

# Racial Resentment, Old-Fashioned Racism, and the Vote Choice of Southern and Nonsouthern Whites in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election\*

Jonathan Knuckey, *University of Central Florida*

Myunghee Kim, *University of Central Florida*

*Objective.* The effects of racial attitudes on the vote choice of whites in the 2012 U.S. presidential election are examined, with a specific focus on the simultaneous effects of both racial resentment and old-fashioned racial prejudice. *Methods.* Data are taken from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). Models of vote choice are estimated separately for southern and nonsouthern whites. *Results.* Findings show that racial resentment alone affected the vote choice of southern whites, but among nonsouthern whites both racial resentment and old-fashioned racism exerted independent effects on vote choice. Furthermore, it was among independents that the effects of racial attitudes were most visible. *Conclusions.* Overall, it is estimated that racial attitudes cost Obama support among white voters, and likely made his victories in a number of swing states a lot closer than they would have been absent the effects of racial attitudes. Consistent with prior literature, findings also demonstrate that the election of the first African-American president has primed old-fashioned racial prejudice.

Barack Obama defeated Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election with the lowest share of the white vote received by a winning presidential candidate. Compared to his performance in 2008, Obama's support dropped by 5 percentage points among white voters, from 44 to 39 percent. Although no Democratic presidential candidate has won the white vote since Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory in 1964, Obama received 1 percent of the vote less than that received by Michael Dukakis in 1988, who was defeated in an Electoral College vote landslide. Moreover, since 1972 only George McGovern (1972), Jimmy Carter (1980), and Walter Mondale (1984) polled worse among white voters than Obama in 2012, and each of these candidates was defeated in Electoral College *and* popular vote landslides. Indeed, according to exit poll data, although Obama was able to win, with the exception of North Carolina, for all of the "battleground" states in 2012, he lost the white vote in each one except for Iowa and New Hampshire, with his vote declining among whites in every battleground state save Iowa.<sup>1</sup>

The result of the 2012 election demonstrated the growing importance of nonwhite voters in shaping election outcomes, with Obama winning 93 percent of the African-American vote and 71 percent among Latinos, the fastest growing minority group. However, it

\*Direct correspondence to Jonathan Knuckey, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida, 4297 Andromeda Loop North, Orlando, FL 32816 (jonathan.knuckey@ucf.edu). The authors will share data and coding for replication purposes. The authors would like to thank Michael Mousseau, Drew Noble Lanier, Neal Allen, and the anonymous reviewers for providing helpful comments and suggestions. Myunghee Kim is deeply grateful to Charles F. Andrain, Michael D. McDonald, and Ian Budge for their ongoing support and guidance. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 9–11, 2014.

<sup>1</sup>All 2012 exit poll data are taken from CNN (<http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/president>).

also highlighted the possible role that racial attitudes played in affecting the vote choice of the white electorate. Thus, the 2012 presidential election affords the opportunity to further examine the salience and role of racial attitudes on vote choice using data from the American National Election Study. The article has four major concerns. First, in examining vote choice in 2012 it builds upon the findings of research that noted the role of racial attitudes in the 2008 presidential election (see, e.g., Knuckey, 2011; Piston, 2010; Tesler and Sears, 2010). Second, and more generally, the article adds to the literature addressing white “racial backlash” in elections that feature African-American candidates (see, e.g., Citrin, Green, and Sears, 1990; Highton, 2004; Kinder and Sears, 1981; McConahay and Hough, 1976; Reeves, 1997; Sigelman et al., 1995; Sonenshein, 1990; Terkildsen, 1993; Voss and Lublin, 2001). Third, while most of the literature on racial attitudes has examined the centrality of racial resentment and its effects on political behavior (Kinder and Sanders, 1996), this article explores the relative effects of *both* racial resentment and old-fashioned racism in shaping vote choice. Fourth, given the racial legacy of the South (Key, 1949) and the role that racial attitudes have played in shaping the political behavior of southern whites and their realignment toward the Republican Party (Knuckey, 2005; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Black and Black, 2002), the article explores whether there were differences in the effects of racial attitudes on the vote choice of southern and nonsouthern whites. In doing so, it contributes to the ongoing debate concerning “southern exceptionalism” (see, e.g., McKee, 2009; Shafer and Johnston, 2006).

### **White Racial Attitudes Toward a “Postracial” Candidate and President**

The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was interpreted by many as marking a watershed moment in racial politics in the United States. However, analyses of the 2008 election soon portrayed a far different assessment of the role that racial attitudes played in affecting vote choice. Given the racial legacy and the continuing importance of race in southern politics, opposition to an African-American candidate might be most evident in the 11 states of the Old Confederacy. Indeed, Aistrup, Kisangani, and Piri (2010) found that racial attitudes of southern whites—specifically racial resentment or symbolic racism—affected preelection levels of support for and evaluations of Barack Obama and John McCain. These findings were also confirmed in an analysis of vote choice in two southern states—Georgia and Arkansas—by Ford, Maxwell, and Shields (2010), who also found that racial resentment shaped evaluations of Obama and McCain. These regional and state-level findings were further confirmed at the national level, with racial resentment exerting a larger effect on presidential vote choice in 2008 than in any prior elections (see, e.g., Kam and Kinder, 2012; Knuckey, 2011; Tesler and Sears, 2010). Moreover, Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau (2010) estimate that this white racial “backlash” may have cost Obama up to 5 percentage points in his national vote share, and hence the popular vote landslide that might have been expected for a candidate of the opposition party with such overwhelmingly favorable short-term forces running in its direction.

Of course, it is not surprising that racial issues were an important determinant of vote choice in 2008. After all, racial attitudes have long been considered to be a major cross-cutting issue in American politics that disrupted the primacy of social-welfare issues and resulted in changes to the coalitional bases of support for both the Democratic and Republican parties (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). As with the aforementioned literature on the role of racial attitudes in the 2008 election, the specific assumption was that it was racial resentment that was affecting political behavior. Racial

resentment was conceptualized as a new form of racism that replaced “old-fashioned” or “biological” racism (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988; Sears and Kinder, 1971). Indeed, much of the literature on the effects of racial attitudes on the vote choice and party identification of whites has emphasized the role of racial resentment as the means by which Republican candidates have appealed to many working-class white voters (Edsall and Edsall, 1991; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt, 1989; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001). At the same time, racial resentment has also been especially prominent in explaining the party realignment of southern whites toward the Republican Party (Knuckey, 2005; Valentino and Sears, 2005).

However, the election of Barack Obama also produced a renewed focus on the role that “old-fashioned” racism might have played in affecting the political behavior and attitudes of whites, both during the 2008 campaign and in the first term of the Obama administration. For example, in examining the voting behavior of whites, Piston (2010) found that explicit or “overt racism,” measured by a racial stereotyping index, exerted a larger effect on vote choice in 2008 than in any prior election going back to 1992. Moreover, the effects of overt racism were confined to evaluations of Barak Obama, and were not evident in explaining variation in the feeling thermometer rating of Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, or the Democratic Party. Said differently, the candidacy of Barack Obama alone was the nexus linking old-fashioned racial prejudice to the vote choice of whites. The finding that overt racism affected vote choice in 2008 is all the more interesting given that, on the surface, there was no obvious attempt by the McCain campaign to appeal to overt racism. On the other hand, the rhetoric in the closing stages of the campaign, especially from McCain’s running mate Sarah Palin, was viewed by some as being inflammatory and having racial undertones. For example, Palin commented at one rally: “This is not a man who sees America as you see it [America] and how I see America . . . Our opponent though, is someone who sees America it seems as being so imperfect that he’s palling around with terrorists who would target their own country?” (quoted in Phillips 2008). The reference was to Obama’s association with William Ayers, a member of the 1960s anti-war group the Weather Underground. Later media coverage of a McCain rally, where cries of “terrorist” and “kill him” were audible from the crowd in reaction to McCain invoking Obama’s name, led veteran civil rights leader U.S. House Representative John Lewis to make the most direct accusation of the Republican campaign creating an environment where racial hostility festered. Lewis observed that it reminded him “of another destructive period in American history. Senator McCain and Governor Palin are sowing the seeds of hatred and division, and there is no need for this hostility in our political discourse” (quoted in Allen and Martin, 2008).

The idea of the mere presence of an African-American presidential candidate activating or priming white racial attitudes—whether through racial resentment or old-fashioned racism—was further confirmed during the first year of the Obama presidency. Most dramatically, the rise of the Tea Party movement, although portrayed as a grass-roots movement emphasizing fiscal conservatism, was also considered to be a protest vehicle motivated by white racial backlash against an African-American president (see, e.g., Abramowitz, 2011; Jacobson, 2011; Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin, 2011). The rhetoric evident at many “town hall” protests against health-care reform—Obama’s key first term legislative priority in domestic politics—was also perceived as being driven in part by racial attitudes (Robinson, 2010). Moreover, the treatment of President Obama by some Republican elected officials was also viewed through the prism of race. Examples include U.S. House Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina shouting “You lie!” at the president during an address on health-care reform to a joint session of Congress, or Arizona Governor Jan

Brewer waving a finger in the face of the president immediately after his arrival in the state, and later telling reporters that she “felt a bit threatened if you will, in the attitude that he had” (quoted in Slack, 2012). Furthermore, the efforts by some to delegitimize the president by the questioning of both his religious faith and citizenship—which started during the 2008 campaign and continued through Obama’s first term—have also been perceived as racially motivated. Indeed, Maxwell, Dowe, and Shields demonstrate that racial resentment was strongly correlated with the view that Obama was something other than a Christian and that “in the 2008 presidential election the label ‘Muslim’ functioned as a new ‘code-word’ for anti-African-American sentiment” (2013: 340).

The salience and political potency of racial attitudes during Obama’s first term in office were demonstrated by Tesler (2013), who found that *both* racial resentment and old-fashioned racism shaped evaluations of Obama as well as affected party identification and vote choice in the 2010 midterm elections. Moreover, the fact that old-fashioned racism also affected attitudes on health-care reform, Obama’s signature achievement in his first term (Tesler, 2012), provides further support for the argument advanced by Huddy and Feldman (2009) that old-fashioned racism had not disappeared from American politics and that the election of an African-American president, far from representing the transition to a postracial politics, actually reawakened old-fashioned racism in political discourse.

Kinder and Sanders noted that racial resentment “is not an automatic part of American political discourse or public opinion . . . How deeply resentment infiltrates our politics depends importantly on decisions made by elites” (1996: 258). This suggests that political elites need to prime racial attitudes to make them salient determinants of vote choice, something that can be accomplished through campaign advertising (Valentino, Hutchings, and White, 2002). Of course, the mere presence of an African-American candidate might be sufficient to activate racial resentment without the need to raise issues designed to appeal to white racial backlash. Indeed, as Tesler notes, “Obama’s rise to prominence, rather than anything he or his party did politically, is primarily responsible for the renewed effects of [old-fashioned racism] on partisan preferences” (2013: 121).

Therefore, it could be argued that racial attitudes would be primed by the mere presence of an African-American incumbent president running for reelection. However, there were also aspects of the 2012 campaign that might be viewed as efforts to prime both racial resentment and old-fashioned racism. For example, in early caucus and primary states two Republican presidential candidates invoked welfare issues, which have often been viewed as a means of appealing to white racial resentment. Former U.S. House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, who briefly led the GOP field in polls at the end of 2011, referred to Obama as the “most successful food stamp president in American history” in his speech announcing his candidacy for the Republican nomination (quoted in Rucker, 2011). It was a refrain that Gingrich would emphasize campaigning in the early primary and caucus states. Furthermore, at another campaign event Gingrich noted that “really poor children in really poor neighborhoods have no habits of working and nobody around them who works” (quoted in Blow, 2011). This rhetoric was especially prominent while campaigning in the Republican primary election in South Carolina, which Gingrich went on to win. Gingrich was not the only GOP candidate engage in such “dog-whistle” political campaigning. In Iowa, former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum said he did not want to “make black people’s lives better by giving them somebody else’s money” (quoted in Blow, 2012).<sup>2</sup> These “welfare” themes would later resurface in a campaign advertisement by Mitt Romney that

<sup>2</sup>Santorum later stated that he said “blah people,” rather than “black people.” Interestingly, the answer given by Santorum was to a question asked of him about foreign influence in the U.S. economy.

erroneously suggested that the Obama administration had ended the work requirement for welfare recipients, when in actuality waivers had been granted to states that demonstrated that they were moving more people to work from welfare (Delaney, 2012).

Such campaign rhetoric and campaign advertising have long been considered subtle ways to activate white racial resentment. Sears describes racial resentment as a mixture of “some anti-black feelings with the finest and proudest of traditional American values, particularly individualism” (1988: 54). The concept of racial resentment still emphasizes prejudice, but one that views African Americans as being at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder not as a result of inborn abilities (as is the case with old-fashioned racism) but rather as a result of not meeting the values embodied by the “Protestant work-ethic” (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Welfare issues have frequently been used as “wedge issues” by Republican candidates to appeal to white voters when running against *white* Democratic candidates (Edsall and Edsall, 1991), and specifically have been viewed as a major component of the GOP’s “southern strategy.” As Black and Black (1992:7) noted, “[p]rejudicial feelings and conflicts of interest between whites and blacks can still be exploited in elections, especially when the appeal can be packaged in symbols or issues that have no explicit connection with race” (see also Aistrup, 1996; Glaser, 1996). However, the nature of such appeals might likely be perceived differently when the Democratic candidate is African American. Indeed, Tesler (2013) postulates that the Obama candidacy and presidency not only strengthened the linkage between racial resentment and white political behavior but it also primed old-fashioned racism. Specifically, Tesler concludes that “[w]e may . . . see an increase in racist political rhetoric since such messages should be more relevant and resonant now that [old-fashioned racism] factors into partisan preferences” (2013:121).

Arguably, such rhetoric was not absent during the 2012 campaign. For example, the questioning of President Obama’s citizenship and religious faith—the questioning of his very legitimacy as president—appears to be something above and beyond the use of racial resentment. Indeed, one of the most vocal “birthers” was businessman Donald Trump, who briefly entertained a bid for the GOP presidential nomination. Despite not entering the race, Trump was hardly a marginal figure during the 2012 Republican primary campaign, with several GOP candidates seeking his endorsement, including Mitt Romney, who eventually received a public endorsement from Trump in Las Vegas two days before the Nevada caucus. Romney never did flatly repudiate Trump’s views concerning the latter’s skepticism of the authenticity of President Obama’s birth certificate. Indeed, while later campaigning in Michigan, Romney told a crowd of supporters: “No one’s ever asked to see my birth certificate; they know that this is the place that we were born and raised” (quoted in Sonmez, 2012). One particular high-profile surrogate for the Romney campaign, John Sununu, also employed racial rhetoric that was anything other than subtle. During a conference call with reporters about the economy, Sununu commented that: “I wish this President would learn to be an American” (quoted in Gabriel and Baker, 2012), a remark for which he later apologized. Sununu subsequently characterized Obama’s performance in the first presidential debate as “lazy and disengaged,” while also noting that Obama’s subsequent debate performances would likely not improve because “[w]hen you’re not that bright you can’t get better prepared” (quoted in Li, 2012). Again, this might be viewed as rhetoric that was closer to priming old-fashioned racism than racial resentment. Moreover, it came from an “establishment” Republican figure who had served as governor of New Hampshire and later as White House Chief of Staff in the administration of President George H. W. Bush.

Overall, it seems plausible that the racial attitudes of whites should exert an effect on voting behavior in the 2012 presidential election. However, this article specifically focuses



on the relative contributions that both racial resentment and old-fashioned racism played in shaping vote choice, as well as the extent to which the role and salience of racial attitudes differed among southern and nonsouthern white voters.

## Data and Methods

Data are taken from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES).<sup>3</sup> The analysis is restricted to non-Latino white voters only. The dependent variable is vote choice (1 = Obama, 0 = Romney),<sup>4</sup> with logistic regression being used to estimate parameters.

The meaning and measurement of racial resentment have generated considerable discussion. Specifically, questions have been raised over its validity in terms of whether it is actually a manifestation of racism or instead simply the product of a more general conservative orientation and values (see, e.g., Schuman et al., 1997; Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986). However, Tarman and Sears (2005) address many of these concerns, noting that racial resentment is conceptually and empirically distinct from general nonracial conservatism, and, moreover, exerts an independent effect on political attitudes and behavior, even after controlling for other potentially confounding variables (see also Rabinowitz et al., 2009; Sears et al., 1997; Sears and Henry, 2005).

Following Kinder and Sanders (1996) racial resentment is measured through the four items that have been asked by ANES since 1986: (1) “Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors”; (2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class”; (3) “It’s really just a matter of some people trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites”; (4) “Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” Each item asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement and how strongly they did so.<sup>5</sup>

To measure old-fashioned racism, the approach of Piston (2010) is followed, creating an index that measures negative racial stereotypes. Respondents were asked to rank different racial groups on seven-point scales in terms of whether they were “hardworking” versus “lazy” and “intelligent” versus “unintelligent.” A relative stereotyping score for each measure was calculated by subtracting the score respondents gave to whites on each item from the score given for blacks.<sup>6</sup> Such blatant negative stereotyping seems central to old-fashioned or “biological” racism and conceptually distinct from racial resentment.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Data were collected by the University of Michigan and Stanford University. Responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here are those of the authors alone.

<sup>4</sup>Respondents who voted for other candidates are excluded from the analysis.

<sup>5</sup>All the racial resentment items are coded so that high scores denote the highest level of racial resentment.

<sup>6</sup>It is important to ascertain just how much variation exists in a variable measuring old-fashioned racism. While the mode for each variable was zero, that is, respondents ranked blacks no differently from whites on each seven-point scale, a majority of respondents (54 percent) nonetheless ranked blacks lower than whites on the hardworking stereotype variable by at least one point and a sizeable minority (44 percent) ranked blacks lower than whites on the intelligence stereotype variable. Extreme prejudice, defined as ranking blacks two or more points lower than whites, was less common on both the hardworking and intelligence stereotype variables (17 percent and 12 percent, respectively).

<sup>7</sup>To determine that there are two racial attitude dimensions, the four racial resentment items and the two old-fashioned racial stereotype variables were subject to a principal components factor analysis with oblique rotation to derive a terminal solution. Two distinct dimensions were evident, with the four racial resentment items loading on one factor (eigenvalue = 3.089; cumulative variation = 51.5 percent) and the two

The four racial resentment items were combined into a single additive index (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.820$ ), and the two old-fashioned items combined into a single index (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.780$ ). Each index was standardized to a metric of 0 (lowest racial resentment/racism) to 1 (highest racial resentment/racism). The correlation between the two indices is quite modest ( $r = 0.399$ ) and indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue when using both racial attitude dimensions in the same model to predict presidential vote choice.

Several control variables are included that might be antecedent to racial attitudes or that might mediate their effects on vote choice. These include party identification (strong Republican coded high), ideological identification (extremely conservative coded high), gender, union member household, age group, education, income, religiosity,<sup>8</sup> and retrospective evaluations of the economy (positive evaluations coded high).<sup>9</sup> All the control variables were also coded to a metric of 0–1.

Separate models are estimated for nonsouthern and southern whites. This disaggregation method is the proper way to capture both the interaction between racial attitudes and region as well as all the interaction effects of other explanatory variables that might differ for southern and nonsouthern whites.<sup>10</sup> For the logistic regressions for southern whites, an additional dummy variable is included to control for differences between southern whites from the Deep South and Rim South (see, e.g., Glaser, 1994; McKee, 2009).<sup>11</sup>

## Findings and Analysis

The results of the logistic regression predicting presidential vote choice for southern whites and nonsouthern whites are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. In each table three models are displayed: Model I presents the results with racial resentment, Model II with old-fashioned racism, and Model III estimates the simultaneous effects of both racial attitude variables together.

old-fashioned racism items loading on a second factor (eigenvalue = 1.204; cumulative variation = 20.1 percent). The highest factor loading of any item on the other factor was for the racial resentment item about blacks trying harder, which had a factor loading of 0.462 on the old-fashioned racism dimension.

<sup>8</sup>The religiosity variable is an index consisting of the following items: frequency of church attendance, the importance of religion in providing guidance in day-to-day life, and frequency of prayer (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.867$ ).

<sup>9</sup>Some have argued that it is important to control for political sophistication when estimating the effect of racial resentment on political behavior (e.g., Gomez and Wilson, 2006). Thus, a political knowledge index was created from the standard political office identifications asked by ANES, that is, identification of the Vice President of the United States, Speaker of the U.S. House, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and British Prime Minister). Inclusion of the political knowledge index had no effect on the magnitude or statistical significance of the racial resentment and old-fashioned racial prejudice variables for either southern or nonsouthern whites. Moreover, political knowledge had no statistically significant effect on vote choice for either southern or nonsouthern whites. As political knowledge served here as a control variable, rather than a theoretically relevant determinant of vote choice, we report the models of vote choice without the political knowledge index variable.

<sup>10</sup>This is the approach suggested by Nagler (1991) for examining interaction effects. It avoids the need for interaction terms in the models, which are often highly correlated with each other and their component terms.

<sup>11</sup>The Deep South states are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. It should be noted that the sample size for the Deep South states was quite small ( $N = 266$ ). Thus, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting any subregional differences among southern whites. The Deep South dummy variable was included in a bivariate analysis. Deep South whites were significantly less likely to vote for Obama (13 percent support) than whites in the Rim South (36 percent support). However, there were no statistically significant differences between the mean racial resentment scores for Deep South and Rim South whites (0.770 and 0.707, respectively) nor for old-fashioned racism scores (0.621 and 0.592, respectively).

TABLE 1

Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting 2012 Presidential Vote Choice of Southern Whites

Independent Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III
Racial resentment	−2.931*** (0.799)	—	−2.831*** (0.845)
Old-fashioned racism	—	−2.741* (1.665)	−0.638 (1.741)
Party identification	−6.915*** (0.696)	−6.765*** (0.665)	−6.911*** (0.696)
Ideological identification	−2.748*** (0.488)	−2.878*** (0.890)	−2.730*** (0.897)
Economic evaluations	3.691*** (0.697)	4.009*** (0.688)	3.683*** (0.699)
Gender (women)	−0.036 (0.322)	−0.030 (0.320)	−0.029 (0.323)
Income	−0.290 (0.657)	−0.363 (0.636)	−0.299 (0.657)
Education	1.076* (0.607)	1.269** (0.600)	1.091* (0.609)
Age group	−0.860 (0.600)	−1.024* (0.590)	−0.857 (0.600)
Union household	0.146 (0.525)	0.369 (0.502)	0.175 (0.531)
Religiosity	−0.421 (0.503)	−0.205 (0.496)	−0.428 (0.503)
Deep South	−0.393 (0.467)	−0.660 (0.456)	−0.392 (0.466)
Constant	5.303*** (1.005)	4.670*** (1.227)	5.587*** (1.274)
	N = 586	N = 588	N = 588
	Cox & Snell	Cox & Snell	Cox & Snell
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.575	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.567	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.575
	Percentage of correctly classified = 92.1	Percentage of correctly classified = 92.7	Percentage of correctly classified = 92.1

NOTE: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. All independent variables were coded from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is presidential vote choice (1 = Obama, 0 = Romney). \*\*\**p* < 0.01; \*\**p* < 0.05; \**p* < 0.10.  
SOURCE: American National Election Study, 2012.

When the effects of both racial attitude variables are examined separately (Models I and II), both exerted a statistically significant effect on vote choice for southern whites and nonsouthern whites. However, when the effects of both racial variables are examined simultaneously (Model III), there are differences in the effects on the vote choice of southern and nonsouthern whites. Among southern whites, the effects of the old-fashioned racism variable wash out completely, and no longer exert a statistically significant effect on vote choice (*b* = −0.638; *p* > 0.10). However, the racial resentment variable continues to affect vote choice (*b* = −2.831; *p* < 0.01). Thus, after controlling for other explanatory variables, all of the effects of racial attitudes on the vote choice of southern whites are captured by racial resentment. Of most interest, however, are the effects of both racial attitude variables on the vote choice of nonsouthern whites. While racial resentment exerts a similar effect on the vote choice of nonsouthern whites as it did for southern



TABLE 2  
Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting 2012 Presidential Vote Choice of Nonsouthern Whites

Independent Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III
Racial resentment	−2.897*** (0.462)	—	−2.431*** (0.497)
Old-fashioned racism	—	−4.868*** (1.050)	−2.708** (1.130)
Party identification	−5.329*** (0.365)	−5.529*** (0.370)	−5.415*** (0.373)
Ideological identification	−3.353*** (0.601)	−3.757*** (0.591)	−3.394* (0.604)
Economic evaluations	4.003*** (0.389)	4.253*** (0.386)	3.980*** (0.391)
Gender (women)	0.452** (0.188)	0.361* (0.187)	0.409** (0.189)
Income	−1.257*** (0.353)	−1.326*** (0.349)	−1.284*** (0.356)
Education	−0.301 (0.375)	0.028 (0.364)	−0.330 (0.378)
Age group	−0.860 (0.600)	−0.069 (0.356)	−0.070 (0.361)
Union household	0.364 (0.213)	0.253 (0.211)	0.337 (0.214)
Religiosity	−1.604*** (0.284)	−1.518*** (0.281)	−1.623*** (0.285)
Constant	5.663*** (0.604)	6.600*** (0.808)	7.000*** (0.832)
	N = 1,748	N = 1,742	N = 1,737
	Cox & Snell	Cox & Snell	Cox & Snell
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.614	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.610	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.615
	Percentage of correctly classified = 91.4	Percentage of correctly classified = 91.3	Percentage of correctly classified = 91.4


NOTE: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. All independent variables were coded from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is presidential vote choice (1 = Obama, 0 = Romney).  
\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.10$ .  
SOURCE: American National Election Study, 2012.

whites ( $b = -2.431$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ), old-fashioned racism also had a statistically significant effect, indeed one that was slightly *greater* than that found for racial resentment ( $b = -2.708$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). This finding is all the more interesting because when examining the simultaneous effects of racial resentment and old-fashioned racism on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election, old-fashioned racism was *not* a statistically significant predictor of vote choice for either southern or nonsouthern whites.<sup>12</sup> Thus, consistent with some of the aforementioned literature, the Obama presidency, rather than heralding a postracial politics, actually activated old-fashioned racism attitudes as a determinant of vote choice, above and beyond the effects of racial resentment. Given the racial legacy of the South, however, it is of interest that this occurred among nonsouthern whites rather than among southern whites.

<sup>12</sup>The full logistic regressions for 2008 vote choice are available on request from the authors.

FIGURE 1

Predicted Probability of Obama Vote by Racial Resentment and Old-Fashioned Racism, Southern and Nonsouthern Whites.



NOTE: Predicted probabilities were calculated based on the coefficients from Model III in Tables 1 and 2. The racial resentment and old-fashioned racism variables were manipulated across their range with all other independent variables taking their sample values. The mean racial resentment score for southern whites = 0.721 and for nonsouthern whites = 0.646. The mean old-fashioned racism score for southern whites = 0.599 and for nonsouthern whites = 0.572.

To further and more substantively demonstrate the effects on racial attitudes on the vote choice of southern and nonsouthern whites in 2012, the predicted probability of voting for Obama by level of racial resentment and old-fashioned racism is shown in Figure 1. Probabilities were calculated by manipulating the racial attitude variables across their ranges while all other variables took their sample values.

At first blush, Figure 1 suggests a substantial effect of racial resentment on vote choice. Across its entire range, the probability of voting for Obama drops by 24 percentage points for southern whites and 20 percentage points among nonsouthern whites. However, it is important to note that the values on the racial resentment variable do not resemble a normal distribution, but rather are skewed in a more racially resentful rather than racially sympathetic direction. For example, among southern whites, the mean racial resentment score is 0.721. At this level of racial resentment, the predicted probability of voting for Obama is only 0.371. Indeed, irrespective of the racial resentment score among southern whites, the probability of an Obama vote never exceeds 0.500. Moreover, the probability of an Obama vote only ever exceeds 0.400 with a racial resentment score of 0.300, and only 7 percent of southern whites had scores on the variable that were at or below this racially sympathetic point on the scale. On the other hand, 45 percent of southern whites had a racial resentment score *above* the mean score, which reduced the probability of voting for Obama by up to a further 5 percentage points.

Among nonsouthern whites, the mean racial resentment score of 0.646 is lower than that for southern whites. At that level the predicted probability of an Obama vote is 0.470, where the likelihood of an Obama vote almost matched that of a Romney vote. However, unlike for southern whites the predicted probability of voting for Obama does exceed 0.500, but at the fairly racially sympathetic score of 0.450. Once again, the distribution of the racial resentment variable suggests that racial attitudes resulted in a higher cost than gain in support for Obama, with only 22 percent of nonsouthern whites having a racial resentment score of 0.450 or below. On the other hand, almost twice this number of nonsouthern whites (41 percent) had racial resentment scores above the mean, with the probability of an Obama vote declining by up to 7 percentage points among these racially resentful white voters.

The bottom panel in Figure 1 shows the quite different substantive effects of old-fashioned racism for southern and nonsouthern whites, given that the variable failed to achieve statistical significance for the former. Among nonsouthern whites at the old-fashioned racism mean score of 0.572, the predicted probability of voting for Obama is 0.467. For nonsouthern whites with old-fashioned racism scores above the mean, the probability of voting for Obama is reduced by up to 8 percentage points. However, it should be noted that all but 5 percent of southern whites had an old-fashioned racism score bounded at 0.750. At that point the probability of an Obama vote is 0.431, just 3 percentage points below the predicted probability of an Obama vote for those with a mean old-fashioned racism score. The probability of voting for Obama does exceed 0.500 at a score of 0.400 on the old-fashioned racism scale. However, less than 2 percent of nonsouthern whites had such a score, which essentially represents a position of positive African-American affect, where respondents had more favorable evaluations of African Americans than of whites.


Given the importance of party identification in explaining vote choice, it is also important to examine the conditioning effects of partisanship on racial attitudes. Figure 2 shows the effects of racial resentment on vote choice for Democrats, independents, and Republicans among southern and nonsouthern whites.

As Figure 2 shows, while the probability of a vote for Obama among southern and nonsouthern whites declines as the level of racial resentment increases for each partisan group, the substantive effect was most evident among independents. Indeed, among both southern and nonsouthern whites, the *most racially resentful* Democrat was still more likely to vote for Obama, and the *most racially sympathetic* Republican was still more likely to vote for Romney. Among nonsouthern Democrats, the probability of an Obama vote never drops below 0.600, and it only drops below this level for southern Democrats with an extremely high racial resentment score of 0.95. For southern Republicans, even the most racially sympathetic only had a probability of 0.281 of voting for Obama. The predicted probability is higher (0.426) for the most racially sympathetic nonsouthern Republicans but the number of Republicans with such low racial resentment score was negligible.

As might be expected, the marginal effects of racial resentment on vote choice were most evident among independents. Among southern independents with an average racial resentment score (0.681) there was a 0.450 probability of voting for Obama. However, 41 percent of southern independents had a racial resentment score that was greater than average, with the probability of voting for Obama declining by up to 10 percentage points among these racially resentful independents. Those southern independents with a racial resentment score of 0.550 and below were more likely to vote for Obama than for Romney, with 35 percent of southern independents exhibiting these less racially resentful scores. As racially resentful independents in the South were more numerous than racially sympathetic

FIGURE 2

Predicted Probability of Obama Vote by Racial Resentment and Party Identification, Southern and Nonsouthern Whites.



NOTE: Predicted probabilities were calculated based on Model III in Tables 1 and 2. The racial resentment variable was manipulated across its range and party identification was set as the mean value for each partisan group by region as follows: southern Democrats = 0.181; nonsouthern Democrats = 0.152; southern and nonsouthern independents = 0.500; southern Republicans = 0.849; nonsouthern Republicans = 0.844. All other independent variables took their sample values. The mean racial resentment score for southern Democrats = 0.608, southern independents = 0.681, and southern Republicans = 0.786. The mean racial resentment score for nonsouthern Democrats = 0.541, nonsouthern independents = 0.669, and nonsouthern Republicans = 0.736.


independents, the effects of racial resentment on vote choice meant a loss of support for Obama, or a gain in support for Romney.

The effect of racial resentment on the vote choice of nonsouthern independents resembled that of their counterparts in the South. A nonsouthern independent with an average racial resentment score had a predicted probability of 0.465 of voting for Obama. Among the 37 percent of nonsouthern independents with higher than average racial resentment scores, the predicted probability of a vote for Obama declined by up to 11 percentage points. The probability of voting for Obama exceeds 0.500 among nonsouthern independents with racial resentment scores of 0.500 and below, with 41 percent having these more racially sympathetic scores.

Figure 3 shows the same conditioning effects of party identification on vote choice for old-fashioned racism. For each partisan group of southern whites, the effects of old-fashioned racism are quite limited. Regardless of the level of old-fashioned racism, southern Democrats were more likely to vote for Obama and southern independents and Republicans for Romney. The effect of old-fashioned racism among each partisan group of nonsoutherners appears to be more substantial. However, once again the distribution of the values on the old-fashioned racism variable needs to be taken into consideration, especially given the very

FIGURE 3

Predicted Probability of Obama Vote by Old-Fashioned Racism and Party Identification, Southern and Nonsouthern Whites.



NOTE: Predicted probabilities were calculated based on Model III in Tables 1 and 2. The racial resentment variable was manipulated across its range and party identification was set as the mean value for each partisan group by region as follows: southern Democrats = 0.181; nonsouthern Democrats = 0.152; southern and nonsouthern independents = 0.500; southern Republicans = 0.849; nonsouthern Republicans = 0.844. All other independent variables took their sample values. The mean old-fashioned racism score for southern Democrats = 0.579, southern independents = 0.606, and southern Republicans = 0.607. The mean old-fashioned racism score for nonsouthern Democrats = 0.557, nonsouthern independents = 0.565, and nonsouthern Republicans = 0.589.

small number of cases in each group with a score of under 0.500.<sup>13</sup> While respondents with higher old-fashioned racism scores were less likely to vote for Obama, the overall effect of moving from the absence of old-fashioned racism (0.500) to where old-fashioned racism was exhibited was quite small. Specifically, there was a decline of up to 5 percentage points in the probability of voting for Obama among Democrats, up to 4 percentage points for independents, and 2 percentage points among Republicans.

Overall, the discussion of the substantive effect of white racial attitudes on vote choice suggests that there was a limited overall effect on the aggregate vote in the 2012 presidential election. In order to determine the extent of the vote cost to Obama of white racial attitudes, a simulated Obama vote share is estimated from the logistic regression models for both nonsouthern and southern whites. This was calculated by setting the racial resentment and old-fashioned racism scores of all respondents to a value that denotes the absence

<sup>13</sup>Among nonsouthern whites only 4 percent of Democrats, 3 percent of independents, and 2 percent of Republicans had an old-fashioned racism score under 0.500.

of racial resentment (0.579) or old-fashioned racism (0.500).<sup>14</sup> Respondents with values lower than these on both variables retained their sample value. Predicted probabilities were then recalculated with all other variables again taking their sample values. In estimating the aggregate vote share a respondent with a predicted probability of 0.500 and over was classified as an Obama vote and those with a predicted probability of under 0.500 as a Romney vote.<sup>15</sup> Racial attitudes cost Obama an estimated 2.7 percent of the vote among southern whites, with Obama winning a projected 32.9 percent of the vote absent racial resentment and old-fashioned racial prejudice (compared to an actual vote of 30.2 percent). Among nonsouthern whites, the cost to Obama was an estimated 4.5 percent of the vote and potentially a majority of the white vote, with a projected 51 percent of the vote absent racial resentment and old-fashioned racial prejudice (compared to an actual vote of 46.5 percent). Of course, even with the effects of racial attitudes, Obama nonetheless won a popular vote and Electoral College vote majority. At the same time, it appears that North Carolina was the only state where racial attitudes likely cost Obama victory in a state. However, the effect of racial attitudes maybe contributed toward closer contests in the other two swing states in the South, Virginia and Florida. Outside the South, Obama may have had more comfortable victories in the swing states of Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. This certainly underscores just how critical a role that the mobilization of nonwhite voters played in counteracting the loss of support among white voters in these key battleground states. Finally, absent the effects of racial attitudes, Obama would have been in striking distance of Romney in Arizona (actual Obama vote of 44 percent), Georgia (45 percent), Indiana (44 percent), and Missouri (44 percent). That is not to imply Obama could have necessarily carried those states, but the Obama campaign might have devoted more campaign resources to them had the polls reflected closer races. At minimum, it may have forced Romney to expend campaign time and resources in those states too.

## Conclusion

The objective of this article was to understand the role that racial attitudes played in shaping vote choice in the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Specifically, it examined the relative effects of racial resentment and old-fashioned racism as well as the role that these racial attitudes played among southern and nonsouthern whites. While the role of racial resentment on white political behavior has been well documented, the attention to old-fashioned racism builds on recent scholarship that suggested a renewed salience of these attitudes during the Obama presidency. Findings suggest that among southern whites, racial resentment carried all of the explanatory power, with old-fashioned racism not exerting an independent effect on vote choice when both racial attitude variables were examined simultaneously. However, both racial resentment *and* old-fashioned racism shaped the vote choice of nonsouthern whites. The finding that racial resentment affected vote choice was not a surprise, given that it is a determinant of vote choice even in elections that do not feature a minority candidate. That old-fashioned racism affected vote choice, at least among nonsouthern whites, is consistent with the findings of prior research that has hypothesized that the Obama presidency has reactivated old-fashioned prejudice among some white voters.

<sup>14</sup>The absence of racial resentment score was equivalent to responding “neither agree nor disagree” to the four racial resentment items.

<sup>15</sup>These vote shares are Obama’s percentage of the two-party vote only.



The findings of the article also suggest that racial attitudes reinforce existing partisan preferences in the electorate. Irrespective of levels of racial resentment or old-fashioned racism, Democrats were more likely to vote for Obama and Republicans more likely to vote for Romney. It was among independents, however, that the effects of racial attitudes were most visible. Of course, this is a classic “swing” group in the electorate among whom elections are frequently decided. Moreover, the influence of independents in elections is likely greater in “battleground” states, where they tend to be more numerous. Thus, while we conclude that Obama lost support at the margins in 2012, this is exactly where recent presidential contests have frequently been decided. Moreover, absent the mobilization of minority voters to the Obama coalition, the vote cost to Obama among white voters in the swing states may have been far more consequential in tipping some of them to Romney.<sup>16</sup>

Beyond the 2012 presidential election, the findings of the article are of more general interest for research on racial attitudes and political behavior. First, it suggests the importance of examining *both* racial resentment and old-fashioned racism as explanatory variables in understanding political behavior and attitudes, when much attention has hitherto focused on the former. In this respect the findings support some recent scholarship on the role of old-fashioned racism in explaining political behavior and attitudes (Tesler, 2012, 2013; Piston, 2010). Of course, it would be remiss not to point out the irony of the election of first African-American president reawakening old-fashioned racism, which evidently had never fully disappeared from discourse, but perhaps was just dormant. Second, the findings suggest the importance of continuing to make regional distinctions between the political attitudes and vote choice of whites, especially southern whites. The finding that old-fashioned racism failed to achieve statistical significance when controlling for racial resentment among southern whites but did so for nonsouthern whites is certainly of interest, and perhaps one of the more unexpected findings given the racial legacy of the South. However, the anomalous finding here might be for nonsouthern whites. As noted, in the 2008 election old-fashioned racism did not exert a statistically significant effect on vote choice when racial resentment was included in the model for both southern and nonsouthern whites. Thus, the pertinent question is why was old-fashioned racism primed for *only* nonsouthern whites four years later, even when controlling for racial resentment? Interestingly, the coefficient for old-fashioned racism for nonsouthern whites was only a statistically significant predictor of vote choice when party identification was included as an explanatory variable. A full exploration and understanding of the dynamics underlying the relationship between vote choice, partisanship, and old-fashioned racism among nonsouthern whites is beyond the scope of this article, although clearly it is an avenue for future research.

Finally, the findings of the article contribute toward the debate about “southern exceptionalism.” Southern white voters certainly remain rendered distinguishable by their political behavior. Irrespective of racial attitudes held, southern whites were much less likely to support Obama than nonsouthern whites. However, this difference cannot be accounted for exclusively by racial attitudes, but perhaps by the distribution of southern whites on other relevant explanatory variables, particularly party identification and ideology. Southern whites, after all, are more likely to identify as Republicans and conservatives than are nonsouthern whites.

In closing, further research might address the role that both racial resentment and old-fashioned racism play in affecting vote choice in future elections. Although Barack Obama

<sup>16</sup>Obama’s vote among whites dropped by 5 or 6 percentage points in Colorado, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. These five states, collectively, accounted for 99 Electoral College votes.

will not be on the ballot, it is of interest to determine whether the effect of old-fashioned racism continues to exert an influence on vote choice. Said differently, are the effects of old-fashioned racism driven entirely by evaluations of an African-American candidate, or might they become more closely tied to general partisan appeals? Based on the findings of this article, there is reason to be less than sanguine about a postracial political environment at the mid-point of Obama's second term than on the night of his initial victory in 2008.

## REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2011. "Partisan Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA.
- Aistrup, Joseph A. 1996. *The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Aistrup, Joseph A., Emizet F. Kisangani, and Roxanne L. Piri. 2010. "The Legacy of Race in 2008." Pp. 233–50 in Branwell DuBose Kapeluck, Robert P. Steed, and Laurence W. Moreland, eds., *Presidential Election in the South: Putting 2008 in Political Context*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Allen, Mike, and Jonathan Martin. 2008. "Civil Rights Icon Says McCain Stirs Hate." *Politico.com* October 11. Available at (<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/14488.html>).
- Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 1992. *The Vital South: How Presidents are Elected*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2002. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Blow, Charles. 2011. "Newt's War on Poor Children." *New York Times* December 2. Available at ([www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/opinion/blow-newts-war-on-poor-children.html?\\_r=2&](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/opinion/blow-newts-war-on-poor-children.html?_r=2&)).
- . 2012. "The G.O.P.'s 'Black People' Platform." *New York Times* January 6. Available at ([www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/blow-the-gops-black-people-platform.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/blow-the-gops-black-people-platform.html)).
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, and David O. Sears. 1990. "White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54(1):74–96.
- Delaney, Arthur. 2012. "Mitt Romney Welfare Ad Repeats False Claim." *Huffington Post* August 20. Available at ([www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/20/mitt-romney-welfare-ad\\_n\\_1810134.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/20/mitt-romney-welfare-ad_n_1810134.html)).
- Edsall, Thomas, and Mary Edsall. 1991. *Chain Reaction*. New York: Norton.
- Ford, Pearl K., Angie Maxwell, and Todd Shields. 2010. "What's the Matter with Arkansas? Symbolic Racism and 2008 Presidential Candidate Support." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 40(2):286–302.
- Gabriel, Trip, and Peter Baker. 2012. "Romney and Obama Resume Economic Attacks, Despite a Few Diversions." *New York Times* July 17. Available at ([www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/us/politics/romney-and-obama-resume-economic-attacks.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/us/politics/romney-and-obama-resume-economic-attacks.html)).
- Glaser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *Journal of Politics* 56(1):21–41.
- . 1996. *Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gomez, Brad T., and J. Matthew Wilson. 2006. "Rethinking Symbolic Racism: Evidence of Attribution Bias." *Journal of Politics* 68(3):611–25.
- Highton, Benjamin. 2004. "White Voters and African-American Candidates for Congress." *Political Behavior* 26(1):1–25.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, and Carol W. Kohfeld. 1989. *Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

- Huddy, Leonie, and Stanley Feldman. 2009. "On Assessing the Political Effects of Racial Prejudice." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:423–47.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 2011. "The President, the Tea Party, and Voting Behavior in 2010: Insights from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA.
- Kam, Cindy, and Donald R. Kinder. 2012. "Ethnocentrism as a Short-Term Influence in the 2008 Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2):326–40.
- Key, V. O. Jr. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40(3):414–31.
- Knuckey, Jonathan. 2005. "Racial Resentment and the Changing Partisanship of Southern Whites." *Party Politics* 11(1):5–28.
- . 2011. "Racial Resentment and Vote Choice in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election." *Politics and Policy* 39(4):559–82.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Charles Tien, and Richard Nadeau. 2010. "Obama's Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43(1):69–76.
- Li, Stephanie. 2012. "Obama, Still the Black Candidate." *Huffington Post* October 12. Available at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephanie-li/obama-campaign-race\\_b\\_1951010.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephanie-li/obama-campaign-race_b_1951010.html).
- Maxwell, Angie, Pearl Ford Dowe, and Todd Shields. 2013. "The Next Link in the Chain Reaction: Symbolic Racism and Obama's Religious Affiliation." *Social Science Quarterly* 94(2):321–43.
- McConahay, John B., and Joseph C. Hough. 1976. "Symbolic Racism." *Journal of Social Issues* 32(1):23–46.
- McKee, Seth C. 2009. *Republican Ascendancy in Southern U.S. House Elections*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nagler, Jonathan. 1991. "The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on U.S. Voter Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 85(4):1393–1405.
- Phillips, Kate. 2008. "Palin: Obama Is 'Palling Around with Terrorists'." *Washington Post* October 4. Available at <http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/palin-obama-is-palling-around-with-terrorists/>.
- Piston, Spencer. 2010. "How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election." *Political Behavior* 32(4):431–51.
- Rabinowitz, Joshua, David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Jon A. Krosnick. 2009. "Why Do White Americans Oppose Race-Targeted Policies: Clarifying the Impact of Symbolic Racism." *Political Psychology* 30(5):805–28.
- Reeves, Keith. 1997. *Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Racial Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, Eugene. 2010. "What's Behind the Tea Party's Ire?" *Washington Post* November 2. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/01/AR2010110105086.html>.
- Rucker, Phillip. 2011. "Gingrich Promises to Slash Taxes, Calls Obama 'Food Stamp President'." *Washington Post* May 13. Available at [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-13/politics/35264945\\_1\\_food-stamp-president-newt-gingrich-gains-and-estate-taxes](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-13/politics/35264945_1_food-stamp-president-newt-gingrich-gains-and-estate-taxes).
- Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan. 1997. *Racial Attitudes in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sears, David O. 1988. "Symbolic Racism." Pp. 53–84 in Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, eds., *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*. New York: Plenum.
- Sears, David O., and P. J. Henry. 2005. "Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism and its Critics." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 37:95–150.
- Sears, David O., and Donald R. Kinder. 1971. "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles." Pp. 51–88 in Werner Z. Hirsch, ed., *Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership*. New York: Praeger.

- Sears, David O., Colette VanLaar, Mary Carrillo, and Rick Kosterman. 1997. "Is it Really Racism? The Origins of White Americans' Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61(1):16–53.
- Shafer and Johnston. 2006. *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sigelman, Carol K., Lee Sigelman, Barbara J. Walkosz, and Michael Nitz. 1995. "Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1):243–65.
- Slack, Donovan. 2012. "Jan Brewer Tarmac Tiff Touches Nerve in Black Community, Some Commentators Say." *Politico.com* January 28. Available at [www.politico.com/politico44/2012/01/jan-brewer-tarmac-tiff-touches-nerve-in-black-community-112617.html](http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/01/jan-brewer-tarmac-tiff-touches-nerve-in-black-community-112617.html).
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Michael G. Hagen. 1985. *Race and Inequality: A Study in American Values*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Thomas Piazza. 1993. *The Scar of Race*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Philip E. Tetlock. 1986. "Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis." *Journal of Social Issues* 42(2):129–50.
- Sonenshein, Raphael J. 1990. "Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?" *Political Science Quarterly* 105(2):219–41.
- Sonmez, Felicia. 2012. "Mitt Romney: 'No One's Ever Asked to See My Birth Certificate'." *Washington Post* August 24. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/08/24/mitt-romney-no-ones-asked-for-my-birth-certificate/>.
- Tarman, Christopher, and David O. Sears. 2005. "The Conceptualization and Measurement of Symbolic Racism." *Journal of Politics* 67(3):731–61.
- Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. "When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4):1032–53.
- Tesler, Michael. 2012. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):690–704.
- . 2013. "The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans' Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era." *Journal of Politics* 75(1):110–23.
- Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears. 2010. *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White. 2002. "Cues That Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 96(1):75–90.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. 2005. "Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3):672–88.
- Voss, D. Stephen, and David Lublin. 2001. "Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections." *American Politics Research* 29(2):141–82.
- Williamson, Vanessa, Theda Skocpol, and John Coggin. 2011. "The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism." *Perspectives on Politics* 9(1):25–43.