a fifty-state study this is often not the case, as there can be wide intercept variation between states. To remedy this problem, a dummy variable is often entered that adjusts the intercept of the model specifically for each state. In the southern states, except for Tennessee, all intercepts are within  $\pm 5$  percentage points of each other and generally not significant. This indicates that the assumption that the coefficients are the same for each pool is largely borne out by empirical findings. This may not be a large surprise given the relative homogeneity between the former members of the Confederacy, especially when compared to the diversity of all the states.

#### **Explaining Democratic Elite Liberalism: Pooled Analysis**

Table 2 presents the results for the pooled OLS regression model that explains variance in southern Democratic elite liberalism. This model explains about 63% of the variance in Democratic ADA scores

TABLE 2  
Explaining Democratic Elite Liberalism in the South  
(eleven states from 1946 to 1995, biennially)

Independent Variable	Hypothesized Sign	b (PCSE)*	P value
Black population	+	2.493 (.459)	.000
Black political influence	+	.0549 (.015)	.000
White-northern migration * proportional representation	+	.6712 (.145)	.000
Wealth (per capita personal income)	+	.0016 (.000)	.000
Urbanization * proportional representation	-	-.4067 (.045)	.000
Constant <sup>†</sup>		NA	NA
		N = 275 Adj. R <sup>2</sup> = .63	

\*Panel corrected standard error.

†No constant term reported as all eleven states are entered as dummy variables (see note 15).

and is statistically significant as a whole. The model includes five main variables of interest and dummy variables for each state representing political culture.<sup>15</sup> Political culture clearly seems to matter here. There are wide differences between the intercepts for each state that are not explained by the other plausible variables in the model. The intercepts range over 91 percentage points from a high of 7% (both Tennessee and Texas) to a low of -84% (Mississippi). Even tossing out the extremes leaves a 48 percentage point difference (between Arkansas and South Carolina).

The five other variables in Table 2 are all statistically significant. Four have a positive sign and one has a negative sign, and each variable operates in the expected direction. Black population is the strongest of the five, with a better than 1:1 ratio for the standardized coefficient  $\beta = 1.1$ . A 1% increase in black population boosts Democratic elite liberalism by 2.5%.<sup>16</sup> Black political influence also has a positive relationship ( $b = .055$ ), but less than one-half that of black



population as a whole ( $\beta = .38$ ). Thus, as blacks gain political influence within the Democratic Party after mobilization and proportional representation, the Democratic Party responds to its new constituency by becoming more liberal.

Table 2 also shows that white northern migration after one person, one vote has a moderate positive effect ( $\beta = .46$ ): each 1% increase in white northern migrant population translates into .67% higher liberalism in the Democratic Party. Running another model with white northern migration in effect through the whole time period provides similar results. State wealth has a moderate positive effect on Democratic elite liberalism as well, boosting it by 1.6% for every \$1,000 increase in wealth ( $\beta = .49$ ). Finally, urbanization, after proportional representation brings power to the cities and suburbs, has a strong negative effect (standardized coefficient of  $-.68$ ): a 1% increase in urbanization pulling the Democratic Party .41% back in the conservative direction. Estimating the model with GLS provides similar results.<sup>17</sup>

### Path Analysis

Table 3 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects for the five variables that affect both Democratic elite liberalism and Republican state house membership. Direct effects are taken from Table 1, Model 2. To generate indirect effects from Table 2, the coefficients for each of the five variables that affect Democratic elite liberalism are multiplied by the direct effect of Democratic elite liberalism on Republican legislative strength ( $b = .0835$ ). Direct and indirect effects are summed to get total effects.

Interpretation of two variables is relatively simple. White northern migration and wealth have positive direct and indirect effects (more of each aids Republicans directly and pushes the Democratic Party in the liberal direction that then also aids the GOP). Consequently, they each have larger overall positive effects on Republican legislative strength. So, for every \$1,000 increase in wealth, GOP membership climbs by 1.2% instead of 1.1%. And for every 1% increase in white northern migration after proportional representation, Republican fortunes are boosted by .172% instead of .116%.

Urbanization has a large positive direct effect (urban areas are favorable to Republicans) and a relatively small negative indirect effect (those urban areas pull the Democratic Party in the conservative direction). Therefore, urbanization still has a positive effect on Republican legislative membership, but slightly less at .099% compared to .133%. Black political influence works in a reverse

TABLE 3  
Path Analysis for Variables with both Direct and Indirect Effects  
on Republican Legislative Strength

Independent Variables	Effect of Unstandardized Coefficient		
	Direct	Indirect*	Total
Wealth (per capita personal income)	.0011	.0001	.0012
Black population	-.1458	.2082	.0624
Black political influence	-.0137	.0046	-.0111
Urbanization * proportional representation	.1329	-.0340	.0989
White northern migration * proportional representation	.1156	.0560	.1716

\*Indirect effect through Democratic elite liberalism.

fashion. It has a relatively strong negative direct effect (increasing black strength within the Democratic Party hurts Republicans) and a relatively weak positive indirect effect (increasing black strength within the Democratic Party pulls the party in the liberal direction, and that helps GOP legislative membership). The end result is that black political influence still has an overall negative effect on Republican state house membership, although again slightly lower: -.011% versus -.016%.

The effect of black population is the most interesting of the five since it has a moderate negative direct effect and a stronger positive indirect effect. As a result, although the direct effect of black population on Republican percentage of state houses in the South is negative (-.146%), the overall effect is positive (.062%). What then is the overall effect of race on GOP gains in southern state houses? Black political influence within the Democratic Party has a beta of negative .102. This is almost 3 times stronger than the standardized regression coefficient for the 'black population at positive .036. Consequently in the overall model, race hurts Republican legislative growth in the South more than it helps.

Having completed analysis of the model, let us now draw some conclusions concerning state partisan change, Republican legislative growth in the South, and the potential for future GOP increases.

### Conclusions

To summarize the overall success of the pooled model that explains variance in southern Republican legislative strength, 17 of the 20 specific hypotheses receive support. Of the seven theories of partisan change discussed above, only one finds little support: dealignment. At least some elements of each of the other six find support. These six are secular change, critical realignment, issue evolution, two-stage realignment, the structure of political opportunity, and political culture.

The empirical findings indicate that there are many sources of partisan change. Secular and political forces, issues, national preferences, political opportunity, and even, indirectly, political culture, all influence state-level partisan change. Some sources of state partisan change like urbanization, state political organization, and elite ideology may arise primarily within state boundaries. But many external forces like migration, federal election cycles, and national party stances and scandals also buffer state politics. Partisan change can also occur in two stages, and in the South does so in a top down fashion. GOP growth at the national level contributes to state legislative growth years later.

State partisan change does not just occur every 36 years, nor, in southern legislatures, did it occur only in 1964 or 1994. Partisan change is an ongoing process affected continuously by factors like changing racial demographics and increasing state wealth. However, state partisanship is subject to occasional major alterations like the Civil and Voting Rights Acts, Watergate, and the midterm effect (especially after President Clinton's first two years in office). Major structural changes may influence state partisanship by interacting with other variables over time. The critical changes in redistricting that took place in the 1960s brought several decades of power to urban areas, blacks, and northern white migrants.

Many of the sources of legislative partisan change in the South covered here have also been found to operate in other regions of the country, nationally, for higher offices, and at the individual level of analysis. While the South remains distinctive, southern political explanations don't have to be idiosyncratic: general theories will apply as long as the variable measurements and model are adjusted for specific historical factors. Having constructed and estimated such a model, we can now ask, what are some of the most important findings as applied to Republican legislative growth in the South?

First and foremost is the key role of Democratic elite liberalism modeled as an endogenous variable. The findings support the



hypothesized direct effect of Democratic elite liberalism on GOP legislative strength. As southern Democratic congressional delegations liberalize, Republicans pick up seats in the legislatures. However, Democratic elite liberalism is also crucial because it clarifies the overall effect of several other variables including race, urbanization, wealth, and migration.

As expected, race is critical to explaining state partisan change in the South. Yet the effect of race is complex. As hypothesized, race is an impetus for Republican growth in the South but also hinders Republican gains. African American population and increasing black political power within the Democratic Party work directly against GOP success. On the other hand, these racial variables indirectly help Republicans by pulling the Democratic Party in the liberal direction. Taking into account the effect of both variables, race has a negative relationship with GOP legislative strength. However, because the concept of black political influence within the Democratic Party is kept distinct from the concept of black population overall, and because their effect on Democratic elite liberalism is taken into account, the model reveals that the percentage of African Americans by itself actually has a positive effect.

One plausible explanation for this is that black population is a reflection of a state's racial climate. Consider the following scenario: The South's poor racial climate through the 1960s causes black population to decline as many African Americans "vote with their feet" and migrate North. And as the racial climate deteriorates in a state, the Democratic Party becomes more conservative in response. As racial climate improves in the 1970s and after, black population levels off and actually begins to moderately increase again in many states by the 1980s. The improved racial climate during this period of time can be logically linked to the liberalization of southern Democratic elites in Congress. Thus, across the 50-year span, this could help explain the positive relationship between black population and Democratic elite liberalism.

However, the evidence supporting many other explanations of Republican legislative growth suggests that scholars who emphasize only race to the exclusion of other causal factors are being overly simplistic. While race is clearly a dominant issue in southern politics, it is certainly not the sole driving force in southern legislative party change. Increased urbanization after proportional representation has a positive effect on Republican legislative strength that is lessened somewhat by its influence through Democratic elite liberalism. White northern migration after the implementation of one person, one vote,

and wealth, especially, both have positive effects on GOP growth that are enhanced through Democratic elite liberalism. And, of course, several variables operate in the South as they perform in other regions of the country: Watergate hurts Republican legislative membership, while increased party organizational strength helps, and the midterm effect helps or hurts depending on which party controls the presidency.

Finally, what are the prospects for continued GOP growth in southern legislatures? Results from elections in the late 1990s provide mixed evidence. Republicans lost control of the North Carolina House, maintained control of the South Carolina House, and gained control of the entire legislature in Florida and Virginia. While the GOP will likely continue winning seats, Democrats can take solace in the fact that they still have a strong underlying base of support. In states with larger African-American populations, Democrats may continue building winning coalitions with blacks and a relatively smaller number of whites. This may be reinforced if black population continues to increase in the South as it did in the 1990s. Further, with some ideological repositioning and strategic mobilization, Democrats may even be able to counteract GOP gains, as in North Carolina. On the other hand, though there may be an upper limit on Republican growth in every state, the days of dominant one-party rule in southern legislatures seem gone for good. Elephants have trampled through the cottonfield for some time (Greenhaw 1982) and now seem permanently stabled in the Dixie state house.

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## NOTES

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1. The hypotheses are drawn from various theories of partisan change, with some of the hypotheses constructed from more than one theory. Elements of critical realignment can be seen in hypotheses 8, 9, 10, and 11. Secular realignment can be seen in hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. Dealignment is connected with hypothesis 13. Elements of issue evolution can be seen in hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 16, 18, and 19. Political culture is represented in hypotheses 14 and 20. The structure of political opportunity is captured in hypotheses 1, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15, 17, and 18. And two-stage realignment is found in hypothesis 9.

2. As with hypothesis 14, the expected directional impact of political culture is largely a matter of state-by-state conjecture. For instance, based on observations by Key (1949, chs. 11, 12), Mississippi is probably more resistant to Democratic elite liberalism and Texas less so. For hypotheses 14 and 20, the more important question is whether or not state boundaries (measured as state dummy variables) actually affect partisan change and/or party ideology.

3. Readers interested in a state-by-state look at the dependent variable and/or Republican change at other levels should see Ballock and Rosen (1998) and Hadley and Bowman (1995).

4. While there is debate on whether ADA scores make a good measure for state liberalism in the electorate (Berry et al. 1998), here it is used less controversially to tap the liberalism of the Democratic elite.

5. Data measured every decade by original sources, like the Census Bureau, is transformed to biennial measures through straight-line interpolation.

6. Florida State University Professor William Claggett updated the state party strength data through 1995 that was originally compiled by Paul David (1972).

7. The effect of Watergate is coded as an intercept change per the guidelines of interrupted time-series analysis (Levinsohn 1986). While Watergate creates a one-time disturbance, and thus not a slope change, it does cause a permanent change to the intercept of the series after 1974 (Jewett 1997). Coding Watergate as a "pulse" (scoring it 0 before the occurrence, 1 for several time periods and then back to 0) causes a decrease in adjusted R-squared, reduces the estimated percentage GOP loss to lower than what historically occurred, and creates odd findings in both direction and significance for other variables in the model.

8. Note that there is not as much activity in the dependent variable between 1945 and 1960 (indeed, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina have no GOP members in this time period). However, the other states have at least some activity, and a few of them have quite a bit. Further, there is significant cross sectional variation in the dependent variable through this time period that is presumably being explained in the pooled model. In addition, differences in the values of the independent variables tend to match those of the dependent in each state over time and within a biennial period. That is, states that have the least activity in GOP legislative strength also tend to have the least activity on variables like wealth and Republican organization. And of course, the pooled model takes into account a number of independent variables that do not plausibly enter the model until after 1960. Finally, it is plausible that placing this earlier time period in the model should strengthen confidence in the results since statistical significance should be harder to come by when there is less variation in the dependent variable. As a practical matter, the results (as far as significance and direction of results) for the post-1960 period are unchanged when the model is run separately. And since the 30-year model explains changes over a longer period of time, it seems desirable to estimate and report it to show that the model is not time bound to the post-1960 period.

9. The only exception to this rule is the recording of the special election results from early 1967 in Florida as 1966 results (since federal courts invalidated the November 1966 elections with a special election in March 1967).

10. Panel models present several estimation problems, including a tendency to violate the regression assumptions of homoscedasticity, lack of autocorrelation, and



cross-sectional independence (lack of spatial autocorrelation). Panel corrected standard errors are reported here since they are consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and spatial autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 1995a, 1995b). White's (1980) test suggests a small to moderate amount of heteroscedasticity that perhaps is not unexpected given the moderate variation in the size of state house membership upon which the dependent variable is based. Beck and Katz (1995a, 645) suggest that unless the problem is extreme (and they say that they have never seen a pooled time-series data set where this is the case), one should stick with panel corrected standard errors. Further, they note that even when correction may be necessary, panel corrected standard errors generate more consistent and accurate estimates in panel situations than do White's heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995a, 646 at note 13).

11. While some methodologists do not believe that standardized betas contain useful information, others still do (i.e., Corbett 1999, 209-11; White 1999, 335-38). For ease of presentation, the standardized betas are not shown in the tables.

12. As theory suggests, entering white northern migration in the model for the whole period as a replacement for the interaction term, or in addition to the interaction term, does not result in a statistically significant coefficient.

13. As theory suggests, entering urbanization in the model for the whole period as a replacement for the interaction term, or in addition to the interaction term, does not result in a statistically significant coefficient.

14. The major difference in terms of both magnitude and significance of variables occurs with Democratic liberalism and black political influence. Democratic liberalism in the GLS model is about one-fourth its size compared to OLS Model 2; further, its statistical significance is over .35. The coefficient for black political influence is about one-half its former size and is significant at the .45 level. Perhaps not coincidentally, black population has a coefficient about twice as big as before, as does white northern migration. Urbanization and Republican organization fall to about one-half their former selves and two-stage realignment to about one-third. Watergate falls by not quite half, and PCPI decreases very marginally.

15. All states in the panel can be included as dummy variables in the model for comparison when the regression is run through the origin (Says 1989, 29-32). LIMDEP version 7.0, by default, eliminates the constant when all cross-sectional units of a panel are entered (Greene 1995, ch. 17). The regression coefficients for the state dummy variables are Alabama -39.19, Arkansas -10.50, Florida -15.74, Georgia -44.06, Louisiana -49.50, Mississippi -84.22, North Carolina -14.43, South Carolina -58.03, Tennessee 7.553, Texas 7.086, and Virginia -27.51.

16. The simple linear positive relationship between Democratic elite liberalism and black population worked as hypothesized. However, I tried three other operationalizations. Variations included no effect (black population scored 0 until the late 1960s), a nonlinear effect (black population squared), and a combination based on effective black access to electoral institutions (linear before and nonlinear after). None of these variations achieved statistical significance. One explanation may be that this model separates out black political influence within the Democratic Party from black population. Many other models simply use black population as the sole measure of influence.

17. The GLS model explains less variance (adjusted R-square = .54) but is still statistically significant as a whole. Of the five main variables of interest, all have the same sign and four out of five are still significant and have similar coefficients: black influence and white northern migration are slightly weaker; wealth is slightly stronger; and urbanization is unchanged. Only black population is substantially weaker with less than one-half the coefficient strength and a significance level just slightly out of acceptable range. Again though, the bottom line is that almost all hypotheses receive some support, although slightly less than with the OLS model.

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