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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BOBBY SINGLETON, et al,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WES ALLEN, in his official
Capacity as Alabama Secretary of
State, et al.,

Defendant.

EVAN MILLIGAN, et al,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WES ALLEN, in his official
Capacity as Alabama Secretary of
State, et al.,

Defendant.

MARCUS CASTER, et al,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WES ALLEN, in his official
Capacity as Alabama Secretary of
State, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.

2:21-cv-1291-AMM

THREE-JUDGE COURT

Case No.

2:21-cv-01530-AMM

THREE-JUDGE COURT

Case No.

2:21-cv-01536-AMM

THREE-JUDGE COURT

DEPOSITION OF: KARI FREDERICKSON, PhD.

S T I P U L A T I O N

IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties through their respective counsel that the deposition of KARI FREDERICKSON may be taken on August 29, 2024, before Anne E. Miller, Commissioner and Notary Public, at Whatley, Kallas, 1000 Park Place Tower, 2001 Park Place North, Birmingham, Alabama.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the signature to and the reading of the deposition by the witness is waived, the deposition to have the same force and effect as if full compliance had been had with all laws and rules of court relating to the taking of depositions.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that it shall not be necessary for any objections to be made by counsel to any questions except as to form or leading questions, and that counsel for the parties may make objections and assign grounds at the time of trial or at the time said deposition is offered in evidence or prior thereto.

A P P E A R A N C E S

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Mr. Myron Penn
Ms. Riley Kate Lancaster
Ms. Jyoti Jasrasaria

Court Reporter: Anne E. Miller

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20
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22
23

1 I, Anne E. Miller, a Court Reporter of the State
2 of Alabama, acting as Commissioner, certify that on
3 this date there came before me at Whatley, Kallas, 1000
4 Park Place Tower, 2001 Park Place North at Birmingham,
5 Alabama, on August 29, 2024, beginning at or about
6 10:00 a.m., KARI FREDERICKSON, PhD, witness in the
7 above cause, for oral examination, whereupon the
8 following proceedings were had:

9
10 KARI FREDERICKSON, PhD,
11 having been first duly sworn, was examined and
12 testified as follows:

13
14 EXAMINATION BY MR. GEIGER:

15 Q. Good morning.

16 A. Morning.

17 Q. My name is Soren Geiger, and I work for the
18 attorney general. I represent Secretary of State Wes
19 Allen in this lawsuit. Would you please state and
20 spell your last name?

21 A. My name is Kari Frederickson, K-a-r-i, last name
22 is F-r-e-d-e-r-i-c-k-s-o-n.

23 Q. Thanks. Have you been deposed before?

1 A. No.

2 Q. So just a couple of basic ground rules. I won't
3 belabor the point. But in order to get a clean
4 transcript, let's do our best not to talk over each
5 other and to talk at kind of a normal tempo. Also,
6 please let me know if you need me to repeat or rephrase
7 a question. I'm never going to try to trick you or
8 intentionally ask a confusing question.

9 Finally, if you need a five-minute break,
10 please just let me know. We will take several of them,
11 I'm sure, and we'll take lunch as well. Any questions
12 before we begin?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Do you have a master's degree?

15 A. I do.

16 Q. And from what institution?

17 A. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.

18 Q. When did you earn that degree?

19 A. I earned that degree in 1991.

20 Q. And did you write a thesis for that degree?

21 A. I did.

22 Q. And what was that focused on?

23 A. That was focused on the ideology of the Ku Klux

1 Klan in the 1920's.

2 Q. And did you have a thesis statement or were you
3 trying to argue a point or study that aspect of history
4 in general?

5 A. Gosh, this is going back a long time. I haven't
6 thought about that thesis in 40 years. I believe what
7 I was trying to show is -- one of the things I was
8 trying to show was some of the gender perspectives of
9 the ideology of the Klan and that the Klan's ideology
10 was rather expansive.

11 Q. Did you say gender perspectives?

12 A. Yes, right, that they -- well, that they -- in
13 terms of their white supremacy. I had been influenced
14 by -- there had been a recent book, I think, on women
15 of the Klan by Kathleen Blee. Nancy MacLean had had an
16 article about the Klan and sort of their ideas about
17 women's roles within the larger project of white
18 supremacy and how often women could try to subvert that
19 to their advantage. And so I had started on my
20 project, read their work. You know, I think kind of
21 was influenced by sort of those ideas. But as far as I
22 can recall what I wrote in my thesis, it was looking at
23 their ideas, a little less than their actions, where I

1 had printed materials and the types of things that you
2 look at as a master student with not a lot of time to,
3 you know, travel and do research.

4 Q. Right. What was your master's degree in?

5 A. History.

6 Q. History?

7 A. Uh-huh (yes).

8 Q. And do you have your doctorate?

9 A. I do.

10 Q. Did you write a dissertation?

11 A. I did.

12 Q. And what was that on?

13 A. My dissertation is on The Dixiecrat Revolt,
14 which was an attempt by some white southern Democrats
15 to throw the election of 1948 into the House of
16 Representatives. It was an attempt that was motivated
17 both by Harry Truman's civil rights program and civil
18 rights initiatives and also a response to grass roots
19 activity by African-Americans to secure political
20 rights.

21 Q. Is that dissertation published?

22 A. It is.

23 Q. When did you publish that?

1 A. 2001. I need to look at my own CV. Sorry.

2 Yes, 2001. I published it with the University of North
3 Carolina Press.

4 Q. And when did you complete your doctorate?

5 A. 1996.

6 Q. And from what institution?

7 A. Rutgers University.

8 Q. And why did you choose to write on The Dixiecrat
9 Revolt?

10 A. I went to Rutgers because I went to work with a
11 particular historian named David Oshinsky who had done
12 a biography on Joseph McCarthy. So my initial interest
13 both developed in my master's program under the
14 guidance of Professor Glenn Johnson. And then under
15 David Oshinsky, I was interested in conservatism
16 broadly pursued. Actually it was Glenn who had my
17 master's thesis advisor who had recommended, "You know,
18 nobody has written on the Dixiecrat. Why don't you do
19 that?" And I posted to David Oshinsky, and he actually
20 had moved from writing about Joseph McCarthy to writing
21 a book on Parchman prison in Mississippi. So he had
22 kind of moved into the South. So it was, you know,
23 kind of a nice dovetailing of interests.

1 And also I had been contacted really early
2 by someone at North Carolina Press who heard that I was
3 interested. And so they were -- you know, started kind
4 of cultivating me as a new author fairly early.

5 Q. What is your current occupation?

6 A. My current occupation is I'm a professor of
7 history at the University of Alabama.

8 Q. How long have you been employed at UA?

9 A. I have been at UA since 1999.

10 Q. Are you teaching this semester?

11 A. I am.

12 Q. What classes?

13 A. I'm teaching a class on the History of the
14 American South since 1865. That's an undergraduate
15 class, upper level. And I'm teaching a graduate
16 seminar, basically readings course, on the history of
17 the Jim Crow era, essentially 1876 until end of World
18 War II. And that's a graduate level class.

19 Q. Are you teaching next semester?

20 A. No. I'm on leave.

21 Q. Congratulations.

22 A. Thank you.

23 Q. Have you ever been fired, demoted or asked to

1 resign from a job?

2 A. No. Are you talking about a professional job or
3 any job that I had in my life since I was 16?

4 Q. Let's stick with professional.

5 A. Yeah. No.

6 Q. Have you ever been disciplined by a licensing
7 body?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Have you ever been disciplined by a court or
10 tribunal?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Since you have worked at UA since '99, have you
13 ever been disciplined or suspended by the University?

14 A. No.

15 Q. You have been retained by the Singleton
16 plaintiffs as an expert in their lawsuit against
17 Secretary of State Wes Allen; is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Are you being compensated?

20 A. I am.

21 Q. And what is that rate or how are you being
22 compensated?

23 A. I'm being compensated at \$200 an hour.

1 Q. Do you plan to testify at trial if called?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And will your hourly compensation rate be the
4 same to the best of your knowledge?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Is your compensation tied in any way to whether
7 the Singleton plaintiffs win, lose or settle this
8 lawsuit?

9 A. No.

10 Q. For purposes of this lawsuit, in what field are
11 you claiming to be an expert?

12 A. I'm an expert in the history of American
13 politics in the 20th century, southern history since
14 the end of the Civil War and Alabama history.

15 Q. What was your assignment in this case?

16 A. My assignment as described to me by
17 Mr. Blacksher is to write a 20-page report, which I'm
18 sorry, I went a little bit over.

19 Q. Close.

20 A. That looks at race and political parties in the
21 South and Alabama, specifically for the 20th century.

22 Q. From 1901 to 2024?

23 A. Essentially.

1 Q. Were you asked to reach a particular conclusion?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Were you given any other direction on the
4 opinions that you were asked to form?

5 A. No.

6 Q. In your own words, what opinions do you express
7 in this case?

8 A. As I note in my summary of opinions, I write
9 that race is a defining issue in southern politics,
10 probably Alabama politics specifically. That for much
11 of the 20th century, the Democratic Party maintained
12 its dominance by presenting itself as the party of
13 white supremacy and by using its power, particularly at
14 the national level but also state level, to oppose,
15 destroy any attempt to -- any attempt to cripple white
16 supremacy, which, you know, as they see these threats.
17 Right?

18 With the slow embrace of the Civil Rights
19 Movement, the Democratic Party begins to move away from
20 those policies, and we begin to see a transition of the
21 Republican Party, which for much of the 20th century
22 was anathema politically in Alabama and much of the
23 white Suth. We begin to see more of an embrace of the

1 Republican party of politics meant to appeal to white
2 voters. They do that explicitly. But as we get
3 further on in the 20th century, more implicitly drawing
4 on -- you know, when you make something explicit, you
5 don't have to keep doing it over and over again.

6 Eventually it becomes embedded in certain ways, in
7 policies and whatnot. In coded language, for example.

8 And that the Republican Party went from really a
9 nonentity in places like Alabama and other places in
10 the South to being a robust presence both in the South
11 and in the country, primarily based on its ability to
12 attract white voters.

13 Q. When did you first hear about this lawsuit?

14 A. I first heard about the Singleton lawsuit when I
15 was contacted by Mr. Blacksher.

16 Q. And when was that? When were you contacted?

17 A. February.

18 Q. Of this year?

19 A. Of 2024.

20 Q. Okay. Have you reviewed any expert reports in
21 this case?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Have you reviewed --

1 A. I mean, beyond Carrington, Dr. Carrington.

2 Right, yes.

3 Q. Beyond his?

4 A. No.

5 Q. When you were preparing your reports, did you
6 have any communications with any other experts in the
7 case?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Did you communicate with anyone else about your
10 reports, like colleagues or students at UA?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Did research assistance help you with preparing
13 your reports?

14 A. No.

15 MR. GEIGER: Let's go ahead and put those
16 into the record. I will mark and publish Exhibits 1, 2
17 and 3 all together.

18 (Defendant's Exhibits 1-3 were marked for
19 identification.)

20 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Let's look at Exhibit 1 first.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. Do you recognize that document?

23 A. I do.

1 MR. BLACKSHER: Could we take a pause?

2 (Recess taken.)

3 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Let's go back to these
4 exhibits. Exhibit 1, do you recognize this document?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Does it appear to be a copy of your report from
7 May 17th, 2024?

8 A. It does.

9 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 2 real quick. Do you
10 recognize that document?

11 A. I do.

12 Q. Does it appear to be a copy of your supplemental
13 report from July 25th?

14 A. It is. It does.

15 Q. And Exhibit 3, do you recognize that document?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is that Dr. Carrington or a copy of his report
18 from June 27th?

19 A. It appears to be.

20 Q. Do your initial supplemental reports contain a
21 complete statement of the opinions you formed in this
22 case?

23 A. My initial supplemental report?

1 Q. I'm sorry, initial and supplemental.

2 A. Oh, initial and supplemental, yes.

3 Q. On page three of your initial report, you state
4 that you have conducted research at the Alabama
5 archives?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did you visit the archives to research for this
8 report?

9 A. No.

10 Q. When did you conduct that in-person research?

11 A. I conducted that research for my dissertation
12 and first book, and also for my third book on the
13 Bankheads, a political family in Alabama. And on
14 subsequent -- well, I mean, I think those are the
15 research that I did for those is most pertinent to the
16 task that I was asked to perform here.

17 Q. Roughly what years did you visit the archives
18 for this research? During what years?

19 A. Dissertation research and first book would have
20 been between '95 and 2000 because I would have made
21 return trips in preparation, turning my dissertation
22 into a book. And then for Bankhead book, multiple --
23 like I don't even know how many trips. I basically

1 lived there between when I started the book, which
2 would have been about 2012, to when it was published in
3 2022. So, you know, more than ten visits.

4 Q. You also state that you consulted newspapers,
5 books and articles?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Are all of those cited in the end notes of your
8 report, or are there others not cited?

9 A. I would say the bulk of them are cited, but it
10 is quite possible that conclusions that I drew in my
11 Bankhead book or in the Dixiecrat book were based on
12 newspapers and articles, right, which would have been
13 consulted earlier. Does that make sense?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. But there were -- there was primary research
16 into newspapers articles that was done specifically for
17 this task.

18 Q. Right. Okay. And just to clarify one more
19 time, that primary research for this task is cited in
20 your end notes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did you review any other documents in preparing
23 your initial report?

1 A. What do you mean by documents?

2 Q. Did you conduct any other research, I should
3 say, beyond drawing from what you had done at the
4 archives and beyond the newspapers, books and articles?

5 A. I conducted research in what historians call
6 secondary sources, which are books and articles
7 published by other scholars.

8 Q. Would you include that under what we already
9 discussed as consulting books, articles and documents?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. Did counsel provide you with any
12 documents for your consideration for your report?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Did counsel provide you with any facts to
15 consider or to rely upon?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Did anyone else provide you anything as you
18 prepared your report?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Roughly how many hours did you spend preparing
21 your initial report?

22 A. Roughly 60.

23 Q. Would you consider it an original work?

1 A. I don't think when you are drawing on the work
2 of other scholars to -- in my world that would not be
3 considered original unless I am coming up with new
4 conclusions. I think there are certain parts of the
5 report that are based on my primary research of looking
6 at primary documents in which I have drawn conclusions.
7 So part of it, I think, is original to me and related
8 to early work that I have published. In other parts, I
9 have relied upon the findings of scholars that -- you
10 know, who I find their work credible and valuable. So
11 I guess if you are asking could I get this published in
12 a history journal, no.

13 Q. Understood. So did you come up with any new
14 conclusions of your own, unique to you in this report?

15 A. Unique to me and not represented by the history
16 profession at large?

17 Q. Not necessarily disagreed with by the history
18 profession at large, but just not yet articulated?

19 A. I don't think so.

20 Q. You mentioned some of the -- drawing upon some
21 of your own conclusions from earlier work you had done.
22 Did you ever copy from portions of those books and
23 articles into this report?

1 A. You mean from my own books and articles?

2 Probably.

3 Q. Any idea about how much of your report has been
4 copied from earlier work you have done?

5 A. No.

6 Q. No idea?

7 A. No. I mean, I would imagine the section on the
8 Dixiecrat is not going to -- I'm not going to come up
9 with a new idea about the Dixiecrat if I already spent
10 six years working on a book on the Dixiecrat.

11 Q. Of course.

12 A. Same thing related to the Bankhead book. So,
13 you know, I kind of object to the word "copy" since it
14 is my original -- much of that is my original creation.

15 Q. Right. Is there a word that would be more
16 accurate?

17 A. Rely on.

18 Q. I see from your end notes that you do
19 occasionally cite your own work.

20 A. Uh-huh (yes).

21 Q. Do you think you cited it every time that you
22 relied upon it?

23 A. I tried to.

1 Q. And you didn't rely upon any other author's work
2 without citation to the best of your knowledge?

3 A. I tried not to.

4 Q. When preparing your supplemental report, about
5 how many hours did you spend on that?

6 A. Twenty approximately.

7 Q. Did you review the sources cited in
8 Dr. Carrington's report?

9 A. I'm trying to think. I don't believe so.

10 Q. He cited a large number of books and primary
11 sources.

12 A. Uh-huh (yes).

13 Q. Okay. So just to confirm, you didn't go and
14 look them up or review them?

15 A. No. Some of them I was familiar with.

16 Q. Understood.

17 A. Some of them -- and I do think in some
18 instances, for example, the political scientists, Earl
19 and Merle Black we both used. So I felt like I was
20 familiar or if I had seen assessments of that work, I
21 didn't feel like I needed to go back and look. I was
22 mostly interested in his conclusions.

23 Q. Right, right. Did counsel edit your reports at

1 all before they were submitted?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you read the Singleton plaintiffs' most
4 recent complaint in this lawsuit?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Do you know specifically or vaguely what claims
7 they have raised in this lawsuit?

8 A. So now you did send something to me, so I don't
9 know if it was the most recent one. I read something,
10 but my approach was I was given a task. I didn't want
11 to become overly familiar with what they were going to
12 argue because that's not my job. My job is to answer a
13 question to the best of my ability. Whether they find
14 it useful or not is really not something I can concern
15 myself with.

16 Q. Understood. Do you recall having reviewed any
17 court documents like opinions or orders from this case
18 at all?

19 A. (Witness nods head back and forth.)

20 Q. Are you familiar with the Voting Rights Act of
21 1965?

22 A. I am.

23 Q. What about the 1982 amendments to the Voting

1 Rights Act?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you say no?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Are you familiar with the Equal Protection
6 Clause of the 14th Amendment?

7 A. I am.

8 Q. If someone were to ask you what is this lawsuit
9 about which you have been retained to assist with, what
10 would you say?

11 A. I would say speaking as a nonexpert, this
12 lawsuit is about how congressional districts are drawn
13 and the specific concern with Singleton is primarily
14 with the fact that Jefferson County is parts of -- ends
15 up in parts of three congressional districts and that
16 their concern is that that violates something in the
17 14th Amendment and that what they're concerned with is
18 creating districts that recognize -- I forget the term
19 of art, but it's something about areas of opportunity
20 or something like that. Right? Recognizing that
21 certain areas have the potential to create political
22 coalitions, which is not possible with the way the
23 district lines are drawn now. But like I said, I read

1 it over once. I felt if I became too familiar with it,
2 that's going to get into my brain, and that wasn't my
3 job, to make or break their argument.

4 Q. Completely understand. Have you ever testified
5 in court before?

6 A. I have not.

7 Q. What have you done to prepare for today's
8 deposition?

9 A. I have read over my report. I read over my
10 supplemental report. I asked a few process questions
11 of Mr. Blacksher, and that's it.

12 Q. Roughly how many hours did that take?

13 A. Three or four.

14 Q. Roughly -- or not roughly. Scratch that. Did
15 you discuss your testimony with anyone other than
16 counsel?

17 A. No.

18 Q. And how many meetings did you have with counsel
19 in preparation for today's deposition?

20 A. Preparation for the deposition, we spoke on
21 Friday.

22 Q. Okay. For roughly how long did you speak?

23 A. Two hours.

1 Q. Two hours? Was it just you and he?

2 A. Present was also Judge Clemon and a fourth
3 individual whose name I forget.

4 Q. That's fine. Did you review any documents with
5 counsel?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did you review your reports with counsel?

8 A. We went over my report.

9 Q. Okay. Have you reviewed any deposition
10 transcripts from this lawsuit?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 1, your initial report.
13 Page four, please. Very first sentence, "The
14 Republican Party's ability to exploit white racial" --

15 A. Wait, page four?

16 Q. Yes. The very top sentence.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. "The Republican Party's ability to exploit white
19 racial anxiety beginning in the early 1960's and later
20 in the 1980's, by developing conservative policy
21 positions with race at the center, allowed it to
22 attract a growing number of white voters." What do you
23 mean by the phrase "with race at the center"?

1 A. That race is -- my opinion is that race -- you
2 cannot disentangle race from policy, and sometimes it
3 can be explicit with regard to perhaps something like
4 affirmative action. Sometimes it's implicit, but that
5 -- so just about any issue that you could find, there
6 is a historical narrative in which race is implicated.

7 Q. And it's Republican policy specifically that you
8 can't disentangle race from?

9 A. Starting in -- I would say in the 1960's.

10 Q. And skipping one sentence, I guess, so the
11 bottom sentence of that paragraph, "With white identity
12 politics occupying the center of Republican politics,
13 creating effective and enduring biracial coalitions is
14 extremely difficult, if not impossible." What are
15 white identity politics?

16 A. White identity politics are politics in which
17 white victimization or white privilege plays an
18 important role, sometimes explicitly, sometimes
19 implicitly, but they are policies in which the
20 attraction of white voters is the goal.

21 Q. Okay. To make sure I understand, to say that
22 race is at the center of Republican politics beginning
23 in the '60's is also to say that white identity

1 politics is at the center of Republican policy?

2 A. I think one can say that, yes.

3 Q. If white privilege and white victimization are
4 at the center of Republican politics, is that also to
5 say that Republican policy is at its core about white
6 interests and white values?

7 A. I think a lot of it is. I'm sure we could find
8 issues. It's not every single issue, but if the
9 primary goal or one of the questions is why does the
10 Republican Party become viable in the South, in the
11 state of Alabama, it is because of their ability to
12 attract white voters. And much of that attraction was
13 accomplished through politics that appealed to a
14 defense of privilege or a sense of victimization.

15 Q. Do you believe that the Republican Party's
16 policy positions actually advantaged or gave preference
17 to white interests or white over black interests?

18 A. What period are we talking about?

19 Q. Let's start with the 1960's.

20 A. I think -- okay. Sorry. Restate the question.

21 Q. Do you believe that the Republican Party's
22 policy positions in the 1960's advantaged or gave
23 preference to white interests over black interests?

1 A. I think in terms of how politicians talked about
2 things like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, then, yes.

3 Q. Would you say yes as well if we are talking
4 about the 1970's?

5 A. What issue are you speaking about in particular?

6 Q. I'm not. Just the Republican platform, the
7 Republican -- I think earlier you said that
8 conservative policy positions, plural, would develop
9 Republican Party with race at its center. So I'm
10 speaking generally.

11 A. I think if you looked at something like busing,
12 then while black parents were not huge fans of busing,
13 I think they saw busing -- busing is an issue without a
14 constituency. But by the time busing becomes the
15 method by which equal opportunity and education can be
16 achieved, while black parents may not like it, it's the
17 best that they can hope for. White parents see it as
18 -- as they see themselves as victims of an overleaning
19 federal state, trying to engineer something that they
20 are opposed to, right? So I think with busing, then I
21 think -- I think race is at the center of that, and
22 white victimization is at the center of how many white
23 people feel about busing.

1 Q. And then jumping forward another decade into the
2 '80's and the Reagan era, would you also say that race
3 not only was at the center but that the Republican
4 Party was trying to advantage white interests over
5 black interests?

6 A. Again, I would ask you, you know, I think we
7 need to be careful. There is many policies in the
8 Reagan Administration, right? But I think we can take
9 a number. For example, affirmative action and/or
10 Reagan's -- let's say his attack on government
11 spending. When cuts are made in departments that are
12 large employers of black people, yet not in others
13 where black employees are less prominent, for example,
14 the department of state, then I think you could say
15 yes, you know. You can talk about -- when you are
16 talking about big government, right, those have racial
17 implications when the cuts in spending that he
18 implements are in departments that -- you know, like
19 HUD, like the Department of Education, like general
20 services that employ a lot of black people. Right? So
21 while he -- is he explicitly saying "I want black
22 people to lose their jobs"? When you target those
23 organizations that employ a lot of black professionals

1 and they bear the brunt of those cuts, whether in
2 employment or different types of social spending, then
3 I don't think you can ignore race.

4 Q. And moving forward even further into the '90's,
5 with the Clinton Administration and the further
6 changing landscape in the South, are there specific
7 issues again that -- for which you cannot ignore race?

8 A. For the Republican, here is what I would say to
9 that, which is as a historian -- and I try to do this
10 in my report, and Carrington kind of dinged me for it.
11 He says I wrap it up pretty quickly. I think as a
12 historian and in terms of the sources that we have
13 available to us, you know, whether we are doing that
14 research ourselves or we are relying on the research of
15 others, I think the '90's is still a little early for
16 someone like me to say definitively this is what I
17 think about these policies because we don't -- you
18 know, the '90's is relatively recent for historians
19 honestly. It's more the purview of political
20 scientists and others. So in terms of my -- where I
21 would like to sort of ground my testimony, I'm not
22 terribly comfortable going past the '80's.

23 Q. That's helpful. So if the '90's are relatively

1 recent for historians, then certainly anything after
2 the turn of the millennium would be more so?

3 A. Yeah. I mean -- you know, I could tell you what
4 I think as an educated citizen of the state of Alabama.
5 But in terms of my training, my expertise, my level of
6 comfort making a scholarly assessment, I would say that
7 that is -- it's not appropriate for me to do that.

8 Q. If called to testify at trial, would you opine
9 on the voting behavior of white southerners, for
10 example, after 2000?

11 A. I would not. I also don't -- I was very careful
12 also not to talk about voting behavior very much. And,
13 you know, I might have slipped in a word here and
14 there, which if I were to do it over again would be
15 very -- much more careful. But my task again was to
16 talk about party positions and how the party represents
17 itself and the positions that it takes. How voters
18 respond to that is not -- you know, voter choice and
19 voter behavior really is a different academic area.

20 I think as a historian, there are ways that
21 you can try to discern that. But for the latter, you
22 know, the more recent period, anything post '90's,
23 again, that's not my area of expertise.

1 Q. And you don't try to discern that?

2 A. I try not to.

3 Q. Having clarified it, thank you. You are looking
4 again at party positions, party platforms and how they
5 present themselves to the electoral. If called to
6 testify at trial, would you opinion on party positions
7 post 2000 and what they communicate to you as a
8 historian?

9 A. I would talk about the roots perhaps of those
10 party positions, but no. I would not talk about, you
11 know, what happened in the 2024 election or 2020.
12 Right? Again, because that's not my area of expertise.

13 Q. Okay. Let's go to page six, please. The first
14 full paragraph "beginning as a consequence," the last
15 sentence of that paragraph.

16 A. Sorry. Consequence, okay.

17 Q. I will read it. "The Democratic Party, whose
18 official symbol from 1904 to 1966 featured a rooster
19 and the slogan "White Supremacy for the Right," reigned
20 supreme in Alabama for the next 80 years." I believe
21 you clarified this earlier in the paragraph, but for
22 the transcript, the beginning of that 80-year period,
23 was that 1932 roughly?

1 A. That's a good -- let's see. Honestly, I'm a bit
2 confused by that sentence. So I don't -- I can't say
3 for sure when I start those 80 years.

4 Q. It's not super important, but let's look at the
5 second sentence of that paragraph. "During periods in
6 which Democrats were in the majority, especially
7 beginning in 1932, seniority brought committee
8 chairmanships and extraordinary power to kill any
9 legislation that threatened white supremacy." Do you
10 think you might have been referring to the early 1930's
11 as kind of the beginning of that 80-year reign?

12 A. No. No. I mean, honestly I would have to go
13 back and see when they -- when they adopted -- adopted
14 that slogan because obviously it's at least from 1904.
15 Oh, no, no. What I'm talking about is that Democratic
16 Party itself, not the slogan and the -- right. The
17 Democratic Party reigns supreme, right, from -- I would
18 say reading this paragraph, from the movement of
19 disfranchisement. So that's more what I'm talking
20 about.

21 Q. 1901?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. Which would then put the tail end of that reign

1 in the '80's?

2 A. I think that's when, you know, in terms of
3 having very little competition, right? Doesn't mean
4 that they weren't still getting elected, but in terms
5 of what we see earlier in the century, it doesn't --
6 it's not the same, right? Where there is absolutely no
7 meaningful Republican competition.

8 Q. Early on in that reign, would you say that the
9 Democratic Party was the party of white supremacy?

10 A. When you say early on, what are you talking
11 about?

12 Q. At disfranchisement.

13 A. Was the Democratic Party the party of white
14 supremacy? Yes.

15 Q. Did it ever stop being the party of white
16 supremacy?

17 A. I think it -- are you talking about the national
18 Democratic Party or the state Democratic Party?

19 Q. Let's do national first.

20 A. Okay. It's complicated because with the
21 Democratic Party being the primary party in the South,
22 southern members of that party in congress maintained a
23 lot of power throughout the 20th century. However,

1 beginning in 1948 and let's start with '48 with Truman,
2 we began to see a split where the Democratic Party and
3 certain members, not white southerners, in congress are
4 beginning to -- I wouldn't say fully embrace but to
5 articulate a stronger civil rights position.

6 And so while I would say southern Democrats
7 hang on to policies and beliefs that are not conducive
8 to racial equality and, I think, you know, who hangs on
9 to what is really almost comes down to an individual
10 level. Nationally, the party begins moving away in the
11 late 1940's. And so members of that party remain
12 wedded to the defense of segregation while the national
13 party is promoting something and trying to move in a
14 different direction.

15 Q. Okay. Now moving to the state Democratic Party.

16 A. Right.

17 Q. Specifically Alabama.

18 A. Uh-huh (yes).

19 Q. Did it stop being the party of white supremacy
20 before it lost control?

21 A. When do you say that it lost control?

22 Q. 2010.

23 A. Again, I think, you know, unlike one of my

1 disputes with Carrington was he claims that I said the
2 switch was immediate. I don't say that. I think -- I
3 think -- I think there are -- I think the Democratic
4 Party locally had to move away from policies that kept
5 black voters as second class citizens once the Voting
6 Rights Act of 1965 was wedded. Things are complicated
7 by you now have new black voters that want to
8 participate. But in terms of whether once the Voting
9 Rights Act of 1965 is signed, do all white Democrats
10 and white political leaders in Alabama suddenly become
11 lovers of racial equality? No. It takes a while for
12 the party, locally or statewide, right, to figure out,
13 you know.

14 Like I said, it takes a while. It takes
15 well into the 1980's, according to what I have read, to
16 figure out that balance, right? How are we going to
17 embrace, incorporate black voters, black leaders,
18 right? Black politicians who want a say in the
19 direction of the party without losing our base with
20 white voters who don't want to give all that up.

21 Some people did it more easily than others,
22 right? George Wallace, although he does apologize for
23 his previous segregationist positions, he carries that

1 history with him. Some black voters will -- they
2 believe that he is sincere, and actually I think he
3 gets 30 some percent of the black vote in his last
4 election as governor because black people have always
5 had -- they have always had to be pragmatic.

6 And I know I'm doing what I'm not supposed
7 to be doing, which is being a professor and trying to
8 go on and on. And I sort of lost the thread of the
9 question. But I don't -- I don't think you can
10 pinpoint time in which we say, okay, the Democratic
11 Party in Alabama no longer has members, leaders. You
12 know, they are not going to push for segregation.
13 That's over. And really nobody is -- you know, I think
14 nobody is pushing for segregation. That fight is over,
15 right? Then the fight moves into new terrains of
16 policy, of other types of ways in which, you know,
17 parties can carve out their positions.

18 Q. At the end of page six, the last sentence, I
19 will read that, and then I will go on to page seven.
20 "In addition to creating constitutional barriers to
21 electoral participation, white Democrats crafted a
22 strong cultural narrative about the superiority of the
23 Democratic Party and the corresponding illegitimacy of

1 the Republican Party. Democrats established their
2 legitimacy as the ruling party by creating a particular
3 interpretation of the southern past and the southern
4 present that made a virtue of white elite Democratic
5 rule, denigrated black culture, perpetuated a fear and
6 hatred of black political participation and the
7 Republican Party and taught reverence for the
8 antebellum South and the Confederacy." Just so I'm
9 clear, when did that take place? When was that attempt
10 to craft that narrative by the Democratic Party?

11 A. That begins in the 1880's, and it continues well
12 into the 20th century.

13 Q. How far into the 20th century, do you think?

14 A. In terms of the Democratic -- members of the
15 Democratic Party pushing that narrative? Again, we can
16 find individuals like Marie Bankhead Owen who never
17 gives up the ghost, and she is doing it well into the
18 1950's. And that's no small thing in someone who is
19 from a Democratic Party, a Democratic political family
20 and head of a major state institution.

21 But in terms of the party itself, to a
22 greater or lesser degree, into the early -- you know,
23 the late 1950's and starting into the 1960's. And then

1 certain individuals like George Wallace would continue,
2 I think, to use those symbols. But again, it becomes
3 problematic when you have to attract black voters, and
4 these symbols and narratives, they are not helpful.

5 Q. Can we go to page nine?

6 A. Uh-huh (yes).

7 Q. The middle paragraph there beginning "the
8 greatest threat," the second sentence. "Protestant
9 leaders across the South expressed fear of Smith's, Al
10 Smith's, candidacy. Many wondered whether cultural and
11 religious concerns might trump race in this campaign,
12 leading some white southern voters to abandon the
13 Democratic candidate to support the hated Republicans
14 and their popular candidate, Herbert Hoover."

15 And then jump to the next page, which is
16 still talking about this election. The last two
17 sentences of that top paragraph, "Alarmed by Heflin's
18 bolt, the state Democratic Party countered with an
19 attack of their own, depicting Hoover as a supporter of
20 racial equality and reminding white Democratic voters
21 of the tragedy of reconstruction, when carpetbaggers
22 invaded the South and freedmen served in the
23 legislature. A vote for Herbert Hoover, they cried,

1 meant a return to black domination." And one last
2 sentence, the second sentence or, excuse me, the third
3 sentence of the next paragraph, "Al Smith carried
4 Alabama by a mere 7,000 votes. Roughly 100,000 Alabama
5 Democrats voted for Herbert Hoover." Would you agree
6 that for at least those 100,000 Alabama Democrats,
7 religion did appear to turn race at least in that
8 election?

9 A. No.

10 Q. And why not?

11 A. Because I think you have to look at who the
12 messenger is, right? And the messenger for Alabama was
13 Cotton Tom Heflin, who, you know, never did a poll, but
14 he was one of the most virulent white supremacists.
15 Nobody was going to question his white supremacist
16 credentials. So when I think -- and also if you look
17 at how he talks about papal conspiracies and, you know,
18 the pope is going to start -- I don't know. I mean,
19 it's really crazy stuff. But much of it involves race,
20 right? He does not separate those things, and the fact
21 that he has these credentials, he is a -- you know, he
22 is a staunch white supremacist. Nobody could besmirch
23 him of that. I think that means something.

1 If it was somebody else, if it was a
2 Republican who was talking about papal conspiracies
3 and -- you know, and prohibition also. You can't talk
4 about prohibition in the South without talking about
5 race. And so, again, the messenger is important.

6 And so, no. I don't think -- I think was
7 religion and prohibition part of it? Of course, it
8 was. Right? But the fact that it is Cotton Tom Heflin
9 who is leading this charge is meaningful, and it is
10 embedded in ideas of white supremacy.

11 Q. So even though the Democratic Party also tried
12 to use a racist to smear campaign against --

13 A. Sure, Herbert Hoover. Right.

14 Q. Herbert Hoover, yet that didn't work incredibly
15 well or at least 100,000 Alabama Democrats still voted
16 for Hoover?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Your position is that race was the driving force
19 behind their vote?

20 A. I think it made them comfortable to go off the
21 reservation as it were. Sorry, that's not a very
22 cultural sensitive thing, but to abandon the Democratic
23 Party again because of Heflin. And so in some ways,

1 I'm not saying religion, right, the Catholicism of Al
2 Smith, his position on prohibition didn't matter. But
3 if Al Smith had not -- Al Smith had not also been
4 presented as someone who -- by a white supremacist as
5 someone who -- you know, he is a New Yorker. Right?
6 He hired black people. He had black men supervising
7 white women. I think if you take that way, I don't --
8 you know, it wouldn't -- I mean, it's a counter
9 factual, right? I think it matters. I don't think you
10 can divorce those things.

11 Q. Okay. Let's fast forward to page 24, and
12 Richard Nixon.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Go to the very middle of that paragraph
15 beginning "unlike Wallace." Do you see that? "Unlike"
16 is on the right-hand side of the page.

17 A. Oh, yes. Okay.

18 Q. I will read a few excerpts. "Unlike Wallace,
19 Nixon avoided supporting segregation openly. He
20 developed what came to be known as a southern
21 strategy." Just a quick question right there. Do you
22 think Nixon supported segregation secretly?

23 A. No. Nixon was not a Segregationalist.

1 Q. Why did you phrase it as "unlike Wallace, Nixon
2 avoided supporting segregation openly"?

3 A. Yeah. I mean, I would agree that that's
4 probably not as carefully worded. I think what I was
5 -- well, he didn't talk about it openly. He didn't --
6 he didn't profess support for segregation. So how
7 about that?

8 Q. Okay. Kind of skipping the rest of that, and
9 then moving on to the one beginning "Nixon
10 established."

11 A. Okay, yes.

12 Q. "Nixon established a politically safe terrain by
13 simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles
14 of equality while opposing the use of federal
15 intervention to enforce compliance. A majority of
16 white Americans had come to believe that denial of
17 basic citizenship rights was wrong, but they were
18 opposed to the prospect of substantial residential and
19 educational integration imposed by the courts and by
20 the federal regulatory bureaucracy through involuntary
21 mechanisms, especially busing." Could you turn the
22 page to page 25.

23 A. Okay.

1 Q. And the second sentence of that first full
2 paragraph, "Nixon carried through on his promises of
3 conservative judicial appointments" --

4 A. I'm sorry. Where are we?

5 Q. It's the first full paragraph, beginning "Nixon
6 carries."

7 A. "Carried much of the upper South"?

8 Q. And then the second sentence.

9 A. Sorry, okay.

10 Q. "Nixon carried through on his promises of
11 conservative judicial appointments, relaxed enforcement
12 of school desegregation and opposition to busing to
13 achieve racial balance in public schools."

14 A. Uh-huh (yes).

15 Q. Could you go to Exhibit 3, which is
16 Dr. Carrington's report?

17 A. Uh-huh (yes).

18 Q. Specifically page 19. The very last complete
19 sentence beginning "a Harris poll." "A Harris poll
20 from 1975 found that Americans supported desegregation
21 by a 56 percent to 35 percent margin while the same
22 sample opposed busing 75 percent to 20 percent. Thus,
23 a number of voters did not see busing as essential to

1 achieving the goal of desegregation, a goal with which
2 they agreed. Importantly, these statistics also
3 revealed far from boisterous support from African-
4 Americans. In a 1973 Gallup poll, for example, only
5 nine percent of African-Americans rated school busing
6 at the top of their list of the best means for
7 integration." I think you even mentioned this a little
8 bit earlier, but do you disagree that busing was
9 unpopular among both white and black Americans as a
10 means of desegregation?

11 A. No.

12 Q. And back to page 25 of your initial report.

13 A. Uh-huh (yes).

14 Q. I think I will just reread that one sentence
15 that I already read. "Nixon carried through on his
16 promises of conservative judicial appointments, relaxed
17 enforcement of school desegregation and opposition to
18 busing to achieve racial balance in public schools."
19 Is it your opinion as a historian these three policies
20 made Nixon an attractive candidate to southern
21 segregationists?

22 A. I would say so, yes.

23 Q. Do a little bit of jumping around here, but

1 could we go back to page 19 of Dr. Carrington's report?

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. The paragraph beginning "But hanging the hat."

4 A. Uh-huh (yes).

5 Q. I'm going to start reading at the reference to
6 Black & Black. "Black & Black note that Nixon
7 positioned himself to southern voters as opposed to
8 segregation but favoring only voluntary integration.
9 Such a position would be quite the concession for white
10 supremacists to take in their voting preferences."
11 Skipping a sentence. "Nixon's desegregation plan still
12 included substantial Justice Department-initiated
13 litigation, which Dean Kotlowski" -- K-o-t-l-o-w-s-k-i
14 -- "notes offended many white southerners, and thus
15 made questionable whether Nixon had swapped civil
16 rights enforcement for southern votes as his critics
17 complained. After these executive branch lawsuits
18 began, a record number of African-American school
19 children went to integrated schools in the fall of
20 1969." Then turning the page to page 20. The first
21 full paragraph, the sentence beginning, "In 1968, 68
22 percent."

23 A. First full paragraph. Okay, yeah, yeah.

1 Q. "In 1968, 68 percent of black children in the
2 South attended single-race schools. That number had
3 plummeted to eight percent by 1972, the year Nixon ran
4 for re-election. Far from coming despite Nixon, these
5 welcome results happened in part due to his
6 administration's efforts."

7 Now I will skip a sentence. "His budget
8 proposals to Congress asked to increase funding for
9 enforcing civil rights from 75 million to 2.6 billion
10 between 1969 and 1972. In 1970, he approved a new IRS
11 policy denying tax exempt status to all-white private
12 schools, a move that especially went after institutions
13 in the South trying to avoid public school
14 integration." The last thing I will read is the last
15 two sentences of the page on page 20.

16 A. Which page?

17 Q. Page 20, beginning "But Nixon forged ahead."

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. "But Nixon forged ahead, doing something the
20 Johnson Administration had not on this issue:
21 establishing numerical requirements for minority hiring
22 among those entities eligible for government contracts
23 with concrete timetables attached. This policy, far

1 from a new attempt to woo southern segregationists,
2 went beyond Nixon's former position in favor of
3 persuasion over coercion when he was vice president
4 under Eisenhower." Is it true that Nixon approved the
5 IRS taking away tax exempt status from private schools,
6 like Bob Jones?

7 A. That, I don't know. It's my understanding that
8 that was more of a Carter thing. So I can't -- I can't
9 say for certain.

10 Q. Is it true that integration was largely
11 accomplished to -- educational integration under the
12 Nixon presidency?

13 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form. Go
14 ahead.

15 A. I won't dispute the number that he gives here
16 because I don't have a counter number. However, I
17 would question what qualifies as integration. And, you
18 know, is it one black student in an all-white school?
19 I think we would also need to look at how many white
20 students fled the public school system. So I think
21 there is a lot of unpacking that I would need to do
22 about the degree of integration that takes place under
23 Nixon's watch.

1 I would also say with regard to -- I think
2 timing is important here, and also what the alternative
3 was. If the question is ultimately why would white
4 southerners support somebody under whom, you know,
5 integration proceeded, what was the alternative? The
6 alternative was McGovern.

7 And so in terms of Nixon keeping his
8 promise or being the better choice, of course, for
9 people who did not like enforced desegregation using
10 the tools of the Justice Department or the federal
11 bureaucracy, first of all, from what I have read -- and
12 this is not my particular area of research expertise.
13 There was -- there were certain things that Nixon just
14 simply couldn't stop that were already in the works
15 with regard to DOJ and career attorneys and timelines
16 and that sort of thing. Nixon said, "I'm going to slow
17 down timelines. We are going to stop this. We are
18 going to appoint conservative southerners," which he
19 tried to do. Some of them were not -- were not
20 approved for the Supreme Court.

21 But I think one thing Carrington ignores is
22 that Nixon was a much better alternative than Humphrey
23 and also a better alternative than McGovern in terms of

1 the pace. At some point Nixon simply couldn't stop it,
2 and he knew that. Right? There were some things he
3 could do. He could also -- when he comes to these sort
4 of minority, it's his Philadelphia plan, right, where
5 you have to have a certain number of contracts. And
6 Nixon never -- there was never a racial conflict that
7 he didn't mind for political profit.

8 On the one hand, I think he truly believed
9 in providing economic opportunity for black people.
10 That was something that I think he could get onboard
11 with, but there was a bonus here for him with the
12 Philadelphia plan, which is it's a way to pit black
13 workers and black business owners and black contractors
14 -- and I think really where he is focusing on is the
15 building trades -- against white unions. Two key
16 members of the Democratic Party coalition.

17 And so the Philadelphia plan, which I don't
18 know how much progress that ended up being for black
19 contractors. While that's, you know, you could say,
20 "Well, look. Look what Nixon is doing." What he is
21 really doing, what he is really interested in is sewing
22 discord between two key members of the Democratic Party
23 coalition.

1 So I guess my response would be that one
2 would have to -- there is a lot more going on beneath
3 the surface, I believe, of what Carrington is saying.
4 He is picking and choosing statistics, and Nixon is a
5 complex guy.

6 But I think at the end of the day, what we
7 can say is that in terms of who -- who is providing a
8 policy on school integration that is more palatable to
9 a group of voters who are concerned about that issue
10 and that it's going too fast, Nixon was the better
11 choice.

12 Q. Okay. So Nixon was a better choice to those
13 concerned about desegregation than Humphrey or
14 McGovern. Do you think it was a lesser of two evils
15 situation or Nixon was more a positive good and
16 Humphrey and McGovern were --

17 A. I wouldn't look at it as the lesser of two
18 evils. I mean, I think in '68 he was probably the
19 lesser -- or he was probably -- I mean, Wallace was the
20 better choice or the more palatable choice for a lot of
21 white southerners. No. I think there is a lot about
22 Nixon that -- I wouldn't think he was the lesser of two
23 evils.

1 Q. So what policies specifically of Nixon's do you
2 think made him a positively attractive choice to
3 southern voters?

4 A. What policies? I mean, like I said, you know,
5 he did appoint conservative southerners to -- or he
6 nominated them. Whether they succeeded in getting on
7 the court, right, he chose men who had a record of not
8 being pro-civil rights jurists. Right? Okay. That's
9 something that white southerners can get behind. They
10 were successful or not, that's not on Nixon.

11 So I would point to that and say, 'okay,
12 that's where he,' you know -- 'that's where he comes
13 through.' I think when he says, you know, I am not
14 going to -- you know, probably more statements than --
15 you know, I'm not a Nixon policy expert. But when
16 Nixon talks about forced busing, using the power of the
17 state to make desegregation or integration a fact of
18 life, you know, that is something that white
19 southerners can get behind. Whether he is actually
20 able to do that, I think, is kind of beside the point
21 politically. He says that he is against it. And
22 whether desegregation continues under his watch, again,
23 there is very little -- he doesn't get punished for it.

1 There is very little that he can do once that ball is
2 in motion, I think, as president.

3 And, yeah. He is not -- they don't punish
4 him for it, right, because again, what's the
5 alternative? The alternative is George McGovern.

6 Q. The section titled "Stymied in the 1970's" on
7 that same page, 25.

8 A. Uh-huh (yes).

9 Q. This is page 25 of the initial report, Exhibit
10 1. The second sentence, "Despite Nixon's success in
11 1972 and despite the fact that the national Democratic
12 Party by 1972 had become increasingly fractured and
13 defined by its liberal-reform wing that was dedicated
14 to using federal machinery to expand and secure rights
15 for those at society's margins, southern Democrats in
16 the House and the Senate withstood the Goldwater and
17 Nixon challenges." This liberal reform wing you
18 mention, is that what some refer to as the New Left?

19 A. I don't like that -- I don't like that term.
20 What I would talk about there would be groups that --
21 like the women's -- people interested in women's
22 rights, people interested in gay rights.

23 New Left, I think, by this point, I mean, I

1 guess you could call it that. When I think about the
2 New Left, I really associate it more with the Vietnam
3 War and opposition to that war. But, you know, that's
4 fine. We can use that term.

5 Q. Okay. Were Humphrey and McGovern liberal reform
6 candidates?

7 A. Humphrey was not. Humphrey was a pretty solid,
8 you know, Democrat whose base of support was with labor
9 unions. That was one of his, you know, major areas of
10 support, slightly less civil rights groups. McGovern
11 had -- you know, was to the left, although he had a
12 strong -- both McGovern and Humphrey had strong voting
13 records for working-class issues.

14 I think in terms of, you know, McGovern was
15 -- had more of an ear for women's rights, for gay
16 rights, for the anti-war movement. Right? Humphrey
17 was Johnson's man. Right? He was going to continue
18 that policy. And so I think they are two -- I would
19 put McGovern to the left. And, of course, he was
20 absolutely slaughtered in '72.

21 Q. To what degree had the Democratic Party by 1972
22 become fractured and defined by the liberal reform
23 wing?

1 A. I don't think it had become defined by it, but
2 it was certainly cracking. The party itself comes up
3 with new rules with regard to who can participate or
4 who -- yeah, who participates in the convention and the
5 delegate process so that you do have more -- you know,
6 you have to have -- if you are sending a delegation --
7 and again, I don't know the rules specifically, but
8 there had to be more young people. There had to be
9 more people of color. There had to be more women. And
10 all of those groups have -- you know, those are in many
11 ways, except for African-Americans, right, these are
12 now constituencies with new concerns that are moving
13 the party to the left.

14 The counter balance to them is organized
15 labor, which remains supportive of the war in Vietnam.
16 A fairly staunch supporter of civil rights initiatives,
17 right, labor is usually in the forefront of a lot of
18 those fights going back to the '30's. But there are
19 places, you know, where they might differ. So I think
20 in '72, you really start seeing, yeah, the impact of
21 these new previously marginalized groups beginning to
22 make their voices heard, and the Democratic Party is
23 opening the door to that.

1 THE WITNESS: Can I get some more coffee?

2 MR. GEIGER: Yes. Can we go off the
3 record.

4 (Recess taken.)

5 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Page 26 of your initial report,
6 Exhibit 1.

7 A. When you say page 26, are we talking about
8 your --

9 Q. I'm only talking about yours.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. The very middle of that middle paragraph
12 beginning "Wallace's strident racial appeals secured a
13 base of support among white voters that Republicans
14 found impossible to break."

15 A. Uh-huh (yes).

16 Q. And I want to reference one sentence in your
17 supplemental report, this is on Exhibit 2, but yes,
18 it's also Exhibit C. Exhibit 2, page six. The first
19 sentence of the first full paragraph, you write,
20 "George Wallace was the most consequential politician
21 in Alabama in the second half of the 20th century."
22 How long did Wallace's strident racial appeals that you
23 reference stymie Republican efforts in Alabama?

1 A. I mean, Wallace -- and here, I think when we
2 talk about strident racial appeals, we can't ignore the
3 ones he had made in the past. Those stay with him,
4 right? Even when he runs in 1982, apologizes to black
5 voters and seems to have put that part behind him, it's
6 a part of who he is. It's still part of his record.
7 So I think it stays with him, right? Whether he is
8 overtly making racial appeals or not or whether he is
9 apologizing to black voters, again, black voters have
10 to be -- got to be pragmatic.

11 Why did they vote for Wallace in '82?
12 Because he is powerful, because he maybe did bring them
13 things like the junior college system. But in terms
14 of, you know, there was no room for -- you know, I
15 guess when I say strident racial appeals, I'm thinking
16 more about his past, sort of pre-early '70's. As we
17 get into the '70's, strident racial appeals are
18 becoming -- you know, it's not something that
19 Republicans are necessarily going to adopt, but there
20 is no room for them to maneuver even sort of if they
21 are using implicit racial appeals because Wallace has
22 that covered. Right?

23 And so I think when they think about George

1 Wallace, we don't think about George Wallace just in
2 one particular place in time. We have to think about
3 George Wallace in 1958 George Wallace or 1962 George
4 Wallace. So you can't divorce him from his history.

5 Q. Wallace had implicit racial appeals covered
6 during the '70's, I think I heard you say?

7 A. And I would say even until '82, the last time
8 that, you know -- he is who he is.

9 Q. I would like to introduce this article from the
10 Washington Post archives. This will be Exhibit 4.

11 (Defendant's Exhibit 4 was marked for
12 identification.)

13 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) This is an account of that
14 apology, which you have now referenced a few times. If
15 you can flip the page to the back, this Post,
16 Washington Post author writes, "The evidence suggests
17 genuineness. In 1979 at the Dexter Avenue Baptist
18 Church in Montgomery where Martin Luther King, Jr.,
19 pastored in the 1950's, Wallace made an unpublicized
20 and unannounced Sunday morning visit to the
21 congregation. As recounted by Stephen Leshner in his
22 1994 book, 'George Wallace, American Populist,' the
23 former governor was pushed up the aisle and spoke. 'I

1 have learned what suffering means in a way that was
2 impossible before the shooting. I think I can
3 understand something of the pain black people have come
4 to endure. I know I contributed to that pain, and I
5 can only ask your forgiveness.'"

6 And skipping a paragraph, "In Wallace's
7 last term as governor in the late 1980's, he hired a
8 black press secretary, appointed more than 160 blacks
9 to state governing boards and worked to double the
10 number of black voter registrars in Alabama's 67
11 counties. In part, it was the politics of patronage.
12 In his last race for governor, he won with 60 percent
13 of the vote and well over 90 percent of the black vote.
14 But on a deeper level, it was using his waning
15 political power to bond with those he once scorned.
16 Tuskegee Institute responded with an honorary degree. "

17 So I know that's some question of the
18 genuineness, and that's not what this is about. But
19 rather, I'm still interested in your opinion that
20 Wallace's past is carried with him into the '80's, into
21 his last term as governor. Can you explain that a bit
22 more to help me understand how after a moment like
23 that, his segregation, his past, still to a degree

1 still defines him in his last term?

2 A. Uh-huh (yes). Well, I think part of it would
3 have to -- you know, that lies on the individual voter.
4 Do people believe him? And it's -- you know, if I'm a
5 white voter in Alabama and I see him apologizing in a
6 black church, I can choose whether to believe that or
7 not. I can choose to believe whether that's a
8 legitimate change of heart and embrace -- I mean,
9 whatever is quoted here. I mean, he is only talking
10 about now that he has been shot, he recognizes that he
11 has caused pain. Okay.

12 You know, there is nothing here about equal
13 opportunity or equality or whatever. And if I'm a
14 white voter, I can -- you know, I get to interpret that
15 statement. Right? I still see the same man, you know,
16 who stood in the schoolhouse door. And I can choose to
17 believe whether he has changed or not as can -- as can
18 a black voter.

19 So I think simply because you apologize and
20 you do some hiring, it doesn't -- it doesn't erase who
21 you were, and voters are welcome to interpret this the
22 way they want to. I mean, they know George Wallace
23 really well. George Wallace has been a part of

1 political life for 30 years or 20 whatever, 25 years.
2 And to say that people -- now that, you know, he has
3 made a statement, suddenly white voters have to accept
4 what is perhaps presented to them as a new version of
5 Wallace, who can say? You know, that's up to them to
6 interpret.

7 Q. So then, I guess, that makes sense to me. But
8 when you write that "Wallace's strident racial
9 appeals," which I guess would include implicit appeals,
10 "secured that white base that Republicans found
11 impossible to break," what's your evidence that that
12 difficulty to break into the white vote by the
13 Republicans lasted into the '80's because of --

14 A. Because they say so.

15 MR. BLACKSHER: Y'all are talking over each
16 other.

17 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry.

18 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) The last part of my question
19 was because of Wallace's history?

20 A. Right, because that is what Republican
21 candidates say, right? That he still occupies center
22 stage in Alabama politics, and it's hard for us to find
23 a place to maneuver. And so -- in fact, I was just

1 reading something the other day. I could get you the
2 citation, if you need it.

3 But over and over again, that is what they
4 say. There is no place for us because he has that
5 covered. Whether he is going to continue the policies
6 of '62 or not, right, he carries that with him. And so
7 if we -- you know, we will try -- we see our future in
8 appealing to white Alabama voters. But as long as this
9 guy is here, as long as white Democrats who are not
10 Wallace can separate themselves from this increasingly
11 liberal national Democratic Party, there is no place
12 for -- you know, it's very, very hard for them.

13 Q. I understand that in the '80's, in response to a
14 powerful figure like Wallace was and the power that he
15 still had in the mind of the average Alabamian, both
16 white and black, but was it Wallace as the
17 segregationist, as the former segregationist, that --

18 A. I think it's Wallace -- sorry.

19 Q. Was it the Wallace as the former segregationist
20 that kept Republicans out or was it just this powerful
21 figure who was publicly a repensive segregationist and
22 one who had disallowed that --

23 A. I mean, Wallace was not a segregationist by the

1 1980's. I mean, he doesn't promote segregation in
2 1982. He is not -- he doesn't do that. But again, he
3 has spent his entire political life as the torchbearer
4 for mostly working-class whites and some middle -- you
5 know, who feel like all of these changes have
6 disadvantaged them. And he -- they still believe in
7 that, regardless of his apology, regardless of his
8 hiring of 160 people. They still see him as their
9 champion. And so, no. I wouldn't say that he is
10 making -- you know, he is promoting segregation in
11 1982. He is not doing that. But these appeals that he
12 made in the past, these echos of the older George
13 Wallace, are still there.

14 Q. Is he promoting race-based policies in 1982?

15 A. That, I don't know for sure.

16 Q. Do you think that white southerners in 1982 were
17 voting for him for racial reasons?

18 A. I think you can't separate whatever it is George
19 Wallace is doing from some sort of implicit appeal to
20 white voters.

21 Q. Because of their race?

22 A. Because of their feelings of victimization, and
23 his -- and his expert ability to exploit that.

1 Q. Let's turn to page to page 27. The second
2 paragraph begins, "The Republican party in the 1980's
3 did not shy away from racial messaging." And I'm just
4 going to skip to the third paragraph. "Under Reagan's
5 leadership," do you see where I'm at?

6 A. Yeah, yeah.

7 Q. "Under Reagan's leadership, the Republican Party
8 in the 1980's pursued a conservative agenda that, while
9 not explicitly racist, had race at its center.
10 Republicans pursued a range of policy prescriptions
11 that relied on the belief that the black community is
12 marked by higher rates of crime and illegitimacy, a
13 weakened family structure, low achievement in
14 educational levels, and greater demands on the welfare
15 system." I'm going to go back up a little bit to the
16 Lee Atwater quote.

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. "Republican strategist Lee Atwater in 1981
19 admitted that, quote, 'The whole strategy was based on
20 coded racism, the whole thing,'" end quote. Did you
21 listen to the whole interview of Atwater by Alexander
22 Lamis in 1981 that this quote is taken from?

23 A. No.

1 Q. I would like to give you a transcript of a
2 portion of that interview in context. And also because
3 I am not a person -- I want the audio of that part, and
4 we can follow along. And the audio is not -- I have
5 tried this before, and it's not excellent. It seems
6 like the microphone is a little bit far away from
7 Atwater and Lamis, but I think we'll be able to hear.
8 I'm not positive our Zoom listeners will hear, but
9 again, the transcript is going to be in the record. So
10 I will go ahead and mark and publish the transcript
11 now.

12 (Defendant's Exhibit 5 was marked for
13 identification.)

14 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Exhibit 5.

15 MR. BLACKSHER: Hold on a second here,
16 Soren. I'm concerned about authenticity,
17 authenticating what we are about to read or listen to.

18 MR. GEIGER: I have the whole transcript I
19 can also introduce into evidence, and I can --

20 MR. BLACKSHER: What is being marked as
21 Exhibit 5?

22 MR. GEIGER: That's a transcript of the
23 portion of the -- an audio portion of the interview we

1 are about to listen to.

2 MR. BLACKSHER: Okay. What was the date of
3 the interview?

4 MR. GEIGER: It's in 1981.

5 MR. BLACKSHER: And where is it available
6 publicly? How did you get it, in other words?

7 MR. GEIGER: It's available publicly
8 online. You don't have to go through any pay wall or
9 any subscription service.

10 MR. BLACKSHER: Okay. So is there any
11 problem in introducing the entire interview?

12 MR. GEIGER: No. That can be Exhibit 6.

13 MR. BLACKSHER: Pardon?

14 MR. GEIGER: That can be Exhibit 6.
15 Exhibit 5 is just the relevant portion of the 41-minute
16 interview.

17 MR. BLACKSHER: Okay. Is this the
18 interview in which he made the infamous remark about
19 "you can't say nigger, nigger, nigger again"?

20 MR. GEIGER: It is. That's not the portion
21 that Dr. Frederickson quotes. That's later on so we
22 are not going to be listening to that.

23 MR. BLACKSHER: We will be listening?

1 MR. GEIGER: We will not be.

2 MR. BLACKSHER: Okay.

3 (Audio played.)

4 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Okay. So did you include the
5 quotation, "The whole strategy was based on coded
6 racism," the whole thing as descriptive of Reagan's
7 strategy in your report?

8 A. Yeah. I'm looking at -- I want to look at the
9 footnote for that because I'm citing somebody else who
10 is citing Goldwater -- or sorry, Atwater. Okay. And
11 also Dan Carter. Yes.

12 Q. Do you agree based on what we heard in context
13 that Atwater was talking about the old Southern
14 strategy, not Reagan's campaign?

15 A. I would follow up on --

16 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form. Go
17 ahead.

18 A. I would follow up on what Mr. Blacksher was
19 speaking of is that I would need to read -- listen to
20 the entire -- to the interview in the entirety. In
21 terms of, you know, there is times when he says the
22 word that or this or whatever. I mean, before I would
23 answer that, I would need to listen to or read the

1 entire interview. But regardless of what Atwater is
2 saying, you know, and then he goes on to talk about --
3 well, he only talked about economics or national
4 defense. And I think as I answered in my supplemental
5 report that those things are not race neutral.

6 Q. What do you mean of his -- of Atwater's
7 statement that race was not a dominant issue in 1980?

8 A. I would say then why start your -- you know,
9 kick off your campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi?
10 Hardly a metropolis, but a highly charged location to
11 talk about State's rights. And then he goes on to talk
12 about the Voting Rights Act. Nobody is saying in 1980
13 that black people shouldn't vote. Right? We are well
14 beyond that. But going to Philadelphia, Mississippi,
15 where three civil rights workers were murdered and then
16 talk about State's rights and local control, the racial
17 overtones of that are difficult to ignore.

18 Q. The end of the next page, page 28, the sentence
19 beginning "In the 1980's and 1990's," kind of halfway
20 through that paragraph, the bottom paragraph.

21 A. Sorry. What does it start with?

22 Q. "In the 1980's and 1990's."

23 A. Okay.

1 Q. "In the 1980's and 1990's, the Republicans
2 incorporated additional conservative themes of anti-
3 feminism and religious fundamentalism that were
4 interwoven with racial resentment. As one scholar has
5 noted, 'Even when not directly on the surface, race
6 lurks beneath nearly every issue in state politics.'
7 Polls have shown that white evangelicals are
8 disproportionately more likely to voice support for
9 policies and politicians that have racially
10 conservative implications." I don't see a citation at
11 the very end to any polls. Are you familiar with what
12 polls those might have been?

13 A. No. They are probably cited in a secondary
14 source so that's my error. But most of -- a lot of
15 polls are included in the Angie Maxwell/Todd Shields
16 book, "The Long Southern Strategy."

17 Q. And the very end of what I just read, what are
18 racially conservative implications?

19 A. Where are we talking about?

20 Q. The same sentence, "Polls have shown that white
21 evangelicals are disproportionately more likely to
22 voice support for policies and politicians that have
23 racially conservative implications."

1 A. Well, for example, public spending on welfare,
2 which on its face seems race neutral until you see that
3 those cuts fall disproportionately on black families,
4 right? So there is many -- I think many elements of a
5 broader conservative agenda that have racial
6 implications or government spending, like I mentioned
7 before. Right? We are going to cut the size of
8 government. Well, that has racial complications
9 because government, courts, have been the tools through
10 which different decisions, whether they are with regard
11 to civil rights or women's rights, have been pursued.

12 Q. Do you agree with David Hughes who you cite in
13 footnote 58 that race lurks beneath nearly every issue
14 in the state's politics?

15 A. Yes, lurks beneath a lot of them.

16 Q. If I were to name a few of the more prominent
17 issues from that era, the era being the 1980's and
18 '90's, could you articulate how you think they are
19 connected to race?

20 A. Maybe.

21 Q. Let's try a few. Why do you think that race
22 would lurk beneath the issue of religious liberty?

23 A. Who is talking about religious liberty?

1 Q. School prayer, for example.

2 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form.

3 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Does race lurk beneath the
4 issue of school prayer?

5 A. I think race is connected -- that you can't
6 divorce the politicization of evangelicals in the late
7 1970's around issues of school prayer without
8 acknowledging that those same people were supporters of
9 segregation. Right? So while you might -- so I think
10 there is a connection with regard to individuals, and I
11 think there is also a connection with regard to what --
12 you know, sort of the proper role of government. And
13 so if government and the courts have been the tools by
14 which disadvantaged groups, particularly African-
15 American's have sought an equal playing field or
16 equality, but then those same tools are being
17 criticized for, you know, denying religious liberty or
18 what have you, I don't think you can separate those
19 things.

20 Q. Okay. What's your basis for believing, or do
21 you believe, that race lurks beneath the issue of
22 abortion?

23 A. I would say the same thing, that race again

1 politicizes evangelicals who took up abortion. First
2 of all, that's a new issue for them. But again, the
3 same people who are articulating what they call, you
4 know, family values conservatism are the same people
5 who pushed against efforts, you know, to desegregate
6 schools, to desegregate -- to deny, you know, 501(c)(3)
7 status or whatever it is to religious schools. So is
8 it at the heart of abortion? No, but it's not
9 unrelated.

10 Q. And it's related because those figures who
11 prominently advocate against the issue of abortion have
12 also advocated on issues of race or against issues of
13 racial equality?

14 A. Yes. I mean, that's -- I would point to my
15 own -- my supplemental report where I address Falwell,
16 Jesse Helms.

17 Q. So that aspect of their advocacy taints the
18 other non-explicitly racial issues with race?

19 A. I wouldn't use the word taint. I would say it
20 makes it very difficult to disconnect them. Is every
21 person opposed to abortion also opposed to equal rights
22 for black people or whatever? No, of course not. I'm
23 sure there are black individuals who because of their

1 religious beliefs are anti-abortion, but I think the
2 broader question is people claiming rights. Right?

3 Abortion doesn't become an issue for
4 evangelicals until women demand it as a right and it
5 becomes a protected right. Before that, it was a
6 Catholic issue. Right? So it's the expansion of the
7 tools of government to ensure rights in this case for
8 women that suddenly it becomes an issue around which to
9 galvanize. And so it's that -- I think it's that put
10 into that broader context, and again, that context
11 concludes rights for African-Americans as well in my
12 opinion.

13 Q. Along similar lines then, same sex marriage
14 rights, are they also -- is the issue and the argument
15 surrounding that issue also related to race?

16 A. Same sex marriage was not an issue in the '80's
17 and '90's. So I'm not going to address that because
18 I'm not -- I have not studied that issue as a political
19 issue.

20 Q. Okay. What about tax policy?

21 A. What about it?

22 Q. In the '80's and '90's, was that issue related
23 to race?

1 A. I think so because ultimately with Reagan's tax
2 policy, a lot of the burden is shifted to -- there is a
3 couple of things that's happening. Right? You can
4 never divorce any issue from anything else. And I
5 think as historians, it's our duty to find out how
6 these things interact to a lesser or greater degree.
7 And so I think Reagan's tax policy, which shifts the
8 burden to middle and working-class people at the same
9 time that welfare roles have been expanding, those
10 individuals are told both implicitly and explicitly
11 that they are bearing the cost of government spending
12 for poor people. And by the 1980's, welfare spending
13 over the course of, you know, two decades of discussion
14 is being coded as white -- or as black, excuse me, even
15 though, you know, numbers show us that there are more
16 white welfare recipients, but a greater percentage of
17 black families avail themselves of things like AFDC and
18 food stamps.

19 And so when tax burdens are shifted, people
20 feel that they are burdened. Those burdens are seen to
21 be benefitting black people unequally, then, yes, I
22 think it has racial implications.

23 Q. Going back to the issue of abortion, focusing on

1 party positions unnecessarily on voter behavior and
2 voter attention; is that right?

3 A. Uh-huh (yes). Try to.

4 Q. So in the 1990's, for example, the Republican
5 Party position, pro-life position, do you view their
6 inclusion of that in their platform as tied to race at
7 its core or at its periphery tied to race?

8 A. I wouldn't go so far as to say at its core, but
9 again, I will refer back to my earlier comments about
10 the use of government, the demands of marginalized
11 people for protections, that all of those things are
12 taking place within a large conversation, and that
13 conversation very much includes rights for blacks.

14 Q. Is it that whenever --

15 A. And let me -- can I continue?

16 Q. Yes, please.

17 A. Also, I mean, I think you also have to consider
18 the fact, as I have already said, right, that these are
19 -- these are rights being demanded by women, which
20 again, part of a larger conversation about the Equal
21 Rights Amendment, right, and the women's sexual
22 liberation movement which draws out of the civil rights
23 movement.

1 So I don't think you can slice and dice
2 these things and say abortion is only about -- now for
3 an individual, I'm not going to say what an individual
4 thinks. But I think as far as a larger conservative
5 agenda, these things are connected.

6 Q. So whenever a marginalized group has a right
7 threatened, is that related to race?

8 A. Whenever a marginalized group has a right
9 threatened, is that related to race? I would say
10 whenever a marginalized group proclaims a right and
11 seeks protection, I think if you want to understand the
12 articulation of that right and what it is they are
13 demanding and their demands for inclusion and
14 protection, you can't necessarily have -- I mean,
15 again, we are talking in generalities so I would have
16 to know what rights you are talking about. I think
17 within the context of American history, I think race is
18 always part of the discussion.

19 Q. Let's go on to page 29 and try to wrap up this
20 discussion of your initial report before lunch. About
21 seven or eight lines up from the very bottom, sentence
22 beginning, "Since the 1970's."

23 A. Uh-huh (yes).

1 Q. "Since the 1970's, Democrats have lost seats in
2 almost every legislative election cycle, due largely to
3 their loss of support among rural white voters." Jump
4 over to Dr. Carrington's report real quick, page 18.
5 The last sentence of that very top portion of the
6 paragraph, "Not until the 2010's did rural Southerner
7 whites align with the GOP more than urban whites."

8 A. Uh-huh (yes).

9 Q. Why do you think rural white voters were so slow
10 to switch to the GOP in the South?

11 A. Part of it is, I think, the proximity -- well, a
12 couple of things. First of all, I think Democrats just
13 had a deeper bench. I don't think we can talk about
14 the viability of the Republican party without looking
15 at, first of all, how very, very skilled Democratic
16 politicians were. I think Howell Heflin would be a
17 great example of that.

18 And somebody who could thread the needle
19 with regard to his own sort of more conservative
20 positions on something like school prayer with his
21 support for affirmative action. And he could -- and
22 that is one reason why it's so hard -- you know, so,
23 first of all, I think Republican Party just had -- it

1 took them a very long time to develop a party
2 structured to develop a party to field candidates at
3 lower levels who then could become part of their bench,
4 right? And so just weren't very good candidates.
5 Right? They were pretty bad actually.

6 So part of it is just kind of the human
7 element that Democrats were just better. Right? They
8 were just stronger, better candidates. I think also in
9 the 1970's, we still have that kind of human connection
10 in terms of party leaders with the new deal. The new
11 deal is transformative for poor people, but more so
12 working-class people.

13 And there was a special transformative for
14 white people. They were the beneficiaries of that
15 government largess and those government rights to a
16 much greater extent than were black people. I think as
17 that connection gets attenuated and stretched out,
18 right, as people who might have voted in the '30's,
19 '40's and '50's died, right, that connection is not
20 there. All right. Sorry. Remind me of your
21 original --

22 Q. So I will just ask a follow-up question along
23 those same lines. So in the 1990's, was the Democratic

1 Party in the South trying to keep their white base,
2 what was left of it, with appeals to race, do you
3 think?

4 A. I think they were trying to find policy
5 positions that did not aggravate black voters and make
6 them feel that black people were getting -- you know,
7 whether we agree that these are additional benefits or
8 not, I think they try to carve out policy positions
9 like -- and even this is not -- this is not free of
10 racial implications, like infrastructure, right?

11 They try to carve out policy positions that
12 can attract enough white voters and not lose too many
13 black voters. And again, black voters, they don't have
14 the luxury of shopping around, right? They are a
15 minority population. The Democratic Party, the
16 national party, has proven itself to be receptive and
17 sensitive to their needs and desires.

18 And so there is really sort of no option
19 for them, but the Democratic Party can't -- you know,
20 the only way it can compete, it has to hang on to a
21 certain percentage of white voters. And so finding
22 policy positions that, again, can sort of thread that
23 needle is becoming increasingly difficult and

1 especially at, you know, the national level where black
2 voices are becoming more prominent.

3 Jesse Jackson would be a good example of
4 that, and that makes white voters in the South -- you
5 know, they are not supporters of Jesse Jackson, right?
6 He is kind of their worst nightmare in terms of this
7 has become the black people and black needs and black
8 desires and, therefore, it's a zero game. We will be
9 disadvantaged.

10 Q. A couple more things real quick. The first
11 paragraph on page 29, "Building on the position that
12 Nixon had pioneered and Reagan had expanded, by the end
13 of the 20th century, race and white anxiety formed the
14 bedrock of conservative political ideology and was
15 embedded in conflicts surrounding taxes, spending,
16 education, crime and welfare as well as the promotion
17 of what came to be known as family values issues.
18 Racial attitudes become a central characteristic of
19 both ideology and party identification, integral to
20 voters' choices between Democrats and Republicans."
21 And then the second to the last sentence on this page
22 beginning "Only 17 percent."

23 A. Okay.

1 Q. "In Alabama, only 17 percent of white voters
2 identify as Democrats and only 15 percent of black
3 voters identify as Republicans." Is it your opinion as
4 a historian that the racial breakdown of the two
5 political parties is the result of race and white
6 anxiety?

7 A. I think the racial breakdown of the parties is
8 due to a lack of effort on the part of the Republican
9 Party to attract black voters and to appeal to white
10 voters, whether the voters themselves feel anxiety or
11 not or they choose on that. I try not to get too far
12 into voter choice.

13 Q. The last sentence of that top paragraph that I
14 read, you write, "Again, racial attitudes become a
15 central characteristic of both ideology and party
16 identification, integral to voters' choices between
17 Democrats and Republicans."

18 A. If I were to write this over, I would probably
19 take out "voter choices."

20 Q. Okay. How would you know -- first, strike that.
21 During the period you have studied, ending with the
22 1990's, did race dominate Southern politics?

23 A. How would you define dominate?

1 Q. Using some of the phrases that you have used,
2 it's central to party politics. It's embedded in
3 almost every issue.

4 A. Yeah. I mean, I think saying it dominates is
5 saying it's implicated in a lot of different issues.
6 So, yes. I would say that you can take a multitude of
7 issues, and you don't have to scratch too far below the
8 surface to find that there are racial consequences and
9 racial implications.

10 Q. Is it the most important issue that might be
11 lurking below the surface?

12 A. Are you asking me as a historian or as a
13 citizen?

14 Q. As a historian.

15 A. As of 1990? I would say -- I would say it's the
16 most intractable.

17 Q. How would you know when it has stopped being the
18 most intractable?

19 A. Uh-huh (yes).

20 Q. What would you look for as evidence of that?

21 A. Being a historian, what I would first have to do
22 is wait. In someone who is interested in party
23 politics, I think I would have to wait until people's

1 papers are available and I see communications that
2 people are having with -- the politicians are having
3 with voters.

4 I truly believe as a historian that you
5 really can't talk about sort of voter desire and voter
6 choice until you actually get the voices of voters.
7 And so we get some snippets of that in polls, but, you
8 know, questions are worded weirdly. What you can see
9 in politicians' papers though are people writing and
10 saying, "This issue is important to me. I like this
11 issue because I'm concerned about X."

12 And so I think in order to understand,
13 okay, when does it get eclipsed, you know, I can't say
14 because I don't think the evidence is available for me
15 to survey. Speaking as -- well, I will just leave it
16 there.

17 Q. Would it be significant evidence to you that it
18 has been eclipsed if conservative issues were beginning
19 to wane in popularity?

20 A. So in other words, if there was a progressive --
21 I mean, I would have to -- I would have to see what
22 issues are coming to the forefront.

23 Q. Hypothetically, if the Republican Party threw

1 off the pro-life policy position, disavowed it, would
2 that be evidence to you that race was beginning to lose
3 some of its force in Republican politics?

4 A. Not necessarily, because the pro-life position
5 is -- first of all, I don't see that happening. But
6 second of all, it's interconnected. So I would have to
7 see -- you know, I would have to see the context.

8 Q. Looking at how voters vote, whether they vote
9 Republican or Democratic, is that evidence one way or
10 the other of the influence that race has upon politics
11 in the South?

12 A. I mean, it's not meaningless, right? And I
13 think if -- you know, what you can say is you can look
14 at it, look at a campaign. You can look at all the
15 materials surrounding an administration or a politician
16 and their positions. Look at the issues that they
17 emphasize, how often do they talk about it, how do they
18 talk about it, what are people responding to. And then
19 you look at the vote. I think you can say if all a
20 politician talks about is white supremacy and he gets
21 90 -- or she gets 99 percent of the white vote, then I
22 would say yes, race is pretty important. But I think
23 it's something that we need to be -- you know, it takes

1 care, and it takes time. And I do think as a
2 historian, I think it takes some distance.

3 Q. If all a politician talked about were pro-life
4 position, lower government spending, certain foreign
5 policy positions and garnered 83 percent of the white
6 vote, would that be evidence to you that race is
7 actually at play in that politician's strategy or in
8 his politics?

9 A. One thing I would say is that lower government
10 spending often targets programs and agencies that have
11 as part of -- main part of their benefits, programs,
12 employment that address the needs of poor people and
13 especially poor black people. And so if that is where
14 your -- you know, your spending cuts are falling,
15 again, we would have to see what do they want to cut?
16 Do you want to cut defense? Okay. I don't know that
17 -- you know, I'm not going to say it doesn't involve
18 race, but I would have to take a closer look at it.
19 But if what we are talking about is social spending,
20 again, looking historically, you can't separate social
21 spending cuts from ideas about race.

22 Q. Almost done before lunch. If more white voters
23 voted Democratic, would that be a good sign that race

1 was losing some of its influential power?

2 MR. BLACKSHER: Is the question about today
3 or what's the timeframe?

4 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) The statistics you gave, I
5 think, were modern, today's statistics of 17 percent
6 white Republicans.

7 A. I mean, you know, I don't think I'm qualified to
8 comment on -- if we are talking about 2024. I'm a
9 historian so --

10 Q. The very last page of your initial report, page
11 30, I guess I should begin the sentence on page 29.
12 The sentence expands the pages.

13 A. Uh-huh (yes).

14 Q. "As Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields argue in
15 their recent book, 'The Long Southern Strategy,' the
16 decision to chase white Southern voters in order to
17 build a new Republican coalition was not only
18 intentional, strategic and effective, but it was also
19 unabating." Quoting that adjective "unabating," as a
20 historian, is it your opinion that it was unabating up
21 until the end of the 20th century or do you also as a
22 historian believe that it continues to be unabating?

23 A. Speaking as a historian, I would say that the

1 evidence is clear through the period in which I feel
2 comfortable, talking about roughly the '90's, that the
3 Republican party saw its future in attracting Southern
4 white votes.

5 MR. GEIGER: How about a lunch break?

6 (Recess taken.)

7 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Let's go to your supplemental
8 report, Exhibit 2, I think.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Your footnote one?

11 A. Uh-huh (yes).

12 Q. "Calling the Democratic Party the party of
13 Jefferson Davis is peculiar and unnecessarily
14 inflammatory." Would you consider Jefferson Davis a
15 white supremacist?

16 A. Oh, absolutely.

17 Q. And he was a Democrat, right?

18 A. Yep.

19 Q. And I think we talked about the passage in your
20 initial report describing the Democratic Party as the
21 party of white supremacy --

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. -- for at least the first half of the 20th

1 century?

2 A. Uh-huh (yes).

3 Q. I'm going to read the sentence that goes from
4 page one to two. "He states elsewhere that, quote,
5 'Race, of course, came to the forefront in the 1960's
6 in a way that severely tested the Democratic New Deal
7 coalition but did not produce an immediate move" --
8 this is yours -- "to the Republican party of any
9 durability,'" end quote. The next sentence, "Neither I
10 nor the preponderance of scholars of Southern politics
11 who look at the issue of race argue that the transition
12 was immediate. His report seeks to disprove this
13 faulty premise which, because it is so reductive and
14 simplistic, relieves him of the responsibility of
15 examining the deep historical and culture complexity of
16 Democratic Party allegiance stretching back to the 19th
17 century." Were there other places in his report that
18 communicated to you that Dr. Carrington believed that
19 the other side, including you, think the switch was
20 immediate?

21 A. Beyond what I have quoted here, no. I think
22 that that will -- you know, off the top of my head, if
23 I haven't included it here, then it might -- it might

1 be that sentence. In other words, he is trying to
2 disprove something that I never claimed.

3 Q. Or do you think it's possible that you and he
4 agree on that part of the story, that the transition
5 was slow and that he is not trying to characterize your
6 argument one way or the other?

7 A. Then I don't think -- if that is the case, I
8 mean, anything is possible. But I think he tries to --
9 he tries to disprove a claim that I do not make. I
10 don't -- I don't know what he believes or doesn't
11 believe, but I think he spends a lot of time saying,
12 well, because we see Democrats being elected here and
13 because Strom Thurmond is the only person who did this,
14 you know, therefore, this argument is unsubstantiated,
15 when in fact it's not an argument I made. So I feel
16 like he misrepresented what I said.

17 Q. The next paragraph beginning "His
18 mischaracterization," about three sentences in, "As
19 Jason Morgan Ward has argued, overt defense of white
20 supremacy per se receded around mid century to be
21 replaced by a defense of segregation and later by
22 racialized (though not explicitly white supremacist)
23 policy positions and politics." How do you define

1 white supremacy?

2 A. That's a good question. I would describe white
3 supremacy as a political position that predominates in,
4 among Democratic Party politicians, you know, fairly
5 explicitly, probably until passage of Voting Rights
6 Acts of 1965 when we see black voters entering the
7 political system and wanting to vote Democratic.

8 White supremacy, I think, involves more
9 than simply white -- maintaining white privilege or
10 protecting white interests. I think it is an over-
11 arching system of exclusion, a lack of rights, a belief
12 that black people are somehow not fully -- I want to
13 say not fully human, but characteristically different
14 from white people. And white supremacy is a system
15 that must be maintained both through law and also
16 through violence.

17 And so what I objected to was he ascribes
18 to me calling Nixon -- he uses -- the word "white
19 supremacist" as if I used that to describe Nixon. And
20 so I was objecting to that because I think white
21 supremacy in many ways begins to ebb from the scene in
22 the 1960's. And, you know, by the 1970's, I mean,
23 yeah, you will have people today who declare all of

1 those things that I just said, but you are not going to
2 see a party exposing them. So I'm thinking mostly of
3 sort of party positions.

4 Q. This Jason Morgan Ward story, he tells of white
5 supremacy to segregation to implicit racialized policy
6 positions. And I think he actually says racialized
7 policy positions, but then in parenthesis not
8 explicitly white supremacy. Do you think he would
9 define white supremacy perhaps a bit more broadly than
10 you to not -- so to be a little bit more specific, do
11 you think Ward believes that racialized policy
12 positions in the post segregation era are implicitly
13 white supremacists?

14 A. I can't say what he believes.

15 Q. Do you think that these racialized policy
16 positions are implicitly white supremacist?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you think that segregation is inherently
19 white supremacist?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Why?

22 A. Because it's a system, because it is maintained
23 not only through law but through violence, because it

1 rests on a belief about black people as fundamentally
2 -- not only deserving of equal treatment but in some
3 ways fundamentally different from white people in all
4 sorts of different ways.

5 Q. Why then aren't racialized policy positions more
6 implicit appeals not also at the core white
7 supremacist?

8 A. Well, I think the most obvious reason is they
9 are not going to be maintained through violence. If
10 someone doesn't agree or votes against or opposes
11 publicly -- opposes, you know, cutting welfare
12 spending, it's not bloody likely that there is going to
13 be a lynch mob. Right? There is not the fairly
14 explicit threat of maintaining that policy through
15 violence, and I think violence is really a key thing.

16 I mean, in the early part of 20th century,
17 white supremacist politicians were openly supportive of
18 extra legal violence, right, to maintain the system and
19 maintain their sense of superiority and their actual
20 superiority legally and politically and economically.

21 Q. So when it comes to that system of violence,
22 would you agree that that is behind us when it comes to
23 party positions?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And when do you think that ceased to be a part
3 of the political scene?

4 A. Yeah. Again, you know, individual -- I'm sure I
5 can find an individual who doesn't speak to this, but I
6 think beginning -- I would agree -- you know, I don't
7 completely agree with Ward, and I have to go back and
8 be more specific about him, his book here. But, you
9 know, I wrote about in the Dixiecrat book, you know,
10 the person who runs for the Dixiecrat president, you
11 know, the Dixiecrat candidates, Strom Thurmond, quite
12 explicitly speaks out against extra legal violence and
13 lynching.

14 And so I think, you know, because -- and
15 his reasons for doing it are not necessarily because he
16 values black life, but because modern societies don't
17 form lynch mobs and, you know, execute people outside
18 of the rules of law. So I would say, you know, World
19 War II is an important turning point.

20 Q. Okay. So even though these racialized policy
21 positions are no longer accompanied by the threat or
22 use of violence, do they still give priority to or
23 preference to white interests and white values?

1 A. Can you be more specific?

2 Q. I believe that when I first asked you to define
3 white supremacy, you said it's not just white
4 privilege?

5 A. Uh-huh (yes).

6 Q. Or even white victimization?

7 A. Uh-huh (yes).

8 Q. But these racialized policy positions, would you
9 define them as inherently about white privilege and
10 white victimization?

11 A. I would say very -- I don't know if I would say
12 primarily, but I think that is an important component.

13 Q. Of how they are racialized?

14 A. Right. And again, I think the key there also is
15 what are the implements used to enact these policies,
16 right? It's the judiciary. It's the federal
17 bureaucracy.

18 I think that's also important in terms of
19 how whites begin to see themselves as victimized
20 because a lot of -- again, a lot of the rights and
21 benefits and protections that marginalized people seek
22 are ultimately carried out through these different
23 mechanics of unelected people. Right? And I think

1 people like Wallace, Nixon, Ronald Reagan, they are
2 very adept at using that rhetoric of Wallace's. You
3 know, he is the originator, right? Of this, you know,
4 the bureaucratic elite, these unelected officials who
5 are forcing black students into your schools or forcing
6 black students into your neighborhoods.

7 And I think -- I think white voters, as I
8 say in my original report, can say on the one hand, we
9 believe -- we support the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On
10 the other hand, we feel like we are bearing the brunt
11 as they would define it, right, of the benefits and
12 advantages and then what have you, the rights being
13 afforded these people. They are coming into our
14 neighborhoods, they are coming into our schools. So,
15 therefore, we are -- we are the victims now.

16 Q. Do you think white southerners continue to think
17 of themselves as victims in the 1990's?

18 A. In what capacity?

19 Q. So, for example, with separation of powers or
20 federalism that perhaps white southerners would have
21 some contempt for the federal bureaucracy? Is that
22 because they were thinking of themselves as a white
23 victim?

1 A. I think that conservative ideology and that the
2 conservatism as was developed -- you know, largely
3 developed by Reagan and carried on by George Bush, drew
4 on what I would say sort of a broader sort of
5 conservative egalitarianism where they would talk about
6 equality of opportunity but not equality of results
7 because to get a quality of results requires the
8 mechanism of government.

9 And so when you say, well, we believe in
10 equality of opportunity and everything should be fair,
11 we see a lot more talk of fairness. Well, affirmative
12 action by working-class white people who maybe are in
13 the fire department or the police department, some of
14 these early places where affirmative action does start
15 to get in force, saw themselves as victims. It's not
16 fair. I didn't cause -- you know, I'm not a
17 segregator, right?

18 So, therefore, I think that that language
19 of fairness, that conservative egalitarianism, which I
20 think on its face ignores the fact of systemic racism
21 and systemic discrimination that has a long history
22 does allow a certain feeling of victimhood because in
23 many ways they are not wrong, right? Those policies

1 are being enacted in their place of work, in their
2 neighborhoods. Now how they should feel about that, of
3 course, is a different thing.

4 Q. On page four of your supplemental report, that
5 one sentence paragraph there in the middle, "Alabama
6 was a site of fervent progressive reform. Many of the
7 social and political reforms undertaken were driven or
8 warped by the desire to maintain white supremacy, but
9 they were considered progressive nevertheless."

10 A. Uh-huh (yes).

11 Q. What new deal programs did southern Democrats
12 have this fervent --

13 A. You mean progressive reforms?

14 Q. Yes. Thank you. I meant progressive programs.

15 A. Child labor, child labor reform. You know, the
16 turn of the century, it would be quite common to go to
17 a textile mill and find an eight-year-old, and textile
18 mills were exclusively loosely -- I hate to use that
19 word loosely -- for poor white people. They were
20 promoted as a way to uplift the white South to, you
21 know, help dirt farmers, white dirt farmers, right,
22 move into the industrial era.

23 And for a variety of reasons, progressive

1 reformers in Alabama focused on child labor reform,
2 that it's not good to -- not because childhood needs to
3 be protected. That's part of it. But because by
4 spending 12 hours a day in a mill, you are not going to
5 school. If you are not going to school, you are not
6 learning to read. If you are not learning to read, how
7 are you going to pass the literacy test? And how will
8 we preserve white democracy if we have this large
9 burgeoning politician -- or population of white
10 children who are going into industrial work? Right?

11 So race is never far from -- never far from
12 the surface. I would say prohibition would be another
13 one, that prohibition -- the one place where you would
14 find whites and blacks mixing regularly were in road-
15 houses, right? And at the cabins of bootleggers.
16 Well, how do you maintain that color line? You just
17 get rid of the -- you get rid of the source.

18 Q. Next paragraph, the sentence three lines up from
19 bottom, beginning "These two groups."

20 A. Uh-huh (yes).

21 Q. First, I should -- you define those groups as
22 southern white Democrats and African-Americans where
23 they could access the votes.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. "These two groups were far from equal partners
3 in this coalition." Do you -- and then I believe you
4 go to explain why for the rest of the paragraph. Are
5 you responding to a portion of Dr. Carrington's report
6 where you think he is saying that they are or they were
7 equal partners in that New Deal coalition?

8 A. I think he -- he is trying to make an argument
9 about the new deals focus on class. And because they
10 focused on class, you could have these groups with very
11 antithetical desires in a political party together.
12 And what I was saying here is that I think that ignores
13 the fact that, first of all, Southern -- white southern
14 Democrats, the New Deal wouldn't exist without them.
15 They crafted a lot of it, and they were -- if Roosevelt
16 didn't have their support, it would not have passed.
17 They would not have gotten anything.
18 As a result, the new deal is very -- its benefits, its
19 protections, excludes a lot of black people, right? So
20 it's not the new deal, and its measures did not support
21 working people equally. It was, you know, very heavily
22 weighted towards the white working class. They were
23 the beneficiaries.

1 So in other words, I was arguing that it's
2 -- you know, you can't look at the new deal and not
3 talk about race. And again, it's embedded in my larger
4 disagreement with him where he is trying to erase from,
5 you know, the early part of the century.

6 Q. Okay. Let's talk about that point specifically.
7 And can we go to his report real quick, Exhibit 3?

8 A. Uh-huh (yes).

9 Q. Page two, the second full paragraph beginning
10 with the word "first," looks like three sentences down
11 or so. "In that examination, I do note how pervasive
12 the issue of race was during the post Civil War and
13 early 20th century periods." Do you see that?

14 A. Uh-huh (yes).

15 Q. And skip to page six, first little paragraph,
16 third sentence after footnote 16. "And race did play
17 an out-sized part through a significant portion of
18 Southern political history." Skip two sentences. "In
19 this instance, race and its institutionalization in
20 slavery or later in segregation, overwhelmed other
21 factors that might have undermined this majority
22 faction and created fluid coalitions." And a little
23 bit further down in that paragraph, beginning with "The

1 issue of race." "The issue of race was perpetuated by
2 voter suppression and Jim Crow segregation in the post-
3 reconstruction South as well." And the last sentence
4 of the paragraph, "Therefore, the preceding points must
5 be seen and acknowledged as deeply influential on
6 Southern politics in the 19th and early to mid 20th
7 centuries." Do you still hold that Dr. Carrington was
8 trying to erase race from the --

9 A. I do because, first of all, he says the
10 progressive -- it doesn't in the South, which is not to
11 be mean, absurd. I mean, it's one thing -- I mean, if
12 he would have said segregation disenfranchisement
13 didn't happen, I think he gives us the baseline. But
14 when he gets to specifics and he is trying to make his
15 arguments about class, in the specifics, he ignores it
16 completely.

17 So I think it's one thing to say yes, there
18 was disenfranchisement and segregation. It is quite
19 another then to say but there was no progressive
20 movement and the new deal was wholly about class and
21 ignore how race was embedded in both of those things.
22 They can't both be true.

23 Q. Could you say that last part one more time?

1 What can't both be true?

2 A. You can't both say that segregation and -- you
3 know, segregation and disfranchisement as -- he
4 acknowledges that they exist, but then when he is
5 looking at particulars of sort of political activity
6 like the new deal, all he sees is class. And, of
7 course, like I said, he doesn't think it existed at all
8 in the South.

9 Q. Let's look at page five of your supplemental
10 report under -- actually continuing with this theme of
11 class versus race or class and race. The paragraph
12 under heading three, the last sentence of that
13 paragraph, "Any conflict between the Democratic Party
14 nominees and white working-class voters was not based
15 on any lack of support for working-class issues."
16 Would white working-class southerners have felt just at
17 home within the Democratic Party of 1972 as within the
18 Democratic Party of the '30's, '40's and '50's?

19 A. Okay. Sorry. It took me a while to get to the
20 sentence. "Any conflict between the Democratic Party
21 nominees and white working-class voters was not based
22 on any lack of support for working-class issues." If
23 what we are talking about -- so you are saying -- I'm

1 sorry. Repeat your question.

2 Q. Would white working-class southerners --

3 A. Uh-huh (yes).

4 Q. -- have felt just as home within the Democratic
5 Party of 1972 with McGovern as within the Democratic
6 Party of the '30's, '40's and '50's?

7 A. If all they were concerned about were how the
8 leaders of those parties or the national parties dealt
9 with labor issues, then they should have been. What
10 I'm saying here is that that was not the issue that was
11 driving them away. If you look at you Hubert
12 Humphrey's voting records, if you look at McGovern's
13 voting record, they have, you know, from whoever
14 measures those things. I think the unions, you know,
15 like the NRA gives out voting records from people who
16 support gun rights and all of that. Labor unions did
17 likewise.

18 Both these guys are almost 100 percent.
19 Right? Everything that labor -- and here I am, I'm
20 talking about organized union labor because they were
21 the ones that were sort of -- they were kind of the
22 mouthpiece, right? Everything that labor wanted in
23 terms of sort of bread and butter issues, right?

1 Humphrey and McGovern gave them.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. Right? And so, you know, I am explicitly
4 countering his argument that why working-class people
5 started leaving the Democratic Party was because some
6 small group of left wing intellectuals were calling
7 them racist. First of all, there is no basis in fact
8 for that. And in terms of who actually held power in
9 '68? It was labor. They were the biggest voice in the
10 room.

11 Q. What about '72 with McGovern?

12 A. Uh-huh (yes). '72 is a problem. McGovern has a
13 very strong record, but he is against the war. He is
14 much more liberal on social issues than is Hubert
15 Humphrey, and honestly, a lot of those issues hadn't
16 really percolated to the surface in '68 the way they
17 did by 1972, things like abortion and women's rights
18 and sexual liberation and all of that. I don't know
19 how Humphrey would have responded to that, but that's a
20 counter factual.

21 And so for working-class people who -- you
22 know, and by '72, as I already indicated in terms of
23 party rules, stronger participation by women, by young

1 people, by black voters. You know, we're also how many
2 years down the road? We are now into a period of
3 busing. The Democratic Party for all of the concerns
4 about busing, they do support it in their platform.

5 So there are -- you know, it's not -- it's
6 not economic issues on their face that are driving
7 working-class people away. It's racial issues, and
8 it's cultural issues. And those things often combine.

9 Q. So some of those cultural issues that you
10 mentioned that could happen likely did drive white
11 southern working-class voters away, would have been
12 abortion and women's rights and the Vietnam war,
13 position of the Democratic Party, sexual liberation,
14 things of that nature?

15 A. Yeah, uh-huh (yes).

16 Q. And those are related to race?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. On page six, please, that first full
19 sentence on the top of the page. "Although the
20 numerous groups that made up the New Left coalition
21 would eventually help shape the Democratic Party agenda
22 after 1968, the first major fracture with electoral
23 impact at the presidential level came about as a result

1 of civil rights legislation and George Wallace's third
2 party candidacy." And I will mark and publish exhibit
3 -- be No. 6.

4 (Defendant's Exhibit 6 was marked for
5 identification.)

6 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Do you recognize this book and
7 the chapter 12 that I have excerpted?

8 A. I do.

9 Q. Could you tell me what it is?

10 A. This is an edited volume of topics in Southern
11 history in which I was invited to participate and
12 contribute a chapter on political history in the 20th
13 century.

14 Q. It was published last year?

15 A. Sorry. And it was published last year,
16 University of North Carolina Press.

17 MR. BLACKSHER: What's the number? Exhibit
18 what?

19 MR. GEIGER: This is six.

20 MR. BLACKSHER: Thank you.

21 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) There are no page numbers
22 unfortunately, so just turn the page once to the page
23 opposite of George Wallace's face.

1 A. Uh-huh (yes).

2 Q. The very top sentence of that page, "After
3 1968."

4 A. Oh, sorry. Which one? Top sentence of which
5 page?

6 Q. Flip one more.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. "After 1968," very top.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. "After 1968, the national Democratic Party
11 underwent a transformation, becoming more liberal with
12 stronger representation among previously under-
13 represented groups. The party staked out progressive
14 positions on women's rights, particularly support for
15 the Equal Rights Amendment and the support for a
16 women's right to terminate a pregnancy that were at
17 odds with many culturally conservative white voters in
18 the South." Within the fractures of the Democratic
19 Party of the late '60's and early '70's, would you
20 agree that the New Left or the liberal reform that we
21 are talking about is the one that had a lasting and
22 defining impact?

23 A. Lasting and defining impact on what?

1 Q. On the Democratic Party, the national Democratic
2 Party.

3 A. More lasting and defining than the civil rights
4 movement? No.

5 Q. Than, for example, George Wallace's third party
6 candidacy in 1968?

7 A. No.

8 Q. It would not have -- it would not be the
9 lasting --

10 A. It wouldn't -- it wouldn't be more -- it is
11 lasting. It has had an impact. Is it more important
12 than the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
13 Act of 1965? I would think not. And again, as I have
14 said many times, right, I think these things are --
15 it's very hard to separate them. Right? One draws
16 upon the other.

17 Q. On page six of your supplemental report, the
18 part we just read -- sorry, of your supplemental
19 report. The part we just read, would you say the first
20 major fracture with electoral impact at the
21 presidential level came about as a result of civil
22 rights legislation and George Wallace's third party
23 candidacy? And then elsewhere I think we have already

1 spoken about Wallace, but you wrote that he was the
2 most consequential politician in Alabama in the second
3 half of the 20th century.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. Do you believe that George Wallace's third party
6 candidacy and his presence on the political scene had a
7 greater lasting impact for the Democratic Party than
8 did the New Left, the New Left's rise?

9 A. Only insofar as I think Wallace created a
10 playbook that was adopted by Richard Nixon and others.
11 So I think in many ways, his impact was greater on the
12 Republican Party. You know, the -- he gave them a
13 language by which to, I think, overcome the long
14 historical antipathy towards the Republican Party.

15 But in terms of why his candidacy is
16 successful, which is based on his, you know, opposition
17 to the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act. And
18 his -- you know, to a lesser degree, his opposition to
19 anti-war protesters, I think that -- that has -- that
20 has a greater impact. And that is only, you know,
21 accelerated by the incorporation of the needs, wants,
22 desires of marginalized groups.

23 Q. On Dr. Carrington's report, Exhibit 3 again.

1 A. That's me. Okay.

2 Q. Bottom of page ten, the sentence three lines up
3 beginning "The New Left would move." "The New Left
4 would move the Democratic Party's coalition to include
5 more college-educated voters and to focus more on non-
6 economic issues of gender, race, the environment, gun
7 regulation and other matters." Would you agree with
8 that? It appears to be fairly similar to what you
9 wrote in the chapter submitted for a new --

10 A. I am troubled by non-economic because I think a
11 lot of the gender issues, a lot of the racial issues
12 have to do with employment.

13 Q. Other than that characterization of those issues
14 as non-economic, would you agree that that's what the
15 New Left emphasized and focused on?

16 A. I mean, I don't know about environment, gun
17 regulation, and, you know, I'm not -- I'm not versed in
18 those issues in the political environment. So it
19 sounds -- it sounds fine.

20 Q. The next sentence, "Working-class voters would
21 remain in the coalition but with increasing unease and
22 decreasing numbers. For in these developments, a
23 growing section of the Democratic Party would expand on

1 C. Wright Mills' implicit critique of the working
2 class, arguing in more explicit terms that it
3 perpetuated the forces of oppression on issues sex,
4 sexuality and race." Do you disagree with the latter
5 two sentences that I just read?

6 A. Yes, mostly because I think the idea that
7 everybody reading C. Wright Mills and pointing fingers
8 at them and saying the white working class are sexist
9 and racist and all of that. I think -- I think it's --
10 I won't say ridiculous. I think it's overblown, and I
11 think if in fact one of the -- I can think of an
12 example that implicitly, I think, counters that, which
13 is, let's say, women's rights, the right -- you know,
14 equal employment opportunity but also issues of daycare
15 and government-funded daycare. That goes explicitly to
16 questions of class. Right?

17 It's one thing to have a right, which is
18 the right to work and the right to compete in the labor
19 market. It's quite another thing to be able to do
20 that, and women's groups took on that challenge by
21 advocating for government-funded daycare so that
22 working-class women can also have that opportunity. So
23 I would say, you know, at least in that specific, I

1 think he is wrong.

2 Q. Do you think generally that working-class voters
3 felt an increasing sense of unease with the direction
4 of the Democratic Party in the 1970's?

5 A. I think that's probably electorally proven,
6 yeah.

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. Now the source of that, I think probably --
9 Carrington and I would probably disagree with that.
10 But, yeah. I think the numbers bear that out.

11 Q. I guess that would go to the last phrase of the
12 excerpt from "A New History of the American South" that
13 I read, which is that these issues of the New Left were
14 at odds with many culturally conservative white voters
15 in the South.

16 A. Uh-huh (yes).

17 Q. Hence, their unease?

18 A. Well, I mean, okay. But culturally conservative
19 white voters is not necessarily always working-class
20 voters. I would, you know, just take pains to point
21 that out.

22 Q. Understood. The section "Anticommunism" a
23 little bit further down the page on page six in your

1 supplemental report.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The middle sentence of that first paragraph
4 reads, "He grounds white southerners' anticommunism in
5 their religiosity but very quickly dismisses the long
6 history of the linkage between race and anticommunism
7 -- a history that stretches back to 1919." How does
8 the linkage stretch back to 1919?

9 A. It stretches back to the -- and here, I'm
10 talking about just the linkage of race and
11 anticommunism or communism nationally, not just
12 confined to the South. But in 1919, there was a race
13 riot in Chicago in which J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI,
14 local officials said this was the result of communist
15 infiltration and agitation as opposed to, you know,
16 something else. Right? Local conditions.

17 Q. The last complete sentence of this page, "A
18 history exists of communists fighting for racial
19 equality and workers' rights in America" --

20 A. Alabama.

21 Q. Sorry, thank you. In Alabama. And then just
22 keep reading. "In the 1930's, the Communist Party
23 organized black sharecroppers into a union." And then

1 skipping a sentence, "More famously, lawyers with the
2 Communist Party's International Defense fund defended
3 the Scottsboro boys." Are you saying that the
4 segregationist and white supremacist view of communism
5 as intertwined with civil rights was not entirely
6 unfounded, that there actually was a connection between
7 communism and civil rights efforts?

8 A. I think that -- yeah. I would think that that's
9 accurate, although I would pause to say that that is an
10 uneasy relationship in that the Communist Party doesn't
11 really see race as a thing and that ultimately the
12 black workers are simply workers and that they are
13 under class oppression.

14 So that relationship between communists and
15 black southerners is problematic in terms of communism
16 theory and what black southerners are seeking to
17 achieve. I would also point out that when accused
18 of -- you know, these were the only people who came to
19 support them. So, you know, they were going to take
20 that help. So I don't think you can then say, well,
21 the Scottsboro were communists. But the Communist
22 Party was a loud voice in the South, fighting for, you
23 know, racial equality, but really what they see as more

1 of a class struggle on behalf of the most disadvantaged
2 workers, which are black workers.

3 Q. Is it possible that some of what you attribute
4 to racial resentment could have been a legitimate
5 concern about Communism infiltrating the South?

6 A. I -- no.

7 Q. Why not?

8 A. I don't think they understood it. I think the
9 -- yeah, no. And I also don't think you can separate
10 concerns about racial equality and separate out what we
11 are just really worried about communism. Communism --
12 you know, communism's involvement in the South was
13 almost always focused on helping black people.

14 Q. Still on page seven in that top paragraph, a
15 little over halfway down after footnote 19. "From the
16 1930's forward then, the term "communist" was
17 associated with any entity that appeared to threaten
18 the region's rational or industrial status quo." From
19 the 1930's forward, is that until as recently as today?

20 A. Again, I'm not going to comment on today,
21 although I did include a quote from Senator Tuberville
22 just to show that it is still present. But I think,
23 you know, throughout much of the 20th century that

1 communism and whether -- you know, which then becomes
2 used interchangeably with socialism is anything that
3 disrupts, yes, the status quo. I think that's fairly
4 -- I think that's fairly well documented.

5 Q. How do you take into account the Cold War and
6 there actually being a communism or perceived communist
7 threat to American freedom, American democracy?

8 A. Because I think one is an international threat,
9 and I think that threat is very real and in many ways
10 existential. I think the documentation of communist
11 activity in the United States, you know, starting in
12 the 1940's is pretty minimal, under attack. Most
13 liberal organizations purged their communism members
14 simply so they won't be attacked. And so the domestic
15 threat of communism and communism infiltration is
16 completely overblown, and there is no evidence for it.

17 And if we are talking about sort of major
18 organizations seeking change on behalf of working-class
19 people like the CIO or, you know, civil rights
20 organizations, can we find communist people who believe
21 in communism in those organizations? Probably. But
22 after a certain amount of time, they were kept at arm's
23 length.

1 Also, you know, the rights and protections
2 they are trying to acquire and achieve are things like
3 evolution of the poll tax. It's hardly, you know,
4 hardly the harbinger of a soviet state. So, yes.
5 Communists are here. They exist. They work in these
6 organizations, but they in no way, shape or form
7 dominate any movement for change in the South
8 without -- you know, and when they do, right, they are
9 pretty much destroyed like the sharecroppers' union.

10 Q. You mentioned Tuberville. I couldn't get that
11 link to work, the link to footnote 20, msn.com. It
12 says the video is no longer available. So I went and
13 searched for the quotation. I think I found something
14 close or perhaps even the very one, and I will insert
15 this as -- or mark and publish this as Exhibit 7.

16 (Defendant's Exhibit 7 was marked for
17 identification.)

18 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) First, before I read from this
19 piece, I will read the portion from your report where
20 you quote Tuberville. "Within the past year, U. S.
21 Senator from Alabama Tommy Tuberville grounded his
22 fight to put a hold on military promotions until the
23 military changed its policy regarding access to

1 reproductive care for female service members in the
2 notion that providing abortion access to female
3 soldiers was communistic." On this -- in Exhibit 7, it
4 would be about five paragraphs down, beginning
5 "Tuberville continued."

6 A. Uh-huh (yes).

7 Q. "Tuberville continued, 'They voted Pentagon
8 abortion policy through Congress in 1984. But in 2023,
9 they want to change it with a memo from the White
10 House. We are not a communist country. Everything
11 that makes policy and law goes through Congress. And I
12 told them, if you change it I'm going to block your
13 admirals and generals.'" Communism is a political
14 regime, right?

15 A. It's a political system, yes.

16 Q. In this context, do you think that Tuberville's
17 statement is a criticism of the White House's executive
18 action as reflecting features of the political system
19 that he disagrees with?

20 A. I think it is a word that he is using in a
21 particular context, and you have to pay attention to
22 that context. And that context is allowing women who
23 are in the armed forces, which, you know, I don't know

1 about what -- what purview the chief -- commander in
2 chief has over certain types of policies. Maybe he can
3 change it with a memo. Maybe they did have a policy
4 that was voted on by Congress, but maybe that policy is
5 amenable to change by the White House. I don't -- I
6 don't know all that, but I don't think we can ignore
7 the fact that what he is talking about here is women's
8 access to reproductive care.

9 You know, I don't think you -- simply
10 because he is using the word "communism" to describe an
11 action by President Biden, I don't think you can look
12 at that outside of what he is complaining about, and
13 it's about women's access to reproductive care, which
14 is what he doesn't like. He doesn't want these women
15 to have access to abortion services. I don't think he
16 is necessarily talking about the action of the
17 President. He is talking about the action of the
18 President in service to these women.

19 Q. He is not explicitly saying that though, or he
20 is not --

21 A. But that's the issue he is choosing to -- you
22 know, it's the hill he is going to die on.

23 Q. Unless Congress changes the law?

1 A. Unless -- unless whatever policy goes through
2 whatever channel he says it needs to go through. And
3 apparently as a senator, right, he had the right to
4 hold up this process. As far as I know, I don't know
5 -- and I can be wrong. I didn't see anybody else
6 complaining about that policy change.

7 Q. Would you consider his use of the phrase
8 "communism" in the quote that I found or "communistic"
9 in what you found as implicitly racial?

10 A. I think it's implicitly ridiculous. I think --
11 I think, first of all, it's just -- I mean, if we are
12 playing the game of, you know, is -- if we -- if we
13 take him at his word, right, that he feels like -- if
14 the President is acting in an antidemocratic way, I
15 think the term that he should use is authoritarian. I
16 think communism is -- it's not even the right word to
17 use in this situation.

18 So I guess my point is he doesn't even know
19 what it means. He knows that -- but he is using it
20 because it has historical connotations, and that
21 connotation by this time has gotten to the point where
22 it's anything I don't like. And in this case, access
23 to abortion services.

1 Q. And historical connotations are racial?

2 A. Yes. I don't think there is any doubt about
3 that, at least not in my mind.

4 Q. And section two, "The Role of Class and Reagan's
5 Economic Policy" on page seven of your report.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. The second paragraph, and second sentence of the
8 second paragraph, "What we do know is that Southern
9 members of Congress were lukewarm towards Reagan's
10 free-market ideology." And then a couple of sentences
11 later, the last of the paragraph, "Southern lawmakers
12 were hostile to Reagan's attack on price supports for
13 farmers, and white rural voters recoiled at the
14 President's attack on rural electric cooperatives."
15 First, what Southern members of Congress are
16 you referring to or do you -- Democrats?

17 A. Boll weevils. Democrats, yes, but who, you
18 know, probably -- I don't know their voting records in
19 the election, but they may have voted for Reagan. They
20 liked Reagan. A lot of his policy, they were attracted
21 to.

22 But this, I mean, Dr. Carrington was making
23 a point that it's Reagan's -- you know, let the free

1 market sort out all of these economic issues and that
2 that was -- that is why white Southern voters -- or he
3 doesn't say white. He just says Southern voters voted
4 for Reagan. I think it's simply not proven by the
5 facts or by the evidence.

6 Q. Is your position that these Southern white
7 voters or rural -- anyway, Southern white voters voted
8 for Reagan despite disagreeing with some of his free-
9 market ideology so it must have been because of race?

10 A. I think it's because of other things. I think
11 free-market ideology, if you are a rural -- you know,
12 if you are a farmer, you don't want to be thrust in the
13 free market. It did not meet their economic needs.
14 Right? They would have been swallowed up by it. They
15 require federal subsidies. They have had them since
16 the 1930's. And so I'm not saying it must be because
17 of race, but it's certainly not because of free-market
18 ideology.

19 Q. Then what might it have been because?

20 A. It could be a lot of things. Again, it could be
21 his anticommunism, but again, that comes with a lot of
22 historical baggage. It could be because, you know, the
23 quote, unquote, "family values," but again, that comes

1 with racial historical echos. But he is -- he is
2 trying -- Carrington is trying to divorce race from a
3 lot of these issues, and I'm saying you can't do that,
4 nor has he provided evidence. And if he has it, that's
5 fine, that everybody was all for the free market, and
6 that's why, you know, people voted for Reagan. So the
7 evidence just simply doesn't support that. I mean,
8 there is a lot of places where conservative Southern
9 Democrats, who in many ways found Reagan attractive,
10 where they battled with him.

11 Q. And other places they agreed?

12 A. Uh-huh (yes), and sometimes he disappointed
13 them. Right? They were more conservative than he was
14 on a lot of issues.

15 Q. The last paragraph on this subsection number two
16 on page eight begins, "As far as metropolitan growth
17 goes, Birmingham and Huntsville seem to contradict
18 Dr. Carrington's argument that such growth was tied in
19 with Reagan's anti-statist free-market ideology." I
20 didn't see where Carrington made the point that the
21 growth was tied in with the free-market ideology. Do
22 you mean by that that the free-market ideology was a
23 source of the growth?

1 A. I think so, yeah.

2 Q. You think that's what Carrington was arguing?

3 A. I believe so.

4 Q. Can we go to page 25 of Dr. Carrington's report?

5 The first full paragraph, pretty much the very middle
6 after the words "20th century." "The South began a
7 period of sustained economic growing that continues to
8 this day."

9 A. I'm sorry. Where are we? We are on page 25?

10 Q. The first full paragraph.

11 A. First full paragraph.

12 Q. And pretty much the middle sentence but
13 beginning after the words "20th century." So the
14 sentence begins "The South began."

15 A. Oh, okay. Sorry. Thank you.

16 Q. "The South began a period of sustained economic
17 growth that continues to this day. A new vibrant
18 middle class arose." And then skipping to the
19 beginning of the next paragraph, "This growth in jobs
20 and other opportunities accelerated migration from
21 other parts of the country to the South. These new
22 southerners overwhelmingly consisted of white-collar
23 workers who already formed a foundational component of

1 the GOP elsewhere. Economic development of a rising
2 middle class continued to accelerate GOP gains in the
3 South in the 1980's during the presidency of Ronald
4 Reagan." It seems to me that Dr. Carrington is just
5 stating that the growth occurred during Reagan's
6 presidency, not necessarily that free-market ideology
7 spurned the growth.

8 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form.

9 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) It wasn't a question. Do you--

10 A. I would go and look at the first sentence of the
11 first paragraph "as an economic program of free markets
12 and a political philosophy of smaller government took
13 hold within the GOP, certain developments in the South
14 made those positions even more attractive." And so I
15 think he is implicitly making a connection between
16 economic growth and free-market ideology that I don't
17 think -- I don't think he has made his case.

18 Especially if the areas that are growing, places like
19 Huntsville. I mean, he could -- he could talk about
20 Reagan's role in defense spending. That would, you
21 know, be a stronger argument it's not a free-market
22 ideology. So I think his cause and effect are wrong.

23 Q. Let's publish a batch of three exhibits at once.

1 I think my final three. Eight, nine and ten.

2 (Defendant's Exhibits 8-10 were marked for
3 identification.)

4 A. I haven't seen this in a while.

5 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Here is ten.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. Exhibit No. 8, do you recognize this cover?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. What is this?

10 A. First of all, it's a great photograph. I think
11 that shows the cover of my book. This is the cover of
12 my second monograph, Cold War Dixie, published in 2013
13 by the University of Georgia Press.

14 Q. I apologize for the lack of page numbers, but if
15 you could go to the second to the last page.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. The second paragraph begins, "Much of the
18 impetus."

19 A. Sorry. Second to the last page? Sorry, yes.

20 Q. "Much of the impetus behind the growth of the
21 Republican Party was the particular economic change
22 that accompanied the Cold War. Between 1950 and 1970,
23 90 percent of growth in employment in industry in the

1 South took place in high-wage industries, many of them
2 considered part of the military-industrial complex.
3 These white-collar employees, housed in expanding urban
4 and suburban areas, increasingly identified their
5 economic interests as resting with the Republican
6 Party."

7 A. Uh-huh (yes).

8 Q. And then on the opposite page, the second full
9 paragraph, the first sentence, "The expanding
10 metropolitan areas were the source of the reborn
11 Republican Party." Do you have any reason to doubt
12 that like in South Carolina, which I believe is the
13 focus of parts of your book, the Republican Party in
14 Alabama made the most durably gains in metropolitan
15 areas?

16 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form, unless
17 you want to specify the timeframe.

18 A. Yeah. What timeframe?

19 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) During the same time frame that
20 the Republican Party made the most durable gains in
21 metropolitan areas.

22 A. Between 1946 and 1963?

23 Q. No. I believe even after that, between 1950 and

1 1970 during the period in which 90 percent of growth in
2 employment in industry in the South took place in these
3 high wage industries, many of them considered part of
4 the military industrial complex.

5 A. What I would say is that -- let me just read
6 this over. I think much of the impetus, I think for
7 the area that I'm -- in South Carolina, which is
8 heavily militarized in terms of its economy, I think
9 that's very much true. I think slightly less true for
10 other parts of the South, but I think a lot of the
11 growth was -- I don't -- I'm not discounting that a lot
12 of the growth was driven by the Cold War, and that
13 along with a certain amount of that growth comes
14 Republican Party affiliation. But that was never going
15 to be -- I don't think that that necessarily discounts
16 the other half of that point, which is that Republican
17 Party becomes viable and ultimately dominant because
18 it's able to attract other voters, not necessarily
19 involved in the Cold War economy.

20 I don't discount Republicanism as a result
21 of economic change and new opportunity, and I spent a
22 lot of time talking about this area of South Carolina
23 that becomes sort of the origin in many ways of local

1 Republican activity. But I think later, I do say but
2 for the party to become viable, you know, we don't
3 really see that until, again, after the mid 1960's and
4 Civil Rights Act of '64. Voting Rights Act of '65
5 played a key role in that.

6 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 9, which I passed out as
7 well. Do you recognize this?

8 A. Barely. It's been a while, but yes. This is an
9 essay I was asked to write for a collective volume, an
10 edited volume published by University of Massachusetts
11 Press. I think a lot of it was probably based on
12 research I was doing for Cold War Dixie.

13 Q. I'm going to read kind of a lengthier excerpt at
14 the very beginning, starting at the very beginning of
15 the piece. "In 1956, William Faulkner lamented that
16 agriculture no longer stood at the center of the
17 southern economy. 'Our economy,' he remarked, 'is the
18 federal government.' Beginning in the immediate post-
19 World War II era, the region that once had been
20 dominated by cotton fields, tenant shacks and textile
21 mill villages was rapidly giving way to defense
22 installations, aerospace engineering facilities and
23 suburbs. Within three decades, federal spending

1 changed the South's economic base and demographics to
2 such a degree that by the early 1980's, the region that
3 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had once identified as
4 the nation's number one economic problem had become one
5 of the nation's leading industrial producers. Much of
6 this federal spending was filtered through the rapidly
7 expanding military-industrial complex necessitated by
8 the Cold War. Consequently, although federal dollars
9 constituted the engine that drove change in the South,
10 the direction and shape of change was very much
11 determined by the various corporate entities that moved
12 south in the 1950's and '60's to capitalize on this
13 federal largesse."

14 "To date, studies of the impact of the Cold
15 War on the American South have been largely confined to
16 examining the complex impact of anticommunism on
17 southern politics and the budding civil rights
18 movement. Anticommunism poisoned the local political
19 well and fueled the massive resistance movement, making
20 even the most tepid statement on racial progress by an
21 elected official a sure road to political oblivion.
22 But the Cold War contributed more than just toxic
23 anticommunism to the South's political landscape."

1 "The economic and demographic impact of the
2 military industrial complex throughout the region was
3 profound. The development of new aerospace facilities
4 around Atlanta, the growth of the space industry in
5 Huntsville and on the east coast of Florida, the
6 development of the Research Triangle in North Carolina
7 and the proliferation of military contracts generally
8 brought thousands of new, highly educated workers to
9 the region. Many of these new workers brought their
10 Republican politics with them. At the very least, few
11 possessed the historically based, reflexive support of
12 the Democratic Party on matters of race that had
13 plagued the South since the turn of the century.
14 Unencumbered by the region's historic hostility to the
15 Republican Party, these Cold War immigrants became the
16 foot soldiers in the creation of a modern civic
17 politics and of the two-party system in the South."

18 I think there is one more shorter quotation
19 I wanted to read. This is on page 372 at the second
20 full paragraph, very beginning of it. "Political
21 scientists have noted how, in the post-war era,
22 residents of the urban and suburban South gradually
23 began to identify their economic interests as resting

1 with the Republican Party." And then on page 376, "The
2 onset of the Cold War," this is right after the section
3 break. "The onset of the Cold War and the disbursement
4 of billions of dollars in federal funds through the
5 military industrial complex transformed regions of the
6 American South in countless ways. In the once sparsely
7 populated, mostly rural region of western South
8 Carolina, the arrival of thousands of highly educated
9 scientists and engineers heralded the beginning of a
10 process to break down the political parochialism of the
11 South. Just as New Deal labor legislation initiated
12 the decline of the South's economic isolation, so too
13 did the influx of the corporate Cold War foot soldiers
14 mark the beginning of the end of the South's political
15 isolation."

16 And on page 377, the final couple of
17 sentences, "The result was a more modern South. The
18 efforts of plant employees to create a viable
19 Republican Party laid the critical groundwork for a
20 two-party system in a region that had not known true
21 political competition since the 19th century. The
22 creation of a more Democratic, competitive political
23 system in which the local Republican Party drew on

1 themes resonating in communities around the nation
2 ultimately made the South less peculiar and more like
3 the rest of the country." Thanks for bearing with me
4 there.

5 A. She is really good. Who wrote that?

6 Q. Do you still hold these views that I have read
7 and that you articulated in this piece?

8 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form because
9 it is extremely complex, but go ahead.

10 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Do you disagree now with
11 anything I just read?

12 A. No. But I think it bears -- I think it bears
13 emphasizing that what I don't say is that it was --
14 that these new transplanted southerners or transplanted
15 people in the case of Aiken made Republicans -- it
16 tells a part of the story. And I don't necessarily
17 disagree with those parts of Carrington's report that
18 says, yes, Eisenhower does make gains in certain parts
19 of the South. And I think Cold War Dixie is part of
20 that story.

21 I think the area that I'm looking at has --
22 you know, you always have to look at particular
23 political cultures and populations and histories. But

1 I would also say, as I do later in the book -- and I
2 can't simply remember because it was ten years ago.
3 But that, you know, as in Alabama, the Republican
4 Party's growth is not -- you know, they started it,
5 right, and they were very active. But they didn't
6 become the dominant party because of the Savannah
7 riverside. Republican party becomes the dominant party
8 in South Carolina and Alabama and elsewhere because of
9 the Democratic Party's embrace of civil rights
10 initiatives. So I don't discount their activity. I
11 think the most interesting story is how do all these
12 groups work together? That goes beyond the purview of
13 our discussion here.

14 Q. Finally, Exhibit 10, do you recognize this
15 piece?

16 A. Okay. I think so. So this was -- I was asked
17 to read -- I think this is a response to a book about
18 -- if I'm not mistaken, a book about Vietnam and the
19 Vietnam war and the South. And I believe I was part of
20 a round table that, you know, you read these books and
21 then everybody kind of has their particular take on
22 some element. It's sort of like a discussion, but in
23 written form. And so once again, this looks at my

1 study of the area around the Savannah river plant.

2 Q. I'm just going to read a few sentences of this
3 one. Very bottom of the first page, the last sentence,
4 "The relationship between southern states and the
5 national security state was strong and vital." The
6 next page, "Having spent the better part of the last
7 ten years examining how decisions regarding the
8 expansion of the arms race affected southern
9 communities, I would argue for a further refinement of
10 this position. Military contracts and Cold War
11 industrial facilities brought more than jobs. They
12 possessed the power to remake entire regional
13 economies, bringing the fruits of modernization that
14 had alluded the South for so long."

15 And the last two sentences of that
16 paragraph, "The arrival of the military industrial
17 complex into underdeveloped southern communities helped
18 the region to overcome some of its more unsavory
19 regional attributes. The Cold War made the South less
20 Southern." What are some of those unsavory regional
21 attributes that you are referencing there?

22 A. Oh, I mean, I would have to think about this for
23 a moment and think about where my head was at this

1 time. But I would say primarily it's, you know, one
2 crop agriculture reliance on cotton and everything that
3 came with it, including sharecropping and tenancy.
4 Unsavory regional attributes.

5 Q. Do you think the arrival of --

6 A. I think also it's colloquialism, right? When
7 you have 10,000 highly educated engineer, scientists,
8 physicists, what have you, coming to a very rural,
9 mostly rural part of South Carolina, it breaks down
10 some parochialism. And I think that's actually where I
11 got the quotation and the title from was from my
12 husband's uncle who was a mill worker living in this
13 region. And he said, you know, when the bomb plant
14 people -- they call it the bomb plant. When they came
15 in, they brought grocery stores. They brought
16 different kinds of churches. They brought -- basically
17 they brought -- they brought a more cosmopolitan way of
18 life, and they made us into what he called a
19 respectable era.

20 I would also say if we could kind of go
21 back to the former question about defense spending or
22 whatever. I think it's important to note, you know, in
23 the context of our discussion about, you know, how

1 terms like anticommunism are -- you know, have racial
2 echos in them.

3 I don't think we can ignore the role of
4 Strom Thurmond in this story, right? Strom Thurmond is
5 all over the Savannah Riverside. It's in his home
6 area. He is very involved with lots of things related
7 to it, and he is a very human connection to -- you
8 know, this time still the segregationist present. And
9 so while -- so I don't think we can ignore the sort of
10 human connections that sort of wed those two things
11 together.

12 Q. Do you think the arrival of GOP voters from the
13 North helped drive a wedge into the racial attitudes of
14 the South in these areas?

15 A. A wedge in terms of that they weren't
16 segregationists?

17 Q. Yes, and helped to break down some of those
18 racial attitudes.

19 A. I think a couple of things. First of all, I
20 think a lot of them -- well, some of them came as
21 Republicans. Others of them, as I explained in the
22 book, got active in the Republican Party because that
23 was the only place they could gain a foothold. And so

1 it became sort of a way for them to become civically
2 active because the Democratic Party wasn't open to
3 them. Right? They were already people in line for
4 posts. It was the closed club.

5 So part of it was simply -- it was
6 functional, right? From terms of segregationist
7 attitudes, I think in places like Aiken -- and again,
8 Aiken is a special place, right? I mean, it's -- I
9 don't even know if you could compare -- you can't
10 compare the story that I'm telling in Cold War Dixie,
11 or you have to be very careful if you are talking about
12 that area with, say, Charleston where you have a lot of
13 military spending. You have bases, very different type
14 of personnel, right? Not college educated. You know,
15 so I think -- I think specificity matters. I think the
16 type of Cold War complex we are talking about matters.
17 I think that the way it integrates into the community
18 matters.

19 But back to your point about racial
20 attitudes, I do think in a place like Aiken where that
21 community is -- honestly, it's overwhelmed by
22 outsiders, right? Who come with either Republican
23 politics, not as strong, you know, not strong racial

1 attitudes or whatever. And they also see themselves as
2 modern. They are problem solvers. They are
3 scientists, and modern communities do not kill little
4 children in churches.

5 And so I think what happens is that they do
6 have an impact on their community, right? But they
7 have an impact because there are so many of them, and
8 that's not the case in every -- in every place where we
9 have suburban growth. Right? I mean, these were
10 outsiders wholly coming in, right? And completely
11 transforming an area. Does that make sense?

12 Q. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. The next section in
13 your supplemental report entitled "Religiosity,
14 Abortion and Sexuality," page eight, the sentence
15 beginning a little above the middle of that paragraph,
16 "Race occupies a prominent place."

17 A. Uh-huh (yes).

18 Q. "Race occupies a prominent place in the history
19 of southern white evangelical Christians and their
20 particular world view. Furthermore, prominent
21 Christian leaders and politicians who opposed abortion
22 and gay rights, like Jerry Falwell, Sr., founder of the
23 organization Moral Majority, and Senator Jesse Helms of

1 North Carolina, had sustained records of opposing civil
2 rights advances, for example, slow-walking
3 desegregation at the University of North Carolina and
4 Bob Jones University's fight to maintain racially
5 discriminatory practices."

6 "The connection to race is found in the
7 broader conversation regarding rights, specifically the
8 rights demanded by women and the rights demanded by
9 LGBTQ+ individuals. The connection to race lies not
10 only in the actions of individuals like Falwell and
11 Helms, but in white evangelicals' particular conceptual
12 world."

13 Earlier in this deposition, I believe you
14 said that gay rights were not an issue at this time and
15 that, as a historian, you don't have an opinion about
16 whether being pro or against gay rights as a policy
17 position implicated racial -- implicated race.

18 A. I guess in that case, I am responding to his
19 inclusion, but I do not feel comfortable talking about
20 that iteration of sort of rights, you know, conflicts.

21 Q. Understood. So the very last three words or the
22 last four words that I read, "evangelicals' particular
23 conceptual world," five, "white evangelicals'

1 particular conceptual world," what do you mean by that
2 phrase?

3 A. So here, I am drawing on the work of Glenn
4 Feldman, Historian Glenn Feldman. Also I think Shields
5 and Maxwell in their book, "The Long Southern
6 Strategy," have a particularly interesting take on
7 white evangelicals and sort of tying -- you know, sort
8 of implicating race into these other -- these other
9 fights, for lack of a better word.

10 I think the particular world view is one
11 that is based on the patriarchal family in which there
12 is a sense of order with men as the head of the
13 household and women as secondary, for lack of a better
14 word.

15 I think there is a sense of order, right?
16 First, there was a sense of racial order in which --
17 and I think Shields and Maxwell do a pretty good job of
18 this, and Paul -- what is his last name? Paul Harvey,
19 also a historian of southern religion, you know, that
20 women, particularly white women, have an important role
21 to play in maintaining racial order, which is they are
22 the bearers of children and they are the protectors of
23 white supremacy.

1 And so this idea that sort of gender
2 relations, gender hierarchy is very much implicated in
3 racial hierarchy is kind of part of this evangelical
4 world view. And when racial hierarchy becomes
5 disturbed, according to these historians, right, the
6 next -- and when the women's rights movement begins,
7 right, that is -- you know, they very easily and
8 obviously, right? It's well documented, right? They
9 moved from, you know, that their racial fight is
10 basically over. They are not going to win that. They
11 may slow things down, right, but then the next place in
12 which the battle is going to be engaged is going to be
13 in gender roles, right? Particularly over issues like
14 abortion or the Equal Rights Amendment. Yeah.

15 Q. That's a lot to unpack there, and I will get to
16 that in bits.

17 A. Sorry.

18 Q. That's fine. One of the first things you
19 mentioned was the sense of order. And so is this
20 particular conceptual world of white evangelicals the
21 virtuous Christian society? Is that what you mentioned
22 on page nine?

23 A. I mean, I will say straight up that I'm not a

1 historian on religion. So I'm drawing on the
2 scholarship of others that I find to be compelling
3 because I think they do a good job of kind of showing
4 the -- you know, the weddedness of gender and race.
5 But I also think looking back, even if we are not
6 talking about evangelicals, I think, you know, gender
7 hierarchy and racial hierarchy, you can't disturb one
8 without disturbing the other, because particularly of
9 the role of white women in maintaining racial purity,
10 right? You can't have racial purity if you don't have
11 white women, right, just staying with white men. So
12 they had a critical role to play, but that role was one
13 in which they are under control. Right? Patriarchy is
14 not just a -- it does not just have a place for black
15 people, but it has a place for women as well.

16 Q. The last sentence of that partial paragraph at
17 the top of page nine, you write, "The imagined virtuous
18 Christian society was a patriarchal one of order based
19 on rigid and interlocking racial and gender hierarchies
20 in which white women and all black people were
21 subservient to white men." You just explained to me
22 that the role of white women in this society was to
23 maintain racial purity. Do you believe the white

1 evangelical conceptual world or this virtuous Christian
2 society is one of racial purity?

3 A. Now?

4 Q. Not now, but in the -- no later than in the
5 '90's.

6 A. I think -- no. I mean, I think what I'm talking
7 about here is a much earlier time, right?

8 Q. When was that?

9 A. You know, pre 1960's, right? So, no. I
10 wouldn't say that -- but what I am saying is that these
11 two movements, both to opposition to the women's rights
12 movement and the opposition to civil rights movement,
13 are not disconnected because at one time they were
14 integral.

15 Q. Okay. The last paragraph on page nine beginning
16 "Conservative Christians."

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. "Conservative Christians found their next fight
19 in the expanding women's liberation movement, which
20 involved not only the right to terminate a pregnancy
21 but also the fight for the Equal Rights Amendment
22 (ERA), antifeminists, especially those who considered
23 themselves part of the Christian Right, labeled ERA

1 supporters and pro-choice activists as anti-family and
2 worse."

3 And then the last partial sentence on page
4 nine that goes on to page ten reads, "Religious
5 conservatives lost much of the traditional theological
6 undergirding for their race politics, but they found
7 new inspiration in the defense of traditional gender
8 roles. In the process, the conservatives jettisoned
9 the familiar arguments for racial hierarchy, replacing
10 these now-discredited views with a renewed and updated
11 defense of gendered hierarchies." Essentially what you
12 just explained to me --

13 A. Uh-huh (yes).

14 Q. -- a moment ago. Who were you referring to or
15 what do you mean by conservative Christian, Christian
16 right and religious conservative?

17 A. Mostly talking about those organizations that
18 became active in the late 1970's, early 19 -- into the
19 1980's, for example, Moral Majority and also the
20 Christian Coalition. I'm specifically thinking about
21 these organizations that became politicized, right?

22 Q. So religious conservative, which is the term you
23 used at the very bottom of page nine, is that also

1 thinking of these organizations that became politicized
2 or is that more broadly just people who are religious
3 who are also conservative?

4 A. No. I mean -- well, I think when I was writing
5 this, I was thinking more of why politically engaged
6 organizations acting -- right? Trying to curry
7 influence within the political arena in a way that they
8 had never done before.

9 Q. Can you go back to A New History of the American
10 South, which is exhibit -- is that six?

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. I am on -- go about three pages from the back to
13 figure 12.5, which is Strom Thurmond.

14 A. Uh-huh (yes).

15 Q. So then go back one page previously.

16 A. Yes. The support?

17 Q. "The support," and one page even previous to
18 that.

19 THE WITNESS: Could we maybe take a
20 ten-minute break?

21 (Recess taken.)

22 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Did I read anything yet?

23 A. No, sorry. I disrupted us.

1 Q. That's fine. So beginning of the last
2 paragraph, "Republican prospects."

3 A. I'm sorry. Where? Yes.

4 Q. "Republican prospects in the region began to
5 change with the development of two phenomena. The
6 first was the rise of the Christian right and its
7 political mobilization of conservative Christian
8 voters. The so-called Rights Revolution, which drew
9 inspiration and power from the civil rights revolution,
10 prompted a political backlash. In the 1960's and
11 1970's, the Supreme Court handed down decisions that
12 banned organized school prayer, protected the rights of
13 accused persons, and most important in this context,
14 protected a women's right to seek an abortion." And
15 then the first sentence of the next paragraph. "The
16 support of politically energized evangelicals was
17 critical to the election of Republican presidential
18 candidate Ronald Reagan in 1980." Why do you write
19 that most important in this context was the protection
20 of a women's right to seek an abortion?

21 A. You are asking me about that phrase in
22 particular?

23 Q. Why was that issue of the hierarchy of issues at

1 the top in terms of Republican prospects to begin a
2 major change?

3 A. For the purposes of this article, because I
4 think -- I think it's not merely the existence of
5 abortion, because women have been having abortions as
6 long as women have been having children. And that's
7 true in Alabama and across the South. I think what is
8 different here -- and I believe this is the points I
9 was making -- is that women are now claiming it as a
10 right to be protected.

11 Q. So because they were claiming it as a right to
12 be protected, it fell under that larger umbrella of the
13 rights revolution and when it was opposed and that that
14 opposition brought with it baggage?

15 A. I would say so. And not only a right to be
16 protected, but one -- this didn't come to pass, but in
17 the case of poor women, a right that should be
18 supported. It shouldn't just be a negative right where
19 you don't get prosecuted for having -- for terminating
20 your pregnancy, but actually you can -- it's something
21 that could be supported with federal funds. Of course,
22 you know, that's not the case and never was the case
23 really.

1 And I think the reason that becomes such a
2 flash point, you know, as opposed -- like I said,
3 abortion has been around. Why is it that these groups
4 become energized around that issue in particular that
5 hadn't really concerned Protestants in particular? It
6 was a Catholic issue, and they didn't want to -- you
7 know, they don't want to coalesce with Catholics.
8 That's not a thing that Protestants or Catholics
9 wanted, but it does become an issue. And I think it's
10 because it becomes a right, and it's a right that women
11 demand. It's a right that they are seeking to be
12 protected and supported, and because of that, it's
13 viewed then as a rejection of motherhood. Right? It
14 threatens women's traditional role in the minds of some
15 people, not everybody, right? But it throws into
16 question what it means to be a woman, and if you are
17 rejecting motherhood and you are essentially rejecting
18 the essential part of being a woman, then what does
19 that mean for men? Right? I think the right of women,
20 the demand of women to have protections to terminate
21 their pregnancy ultimately also throws into question
22 what does it mean to be a man and what is their role,
23 right? Because those gender -- you know, one doesn't

1 exist without the other.

2 Q. You mentioned this next point already in one of
3 your answers to me, but I will just read what you wrote
4 again. Again, at the bottom of page 9, going on to
5 page 10. "Religious conservatives lost much of the
6 traditional theological" --

7 A. I'm sorry. These pages aren't numbered so where
8 are we?

9 Q. I should have directed you back to your
10 supplemental report.

11 A. My supplemental report?

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. Exhibit 2? Okay.

14 Q. Page nine.

15 A. I'm sorry. I'm new at this.

16 Q. That was my fault.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. "Religious conservatives lost much of the
19 traditional theological undergirding for their race
20 politics, but they found new inspiration in the defense
21 of traditional gender roles. In the process, the
22 conservatives jettisoned the familiar arguments for
23 racial hierarchy, replacing these now-discredited views

1 with a renewed and updated defense of gender
2 hierarchies." Did gender issues replace racial issues
3 in the South?

4 A. Again, I would say that they -- they are not
5 wholly divorced. But as defense of segregation and
6 racial separation, you know, by the late 1970's, right,
7 not many people are making those arguments and, you
8 know, going on to successful careers.

9 I think as far as replacing, I think it's
10 -- I mean, you could say replacing. I think it's when
11 one is threatened, I think the other becomes
12 threatened. Was it inevitable? Maybe. You know, the
13 women's rights movement draws its energy, its ideas,
14 its claims from the Civil Rights Movement because women
15 see themselves as an oppressed group. They are
16 claiming rights through the same types of
17 organizations, the courts and what have you. I think
18 it makes sense that groups and people who had fought
19 against racial quality, you know, this becomes the new
20 terrain because it's just a slightly shifting terrain.
21 And again, because it threatens order and stability.

22 Q. The very last quotation of your supplemental
23 report is from David Hughes again, writing "the

1 politics of race are never far from the surface." Is
2 there any way to not really quantify, but as a
3 historian, understand how far they are from the
4 surface?

5 A. I think it depends on the issue.

6 Q. So the one we have just been speaking about with
7 the gender issue.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. By the 1990's, has race submerged below the
10 surface pretty far?

11 A. For that particular issue?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. Say for the particular of abortion or --

14 Q. These family values, what you describe as family
15 value issues, yeah.

16 A. I don't think it is as overt as maybe education
17 issues or spending issues. I don't think it's
18 completely gone, but I think in terms of where race
19 stands vis-a-vis women's right to terminate a
20 pregnancy, yes. I think it's probably further
21 attenuated than some other issues. So it's below the
22 surface, probably further below the surface than some
23 other categories of issues.

1 Q. But although it's still kind of lurking below
2 the surface somewhere, a Republican candidate who is
3 putting himself out there as a pro-life candidate, do
4 you think he is still consciously calling upon implicit
5 racial appeals when he is saying "vote for me because
6 I" --

7 A. I doubt it. It doesn't mean that they are not
8 implicitly there, but I think someone could -- I think
9 someone could be anti-choice and, you know, believe in
10 civil rights. I guess what I'm saying is that the
11 adoption of this particular position by the Republican
12 Party comes at a particular time in a particular form
13 pushed by a particular group of messengers that makes
14 that connection pretty clear. What I'm not saying is
15 that an individual religious person or perhaps even
16 candidate, although I think the candidate should know
17 better or would know better and would know the history,
18 maybe they themselves are -- you know, don't have a
19 racist bone in their body, right? Or even -- it
20 doesn't even come to the surface. Two things can still
21 be true, right?

22 But the issue for other voters or as a
23 political issue still has those racial echos. I don't

1 think you can get away from that. Those echos became
2 faint, right? More faint probably with that issue than
3 again education or something else where they sometimes
4 are quite overt. Doesn't mean they are not still
5 there.

6 Q. Can we ever get away from those echos?

7 MR. BLACKSHER: Object to the form.

8 A. I hope so.

9 Q. (BY MR. GEIGER) Do you think as a historian 70
10 years from now looking backward, there could be
11 evidence in the historical record to demonstrate, yes,
12 race no longer lies beneath the surface of some of
13 these issues where it once did?

14 A. Anything is possible. I mean, I would like to
15 think that that could be the case. I think over time
16 that race can become less of a flash point, but I think
17 it's incredibly challenging. I think it is the
18 original sin of the country that we are still battling
19 with to a greater or lesser degree.

20 Q. Is there any issue right now that you can think
21 of where race has essentially been removed from -- even
22 implicitly removed from the discussion?

23 A. Not off the top of my head, and I don't say that

1 with any particular pleasure.

2 Q. Yeah. Do you express any opinion that
3 Republican politicians during the era you have studied
4 were using these implicit racial appeals as you
5 identify, that those appeals were actually picked up on
6 by voters? I know we discussed some voter behavior and
7 how you are not expressing an opinion on that but --

8 A. I do. I think when -- and again, I think we
9 have to be really careful about when we are talking
10 about and what we are talking about. But I think when
11 someone in the 1980's uses the term "state's rights,"
12 that's has racial implications, very strong ones, that
13 I think a white voter would know exactly -- maybe not
14 exactly what they are talking about, but it would mean
15 -- it would have a certain set of meanings for them.
16 But also as I pointed out in my report, I mean,
17 sometimes these connections to race were made
18 explicitly, when someone says "I'm joining the white
19 party." Hard to get less explicit than that. Now
20 that's not everyone. That was that one guy, but, you
21 know, the adoption of cultural symbols of the
22 Confederacy by an organization that at one point had
23 been anathema to white voters, which is the Republican

1 Party, that has certain meaning. When a certain
2 organization defends, you know, preservation of
3 monuments to the Confederacy, that can -- that will be
4 read a certain way by different people.

5 Q. Do you intend to express any opinion in this
6 case on why white voters vote the way they do?

7 A. No.

8 MR. GEIGER: I think I'm done with my
9 questions. I will give anyone else who is on the Zoom
10 call a chance to offer questions, if there are any.

11 MR. BLACKSHER: I have a few questions.

12 MS. LANCASTER: No questions for me.

13

14 EXAMINATION BY MR. BLACKSHER:

15 Q. Dr. Frederickson, we have been referring to your
16 political scientist David Hughes who writes that the
17 politics and race are never far from the surface.

18 A. Uh-huh (yes).

19 Q. And you drop in the footnote the article which
20 you are quoting. It's actually a chapter in a book.
21 Did I ask you to send me a copy of that David Hughes
22 article?

23 A. Yes.

1 Q. All right. I'm going to mark it.

2 (Plaintiff's Exhibit P1 was marked for
3 identification.)

4 Q. (BY MR. BLACKSHER) This is Plaintiff's 1 then?
5 Is that the way do you it? Okay. Plaintiff's 1, so if
6 you will turn to page 284, I think this is where your
7 quote is coming from.

8 MR. BLACKSHER: By the way, for the record,
9 the highlights are mine. The pencil or pen marks are
10 Professor Frederickson's.

11 Q. I have highlighted the phrase, "Overt racism is
12 no longer a viable campaign strategy in Alabama
13 politics. Nevertheless, the politics of race, which
14 dominated state life for generations are never far from
15 the surface." Was this the place that you were --

16 A. Yeah, uh-huh (yes).

17 Q. "Over time, conservative whites, especially
18 white evangelicals, gravitated toward new political
19 issues that similarly otherwise vulnerable minorities,
20 including women and sexual minorities." Otherwise
21 sounds like one of those academic words?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. But that's where you --

1 A. Also women are not a minority.

2 Q. That's where you got the quote from, I take it?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. On page 285, Hughes goes on to say at the top,
5 "Consequently whites identify politics, specifically
6 new evangelical politics, continue to dominate Alabama
7 as voters and legislators push new policies that
8 glorify symbols of the Confederacy, restrict women's
9 access to abortion, and limit the rights and liberties
10 of sexual minorities." Is that consistent with your
11 opinions?

12 A. Well, I mean, he is talking about the modern
13 era. So I would say I believe that is true for the era
14 in which I feel, you know, more comfortable, which is
15 up until the latter part of the 20th century.

16 Q. And if you will turn -- that's right. He is a
17 political scientist, which gives him license to talk
18 about today; is that right?

19 A. He does, yes. And I think this is a pretty --
20 this is a pretty recent -- yeah, 2021. So --

21 Q. And back on page 287, I have highlighted one of
22 his sources, which is Trey Hood's book, "The Rational
23 Southerner." Trey is one of the -- Trey Hood is one of

1 the Alabama attorney general's expert witnesses.

2 A. Uh-huh (yes).

3 Q. Although he was not asked to testify on this
4 subject. And an excerpt from his book is an attachment
5 as an exhibit to the Carrington deposition. Just to
6 make a point, let me make this Exhibit P2.

7 (Plaintiff's Exhibit P2 was marked for
8 identification.)

9 Q. (BY MR. BLACKSHER) The Rational Southerner,
10 there is a title page, and then I copied one page out
11 of it. The highlights are in the exhibit attached to
12 Carrington's deposition, but let me read it since we
13 are in the business of reading long passages. On page
14 181, Professor Hood says, "We also found that
15 mobilization of the African-American electorate has a
16 substantial effect on GOP growth in the face of
17 controls for other traditional explanations; such as,
18 income growth, in-migration and evangelicalism. Simply
19 put, we found as the theory of relative advantage
20 predicted, that the growth of Southern Republicanism
21 was primarily" -- in italics -- "driven by racial
22 dynamics, not class, demographic factors or religion as
23 others have suggested." And to skip down to the next

1 paragraph, "Much of the recent research on southern
2 politics" -- and he cites Lublin and Shafer and
3 Johnson, which are sources that Professor Carrington
4 refers to in his expert report. He says, "Much of the
5 recent research are prominent" -- and he cites
6 prominent examples -- "argues that the role of race in
7 modern southern politics has been overemphasized and
8 that the key to understanding the postwar partisan
9 transformation in the South is class conflict driven by
10 economic growth. We are not arguing that the economic
11 transformation of the South did not play a role in the
12 development of the Republican Party in the region, but
13 it is not the key aspect of or the primary mover behind
14 the growth of the southern wing of the GOP. To
15 understand the temporal and spatial dynamics of GOP
16 growth in the region, we would argue that one must
17 understand the politics of race. Stated succinctly,
18 the partisan and political transformation of the South
19 over the past half century has, most centrally,
20 revolved around the issue of race." Does that
21 correspond with your report insofar as it goes through
22 the period of time you have expertise in?

23 A. It does. And I like the fact that he -- you

1 know, he doesn't discount economic change. Right? It
2 does play a role. But yes, I would agree with this.

3 MR. BLACKSHER: Those are all my questions.
4 Anyone else in the video world have any questions?

5

6 (Deposition concluded at 3:00 p.m.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF ALABAMA)

JEFFERSON COUNTY)

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing proceeding was taken down by me by stenographic means, and that the questions and answers therein were produced in transcript form by computer aid under my supervision, and that the foregoing represents, to the best of my ability, a true and correct transcript of the proceedings occurring on said date at said time.

I further certify that I am neither of counsel nor of kin to the parties to the action; nor am I in anywise interested in the result of said case.

Signed the 9th day of September, 2024.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Anne E. Miller", is written over a horizontal line.

ACCR #486

Expires 9/30/24

My commission expires 11/19/27

[& - 2013]

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 30

(e) Review By the Witness; Changes.

(1) Review; Statement of Changes. On request by the deponent or a party before the deposition is completed, the deponent must be allowed 30 days after being notified by the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which:

(A) to review the transcript or recording; and

(B) if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the reasons for making them.

(2) Changes Indicated in the Officer's Certificate. The officer must note in the certificate prescribed by Rule 30(f)(1) whether a review was requested and, if so, must attach any changes the deponent makes during the 30-day period.

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Exhibit B

Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century Alabama

Report Prepared By:

Kari Frederickson, PhD
University of Alabama
May 17, 2024

My qualifications

I am a Professor of History at the University of Alabama. My area of expertise is twentieth century American history with a particular focus on the history of the South. I earned my Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1996. I began my career at the University of Central Florida and have been at the University of Alabama since 1999. Since becoming a professional historian I have taught undergraduate and graduate courses on U.S. history, the history of the American South, the Civil Rights Movement, American political history since the 1960s, and Alabama history. I have supervised more than 30 Masters students and 15 doctoral students. I have conducted research at the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, and at state and university archives across the South. I currently serve on the Board of Directors of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute and am chairperson of the Institute's Research Grants Committee.

To date I have published four books with highly regarded academic presses. My scholarship focuses on the political, social, and cultural history of the twentieth-century South. *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968*, was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2001 and won the Harry S. Truman Book Award in 2002. *Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South* was published by the University of Georgia Press in 2013 and won the Southern Historical Association's Bennett H. Wall Prize for the Best Book in Southern Economic History in 2014. My latest book, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama*, was published by the University of Alabama Press in 2022 and won the Gulf South Historical Association's Michael V. R. Thomason Award for the Best Book on the Gulf South. I have published an additional 19 scholarly articles and essays in peer-reviewed publications. I have served as a consultant and on-camera expert for six documentaries, most

recently for *The Blinding of Isaac Woodard*, part of PBS's prestigious American Experience series. I was awarded a research grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities and have served as a member of the NEH's grants review committee.

Method of Report

The following report is based on research in a wide range of primary and secondary sources in the political history of Alabama and the South. I have conducted research in relevant gubernatorial papers and in the State Democratic Executive Committee Papers held at the Alabama Department of Archives and History, as well as relevant state and local newspapers. I have consulted more than forty scholarly books and articles on political development in Alabama and the South.

Summary of My Opinion

Race has served as a dividing line in political allegiance and activity since the period of Reconstruction. In particular, the ability of first the Democratic Party and later, the Republican Party, to achieve viability and dominance has depended on each party's ability to secure the support of white voters through racial appeals. The Democratic Party succeeded in establishing itself as the defender of white supremacy following the disfranchisement campaign of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, and through the leveraging of cultural symbols and historical memory. From the 1920s through roughly the 1960s, southern Democrats achieved seniority in the national party, which allowed them to protect white racial customs and made them almost impossible to challenge. The Republican Party overcame considerable hostility and gained relevancy, competitiveness, and ultimately dominance in Alabama by branding itself the "white party" as the Civil Rights Movement gained traction locally and garnered support from the

National Democratic Party. The Republican Party's ability to exploit white racial anxiety beginning in the early 1960s and later, in the 1980s, by developing conservative policy positions with race at the center, allowed it to attract a growing number of white voters, first at the presidential level, and later in down-ballot races. It also successfully appropriated cultural symbols and utilized historical memory that at one time had been the sole possession of the Democrats. Today, the parties are racially polarized; most whites are Republicans and most Blacks are Democrats. With white identity politics occupying the center of Republican politics, creating effective and enduring bi-racial coalitions is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Introduction

For the breadth of the twentieth century, political party identity in the State of Alabama has been largely defined by race. The Democratic Party's disfranchisement campaign at the turn of the century and its dedication to the maintenance of white supremacy through a variety of means secured its dominance in Alabama for much of the twentieth century. The resurgence and competitiveness of the Republican Party in national and state elections beginning in the mid-1960s depended heavily on the party's ability to define itself as the "white man's" party. With race as the primary political dividing line throughout much of the century, creating bi-racial coalitions -- whether overtly political or not -- was nearly impossible and actively resisted.

Disfranchisement

Democratic Party dominance in Alabama was achieved at the turn of the twentieth century through the promotion of a political message that emphasized the protection of white supremacy and through a new constitution that eliminated political competition from the

Republican Party and from disgruntled white Democrats unhappy with the state party by disfranchising the mass of Black voters and many poor white voters.

White voters' hostility toward the Republican Party began prior to the Civil War but really took root during the period known as Radical Reconstruction, roughly 1868-1874. The Republican Party held majority power in Congress from 1868 to 1872, and was responsible for passage of the 14th amendment, which established citizenship rights for all persons born in the United States, and the 15th amendment, which forbade states from denying citizens the right to vote based on race. During the period of Radical Reconstruction, freedmen in Alabama became registered voters, participated in a biracial Republican Party, and held political office. The Democratic Party became identified with the return of white supremacy, and Democrats used a variety of means – primarily fraud and violence – to intimidate Republican voters and regain control of state government in 1874. Despite the continuation of these intimidation methods, Republican voters, both Black and white, continued to participate in state and national politics, posing a persistent threat to the Democratic Party.¹

The 1901 constitution incorporated multiple suffrage obstacles that were devastatingly effective, particularly in the state's majority Black counties. In 1900, before the new requirements went into effect, and despite decades of fraud and intimidation, some 79,311 Black voters appeared on the rolls in fourteen Black Belt counties. Once the constitution went into effect, barely over a thousand remained. Statewide, by 1908, Alabama counted a mere 3,742 registered Black voters. Although not quite as dramatic as the losses incurred by Black voters, voter registration among poor white Alabamians suffered a decline that increased with the passage of time. By 1942, Alabama had only 440,291 registered voters but some six hundred thousand disfranchised white people.² The strongest deterrent to white registration was the poll

tax. With these voters essentially silenced, the threat of political rebellion grounded in shared economic grievance was eliminated. The era of ballot stuffing came to an end, and any hope of a political coalition made up of Black and poor white voters grounded in economic concerns was dealt a severe blow.

As a consequence of disfranchisement, the State of Alabama and much of the South became a one-party region. Unchallenged by Republicans, Democratic officeholders easily won re-election, gaining seniority in the House of Representatives and the Senate. During periods in which Democrats were in the majority, especially beginning in 1932, seniority brought committee chairmanships and extraordinary power to kill any legislation that threatened white supremacy. Although southern congressmen and senators might disagree on matters of economic or foreign policy, on issues of race, they voted as a block and maintained extraordinary unanimity. The Democratic Party, whose official symbol from 1904 to 1966 featured a rooster and the slogan “White Supremacy, For the Right,” reigned supreme in Alabama for the next eighty years.

Democratic Party and Culture

Achieving political hegemony was as much a cultural as a political battle. Having established their political hegemony through disfranchisement, white Democrats had to legitimize their continued control. The dominance and legitimacy of the Democratic Party drew strength from historical memory, giving the party a cultural power that exceeded that of a typical political party and made creating anything resembling a coalition to challenge its rule nearly impossible. In addition to creating constitutional barriers to electoral participation, white Democrats crafted a strong cultural narrative about the superiority of the Democratic Party and the corresponding illegitimacy of the Republican Party.

Democrats established their legitimacy as the ruling party by creating a particular interpretation of the southern past and the southern present that made a virtue of white elite Democratic rule, denigrated Black culture, perpetuated a fear and hatred of Black political participation and the Republican Party, and taught reverence for the antebellum South and the Confederacy. The antebellum South and Confederacy, and the Democratic Party, were commemorated through the erection of monuments; through public lectures and celebrations; through the publication, circulation, and adoption in public schools of approved works of fiction and history; and through the creation of state cultural institutions such as the Alabama Department of Archives and History. Thomas McAdory Owen and Marie Bankhead Owen, directors of the archives for over fifty years and both children of Confederate veterans, made it their mission to erase Republican contributions from history. Tom Owen refused to collect or subsequently destroyed any Reconstruction-era manuscript collections that documented Republican contributions.³

Marie Bankhead Owen's greatest victory in her quest to purge any hint of Republicanism from Alabama's public face came in her campaign to change the state seal and the state motto in the 1930s. In 1868, the Republican legislature elected during Radical Reconstruction created a state seal. This particular legislature was dominated by the Republican Party, which was comprised of white and Black lawmakers. For Bankhead Owen, this 1868 seal was a "monstrosity": the Radical Reconstruction legislature that created it was politically illegitimate, having been created by "the Carpetbag Legislature, made up of men who were strangers to our traditions, and in the main of local renegades and negroes." She also created a new state motto: "We Dare Defend Our Rights," a declaration of the rights of states to defend themselves against the tyranny of federal power.⁴ Given her antipathy for the period of Radical Reconstruction, and

in particular that era's biracial legislatures' support for the 14th and 15th amendments, the "rights" she sought to "defend" were the right of whites to police race relations without federal interference. In 1939, the state legislature adopted the new seal and motto designed by Bankhead Owen. They remain Alabama state symbols more than eighty years later.

Redistricting in 1916

Disfranchisement, although devastating, still did not completely eliminate Republican voting. In counties such as Walker, Fayette, and Winston, the Republican Party maintained a pesky presence. A persistent minority was not to be tolerated, and the Democrats sought other means to further eviscerate Republican power. Congressional redistricting provided another tool through which to further undermine Republican Party viability. Democrats found their opportunity following the 1910 census; Alabama's population growth had earned it an additional congressional representative. For the 1912 and 1914 legislative sessions, a stopgap measure had been instituted, and the seat had been filled by election of a congressman-at-large. A permanent redistricting of the state needed to be undertaken. John Bankhead Jr. of Jasper, son of a United States congressman and author of the enabling legislation that activated the voting obstacles in the 1901 Constitution, drafted the initial legislation creating the new Tenth District. Comprising Fayette, Franklin, Lamar, Marion, Pickens, Walker, and Winston, the Tenth would take four counties from the Sixth, two from the Seventh, and one from the Ninth. Bankhead and the bill's supporters in the state legislature were transparent about their partisan goals: the creation of the new district would help Democratic candidates in the Seventh Congressional District by siphoning off some Republican voters. The bill to create the new Tenth District would dilute this Republican strength and thus make all Alabama congressional districts safely Democratic. Doing so would protect white supremacy. This was something upon which all Democrats could agree.

The bill passed by a razor thin margin on the last day of the legislative session in September 1915.⁵

1928 Bolt and Heflin

The Democratic Party not only implemented measures by which to dilute and eliminate competition from Republicans. It sought to punish individual Democrats who supported Republican candidates. Any deviation from Democratic Party allegiance was deemed a threat to the maintenance of white supremacy. White Democrats who abandoned the Democratic Party to support a Republican candidate during any given election could expect punishment regardless of the individual's white supremacist credentials.

The greatest threat to Democratic party hegemony came in 1928, when the National Democratic Party nominated New York Governor Alfred E. Smith as its presidential candidate. Smith was an Irish Catholic and a foe of prohibition and supported repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Protestant leaders across the South expressed fear of Smith's candidacy; many wondered whether cultural and religious concerns might trump race in this campaign, leading some white southern voters to abandon the Democratic candidate to support the hated Republicans and their popular candidate Herbert Hoover.

The anti-Smith forces in Alabama were led by United States Senator J. Thomas Heflin. Nicknamed "Cotton Tom" for his advocacy on behalf of the state's cotton farmers, Heflin was one of the more colorful politicians of that or any time. Elected to Congress in 1904, Heflin served eight terms in the House and won election to the U.S. Senate in 1920. Heflin was best known for his strident anti-Catholicism, his support of prohibition, and his virulent white supremacy. Repulsed by Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith, Heflin embarked on a full-

fledged political revolt, determined to swing the state to Republican nominee Herbert Hoover, calling Smith a “Negro bootlicker” who favored interracial marriage. Heflin further charged that the New York governor had appointed African Americans to government jobs, giving them supervisory power over white female employees. Speaking in the city of Dothan in October 1928, Heflin painted Smith as the harbinger of a racial apocalypse, claiming that Smith “is in favor of appointing negroes to office where they will be in authority over white people” and declaring that “there are now dance halls in New York City...where every night negro men dance with white women and white men dance with negro women.” Alarmed by Heflin’s bolt, the state Democratic Party countered with an attack of their own, depicting Hoover as a supporter of racial equality and reminding white Democratic voters of the tragedy of Reconstruction, when carpetbaggers invaded the South and freedmen served in the legislature. A vote for Herbert Hoover, they cried, meant a return to Black domination.

The turnout for the 1928 presidential election was one of the largest in Alabama history. Ultimately, party loyalty, cultural antipathy towards the Republican Party, and the Democrats’ history of protecting white supremacy trumped religious bigotry and fear of revocation of the Eighteenth Amendment, but just barely. Al Smith carried Alabama by a mere seven thousand votes; roughly one hundred thousand Alabama Democrats voted for Herbert Hoover. For many white voters, it was their first time supporting a Republican. Despite the fact that Hoover had lost, Senator Tom Heflin, whose support for white supremacy was nearly unparalleled, paid a political price for abandoning the Democrats and making common cause with the Republicans. Party loyalty was a serious matter. Up for re-election in 1930, Heflin was barred by the State Democratic Executive Committee from running as a Democrat. Denied the powerful Democratic Party affiliation, Heflin attempted to create a coalition of disgruntled Democrats and

Republicans but ultimately lost the election to John Bankhead Jr. His political career never recovered.

Biracial coalitions, Part I: Organized Labor

The severe prohibition against political coalitions that threatened white supremacy extended beyond politics to broader Alabama society. Difficult economic conditions that hit both white and Black at times precipitated the creation of biracial coalitions to address challenging circumstances. Time after time, these coalitions were attacked by the political and economic elite who saw in such coalitions a threat to white supremacy as well as to profits.

The growth of industry in Alabama in the postbellum era was predicated upon a racially stratified labor force. An industrial workforce divided by race gave owners a powerful tool to keep wages low. The often-violent backlash against the organizing of Black and white laborers in particular into labor unions made the potential for a political coalition based on shared economic grievance highly unlikely. The defense of white supremacist ideology, politics, and social practices undermined and outright sought to destroy interracial coalitions.

The rise of the steel industry, and the mining of the coal and iron ore on which it depended, brought waves of black and white migrants to the area around Birmingham in search of better wages and relief from rural poverty. Early on, a mixed workforce began to emerge in the Birmingham District. By 1900, more than half of the mining workforce in the Birmingham coal fields was Black. Alabama's competitive edge hinged on coal operators' ability to keep wages low. Despite deep cleavages between white and black miners, the history of the industry illustrates moments when the two groups made nearly heroic attempts to unify to address extremely harsh working conditions and low pay, only to be undermined and destroyed by the

power of capital, often assisted by the military power of the state. The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) made repeated efforts in the Alabama coalfields to galvanize interracial unity in pursuit of better working conditions and higher pay. Alabama's miners affiliated with the UMWA in April 1890, becoming known as UMW District 20.

By 1903, the UMWA had more than 95 locals and 14,000 members in District 20. After coal operators cut their wages in 1908, UMWA miners – Black and white – went on strike. The two-month strike was marked by armed confrontations between striking miners and guards employed by the coal companies. Prominent mine owners excoriated the union's biracial composition, encouraged white citizens to take vigilante action against the members of the union, and appealed to Governor Braxton Bragg Comer to lend military assistance to the owners in putting down the strike. After two months of violent labor confrontations, Governor Comer mobilized the Alabama National Guard to break the strike. Coal miners went on strike again, this time to protest the rollback of wage and other gains achieved during World War I. Once again, the governor (this time, Thomas Kilby) used troops to break the strike.⁶

Biracial coalitions, Part II: Great Depression: Southern Conference for Human Welfare

The conditions that befell white and Black Alabamians during the Great Depression once again provided a context within which some sought to create coalitions to address the state's and region's needs. One such coalition was the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW). Founded in 1938, the SCHW was a coalition of groups and individuals interested in expanding New Deal-style reforms in the South to accelerate economic recovery while also opening the door to democratic reforms. Drawing support from organized labor, civil rights organizations, and a few traditional Democratic political leaders, the SCHW held its inaugural meeting in Birmingham in 1938. Roughly one-quarter of the delegates who attended the three-day meeting

were Black. The organization's support for interracial labor organizing, such as that undertaken by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), as well as its opposition to the poll tax made the SCHW a target of mainstream politicians in Alabama and throughout the South. Although members of the Communist Party participated in the SCHW, the organization was by no means a communist organization. Nevertheless, the organization's refusal to take a staunch anti-communist stance in the post-war era made it vulnerable to anti-communist attacks. The organization folded in 1948.

Turning point: World War II

The onset of World War II precipitated changes in Alabama and across the region that put increasing pressure on those dedicated to maintaining white supremacy. Massive numbers of Black southerners migrated north and west in search of wartime employment. Once settled in their new communities, these new residents became registered voters. The Great Depression and the Democratic Party's New Deal had prompted Black voters (even those few in the South) to support the Democratic Party after decades of support for the party of Lincoln. "The switch was abrupt. In 1932 Roosevelt received only 23 percent of the Black vote; in 1936 he received 71 percent."⁷ Now, with significant growth of Black voters in the North, for the first time in the twentieth century, civil rights moved onto the agendas of both national political parties eager to win these new voters, and African American veterans returned home determined to fight for democracy in their communities.

The most direct assault on the region's anti-democratic political machinery came from the United States Supreme Court in its 1944 decision in the Texas case of Smith v. Allwright. The court ruled that the Texas white primary law violated the Fifteenth Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. While the states of the Upper South acquiesced in the ruling, the

decision was a political bombshell in the Deep South, where white Democrats scrambled to shore up the political barriers to Black voting. Alabama's governor, Frank Dixon, wrote of his concern to the head of the state Democratic Party. "It is obvious that the only thing that has held the Democratic Party together in the South for many years past has been the thing which caused its strength in the first place, namely, white supremacy." If the national Democratic Party followed the Supreme Court's lead "through forced registration of negroes in the State, the Democratic Party will become anathema to the white people in the South."⁸ State senator and U.S. Senate candidate James Simpson regarded the *Smith* decision as "the gravest threat to white supremacy since Reconstruction."⁹ The *Smith* decision and service in the war for democracy galvanized groups of Black voters in Alabama. Determined to stifle Black political participation, in 1946 the Alabama legislature passed, and voters approved, the Boswell Amendment to the state constitution. This amendment introduced new suffrage standards that required potential voters to "read and write, understand and explain any article of the Constitution of the United States" and granted local boards the power to administer registration requirements "in as discriminatory a fashion as they saw fit."¹⁰

Southern Democrats' unanimity on issues of race and their immense power in Congress allowed them to kill any legislation that threatened white supremacy.¹¹ But that stranglehold was starting to loosen ever so slightly in the late 1940s. The recent war for democracy, the growth of an increasingly vocal Black citizenry in northern cities, the mobilization of Black southern voters, and a rash of violence against Black veterans across the South in the postwar era emboldened President Harry Truman to challenge the power of Southern Democrats to dictate the party's allegiance to white supremacy. In February 1948, during an election year, Truman submitted a civil rights package to Congress that included anti-poll tax and anti-lynching

legislation, as well as a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission that would make employment discrimination illegal. Truman expected an outcry from southern white Democrats, but predicted that white southerners' historic allegiance to the party would win out, and that they would ultimately support him in the presidential election in November.

He was wrong. A group of southern Democrats – apoplectic at the thought that the party that had for so long served as the protector of white supremacy was now pursuing Black voters – staged a political revolt. Unsuccessful in preventing a civil rights plank in the Democratic party platform and in denying Truman the Democratic party's nomination, this group of disgruntled white Democrats created their own party to challenge the Democrats and Republicans in November and to protect white supremacy. Its official name was the States' Rights Democratic Party, but it was more popularly known as the Dixiecrats. Alabama was among the strongest Dixiecrat states, with former Governor Frank Dixon, state party chair Gessner McCorvey, and attorney and political insider Horace Wilkinson as its most vocal leaders. McCorvey pledged to defeat Truman's "damnable, obnoxious, and unthinkable" civil rights program.¹² Others compared Truman's program to the dark days of Reconstruction, when "federal bayonets...[forced] the negro down our throats." Horace Wilkinson was more blunt: if southern Democrats submitted to Truman's wishes, they might as well "haul down the Democratic flag [and] submit to nigger rule."¹³ The Dixiecrats succeeded in hijacking the state party and running the Dixiecrat presidential and vice-presidential candidates under the "Democratic Party" label. The Dixiecrats also appropriated "the most powerful cultural symbols associated with" the Confederacy, including the Confederate battle flag and portraits of Confederate heroes.¹⁴ Democrats were forced to list President Truman and his running mate on the ballot as the nominees of the "National Democratic Party." Alabama's governor, James Folsom, its two

Senators, and its entire Congressional delegation remained loyal to the president; but that loyalty did not mean they supported Truman's civil rights program. Rather, they supported the national nominee because they believed Alabama (and the South's) continued allegiance to the Democratic Party remained the surest way to defeat any civil rights proposals. Although the Dixiecrat effort was defeated, the 1948 political bolt was a turning point for some white southerners as they began to question their historic allegiance to the Democratic Party as the best vehicle through which to preserve white supremacy.

Following the 1948 presidential election, politics in Alabama and across the South entered into a long transitional period in which the right to claim the mantle of the defender of white supremacy shifted slowly from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. This shift occurred first at the presidential election level, and voters – particularly white voters – in Alabama adhered to this shift primarily in national elections over the next thirty years. Although it had been possible to support the economic liberalism of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal while maintaining support for segregation and white supremacy, Truman's civil rights program (although ultimately defeated in Congress) incorporated racial liberalism into the national party's profile that only grew more intertwined in the coming decades; by the 1980s, "liberalism" had become anathema to southern white voters. According to one historian, "the word could not be uttered in an economic sense without also conjuring the culturally fatal albatross of racial inclusion."¹⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 election, the Democratic Party in Alabama sought to reclaim its reputation as the best vehicle through which to protect white supremacy.¹⁶ Hence it sought to eliminate the possibility of a future Dixiecrat-like bolt. In 1951, the state Party passed a loyalty oath that effectively made a repeat of the Dixiecrat Revolt in 1952 an impossibility. With

another hijacking of the Democratic Party machinery now off the table, prominent Dixiecrats in the state looked for other party options, among them, the dreaded Republican Party. Birmingham columnist and Dixiecrat supporter John Temple Graves told a gathering of former Democrats, "Let us not wince anymore when we hear the word Republican."¹⁷ Abandoning the Democratic Party, with its historic allegiance to the defense of white supremacy, would take some time.

The 1950s: A Period of Transition

Despite President Truman's embrace of civil rights, the majority of white southern voters remained in the Democratic column. As of 1950, not a single Senator from the South was a Republican, and only 2 out of 105 southern members of Congress were Republicans. The party's prospects for the South improved when, after 1948, the Republican party began to lose favor with Black voters. This realization prompted some Republicans to look to the South, which the national party had neglected for generations.¹⁸ Aware of a potentially significant independent white southern vote, the national Republican Party welcomed the disgruntled Dixiecrats. At a Lincoln Day rally of Alabama Republicans in Birmingham in early February, Republican National Chairman Guy Gabrielson made a strong pitch to win Alabama Dixiecrats over to the GOP. Gabrielson declared, "We want the Dixiecrats to vote for our candidate. The Dixiecrat movement is an anti-Truman movement. The Dixiecrat party believes in states' rights. That's what the Republican party believes in."¹⁹

In 1952, the national Democratic Party nominated Illinois senator Adlai Stevenson and U.S. Senator from Alabama John Sparkman as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 1952. The party's platform contained a much weaker civil rights platform than it had in 1948; furthermore, many Alabama Dixiecrats recognized the futility of opposing a Democratic ticket that carried the state's own Senator. Still, having made the break in 1948, many former

Dixiecrats could not go back. Several threw their lot in with Republicans. Tom Abernethy of Talladega, a 1948 Dixiecrat elector and 1950 States' Rights campaign chairperson, resigned his position on the State Democratic Executive Committee in July and stumped the state for Republican candidate Eisenhower. A number of other influential Dixiecrats eventually threw their support to the general, including state chairman Gessner McCorvey, textile magnate Donald Comer, Dothan banker Wallace Malone, and Montgomery construction king Winton M. Blount, who would later serve as Richard Nixon's postmaster general. Despite the desire to create new in-roads into Alabama and the other southern states, the national Republican Party reflected Eisenhower's relatively moderate position on civil rights during the 1950s. Eisenhower captured several upper South states and did well with middle- and upper-class white voters in the region's metropolitan areas in 1952 and 1956, but his victories did not have much in the way of coattails.²⁰

During Eisenhower's presidency, the Republican Party focused more intently on forging inroads into the South. It created a "Southern Division" to begin the long process of party-building in the region. Prior to the 1950s, the Republican Party was simply a patronage machine with very little institutional presence in Alabama or elsewhere. According to one observer, prior to the 1960s, the Republican Party in the South "operated from briefcases and transient filing cabinets..."²² With a slightly more robust party machinery, 1960 Republican Party presidential candidate Richard Nixon hoped to build upon Eisenhower's toehold in the region. Nixon possessed a stronger commitment to racial equality than had Eisenhower, but he kept it relatively muted during the campaign and the party adopted a civil rights plank that was weaker than its Democratic counterpart. The shedding of Black voters that had begun in 1948 accelerated. Nixon adopted rhetoric that was familiar to white southerners, affirming that the Republican Party stood

for states' rights; he also mostly avoided mentioning the most famous of Republicans. Abraham Lincoln. Nixon hoped to expand upon Eisenhower's gains in southern metropolitan areas among what were referred to as "country-club Republicans," and was aided in his quest for white southern votes by southern middlemen like Birmingham newspaperman John Temple Graves, who now saw the Republican Party as the best vehicle through which to preserve segregation and white political control.

Despite a stronger party apparatus, Nixon was unable to build upon Eisenhower's record in the South. He carried Florida, Tennessee and Virginia. He was not racially conservative enough to convince a sufficient number of southern white voters in the Deep South to abandon their historic conceptions of the parties. The Republicans also failed to add any additional House seats. Nixon did worse with Black voters than did Eisenhower, winning 32% to Eisenhower's 39%, further convincing some in the party that its future lay with white southern voters. Alabama voters stuck with the Democratic Party in part because of the presence of Texan Lyndon Johnson on the ticket; still, a sufficient number of voters were unhappy with the party's position on civil rights to choose six unpledged presidential electors.²³

The Republican Party's Right Turn: Becoming the White Party

Following Nixon's defeat, conservative Republicans, a small but increasingly vocal and determined group, argued that the party needed to focus more aggressively on white voters in the South. United States Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, champion of this emerging conservative wing of the party, argued that Nixon's moderate approach to civil rights would continue to be a losing approach. The party's future, Goldwater argued, lay with white voters in the South. At a meeting of southern Republicans shortly following Nixon's defeat, Goldwater famously declared. "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we

ought to go hunting where the ducks are.”²⁴ Following Goldwater’s advice, the RNC devoted roughly a third of its annual budget to southern organizing. Within a few years, the party had a presence in 87 percent of southern counties, and many of these new Republicans were staunch segregationists.²⁵ The Republican Party had made a deliberate decision to brand itself as a “white party,” focusing its publicity activities on white voters in the South.²⁶

1962 Hill-Martin Race: A Response to Civil Rights

The Republican Party began making in-roads with white voters in Alabama and the South in the early 1960s as the Civil Rights Movement began gaining traction. The Kennedy administration proved more willing than the previous administration to aid the burgeoning movement, supporting the anti-poll tax amendment, helping to protect the Freedom Riders in Alabama, and aiding in the integration of the University of Mississippi. In 1962, the Republican Party fielded candidates in 7 US Senate races and 113 House races in the South.²⁷

The first serious challenge from a Republican candidate in Alabama came in 1962 when Gadsden businessman James D. Martin challenged incumbent United States Senator Lister Hill.²⁸ Elected to the House of Representatives in 1923 and to the United States Senate in 1958, Hill distinguished himself first as a staunch New Deal Democrat and later as an advocate for expanded access to health care. Hill was a pro-segregationist Democratic loyalist who opposed the Dixiecrat revolt, viewing the seniority of southern senators and representatives within the Democratic Party as the surest way to defeat civil rights legislation. Martin was a political unknown, a free-enterprise Dixiecrat-turned-“Goldwater Republican” who was an economic and racial conservative. He opposed federal civil rights initiatives and regarded programs such as national aid to education and social security as programs indicative of “dangerous socialistic trends.”²⁹ He regarded Democratic Party leaders as “anti-South” in their attitudes.³⁰ In accepting

the state party's nomination for the right to challenge Hill. Martin co-opted and embraced the powerful historical memory that had been the sole property of Democrats for a century. He called for "a return to the spirit of '61 – 1861, when our fathers formed a new nation" to support their principles. "God willing," Martin concluded, "we will not again be forced to take up rifle and bayonet to preserve these principles... Make no mistake, my friends, this will be a fight. The bugle call is loud and clear! The South has risen!"

Martin's attacks on Hill grew more aggressive when he turned to the issue of civil rights. Despite Hill's opposition to federal intervention into what he believed to be the rights of the states, Martin compared Hill's record to that of African American Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New York.³¹ On the campaign trail, he referred to President Kennedy's use of federal marshals during the Freedom Riders episode as a "federal invasion of Montgomery."³² He accused Attorney General Bobby Kennedy of "tearing like a predator... at the [voter] registration laws in Alabama..."³³ In the fall, President Kennedy sent federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, to quell the violence that had erupted when James Meredith integrated the University of Mississippi. Martin called Kennedy's actions "another Reconstruction."³⁴ Martin sent a letter of support to Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, praising what he called the governor's "gallant defense of the sovereign state of Mississippi and its institutions" and pledged his support "in your fight against federal pressure and the intervention of your state's rights..."³⁵ The *Birmingham News* carried the story of Martin's defense of Barnett accompanied by a photo of Martin in front of a Confederate battle flag.³⁶ Martin declared that he was running to "keep the Kennedys from doing to Alabama what they're doing to Mississippi..."³⁷

When the votes were tallied, observers were shocked that veteran Senator and anti-civil rights Democrat Lister Hill had barely survived, eeking by with a 6,803-vote margin of victory.

Hill's support was greatest among the state's few black voters and rural whites in northern Alabama. Martin's biggest gains over totals achieved by Eisenhower in 1956 occurred in counties with large Black majorities. A majority of Alabama's white voters supported Martin.³⁸

Presidential Election of 1964: Five States for Goldwater

Martin's near-toppling of a sitting senator gave hope to the Republican Party that it was on the right track. As the decade progressed, the Democratic Party increasingly aligned itself with the goals of the Civil Rights Movement. Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency upon Kennedy's assassination and declared his determination to become the "civil rights president." He made good on his promise. In July 1964, the president signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a broad desegregation bill.

The year 1964 promised a continuation of Republican inroads as well as a further distancing between the state Democratic Party and the National Democratic Party on the issue of civil rights. President Lyndon Johnson had become anathema to many southern white voters. Many searched for an alternative and found it in Republican Party nominee Barry Goldwater. Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act because he did not believe federal enforcement was possible and state and local enforcement was preferable. He insisted that "the more the Federal government has attempted to legislate morality, the more it actually has incited hatred and violence."³⁹ Goldwater received a warm welcome from white voters in Alabama and was even endorsed by the Grand Dragon of the state chapter of the Ku Klux Klan.⁴⁰ George Wallace, the state's segregationist governor, had temporarily tested the waters during the Democratic primary but eventually withdrew; recognizing Goldwater's appeal to white voters in Alabama and across the Deep South, Wallace offered himself as a possible running mate for the Arizona Senator, who politely declined. During the campaign, Goldwater embraced former Dixiecrat candidate Strom

Thurmond (now a United States Senator), who switched his party identification to Republican. On election day, Goldwater had flipped five southern states, including Alabama, where he garnered nearly 70 percent of the vote. Unlike Eisenhower, whose southern strength lay in the Upper South and in the region's metropolitan areas, Goldwater's greatest margins of victory came from counties with Black majorities, places "where any change to the racial pecking order proved the most alarming."⁴¹

Republicans expanded their activity in southern congressional races in 1964, contesting 70 of 106 congressional districts in the South, "the largest number of Republican challenges in the post-World War II period."⁴² Seven of the ten new seats won by the Republican congressional party in the nation were from the Deep South: five from Alabama alone, where Republicans captured a majority of the state's congressional delegation for the first time since the era of Reconstruction. The role of race and civil rights in this election was clear. Upon switching to the Republican Party, candidate Bill Dickinson declared, "I have joined the white man's party." He continued, "It behooves us to support those who support us and our way of life."⁴³ The other four Republican congressmen from Alabama were similarly outspoken opponents of civil rights. One said that the Civil Rights Act "paved the way for the destruction of our liberties"; another called the day that it passed "Black Friday." Goldwater's victory in the South in 1964 initiated what political scientists Earl and Merle Black call part one of the "Great White Switch," in which southern white voters began to show greater preference for Republican presidential candidates.⁴⁴

Johnson followed up his 1964 landslide victory by signing the Voting Rights Act of 1965. He had accomplished the passage of these two watershed pieces of legislation with almost no support from southern Democrats. "[T]he southern Democrats' traditional strategy of legislative

obstruction on civil rights legislation was finally and convincingly repudiated." A united and bipartisan northern coalition had triumphed over southern obstruction.⁴⁵ Following passage of the Voting Rights Act, Black voter registration swelled, with the new voters overwhelmingly registering as Democrats. Alabama's first Black state legislators since Reconstruction assumed office in 1971.⁴⁶

Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and the Southern Strategy

Southern white votes were up for grabs in the 1968 presidential election as these voters turned their backs on the national Democratic Party. The passage that year of the Fair Housing Act and a U.S. Supreme Court decision that paved the way for the use of busing to achieve racial balance in public schools kept racial integration at the forefront of American politics. With staunch segregationist and American Independent Party candidate George Wallace in the race and sure to win the Deep South states, including his own, Republican candidate Richard Nixon took a more subtle, and ultimately enduring, rhetorical route to win white southern voters. Unlike Wallace, Nixon avoided supporting segregation openly. He developed what came to be known as a "southern strategy," which encompassed promises that appealed to white southerners (and many northerners as well) while avoiding the loss of moderate Republicans in the North. Nixon established a politically safe terrain by simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles of equality while opposing the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance. A majority of white Americans had come to believe that denial of basic citizenship rights was wrong, but they were opposed to the prospect of substantial residential and educational integration imposed by the courts and by the federal regulatory bureaucracy through involuntary mechanisms, especially busing.⁴⁷ Nixon likewise adopted language that originated with Wallace, embracing a tougher

“law and order” attitude that appealed to a “silent majority” that had grown weary of civil rights demands, urban uprisings, and anti-Vietnam War protests.

Nixon carried much of the upper South, taking five states back from the Democrats. George Wallace’s independent candidacy netted five southern states (including Alabama) and stymied Nixon’s effort to replicate Goldwater’s success in the Deep South. Nixon carried through on his promises of conservative judicial appointments, relaxed enforcement of school desegregation, and opposition to busing to achieve racial balance in public schools. He also sought to weaken provisions of the Voting Rights Act.⁴⁸ Although Alabama had gone for Wallace, *The Montgomery Advertiser* appeared satisfied with the Nixon agenda, telling its readers, “Nixon Keeps His Word.”⁴⁹ In 1972, with George Wallace out of the race, Nixon won the South with 60.7 percent of vote. This election represented the first time a Republican had won the South. Voters who had supported Wallace in 1968 overwhelmingly went to Nixon.⁵⁰

Stymied in the 1970s

The success of the Republican Party at the presidential level did not immediately translate down ballot. Despite Nixon’s success in 1972, and despite the fact that the National Democratic Party by 1972 had become increasingly fractured and defined by its liberal-reform wing that was dedicated to using federal machinery to expand and secure rights for those at society’s margins, southern Democrats in the House and the Senate withstood the Goldwater and Nixon challenges, successfully asserting their independence from the national party while establishing their conservative credentials. The Democrats continued to hold majorities in both houses, so southern senators in particular, who had cultivated party and senatorial seniority, continued to secure plum committee chairmanships. Strom Thurmond’s party switching remained a singular act; most senators and representatives were unwilling to give up their power

and influence to join the minority party on a matter of political principal. As long as they could keep some distance from the increasingly liberal national party, southern Democrats were safe. In 1972, Nixon's Postmaster General, Winton "Red" Blount, challenged incumbent Senator John Sparkman, but lost badly, garnering only 33 percent of the vote. Despite having been a member of the president's cabinet, the Republican Blount received tepid support from the president, who recognized Sparkman's relatively conservative voting record as more useful to his legislative program.⁵¹

The Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon's resignation, and the Democratic Party's nomination of white southern Baptist former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, slowed Republican gains down ballot. In Alabama specifically, the dominance and longevity of George Wallace retarded Republican development in the state. Wallace's strident racial appeals secured a base of support among white voters that Republicans found impossible to break.⁵² At the Congressional level, Alabama's delegation remained split during the 1970s and 1980s; two districts remained in Republican hands while a third, the Sixth District, went Republican in 1964 but returned to the Democratic column in 1983. The Democratic Party maintained in control of the state's two senate seats throughout the decade.

Black voters entered the political process as Democrats. Democrats remained competitive into the 1980s and 1990s because of their ability to create biracial coalitions. In order to grow, the Republican Party continued to lean into its appeals to white voters. Republican state house members broke into double digits only in the early 1980s and in the state senate in the 1990s. As the parties became more racially polarized in the 1980s and 1990s, and as more white voters migrated to the Republican Party, creating coalitions became increasingly difficult.

Ronald Reagan and the Great White Switch, Part II

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 secured the second part of the “Great White Switch,” in which a majority of the South’s white voters not only *voted* Republican for the presidency, but also *identified* as Republicans. By 1992, 43 percent of white voters in the South regarded themselves as Republican, while 42 percent considered themselves Democrats. The Republicans had become competitive by relying almost exclusively on white southern voters.

The Republican Party in the 1980s did not shy away from racial messaging. Reagan kicked off his presidential campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi, site of a horrific 1964 triple murder of civil rights activists that happened with the complicity of law enforcement. His declaration of his support for states’ rights was a not-so-subtle dog whistle to white southerners generally that his administration would not aggressively pursue remedies for racial discrimination. He promised the white voters in attendance that he intended to “restore to states and local governments the power that properly belongs to them.”⁵³ Republican strategist Lee Atwater in 1981 admitted that “The whole strategy was...based on coded racism. The whole thing.” Reagan’s vice president, George H.W. Bush, followed suit in his own presidential campaign in 1988. The infamous Willie Horton advertisement inextricably linked blackness, criminality, and liberalism – a linkage that originated with Nixon -- and hung it around the neck of Democratic Party candidate Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts.⁵⁴

Under Reagan’s leadership, the Republican Party in the 1980s pursued a conservative agenda that, while not explicitly racist, had race at its center. Republicans pursued a range of policy prescriptions that relied on the belief that the Black community is marked by higher rates of crime and illegitimacy, a weakened family structure, low achievement in educational levels, and greater demands on the welfare system. Racial attitudes among southern Republicans in

particular reflected a resistance to government assistance to Blacks as a group and applying individualistic notions and standards to the situation of Black people in this country. Republicans asserted that inequality was not the result of the legacy of slavery or the long history of racial discrimination but rather is “a matter of effort, and if Blacks worked harder...they would achieve equal status in society.”⁵⁵ Poverty and incarceration, for example, were not the result of discrimination or over-policing of communities of color, but rather the result of poor choices. Government-led redistribution of resources to address inequality was, in the minds of Republicans, an example of anti-egalitarian special preference.

The racial polarization of the parties continued. Throughout the 1980s, southern Black Democratic support ranged between 76 and 94 percent, while the percentage of Blacks identifying themselves as Republican throughout the 1980s at no time was greater than 12 percent.⁵⁶ Race remained the political dividing line between the parties. By the 1980s, southern Democratic and Republican members of congress were voting differently on civil rights issues.⁵⁷ By the end of Reagan’s presidency, approximately 70 percent of all white southern voters were supporting Republican presidential candidates. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Republicans incorporated additional conservative themes of anti-feminism and religious fundamentalism that were interwoven with racial resentment. As one scholar has noted, “even when not directly on the surface, [race] lurks beneath nearly every issue in state politics.”⁵⁸ Polls have shown that white evangelicals are disproportionately more likely to voice support for policies and politicians that have racially conservative implications. In Alabama, Republican Jeremiah Denton, a religious conservative, captured a U.S. Senate seat in 1984 but through ineptitude lost it to conservative Democrat Richard Shelby in 1986. Shelby switched his party affiliation to Republican in 1994.

Building on the position that Nixon had pioneered and Reagan had expanded, by the end of the twentieth century, race and white anxiety formed the bedrock of conservative political ideology and was embedded in conflicts surrounding taxes, spending, education, crime, and welfare, as well as the promotion of what came to be known as “family values” issues. Racial attitudes became a central characteristic of both ideology and party identification, integral to voters’ choices between Democrats and Republicans.

Summary: The Late 20th Century and the Continuing Salience of Race

By the late twentieth century, the Republican Party’s electoral base resided solidly in the southern states. This remarkable political transformation was completed over the course of half a century. Since 1980, every Republican presidential candidate has carried a majority of ex-Confederate states, and in three elections (1984, 1988, and 2004) swept the region entirely. In Congress, the GOP has won a majority of southern seats in both the House and Senate since the 1994 midterm elections. The ability to attract a large majority of white voters in southern states has become pivotal to the party’s ability to win presidential elections and electoral majorities. In order to compete, beginning in the early 1960s, the Republican Party rebranded itself as a “white party” and adopted a host of conservative policy positions that had race at their core and which allowed it to compete effectively for white southern votes.⁵⁹ Since the 1970s, Democrats have lost seats in almost every legislative election cycle, due largely to their loss of support among rural white voters. Alabama elected its last Democratic governor in 1998. Today, nearly every Democratic lawmaker is Black and every Republican lawmaker is White.⁶⁰ Only 17 percent of white voters identify as Democrats, and only 15 percent of Black voters identify as Republicans.⁶¹ As Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields argue in their recent book, *The Long Southern Strategy*, “the decision to chase white southern voters in order to build a new

Republican coalition was not only intentional, strategic, and effective, but it was also unabating.”⁶² The consequence for Alabama is a politics that have become, in the words of one political scientist, “polarized and uncompetitive.”⁶³

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
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 17th day of May 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.



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Education

Ph.D. Rutgers University, 1996
M.A. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1991
B.A. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1986

Employment

Chair, Department of History, University of Alabama, August 2010 to 2016.

Professor, Department of History, University of Alabama, 2014 to present.

Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Alabama, 2003 to 2014.

Director, Alabama Oral History Project, 2009 to 2011.

Director, Frances S. Summersell Center for the Study of the South, 2006 to 2010

Director of Graduate Studies, University of Alabama, 2003 to 2006.

Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Alabama, 1999 to 2003.

Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Central Florida, 1996 to 1999.

Editor, *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 1996 to 1999.

Instructor, Department of History, Columbia College, Columbia, South Carolina.
summer 1996.

Instructor, Department of History and Political Science, South Carolina State
University, Orangeburg, South Carolina, summer 1995.

Instructor, Department of History, Rutgers University, summer 1993 and 1994.

Courses Taught

Graduate:

Teaching History
Proseminar/Seminar. U.S. History Since 1865

Postseminar/Seminar, History of the South
New Left, New Right: U.S. Politics since 1960

Undergraduate:

American Civilization Since 1865
History of the American South, 1607 to the Civil War
History of the American South Since Reconstruction
United States History, 1914-1945
History of Florida to 1865
History of Florida Since 1865
History of Alabama Since 1865
History of the Civil Rights Movement
United States Political History Since 1865
Twentieth-Century American Political Movements
New Left, New Right: U.S. Politics since 1960

Publications

Books

Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022)

Winner, 2022 Michael V. R. Thomason Award for Best Book in the History of the Gulf South, Gulf South Historical Association

Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South, 1945-1980 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013)

Winner, Bennett H. Wall Award for Best Book in Southern Economic and Business History Published Over a Two-Year Period (2014), Southern Historical Association

The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

Winner, Harry S. Truman National Book Award for 2002, Harry S. Truman Library Institute

Edited Books

Making Waves: Female Activists in Twentieth Century Florida, co-edited with Jack E. Davis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

Book Series

The Modern South, co-edited with Susan Youngblood Ashmore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press)

Articles and Essays in Edited Collections

"Creating Rural Consumers in the Cold War." in *The Cold War in the American South*, ed. by Amy Sayward and Leah Vallely (Abstract accepted: book under advance contract from University of Alabama Press).

Review Essay for Roundtable on *The Year That Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968*, in *Diplomatic History* (forthcoming).

"Making New Deal Citizens: Middle-Class Values and the Tenant Purchase Program." *Agricultural History* (submitted, December 2023).

"The South and the State in the Twentieth Century," in *The New History of the American South*, ed. by W. Fitzhugh Brundage (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2023), 392-431.

"John H. Bankhead," in *Tuscaloosans* (Tuscaloosa, AL: Borgo Publishing, 2019).

"Brand New District, Same Old Fight: The Bankhead-Hobson Campaign of 1916". *Alabama Review* 70 (October 2016), 267-295. Winner of the Milo B. Howard Jr. Award, Alabama Historical Association, for best article published over a two-year period.

"Manhood and Politics: The Hobson-Bankhead Campaigns of 1904 and 1906." in *Alabama Review* 69 (April 2016), 99-131.

"Creating a 'Respectable Area': Southerners and the Cold War," commentary. "Special Forum: Domestic Regionalism and U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 36 (June 2012), 487-90.

"Cold War Corporate Culture and the American South," in *With Liberty and Justice For All? Rethinking Politics in Cold War America, 1945-1965*, edited by Kathleen Donohue (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 361-82.

"The New South in Transition: New Deal, World War II, and Cold War," in *The American South: A Reader and Guide*, edited by Daniel Letwin (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2011), 320-30.

"World War II, White Violence, and Black Politics in V. O. Key's *Southern Politics*, in *Unlocking V.O. Key: "Southern Politics" for a New Century*, edited by Todd Shields and Angie Maxwell (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2011), 39-54.

"The Cold War at the Grassroots: Militarization and Modernization in the American South," in *The End of Southern History?: Integrating the Modern South and the Nation* Edited by Matthew Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (Oxford University Press, 2010), 190-209.

Introduction to Louise Cassels, *Unexpected Exodus*, reprint (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007).

"Confronting the Garrison State: South Carolina in the Early Cold War Era," *Journal of Southern History* 72 (May 2006), 349-78.

"'As a Man, I am Interested in States' Rights': Race, Gender, and the Political Culture of the States' Rights Movement, 1948-1950," in *Jumpin' Jim Crow: Politics in the New South*, edited by Glenda E. Gilmore, Bryant Simon, and Jane Dailey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 260-74.

"Documenting 'The South's Number One Problem': V. O. Key Jr. and the Study of Twentieth-Century Southern Politics," in *Reading Southern History: Essays on Interpreters and Interpretations*, edited by Glenn Feldman (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 123-33.

"Dual Actions, One for Each Race': Biracial Political Challenges to the Dixiecrats, 1948-1950," *International Social Science Review* 72 (Spring 1997), 14-25.

"'The Slowest State, the Most Backward Community': Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil Rights Legislation," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 98 (April 1997), 177-210.

"Cathrine Curtis and Conservative Isolationist Women, 1939-1941," *The Historian* 58 (Summer 1996), 825-39.

Encyclopedia Entries

"Dixiecrats," *Encyclopedia of Alabama*, www.encyclopediaofalabama.com

"Dixiecrats in South Carolina," *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, edited by Walter Edgar (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 267.

"Fielding L. Wright," *American National Biography*, Vol. 24, edited by John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12-14.

Book and Video Reviews

Review of Jefferson Cowie, *Freedom's Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power*, in *Journal of Southern History* (forthcoming).

Review of Carl V. Harris (edited and completed by Elliot W. Brownlee), *Segregation in the New South: Birmingham, Alabama, 1871-1901*, in *Alabama Review* 77 (April 2024), 13-16.

“Who’s the ‘Mass.’ Where’s the Resistance? Gender, Class, and Region in the Reconsideration of Massive Resistance.” Review essay, Rebecca Bruckmann, *Massive Resistance and Southern Womanhood: White Women, Class, and Segregation*; Emma J. Folwell, *The War on Poverty in Mississippi: From Massive Resistance to New Conservatism*; and Elizabeth Gillespie McRae, *Mothers of Massive Resistance: White Women and the Politics of White Supremacy*, in *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and Culture* (October 2022 online), 244-247.

Review of Zachary J. Lechner, *The South of the Mind: American Imaginings of Southern Whiteness, 1960-1980*, in *Florida Historical Review* (Winter 2019), 365-66.

Review of Martin T. Olliff, *Getting out of the Mud: The Alabama Good Roads Movement and Highway Administration, 1896-1928*, in *Alabama Review* 72 (January 2019), 61-64.

Review of Andrew Fry, *The American South and the Vietnam War*, in *Diplomatic History* 40 (Spring 2016), 366-68.

Review of Keith Findley, *Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight Against Civil Rights, 1938-1965*, in *Florida Historical Quarterly* 88 (Summer 2009), 120-22.

Review of Gary Mormino, *Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams*, in *Florida Historical Quarterly* 85 (Fall 2006), 107-110.

Review of James B. Crooks, *Jacksonville Before Consolidation*, in *Journal of Southern History* 72 (August 2006), 709.

Review of Jeff Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968* (2004), in *Alabama Review* 58 (July 2005), 237-38.

Review of Steve Neal, ed., *Miracle of '48* (2003), in *Chicago Tribune*, February 22, 2004.

Review of Gordon E. Harvey, *A Question of Justice: New South Governors and Education, 1968-1976* (2002), in *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 104 (April 2003), 137-38.

Review of Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (2002), in *Journal of Southern History* 69 (November 2003), 990-92.

Review of Samuel L. Webb and Margaret E. Armbrister, eds., *Alabama Governors: A Political History of the State* (2001), in *Alabama Review* 56 (July 2003), 225-27.

Review of Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908* (2001) in *The Historian* 65 (2003), 1428-29.

Review of John Drescher, *Triumph of Good Will: How Terry Sanford Beat a Champion of Segregation and Reshaped the South* (2000), in *North Carolina Historical Review*.

Review of Tracey E. Danese, *Claude Pepper and Ed Ball: Politics, Power, and Purpose* (2000), in *Florida Historical Quarterly* 80 (Spring 2002), 559-60.

Review of Sarah Hart Brown, *Standing Against Dragons: Three Civil Rights Lawyers in an era of Fear* (1998), in *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 83 (Fall 1999), 615-616.

Review of Janet L. Coryell, Martha H. Swain, Sandra Gioia Treadway, and Elizabeth Hayes Turner, *Beyond Image and Convention: Explorations in Southern Women's History* (1998), in *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 100 (July 1999), 286-87.

Review of "Riding the Rails," The American History Project (1997), in *Journal for Multimedia History* Volume 2, 1999.

Review of Bentley Orrick and Harry L. Crumpacker, *The Tampa Tribune: A Century of Florida Journalism* (1998), in *Journal of Southern History* 66 (February 2000), 149.

Review of R. Bruce Stephenson, *Visions of Eden: Environmentalism, Urban Planning, and City Building in St. Petersburg, Florida, 1900-1995* (1997), in *Journal of American History* 85 (September 1998), 709.

Review of David L. Chappell, *Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement* (1994), in *Southern Historian* 17 (1997), 91-93.

Review of Carl Grafton and Anne Permaloff, *Political Power in Alabama: The More Things Change...* (1996), in *The Historian* 60 (Fall 1997), 137-39.

Review of *Georgia in Black and White: Explorations in the Race Relations of a Southern State*, edited by John C. Inscoe (1994), in *Southern Historian*, 99-100.

Review of William Ivy Hair, *The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey P. Long* (1991), in *Gulf Coast Historical Review* 10 (Spring 1995), 85-86.

Conferences

"The South and the State," Roundtable Discussion of *A New History of the American South* (University of North Carolina Press, 2023), at Louisiana Book Festival, Baton Rouge, October 28, 2023.

Organizer and Participant, "Truman Civil Rights Symposium: A National 75th Anniversary Commemoration," Sponsored by the Truman Library Institute, July 26-28, 2023, Washington DC.

"Finding Upland Bend: The Transformation of a Postwar Southern Community," Alabama Historical Association Annual Meeting, April 14, 2023, Prattville, Alabama.

"Making New Deal Citizens: Middle-Class Values and the Tenant Purchase Program," Gulf South Historical Association Annual Meeting, Gulfport, Mississippi, October 13, 2022.

"Soft Power: Marie Bankhead Owen and the Politics of Race and Class in Alabama," at "Rethinking Alabama Politics from the Civil War to the Present," Symposium at the University of Alabama, October 3, 2022.

"Family Biography as Regional History: The Bankheads of Alabama," A Roundtable Discussion of *Deep South Dynasty*, Alabama Historical Association Annual Meeting, April 8, 2022, Florence, Alabama

Panel Chair, "Memorialization and Resistance on Campus," Southeastern American Studies Association Conference, Birmingham, Alabama, March 3, 2022.

"The Federal Road Aid Act of 1916," Alabama Historical Association Meeting, Auburn, Alabama, April 2017.

Roundtable Participant, "Leading Women: A Roundtable Discussion of Gender and Academic Leadership," Southern Historical Association Conference, Mobile, Alabama, November 3, 2012.

"World War II, Black Political Activity, and White Violence in V.O. Key's Southern Politics," Unlocking V.O. Key, Second Annual Blair Legacy Series Conference, Rockefeller Institute/Diane D. Blair Center for Southern Politics, University of Arkansas, Petit Jean Mountain, Arkansas, April 1-3, 2009.

Commentor, "The 1947 Lynching of Willie Earle: Three Perspectives on South Carolina's Last Known Lynching," Organization of American Historians, Seattle, Washington, March 27, 2009.

Moderator, "The State of Alabama Political History," Alabama Association of Historians, University of West Alabama, Livingston, Alabama, February 6, 2009.

Organizer and Moderator, "Shifting Sands: Changing Images in the 1930s South," Hickory Hill Fall Forum, Watson-Brown Foundation, November 2008.

Organizer, "Race and Place in the American South," University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, April 2007.

"ACE's Wild: The Army Corps of Engineers and Southern Life," Southern Historical Association Conference, Birmingham, Alabama, November 2006.

"Corporate Culture, the Cold War, and the American South," The Military and the American South, 1898 to Present, Watson-Brown Conference, Thomson, Georgia, October 6-7, 2006.

Commentator, "The Rise of the Christian Right," Organization of American Historians, Washington, DC, April 2006.

"The Cold War at the Grass Roots," The End of Southern History? Integrating the Modern South and the Nation, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, March 23-24, 2006.

"Uncle Sam in Dixie: Touring Federal Installations in the American South," International Society of Travel Writing, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2004.

"The Cold War Comes South: A View from the Grassroots," Organization of American Historians, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2004.

"Atomic Spaces in Dixie: Land and Landscape in the Cold War South," Southern Historical Association, Houston, Texas, November 2003.

Commentator, "Alfred Gore Sr. and the Politics of the Modern South," Organization of American Historians, Memphis, Tennessee, April 2003.

"Federal Housing Policy and the Construction of the Savannah River Plant in the 1950s," Organization of American Historians, Washington, DC, April 13, 2002.

"'Displaced Persons' and 'New People': Creating the Savannah River Plant," South Carolina Historical Association, Charleston, South Carolina, March 1, 2002.

"Revolt of the Black Belt: The Dixiecrat Party of 1948," Southern Historical Association, Louisville, Kentucky, November 11, 2000.

Chair, "African American Experiences of Health Care in the South," Southern Association for the History of Medicine and Science, Birmingham, February 18, 2000.

"Southern Labor and Politics: Methodologies, Interpretations, Issues," Southern Labor Studies Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, October 2, 1999.

"Race, Class, and the Willie Earle Lynching: South Carolina, 1947," Southern Historical Association, Birmingham, Alabama, November 12, 1998.

"The Girls' Recreation Center in Orlando and the Origins of an Urban Social Service Network, 1920-1930," Florida Historical Society, Tampa, Florida, May 30, 1998.

"Girls Just Wanna Have Fun: The Girls' Recreation Center in Orlando, 1920-1930," Popular Culture Association, Orlando, Florida, April 10, 1998.

Chair, "Defining Boundaries of Americanism from Hot War to Cold: Race, Gender, Nationalism, and Subversion, 1940-1960," Organization of American Historians, Indianapolis, Indiana, April 4, 1998.

Commentator, "Gender and Sports," Sports and American Culture Lecture Series, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida, March 30, 1998.

"Class and Confederate Symbolism in the Dixiecrat Movement," Popular Culture Association in the South, Columbia, South Carolina, October 16, 1997.

Commentator, "Race and Education in Late-Nineteenth-Century Florida," Florida Historical Society, Jacksonville, Florida, May 30, 1997.

Commentator, "Women and South Carolina History," South Carolina Historical Association, Columbia, South Carolina, March 8, 1997.

"The Slowest State, the Most Backward Community": Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil Rights Initiatives," Florida Conference of Historians, Jacksonville, Florida, February 28, 1997.

"Dual Actions, One for Each Race": The Progressive Democrats, the Citizen Democrats, and the Challenge to the Dixiecrats in South Carolina, 1948-1950," Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, Charleston, South Carolina, October 3, 1996.

"As a Man, I am Interested in States' Rights": Race, Gender, and the Political Culture of States' Rights, 1948-1950," Organization of American Historians, Chicago, Illinois, March 31, 1996.

"Politicizing the Unprintable: Race, Sex, and Libel in South Carolina Politics, 1949-50," National Association of African American Studies, Virginia State University, St. Petersburg, Virginia, February 17, 1995.

"Reconstituting the Isolationists: Cathrine Curtis and the Mothers' Movement," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts, June 23, 1994.

"Deploying Motherhood: Right-Wing Women and World War II," World War II Conference, Siena College, Loudonville, New York, June 3, 1994.

Invited Lectures

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Museum of Mobile, August 9, 2023, Mobile, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Tuscaloosa Rotary, June 6, 2023, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

New Book Symposium on *Freedom's Dominion*, by Jefferson Cowie, Crossroads Civic Engagement Center, April 25, 2023, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama." Birmingham Historical Society, February 27, 2023. Birmingham, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama." Alabama Department of Archives and History. Montgomery, Alabama, March 29, 2022.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Leadership Board Meeting, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, March 5, 2022.

"Who are the Bankheads, and Why Should I Care About Them?" OLLIE talk, January 31 2022. Bryant Conference Center, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

"Family History as Regional Biography: An Overview of Deep South Dynasty," Ernest & Hadley Book Store, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, January 22, 2022.

"Family History as Regional Biography: The Bankheads of Alabama," Jasper Rotary Club, Jasper, Alabama, December 7, 2021.

"How did we Get Here? Some Answers from Alabama's Past," Women's Policy Institute of Birmingham, September 9, 2021.

"200 Years of Alabama History in 45 Minutes," Leadership Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, January 8, 2021.

"200 Years of Alabama History in 45 Minutes," Blackburn Institute, University of Alabama, August 2020.

"'Better Living'": Life in a Cold War Company Town," National Archives Southeast, Morrow, Georgia, September 2016.

Moderator, "Hidden Humanities" Roundtable Discussion with Professor William Ferris, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, October 6, 2014.

"Finding Women in the Cold War," Pickens-Salley Symposium on Southern Women, University of South Carolina at Aiken, March 25, 2014.

"Better Living': Life in a Cold War Company Town," Up & Atom Breakfast, Employees of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (formerly Savannah River Site), Aiken, South Carolina, March 26, 2014.

"Cold War Dixie," Savannah River Site Employees (Retired), North Augusta, South Carolina, February 21, 2014.

"The South in the Cold War," Kiwanis of Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama, November 12, 2013.

"Searching for Political Alternatives in the Great Depression." Harry S Truman Presidential Library. Independence, Missouri. July 22-24, 2009.

"Militarization and Modernization in Aiken, South Carolina, in the 1950s." Up & Atom Breakfast. Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness, Aiken, South Carolina, March 14, 2007.

"Atomic Spaces in Dixie." Southern Association for the History of Medicine, Science, and Technology, Augusta, Georgia, February 25, 2005.

"Life on the Nuclear Frontier: The Cold War in South Carolina," South Carolina Historical Symposium, Columbia, South Carolina, February 23, 2005.

"Strom Thurmond and the Biography of Southern Political Change," Continuing Education, University of Alabama, February 2004.

"Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat Revolt, and the Origins of the Two-Party South," University of Missouri at Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri; and the Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, March 2003.

"Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat Revolt, and the Origins of the Two-Party South," University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, March 26, 2002.

Documentary and Media Appearances

"The Bankheads of Alabama," interview on WKRG-TV (Mobile), August 6, 2023.

"The Cold War in the American South," Modern Scholar Podcast (modernscholarpodcast.com), aired October 2023.

The Blinding of Isaac Woodard, American Experience, PBS, first aired March 30, 2021. On-screen content expert.

Finding the Cornerstone: The Wallace A. Rayfield Story, APTV, aired April 2021. On-screen content expert.

"Walter Edgar's Journal," South Carolina Educational Radio Network, January 2008

"Walter Edgar's Journal," South Carolina Educational Radio Network, March 22, 2002.

Grants, Awards, and Honors

2022	Michael V. R. Thomason Award, Best Book in History of the Gulf South, Gulf South Historical Association
2021-24	Leadership Board Faculty Fellowship, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Alabama
2018	Milo B. Howard Jr. Award, Alabama Historical Association.
2014	Bennett H. Wall Book Award, Southern Historical Association
2009	Academy for Improving Student Success Grant, University of Alabama
2008	Watson-Brown Foundation Contract Grant
2008	Community Based Partnership Grant, University of Alabama

2002	Harry S. Truman National Book Award
2000	National Endowment for the Humanities, Summer Stipend
2000-02	Research Advisory Committee Grant, Office of Sponsored Research, University of Alabama
1997-98	Scholar/Humanist Grant, Florida Humanities Council
1997-98	Dean's Initiative Grant, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Central Florida
1995-96	Louis Bevier Fellowship, Rutgers University
1994-96	Graduate Research Fellowship, Institute for Southern Studies, University of South Carolina
1993-95	Excellence Fellowship, Rutgers University
1994	Dissertation Research Grant, Harry S. Truman Institute

Community Engagement and Outreach

2023	Exhibit Review, Randall Museum at American Village, Montevallo, Alabama
2017-20	Executive Committee, Tuscaloosa Bicentennial Commission
2017-20	Chair, Education Committee, Tuscaloosa Bicentennial Commission Organized "Tuscaloosa Through Time: A Bicentennial History Expo," April 24-27, 2019. Expo featured 29 historical exhibitions from every public and private school in Tuscaloosa. Over 10,000 students attended the exhibit over the course of 3-1/2 days. Managing Editor, <i>200: An Artistic and Literary Celebration</i> (Tuscaloosa, 2019). Includes poems, short stories, and artwork from students representing every school in the city.

Related Professional Experience and Service

Consultant and Participant, "Isaac Woodard, Harry Truman, and Civil Rights," documentary, American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service (March 2021).

Consultant and Participant, "Finding the Cornerstone," documentary, Alabama Public Television (in progress).

Consultant, "Get Right With God," Southern Oral History Collection, University of North Carolina, 2015 to present.

Board of Directors, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Missouri, 2019-present.

Grants Committee, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Missouri, 2013-present (chair of committee, 2018-present).

Consultant and Participant, "The Bankheads," documentary, Center for Public Broadcasting, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama (2016).

Consultant, "Three Days at Foster," documentary, directed by Keith Dunnavent, Shadowvision Productions, 2013.

Consultant, "The Durrs of Montgomery," documentary, Alabama Public Television, 2012.

Consultant. "Displaced: The Unexpected Fallout from the Cold War." Directed by Mark Albertin. Produced by Scrapbook Video Productions. 2009.

Member, Educational Advisory Committee, Alabama Public Television. 2009-present.

Consultant, National Endowment for the Humanities, Exhibition Grant, University of West Georgia. 2009-present.

Member, Women in the Profession, Southern Historical Association. 2010-2012.

Chair, Lerner-Scott Dissertation Prize, Organization of American Historians. 2008-2009

Member, Southern Industrialization Project, Southern Historical Association Panel. 2007-2008

Member, William F. Holmes Award Committee, Southern Historical Association. 2003

Panelist, National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipends Program. 2000-2002, 2004, 2006

Editorial Board, *Florida Historical Quarterly*

Editorial Board, *The Alabama Review*

Editorial Board, *Atlanta History*

Member, State Records Commission, Montgomery, Alabama, 2000-2003

Member, Local Records Commission, Montgomery, Alabama, 2000-2003

Supervisor, Public History Internship Program, University of Alabama, 2001 to present

Supervisor, Public History Internship Program, University of Central Florida, 1997 to 1999

Consultant, Orange County Regional History Center, Maitland County Historical Museum

Manuscript reviewer for Houghton Mifflin, Harcourt Brace, Addison Wesley Longman, ABC-CLIO, New York University Press, University of Alabama Press, University Press of Florida, University of Georgia Press, West Virginia University Press, University of North Carolina Press, University of Missouri Press, Cambridge University Press, Johns Hopkins University Press

Chair, Diversity Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Council, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Affairs Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Undergraduate Affairs Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Executive Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Technology and Media Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Faculty Development Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Affairs Committee, University of Central Florida

Member, University Assessment Committee, University of Central Florida

Member, Teaching Incentive Program Committee, University of Central Florida

Memberships

Organization of American Historians
 Southern Historical Association
 South Carolina Historical Association
 Alabama Historical Association

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Exhibit C

Supplemental Report

Dr. Kari Frederickson

July 25, 2024

This supplemental report provides my responses and opinions regarding the June 27, 2024, report submitted by Dr. Adam Carrington.

My concerns about his report can be summarized as follows:

1. He mischaracterizes my argument (and that of much of the scholarship on the political transformation of the South) by stating that I claim the transformation happened quickly and completely. Much of his report is a response to an argument I did not make and which most historians of southern politics do not make.
2. In order to make an argument that downplays the role of race in the post-1965 political landscape, he erases race from Alabama history almost entirely.
3. He makes a number of factual errors as well as errors of omission with regard to Alabama political history. Dr. Carrington is a political scientist whose scholarship focuses on nineteenth century legal history. He is not a recognized scholar of post-Civil War southern or Alabama history.
4. He ignores the political impact of George Wallace, both in the 1968 election and in Alabama political history generally.
5. He identifies a number of factors that he claims explain white voters' turn towards the Republican Party in 1980 and after but ignores the role of race embedded in these issues.

I. Mischaracterization of My Original Argument:

Dr. Carrington sets up his report with a simplistic and inaccurate summary of my report and much of the mainstream of historical scholarship on the issue of political transformation. He writes: "The end of legal segregation and the gains made by the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s caused racially-focused Democrats to abandon the party of Jefferson Davis. They then moved to the Republican camp because the GOP, no longer the party of Lincoln, had adopted the race-conscious, even white-supremacist views once the commitment of the Democratic Party. In short: the two parties switched and Southern whites, unchanged in their views, switched parties in response."¹ He states elsewhere that "[R]ace of course came to the forefront in the 1960s in a

¹ Adam M. Carrington, Report, June 27, 2024, p. 1. Calling the Democratic Party the "party of Jefferson Davis" is peculiar and unnecessarily inflammatory. Certainly historical figures never characterized the party in this fashion, preferring instead to identify Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson as the party's founders. The annual Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, typically held in early spring, was an annual fundraising event for Democratic Party officials. Davis was indeed a Democrat but had no discernible impact on party ideology. Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 80-81.

way that severely tested the Democratic New Deal coalition [but] did not produce *an immediate move* (emphasis mine) to the Republican Party of any durability.”² Neither I nor the preponderance of scholars of southern politics who look at the issue of race argue that the transition was immediate.³ His report seeks to disprove this faulty premise which, because it is so reductive and simplistic, relieves him of the responsibility of examining the deep historical and cultural complexity of Democratic Party allegiance stretching back to the nineteenth century. The entire transition took decades, although watershed moments, such as the elections of 1964 and 1980, exist. A complete rendering of the transition needs to take into account the political power of southern Democrats in Congress, the differences between southern Democrats and the national Democratic Party, as well as the adoption of key cultural symbols of historic importance by the Republican Party, all of which I address in my original report. In the state of Alabama specifically, this process of Republican resurgence had to grapple with the outsized presence of George Wallace, something Dr. Carrington does not discuss.

His mischaracterization of my argument also involves his careless use of terminology. In particular, he attributes to me the use of the term “white supremacy” or “white supremacist” in a way that is ahistorical and which I do not use in my report beyond a discussion of the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948. As Jason Morgan Ward has argued, overt defense of “white supremacy” per se receded around mid century to be replaced by a defense of segregation, and later by racialized (though not explicitly “white supremacist”) policy positions and politics. To attribute to me the charge that Nixon, for example, was a “white supremacist” or that the post-1964 Republican Party became the party of “white supremacy” grossly misrepresents both my argument and history of racialized political language and policies.⁴

II. Racial Erasure and Errors of Fact

Throughout his report, even when discussing historical points supposedly not in dispute in this case, Dr. Carrington downplays the significance or even the existence of racialized politics altogether. The result is an inaccurate representation of historical events and of the history of the Democratic Party in the South. Removing race from earlier political developments allows him to ignore its role in the political transformation of Alabama and the South in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Allow me to provide a few examples:

Carrington, Report, p. 29.

I address the origins of this slow transition in my book *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). For support of this argument within the scholarship on southern politics see, among many others, Earl and Merle Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002); James M. Glaser, *Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

See, for example, Carrington, Report, p. 19; Jason Morgan Ward, *Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936 – 1965* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

The Republican Party During Reconstruction and in the Later Nineteenth Century: About this incredibly contentious and revolutionary moment in American history, Dr. Carrington writes that “Some attempts (emphasis mine) were made during Reconstruction to make the GOP competitive in the South but such efforts failed, especially once federal troops were withdrawn.”⁵ First, the wording of this is peculiar. Characterizing the creation of the biracial Republican coalitions in the southern states as merely “some attempts” mischaracterizes the extent of as well as the revolutionary nature of the Republican party’s biracial coalition of freedmen, white southerners, and white newcomers in Alabama and across the South. Republicans – Black and white – were elected to local, state, and national offices. This coalition was responsible for repealing the onerous Black Codes and for ratifying the 14th and 15th amendments. Although they never dominated the Republican Party, Black Republicans continued to be elected to public office in the 1880s and 1890s.⁶ The “attempts” actually were quite successful. Second, Dr. Carrington’s representation of the connection between federal troops and Republican Party viability is misleading, implying that Republican viability was only possible with federal protection. The truth is that the number of federal troops in the South during Reconstruction was never sufficient to keep domestic order. White and Black Republicans participated in politics at great physical peril at all times, even while the region was under Union occupation. Republican Party coalitions were regarded by white Democrats as illegitimate from the moment they were created. Most historians would argue that the failure of the Republican Party – a biracial coalition – to remain competitive was due to unrelenting violence from white Democrats – violence that occurred while US troops remained in the South. Dr. Carrington’s interpretation downplays Black political agency, the existence of biracial political coalitions, and the relentless use of white terror that cast a long shadow over Alabama and southern politics.⁷

Dr. Carrington further chalks up the lack of Republican inroads in the South in the latter part of the nineteenth century to the region’s traditional culture, agricultural economy, and the fact that [white] southerners were “embittered by the memory of the Civil War.”⁸ This simply is incorrect. Most, but not all, white southerners despised the Republican Party because of the revolutionary changes wrought by Reconstruction as well as continued Republican Party support for voting rights protection such as that offered by the Federal Elections Bill of 1890, also known as the Lodge Bill. As the national party turned its focus to economic matters such as tariffs and to the

⁵ Carrington, Report, p. 8.

⁶ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Civil War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1988); Steven Hahn, *A Nation Under our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003); *Black Americans in Congress, 1870 – 2007* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008).

⁷ For white violence in Alabama during Reconstruction and the political aftermath, see Jefferson Cowie, *Freedom’s Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2022), chapters 9 and 10. For white violence during Reconstruction elsewhere in the South, see Stephen V. Ash, *A Massacre in Memphis: The Race Riot That Shook the Nation One Year After the Civil War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013); LeeAnn Keith, *The Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Richard Zuczek, *State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009).

⁸ Carrington, Report, p.24.

concerns of industrial America. It all but abandoned its earlier determination to protect the rights of Black southern voters.⁹

The Progressive Era Dr. Carrington incorrectly states that the Progressive Movement made “little inroads in its southern portion.”¹⁰ This statement is simply wrong and demonstrates not only a lack of understanding of Alabama politics and social movements, but also again serves as a thinly veiled attempt to erase race from Alabama politics entirely. The racial disfranchisement campaigns in Alabama and across the South were promoted as a type of Progressive reform. With Black men removed from the electorate, white men were free from the necessity to commit fraud and could safely disagree on the issues without worrying about who controlled the so-called “negro block vote.”¹¹ Two of the most consequential pieces of legislation passed by Congress during what is identified as the Progressive Era – the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the Federal Road Aid Act (until the New Deal, this program resulted in the greatest transfer of federal dollars to the states) -- were authored by Congressman Henry Clayton and Senator John Bankhead respectively, both from Alabama. Alabama congressman Richmond Hobson was a leading voice on prohibition and fought long and hard for what eventually became the 18th Amendment.¹² This movement had strong support among the state’s Black and white citizens, particularly evangelical Christians. The most significant Progressive Era reform, the passage of the 19th Amendment, though not ratified by the Alabama state legislature, received strong support from Hobson who by that time was out of office. Although Alabama suffragists fought hard for ratification, they were no match for the Anti-Suffragists, who lobbied state legislators and warned that ratification of the amendment would open the voting booth to Black women and thus serve as a backdoor assault on white supremacy.¹³

Alabama was a site of fervent Progressive reform. Many of the social and political reforms undertaken were driven or warped by the desire to maintain white supremacy, but they were considered “progressive” nevertheless.

New Deal Coalition Dr. Carrington’s incomplete description of the New Deal coalition and how it functioned likewise ignores racial complexity and plants the seeds for his later class-based explanation for why the Democratic Party fractured in the late 1960s. He is correct in pointing out that by the mid 1930s, the Democratic Party became a broad coalition in which southern white Democrats and African Americans (where they could access the vote) participated, and that New Deal policies were primarily economic in focus. These two groups were far from equal partners in this coalition, however. Southern Democrats in Congress had a significant hand in the design and passage of New Deal programs. As a result of southern political power, Blacks

For the national Republican Party’s abandonment of Black voters in the South, see Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

⁹ Carrington, Report, p. 24.

¹⁰ R. Volney Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890-1908* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); William A. Link, *The Paradox of Southern Progressivism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

¹¹ Karl Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022), Chapter 6. Hobson was the first congressman to introduce the amendment, which he did in 1911.

¹² Eliza C. Green, *Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 107-9.

received fewer benefits than whites (especially from programs administered at the local level) and were often left out of certain programs and protections altogether. Many popular New Deal reforms and programs were firmly locked within what political scientist Ira Katznelson calls the "southern cage." The greatest beneficiaries of the New Deal were working class whites. The national Democratic Party's willingness to accept racial discrimination in New Deal programs and legislation was essential for keeping this coalition together in the 1930s and 1940s.¹⁴ Why would African Americans (those who could vote) support a president and a party that so clearly was discriminatory in its programs? Black voters have never been able to afford the luxury of ideological purity (if they wanted to exercise their citizenship rights), so pragmatism was the order the day. What Black Americans received from the New Deal, however limited, was far more than they had received from any Republican administration since Reconstruction.

These three examples contradict Dr. Carrington's dismissal of the role of race in critical moments in southern and Alabama history, as well as his general lack of understanding of Alabama history.

III. Cracks in the Democratic Party Coalition: The Role of George Wallace

Unwilling to see race anywhere in southern politics, Dr. Carrington carries this interpretation forward in attempting to explain post-1964 political change, starting with the 1968 election and changes within the Democratic Party coalition. He credits a relatively small, fractious group of left-wing intellectuals for fomenting the 1968 fracture. Dr. Carrington argues that these intellectuals drove working-class white voters out of the Democratic Party beginning in 1968 by accusing them of racism and equating them with oppressors. This interpretation simply is not supported by the facts, nor by the scholarship. Organized labor – the loudest voice of the working class, with its strong anticommunist bent and support for continuation of Lyndon Johnson's policy in Vietnam – remained the most powerful member of the Democratic Party coalition; the notion that labor in 1968 was cowed by a rag-tag group of leftwing intellectuals is false. Democratic Party nominee Hubert Humphrey had a strong voting record on labor issues, as did the 1972 nominee, Senator George McGovern. Any conflict between the Democratic Party nominees and white working-class voters was not based on any lack of support for working-class issues.

The biggest electoral challenge in 1968 to the Democratic Party coalition came from George Wallace, candidate of the American Independent Party, not from left-wing intellectuals. Wallace peeled off racially conservative southern voters and won five southern states in 1968, states that quite possibly would have gone to Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Just as important, though, Wallace's appeal reached beyond the South to white working-class constituencies in the Midwest. Organized labor's last-minute campaigning for Humphrey clawed back much of that early support by illustrating Wallace's poor record on labor issues.¹⁵ Wallace's appeals to white working-class grievance – both racial and to a lesser degree opposition to perceived elitism of

¹⁴ For the role of southern lawmakers in the crafting of New Deal legislation, see Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (New York: Liveright, 2013); and Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty*, chapters 9-11.

¹⁵ Luke Nichter, *The Year that Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023).

anti-war protestors – helped further the transition of many white voters (North and South) away from the Democratic Party in presidential elections. Although the numerous groups that made up the New Left coalition would eventually help shape the Democratic Party agenda after 1968, the first major fracture with electoral impact at the presidential level came about as a result of civil rights legislation and George Wallace's third-party candidacy.

George Wallace was the most consequential politician in Alabama in the second half of the twentieth century. His impact resonated beyond this single state and had a profound impact on politics in the latter half of the twentieth century.¹⁶ His 1968 presidential run, though not successful, introduced the rhetoric of anti-elitism and hostility to federal power (mostly as it applied to school integration and fair housing legislation) as the new language of racial grievance, a rhetoric that was adopted by conservative politicians across the country. Wallace dominated Alabama politics for roughly three decades, and any attempt to discuss the history of political parties in the state and region must take his influence into account. With the exception of a few mentions specifically tied to the 1968 election, George Wallace appears nowhere in Dr. Carrington's report.

IV. Economic, Cultural, and Foreign Policy Issues and their Role in the Growth of the Republican Party in the South

Dr. Carrington holds that white southern voters gravitated to the Republican Party because of its position on economic and cultural/religious issues, as well as the staunch anticommunist foreign policy positions of Republican candidates. His discussion of the impact of free trade ideology, strident anticommunism (as enunciated by Republican candidate-then-president Ronald Reagan), and the role of politicized evangelicals at times is inaccurate and lacks evidence.

I. Anticommunism:

His analysis of white southerners' staunch anticommunism as a reason for their Republican Party allegiance is superficial, narrowly defined, and without grounding in critical historical events. He argues that anticommunism exists only in the very limited space of international Cold War fears, and that anticommunism as a position applies strictly to foreign policy. He grounds white southerners' anticommunism in their religiosity but very quickly dismisses the long history of the linkage between race and anticommunism -- a history that stretches back to 1919. This linkage and its long, tortured history are fundamental to an understanding of how white southerners understood the term "anticommunism."¹⁷

White southerners declared any challenge to the social order -- particularly, but not exclusively, the campaign for civil rights and protections for labor -- as "communist." A history exists of communists fighting for racial equality and workers' rights in Alabama. In the 1930s, the

¹⁶ Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Dan T. Carter, *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999).

¹⁷ See Timothy Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); George Lewis, *The White South and the Red Menace: Segregation, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004).

Communist Party organized Black sharecroppers into a union and staged strikes on thirty-five plantations across seven Black Belt counties in 1935. Although concessions were won in several counties, ultimately the strike and the union were destroyed by violence from landowners and law enforcement.¹⁸ More famously, lawyers with the Communist Party's International Defense Fund defended the *Scotsboro Boys* -- nine Black teenagers wrongfully accused of raping two white women. This incident of racial injustice received international attention. That communists would provide a legal defense for Black teenagers accused of the most heinous (in the eyes of white southerners) of crimes -- interracial rape -- cemented their place as one of the greatest threats to the southern social order.¹⁹ From the 1930s forward, then, the term "communist" was associated with any entity that appeared to threaten the region's racial or industrial status quo. At times, that entity was the federal government, the civil rights movement, the labor movement, or even the Supreme Court. So when Republican politicians such as Ronald Reagan promoted themselves as staunch anticommunists, that position had a historical resonance for white southerners that was grounded in ideas about race.

The conflation of communism with "anything that threatens the conservative social order" continues to this day. Within the past year, U.S. Senator from Alabama Tommy Tuberville grounded his fight to put a hold on military promotions until the military changed its policy regarding access to reproductive care for female servicemembers in the notion that providing abortion access to female soldiers was "communistic."²⁰ The senator's use of the term is completely divorced from any foreign policy position but rather is tied to his conservative social and cultural views. This conflation has a long history that Dr. Carrington conveniently ignores but which has powerful meaning nevertheless.

2. The Role of Class and Reagan's Economic Policy

Dr. Carrington argues that the Republican Party's economic philosophy (especially as introduced and articulated by Republican president Ronald Reagan) was the primary force behind white southerners' migration to the Republican Party. He argues that Reagan's free market orientation and tax cuts fostered economic growth, in particular white-collar jobs in southern metropolitan and suburban areas. This growth, he holds, fueled the Republican Party's resurgence in the South.

Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence from Alabama as to how Reagan's policies were received, or any evidence as to how his policies drove growth and thus political change. What we do know is that southern members of Congress were lukewarm towards Reagan's free-market ideology and possessed a decidedly different economic perspective than did the Republican president. Despite generations of overt antagonism towards federal power, southern leaders were prepared to scale back government only when it did not have a negative impact on important regional industries. Southern lawmakers were hostile to Reagan's attack on price supports for farmers, and white rural voters recoiled at the president's attack on rural electric cooperatives.

¹⁸ Robin D. G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1990).

¹⁹ James Goodman, *Stories of Scotsboro* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).

²⁰ <https://www.msn.com/en-us/video/health/tuberville-on-military/vi-AA1ijEVu>

Ultimately, agricultural interests rejected and defeated Reagan's free-market ideology by maintaining supports programs for key southern commodities, severely inhibiting Reagan's plan for a free market in agriculture. Free trade was also detrimental to the textile industry, which by 1980 was the largest industrial employer in Alabama. The industry was struggling against cheaper imports from Asia. Although Reagan initially promised to protect textiles (contradicting his own policy), he reneged, refusing to sign a bill protecting the industry, much to the chagrin of Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton and others. Alabama lawmakers were more in line with Reagan's plan to cut social spending and, to a lesser degree, to cut taxes.²¹

As far as metropolitan growth goes, Birmingham and Huntsville seem to contradict Dr. Carrington's argument that such growth was tied in with Reagan's anti-statist free market ideology. Economic growth in Huntsville was driven by defense spending and access to cheap TVA power. In Birmingham, economic vitality was linked to the University of Alabama at Birmingham. In addition, long-term, concerted efforts by numerous stakeholders in those communities to attract businesses through multi-pronged economic recruitment strategies contributed mightily to their growth.²²

3. Religiosity, Abortion, and Sexuality

Dr. Carrington argues that white southerners' religious beliefs, expressed politically in their opposition to abortion and to LGBTQ+ rights, likewise drove white southern voters toward the Republican Party, whose stance on those issues they found more congenial. He further states that these issues are wholly divorced from race. His framing of these issues and their adoption by the Republican Party again ignores the role of race. He also disregards the role played by the women's liberation movement. Race occupies a prominent place in the history of southern white evangelical Christians and their particular worldview; furthermore, prominent Christian leaders and politicians who opposed abortion and gay rights, like Jerry Falwell Sr., founder of the organization Moral Majority, and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, had sustained records of opposing civil rights advances (e.g. slow-walking desegregation at the University of North Carolina and Bob Jones University's fight to maintain racially discriminatory practices). The connection to race is found in the broader conversation regarding rights, specifically the rights demanded by women and the rights demanded by LGBTQ+ individuals. The connection to race lies not only in the actions of individuals like Falwell and Helms, but in white evangelicals' particular conceptual world.

Historian Glenn Feldman, one of the foremost experts on the history of Alabama politics in the twentieth century, notes that "politics, morality, and race...have a long history of interconnectedness and overlap in southern mind, manners, and sensibilities – an indelible

²¹ Jonathan Barthol: *Whistling Dixie: Ronald Reagan, the White South, and the Transformation of the Republican Party* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2024)

²² Matthew L. Downs, *Transforming the South: Federal Development in the Tennessee Valley, 1915-1960* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014); Wayne Flynt, *Alabama in the Twentieth Century* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 164-65.

relationship that resonates strongly into the present.”²³ The practice of racial segregation was supported by southern religious leaders and laypeople. According to historian Fred Bailey, southern Baptists and other white clergy “gave the sanction of religion to a society in which white men of substance were born to rule, lesser whites to follow, and blacks to obey.” The relegation of Blacks to an inferior social status was required in “a virtuous Christian society.”²⁴ This imagined virtuous Christian society was a patriarchal one of order based on rigid and interlocking racial and gender hierarchies in which white women and all Black people were subservient to white men.

The Civil Rights Movement profoundly threatened the southern social order, and white evangelicals marshalled religion in defense of segregation as the movement accelerated. In Alabama specifically, site of critical victories for the cause of racial equality, ministers and laypeople invoked religion in defense of racial segregation. Historian Paul Harvey writes that ministers such as Henry L. Lyon of Birmingham “defended segregation as positively God-ordained. In ‘Why Racial Integration is UnChristian,’ an address he delivered often, he argued that ‘separation of the races is the commandment and law of God.’”²⁵ The *Alabama Baptist* printed the opinion of the Reverend J.M. Drummond, who claimed that “integration is nothing but Communism, and it is strictly against God’s Holy Word.”²⁶

Ultimately, white southerners lost the fight to maintain segregation. But the anger of conservative evangelicals with the relatively moderate position on desegregation enunciated by their national organizations led conservatives to organize. Beginning in the 1970s, conservatives in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) staged a rout of moderates and assumed control over the convention’s numerous agencies and its significant budget.²⁷

Conservative Christians found their next fight in the expanding women’s liberation movement, which involved not only the right to terminate a pregnancy but also the fight for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Anti-feminists, especially those who considered themselves part of the Christian Right, labeled ERA supporters and pro-choice activists as anti-family and worse. Dr. Carrington ignores the role of the expanding women’s liberation movement and the reactionary anti-feminism that sought to thwart it as key elements in the Republican Party’s agenda beginning in 1980. Just as the women’s liberation movement (and the broader rights revolution) drew strength and momentum from the Civil Rights Movement, the expanding rights terrain precipitated a shift in focus for religious conservatives, who recoiled at the challenges feminists posed to traditional gender roles.²⁸ Religious conservatives lost much of the traditional

²³ Glenn Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2005), 3.

²⁴ Fred Bailey, “That Which God Hath Put Asunder: White Baptists, Black Aliens, and the Southern Social Order, 1890-1920,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 12, 27.

²⁵ Paul Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South, 1945-1990,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 106.

²⁶ Mark Newman, *Getting Right with God: Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-1999* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 58.

²⁷ Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South,” 101.


²⁸ Robert Self, *All in the Family: Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012).

ideological undergirding for their race politics, but they found new inspiration in the defense of traditional gender roles. In the process, the conservatives jettisoned the familiar arguments for racial hierarchy, replacing these now-discredited views with a renewed and updated defense of gendered hierarchies. This rejection of feminism and reproductive choice was embraced by the Republican Party beginning in the 1980s.

Summary

Racial politics has a long history in the United States, the American South, and in Alabama. For the first half of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party's dominance in the one-party South was dependent on its defense of white supremacy. White voters' allegiance to the Democratic Party was deeply engrained in southern culture, and breaking that allegiance took time. For much of the twentieth century, the Republican Party in the South was not competitive; the Great Depression relegated the Republican Party nationally to minority status. My original report argued that, in order to become competitive, the Republican Party made a deliberate decision to court southern white voters, both through its policy positions and through its adoption of historical cultural symbols. This decision paid off to the point where the party's continued growth relied on winning white majorities in the southern states. In Alabama, the political parties are racially polarized. While the overt racism of the past no longer animates Alabama politics, I agree with political scientist David A. Hughes, who writes that "the politics of race...are never far from the surface."²⁹

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 25th day of July 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.



Kari Frederickson, Ph.D.

²⁹ David A. Hughes, "Alabama: Polarized and Uncompetitive," in Charles S. Bullock and Mark Rozell, eds., *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), 84.



Milligan v. Allen

Caster v. Allen

Singleton v. Allen

N.D. Alabama

Expert Report of Adam M. Carrington, Ph.D.

June 27, 2024

Qualifications

I am an Associate Professor of Politics at Hillsdale College where I have taught since 2014. I received my M.A. and Ph.D. from Baylor University in that same year. At Hillsdale, I hold the William and Patricia LaMothe Chair in the U.S. Constitution. I also hold an appointment and teach regularly in the Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship at Hillsdale. My scholarship has focused on American political institutions in their historical context, including the judiciary, the presidency, and political parties. I have published work concerning these topics focused on the American South as well. Along these lines, I have had scholarly articles published on Southern judicial history in *Southern Legal History* and *Journal of American Legal History*.¹ These pieces focused on the Reconstruction Era. I also have an article on Congressional attempts to curb the Supreme Court through proposing Constitutional amendments, which links those efforts to changing political party dynamics in the latter half of the 20th century.² Moreover, I have taught courses on political parties, the presidency, the U.S. Constitution, and Constitutional law throughout my time at Hillsdale College.

For my work on this report, I was compensated at the rate of \$300 an hour. I was not directed to come to any particular result but to submit my findings based on my own research and conclusions.

Findings and Conclusions

In this report, I analyze the historical development of party affiliations among Alabama voters from comprising the core of the Democratic “Solid South” to becoming a dependably Republican-voting state. I give special focus to the shifting patterns of Southern white voters from reliably Democrat to dependably Republican. This development will reach back to the 1920s, though particular attention will be given to the region’s and state’s histories since the 1950s.

As I will recount, many explain the historical partisan shift with a decided if not entire focus on race: The end of legal segregation and the gains made by the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s caused racially-focused Democrats to abandon the party of Jefferson Davis. They then moved to the Republican camp because the GOP, no longer the party of Lincoln, had adopted the race-conscious, even white-supremacist views once the commitment of the Democratic Party. In short: the two parties switched and Southern whites, unchanged in their views, switched parties in response.

¹ Adam M. Carrington, “Running the Robed Gauntlet: Southern State Courts’ Interpretation of the Emancipation Proclamation” *Journal of American Legal History* 57(4)(December 2017): 556-584; Adam M. Carrington, “Equality, Prejudice, and the Rule of Law: Alabama Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Peters’ Protection of African-American Rights During Reconstruction” *Journal of Southern Legal History* 25(2017): 205-234.

² See Curt Nichols, David Bridge, and Adam M. Carrington, “Court Curbing via Attempt to Amend the Constitution” *Justice Systems Journal* 35(4)(2014): 331-343.

So the story goes. But I will discuss how this focus fails to tell the full tale. A singular or even dominant focus on race is insufficient in explaining the development of the current partisan landscape in the broader American South generally and in Alabama specifically. This report will seek to give a fuller picture of the development of political parties in the 20th century and into the 21st century that describes other, crucial factors that contributed to the partisan shift in the South from Democrat to Republican.

First, I will set up the concept of American political parties, examining how the history and scholarship regarding them points toward parties as voter coalitions with significant fluidity. Voters in most cases are not defined by one issue or identity in their electoral choices. Second, I apply this theory to Southern partisan voting patterns since the 1920s, with special attention paid to the post-1950 history. In that examination, I do note how pervasive the issue of race was during the post-Civil War and early 20th century periods. However, as other scholars argue, too, I will describe how the post-Civil Rights era marked the South's transition toward acting more in line with the scholarly theories of parties and thus closer to the rest of the country. Historically, this story moves from the New Deal Democratic Coalition to the rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party and the rise of Modern Conservatism within the Republican Party. Those developments in the parties in the 1950s and 1960s inaugurated a slow but definite partisan shift. On a host of non-racial issues—economic, foreign policy, and social—Democrats moved away from the preferences of a majority of Southern voters, making the Republican Party, especially its Modern Conservative element, more attractive. Moreover, the South itself evolved in ways that aligned it more naturally with the GOP, especially on economic policy.

This analysis is relevant to the totality of circumstances test required by §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Specifically, it appears to touch on the issue of redistricting in relation to at least three of the factors put forth by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its 1982 amendment of §2. The first Senate factor considers the “extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process.” While not focused on particular laws, executive orders, or like public policy actions (though some will receive direct attention), this report will discuss the matters that precede and often underly government action. Government actions result from those holding office who obtain those offices either directly or indirectly by elections. Election results stem from the actions of voters taken in relation to their political views. These views closely relate to the political parties and other coalitions with which they align. Understanding the significant roles played by issues other than race in Southern and Alabama party affiliations can help to understand whether racial discrimination features in Alabama's political processes.

This report also comments on redistricting in relation to the second factor, which concerns the “extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” By this factor, I understand polarization to involve more than simply the question of whether whites and blacks generally vote for different political parties and candidates. That African-American and white voters tend to vote more for Democrats or Republicans nationally, regionally, and in Alabama particularly is largely true. However, just because racial polarization might technically or statistically exist does not mean that it *substantively* exists. Statistical racial polarization in itself reveals nothing about the motivations underlying voter behavior. I understand substantive racial polarization to mean that race, rather than other factors like political partisanship, predominantly explain voting patterns. My report will give evidence that partisanship fueled by political issues not directly tied to nor driven by racial

views better explains the statistical racial polarization seen in Alabama. In other words, the evidence suggests that party politics, not race, explains why Alabama voters vote the way they do.

Finally, this report bears on the sixth factor, which confronts the question of whether or not, “political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.”³ While some attention will be paid to particular comments made by public persons, this report will focus on the deeper and broader coalitional developments among Southern voters that have helped shift the South, including Alabama, from reliably Democratic in voting patterns to generally Republican. These developments will examine a combination of policies, platforms, and public perceptions related to the two major political parties. Here, the report will contend, again, that the appeals that have effectively shifted partisan leanings in the South include appeals to economic, foreign policy, and social issues not focused on race.

Ultimately, the broader story of the partisan shift in the South, including Alabama, speaks to race as not the exclusive or even dominant factor in enduring voting changes. Instead, the success of the Civil Rights Movement helped in the ability for other political matters to come to prominence. Those other matters then took on a significant role in the partisan changes among Southern voters, including voters in Alabama.

Methodology

I have taken an approach that is both theoretical and historical. I begin with theory, discussing the concept of political parties in the scholarly literature. I then turn to history, using the theory as a lens through which to see the historical development of parties with a special comparative focus on the South. My focus will predominately be on Southern white voters, whose shift in voting tendencies formed the main statistical reason for the change in expected partisan election results. My analysis also will tend to focus on the South generally and the Deep South in particular, though specific instances and data related to Alabama will be noted. In this approach, I agree with the general scholarly view that Alabama is not an outlier within the Deep South in significant ways on the issues this report addresses.⁴

To construct this analysis, I draw heavily on historical scholarship and also draw on primary documents such as speeches at national conventions, party platforms, national legislation, presidential executive orders, and state ballot initiatives. Given the party and coalitional lens, prominence will be given to party-related documents.

The Nature of American Political Parties

In 1942, E.E. Schattschneider wrote that “democracy is unthinkable save in terms of [political] parties.”⁵ Historically, political parties have formed the basic structure by which Americans organize themselves around principle and policy commitments. In this light, they structure their choices for public offices — national, state, and local. Political parties also aid in the functioning of government, providing

³ United States Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 97-417, 28-29.

⁴ Placing Alabama as a generally typical state within the Deep South is longstanding. See Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966); Seth C. McKee and Melanie J. Springer, “A Tale of ‘Two Souths’” *Social Science Quarterly* 96(2)(June 2015): 588-607.

⁵ E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government: American Government in Action* (New York: Routledge, 2003[1942]), 1.

an institution and an identity that facilitates cooperation between Constitutional offices such as the House and the Senate, Congress and the President, as well as state and national governments.⁶

John Aldrich, in his 1995 work, *Why Parties?*, points up that, “[a]ll democracies that are Madisonian, extended republics, which is to say all democratic nations, have political parties.”⁷ By speaking of James Madison and an extended republic, Aldrich grounds the study of American political parties in that Framer’s possibly most famous written work, *Federalist 10*.

In 1787-1788, the Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the then-proposed Constitution argued that America already was too large to operate as a functioning republic. Taking a cue from the French philosopher Montesquieu, these Anti-Federalists argued that republics must be small in size. When they grew too large, they morphed into empire and went from a government of, by, and for the people into a despotism either of one person or of a few elites. *Brutus*, one of the leading Anti-Federalists, made this argument in his first paper critiquing the proposed constitution. He wrote “that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a high number of inhabitants...as that of the whole United States.”⁸ He recounted how the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, having “extended their conquests over large territories of country” that “the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.”⁹

In *Federalist 10*, James Madison responded to this and like critiques as part of a broader argument to ratify the Constitution. He did so first by bringing up a different problem that plagued popular governments. This problem was so dangerous it proved to have “been the mortal diseases under which popular governments everywhere have perished.”¹⁰ This hideous monster he called faction. It consisted of either “a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”¹¹ These factions were driven not by cool, thoughtful reflection on the common good but by impulsive, emotional prejudices to oppress others or to do some other kind of public harm. Factions caused instability and injustice to seize the political process, often sending the republic in a tumultuous pendulum swinging between anarchy and tyranny, ending in the regime’s demise.

By his own account, Madison’s most important solution for the problem of faction was an extended or large republic—the very set-up the Anti-Federalists feared. However, Madison argued that an extended or large republic would contain significant advantages over a small one in addressing faction’s pernicious effects. Small republics tended to have a very homogenous population with super-majorities sharing a wide swath of characteristics, principles, and policy positions. This homogeneity allowed for majority factions to organize and to act on their disordered, oppressive injustice with relative ease.

⁶ See Harry V. Jaffa, *A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 434.

⁷ John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 3.

⁸ *Brutus*, “No. 1,” *The Anti-Federalist*, edited by Hebert J. Storing, Selected by Murray Dry from *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985[1981]), 113.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹¹ *Publius* (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay), *The Federalist, Gideon Edition* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 43.

A large republic countered this problem. It did so by subverting factions' ability to organize and to act as majorities. The logic was fairly common-sense. A large republic meant more people involved in politics across a wider expanse of territory. Usually, that enlarging of the population introduced much greater diversity within the people regarding their characteristics, their principles, and their preferences. Doing so undermined the ability of homogenous majorities to realize their existence and organize politically around it. Even more important, though, this diversity then restricted if not eliminated the existence of broad and deep majorities in the first place.

This heterogeneous population held two important ramifications for this report's purposes. First, majorities usually needed to be created by means of forming coalitions. In other words, persons not exactly alike must agree to work together to reach the needed vote threshold to win elections. On religion, for example, no one sect tended to garner over 50% of the vote. Thus, Baptists might need to make common cause with Lutherans or Presbyterians or Roman Catholics or other faiths (or no faith) to achieve the majority needed to enact principles and policies. Doing so tended to keep the majorities from agreeing to the plans of oppressive factions. Instead, they had to find common ground more on basic human rights and the common good of the general public.

Second, the coalitional nature of majorities made those majorities much more fragile and fluid than they would be in a small republic with a largely homogeneous population. Persons or groups did not tend to have only one issue that drove them. Various matters could ignite their interest and influence their vote at the same or at different times. Thus, these persons or groups may unite on one issue or set of issues but not on others. Views on taxes or foreign policy might be the main point holding the coalition together, for instance. But if other issues became primary, ones on which the coalition did not agree, they could split the coalition and make way for new majorities formed by other primary points of agreement.

As Aldrich implied, much of the modern political science literature on American political parties traces its theory, whether consciously or not, back to Madison's observations in *Federalist 10*. For political parties are seeking majorities in the House, Senate, state legislatures, governorships, and in the Electoral College that selects the president. Given our extended (and ever more extending) republic, competitive American political parties must be coalitional. They cannot rely on one region, one subgroup, or one issue to win and maintain majorities. Thus, parties act like coalitions as described above. They form around basic like characteristics and on agreement regarding a set of issues. In fact, recent party literature has focused on the claim that, "groups of organized policy demanders are the basic units of our theory of parties."¹² Therefore, parties consist of "coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals."¹³ The party usually tries to focus its stances on issues that accentuate its unity. However, new issues arise and secondary matters become primary. Parties, then, whether as a whole or in regard to particular members, may be forced to take other stances that threatens to undermine its unity.¹⁴ The 19th century Whig Party, for example, formed around common views about internal improvements and tariffs (known as the "American System"), legislative supremacy within the elected branches of government, and opposition to President

¹² Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Maskett, Hans Noel, and Johnny Zaller, "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics" *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3)(August 2012): 575.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 571.

¹⁴ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S." *Perspectives on Politics* 6(3)(2008): 433.

Andrew Jackson. Yet in the 1850s, the party was ripped into pieces and ceased to exist when slavery, an issue it tried to relegate to secondary status, rose to a place where it no longer could be avoided.¹⁵

This background brings us to the focus of this report. In discussing voting patterns and coalitional arrangements in the South, including Alabama, race has been exalted as the dominant factor influencing voters up to the present.¹⁶ And race did play an out-sized part through a significant portion of Southern political history. In fact, this matter showed the explanatory limits of the extended republic as Madison described it in *Federalist 10*. Sometimes, though rarely, one issue or identity could overwhelm the others. In this instance, race and its institutionalization in slavery or, later, in segregation, overwhelmed other factors that might have undermined this majority faction and created fluid coalitions. Economic class, for instance, did not have the explanatory power that *Federalist 10* and other theories held for it in defining party alignments and developments.¹⁷ A 1958 article noted, “[t]he emphasis on unity among the ‘whites’ in the south’s one-party system de-emphasizes class differences or issues involving conflict within the white group.”¹⁸ Glen Feldmen observed the longstanding tendency “to put race regularity and white supremacy above all other competing factors.”¹⁹ Moreover, the predominance of race and slavery over all other issues in the 1850s helped lead to the American Civil War. The issue of race was perpetuated by voter suppression and Jim Crow segregation in the post-Reconstruction South as well. There was some white dissent in the South even during these periods, especially in the mountain regions of Eastern Tennessee and Western North Carolina that had opposed secession and, post-war, clung to Republican Party loyalty, despite finding little statewide electoral success.²⁰ But these were exceptions, not the rule. Therefore, the preceding points must be seen and acknowledged as deeply influential on Southern politics in the 19th and early to mid-20th centuries.

Yet, as introduced earlier, this focus on race does not tell the whole story of Southern coalitions and voting patterns, especially since the middle of the 20th century. Instead, that history shows the South moving toward and finally realizing the more diversity and fluidity in coalitions that marked the logic of *Federalist 10* and the theory of political parties as coalitions that occur within extended republics. It was a turn toward the normalized politics Madison envisioned and that usually occurred within other parts of the country. Thus, Byron Schafer and Richard Johnston titled their book, one giving non-racial factors as the dominant reasons for partisan re-alignment in the South, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism*.²¹

Other scholars also admit, even if grudgingly, that the partisan shift in the South involved much more than race. Carmines and Stanley wrote that, “[w]hile racial conflict may have precipitated, in part,

¹⁵ See Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Gerald R. Webster, “Demise of the Solid South” *Geographical Review* 82(1)(Jan. 1992): 43-55.

¹⁷ Madison said in *Federalist 10* that, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.” See Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 44.

¹⁸ James W. Prothro, Ernest Q. Campbell, and Charles M. Griff, “Two-Party Voting in the South: Class vs. Party Identification” *American Political Science Review* 52(1)(March 1958): 131.

¹⁹ Bruce Feldmen, *The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013), xii. The time period of Feldmen’s book is particularly helpful since his report argued that politics in the covered period (1865-1944) was mostly defined by race with changes coming in subsequent decades.

²⁰ Sundquist, 103. Gordon B. McKinney, “Southern Mountain Republicans and the Negro” *Journal of Southern History* 41(4)(Nov. 1975): 493-516.

²¹ Byron E. Schafer and Richard Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

conservative movement away from the Democratic Party, the transformation has been sustained by other issues.”²² In fact, the same influential political party scholars wrote in 1990 that, “Southern political conservatives are now out of tune with the Democratic party on a wide range of issues.”²³ In 2001, Aubrey Jewett concluded his study of increased GOP strength in Southern state legislatures between 1946-1995 by writing that, “the evidence supporting many other explanations of Republican legislative growth suggests that scholars who emphasize only race to the exclusion of other causal factors are being overly simplistic.”²⁴ Along the same lines, Earle and Merle Black in the 2002 book, *The Rise of Southern Republicans*, noted that, “modern southern politics involves more than its obvious racial divisions.”²⁵ By 2004, David Lublin declared about Southern politics, “I find little evidence of continuing white backlash” to the rise of full participation by African-Americans in the political process.²⁶ While still giving a significant place for race, Matthew D. Lassiter’s *Silent Majority* (2006) argued against “race reductionist” readings of American history that failed to account for how Southern metropolitan areas came to operate much like Northern counterparts and the place that social and economic class played in conscious political motivations of voters and policy-makers.²⁷

This report accepts as true that race once played a predominant role in Southern politics, including Alabama as part of the Deep South. But it will examine reasons to question the claim that race continues to possess the dominant explanatory power often given to it in this story. In so doing, it will look to other factors beyond race which made significant contributions to partisan re-alignment in the American South, including the state of Alabama, especially starting in the second half of the 20th century. This report, then, will argue that explaining the status of partisan politics in 2024 solely or predominately in racial terms leaves out too much of the backstory and too much other, reasonable explanations for current party alignment and voting patterns. For some time, a wide range of other issues have played a significant role. Those issues arose out of a broader, national ideological change within both parties to which we turn next.

Party Change—The Rise of the New Left and Modern Conservatism

1) *The Rise of the New Left*

The story of partisan alignment in the South, including Alabama, must begin with the Democratic Party. The South had been the base for the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, the precursor to the modern Democratic Party. It continued to be the stronghold for the Democratic Party that formed under Andrew Jackson’s leadership in the 1820s and 1830s.²⁸ The Democratic Party’s base

²² Edward G. Carmines and Harold W. Stanley, “Ideological Re-Alignment in the Contemporary South: Where Have All the Conservatives Gone?” in *The Disappearing South*, edited by Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 32.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Aubrey W. Jewett, “Partisan Changes in Southern Legislatures, 1946-1995” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(3)(August 2001): 479.

²⁵ Earle Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4.

²⁶ Lublin, 28.

²⁷ Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

²⁸ Aldrich, 107-119.

remained in the South after the Civil War, too, intensified by the Republican Party's connection to the Union cause. Some attempts were made during Reconstruction to make the GOP competitive in the South but such efforts failed, especially once federal troops were withdrawn.²⁹ Still, the Republican Party became the national majority party after the end of the Civil War. Periods of closely contested elections and of divided government existed, especially at the end of Reconstruction in the latter 1870s and throughout the 1880s. However, the GOP reigned as the majority party through the greater portion of the years spanning 1865-1932.

The Great Depression opened up the potential for a new majority coalition. The Republican Party under President Herbert Hoover was thoroughly discredited in light of the economic collapse that shook the country and then settled into a new and harsh reality far different from the heady days of the "Roaring '20s." The Democratic landslide of 1932, under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, railed against the GOP's failures as part of asserting their own ascent to political power.³⁰

The consequent New Deal coalition established the Democrats as the country's majority party for the first time since before the American Civil War. The Democratic Party built on the New Deal focused on economic issues. FDR's program sought much greater government involvement in regulating as well as participating in the economy. Thus, the coalition was defined predominately in economic terms, with working class or "blue-collar" Americans identifying decidedly with Democrats in their attempt to alleviate the hardships the Great Depression involved. This link we can see in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's rhetoric in the period. In his First Inaugural, Roosevelt had lambasted, "the unscrupulous money changers" who "know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers."³¹ On the eve of his decisive re-election in 1936, FDR said, "I should like to have it said of my first Administration that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second Administration that in it these forces met their master."³² This placement of the Democratic Party with the working class, and against the wealthy, had a long pedigree going back to the original party system between the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans and the Hamiltonian Federalists and then to Andrew Jackson railing against the "monied interests" that he equated with the Whig Party. However, the New Deal did more than renew that old distinction; it intensified it to a degree not seen since before the Civil War, if ever.

This coalition crossed racial bounds. A majority of African-Americans first began voting for the Democratic Party nationwide during the Great Depression.³³ This meant that Southern segregationists and African-Americans voted for decades for the same party.³⁴ Such a broad coalition wielded dominant results at the national and state levels with massive margins of victory for FDR in 1932 and 1936 as well

²⁹ Gordon B. McKinney, "Southern Mountain Republicans and the Negro" *Journal of Southern History* 41(4)(Nov. 1975): 493-516.

³⁰ Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*, 288-289. See also H.W. Brands, *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 238-239, 264-265.

³¹ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address" *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 2: 12.

³² Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Address at Madison Square Garden, New York City" *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 5: 568-569.

³³ See Nancy Joan Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of F.D.R.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Sidney M. Milkis, "Ideas, Institutions, and the New Deal Political Order" *American Political Thought* 3(1)(Spring 2014): 172.

³⁴ James C. Cobb, *South Atlantic Urban Studies* 1(1977): 255.

as huge majorities in Congress, governorships, and state legislatures. The GOP had been reduced to a rump party with little chance of contesting for a national majority.

However, the Madisonian-based theory of parties says that coalitions can be tenuous and fluid, especially when in the majority. New issues arise, both from competing parties but also from within the coalition itself. The New Deal coalition that had made the Democrats the dominant majority party began to show serious, enduring signs of strain in the early 1960s. The strain came internally when that period saw the rise of the self-defined “New Left.” Prominent intellectual C. Wright Mills penned “A Letter to the New Left” in 1960 working out how this form of liberalism distinguished itself from the now decades-dominant Old Left.³⁵

Mills argued that the Left’s primary focus on economic class no longer worked in the effort to pursue social justice. In the past, “the historic agency [of change] has been the working class...also parties and unions variously composed of members of the working class.”³⁶ But that no longer was true; the working class had become part of the problem of oppression, not the central means for finding new solutions to it. Instead, Mills pointed toward a new coalition that looked at the world as involving oppressors and oppressed but in relationships beyond labor versus capital. This perspective paved the way for a liberalism that focused on issues of racial justice and which began to discuss matters of women’s rights and LGBTQ rights. It also opened the door to expressing frustrations with American Cold War policy, especially on the nuclear arms race,³⁷ as well as a concern for environmental matters such as water and air pollution.³⁸ Taken together, the New Left was more willing to criticize American policy but, even more radical for the time, to also condemn America itself as inherently unjust, something that the much more patriotic-speaking New Deal Democrats did not do and would not have done.

Given the shift away from a focus on economic class, the New Left’s intellectual center would not be the union hall. Instead, its foundation would build from the college campus and include those with college degrees—itsself a growing population among the Baby Boomers. “It is with this problem of agency in mind,” Mills wrote, “that I have been studying, for several years now, the cultural apparatus, the intellectuals — as a possible, immediate, radical agency of change.”³⁹ Thus, the “Port Huron Statement” presented one of the most famous declarations of this new ideology’s views. Published on June 15, 1962, the document was written by Tom Hayden on behalf of the group “Students for a Democratic Society.”⁴⁰ The document claimed the perspective of a new generation, “housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.” That document further spoke of “the Southern struggle against racial bigotry.” The “Port Huron Statement” further observed the fear many had at the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.⁴¹ It stated that “tarnish appear[ed] on our image

³⁵ C. Wright Mills, *The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings of C. Wright Mills*, edited by John H. Summers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 255-266.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 262.

³⁷ Paul Boyer, “From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980” *Journal of American History* 70(4)(1984): 837-844.

³⁸ Keith M. Woodhouse, “The Politics of Ecology: Environmentalism and Liberalism in the 1960s” *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2(2)(Fall 2008): 53-84.

³⁹ Mills, 264.

⁴⁰ Jim Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); See also *The Port Huron Statement: Sources and Legacies of the New Left’s Founding Manifesto*, edited by Richard Flacks and Nelson Lichtenstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

⁴¹ “Port Huron Statement,” 3.

of American virtue" and it spoke of "the hypocrisy of American ideals."⁴² As the movement developed, these critiques also extended to the working class that had formed the backbone of the Democratic New Deal coalition. In a 1980 article, Sidney M. Wilhelm noted that, "working-class racism" challenged the Marxist economic paradigm which itself had sought to explain racism as the product of capitalism. Though he attempted to re-configure an economic underlying basis, he had to admit that working class Americans could take the side of oppressors.⁴³ As time would go on, certain intellectuals on the Left would make harsher critiques of working-class voters on their views regarding the issues on which the New Left now gave greater focus. They would more and more be seen as part of the problem rather than a full partner in the solution.

The rise of the New Left created a rift within the Democratic Party. Perhaps the best-known and most dramatic manifestation of this rift came during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The New Left subset sought renewed focus on civil rights and an end to the Vietnam War. Nicolas Proctor, in his book on the 1968 Convention, noted that, "conservative Democrats—particularly those from the South—argued the opposite."⁴⁴ They gave much greater support to American foreign policy and much less support to civil rights efforts. Chicago's Democratic Mayor, Richard Daley, sent police in to violently break-up these protesters in the streets, using clubs and tear-gas. Doing so did not result in restored peace and harmony within the Democratic Party, however. Subsequent changes in presidential selection strengthened the New Left within the Democratic Party as well. A mixed system had existed that permitted some say by voters in primaries but left substantial nominating power to the party itself regarding presidential candidates. In response to the McGovern-Fraser Commission, the Democratic Party moved to a system where the voters took effective control of the nomination-making through a process dominated by primaries or caucuses.⁴⁵ Nicol C. Rae noted that, starting in the 1970s, the new nomination process, "was structurally biased in favor of candidates from the party's neoliberal and New Left factions, with little appeal to most southern white voters."⁴⁶

In 1972, the New Left got one of their own nominated on the Democratic ticket for president: George McGovern.⁴⁷ He went on to a crushing defeat against sitting president Richard Nixon, winning only Massachusetts and D.C. for meagre 17 electoral votes to Nixon's 520. But the New Left would continue to exert a serious and growing influence over the Democratic Party. Bruce Miroff declared that, after McGovern, "the party would never again look like the urban-labor coalition of the New Deal era."⁴⁸ The New Left would move the Democratic Party's coalition to include more college-educated voters and to focus more on non-economic issues of gender, race, the environment, gun regulation, and other matters. Working Class voters would remain in the coalition but with increasing unease and decreasing

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴³ Sidney M. Wilhelm, "Can Marxism Explain America's Racism?" *Social Problems* 28(2)(December 1980): 98-112.

⁴⁴ Nicolas Proctor, *Chicago, 1968: Policy and Protest at the Democratic National Convention* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

⁴⁵ See Adam Hilton, *True Blues: The Contentious Transformation of the Democratic Party* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 66-87; James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 260-303.

⁴⁶ Nicol C. Rae, *Southern Democrats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46.

⁴⁷ Bruce Miroff, *The Liberals' Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party* (Leavenworth University of Kansas Press, 2007).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

numbers.⁴⁹ For, in these developments, a growing section of the Democratic Party would expand on C. Wright Mills' implicit critique of the working class, arguing in more explicit terms that it perpetuated the forces of oppression on issues sex, sexuality, and race.

As time went on, the rise of the New Left bore fruit for the Democratic Party in some regions while hurting its electoral prospects in others. Jonathan Bell described how the new liberalism helped turn California into a reliably Democratic and Progressive state.⁵⁰ States like Massachusetts and others in the Northeast also became increasingly Democratic, despite for a long time being the regional electoral base for Republicans. But in the South, including Alabama, this turn in the Democratic Party bode ill for its long-term electoral viability, for reasons we will turn to soon.

2) *The Rise of Modern Conservatism*

The Republican Party developed during this time as well. In the 1920s, the party had been defined by policies of lower taxes, fiscal responsibility, and limited government linked to leaders like President Calvin Coolidge.⁵¹ This approach gained significant popularity during the economic boom of the 1920s but fell into disrepute, as noted above, during the Great Depression and in response to FDR's critiques. The Republican party did not regain any majority in Congress from 1932 until 1946. They did not recapture the White House until Dwight D. Eisenhower, hero of World War II, won the office in 1952. During the 1950s, the GOP had largely followed the "New Republicanism" of Eisenhower.⁵² This view sought moderation, arguing it would follow the New Deal consensus and manage its governmental programs in a restrained and efficient manner. It also looked to contain, not roll back, the forces of Communism led by the Soviet Union and China.⁵³

But portions of the Republican Party chafed under this new approach.⁵⁴ These men included Robert Taft, an Ohio Senator who was the main rival to Eisenhower for the GOP presidential nomination in 1952. First, this group sought to renew the GOP's pre-New Deal economic philosophy, critiquing FDR's policies as undermining American liberty. Second, many of the same Republicans wished to take a hard line against global Communism, defeating it outright rather than merely limiting its expansion. Third, they began to emphasize federalism on the level of governmental structure against an ever-growing national government. Fourth and finally, this group wished to emphasize traditional views on issues of religion and morality.

One can see this synthesis encapsulated in William F. Buckley's editorial announcing the first issue of *National Review*, published in November of 1955. Buckley wrote of "Conservatives" as those

⁴⁹ White working-class voters saw some limited success nationally, such as with the presidential candidacies of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. These national victories tended to need special circumstances, such as Watergate for Carter and the crushing defeats suffered by more New Left-aligned candidates preceding Carter's (McGovern) and Clinton's (Mondale, Dukakis) candidacies.

⁵⁰ See Jonathan Bell, *California Crucible: The Forging of Modern American Liberalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

⁵¹ See Amity Shlaes, *Coolidge* (New York: Harper Collins, 2013).

⁵² Randall Bennett Woods, *Quest for Identity: America Since 1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 73-98.

⁵³ John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 41-43.

⁵⁴ John Andrew, "The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960" *The Historian* 59(3)(Spring 1997): 613-631.

"who have not made their peace with the New Deal."⁵⁵ Buckley decried a "relativism" that downplayed belief in God and would doubt, "the superiority of capitalism to socialism, of republicanism to centralism."⁵⁶ Anticipating Mills, he saw this view as growing on college campuses in particular.⁵⁷ In similar fashion, the Sharon Statement, put together in 1960 by young conservatives, with Buckley's help, praised the U.S. Constitution in that it, "reserves primacy to the several states, or to the people, in those spheres not specifically delegated to the Federal government." The document also lauded the "market economy," and declared that, "the forces of international Communism are, at present, the greatest single threat to these liberties."⁵⁸

These views would begin to cause tensions within the Republican Party at a similar time as the New Left threatened the cohesion and peace of the Democratic Party. Republicans' base had been in the North, especially New England. That was the home of what became known as "Rockefeller Republicans" after Nelson Rockefeller, long-time governor of New York and Vice-President under Gerald Ford. These Republicans held more moderate views, especially on social but also on economic issues, and were out-of-step with the emerging conservatism.⁵⁹ This upstart conservatism seemed more at home in the Western states instead. Thus, in 1964, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater captured the GOP presidential nomination. Goldwater represented the emerging conservatism Buckley had articulated nearly a decade prior. In his acceptance speech, given in San Francisco, Goldwater declared that Republicans would act toward, "encouraging a free and a competitive economy" while also upholding "law and order." Goldwater spoke of a philosophy of limited government where the best place for its exercise was, "closest to the people involved." And he railed against the Soviet threat, saying, "communism and the governments it now controls are enemies of every man on earth who is or wants to be free."⁶⁰

Goldwater lost in decisive fashion to Lyndon Johnson in the Fall of 1964. He won only five states—his home state of Arizona and five states within the Deep South, including Alabama. But, as with the New Left in the Democratic Party, this emerging conservatism would not go away. It did suffer from the 1964 electoral setback. Richard Nixon would win the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections for the Republican Party. He rejected significant elements of Modern Conservatism, and, among other acts that frustrated conservatives, he instituted wage and price controls,⁶¹ created the Environmental Protection

⁵⁵ William F. Buckley, "Publisher's Statement" *National Review* November 19, 1955, 5. For a helpful discussion of Buckley's shift on race from the 1950s to the 1960s, one that included a rejection of southern segregation, see Alvin Felzenberg, *A Man and His Presidents: The Political Odyssey of William F. Buckley, Jr.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See also William F. Buckley, *God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of Academic Freedom* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951).

⁵⁸ See Greg L. Schneider, *Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 34.

⁵⁹ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "Activists and Partisan Realignment in American Politics" *The American Political Science Review* 97(2)(May 2003): 257.

⁶⁰ Barry Goldwater, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco" July 16, 1964. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-san>. Retrieved 3/18/2024.

⁶¹ Executive Order 11615 of August 15, 1971, Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and Salaries, 36 FR 17813; Executive Order 11627 of October 15, 1971, Further Providing for the Stabilization of the Economy, 36 FR 20139.

Agency,⁶² and signed both the National Environmental Policy Act⁶³ and the Clean Water Act.⁶⁴ In fact, a conservative Ohio Congressman, John Ashbrook, primaryed the sitting president with the campaign slogan, "No Left Turns."⁶⁵ However, with Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, a Buckley-Goldwater kind of conservatism had gone mainstream, becoming the driving force within the Republican Party. Reagan had been a Goldwater supporter, giving one of the 1964 campaign's most famous speeches in his favor, "A Time for Choosing."⁶⁶ Then and in the 1980 campaign, Reagan spoke of limited government, private enterprise, deep opposition to communism, and traditional moral values. While some of these views continued to keep a significant portion of white-collar, highly educated voters in the GOP, working-class voters began to see elements of the GOP's conservative positions as attractive, too. The decisive shift in the GOP thus had ramifications for partisan alignments around the country, including the South.

In the pages that follow, this report will detail how the above developments in the Democratic and Republican parties participated in the South's slow-motion move from solidly Democratic to solidly Republican.

Civil Rights and voting patterns within the South

We begin with the focus for most discussions of Southern voting patterns: race and the Civil Rights Movement. The narrative states that Southern Democrats became frustrated with the national party over its embrace of African-American civil rights, first in 1948 and then again in 1964. The story of GOP gains in the South tends to focus especially on the 1964 election. There, Republican Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater won the Deep South for the GOP for the first time since Reconstruction, Alabama not only voted for Goldwater but gave him a massive 71% of the vote even though the state had not gone Republican since the Reconstruction era election of 1872. The story goes that the South broke with the Democratic Party over President Johnson shepherding through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Southern white voters abandoned Democrats and ran to Republicans to maintain their race-based partisanship in a new political party, ironically the party formerly (but no more) of Abraham Lincoln, emancipation, Northern aggression, and Reconstruction.⁶⁷

The focus on 1964 applies one influential strain of the broader political party literature. This strain focused on critical elections that marked a significant and lasting shift in the composition of party coalitions as well as which of the major parties held lasting majority status. V. O. Key, a giant in the field of political parties' scholarship, was an early and influential articulator of this perspective.⁶⁸ A number of other scholars followed suit, pointing to elections such as 1800, 1832, 1860, possibly 1896, 1932, and

⁶² See "Reorganization Plan Nos. 3 of 1970," July 9, 1970, U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 91st Congress--2nd Session, Vol. 3, 1970.

⁶³ National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).

⁶⁴ An Act to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).

⁶⁵ Alfred S. Regnery, *Upstream: The Ascendancy of American Conservatism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 141. Ashbrook would receive less than 10% of the vote in the primaries in which he participated before dropping out.

⁶⁶ *The Reagan Manifesto: A Time for Choosing and Its Influence*, edited by Eric D. Patterson and Jeffrey H. Morrison (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 137-138.

⁶⁷ Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields, *The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

⁶⁸ See V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections" *Journal of Politics* 17(1955): 3-18; Key, "Secular Re-alignment and the Party System" *Journal of Politics* 21(1959): 3-18.

1980 as examples that inaugurated new, dominant party coalitions in American politics. In his influential work on the presidency, Stephen Skowronek placed American presidents within “political time,” which concerns cycles of political coalitions that ascend to power, struggle to maintain that dominance, and eventually get disrupted by a new ascendant coalition.⁶⁹ He also used a theory of critical or realigning elections to help explain his “political time.” In much of this scholarship, 1964 can mark a critical election that did not create a new electoral majority but did shift the South to the GOP.⁷⁰

Other scholars rightly pushed back against this theory as not fully explaining the historical development of political parties. One strain argued that some realignments occur more slowly, across multiple elections, spanning even decades before coming to some form of completion.⁷¹ While some have tried to explain the South’s move from predominately Democratic-leaning to Republican through the critical election theory (mostly focused on 1964), others have committed to a more gradual model that says the racial component slowly worked its way toward the partisan shift.

This report will challenge both those narratives. One cannot reduce the shift in political loyalties in the South either to one election or to one issue set like race. As noted above, the fuller story spans close to a century of American history.

Potential GOP prospects in the South arose as early as 1928. At the presidential level, Republicans won what is known in scholarship as the “peripheral South.” This sub-region included Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida. But that election had notable results even in the Deep South, defined as Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.⁷² In Alabama, for example, Democrat Al Smith won with only 51% of the vote and over 43% in Georgia. Some attribute this outcome to race-based issues, since Smith was more open than most Democrats of the time to African-American civil rights.⁷³ But the bigger issue in 1928, other than economic prosperity of the “Roaring 20s” being credited to Republicans, was that Al Smith was Roman Catholic. This point caused consternation in the very Protestant Southern portion of the Democratic Party, where centuries-old views questioning Roman Catholic loyalty and capacity to adapt to non-authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, this report must note where within those states the GOP did well. Republican gains were focused in urban or metropolitan centers, not rural areas, both in the Peripheral and the Deep South.⁷⁴ V. O. Key pointed out as early as 1949 that Republican strength in that earlier election was higher in urban as opposed to rural portions of the South.⁷⁵ This trend continued in subsequent electoral contests. Even in the wipeout election of 1932, Herbert Hoover performed better in Southern cities like Charlotte, Richmond, and Dallas than Republican candidates had in their decisive national victories

⁶⁹ See Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*

⁷⁰ Black & Black, 4, 28; James E. Campbell, “Party Systems and Realignment in the United States, 1868-2004” *Social Science History* 30(3)(Fall 2006): 370.

⁷¹ See Edward G. Carmines and James A. Simpson, “Issue Evolution, Population Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change” *American Political Science Review* 75(1981): 107-118.

⁷² Earle Black and Merle Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 14

⁷³ At the same time, Herbert Hoover garnered a paltry 18% of the vote in Mississippi and under 9% in South Carolina.

⁷⁴ The Deep South included Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment in the Modern South: The Untold Story* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2022), 12.

⁷⁵ Key, 328.

throughout the 1920s.⁷⁶ In the 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower's victories in the Peripheral South as well as his improved percentages in the Deep South came overwhelmingly from urban or metropolitan areas. For example, Donald Strong pointed out that, in the 1950 census, Mountain Brook, Alabama had the highest median income of any city in the state. In 1952, it voted for Republican Eisenhower over Democrat Adlai Stevens by a margin of nearly 4-1.⁷⁷ The three counties that contained Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery all voted by margins notably above the state average of 35% for Eisenhower. Strong would find a similar urban, upper-class strength in the Deep South, including Alabama, for Eisenhower in his 1956 re-election. Bernard Cosman then continued the examination in 1960, finding Richard Nixon, though in a losing national effort, garnered strong margins in the urban South comparable to Ike.⁷⁸

Scholars see this as the start of what has been called, "Metropolitan Republicanism" in the South. The Republican Party's revived prospects came not just in the South's periphery. It also developed *within* Southern states in particular areas, not others. Most notably, as the phrase, "Metropolitan Republicanism" relates, the GOP gained not in rural but in urban portions of the states. As these areas grew in population, so would Republican prospects. Therefore, James C. Cobb in 1977 noted that, "[t]he South's cities seem to be the logical place to begin further analyses of southern Republicanism."⁷⁹ These cities, especially in what later came to be distinguished as "suburbs," proved the base for the rising GOP successes.

The main point to consider here is that, as Sundquist noted, these gains were "durable."⁸⁰ Slow and steady, they formed a definite and consistent trend in Southern voting patterns. Contrast these gains with two elections which some point to as hard moves away from Democrats and toward Republicans in the South. The first was in 1948. The Democratic Party experienced a temporary revolt from its Southern ranks in the form of Dixiecrats who were angry at President Truman and the national party's stance on African-American civil rights. Led by Senator Strom Thurmond, this contingent won Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and one electoral vote from the state of Tennessee.⁸¹ Yet these disgruntled Democrats did not move into the Republican ranks.⁸² In fact, Thurmond won those states in part because he was made the official Democratic nominee on the ballot within them. After the election, these voters mostly returned to the Democratic fold; they did not join the Republican party.⁸³ Moreover, Thurmond's best voting regions were not predominately from groups and areas trending toward Republicans but from regions of continued Democratic strength.⁸⁴ Thurmond would switch to

⁷⁶ Phillips, *Emerging Republican Majority*, 161.

⁷⁷ Donald S. Strong, "The Presidential Election in the South, 1952" *Journal of Politics* 17(3)(August 1955): 343.

⁷⁸ Bernard Cosman, "Presidential Republicanism in the South, 1960" *Journal of Politics* 24(2)(May 1962): 303-322. See also Black & Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 265.

⁷⁹ James C. Cobb, "Urbanization and the Changing South: A Review of the Literature" *South Atlantic Urban Studies* 1(1977): 263.

⁸⁰ Sundquist, 279.

⁸¹ Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 52-53.

⁸² Sundquist, 275.

⁸³ Black and Black, *Rise of Southern Republicanism*, 208.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 276. Thurmond would switch to the Republican Party but not until September of 1964. See Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 450-452.

the GOP though not until 1964—16 years later. Even then, as Dr. Kari Frederickson notes in her report, “Strom Thurmond’s party-switching remained a singular act”⁸⁵ with very few politicians following suit.

The other election—1964—is where many scholars focus the narrative of Republican ascendance in the South. As noted above, that election saw a sudden rise in GOP support, most of it concentrated in the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater did very well in the Deep South and the rural portions of it, the opposite of the trends for the GOP up to that point. Republicans did make some gains below the presidential ticket, including gaining five seats in United States House delegation from Alabama. However, Republicans gave back a significant portion of these gains. In the next congressional election, Alabama’s house delegation reverted to majority Democratic, not to change back again until 1996. In 1968, Richard Nixon received just shy of 14% of the state’s vote, coming in third place behind avowed segregationist and Alabama Governor George Wallace as well as Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey. Governor Wallace did especially well in rural areas, not those where GOP strength had been growing slowly in previous decades.⁸⁶

Thus, the GOP’s lasting growth occurred in the metropolitan and suburban areas during this period, not rural. Rural areas, with the exception of 1964, remained the bedrock group voting for Democrats or for splinter Democratic candidates like George Wallace. This observation matters in assessing the growth of the GOP among white voters in Southern states like Alabama. Rural areas were considered the most committed to maintaining the old ways and most resistant to reform, especially on matters of race.⁸⁷ Those areas, more than urban ones, would seem more likely to seek party change in response to Democrat deviation from racial orthodoxy as the voting patterns in most of these elections support. Metropolitan areas tended to be more diverse in population and open to reform, including on matters related to race. Moreover, the metropolitan areas during these decades saw an influx of persons immigrating from other parts of the country, including the Midwest, bringing with them more GOP votes and less segregationist attitudes. In fact, by 2009 about 1/3 of those living in the South were born in other regions of the country. And most transplants were to urban/suburban areas where Republicans did increasingly well electorally and who fit well within traditionally Republican-friendly constituencies.⁸⁸ Thus, Key observed that, even in the deep South, it was true that at times “urbanism apparently outweighed racial restraints.”⁸⁹

After 1968, the South showed greater willingness to vote Republican at the presidential level. It voted for Nixon in 1972 and for Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the 1980s. However, these all were landslide elections where the Republican candidate dominated across the country. It also did not translate elsewhere down the ticket: the region remained dominantly, stubbornly Democrat in every other electoral sphere. Lublin noted that a shift in the South to a Republican majority anywhere below

⁸⁵ Kari Frederickson, “Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century Alabama,” Initial Report, 25.

⁸⁶ David Knoke and Constance Henry, “The Political Structure of Rural America” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 429(January 1977): 56.

⁸⁷ Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” *American Journal of Sociology* 64 (July 1938): 1-24; 5 Charles O. Lerche, *The Uncertain South* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 236.

⁸⁸ Irwin L. Morris, *Movers and Stayers: The Partisan Transformation of 21st Century Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). See also Richard K. Scher, *Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and Leadership in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd Ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). In the 21st century, this in-migration tended to help Democrats more, though that shift came well after the GOP became not just competitive but favored in the region. See Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 251-253.

⁸⁹ Key, 321.

the presidential level seemed to be a political version of “waiting for Godot.”⁹⁰ For thirty years after the Civil Rights Movement supposedly drove the South into the arms of the GOP, Democrats “held the preponderance of governorships as well as congressional seats” while “Democratic dominance appeared even greater at the state legislative and local levels.”⁹¹ For instance, as late as 1991 Democrats held a 77 to 39 advantage over the GOP—essentially 2-1—among Congressional delegations.⁹²

It was not until 1994 that Republicans won a majority of House districts in the South—thirty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and twenty-nine after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Republicans also won a majority in the North in that election, a double-feat not accomplished since 1872.⁹³ Even crossing this threshold did not result in the immediate collapse of the Democratic Party in the South, which gained some seats in Congress, governorships, and state legislatures back in subsequent elections during the rest of the 1990s and ceded the ground it did in the South only begrudgingly.⁹⁴ It took till the 2000 presidential election for a Republican to win the entire South in a non-blowout contest.

The slowness of this change matters considering the actual voters involved. By 1994, a significant generational shift in voting population from 1964 had taken place. This shift only becomes more pronounced in the 2020s. The most recent census data showed that only 18% of Alabama residents are over the age of 65.⁹⁵ The voters that revolted against the Democrats in 1948 and 1964, then generally returned, comprise a small and shrinking portion of the electorate. The rise of Republican strength in the region in the post-Civil Rights era coincided with not only migration from other parts of the country but also new generations accounting for an increasing segment of the voting public. In fact, research has pointed to “replacement” of older, native voters as one notable contributor to the GOP’s ascendancy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. From the 1980s till 2000, for instance, the average rural Southerner who identified as a Republican was ten years younger than his Democratic-affiliated counterpart.⁹⁶ Green, Palmquist, and Schickler claim that as much as half of white Southern voters’ migration to the GOP was generational replacement.⁹⁷

Moreover, this story includes a further normalization of Southern voting patterns. Consider the slow-motion change in rural partisan preferences between North and South. For most post-Civil War history, the Republican Party’s Northern base was rural with Democrats doing better among the more Roman Catholic, immigrant populations of cities. In the South, as noted before, Republicans did better in cities, though not that well, while Democrats dominated among that region’s rural voters. However, that began to change after the era of Civil Rights. Rural voting patterns began to converge between North and South. Thus, Southern rural voters began to vote more like their counterparts across the country. By 2004, southern rural voters were slightly more Republican in voting patterns than their corresponding

⁹⁰ David Lublin, *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004S), 1.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Black & Black, 13.

⁹³ Black & Black, 2.

⁹⁴ Lublin, 2.

⁹⁵ “Quick Facts: Alabama,” United States Census Bureau.

<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AL/PST045223>. Accessed 3/27/2024.

⁹⁶ Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 28.

⁹⁷ Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

Northern rural voters.⁹⁸ It marked the South becoming more like the rest of the country in its voting patterns rather than maintaining a distinctiveness that before more comported with voting in a dominantly race-conscious manner. Not until the 2010s did rural Southerner whites align with the GOP more than urban whites.⁹⁹

In sum, this move from Democrat to Republican in the South hardly seems explainable predominantly by race. Beyond the statistics, we also have evidence that the Republican Party did not seek to go to the segregationists who had supported Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968. Some have argued that Republicans made sustained racial appeals but in more subdued or cloaked terms. Black and Black, for instance, argue in their 2002 book that Republicans from Nixon onward took this route with Goldwater as an earlier set-up.¹⁰⁰ This theory became known as the GOP's "Southern Strategy," which, some insist, continues to this day. For example, Dr. Frederickson opines that "white identity politics occup[ies] the center of Republican politics"¹⁰¹ now and since at least the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-20th century. She relies heavily on the GOP's "Southern Strategy" as inherently and perpetually grounded in white supremacy to make this argument. There are a number of concerns with her interpretation of the relevant history and with that of others who accept race as dominant in this tale.

For one, consider the case of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and campaigned vigorously in the South in the Fall of 1964, downplaying the civil rights issue there for the sake of getting votes. But he was far from a model segregationist. He had voted for the 1957 and 1960 civil rights bills, desegregated his own family business, integrated the Arizona Air National Guard and U.S. Senate cafeteria.¹⁰² And his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act rested on grounds that the law, while moral in intent, violated the Constitutional distribution of powers, especially between state and national governments.¹⁰³

For another, take the campaigns and presidency of Richard Nixon. Frederickson admits that Nixon was no George Wallace. She says, though, that Nixon wooed Southern white segregationists in that he, "established a politically safe terrain by simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles of equality while opposing the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance."¹⁰⁴

Nixon indeed consistently affirmed his belief in racial equality before the law. In his first inaugural address, Nixon declared:

No man can be fully free while his neighbor is not. To go forward at all is to go forward together. This means black and white together, as one nation, not two. The laws have caught up with our conscience. What remains is to give life to what is in the law: to

⁹⁸ Seth E. McKee, "Rural Voters and Polarization of American Presidential Elections" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41(1)(January 2008): 102.

⁹⁹ Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 24.

¹⁰⁰ Black & Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans*, 216, 277.

¹⁰¹ Frederickson, 4.

¹⁰² See "Where Barry Stands" *Time* August 2, 1963. <https://time.com/archive/6807933/nation-where-barry-stands/>. Accessed August 11, 2024; Lee Edwards, *Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution* (Regnery: 1995).

¹⁰³ See Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, *Legacies of Losing in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 110.

¹⁰⁴ Frederickson, 24.

insure at last that as all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before man.¹⁰⁵

Statements of this kind were not atypical for Nixon nor new in his political career. In fact, Richard Nixon hardly fit the bill for the person to morph the GOP into the party of white supremacy. He held a long record of support for civil rights, including *Brown v. Board of Education* and the civil rights acts of 1957 and 1960. Unlike Barry Goldwater, Nixon also had endorsed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and efforts leading to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.¹⁰⁶ In 1967, Nixon granted an interview with the *New York Times* where he said, "people in the ghetto have to have more than an equal chance. They should be given a dividend" in response to the history they had experienced of discrimination.¹⁰⁷

Frederickson argues Nixon's policies regarding civil rights supports the racial element of the "Southern Strategy." The Nixon Administration did pursue a moderate approach to enforcing civil rights. As president, Nixon opted for fewer hard deadlines for desegregation, moving much of its enforcement from the executive branch to the judiciary as well as supporting more cooperative efforts to get Southern schools to integrate.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, he opposed school busing as the means to integrate public schools.

But hanging the hat of white supremacy on these factors does not hold up well in light of the broader history. While making an argument for a Southern Strategy, Black & Black note that, "Nixon positioned himself to southern voters as opposed to segregation but favoring only voluntary integration."¹⁰⁹ Such a position would be quite the concession for white supremacists to take in their voting preferences. But even that description does not fairly describe Nixon's policies. Nixon's desegregation plan still included substantial Justice Department-initiated litigation, which Dean Kotlowski notes, "offended many white southerners" and thus made "questionable whether Nixon had swapped civil rights enforcement for southern votes as his critics complained."¹¹⁰ After these executive branch lawsuits began, a record number of African-American school children went to integrated schools in the Fall of 1969.

The school busing policies, moreover, were not the only method or necessarily considered the best method for pursuing integration. They also were deeply unpopular, not merely the scourge of Southern segregationists. A Harris Poll from 1975 found that Americans supported desegregation by a 56%-35% margin while the same sample opposed busing 75%-20%.¹¹¹ Thus, a number of voters did not

¹⁰⁵ Richard Nixon, "Inaugural Address" *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and States of the President: 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ronald Sullivan, "Back Rights Bill, Nixon Urges" *New York Times* June 16, 1964, 22. Joseph A. Loftus, "Senate's Leaders Seek Voting Bill: Mansfield and Dirksen Say They Want a Simple Plan" *New York Times* March 11, 1965, 19.

¹⁰⁷ "Nixon Gives Views on Aid to Negroes and to the Poor" *New York Times*, December 20, 1967, 22.

¹⁰⁸ Hugh Davis Graham, "Richard Nixon and Civil Rights: Explaining an Enigma" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26(1)(Winter 1996): 94.

¹⁰⁹ Black & Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans*, 210.

¹¹⁰ Kotlowski, 24.

¹¹¹ *New York Times*, October 5, 1975, pg. 59. A Washington Post poll in 1978 found that only 25% of Americans agreed with the statement that "racial integration of the schools should be achieved even if it requires busing." See Laura Meckler, "Effective But Never Popular, Court-Ordered Busing is a Relic Few Would Revive" *Washington Post*, July 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/effective-but-never-popular-court-ordered-busing-is-a-relic-few-would-revive/2019/07/07/dcc439c8-9d40-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html. Retrieved 6/3/2024.

see busing as essential to achieving the goal of desegregation, a goal with which they agreed. Importantly, these statistics also revealed far from boisterous support from African-Americans. In a 1973 Gallup poll, for example, only 9% of African-Americans rated school busing at the top of their list of the best means for integration.¹¹²

Dr. Frederickson quotes an Alabama newspaper from the time heralding that “Nixon Keeps His Word.” But if Nixon was trying to signal subtly to white supremacists that he was on their side, he sold them a false bill of goods. His rhetoric hardly gave much to them in the first place, extolling racial equality. And his policies did not deliver on segregationist priorities. Simply put, Nixon failed to stop desegregation, instead helping bear considerable fruit on that front. In 1968, 68% of black children in the South attended single-race schools. That number had plummeted to 8% by 1972, the year Nixon ran for re-election. Far from coming despite Nixon, these welcome results happened in part due to his administration’s efforts.

In addition, Nixon compiled a number of other concrete policy accomplishments on civil rights. His budget proposals to Congress asked to increase funding for enforcing civil rights from \$75 million to \$2.6 billion between 1969 and 1972.¹¹³ In 1970, he approved a new IRS policy denying tax exempt status to all-white private schools, a move that especially went after institutions in the South trying to avoid public school integration.¹¹⁴ Nixon privately declared the move would not help him politically but made the call regardless.¹¹⁵ Nixon also played a significant part in the development of affirmative action programs. His “Revised Philadelphia Plan” built upon existing policies requiring those receiving federal funds to show some kind of affirmative action in their procedures. Rather than gut this program, he revived and enhanced it. In particular, the Revised Philadelphia Plan” focused on government contracts for construction jobs. Nixon did not take this route for political ease. He faced significant pressure from Congress to end all affirmative action requirements within the bureaucracy with Elmer P. Staats, the Comptroller General, declaring such plans illegal in November of 1968, the same month Nixon was elected president.¹¹⁶ This opposition included Southern politicians, among them Democratic Senators John McClellan of Arkansas and Sam Ervin of North Carolina.¹¹⁷ But Nixon forged ahead, doing something the Johnson Administration had not on this issue: establishing numerical requirements for minority hiring among those entities eligible for government contracts with concrete timetables attached.¹¹⁸ This policy, far from a new attempt to woo Southern segregationists, went beyond Nixon’s former position in favor of persuasion over coercion when he was Vice-President under Eisenhower.¹¹⁹

¹¹² “Gallup Finds Few Favor Busing for Integration” *New York Times*, September 9, 1973, 55.

¹¹³ <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/09/09/archives/gallup-finds-few-favor-busing-for-integration.html>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

¹¹⁴ Graham, 95.

¹¹⁵ Eileen Shanahan, “Private Schools that Bar Blacks to Lose Tax Aid” *New York Times* July 11, 1970, 1.

¹¹⁶ <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/11/archives/private-schools-that-bar-blacks-to-lose-tax-aid-irs-policy-is.html>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

¹¹⁷ Kotlowski, 25.

¹¹⁸ J. Larry Hood, “The Nixon Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan for Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding Presidential Power and Divided Government” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23(1)(Winter 1993): 147-150.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

¹²⁰ Dean J. Kotlowski, “Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action,” *The Historian* 60(3)(Spring 1998): 528-530.

¹²¹ See also Kotlowski, “Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action,” 533.

In fact, Joan Hoff has argued that Nixon has received too little credit for his advancement of civil rights during his career, including his presidency.¹²⁰ Any assessment of his so-called “Southern Strategy” that is based in alleged subtle racial language must account for the above (and additional) explicit words and deeds promoting the advancement of civil rights. Thus, while Nixon’s less-aggressive approach to civil rights might have been more attractive to segregationist elements in the South than Humphrey in 1968 or McGovern in 1972, Nixon’s policies nevertheless seriously undermined the segregationist and white supremacist agenda. White supremacists’ choice came down more on how to lose the legal and political battle, not whether they would lose.

One point sometimes lost in these discussions is the weak position Southern segregationists were in as the Civil Rights Movement won out and how the Republican Party itself understood this weakness. In 1968, Nixon won the presidency without the votes of the Southerners who cast ballots in droves for the Southern segregationist.¹²¹ Though the margin was narrow, the GOP still could win without the Deep South. In 1969, Kevin Phillips, who then worked in the Nixon Administration, published his famous book, *The Emerging Republican Majority*. In summing up trends toward the GOP in the South, Phillips emphasized the incapacity of segregationists to continue as a relevant factor in American politics. He wrote that “For national political reasons, the Republican Party cannot go to the Deep South, but...the Deep South must soon go to the GOP.”¹²² In other words, the South’s move to the GOP would be more on the latter’s terms, not the former’s. And these terms would have less to do with race and more to do with a combination of economic, foreign policy, and social issues then percolating within the parties and across the country due to the New Left and Modern Conservatism.

Studies bore this point out at least as early as the 1980s. In an examination of voter attitudes between 1980-1988, Alan Abramowitz found that the claim of the centrality of race in explaining partisan behavior was “quite limited,” despite so many scholars assuming its truth.¹²³ He critiqued the findings focused on race for the same basic reason this report questions them: failure to account for other issues, events, and developments that have as much or more explanatory power. The narrow view obscured the broader story.

Dr. Frederickson also claims the race-based “Southern Strategy” continued with Reagan. Her very quick assessment, as with Nixon, makes claims that unnored evidence points against. To give one example: in 1982, President Reagan signed an extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In doing so, he agreed to amendments strengthening the law’s power by replacing §2’s discriminatory intent requirement with an effects test. In fact, African-American civil rights leaders declared that Reagan had given them “everything we wanted.”¹²⁴

Though her short analysis effectively ends with the end of the 20th century, Frederickson concludes that the Republican Party continues to this day to be the “white party” and that it has, “adopted a host of conservative policy positions that had race at their core.”¹²⁵ In fact, she asserts that basically all major conservative and Republican positions, including, “taxes, spending, education, crime,

¹²⁰ Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

¹²¹ Gerard Alexander, “The Myth of Racist Republicans,” *Claremont Review of Books* IV(2)(Spring 2004).

¹²² Phillips, 233.

¹²³ Alan I. Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate” *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1)(February 1994) :2.

¹²⁴ “Voting Rights Act Extension by the Senate Seen Likely as Dole Engineers Compromise,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 4, 1982.

¹²⁵ Frederickson, 29.

and welfare, as well as the promotion of what came to be known as ‘family values’ issues” all really were driven by racial attitudes.¹²⁶

This broad-brush claim shows serious difficulties with the narrative of a race-dominant Southern Strategy. It often falls back on what Dr. Joseph Bagley calls “colormasking”—subtle appeals to racial anxiety or animosity hidden underneath overt language of racial equality.¹²⁷ Thereby, as Frederickson claims, nearly all if not all Republican and conservative appeals ultimately are racial in origin and intent, regardless of what is explicitly stated.

Likely for support on this claim, she ends with a quote from Maxwell and Fields’ book, *The Long Southern Strategy*. That work demonstrates wider problems with the attempt to make race so central to Southern politics in particular and even to American politics more generally. It attempts to place alleged racial appeals within a broader strategy by the GOP regarding sex, sexuality, and religion. It paints a picture of a GOP committed to oppression across most cultural and political questions with race as only one element. But whatever the merits of that argument, it undermines the dominance of race as an explanatory factor by admitting that many other issues distinct from race contributed to the South’s move to the GOP. It attributes increasing prominence to questions regarding women’s rights and economics. At least one of its author’s even emphasizes a religious basis underlying and thus cohering many of these views.¹²⁸

Moreover, a related issue is the problem of deciphering the masked motivation undergirding a particular view or policy as dominated by race. As noted above, it is not clear that opposition to busing was due primarily to racist attitudes, since some did oppose these policies while still supporting integration. Affirmative action is another example. Does the evidence show that Republicans by and large oppose affirmative action and other race-conscious policies because they desire to discriminate against blacks or because they believe in a “color-blind” Constitution, the very argument raised by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his dissent against legalized segregation in *Plessy v. Ferguson*?¹²⁹ Similarly, some, like Dr. Bagley, interpret advocacy for “school choice” along with opposition to the teaching of critical race theory in primary schools as racially motivated rather than coming from a commitment to bettering education for all children.¹³⁰ But that cannot be reconciled with the fact that school choice, for example, continues to garner significant and increasing backing from members of all races.¹³¹ Non-racial reasons certainly can explain policy preferences on these issues. Likewise, a belief in greater border security regarding immigration is seen by Dr. Bagley and others as signaling racial

¹²⁶ Frederickson, 29.

¹²⁷ Joseph Bagley, Declaration, *Milligan v. Merrill*, December 10, 2021, at 1, 3, 26; Bagley, Third Expert Report, *Milligan v. Allen*, May 17, 2024, at 1, 24.

¹²⁸ “[T]he [Republican] party worked to reframe its positions on a host of domestic issues, ranging from health care to foreign policy, into matters of religious belief.” See Angie Maxwell, “What We Get Wrong About the Southern Strategy” *Washington Post*, July 26, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/26/what-we-get-wrong-about-southern-strategy/>. Retrieved 6/5/2014.

¹²⁹ Compare Richard Johnson, “The 1982 Voting Rights Act Extension as a ‘Critical Juncture’: Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole, and Republican Party-Building” *Studies in American Political Development* 35(2)(October 2021): 224; with Matthew Lassiter, *The Silent Majority*, and Abramowitz, *supra* note 123.

¹³⁰ Bagley, Third Expert Report, at 30-31

¹³¹ See Mike McShane, “A Decade of Public Polling on Education” *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemcshane/2022/09/30/a-decade-of-public-opinion-on-education/>. Retrieved 6/27/2024; Denisha Allen, “School Choice Really is the Civil Rights Issue of Our Time” *The Hill* February 14, 2024, <https://thehill.com/opinion/education/4465271-school-choice-really-is-the-civil-rights-issue-of-our-time/>. Retrieved 6/27/2024.

animosity, even when substantial numbers of Latino and African-American voters support such policies.¹³²

This practice of casting each and every conservative policy as containing some element of white supremacy paints a simplistic picture and inappropriately diminishes non-racial reasons explaining voter behavior. Unfortunately, this continues to infect the scholarship.¹³³ But it has also gained new traction in the public arena. For example, former attorney general Eric Holder recently claimed that Alabama's redistricting actions in this case "mirrored the sordid history of the Jim Crow era."¹³⁴ And President Biden described Georgia's attempts to regulate its elections as "Jim Crow 2.0."¹³⁵ And his questioning whether a "real" black person could vote for Republicans suffered from the same problem of assuming rather than showing racial animus.¹³⁶

In what follows, we will look beyond the numbers at the ways that the South came to the GOP and moved away from the Democratic Party. Shifts in all three—the South, GOP, and Democrats—contributed to these changes.

Economics and Role of Government

First, this report will discuss the issue of economic development. In 2008, Gary Miller and Normal Schofield pegged the Republican Party's unity to being "pro-business."¹³⁷ The American public held this view of the GOP going back into the 19th century, when post-Civil War Republicans sought to protect American business through tariffs and spent significant government dollars helping develop railroads and other infrastructure. In the North, this power stretched to rural areas, in part due to the

¹³² Bagley, Third Expert Report, at 30. An April poll found that 42% of Latinos in the US supported a border wall with significant support for deportation (38%) and majority (64%) for shutting down the Southern border as a potential policy tool. See Russell Contreras, "Exclusive Poll: Latino support for border wall, deportation jumps" *Axios* April 11, 2024, <https://www.axios.com/2024/04/11/poll-latino-support-border-wall-deportations-jumps>. Retrieved June 10, 2024. In a Pew poll this Spring, 33% of surveyed Latinos said that increasing deportations of those here against the law would make the current situation "better" while 26% said "worse" (with 19% saying it would not make much of a difference). See, "Latino's Views on the Migrant Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border" Pew Research Center, March 4, 2024, <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2024/03/04/latinos-views-on-the-migrant-situation-at-the-us-mexico-border/>. Retrieved 6/10/2024.

¹³³ One academic example would be Alan Abramowitz, whose 1990s work was cited earlier. His later work also tends to code certain issues, like opposition to affirmative action, school busing, and greater restrictions on immigration, as inherently racial in nature. See Alan I. Abramowitz, *The Great Realignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018). On this point, see also Larry M. Bartels, "Ethnic Antagonism Erodes Republicans' Commitment to Democracy" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 117(37)(September 15, 2020).

¹³⁴ Quoted in Joseph D. Bryant, "Supreme Court Ruling 1 Year Ago Today Changed Alabama's Congressional Map" *AL.com* June 8, 2024, <https://www.al.com/news/2024/06/supreme-court-ruling-1-year-ago-today-changed-alabamas-congressional-map.html>. Accessed June 11, 2024.

¹³⁵ See Joseph Biden, "Remarks by President Biden on Protecting the Right to Vote" *The White House* <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/11/remarks-by-president-biden-on-protecting-the-right-to-vote/>. Retrieved June 11, 2024.

¹³⁶ Quote by President Biden in Eric Bradner, Sarah Mucha, and Arlette Saenz, "Biden: 'If You Have a Problem Figuring Out Whether You're for Me or Trump, then You Ain't Black'" *CNN.com*, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/politics/biden-charlamagne-the-god-you-aint-black/index.html>, Retrieved June 11, 2024.

¹³⁷ Miller and Schofield, 433-436.

GOP expanding its protective tariffs to certain agricultural products. While Democrats had electoral strength in Northern cities due to immigration and Roman Catholic voters, the Southern wing was more aligned with agriculture, making the agrarians a natural base for that portion of the Democratic Party.

Republicans had tried in the post-Reconstruction era to make inroads into the South on economic grounds. President Rutherford B. Hayes sought to attract Southern whites through providing government funding for internal improvements, especially the development of railroad systems.¹³⁸ These efforts failed to make significant change to a South still traditional in culture, agricultural in economy, and embittered by the memory of the Civil War. However, changes in both major parties, as well as economic developments in the South, later caused the region to see its interests as fulfilled more in the GOP than in the Democratic Party.

Since the times of Andrew Jackson, if not even Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic Party had a significant component that desired a government limited in size and scope. This included circumscribed government involvement in the economy, exemplified by Jefferson's and Jackson's opposition to the national bank. The Progressives of the late 19th and early 20th centuries sought to change that philosophy, desiring to reorient the Democrats (and Republicans) toward a more expansive view of governmental powers. Yet this effort only changed portions of the Democratic Party, making little inroads in its Southern portion.

FDR's election and subsequent implementation of the New Deal brought decisive change for the view of government and the economy within the Democratic Party. The New Deal included a massive expansion of governmental regulation, especially of banks. It also involved significant government involvement in the economy with the many programs the Democratic President and Congress put in place to employ American workers.¹³⁹

Though quite popular within the party and across the country, the Democratic Party had its own opponents to the New Deal. Carter Glass and Harry F. Byrd, Democratic Senators from Virginia, both criticized it publicly.¹⁴⁰ Georgia Governor Gene Talmadge won his 1932 race calling for lower taxes and limiting government's size. He later called the New Deal "a combination of wet nursin', frenzied finance, downright Communism and plain dam-foolish."¹⁴¹ By 1938, a discernable and substantial (though certainly minority) group of these Democrats existed and vocally so. Regionally, the highest concentration of them resided in the South. That year, President Franklin Roosevelt attempted a purge of New Deal opponents from the Democratic Party.¹⁴² He did so by pushing more liberal challengers to defeat these anti-New Deal Democrats in the 1938 primaries. He failed miserably in this effort. A strain of Southern Democratic thought, one believing in more limited government and state authority, continued to wield significant power and often aligned with Northern Republicans on matters of common cause. This alliance with Northern Republicans was not built on support for segregation but in

¹³⁸ Vincent P. de Santis, "Republican Efforts to 'Crack' the Democratic South" *Review of Politics* 14(2)(April 1952):248.

¹³⁹ Amity Schlaes, *The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

¹⁴⁰ See A. Cash Koeniger, "The New Deal and the States: Roosevelt Versus the Byrd Organization in Virginia" *The Journal of American History* 68(4)(March 1982): 876-896.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in Howard N. Mead, "Russell v. Talmadge: Southern Politics and the New Deal" *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 65(1)(Spring 1981): 31.

¹⁴² See Susan Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

a continued rejection of the economic philosophy that retooled the 1920s *laissez faire* GOP for modern conservatism.¹⁴³

Moreover, as an economic program of free markets and a political philosophy of smaller government took hold within the GOP, certain developments in the South made those positions even more attractive to voters in the region. The South had been considered economically backward and thus besieged by poverty and slow growth from Antebellum times into the middle of the 20th century. In 1937, the South's per capita income barely attained half the level in the rest of the country, a fact which was blamed mostly on the South's continued agrarian base and thus lack of industrial development.¹⁴⁴ That began to change in the second half of the 20th century. The South began a period of sustained economic growth that continues to this day. A new, vibrant middle class arose. In fact, in the 1940s, 30% of Southerners were considered middle class. That number had doubled to 60% by the 1980s.¹⁴⁵ This economic growth came disproportionately in the suburbs, a category of community that did not exist in the political science literature on Southern politics in the 1950s but was a strength electorally for Republicans for decades prior.

This growth in jobs and other opportunities accelerated migration from other parts of the country to the South. These new Southerners overwhelmingly consisted of white-collar workers who already formed a foundational component of the GOP elsewhere.¹⁴⁶ Economic development of a rising middle class continued to accelerate GOP gains in the South in the 1980s during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.¹⁴⁷ Reagan had argued in his First Inaugural that, "Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem."¹⁴⁸ He had cut taxes and spoke of the need to restrain federal spending, though that latter goal would prove a failing effort. The GOP continued to be identified with those positions, which became increasingly attractive to the growing, upwardly mobile suburban sections of the South.

Since that time, the growth in the South has continued to be urban and suburban, with nearly 90% of job growth coming in those portions of the South between 1987 and 2007.¹⁴⁹ Those changes continued to benefit the GOP. Thus, in the 1990s, the base of the Republican Party in Congress had not only moved to the South, with Georgia's Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House and Texans Dick Armey and Tom Delay serving as majority leader and majority whip, but its base came to a great degree from the region's growing suburbs.¹⁵⁰ Gingrich's 1995 book, *To Renew America*, preached an economic gospel of free trade, low regulation, restored federalism, and a market economy dynamic in wealth creation

¹⁴³ Hood & McKee, 14. See also Erick Schickler, *Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism 1932-1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

¹⁴⁴ Bruce J. Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sun Belt: Federalist Policy, Economic Development, 1938-1980* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 3-4.

¹⁴⁵ Joseph A. Aistrup, *The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). See also James C. Cobb, *Redefining Southern Culture: Mind and Identity in the Modern South* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999).

¹⁴⁶ Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, *Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1996).

¹⁴⁷ Ferrel Guillory, "The South in Red and Purple: Southernized Republicans, Diverse Democrats" *Southern Cultures* 18(3)(Fall 2012): 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ronald Reagan, "First Inaugural Address" *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum*. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/inaugural-address-1981>. Retrieved 3/17/2024.

¹⁴⁹ Guillory, 13.

¹⁵⁰ Matthew D. Lassiter and Kevin M. Kruse, "The Bulldozer Revolution: Suburbs and Southern History Since World War II" *The Journal of Southern History* 75(3)(August 2009): 693.

and uplifting to hardworking Americans.¹⁵¹ It thereby continued basically to follow the blueprint articulated by Buckley in the 1950s, Goldwater in the 1960s, and Reagan in the 1980s. Dr. Bagley tries to cast Gingrich's conservative politics, especially his attempts to reform entitlements, as dominated by disparaging racial views of African-Americans.¹⁵² His accusation would have to strain history to find credible support. Gingrich's views showed the decidedly suburban, middle-class focus of the GOP at the time not a subliminal attempt to play racial politics.

The scholarship has noted these components helping the GOP to slowly gain strength in the South below the presidential level. Lublin found that "economic issues most quickly began to differentiate Republicans and Democrats after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."¹⁵³ Richard Nadeau and Harold W. Stanley found that, since the mid-1970s, economic class has become the defining line for partisan preferences between Democrats and Republicans.¹⁵⁴ Even works emphasizing the racial answers to Southern re-alignment admit the existence and even the importance of a "free-market" economic philosophy in the development of Republican prospects in the 1940s and 1950s South. Challenging that thesis directly, Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston declared that economic change was the "first and foremost" driver of the partisan shift in the South from Democrat to Republican.¹⁵⁵

The combination of Southern economic development, Democratic movement to the left on economic issues, and the GOP embrace of and emphasis on free markets, lower regulation, and limiting government's size and scope, all aided a shift in voter identification toward the Republican party and away from the Democrats. Increasingly numbers of Southerners began to see the national Democratic party as the party of high taxes, irresponsible spending, and thereby the party whose policies stifled individual economic liberty and the economic pursuit of the American Dream.

Foreign Policy: Communism and the Cold War

Next, I turn to the development of the parties regarding the dominant foreign policy issue from 1945-1990: the Cold War against the forces of communism, especially Soviet Russia.

President Roosevelt officially recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, despite the Revolution of 1917 having brought the communists to power sixteen years prior.¹⁵⁶ However, the issue of America's response to national and international communism did not rise to a primary concern until after the end of World War II, when the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan shifted international sphere toward the developing Cold War conflict between Soviet Communism and Western capitalist democracies.

Both parties generically opposed communism and saw it as a significant threat to the United States. President Harry Truman had initiated the foreign policy approach known as "Containment,"

¹⁵¹ Newt Gingrich, *To Renew America* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).

¹⁵² See Bagley, *Third Expert Report*, 30.

¹⁵³ Lublin, 30.

¹⁵⁴ Richard Nadeau and Harold W. Stanley, "Class Polarization and Partisanship Among Native Southern Whites, 1952-90" *American Journal of Political Science* 37(3)(1993): 900-919.

¹⁵⁵ See Schafer and Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Post-War South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

¹⁵⁶ Alonzo Hamby, *Far the Survival of Democracy" Franklin Roosevelt and the World Crisis of the 1930s* (New York: Press Press, 2004), 152-153.

which sought to stop further Soviet territorial expansion.¹⁵⁷ Eisenhower essentially continued that policy during his presidency even if he tried to place some rhetorical distance between himself and his predecessor.¹⁵⁸ But the GOP as a whole tended to articulate a more antagonistic opposition than the Democrats. Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, for example, infamously pushed the issue of communism to the forefront of American politics in the 1950s. GOP leadership proved more cautious. However, Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower, leaders of the more conservative and moderate wings of the party, were as careful to not fully repudiate McCarthy as they were not to fully embrace him. Moreover, in 1952 and 1956, Eisenhower picked Richard Nixon as his running mate.¹⁵⁹ Nixon had risen to prominence in large part due to his large participation in the hearings between Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers, where the latter accused the former of acting within the national government as a communist spy.¹⁶⁰ In 1948, Nixon campaigned tirelessly for Republican Presidential candidate Thomas Dewey in his presidential campaign against sitting president Harry Truman, focusing on the communist threat within the national government.¹⁶¹ The critiques Nixon made of Truman went beyond Democrat inability to find and oust Soviet infiltrators. International developments like the loss of China in 1949 and the war in Korea all opened up attacks on the Democratic Party as soft on our communist enemies.

As Sundquist notes, McCarthy's strident and often erratic anti-communism crusade had surprising popularity with a segment of the population decidedly outside the GOP coalition: Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholic church, however, already had engaged in significant efforts internationally against the rising Red menace.¹⁶² Though it did not result in immediate lasting gains, the move by the GOP to become the more unapologetically anti-Communist would aid in later efforts, mostly through social issues like abortion, to bring Roman Catholics into the party's fold.¹⁶³

The modern conservative movement that began to develop in the 1950s, the movement that became the base of the GOP, defined itself in large part by its anti-communism.¹⁶⁴ We saw this before in William F. Buckley's opening salvo in *National Review*, when he said we must seek the defeat of this foe. Goldwater's acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in 1964 minced no words about his antipathy toward communism, an antagonism Lyndon Johnson used to great effect to paint Goldwater as an extremist who might lead us into nuclear war.¹⁶⁵

The approach to the Soviet Union and to the broader communist threat solidified as a significant party issue with the Vietnam War. America's participation in the conflict was largely escalated by

¹⁵⁷ Elizabeth Spaulding discusses the critiques leveled at Truman's policy during the time which included claims of being too soft on the Soviets as well as too provocative. See Elizabeth Edwards Spaulding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2006).

¹⁵⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 127-128.

¹⁵⁹ Sundquist, 338-339.

¹⁶⁰ Irwin F. Gellman, *The Contender: Richard Nixon, the Congress Years, 1946-1952* (Yale University Press, 2017 [originally The Free Press, 1999]), 196-224.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 255-261.

¹⁶² Sundquist, 339.

¹⁶³ This report does not focus on the movement of Roman Catholics into the GOP due to the small number of self-identified Catholics in Alabama and other portions of the Deep South historically, except for Louisiana.

¹⁶⁴ Donald T. Critchlow, *The Conservative Ascendancy: How the Republican Right Rose to Power in Modern America* (Leavenworth: University of Kansas Press, 2011), 1; Jeffrey D. Howinson, *The 1980 Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 13-16.

¹⁶⁵ Stephen Skowronek, 340.

Democratic presidents, namely John F. Kennedy and LBJ, even as the rising New Left not only questioned our approach toward the Soviet Union but deeply opposed our involvement in Vietnam. The clashes in and around the 1968 Democratic National Convention largely concerned Vietnam.

Moving to the 1980s, President Reagan continued and even amplified the GOP antagonism toward the Soviet Union. He famously called the Soviets an "Evil Empire" in March of 1983, speaking in the kind black and white moral language that appealed to traditional voters. Moreover, he did not push for containment of the communist threat. Instead, in 1987, he called on the Russians to tear down the Berlin Wall while speaking in front of the Brandenburg Gate.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Reagan increased defense spending in relation to the Soviet threat, all of which positioned him in the public mind as fulfilling the longstanding conservative hardline toward communism.¹⁶⁷

The above developments in foreign policy had significant effects on partisanship in the South. As elements of the Democratic Party protested the Vietnam War, Southern Democrats found themselves again out of step with the leftward move. On communism, the clear opposition the GOP articulated became increasingly distinct from Democrats and attractive to Southern voters. Southerners held decidedly negative views of communism.¹⁶⁸ They tended to see it as against their economic and religious views. Carmines and Stanley see political import to this point, attributing Reagan's success in the South in part to his strident anti-communism.¹⁶⁹ Reagan tied his critique of Communist Russia to broader conservative principles such as economic liberty, American patriotism, and to religious faith, telling news anchor Walter Cronkite that "their ideology is without God, without our idea of morality in the religious sense."¹⁷⁰

Some have tried to tie the South's anti-communism back to race, arguing that communism and civil rights were considered linked foes.¹⁷¹ However, this view falls prey to the reductionism previously noted. Anti-communism connected with Southern patriotism and religiosity, not to mention the South's generally free-market economic views.¹⁷² These shifts all point to the Cold War as being one way that the GOP became more attractive to Southerners.

Social issues

Finally, this report turns to social issues. Social issues concern political reaction to cultural and moral matters. As discussed above, the New Deal coalition united around economic policy, differentiating itself with the GOP on those grounds primarily. Social issues were "submerged in the New

¹⁶⁶ See Romesh Ratnesar, *Tear Down This Wall: A City, A President, and the Speech that Ended the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).

¹⁶⁷ Robert M. Collins, *Transforming America: Politics and Culture During the Reagan Years* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007), 193-218.

¹⁶⁸ Joseph A. Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789-1973* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 223.

¹⁶⁹ Edward G. Carmines and Harold W. Stanley, "Ideological Re-Alignment in the Contemporary South: Where Have All the Conservatives Gone?" in *The Disappearing South*, edited by Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 23-24.

¹⁷⁰ Quoted in H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 279.

¹⁷¹ See Jeff R. Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism, 1948-1968* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).

¹⁷² James C. Cobb, "World War II and the Mind of the Modern South," *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South*, edited by Neil R. McMillen (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press 1997).

Deal years.”¹⁷³ Yet they did not stay so in the 1960s and beyond. In fact, the changes in the two major parties on this front did much to create greater distance between the average Southern voter and the Democrats and to push Southern voters closer to the Republican Party.

As a social issue, race of course came to the forefront in the 1960s in a way that severely tested the Democratic New Deal coalition. However, we have discussed how these intra-party battles did not produce an immediate move to the Republican Party of any durability. Separate from race’s effect on voters, other social issues arose from the 1960s and beyond that contributed mightily to the changing partisan landscape in the South.

1) *Religious Identity*

First, we turn to the issue of religious identity. The South has a reputation for high levels of religious adherence, especially to some iteration of Christianity. It is part of the so-called “Bible Belt” and for good reason. Baptists and Methodists have traditionally been the two largest demographics, as from 1850-1926 they combined for about 70% of Southern residents as a whole.¹⁷⁴ Alabama is no different on this score. In a book chapter released in 2005, Ted Ownby found that over 42% of Alabama residents identified as Baptist alone.¹⁷⁵ In its 2014 “Religious Landscape Study,” Pew Research found that 86% of surveyed Alabamians identified as Christians. Forty nine percent of the population claimed “Evangelical Protestant” as their self-designation.¹⁷⁶ This religious connection goes beyond mere identification. More than half of Alabamians reported going to religious services at least once a week, which is well above the national average.¹⁷⁷

For most of American history, this high religiosity did not matter for partisan alignment. Particular denominations tended toward one political party or the other with mainline Protestants forming the backbone of the GOP. Thus, the joke went that the Episcopal Church was, “the Republican Party at prayer.”¹⁷⁸ Democrats did better among Roman Catholics in the North and Baptists in the South. However, these were far from hard and fast distinctions. FDR, for example, was Episcopalian. Warren G. Harding was a Baptist.¹⁷⁹ Regardless, both parties were seen as homes for religious persons, especially those adhering to some form of Christianity.

However, the alignments within Christianity have changed. At first, the change concerned a divide between more theologically liberalizing denominations and those who retained a theologically traditional set of beliefs. Episcopalians and other mainline Christian denominations who liberalized

¹⁷³ Everett C. Ladd, “Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics” *Polity* 22(3)(Spring 1990): 523.

¹⁷⁴ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, *The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 157-160.

¹⁷⁵ Ted Ownby, “Evangelical but Differentiated: Religion by the Numbers” *Religion and Public Life in the South*, edited by Charles Wilson Reagan and Mark Silk (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 41.

¹⁷⁶ “Adults in Alabama” *Religious Landscape Study* <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/state/alabama/>. Accessed 3/13/2024.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Daniel K. Williams, *The Politics of the Cross: A Christian Alternative to Partisanship* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2021), 19.

¹⁷⁹ Pew Research Center, “The Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents” January 15, 2009. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2009/01/15/the-religious-affiliations-of-us-presidents/>. Retrieved 3/20/2024.

theologically now tend to be more aligned with the Democratic Party, though even here laypersons tended to be more Republican than the clergy. Southern Baptists and theologically traditionalist versions of Lutheran, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, and non-denominational churches have moved overwhelmingly into the GOP. The rise of the “Moral Majority” in the 1980s and the “Christian Coalition” in the 1990s further cemented the link between the theologically traditionalist group of churches, political conservatism, and Republican political identity.¹⁸⁰ The “Moral Majority” was formed by Jerry Falwell, founder of Liberty University and founding pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church, both in Lynchburg, VA. Falwell had been angered by *Roe v. Wade* and by the IRS’s efforts to revoke Bob Jones University’s tax exempt status based on its ban for interracial dating and marriage (though he argued for the latter largely on grounds of religious liberty and limitations on governmental power). Falwell then established the “Moral Majority” in June of 1979 through which Falwell endorsed candidates, raised and donated money to political campaigns, and registered evangelicals to vote. Falwell focused on social issues like prayer, traditional marriage, but also anti-communism, warning of God’s judgment if Americans did not turn back to God.¹⁸¹ The Christian Coalition, formed in the late 1980s, was created by another important figure in the American conservative religious landscape: Pat Robertson. Like Falwell, Robertson also founded a college—Regent University in Virginia Beach. The “Christian Coalition” gave special focus to local elections while also putting out voting guides with “scorecards” for United States Congressmen that rated them based largely on their conformity to conservative values.¹⁸² The identification of Republicans with traditional moral or “family” values also attracted an increasing number of Roman Catholics, once solidly in the Democratic column, especially on issues like abortion and marriage.

These developments also continued to push mainline Protestants out of the GOP and toward the Democratic Party. The Episcopal Church, for example, consecrated its first gay bishop in 2003, approved its first liturgy for same-sex relationships in 2012, and officially permitted same-sex marriages within its churches in 2015. The Presbyterian Church (USA) changed its rules to permit the same unions in 2015 as well. This report will discuss below the movements of the parties on LGBTQ rights. But these liberalizing trends in Mainline Protestantism had significant effects on party affiliation as well.

More importantly for this report, the divide *within* religious adherents has been supplemented by a bigger one *between* religious adherents and those who do not identify with any organized religion at all.¹⁸³ The so-called “nones” have ballooned in size, especially among millennials and Generation Z.¹⁸⁴ These persons, either secular or at least unaffiliated with any organized religion, have become one of

¹⁸⁰ See Daniel K. Williams, *God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹⁸¹ Williams, *God’s Own Party*, 171-179.

¹⁸² Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, “Second Coming: The Strategies of the New Christian Right” *Political Science Quarterly* 111(2)(Summer 1996): 274-275.

¹⁸³ Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, “Secularists, Anti-Fundamentalists, and the New Religious Divide in the American Electorate” *From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Religious Mosaic*, edited by J. Matthew Wilson (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 251-276.

¹⁸⁴ Gregory A. Smith, “About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated” *Pew Research Center* December 14, 2021. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/12/14/about-three-in-ten-u-s-adults-are-now-religiously-unaffiliated/>. Retrieved 3/21/2024; Jason DeRose, “Religious ‘Nones’ Are Now the Largest Single Group in the United States,” NPR, January 24, 2024. <https://www.npr.org/2024/01/24/1226371734/religious-nones-are-now-the-largest-single-group-in-the-u-s>. Retrieved 3/20/2024.

the most reliable constituencies for the Democratic Party in the 21st century.¹⁸⁵ By contrast, those who identify with some form of institutional Christianity, but especially theologically conservative evangelical or Roman Catholic iterations, vote overwhelmingly Republican.¹⁸⁶

Given the continuing high levels of religiosity in the American South, especially in Alabama, it makes sense that these trends would affect partisan affiliations on the political front. Thus, a number of works have shown how the religious-secular divide has had a significant impact on the partisan splits within the voting public.¹⁸⁷ Religious adherence or non-adherence has become a fairly reliable marker for partisan identity as well, this research shows. As the GOP has become identified more exclusively with religious voters and Democrats with more secular, the decidedly religious South would likely feel more at home with the former party.

As this report turns to other social issues that have affected the Southern partisan landscape, religion will play a role in each of them. On abortion and LGBTQ rights, the divide between the parties is in part fueled by a divide between religious conservatives on the GOP side and either religious progressives or secularists anchoring the Democratic Party. We turn next to those issues and their importance to this discussion.

2) Abortion

Another issue to develop after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts was abortion. Alabama's legislature passed the first statutory ban on terminating pregnancies in 1841. The penalties attached to violating that law were enhanced in 1894. In 1951, however, the legislature reduced the penalties, though evidence points toward this reduction as trying to secure better enforcement through increased likelihood of convictions.¹⁸⁸

On January 22, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in *Roe v. Wade*.¹⁸⁹ By a 7-2 vote, the justices determined that the Constitution protected a right to privacy that included a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. This decision voided the laws restricting abortion across the South, including those in place in Alabama.

Though reaction at first was mixed between the parties, the Republicans moved toward affirming the Pro-Life cause with Democrats increasingly siding with the Pro-Choice movement. The 1976 GOP Party platform included an acknowledgment that persons in the party existed across the spectrum of wanting near-total allowance and near-total bans on abortion. But, with language

¹⁸⁵ Peter Smith, "Non-Religious Voters Wield Clout, Tilt Heavily Democratic" December 3, 2022. <https://apnews.com/article/abortion-pennsylvania-reproductive-rights-e5eb366a76995619a2c9bae2d0f414e6>. Retrieved 3/21/2024.

¹⁸⁶ For a breakdown of Gallup Polling on this issue in the 2020 election, see Frank Newport, "Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election" November 13, 2020. <https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/324410/religious-group-voting-2020-election.aspx>. Accessed 3/20/2024.

¹⁸⁷ David E. Campbell, Geoffrey C. Lehman, John C. Green, and Nathanael G. Sumaktoyo, "Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations" *American Journal of Political Science* 62(3)(July 2018): 551-565; William V. D'Antonio, Steven A. Tuch, and Josiah R. Baker, *Religion, Politics, and Polarization: How Religiopolitical Conflict is Changing Congress and American Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

¹⁸⁸ See also Brian Lyman and Evan Mealins, "A History of Abortion Law and Abortion Access in Alabama" *Montgomery Advertiser* June 24, 2022.

<https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/2022/06/24/abortion-law-access-alabama-roe-vs-wade-history/7702753001/>. Retrieved 3/14/2024.

¹⁸⁹ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

introduced by Kansas Senator Bob Dole, the platform said, “[t]he Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children.”¹⁹⁰ The Democratic Party platform of that year took a less decided stance. It merely said, “[w]e fully recognize the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion. We feel, however, that it is undesirable to attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court decision in this area.”¹⁹¹

In 1980, the GOP platform enhanced its Pro-Life stance. It reiterated support for a Constitutional amendment protecting unborn life, adding, “[w]e also support the Congressional efforts to restrict the use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion.”¹⁹² Democrats that year also moved toward the Pro-Choice position. Their platform restated that some opposed abortion for ethical and moral reasons. However, it added that “[w]e also recognize the belief of many Americans that a woman has a right to choose whether and when to have a child.” Beyond recognizing these competing views, it also declared that, “[t]he Democratic Party supports the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abortion rights as the law of the land and opposes any constitutional amendment to restrict or overturn that decision.”¹⁹³

Moving on to 1984, the differences between the parties became stark. The GOP declared, “[t]he unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed.” From that statement, the platform not only reiterated a call for a human life amendment but also “legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn children.” It restated the party's opposition to government funding for abortion and commended those private organizations that provided alternatives to abortion for pregnant women.¹⁹⁴ The Democrats' 1984 platform, by contrast, spoke of, “the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive freedom” that Reagan's reelection threatened. In 1988, the Democratic Party would add a provision declaring, “that the fundamental right of reproductive choice should be guaranteed regardless of ability to pay,” thus calling for government funding of abortion for those women living in poverty.

The scholarship reveals that voters paid attention to these hardenings in the parties on the issue of abortion. Louis Bolce, in a 1988 study, argued that a significant shift occurred in voter views of how each party approached abortion.¹⁹⁵ Greg Adams displayed how, by 1997, the Republican and Democratic parties had clarified their abortion stances, with the GOP becoming the clear home for Pro-Life advocates and the Democrats more welcoming to the Pro-Choice movement.¹⁹⁶ Second, he showed how a significant number of voters have switched their party identification in response to abortion.

¹⁹⁰ “The Republican Party Platform of 1976” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/repulican-party-platform-1976>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹¹ “The Democratic Party Platform of 1976” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1976-democratic-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/19/2024.

¹⁹² “The Republican Party Platform of 1980” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/repulican-party-platform-1980>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹³ “The Democratic Party Platform of 1980” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1980-democratic-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹⁴ “The Republican Party Platform of 1984” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/repulican-party-platform-1984>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹⁵ Louis Bolce, “Abortion and Presidential Elections: The Impact of Public Perceptions of Party and Candidate Positions” in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18(4)(Fall 1988): 815-829.

¹⁹⁶ Greg D. Adams, “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution” *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3)(July 1997): 718-737.

Third and finally, he displayed how vocal Pro-life and Pro-choice commitments among party elites has affected the way regular people view major party views on abortion. All of these points direct toward the public, including in the South, seeing the GOP as the Pro-life party.

Moreover, overturning *Roe v. Wade* and then its reaffirmation in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*¹⁹⁷ became rallying cries for conservatives and many within the GOP. In the 1990s, the Democratic Party's Pro-choice stance did include President Clinton's formulation that abortion should be, "safe, legal, and rare." However, since that time, Progressives and the Democratic Party more broadly have made the case for broader and less apologetic support for abortion rights and the women exercising that right.¹⁹⁸

These movements within the two parties clearly placed the GOP closer to, and the Democratic Party further from, the preferences of Southern voters. The South has opposed legalized abortion by higher margins than the country as a whole. Alabama in particular has taken a much more anti-abortion stance than the average American. In a 2014 Pew Research survey, Alabama had the lowest support for legalized abortion in the entire nation.¹⁹⁹ In 2018, Alabama voters passed an amendment to their state constitution by a 59-41% margin.²⁰⁰ The text read that, "[t]his state acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to recognize and support the sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life" and pledged the state's public policy-making to "the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." Then, in 2019, Alabama passed one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country.²⁰¹ It banned nearly all abortions except for fetuses with a "lethal anomaly" or where continued pregnancy would, "present serious health risk" to the woman.

In addition, we have data showing that a significant number of people vote on the basis of abortion. In the 2016 presidential election, for instance, the next president's capacity to nominate new justices to the Supreme Court proved deeply consequential to the election of Donald Trump. A CNN exit poll found that those who said Supreme Court appointments were "the most important factor" reported voting for Donald Trump by a 56%-41% margin.²⁰² This voter focus on the Supreme Court was concerned predominantly with the prospect of overturning *Roe v. Wade* and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*.

The motivations for a pro-life or a pro-choice position does not seem to be based in race. In an early study after the Court handed down *Roe*, Donald Granberg found attitudes about abortion most strongly correlated to religious belief, not economic class, geography, or race.²⁰³ One example pertinent to Alabama politics is the Southern Baptist Convention. In 2024, an estimated 1.25 million Alabama residents, or one in four, considered themselves Southern Baptist, whose adherents overwhelmingly

¹⁹⁷ 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

¹⁹⁸ See Katha Pollitt, *Pro: Reclaiming Abortion Rights* (New York: Picador, 2014); *Shout Your Abortion*, edited by Amelia Bonow and Emily Nokes (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2018); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich and Alesha E. Doan, *Abortion Regret: The New Attack on Reproductive Freedom* (Santa Barbara, Praeger, 2019).

¹⁹⁹ Pew Research Center, "Views About Abortion by State" 2014 U.S. Religious Landscape Study <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/compare/views-about-abortion/by/state/>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

²⁰⁰ Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. I, § 36.06.

²⁰¹ See "Human Life Protection Act" or HB 314.

²⁰² Jane Coaston, "Polling Data Shows Republicans Turned Out for Trump in 2016 because of the Supreme Court" June 29, 2018. <https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-kennedy-reire>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

²⁰³ Donald Granberg, "Pro-Life or Reflection of Conservative Ideology: An Analysis of Opposition to Legalized Abortion" *Sociology and Social Research* 62(April 1977/1978): 414-429.

oppose abortion.²⁰⁴ That denomination's stated positions on abortion did evolve. It gave its first official position in 1971, before the Supreme Court handed down *Roe v. Wade*. This statement and others in the 1970s gave some opening to permitting abortion for certain reasons. However, the Southern Baptist Convention settled on a decidedly pro-life stance by 1980, when it called for amending the Constitution to ban abortion except for when the life of the mother was at risk.²⁰⁵ Also opposing any government funding for abortion, the SBC has maintained a consistent and strident anti-abortion position to the present day.

Thus, it is reasonable to see that Alabama voters highly motivated by that issue would align with the political party closest to their views on abortion. That party clearly is the GOP, not the Democrats. Given the sensitive, emotional nature of the issue, it also is reasonable that the abortion positions of parties and their candidates would make a significant difference in voter decisions at the polls.

3) LGBTQ Rights

Another issue of importance for Southern partisan identification concerned LGBTQ rights. On the Supreme Court, gay rights began to receive consistent protection in *Romer v. Evans* (1996),²⁰⁶ which struck down a Colorado amendment prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for gay persons. This trend continued with *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003)²⁰⁷ that voided a Texas law banning homosexual sodomy. In *United States v. Windsor* (2013),²⁰⁸ the Court struck down portions of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that had defined marriage in traditional terms for federal law. These legal efforts culminated in the 2015 Supreme Court decision *Obergefell v. Hodges*²⁰⁹ which recognized a constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples.

Though neither party officially supported same-sex marriage until the 21st century, the Democratic Party always showed greater openness to and support for the legal and cultural claims of gay persons. As early as 1972, Madeline Davis argued for inclusion of gay rights in the Democratic Party Platform.²¹⁰ Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man elected to office in California, joined the Democratic Party in 1972 before being elected San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1977.²¹¹ One of the first openly gay members of Congress, Barney Frank from Massachusetts, was a prominent Democrat as well.

Beyond persons, official Democratic Party positions moved toward greater recognition about, and advocacy for, gay rights. The 1992 Democratic Party Platform committed to policies that would "provide civil rights protection for gay men and lesbians and an end to Defense Department

²⁰⁴ See Pew Research Center, "Views About Abortion Among Members of the Southern Baptist Convention" <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/religious-denomination/southern-baptist-convention/views-about-abortion/>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

²⁰⁵ See Southern Baptist Convention, "Resolution on Abortion" June 1, 1980. <https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/resolution-on-abortion-6/>. Retrieved 3/20/2024.

²⁰⁶ 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

²⁰⁷ 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

²⁰⁸ 570 U.S. 744 (2013).

²⁰⁹ 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

²¹⁰ Madeline Davis, "Address to the Democratic National Convention," *Speaking for Our Lives: Historic Speeches and Rhetoric for Gay and Lesbian Rights, 1892-2000*, edited by Robert B. Ridinger (New York: Harrington Park Press, 2004), 179-180.

²¹¹ Lillian Faderman, *Harvey Milk: His Lives and Death* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 142-149. Due to his open homosexuality, Milk was murdered after less than a year after taking office on November 27, 1978.

discrimination”²¹² in response to the ban on such persons from serving in the military. Yet this movement was far from smooth. In 1996, Congress passed, and Democratic President Bill Clinton signed, the previously mentioned “Defense of Marriage Act.”²¹³ Again, the law defined marriage for federal government purposes in exclusively heterosexual terms. It also declared that states would not have to recognize marriage between same-sex couples that took place in other states. In Congress, Democratic officeholders voted 118-65 for the bill in the House and 32-14 for it in the Senate. These votes came in addition to nearly unanimous support from the GOP. Yet even here, differences between the parties still existed. Not only did a number of Democrats vote against DOMA, unlike with the GOP; the party platforms for 1996 took very different approaches, with the Republican platform giving full-throated support to the law and the Democratic platform avoiding the issue entirely.

While support for gay rights generally continued to grow within the Democratic Party, it took until 2012 for the Party’s platform to explicitly endorse same-sex marriage.²¹⁴ President Obama, then running for re-election, had stood against legalizing such relationships in his 2008 campaign. But he had announced a change of opinion in the lead-up to the 2012 election,²¹⁵ becoming the first presidential candidate of a major political party to take that stance.

The Republican Party, by contrast, vigorously supported traditional marriage as the exclusive definition of the institution, at least it did through the handing down of *Obergefell*. Some Republicans voiced opposition to this position, including Vice-President Dick Cheney and Ohio Senator Rob Portman.²¹⁶ However, these were decidedly minority views within the party.

For example, in a well-publicized speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention, Pat Buchanan criticized the Democratic ticket of Bill Clinton and Al Gore as “the most pro-lesbian and pro-gay ticket in history.” He also decried, “the amoral idea that gay and lesbian couples should have the same standing in law as married men and women.” He was one of six speakers to advocate for traditional marriage and family structures at the Convention.²¹⁷ In the 2000 presidential election, when Al Gore supported “civil unions” for same-sex couples, George W. Bush strongly opposed them.²¹⁸ The public took notice of these party positions. In a 2003 article, Paul Brewer noted that, “[i]n American politics, support for gay rights has typically been associated with liberalism and the Democratic party, whereas opposition to gay rights has typically been associated with conservatism and the GOP.”²¹⁹

These perceptions were only reinforced by subsequent events. The GOP’s 2004 party platform attacked, “hard-left” judges who, “threaten America’s dearest institutions and our very way of life. In

²¹² “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1992-democratic-party-platform>, Retrieved 3/16/2024.

²¹³ 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).

²¹⁴ “We support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal treatment under law for same-sex couples.” See “2012 Democratic Party Platform,” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2012-democratic-party-platform>, Retrieved 3/19/2024.

²¹⁵ Kerry Eleveld, *Don’t Tell Me To Wait: How the Fight for Gay Rights Changed America and Transformed Obama’s Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), xvi.

²¹⁶ Andrew Reynolds, *The Children of Harvey Milk: How LGBTQ Politicians Changed the World* (New York: Oxford University Press 2019), 239.

²¹⁷ Sean Cahill, “The Anti-Gay Marriage Movement” *The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage*, edited by Craig A. Rimmerman and Clyde Wilcox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 169.

²¹⁸ John Kenneth White, *Barack Obama’s America: How New Conceptions of Race, Family, and Religion Ended the Reagan Era* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 130.

²¹⁹ Paul R. Brewer, “The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion on Gay Rights” *Journal of Politics* 65(4)(November 2003): 1210.

some states, activist judges are redefining the institution of marriage.”²²⁰ The same platform also said that President Bush would defend DOMA. In the same section, it said President Bush supported a Constitutional Amendment that “fully protects marriage” and that, “[w]e further believe that legal recognition and the accompanying benefits afforded couples should be preserved for that unique and special union of one man and one woman which has historically been called marriage.”²²¹

Like with abortion, the party development on this issue opened up a significant gap between the majority of Southern voters and the Democratic Party while the GOP better aligned with those voters. In a 2007 survey of Alabama voters, 60% of respondents agreed with the statement that homosexuality “should be discouraged.” In the 2014 survey, that number dipped a little. However, 52% of respondents still agreed with that statement” In the same report, 57% of Alabama respondents opposed the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Alabama was the state with the least support for legal recognition of same-sex marriage in the entire country according to the Pew study.

These opinion surveys played out in voting patterns. In 2006, Alabama voters approved Amendment 774, also known as the “Sanctity of Marriage Amendment.” Among its provisions, this amendment said, “[m]arriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman” and therefore, “[a] marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.” In addition, the amendment specified that, “The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued.”²²²

The voters passed this new addition to the state constitution by an overwhelming margin, 81%-19%. This move by Alabama voters participated in a much broader trend. Between 2004 and 2012, thirty states passed referenda defining marriage exclusively in traditional terms. Thirteen did so in 2004 alone.²²³

Again, these trends give a non-racial reason for the voting preferences of a majority of Alabama voters in the 21st century. The conservative argument for more traditional values on matters of sexuality has proven more in-line with voter preferences in the state and the region, even as LGBTQ rights have received increased legislative and judicial protection nationally. As with abortion, those voters placing a high importance on these issues in the state and region would tend to see Republicans as their more natural ally.

Conclusion

In this report, I have sought to provide a fuller context for how Alabamians in 2024 come to identify with and vote for one of the two major political parties. This context came from a broader discussion of political parties in America and a more focused inquiry into party history in the South, of

²²⁰ “2004 Republican Party Platform” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2004-republican-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/16/2024.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Alabama Constitution of 1901, Amendment 774, <https://constitution.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/alabama.pdf>. Retrieved 3/19/2024.

²²³ Haeyoun Park, “Gay Marriage State by State: From a Few States to a Whole Nation” *New York Times*, March 31, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/gay-marriage-state-by-state.html>. Retrieved 3/16/2024; Thomas M. Keck, “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights” *Law and Society Review* 43(1)(March 2009): 153-154. See also Cary Franklin, “Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights” *Virginia Law Review* 100(5)(September 2014): 845.

which Alabama comprises an important a consistent example of the Deep South. We know that the once solid Democratic South turned from the Democratic Party, now voting reliably Republican at the national and state levels. With the anomaly of 1964 in the Deep South, it did so slowly and incrementally, starting at the presidential level, in the Peripheral South, and through urban and then suburban areas. Democrats remained the clear majority party on nearly all non-presidential offices for decades after the Civil Rights movement triumphed in the region. Only in the mid-1990s did the South really start to turn to a majority Republican region at the Congressional and state government levels, a trend that continued slowly into the 21st century, with Alabama's legislature only turning fully to the GOP in 2010.

Southern voters, including in Alabama, slow-motion forsook the Democrats and gradually embraced the GOP for a variety of reasons. The rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party caused it to diverge sharply from Southern voters' beliefs on a number of issues. At the same time, developments in the GOP, based in the growth of Modern Conservatism, eventually led many in the South to see Republicans as embodying their views better. These issues included economics and the role of government, communism, abortion, and LGBTQ rights. We could add more to the list, including gun control and environmental policy, where the GOP has come to align decidedly with the preferences of a majority of Southern voters. However, the above gives a good amount of evidence to make the same point: race alone does not account for the partisan realignment of the last 60 plus years.

The explanatory dominance of race could come even more into question in the current election cycle. While very preliminary, polling for the 2024 election has consistently shown significant shifts within minority voters toward the GOP.²²⁴ In fact, Democrats in minority communities have expressed alarm on this point.²²⁵ We should not read too much into these polling numbers and political reactions to them yet. However, they give additional evidence that the political alignments at work today are driven by factors other than race such as economics, foreign policy, and moral issues and that social and economic class also plays a significant role in persuasion toward partisan identities.

In conclusion, I should make clear that these observations do not give a moral approval or disapproval of the views held and actions taken on the above matters. I neither defend nor critique Alabama voters on their views about economics, government, communism, religion, abortion, and gay rights. Instead, what the above clearly show are issues distinct from race that significantly influenced Alabama party affiliation and voting patterns. Nor do I deny that race plays any factor whatsoever in the minds of any voters in Alabama in 2024. As noted in the introduction, these other elements do not eliminate race entirely as a factor in how voters, including white voters, cast their ballots. Still, the above history and scholarship gives solid evidence that other factors beyond race have had an important, consequential effect on partisan realignment in the South, including the state of Alabama. That fuller narrative matters for considering the role of race in redistricting. I believe this evidence should be taken

²²⁴ Jeffrey M. Jones and Lydia Saad, "Democrats Lose Ground With Black and Hispanic Adults" *Gallup* February 7, 2024, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/609776/democrats-lose-ground-black-hispanic-adults.aspx>. Retrieved 6/5/2024; Philip Bump and Lenny Bröner, "Another Lens into the Rightward Shift of Black and Hispanic Americans" *Washington Post* March 11, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/03/11/black-hispanic-republican-votes-polling/>. Retrieved 6/4/2024; Russell Contreras, "Democrats' big vulnerability: Why they're losing Black, Hispanic voters" *Axios* March 13, 2024, <https://www.axios.com/2024/03/13/why-democrats-black-hispanic-vote-republican>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

²²⁵ Maya King, "Behind the Republican Effort to Win Over Black Men" *New York Times*, June 10, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/10/us/politics/2024-election-gop-black-men-voters.html>. Retrieved June 10, 2024.

into account by any judicial body considering redistricting plans, including the current one under consideration by this court.

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Books

Liberty in Full: Justice Stephen Field's Cooperative Constitution of Liberty (Lexington Books 2017, Paperback 2019).

Academic Articles/Book Chapters

- "Power Struggle: Locke and Montesquieu on Separation of Powers" in collected volume honoring Dr. David Nichols (under contract with Lexington Books).
- "Ship as State: the Political Philosophy of *Master and Commander*" in *The Politics of Contemporary Hollywood Films* (forthcoming from Lexington Books).
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“Power Struggle: Locke and Montesquieu on Separation of Powers” conference honoring legacy of Dr. David Nichols 10/14-15/2022.

“Songs in the King’s Key: The Political Thought of the Psalms” given at the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs 10/22/2021.

“Supreme Court Preview: Cases to Keep an Eye on in the Upcoming Term” Webinar for the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs 9/29/2021.

“The First Amendment and Pornography: Drawing a Line in the Sand.” Talk given at 2019 Love & Fidelity Conference, 11/10/2019.

“Still Imperial? The Presidency and the Constitution” (discussant) APSA 2019, Washington, D.C. (8/31/2019).

“‘Full of Fears and Full of Hopes’: Conversations with Tocqueville on the Problems of Democracy in America” at Baylor University (panelist) (6/30-7/1/2019).

James Wilson Institute XVI at the Kirby Center (panelist) (5/3-5/5/2019).

5th Annual Salmon Chase Lecture & Colloquium at Georgetown Law (panelist) (11/30-12/1/2018).

APSA in Boston (chaired panel) (8/30-9/2/2018).

“In Substance, Not Name: Antebellum Court Seeds of the Administrative State.” Talk at Baylor University, 3/16/18.

“The Statesmanship of Job: Joseph Caryl on Job as the Model Magistrate.” Panel at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, 1/6/18.

Roundtable: The Electoral College: Time to Re-Evaluate? Panel at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 9/3/2017.

Roundtable: Checks on Executive Power Under Obama And Trump. Panel at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 9/2/2017.

“Presidential Opinions, Congressional Recommendations: The Ambivalent Constitutional Status of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton.” Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 9/4/2015.

“Free and Happy Bonds: The Nineteenth Century Courts on Marriage and the Pursuit of Happiness,” at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Boston, MA, November 2014,

“Author Meets Critics: Nicholas Buccola’s *The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass: In Pursuit of American Liberty*,” at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2013 (Discussant).

“Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court: Court-Curbing from a Regime Politics Perspective,” paper with Curt Nichols and David Bridge, accepted at the (cancelled) *American Political Science Association* meeting, New Orleans, LA, September 2012.

“Western Natural Law Tradition” Alexander Hamilton Institute, Clinton, New York, June, 2012 (Discussant).

“Enforced Satisfaction: Justice Field on Government’s Role in the Pursuit of Happiness” paper presented at the annual meeting of the *Northeastern Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, PA, November, 2011.

“Presidential Success and Failure,” panel at the annual meeting of the *Northeastern Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, PA, November, 2011 (Chair, Discussant).

“The ‘City on a Hill’ Unglued?: John Winthrop and the Problem of Faction” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, Houston, TX, 2010.

Other Professional Experience

Provided expert report and gave deposition for the State of Alabama in *Stone v. Allen* (2024).

Awards and Honors

William and Patricia LaMothe Chair in the U.S. Constitution, Hillsdale College

Professor of the Month (April 2019), Kappa Kappa Gamma

Hillsdale College Professor of the Year (2018), Hillsdale College

Teacher of the Month (February 2016), Student Federation, Hillsdale College.

Richard D. Huff Outstanding Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, Baylor University, 2014.

Stormie Schott Award (Graduate Outstanding Church/Community Service), Baylor University, Department of Political Science, 2012.

Presidential Scholar, Baylor University, Graduate School, 2009-Present.

James Madison Award (Outstanding Ashbrook Scholar), Ashland University, 2007.

Charles M. Parton Award (Outstanding Thesis), Ashland University, 2007.

Teaching Experience

Assistant Professor, Hillsdale College, 2014-Present

POL 101: *U.S. Constitution*

POL 301: *American Government*

POL 303: *The American Presidency*

POL 305: *Civil Rights*

POL 306: *Political Parties and Elections*

POL 407: *The Federalist*

POL 412/504: *Politics and Literature*

POI. 416: *Montesquieu*

POL 597: *Richard Nixon* (Independent Study)

POL 597: *Political Theory Survey* (Independent Study)

POL 597: *Statesmanship of Lincoln* (Independent Study)

POI. 742: *The American Presidency*

POL 743: *Constitutional Law I: Constitutional Powers*
POL 744: *Constitutional Law II: Constitutional Rights*
POL 832: *Teaching Apprenticeship*
Collegiate Scholars 259: *Tocqueville's The Ancien Regime*
Collegiate Scholars 259: *Hamilton: The Man; the Musical*
Collegiate Scholars 259: *Politics in the Bible*
Collegiate Scholars 259: *Fate and the Individual in European Literature* (w/Dr. Eric Hutchinson)
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Teacher of Record, Baylor University, Waco, TX, 2012-2013
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George Wallace – From the Heart

By Colman McCarthy

Friday, March 17, 1995; Page A27

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In the annals of religious and political conversions, few shiftings were as unlikely as George Wallace's. In Montgomery, Ala., last week, the once irrepressible governor – now 75, infirm, pain-racked and in a wheelchair since his 1972 shooting – held hands with black southerners and sang "We Shall Overcome."

What Wallace overcame is his past hatred that made him both the symbol and enforcer of anti-black racism in the 1960s. On March 10, Wallace went to St. Jude's church to be with some 200 others marking the 30th anniversary of the Selma-to-Montgomery civil rights march.

It was a reaching-out moment of reconciliation, of Wallace's asking for – and receiving – forgiveness. In a statement read for him – he was too ill to speak – Wallace told those in the crowd who had marched 30 years ago: "Much has transpired since those days. A great deal has been lost and a great deal gained, and here we are. My message to you today is, welcome to Montgomery. May your message be heard. May your lessons never be forgotten."

In gracious and spiritual words, Joseph Lowery, a leader in the original march and now the president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, thanked the former separatist "for coming out of your sickness to meet us. You are a different George Wallace today. We both serve a God who can make the desert bloom. We ask God's blessing on you."

This scene at St. Jude's – he is the patron saint of hopeless causes – invites an obvious and skeptical question: Was Wallace, the one-time spewer of venom, sincere? Or was it nothing more than a ploy at going out on positive publicity rather than being embedded in history as the racist blocking a schoolhouse door?

The evidence suggests genuineness. In 1978 at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery – where Martin Luther King Jr. pastored in the 1950s – Wallace made an unpublicized and unannounced Sunday morning visit to the congregation. As recounted by Stephen Leshar in his 1994 book, "George Wallace: American Populist," the former governor was pushed up the aisle and spoke: "I have learned what suffering means. In a way that was impossible {before the shooting}, I think I can understand something of the pain black people have come to endure. I know I contributed to that pain, and I can only ask your forgiveness."

In 1982 Wallace expressed the same sentiment before the SCLC. He has apologized during a television interview. In 1987 he reconciled and prayed with Jesse Jackson.

In Wallace's last term as governor in the late 1980s, he hired a black press secretary, appointed more than 160 blacks to state governing boards and worked to double the number of black voter registrars in Alabama's 67 counties. In part, it was the politics of patronage – in his last race for governor he won with 60 percent of the vote and well over 90 percent of the black vote – but on a deeper level it was using his waning political power to bond with those he once scorned. Tuskegee Institute responded with an honorary degree.

Leshar saw Wallace's change as revealing "a humanity too often lacking in his actions: alone and crippled, forced to introspection for the first time in his life, he realized that though he had purported to be the champion of the poor and the helpless, he had trampled on the poorest and most helpless of all his constituents – the blacks."


By word and act, Wallace comes close to being a living example of one of Martin Luther King's most enduring sermons, delivered on Christmas 1957 at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. It was on forgiveness as both a theological virtue and a practical way of life.

"Forgiveness," King said, "does not mean ignoring what has been done or putting a false label on an evil act. It means, rather, that the evil act no longer remains as a barrier to the relationship. ... While abhorring segregation, we shall love the segregationist. This is the only way to create the beloved community."

George Wallace is as much a part of that community as any other repentant who seeks and receives forgiveness. Wallace didn't create segregation. For much of his early political life, anti-black racism was constitutional, as it has been for most of America's life.

How many more Wallaces still need to come forward and show the courage of asking forgiveness? Whatever the number, no shortage exists of large-hearted blacks like Joe Lowery willing to ask God's blessings for them.

excerpt, Lee Atwater 1981 Interview with Alexander P. Lamis



What happened is that the South went from being behind the times to being the mainstream. In other words, what you had was two things happening that totally washed away the Southern strategy, the Harry Dent-type southern strategy. That is, that whole strategy was based—although it was more sophisticated than a Bilbo or a George Wallace—it was nevertheless based on coded racism. The whole thing: bussing; we want a supreme court judge that won't have bussing. Anything you look at could be traced back to *the* issue in the old Southern strategy. Now it was not done in a blatantly discriminatory way.

But the Reagans did not have to do a Southern strategy for two reasons. Number one, race was not a dominant issue. And number two, the mainstream issues in this campaign had been “Southern issues” since way back in the '60s. So Reagan goes out and campaigns on the economics and on national defense, the whole campaign was devoid of any kind of racism, any kind of reference.

And I'll tell you another thing y'all need to think about that's even surprised me is the lack of interest, really, a lack of knowledge right now in the South among white voters on this Voting Rights Act. I brought all these Republican State chairmen up here to just kind of soothe them down and say, “Look, before we have this meeting, look we may not do exactly what y'all like.” And what I found out about it is all of them were very passive and they said “we'll pretty well go along with whatever you want.” And I looked at polls in the last four to five months, and there's just no interest or no intensity on that thing among white voters.



A New History of the American South

Edited by W. Fitzhugh Brundage

Laura F. Edwards & Jon F. Sensbach, ASSOCIATE EDITORS

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A FERRIS AND FERRIS BOOK

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The South and the State in the Twentieth Century

Campaigning for a seat in the Alabama state legislature in August 1902, John Bankhead Jr. of Walker County enthusiastically defended the state's new constitution approved by voters a year earlier. White Democrats had conducted massive voter fraud in the majority Black counties and thus had ensured the constitution's ratification, but the new document made future fraud unnecessary. As Bankhead giddily declared, the near-elimination of African American voters, as well as a significant decline in the number of poor whites through the implementation of numerous obstacles—a poll tax, a property requirement, a literacy test, and so on—had indeed created “a new order of things.”¹

White southerners had spent the 1870s and 1880s manipulating and suppressing Black votes, and they spent the 1890s and 1900s eliminating them altogether. By rewriting their constitutions, white southerners appeared to have achieved a permanent solution to the problem of African American political participation. Certainly the numbers of registered Black voters confirmed the establishment of white Democracy. In Louisiana, for example, in 1897, before disfranchisement, over 130,000 African Americans turned out to vote. By 1910, this number was a mere 730. Alabama boasted 181,000 Black voters in 1900; by 1902, that number was about 3,000. Accompanying the decimation of the Black electorate was the elimination of any existing, viable political competition. At the same time that southern states were rewriting their constitutions, state Democratic organizations rewrote their rules to bar African American voters from their primaries. John Bankhead Jr.'s “new order” was buttressed by a one-party political system in which white Democrats reigned supreme.² At the state level, a one-party system meant a relatively issueless politics, often driven by individual personalities, in which the needs of the poor—both Black and white—were safely ignored. Despite sustained and often heroic efforts by Black southerners, the protections and benefits delivered by state governments accrued almost exclusively to white southerners for much of the twentieth century.



FIGURE 12.3. Events in the 1970s and beyond would prove this postcard to be prophetic: all of the United States was potentially "Wallace Country." Courtesy of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

The prospects for any Democratic Party presidential candidates in the South continued to sink. In 1972, Nixon was determined to contain Wallace. Specifically, he wanted to make him the Democrats' problem. A third-party effort by Wallace would once again draw conservative whites who might otherwise vote Republican. Nixon hoped to effect a party realignment, with Republicans capturing the votes of white southerners, which would create what he and his supporters hoped would be an enduring Republican majority nationally. To accomplish this, he had to undercut Wallace on social and cultural issues. To Nixon's great relief, in 1972 Wallace ran as a Democrat, throwing fear into the hearts of Democratic Party stalwarts. Wallace won the Democratic primaries in Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, Michigan, and Maryland, and came in second in primaries in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. He was well on his way to trouncing his closest competitors—Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern. Then would-be assassin Arthur Bremer, a mentally ill young man from Milwaukee, shot Wallace four times at a campaign stop in Laurel, Maryland. One of the bullets lodged in Wallace's spine, leaving him forever paralyzed from the waist down. Wallace somehow survived the attack, but his presidential ambitions (although not his political career) were over. The eventual Democratic nominee, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, garnered only 29 percent of the popular vote in the South. The national Democratic Party had hit an all-time

low. After 1968, the national Democratic Party underwent a transformation, becoming more liberal, with stronger representation among previously underrepresented groups. The party staked out progressive positions on women's rights, particularly support for the Equal Rights Amendment and the support for a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, that were at odds with many culturally conservative white voters in the South.

The country's involvement in the Vietnam War had caused serious rifts in the national Democratic Party but had left southern politicians relatively unscathed. The increasingly confrontational and violent protests against the country's military involvement in Southeast Asia provided fertile ground for southern politicians such as Wallace to attack his fellow Democrats. The South itself was more supportive of the war generally and for longer than the rest of the nation. The southern economy benefited from the war, making residents of that region more likely to support its expansion. Political leaders from the region played key roles in the Vietnam drama, including President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Senators Richard Russell and John Stennis, and Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, as well as military leaders such as General William Westmoreland and Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore. Southern men served in Vietnam in numbers that far surpassed the region's share of the population. White southern college students remained more consistently pro-war than their peers elsewhere in the nation. Many even supported the U.S. invasion of Cambodia—an action that sparked massive protests on campuses elsewhere—and rated President Richard Nixon's handling of the war as "excellent" or "pretty good." A minority of white college students in the South protested the war, and the tactics used by these minority dissenters tended to be less violent and less radical than tactics used by college students elsewhere.

Black southerners' relationship to the Vietnam War was different from that of their white counterparts. For African American college students in the region, antiwar activities took a backseat to agitation for domestic racial issues. African American students remained "acutely aware of the deadly force directed at the protestors" on Black college campuses. Protesting the war was much riskier for Black college students than for white. As for military service, the motives of Black soldiers from southern states differed from those of white soldiers. The prevalence of poverty, the racism of draft boards, and African Americans' inability to join Army Reserve and National Guard units meant that southern Blacks faced fewer options and consequently served in numbers greater than their share of the population. They also were more likely than white soldiers to be drafted, to serve in combat, and to be wounded or killed.⁴¹

With their prospects in presidential contests at an all-time low, Democrats confronted challenges at the state level. If Democrats were going to remain competitive in gubernatorial and congressional races, they had to build viable biracial coalitions. The 1970s witnessed the rise of what came to be known as New South governors, moderate Democrats who won the support of the majority of Black voters and enough suburban white voters to overcome white majorities that backed Republican candidates. To accomplish this, Democratic candidates had to mix relatively conservative positions on social and economic issues to appeal to whites with moderate positions on race to satisfy Black constituents. Their positions diverged from those of the national Democratic Party, which was moving further to the Left in the early 1970s. Included in this group were Reubin Askew of Florida, Jimmy Carter of Georgia, Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, James Hunt of North Carolina, and William Winter of Mississippi. Among Deep South states, only Alabama failed to elect a New South moderate. These Democratic governors focused on providing efficient and honest government, and continued the goal of modernizing the South through the attraction of outside investment and the capture of federal dollars. They understood as well as anyone that investment dollars would not come to a region roiled by racial strife. They prided themselves on promoting racial harmony and on acquiring funding for public infrastructure, health, and education. They eschewed generous spending on welfare or other programs designed to help the impoverished. Despite the U.S Supreme Court's explosive 1971 decision that school districts could use busing to achieve racial balance, most New South leaders studiously avoided the issue.

Much of the federal spending that occurred in the South was related to the military. Because the South had a strong presence in the Pentagon and southern leaders enjoyed congressional seniority, southern states received more than their fair share of military installations and military contracts. Facilities for the space program and for military and nuclear weapons programs abounded in the South. Such spending became a huge part of the region's growth. Between 1959 and 1980, the South led all regions in economic growth. But defense spending did little to aid the poor, particularly the Black poor. Jobs in many of these new industries were at the skilled or professional level, and most went to recent transplants from elsewhere in the country. As one historian has put it, the growth strategy of southern leaders privileged place over people.⁴²

Perhaps the most consequential of these New South governors was Jimmy Carter of Georgia, elected in 1970. Declaring at his inauguration that "the time for racial discrimination is over. ... No poor, rural, weak, or black person should ever have to bear the additional burden of being

deprived of the opportunity of an education, a job, or simple justice,” Carter focused on making state government more efficient and government services more effective. Carter’s 1976 nomination as the Democratic Party’s candidate for president was nothing short of phenomenal. A proud Southern Baptist and lifelong resident of the rural Deep South, Carter’s outsider status and image as a man of integrity made him an appealing choice for many voters disgusted by the corruption of Republican Richard Nixon and the Watergate scandal. Nixon’s resignation had rebounded in Democrats’ favor in Congress and in southern statehouses in 1974, where Democrats reclaimed a number of seats. But in 1976, although Carter won every southern state except Virginia, he only garnered 46 percent of the white vote despite his conservative religious credentials and southern roots. His victory was largely the work of African American voters who went to the polls in even greater numbers than they had in 1968.



FIGURE 12.4. Black southerners made the greatest gains in public officeholding at the municipal and county levels in the 1970s. Among these new city leaders was Richard Arrington Jr. (*standing*), elected mayor of Birmingham in 1979. Courtesy of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

The increase in the number of Black voters between 1970 and 1980, from 3.4 million to 4.3 million, also had an impact on Black officeholding. In the South in 1965, only 72 Black citizens

held public office; Mississippi had no Black public officials. By 1980, there were roughly 2,500 Black officeholders. The bulk of these positions were at the municipal and county levels. Blacks won mayoral contests, mostly in small and mid-sized towns such as Tuskegee but also in large cities such as Atlanta and Birmingham. Victories for Black politicians brought heightened expectations from Black constituents. Although Black voters finally had the ear of the officials who ran their communities, the tax bases in urban areas were seldom sufficient to deal with the myriad problems. Despite these gains at the polls, as of 1982 Blacks constituted a paltry 7 percent of state legislators.

As Democrats worked to create biracial coalitions to remain viable in the South, their power in Congress—especially their ability to kill what they considered threatening legislation—was diluted. Since the 1930s, the ability of southern representatives and senators to gain seniority, occupy important committee chairmanships, and operate as a bloc had been critical to protecting white supremacy. Since the late 1940s, liberals in the Democratic Party had been working to handicap conservative members of their party (mainly those from the South), who were increasingly out of step with the party's agenda. By the late 1950s, liberal Democrats were irate that the party's conservative members voted with Republicans roughly 80 percent of the time. Change followed the Supreme Court's decision in the 1962 case *Baker v. Carr*, which mandated redistricting. The result was a decline in the number of congressional districts with overrepresented rural population majorities and an increase in representatives who were less conservative and less wedded to the old ways. The impact in states such as Florida was profound, flip-flopping the preponderance of political power from the mostly white and rural panhandle to the racially and ethnically diverse urban regions and wealthy suburbs from Orlando south. The reapportionment took into consideration the enfranchisement of millions of Black voters; conservative rural white bastions as the sole means of electoral support were a thing of the past.

A reform movement within Congress simultaneously increased the power of members from underrepresented suburban districts and others who rejected the old hierarchical structure of Congress, which had granted enormous power to committee chairmen. The 1970s Legislative Reorganization Act required committee hearings to be public; many were broadcast on radio and television. Congressional reformers also succeeded in requiring the vote of the caucus for committee chairs; agreed that the Speaker, majority leader, and whip should serve on the powerful Ways and Means Committee; and succeeded in stripping the Ways and Means chair of the power to appoint committee members. New members to the House had sufficient power

to demand that all committee chairs be interviewed to determine whether they deserved reappointment. Three committee chairmen, all from the South, made bad impressions, and the caucus voted to remove them. The ironclad system of seniority in the House had been shattered. The Senate, likewise, underwent reform. Committee chairs were chosen by secret ballot. Most committee hearings were open to the public. The biggest reform, though, addressed the filibuster. For decades, southern Democrats had used this tool to paralyze the Senate and kill civil rights legislation. In 1975, the Senate voted to reduce the number of votes for cloture (which ends a filibuster) from two-thirds of the Senate (sixty-seven votes) to three-fifths (sixty votes). Southern politicians' ability to hold the Senate in a stranglehold had finally been broken.

At the state level, the Republican Party was practically nonexistent in the 1970s and 1980s. Republican success remained a top-down affair. Republican candidates struggled to dislodge Democratic incumbents who delivered federal projects—many related to defense work—for their districts. Beyond Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond, the Republicans could claim no southern congressman or senator of any stature some ten years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act. In the 1960s and 1970s, Republicans had little success electing candidates to Congress. Democratic candidates during these two decades won 97 percent of all congressional races.

Republican prospects in the region began to change with the development of two phenomena. The first was the rise of the Christian Right and its political mobilization of conservative Christian voters. The so-called Rights Revolution, which drew inspiration and power from the civil rights revolution, prompted a political backlash. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court handed down decisions that banned organized school prayer, protected the rights of accused persons, and, most important in this context, protected a woman's right to seek an abortion. In 1972, Congress approved the Equal Rights Amendment and sent it out to the states for ratification. For conservative evangelical Christians in both the North and the South, the nation was in cultural crisis. The survival of the family and traditional gender roles was at stake. Organizing nationally under the auspices of groups such as the Moral Majority, founded in 1979, and the Christian Coalition, founded in 1989, but operating locally through thousands of evangelical churches, Christian conservatives flexed their political muscles. They were almost universally wedded to the Republican Party. According to one historian of southern religion, evangelical churches essentially served as precinct headquarters for the Republican Party. This grassroots political realignment unfolded with stunning speed. In 1980, only 29

percent of Southern Baptist ministers identified as Republicans; within five years—by 1985—that number had grown to 66 percent.

The support of politically energized evangelicals was critical to the election of Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan in 1980. A former actor, corporate spokesman, and most recently governor of California, Reagan was a conservative icon. During the campaign, he appeared sympathetic to evangelicals' desires for a school prayer amendment and other conservative cultural ambitions but spent little political capital making them a reality once in office. Significantly for Republican prospects in the South, issues of culture and religion—framed broadly as “family values”—cut across class lines, giving the Republicans access to the allegiance of the region's working-class whites who had previously supported George Wallace. Also propelling Reagan to the White House was a backlash against the welfare state, which had expanded under Lyndon Johnson's Great Society agenda. To Reagan, government was the enemy; free enterprise was the people's friend. The downturn in the economy in the 1970s focused white conservatives' attention on government programs that, in their estimation, primarily benefited the Black poor. Beginning with the resounding defeat of Carter and the election of Reagan, and accelerating thereafter, Republicans began to pick up southern seats in Congress and state legislatures on platforms promoting cultural conservatism, low taxes, a strong military, and limited government. Before Reagan's election, 40 percent of southern white conservatives identified with the Republican Party; by the end of Reagan's presidency, 60 percent proudly did so.



FIGURE 12.5. Senator Strom Thurmond's switch to the Republican Party and the popularity of President Ronald Reagan among white southern conservatives set off a two-decade-long transition of white Democrats to the Republican Party. Congressman Floyd D. Spence (*left*) began his political career as a Democrat; in 1970 he won a congressional seat as a Republican. Courtesy of Floyd D. Spence Papers, South Carolina Political Collections, University of South Carolina.

Other issues cemented the Republican Party's strength in the South. Demographic change and the continued growth of the military-industrial complex worked in the party's favor. Cuban exiles from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 developed strong ties to the Republican Party in Florida because of its strong stance against communism and its support of conservative cultural causes. By 1980, the South was the recipient of 40 percent of the defense budget. Industries such as aircraft building and chemicals moved south, drawn by generous tax breaks and attracted by the antiunion climate. Still, success at winning congressional seats was slow. Between 1980 and 1992, the number of Senate seats and governorships the Republicans controlled remained about the same. At the state level, in 1988, only 23 percent of state legislators were Republican.

The consolidation of Republican power in the South occurred during the presidency of Democrat Bill Clinton, a white southerner. He won only 43 percent of the popular vote; the third-party candidacy of Texas businessman Ross Perot cut into the Republican vote for Pres-

ident George H. W. Bush. Already a minority president, Clinton's first two years were marred by political missteps. Republican whip Newt Gingrich of Georgia sensed an opportunity to flip seats during the 1994 midterm elections. Gingrich staged a national campaign for Republican House candidates, who pledged themselves to uphold the "Contract with America," a list of conservative agenda items that included lower taxes, decreased welfare spending, and legislation dedicated to promoting "family values." The Democrats were steamrolled, losing fifty-five seats and control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. Republicans also picked up seats in the Senate. The Republican Party's increased presence in the South was obvious: they added sixteen new seats in the House to the nine they had won in 1992. The Republican Party now held a slim majority—51 percent—of the South's representation in the House of Representatives. The Republicans controlled the South's delegations in the House and the Senate and captured a majority of the statehouses.

Republican prospects were made considerably brighter by reapportionment of congressional districts following the 1990 census. Population growth had given the South nine new congressional seats. With no Democratic incumbents to challenge, Republican chances improved considerably. In redrawing congressional district lines, every southern state except Arkansas created a Black-majority district. Although these new Black-majority districts essentially ensured an increase in Black representatives, the remaining districts left African Americans in the minority, making them easier for Republicans to win. With the tremendous victories of 1994, Republican candidates seemed like a better bet to opportunistic donors. Funds flowed into campaign coffers. Republicans cemented their presence as the decade wore on. During the 2000 election, Republicans won 71 of the South's 125 House seats, 19 of 33 Senate seats, and 43 percent of seats in state legislatures.

The Republican Party was firmly entrenched in the South by the year 2000, little more than three decades since the landmark civil rights bills of the mid-1960s. It was clearly identified as the conservative party. Republicans in the region could point to some pockets of ethnic diversity, including Cuban Americans in Florida and Mexican Americans in Texas; otherwise the party was overwhelmingly white. Republican voters were attracted to the party's "family values" and low-tax orientation, as well as its probusiness agenda. Increased spending on social programs—which many white voters associated with poor Blacks—was anathema to Republican voters in the South. The Black poor were routinely demonized and scapegoated, and programs such as affirmative action and welfare were frequent targets of Republican wrath.

Racial exclusivity was key to the Republican Party's success, and the Republicans were the primary recipients of the "politics of rage" previously stoked by George Wallace.

Republican election gains were bolstered by conservative judicial decisions that further undermined the ability of the Democratic Party to successfully compete across the South. In 2013, in *Shelby County v. Holder*, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an important provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: it declared that the coverage formula for determining which jurisdictions had to "preclear" changes to their elections rules was out of date and no longer necessary. The response from southern states was immediate. Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo ID law for voter registration, while Alabama and Mississippi declared that they would enforce similar laws that had been banned under the preclearance requirement. Studies have demonstrated that photo ID laws disproportionately disadvantage minority and elderly populations. In Texas alone, such a law would result in the purging of some 600,000 voters.

The Democrats remained viable, but their task was exceedingly difficult. They received the support of the vast majority of African American voters, but needed to attract between 30 and 40 percent of the white vote to remain competitive. A pledge to promote growth and high-quality public education became the default stance of most Democratic office seekers. Promoting agendas that kept this biracial coalition together would prove exceedingly difficult as the twenty-first century dawned.

Will a democratic, representative politics survive, if not entirely thrive, in the South? That remains an open question. By the end of the first decade of the new century, Black officeholding at the state level continued to lag behind the actual demographics. In Mississippi, for example, Black people made up roughly 38 percent of the population but held only 29 percent of the seats in the state's legislature. The picture looked a little brighter in Alabama, where Black people constituted 26 percent of the population and Black legislators held roughly a quarter of the seats. Partisanship has grown more extreme in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Republican state legislatures have used their power to deprive Democrats of representation, replicating the antidemocratic tools of an earlier era. Strict voter ID laws have fallen most heavily on the Democrats' core constituency, and grassroots advocates continue to fight hard to prevent voter purges. In addition, Democrats in southern states have seen their election prospects diluted by Republican gerrymandering. In North Carolina, despite a relatively evenly split electorate, Democrats garnered only three of the state's thirteen congressional seats following a 2016 redrawing of district lines by Republicans. Amplified by an expanding,

noisy right-wing media environment, Republicans in the South and nationwide have doubled down on a politics of white grievance, questioning the legitimacy of the nation's first African American president and using every possible political and legal tactic to effectively disfranchise people of color. Democrats in the South have been able to overcome these obstacles only through the most heroic of efforts. In this hyperpartisan political climate, race remains the defining factor of southern political life, and Republicans continue to practice a politics of subtraction. John Bankhead Jr.'s "new order of things" has returned, only this time it is Republicans erecting the barriers. A truly democratic South remains elusive.

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Republicans

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Republican demands Congress vote on Pentagon abortion policy: 'We are not a communist country'

Tommy Tuberville aims to block policy offering aid to service members and dependents forced to travel for abortions



Tommy Tuberville at the Capitol on Tuesday. He said of his refusal to 'shut down': 'I think they're starting to believe that I mean what I said.' Photograph: Uniquely Martin/AP

Defending his blocking promotions that has left hundreds of military officers in limbo and the US army, navy and marines without Senate-confirmed leaders, the Alabama Republican Tommy Tuberville demanded a congressional vote on Pentagon abortion policy.

He added: "We are not a communist country."

In return, one Democrat invoked a Republican president revered for standing up to communism, and said Ronald Reagan was "rolling in his grave".

Tuberville explained his stance to Bloomberg TV, saying: "I got a briefing about a year ago, what they were gonna do with the new abortion policy. We didn't need one ... Joe Biden and the Democrats ... just decided to change it."

The policy offers aid to service members and dependents forced to travel for abortions because they are based in a state which restricts it, as many Republican-run states have since the US supreme court removed the right last year.

Tuberville continued: "They voted [Pentagon abortion policy] through Congress in 1984, but in 2023 they want to change it with a memo from the White House."

"We're not a communist country. Everything that makes policy and law goes through Congress. And I told them, 'If you change it, I'm gonna block your admirals and generals.' At that time there was one or two. Now we're up to 300. I think they're starting to believe that I mean what I said."

At the top of the US military, the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, Gen Mark Milley, is due to step down this month. His replacement, Gen (X) Brown, is in the queue held up.

Officials have pointed to the plight of lower-ranked officers. In a Washington Post column, the secretaries of the army, navy and air force said: "We know officers who ... are facing genuine financial stress because they have had to relocate their families or unexpectedly maintain two residences."

"Military spouses who have worked to build careers of their own are unable to look for jobs because they don't know when or if they will move. Children haven't known where they will go to school, which is particularly hard given how frequently military children change schools already."

Tuberville, who coached the Auburn University football team before entering politics, has been criticised for not having served. He told Bloomberg he was a "military brat" whose father "died on active duty".

Critics also say Tuberville is affecting preparedness to face national security threats.

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Mark Warner, a Democratic senator from Virginia, told Bloomberg Radio: "Ronald Reagan has to be rolling over in his grave. These kinds of political antics are making our military less strong and our country more weak by playing politics on this issue. I hope and pray that that my Republican colleagues, a lot of whom have expressed concerns to me privately ... will put ... pressure on."

The Maine Republican Susan Collins said Tuberville should limit his holds to "only those individuals who have policy responsibilities".

Tuberville said Democrats who control the Senate "can be clearing these nominations one at a time, two hours each. They don't want to do that."

That would be extremely time-consuming. So far, more pressure has built on Tuberville than on the majority leader, Chuck Schumer of New York.

Tuberville said: "We're not gonna have any movement on my side unless they change this [policy] back. Let's vote on it. And if it passes, it passes. Done is done."

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COLD WAR DIXIE

MILITARIZATION AND MODERNIZATION
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH

KARI FREDERICKSON



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CHAPTER SEVEN

Shifting Landscapes

Politics and Race in a Cold War Community

From 1941 to 1948, Aiken County was represented in the South Carolina state senate by Fred Brinkley, a physician from the tiny town of Ellenton. In addition to being one of the town's two doctors, Brinkley was also a part-time farmer and owner of the one of the town's gristmills. A longtime resident of Ellenton, Brinkley was closely tied to the region's agricultural rhythms and was active in community affairs. And like every other state senator, Brinkley was a Democrat in a state that reviled Republicans. In the early 1950s, after Ellenton was condemned to make room for the Savannah River Plant (SRP), Brinkley moved to the city of Barnwell. He died relatively soon after the evacuation, in June 1952, with his passing serving as poignant symbol of the larger transformations under way in the area.¹

The influx of thousands of new residents from communities across the nation altered not only the region's demographics, built environment, economic profile, and cultural identity but also its politics. In 1968, fifteen years after operations commenced at the SRP, Aiken County voters elected George McMillan to represent them in the State Senate. A Republican and former Du Pont supervisor at the SRP, McMillan was just one of a growing number of Republicans elected to public office in Aiken County and in the expanding suburban regions across South Carolina and other southern states in the 1960s and 1970s. The origins of the Republican Party lay in the communities housing the plant employees; the party drew strength from their conservative, middle-class values, forged not only by opposition to certain New Deal-era programs and staunch anticommunism but also from notions of efficiency and modernization as they applied to the political process. Such values were also deeply engrained in Du Pont's corporate culture.

The growth of the Republican Party in Aiken County coincided with and at times appeared synonymous with the acceleration of school integration. Although the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 motivated thousands of white southerners to vote Republican, the party's roots in South Carolina went further back and were tied to the changes brought on by the Cold War. Integration in this region was in part shaped by Du

Pont's corporate culture. Although the company encouraged employees to participate in local and state politics, there was an understanding that employees were not to engage overtly in the desegregation debate and were to let the issue run its course. As with its employment strategy, Du Pont preferred to follow local custom rather than challenge it directly.

School integration proceeded as slowly in Aiken County as it did in other towns across the South, but without the extreme public acrimony and outright violence present in some communities. Although whites in Aiken County—both longtime residents and newcomers—were content to drag their feet on the issue, the impending threat of a loss of federal funds as well as the judicial dismantling of freedom-of-choice school-assignment plans in the late 1960s finally brought desegregation to the region. When meaningful integration finally came to the county in 1970, white resistance died with a whimper.

The relatively uneventful process of integration partly resulted from factors related to Aiken's particular historical development as well as the more recent changes brought about by the Cold War. White resistance in this corner of South Carolina was muted by a variety of factors, including changing demographics, the influence of Du Pont's particular corporate culture, the central role given to large corporations for securing prosperity and security, the reputation of black schools, and the presence of Winter Colony residents. The intense backlash and white flight to private academies found in other communities simply was not present in Aiken. While not exactly welcoming of the prospect of integration, white parents also were unwilling to take extreme measures to stop it.

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Following company president Crawford H. Greenewalt's advice, Du Pont employees became involved in the city's political institutions, initiating innovations that were based on their desire for modern, efficient, representative government, something that seemed lacking in this one-party region. The majority of Du Pont's permanent operations staff took up residence in Aiken's burgeoning suburbs and in the highly suburbanized town of North Augusta. To bring order and efficiency to the development chaos that was the result of rapid residential expansion, residents of these suburban enclaves organized civic associations that would regularly and collectively bring particular neighborhood issues before the city council. The first such group organized was the Crosland Park Civic Association. By the early 1960s, every suburb boasted a neighborhood association.²

These new civic associations were in the forefront of promoting a change in city government from the commission form to a city manager system. Crosland Park Civic Association took the lead among newcomers in supporting the transition to a full-time city manager system, which, members believed, would promote “sound principles of efficient city administration.” A full-time city manager would be better equipped to handle the problems associated with rapid growth, something Crosland Park residents knew only too well. The five-hundred-plus-home subdivision was cursed with chronic sewage overflow, a complaint regularly brought before the city council.³ Crosland Park residents likewise supported the “appointment of city employees on the basis of merit apart from political considerations or influence,” as well as “planning and zoning provisions which provide for orderly growth, stabilize property values, and protect the citizens of Aiken from the inconvenience, danger, and expense which can result from irresponsible real property development.” Finally, the association called for “a carefully developed system of public hearings which assure that the citizens of Aiken shall have the opportunity to be heard in matters of basic policy determination.” By calling for a merit system and a transparent decision-making process, the new residents were advocating not only for a more democratic and representative government but for a process that in many ways resembled the scientific process, in which all variables are carefully weighed.⁴ With the new neighborhood associations in the lead, Aiken residents overwhelmingly approved the adoption of the city manager system.⁵

Du Pont employees likewise were instrumental in bringing two-party politics to what had been a one-party state. Du Ponters took the lead in promoting Republican candidates in national elections and in organizing the first county-level Republican Party, joining other white-collar suburbanites around the state and region in developing a viable second party. South Carolina's one-party system had grown out of historical racial and political animosities. Since Reconstruction, the Republican Party had been anathema to South Carolina's white voters, synonymous with “negro control.” The return to Democratic Party rule in the 1870s was marred by violence, perhaps nowhere worse than in Aiken County, which had seen two of the worst race riots in state history in 1876. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, South Carolina was the region's most reliably Democratic state, refusing to bolt the party in 1928 and polling huge numbers for Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s. The Republicans rarely fielded candidates for office even at the state's highest levels, and Democrats dominated local politics in all forty-six counties. According to one account, by midcentury, “the South Carolina GOP was merely a quaint relic of the past, widely accused of graft, corrup-

tion, and gross mismanagement.”⁶ Republican conventions were derided as “the semi-annual gathering of the pie brigade” where the spoils of party patronage were distributed.⁷

Dissatisfaction with the national Democratic Party began to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s as changes brought on by the Great Depression, New Deal, and World War II began to chip away at a southern caste system grounded in low-wage labor and white supremacy. By the late 1940s, a growing number of whites were becoming increasingly hostile toward the national Democratic Party’s position on civil rights. In 1948, outraged at President Harry S. Truman’s civil rights initiatives and the inclusion of a civil rights plank in the Democratic Party platform, South Carolina Democrats joined white conservatives from several other southern states and bolted the national party, throwing their support behind the States’ Rights Democratic Party, more commonly known as the Dixiecrats. Led by presidential candidate and South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrats hoped to wrest enough votes from Truman to throw the election into the House of Representatives. In the end, the Dixiecrats won only four states, but their campaign constituted a shot across the political bow, serving notice to the national Democratic Party that white southerners’ political allegiance could no longer be taken for granted. Still, despite their misgivings about the direction of the national party, wrenching a majority of southern whites away from the Democratic Party was going to be extremely difficult. Once “liberated,” where would they go? By the early 1950s, the South still had no meaningful Republican Party organization. Southern whites unhappy with the direction of the Democratic Party continued to express their displeasure in presidential elections, voting in unprecedented numbers for the Republican candidate, but not as members of any local Republican organization. The existing party apparatus was too weak, too corrupt. Any viable Republican Party would have to be built from scratch by individuals free of the historical political baggage carried by white southerners.⁸

Much of the impetus behind the growth of the Republican Party was the particular economic change that accompanied the Cold War. Between 1950 and 1970, 90 percent of growth in employment in industry in the South took place in high-wage industries, many of them considered part of the military-industrial complex.⁹ These white-collar employees, housed in expanding urban and suburban areas, increasingly identified their economic interests as resting with the Republican Party.¹⁰ South Carolina’s employment profile changed dramatically. Aiken County was one of the state’s fastest growing in terms of industrial expansion. In Aiken County in 1940, 31.5 percent of adults were employed in agriculture; by 1970, that percentage had dropped to 2 percent. In 1940, Aiken County was roughly 18 percent urban; by 1970, 44.4

percent of the population lived in metropolitan areas. Over the same period, the percentage of Aikenites employed in white-collar jobs shot from 15 percent to 41 percent. As part of this transition, the county had become wealthier. From 1953 to 1962, purchasing power in the county rose by five hundred dollars per capita and two thousand dollars per household, and retail sales doubled in dollar volume.¹¹ Such changes were not limited to Aiken. Overall, South Carolina's suburban population grew by nearly 400 percent between 1950 and 1970.¹² Aiken joined rapidly expanding counties such as Richland (Columbia), Greenville, Lexington, and Charleston in the white-collar suburban boom.

Profound political change followed this economic transformation. From 1946 to 1963, South Carolina had the lowest level of party competition in the South. Between 1964 and 1974, however, it moved into first place in the Deep South and seventh overall in the region. No other Deep South state experienced increasingly competitive two-party gubernatorial elections between 1960 and 1975.¹³

The expanding metropolitan areas were the source of the reborn Republican Party. In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower drew support from wealthier whites in the urban and suburban areas of South Carolina, as well as more race-conscious whites in the majority black lowcountry who were disturbed at the role of civil rights in the Democratic Party platforms of the late 1940s and early 1950s. By 1956, skeleton Republican Party organizations existed in roughly half of the state's forty-six counties. Between 1956 and 1963, the party had no paid staff and no official, continuing central headquarters. Party leadership came from a mishmash of businessmen, disaffected Democrats, and newcomers, most of them political novices.¹⁴

The early leaders of South Carolina's retooled Republican Party were recent transplants. Gregory D. Shorey Jr., for example, was born in Massachusetts and educated at Boston University, ultimately earning a graduate degree in public relations and marketing communications. He served in the U.S. Navy during World War II and subsequently became active in the Massachusetts Republican Party. In 1950, he moved to Greenville, South Carolina, where he founded a company that manufactured marine safety and water sports equipment and moved quickly to the top of the state Republican Party hierarchy. He served as state chair of Eisenhower for President in 1952 and 1956, a Republican elector in 1952 and 1956, state executive chair from 1954 to 1956, and state chair from 1956 to 1962.¹⁵ The renascent GOP received financial backing from Roger Mil-likens, president of the family owned Deering-Milliken Textile Corporation, the world's third-largest textile firm. Milliken had contributed extensively to the national Republican Party but had avoided the dysfunctional state party until the revamped version emerged



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Corporate Culture, the Cold War, and the American South in the 1950s and 1960s



KARI FREDERICKSON

IN 1956, William Faulkner lamented that agriculture no longer stood at the center of the southern economy. "Our economy," he remarked, "is the Federal Government."¹ Beginning in the immediate post-World War II era, the region that once had been dominated by cotton fields, tenant shacks, and textile mill villages was rapidly giving way to defense installations, aerospace engineering facilities, and suburbs. Within three decades, federal spending changed the South's economic base and demographics to such a degree that by the early 1980s the region that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had once identified as "the nation's number one economic problem" had become one of the nation's leading industrial producers. Much of this federal spending was filtered through the rapidly expanding military-industrial complex necessitated by the Cold War. Consequently, although federal dollars constituted the engine that drove change in the South, the direction and shape of change was very much determined by the various corporate entities that moved south in the 1950s and 1960s to capitalize on this federal largesse.

To date, studies of the impact of the Cold War on the American South have been largely confined to examining the complex impact of anticommunism on southern politics and the budding civil rights movement. Anticommunism poisoned the liberal political well and fueled the massive resistance movement, making even the most tepid statement on racial progress by an elected official a sure road to political oblivion. But the Cold War contributed more than just toxic anticommunism to the South's political

landscape. The economic and demographic impact of the military-industrial complex throughout the region was profound. The development of new aerospace facilities around Atlanta, the growth of the space industry in Huntsville and on the east coast of Florida, the development of the Research Triangle in North Carolina, and the proliferation of military contracts generally brought thousands of new, highly educated workers to the region.² Many of these new workers brought their Republican politics with them. At the very least, few possessed the historically based, reflexive support of the Democratic Party on matters of race that had plagued the South since the turn of the century. Unencumbered by the region's historic hostility to the Republican Party, these Cold War immigrants became the foot-soldiers in the creation of a modern civic politics and of the two-party system in the South.

This was nowhere more true than in western South Carolina. In 1950, the Atomic Energy Commission chose Du Pont Corporation to build and operate the Savannah River Plant, a vast industrial site dedicated to producing plutonium and tritium for the hydrogen bomb. Encompassing over 200,000 acres and employing a permanent operations staff of 6,000, the Savannah River Plant had a significant impact on the region. The arrival of thousands of highly trained scientists and engineers and their families spurred the creation of sprawling suburbs and hastened the arrival of national department store chains. A significant portion of these new residents came from outside the South, bringing with them political traditions and beliefs unencumbered by the peculiar forces of southern history. Their political activities in this region of South Carolina were, however, influenced by the newcomers' specific Cold War environment. The particular political changes that befell the region were shaped by Du Pont's specific corporate culture. Corporate America was a key player in the Cold War. On the national level, the ideas and actions of elite business leaders were critical in shaping President Dwight Eisenhower's Cold War policies and were crucial to the evolution of American culture during this period.³ Henry Luce, publisher of *Time* magazine, had recruited corporate leaders to the Cold War cause in 1947, calling corporations the "front line soldiers and battalions in the battle of freedom."⁴ Du Pont arrived in South Carolina, ready to do battle in the Cold War. With 150 years of industrial experience, a complex reputation, and a well-defined corporate culture that privileged modernization and innovation, Du Pont and its employees had a dramatic effect on the region, particularly its politics. During the 1950s and 1960s, Du Pont employees were instrumental in creating a more efficient and transparent

city government, as well as a vibrant two-party system in a region that, for the previous 80 years, had been dominated by the Democratic Party.



The history of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company is intertwined with the history of the nation. Founded in 1802 on the banks of Brandywine Creek near Wilmington, Delaware, Du Pont is one of the nation's oldest companies. Originally a manufacturer of gun powder, Du Pont received its first government contract from President Thomas Jefferson. It was the beginning of a long relationship. Du Pont gun powder was used in the War of 1812, the Mexican American War, and the American Civil War. Pioneers used Du Pont powder to clear the wilderness for settlement, build railroads, raise factories.⁵ During World War I, Du Pont supplied 40 percent of all the powder used by the Allied powers, chalking up more than \$1 billion in sales.⁶ Such unseemly profits came under the scrutiny of the Senate Munitions Investigation Committee—more popularly known as the Nye Committee—which investigated the cause of America's involvement in the First World War. The committee's final report harshly criticized Du Pont's excessive wartime profits, and the company whose very success was tied to the country's own had earned a grisly, new nickname: "merchants of death." Du Pont worked hard to rid itself of this public relations disaster, downplaying its munitions production and turning to the research and development of consumer and consumer-related products, like nylon, cellophane, and Freon.⁷

But World War II drew Du Pont back to its munitions roots and back to government contracts. Du Pont built and maintained the Hanford Engineering Works, part of the Manhattan Project, and was responsible for creating weapons-grade plutonium that went into the bomb used in the Trinity test and the "Fat Man" bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Eager to avoid the label "war profiteer," Du Pont agreed to participate in the project under two conditions: one, that the company would not make any profits from its association with the atomic project; and two, that any patents resulting from the work accomplished would become the property of the federal government. The government agreed to both conditions, paying Du Pont one dollar a year over costs for its contribution.

Following the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, Du Pont expressed reluctance to continue at the center of the nation's weapons complex. In 1946, the company turned over the maintenance of the Hanford works to General Electric. In the postwar era, Du Pont invested heavily in

research and development, particularly of consumer products and textiles. By 1952, it offered more than 100 products in a wide range of industries. Readily accepting Henry Luce's earlier corporate call to arms, Du Pont positioned itself as the provider of a veritable cornucopia of products, and created a patriotic perception of itself that did not rely on the production of munitions. President Eisenhower in particular embraced this perspective in his foreign policy, expanding it to characterize the nation at large in its global struggle with Communism. With companies like Du Pont in the lead, America would be the provider of goods and services superior to those offered by the rest of the world.⁸

But world events soon overtook the company. On the morning of September 23, 1949, armed with scientific data from American and British experts, a somber President Harry Truman informed the nation that the Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb. In four short years, America's nuclear monopoly was ended. The world had become a much more dangerous place.

The discovery that the Soviet Union possessed nuclear capabilities escalated discussions at the nation's highest levels over whether the United States should proceed with the production of the hydrogen bomb, a thermonuclear device whose destructive capabilities were projected to be one hundred times greater than those of the existing atomic weapons. On January 31, 1950, Truman authorized an accelerated program to develop the hydrogen bomb.⁹ To build this new plant, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) turned to Du Pont.¹⁰ Du Pont executives remained anxious to avoid anything that might revive the "merchants of death" stigma. But the federal government persisted. Said one atomic energy expert, "To ask anybody else to build the plant when you could get Du Pont would be like settling for a rookie when you could get Babe Ruth in his prime."¹¹ Du Pont relented.

In mid-1950, AEC and Du Pont officials criss-crossed the country, investigating some 114 potential production sites.¹² The ideal location would combine "low population density, proximity to a fairly large urban center, a local labor supply, and an adequate supply of water of specified purity."¹³ Their assignment acquired heightened urgency when, in the early hours of Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, thousands of North Koreans poured southward over the 38th parallel. The Korean War had begun. Five months later, on November 28, 1950, only a few days after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, threatening to turn the Korean conflict into a larger Asian land war, the AEC announced that it had chosen a South Carolina site that bordered the Savannah River along the western edge of the state.¹⁴ A massive undertaking, the plant, ultimately known as the Savannah River Plant,

would encompass great swaths of land in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties.¹⁵

The tri-county region out of which the Savannah River Plant was to be carved was already undergoing change in the late 1940s, before AEC officials arrived. The declining cotton economy of large land owners and sharecroppers had begun to give way to a more diversified agricultural mix.¹⁶ The rural areas of Aiken County had lost population since 1940, with sharecroppers in particular leaving in droves during the decade. The scores of vacant farm houses bore testimony to the region's decline.¹⁷ This small human tributary joined the larger rushing torrent of four million — a quarter of the region's farm population — that left the South during the war years. Horse Creek Valley — known to locals as "the Valley" — stretched across the county's northwest quadrant. Home to some of the South's oldest textile mills and mill villages, the Valley likewise had entered a period of transition during the 1940s and early 1950s.

Whereas depopulation and transition characterized the countryside and mill villages, the city of Aiken retained much of its nineteenth-century charm. Though Aiken lay only a few miles outside the Valley and numerous rural hamlets, the residents of the farms, the mill villages, and Aiken lived in different worlds. Incorporated in 1835, Aiken boasted a population of only 7,000 on the eve of the plant's construction.¹⁸ Prior to 1950, Aiken existed peacefully as a wealthy enclave, serving the needs and whims of the nation's upper crust. Mrs. Lulie Hitchcock of Long Island came to Aiken in the 1870s after she discovered that its temperate climate and sandy soil were ideal for raising and training thoroughbreds. Mrs. Hitchcock and her husband owned a stable of race horses and they brought their equine passion to Aiken. She soon convinced many of her wealthy friends in the horsey set to make Aiken their winter home. Collectively they became known as the "Winter Colonists"; they typically arrived in January and left in April. They built sprawling mansions that they called "cottages," and which they christened with names — some stately, some whimsical — like "Rosehill," "Whitehall," "Banksia" and "Joyce Cottage."¹⁹ The cottages lined the beautifully landscaped 150-foot-wide boulevards. Dividing the boulevards were lovely parks, lush with towering magnolias and filled with the riotous color of that magnificent southern trifecta of dogwoods, camellias, and azaleas. The city proudly adopted the slogan the City of Parkways. Most of these broad avenues were still unpaved in 1950, out of consideration for the sensitivity of horses' hooves.²⁰ The horses of some of the nation's leading racing stables, the majority of which were owned by northerners, wintered in

Aiken. Many Kentucky Derby winners held their debuts at the annual Aiken trials, on the beautifully laid-out Mile Track.

Novelist Pat Conroy once observed that Aiken was socially schizophrenic, a town of well-defined categories and an obvious pecking order. The Winter Colonists stood high above the “Old Aikenites”—the town’s merchants and politicians whose families had lived in Aiken for generations and whose livelihood depended on the Winter Colonists; both groups considered themselves superior to the mill folk of the Valley. Politically, however, Aiken—like the rest of South Carolina—was solidly Democratic.

The demographic and economic impact of the Savannah River Plant on this primarily rural region was profound and is relatively easy to document. Between 1950 and 1952, more than 30,000 temporary construction workers and 6,000 permanent employees and their families, as well as proprietors of businesses and services that catered to the plant personnel—nearly 180,000 persons in all—flooded into the region.²¹ Even though the Savannah River Plant was crucial to the national security state’s expanding nuclear arsenal, and although the Korean War had presented the specter of a constant state of total war, the Truman administration rejected the garrison state. They chose not to impose excessive controls by the federal government or the military and decided to rely instead on existing cities, such as Aiken, and private enterprise to absorb the new residents. Ultimately, two-thirds of the permanent employees—managers, scientists, engineers, and technicians—chose to live in and around Aiken. By 1953, the city’s permanent population had tripled. The city’s square mileage had grown 139 percent as a result of suburban annexation and development. Private developers created twenty-seven new “modern and convenient” subdivisions within commuting distance of the plant. The town hired eighty additional teachers in 1952 and added 40 permanent classrooms and 36 temporary classrooms. The Savannah River Plant commenced operations in late 1952, and the first shipment of plutonium left the plant in December 1954. The region, which at the close of World War II was categorized as underdeveloped and primarily rural, now represented an important outpost on the frontier of nuclear science as well as an integral component of the national defense state.

But sheer numbers do not convey the impact of the Savannah River Plant on this region of South Carolina. As important in determining the shape of change was Du Pont’s specific corporate culture. Intent on promoting itself primarily as an innovator and creator of consumer products, such as nylon and cellophane, and downplaying its role in weapons manufacturing, Du Pont had crafted a culture that heralded scientific discovery, innovation, and creativity, and that emphasized consumption and material

well-being as the cornerstone of a free people. Shaping this culture from the top was company president Crawford Greenewalt, who personified the company's emphasis on innovation and achievement. A graduate of MIT and a chemical engineer by training, Greenewalt was technical director of Du Pont's Graselli Chemical Department. He was among a tiny group of civilians invited to the University of Chicago in 1942 to witness the first nuclear reaction. After Du Pont joined the Manhattan Project, the company's president chose Greenewalt to serve as liaison at Hanford between the production team and the physicists. When he took over management of the Hanford project, the nuclear physicists were suspicious of him because he was not a nuclear physicist. Greenewalt boned up so well on nuclear physics that in six months he could talk to the scientists in their own language. He was such a quick study, in fact, that when Du Pont turned the operation of Hanford over to GE after the war, pioneering atomic scientist Enrico Fermi asked Greenewalt to quit Du Pont and devote his life to pure research.²² Greenewalt's wartime managerial success, in addition to his marriage to the daughter of former company president Irenee Du Pont, thrust him into the corporate limelight, and in 1948, he became one of the youngest men (as well as only the second non-blood relative) to become president of Du Pont.

Greenewalt possessed a restless mind and creative spirit. An accomplished musician, he played the clarinet, cello, and piano; he built model steam engines, grew orchids, and developed high-speed photographic equipment to study hummingbirds. Greenewalt had a hand in crafting the company's corporate structure, which likewise reflected its emphasis on innovation. Du Pont's industrial operations were divided into ten departments directing such diverse projects as electrochemicals, explosives, and rayon. Du Pont frequently switched employees among departments to "cross-fertilize" the company and to broaden the employees' experience. For example, an organic chemist might be put in charge of sales, where he was left to sink or swim. Within these positions, employees and managers were given great latitude. If the manager did a good job, the general staff did not meddle.

Because of Du Pont's concerns about image and its desire to foreground its consumer products, Greenewalt maintained a very high profile, and the public record of his thoughts concerning science, the scientist, and society is voluminous. Science, Greenewalt proclaimed, was "the source of [our] national strength, of material progress, of added leisure, and of enriched cultural opportunities."²³ Science relied on creativity; it also was a communal effort in which no idea is ever lost or destroyed.²⁴ And the creative process, of course, relied on intellectual freedom.²⁵ As innovators and

problem-solvers, scientists, Greenewalt argued, had a duty to contribute to civic life.²⁶ This belief applied to Du Pont employees in particular. Greenewalt consistently remarked on the potential of research and innovation to improve Americans' material well-being, and encouraged his employees to expand their creativity to pursuits beyond the laboratory. He and other corporate leaders put their industrial pursuits into a larger Cold War context. Improvement in the material status of mankind can proceed only in a free society, and innovation and creativity in science can take place only where there are no restrictions placed on freedom of thought. This freedom extended beyond the laboratory to participation in democratic institutions. Greenewalt's philosophy about the role of scientists in society jibed with a general faith in scientists, a belief that they might legitimately offer expertise not only as scientists, but might weigh in on a number of policy issues. Greenewalt consistently maintained that leaders of industry and business had a responsibility to involve themselves in political affairs, and Du Pont regularly urged its employees to be politically active.²⁷

Potential employees were attracted to Du Pont because of its diverse industrial profile, its emphasis on research and development, and the potential for growth and experience within the company. Two highly sought-after young scientists — chemist Mal McKibben and nuclear physicist Walt Joseph — are good examples of the Du Pont scientists of the 1950s. With his B.S. in chemistry from Emory University, McKibben considered an offer from Chemstrand Corporation. Later, after joining the Savannah River Plant, he received offers from General Electric, the International Atomic Energy Commission, and Allied General Nuclear Services. Joseph, then a doctoral student in nuclear physics at the University of Pennsylvania, was interviewed twice by what he assumes was the Central Intelligence Agency. Both chose Du Pont because of its wide range of consumer products, its focus on pure research, and its reputation as an innovator. As McKibben stated frankly, "Du Pont was Cadillac, the others were Fords." Now retired, neither is disappointed in his career path. Both men recalled the sense of excitement and discovery that pervaded their work at the Savannah River Plant. Recalls McKibben, "We were always encouraged to think creatively, and we were given the latitude necessary to solve problems. Many employees extended this creativity and problem-solving ability outside the plant."²⁸

Of course, the Savannah River Plant was different from Du Pont's other manufacturing concerns. Because it was dedicated to developing components for the hydrogen bomb, secrecy and security inside the plant were paramount. Nonetheless, within the parameters laid down by the AEC, Du Pont still found ways to "cross fertilize." Nuclear physicist Joseph was as-

signed to no fewer than eight different divisions within the plant during his long tenure. At one point, he was put in charge of plant traffic. Chemist McKibben was moved from heavy-water production to fuel and target fabrication to separations — all extremely different processes — while employed by the company.²⁹ Outside of the plant, employees were forbidden to talk about their work. Employee Ronnie Bryant noted that he and his fellow workers in the heavy-water production sector joked that, when asked about their jobs, they would reply that they were making lipstick. Turning more serious, Bryant observed that the constant reminders not to talk about your work outside the plant “made us feel that what we were doing was really important.”³⁰ Spouses and children were kept in the dark regarding the work that was done at the site. Du Pont acknowledged that such secrecy could cause tension at home. In a “memo for housewives,” the company told spouses of plant employees that even dinner-table conversation about the plant was potentially dangerous. “SRP is not an ordinary plant,” Du Pont reminded the wives of workers. “Its mission is national defense; its job is important and secret.”³¹ Such extreme secrecy in a time of heightened international tension caused stress for area families. Children often came up with imaginative explanations for the secrecy that invaded their family lives. Walt Joseph’s son recalled that “[My father’s] job and work were not the topics of conversation at our dinner table. He left in the early hours of the morning, riding with a group of other men in a carpool, and came home just in time for dinner. Some weekends there would be a late night phone call and he would leave for work in the middle of the night. . . . Every few weeks, . . . my mother, my sister, and I would get in the car in the early evening and drive to pick my father up, and when we did we picked him up at a barber shop in a shopping center on the highway which ran from Aiken to New Ellenton. This was the only business I could associate my father with in the first six years of my life, so I made the logical assumption. My father was a barber.”³²

Everything about the plant seemed to dictate that it existed as an entity wholly separate from the surrounding communities. It was located in a remote region. It sat on 325 square miles of real estate — roughly the size of the city of Chicago. Plant operations and administrative buildings were secluded behind miles of wooded buffer. Traffic streamed into the plant in the morning and out at night. Employees needed an identification badge to enter. It was a curious, secret place. Nevertheless, this insistence upon secrecy and security, rather than isolating the employees and heightening the distance between employees and town, actually facilitated community involvement. For many, the sense of mission that accompanied their work did not stop when they left the workplace. Many took seriously Greenewalt’s — and

Du Pont's— notion about their role in improving the standard of living. "Better living"— a well-known Du Pont slogan— was achieved not only through the acquisition of consumer goods, but through the creation and improvement of community institutions. Recalled Walt Joseph, "it was expected that you were involved in civic affairs."³³

Within the larger Aiken community, these scientists and engineers were referred to collectively not as Savannah River Plant employees but as "Du Ponters." The identification with the company was that strong. Buzz Rich, an Aiken attorney whose family moved to the region in the early 1950s and whose mother worked at the plant, recalled the impact of the Du Pont employees on the region. "All those Du Ponters had a lot of energy, . . . all that brain power, coming into that small southern town. They had time on their hands, in the evenings and weekends. . . . [T]hey got involved and started all of these activities."³⁴ Owen Clary, who grew up in the town of Warrenville in the Valley and who eventually worked for the Savannah River Plant before heading up a local food bank, remarked that many of the Du Pont employees were civic-minded. "They were generous with their time and always volunteered for fundraising activities."³⁵ The activities of Du Pont employees were covered in the local newspaper and highlighted in the company newsletter, the Savannah River News. Du Pont employees started the community theater group, the United Way, and the Rotary Club, and raised money for a new library. Despite their recent arrival, employees of the plant were instrumental in organizing the area's first historical society, with the plant's official historian listed as its first secretary. Plant supervisors and employees worked very hard to relate their work to the community at large. Farmers of Aiken County flocked to a public program on radioisotopes and their applicability to agricultural research.³⁶ The YWCA sponsored a popular lecture series on subjects that ranged from the nature of matter to nuclear reactors. Over 600 school teachers attended an all-day seminar on the incorporation of atomic energy into the school curriculum. Employees founded local chapters of their professional associations and made them relevant to the community. For example, the Savannah River Subsection of the American Chemical Society contributed \$125 for science books for the local high school and counseled students on careers in chemistry and atomic energy.³⁷ Arthur Tackman, assistant manager of the Savannah River Plant, was named Aiken County "Citizen of the Year" for 1953. He had served as campaign chairman of the American Red Cross–Community Chest, coordinator of committees of the Cotton Festival, and chairman of the Boy Scouts in the area. He had only been a resident of the area for two

years.³⁸ SRP employees provided volunteer labor to build a public swimming pool in nearby Williston, and SRP employees organized and staffed various suburban fire departments. By 1955, only five years after the decision to build the plant was made, Du Pont employees were either leading or participating in the major community institutions in Aiken.

Following Greenewalt's advice, employees likewise became involved in the city's political institutions, initiating innovations that were based on their desire for modern, efficient, representative government. The majority of Du Pont's permanent operations staff took up residence in Aiken's burgeoning suburbs. To bring order to development chaos, these new neighborhoods organized themselves into civic associations that would regularly and collectively bring their particular issues before the city council. The first such group organized was the Crosland Park Civic Association, the first suburb built to house plant employees.

These new civic associations were in the forefront of promoting a change from the extant commission form of city government to a city manager system. Crosland Park Civic Association took the lead among newcomers in supporting the transition to a full-time city manager system which, residents believed, "contain[ed] sound principles of efficient city administration. . . ." A full-time city manager would be better equipped to handle the problems associated with rapid growth, something Crosland Park residents knew only too well. The 500-plus home subdivision was cursed with chronic sewage overflow, a complaint regularly brought before the city council.³⁹ Crosland Park residents likewise supported the "appointment of city employees on the basis of merit apart from political considerations or influence," as well as "planning and zoning provisions which provide for orderly growth, stabilize property values, and protect the citizens of Aiken from the inconvenience, danger, and expense which can result from irresponsible real property development." Finally, the association called for "a carefully developed system of public hearings which assure that the citizens of Aiken shall have the opportunity to be heard in matters of basic policy determination." By calling for a merit system and a transparent decision-making process, the new residents were advocating not only for a more democratic and representative government, but for a process that in many ways resembled the scientific process, in which all variables are carefully weighed.⁴⁰ Aiken voters overwhelming approved the adoption of the city manager system.⁴¹ The arrival of the plant and its thousands of employees likewise precipitated a more visual change in the city's identity. By the mid-1950s, the city's crest reflected its new, modern identity: joining images of a golfer,

a thoroughbred, and a plantation home was the symbol for nuclear energy with the word “progress” emblazoned across it.

Du Pont employees likewise were instrumental in lending support to Republican candidates in national elections and in organizing the first county-level Republican Party. South Carolina’s one-party system grew out of historical racial and political animosities. Since Reconstruction, the Republican Party had been anathema to South Carolina’s white voters. The Republican Party became synonymous with “negro control,” and the return to Democratic Party rule in the 1870s was marred by violence, perhaps none worse than in western South Carolina. Aiken County alone witnessed two of the worst race riots in state history in 1876. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, South Carolina was the region’s most reliably Democratic state, refusing to bolt along with its sister states in 1928, and polling huge numbers for Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s. The Republicans rarely fielded candidates for office even at the highest levels, and the Democrats utterly dominated local politics in all forty-six counties. Against such daunting odds, the fate of the state Republican Party was sealed. According to one account, by mid-century, “the South Carolina GOP was merely a quaint relic of the past, widely accused of graft, corruption, and gross mismanagement.”⁴²

Political scientists have noted how, in the postwar era, residents of the urban and suburban South “gradually began to identify their economic interests as resting with the Republican Party.”⁴³ As Aiken’s population exploded with the creation of the Savannah River Plant, they joined the growing numbers of urban and suburban residents across the South as they pulled the lever for Dwight Eisenhower and other Republican candidates. In 1952 in South Carolina, Eisenhower drew support from wealthier whites in the urban and suburban areas, as well as more race-conscious whites in the low country who were disturbed at the role of civil rights in the Democratic Party platforms of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1956, in the wake of the *Brown* decision (in which the Eisenhower administration submitted an *amicus curiae* brief supporting the NAACP’s position), Eisenhower lost much of his race-based low country support. Dissatisfied with the president’s position on race, whites living in majority black counties threw their votes to unpledged electors. In fact, the only county the Republican president carried in 1956 was Aiken. Led by the county’s new residents, the Republicanism of Aiken County was shaped by an opposition to New Deal-style liberalism rather than an overt racism. The party leadership reflected the more cosmopolitan nature of the rank and file, with most key leaders coming from out of state.⁴⁴

Not content to express their Republican sensibilities in presidential elections alone, Republicans in Aiken, led by Du Pont employees, built the party from the roots up, and by the late 1950s they were contesting seats on the city council. Their affiliation with the Republican Party was as much ideological as it was practical: the local Democratic Party appeared to many to be a “closed” body of established elites, so the Republican Party simply offered a vehicle for involvement. Efforts to organize the party on the county level occurred in the early 1960s. SRP employee Walt Joseph remembers the first Aiken County Republican Party Convention. “The law required political conventions to be held in public buildings so the group reserved the courthouse for the designated evening. When the small band of party faithful arrived for the convention, they discovered the courthouse dark and locked. Repeated attempts to phone the building custodian and other political figures were unsuccessful. Finally, in desperation, but within the letter of the law, the convention was held in the courthouse parking lot.” In 1967, Aiken County became the first county in South Carolina to hold a Republican primary.⁴⁵

By the early 1960s, the state Republican Party had been transformed, drawing strength from expanding suburban areas in Aiken, Richland, and Charleston Counties and their middle- and upper-middle-class residents. Contemporary commentators observed that presidential Republicanism in South Carolina was stronger than that in any other southern state.⁴⁶ In the presidential election of 1960, Republican candidate Richard Nixon lost the state by fewer than 10,000 votes, and 63.2 percent of all city and suburban residents voted Republican.⁴⁷ South Carolina Republicans adopted a brand of conservatism that mirrored in important respects the conservatism taking hold in the country as a whole during this period. Popular conservative themes included concerns about the influence of organized labor, the conduct of the Cold War, and the burgeoning civil rights movement. Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona was the poster child of this new conservatism, and he enjoyed widespread popularity among South Carolina Republicans.

By 1962, the state Republican Party felt confident enough to take on three-term U.S. Senator Olin D. Johnston. Johnston’s political credentials were formidable. Elected governor in 1934 and 1942, Johnston had served as the state’s senator since 1945. He was a reliable New Deal Democrat, a strong supporter of organized labor and the limited welfare state. Johnston had remained a loyal—if not enthusiastic—supporter of Harry Truman in the presidential election of 1948, when many states’ rights conservatives in South Carolina bolted the party over the Democrats’

civil rights platform. Likewise, Johnston had remained in the Democratic camp during the tumultuous 1950s, when many disgruntled southern Democrats voted as independents.⁴⁸

The Republicans nominated well-known syndicated newspaper columnist William D. Workman to run against Johnston. A life-long newspaper man, the 47-year-old Workman had always maintained a politically neutral position. However, in a letter to Barry Goldwater, Workman revealed that he had “opposed the [national] Democratic tickets since Roosevelt’s second term.”⁴⁹ Devising a winning strategy proved difficult for the South Carolina Republicans. They considered trying to yoke Johnston to liberal president John Kennedy and the increasingly disruptive civil rights movement, but painting Johnston as a racial liberal was futile. Although hardly a virulent white supremacist, he had established his anti-civil rights credentials in the 1940s and had not wavered since. Although this was his first try at public office, Workman’s conservative criticisms of the civil rights movement and the welfare state were well known. Those not familiar with Workman’s journalism could familiarize themselves with his racial views by reading *A Case for the South*, published in 1960. Declaring his position to be that of “the [white] man in the middle,” *A Case for the South* is Workman’s attempt to explain the white South’s opposition to integration. Workman’s “case” was built on the tired, time-worn arguments of southern apologists: that hundreds of years of cohabitation had given southern whites special insight into the nature of the black man; that African Americans, as a whole were an adolescent race only recently moving into civic adulthood; and that southern whites were most capable of directing their own racial affairs without interference from the courts or the federal government.⁵⁰ Having made his own position clear, Workman stated confidentially on a number of occasions that he did not wish to bring race into the campaign. Most likely this was because it was not an issue with which he could attack Johnston. Johnston deftly kept his distance from certain elements of Kennedy’s program, telling South Carolina voters that he never supported civil rights measures or “wasteful foreign aid give-aways.”⁵¹

Unwilling to take on Johnston directly, Workman attacked liberalism generally and Washington liberals in particular, whom he called a “group of arrogant intellectuals surrounding the Kennedy clan...”⁵² Workman railed against the evils of an activist federal government with its expansive, meddling bureaucracy, which he considered one step away from Communism. He opposed federal aid to education, as well as any federal intervention into health care for the elderly. The expanding welfare state had become “cradle to the grave protection . . . indulgence by the federal government at

taxpayers' expense."⁵³ He endorsed "national defense to whatever degree and at whatever cost is essential to the security of the United States," and championed an unrelenting resistance to world Communism. One Workman advertisement criticized Johnston for supporting arms control and disarmament, warning voters that by advocating arms reduction Johnston threatened national sovereignty and supported the notion of a Soviet superstate.⁵⁴ Such heated rhetoric was red meat to defense workers on the front lines of the Cold War. An arms agreement threatened the livelihood of folks who made their livings developing materials for the hydrogen bomb. Workman did his best to craft his message in the Goldwater mold, making his campaign part of the broader push for "a new conservatism which is spreading throughout America," which sought to stem "the liberal tide which has been sweeping the United States toward the murky depths of socialism."⁵⁵

In Aiken County, Savannah River Plant and Atomic Energy Commission employees became heavily involved in Workman's campaign. Gus Robinson, who worked in the Atomic Energy Commission's Office of Public Information, and Don Law, editor of the *Savannah River Plant News*, provided key information on the political temper of plant employees, assuring Workman that they could "predict good a Republican vote . . . from AEC and DuPont personnel."⁵⁶ Plant physicist Walt Joseph served as a precinct captain for Workman, while North Augusta—a town heavily populated by plant personnel—was considered a lock for the challenger.⁵⁷

Workman made an impressive showing in an improbable race, garnering 44 percent of the statewide vote from an electorate that only a decade before had possessed an almost visceral distaste for all things Republican. Aiken County was one of only three counties to give a majority of votes to Workman.⁵⁸ His most lopsided victories within the county came from precincts in Aiken and North Augusta heavily populated by middle-class plant personnel.⁵⁹

Although defeated, South Carolina Republicans had made tremendous strides in building their party, and they looked forward to the presidential contest of 1964. In September of that year, U.S. Senator and Aiken resident Strom Thurmond announced he was leaving the Democratic Party and joining the Republicans to support standard-bearer Barry Goldwater. Thurmond's party switch was a tremendous coup for South Carolina's Republicans. Garnering the affiliation of the state's most popular politician lent the fledgling party instant credibility. Many observers have since credited Thurmond with bringing two-party politics to the state; however, a closer look demands that more credit be given to party operatives, changing

demographics, and the 1962 campaign in making Thurmond's switch something less than suicidal. Ever the astute politician, Thurmond no doubt had observed the changes in the political terrain wrought by the Cold War. After leaving the governor's mansion and losing the race for U.S. Senate to Olin Johnston in 1950, Thurmond settled in Aiken, joining a local law firm. For the next several years, he represented numerous landowners displaced by the Savannah River Plant in their quest for what they considered more equitable appraisals of their property. Although a private citizen, Thurmond was never out of the public eye, appearing frequently at community events. His professional and possibly his social circle came to involve individuals from the Savannah River Plant. And although it is impossible to know the extent to which he was influenced by the burgeoning Republican sentiment in Aiken, he was certainly aware of it. Within this context, then, Thurmond's switch seems less an example of political soothsaying than a well-timed and sensible political accommodation. Although Thurmond and his aides always maintained that the senator's high-profile switch was a singular act of political bravery, former aid Harry Dent confided to Thurmond's biographer that Workman's challenge to Johnston in 1962 provided "a pretty good poll" of potential Republican support.⁶⁰



The onset of the Cold War and the disbursement of billions of dollars in federal funds through the military-industrial complex transformed regions of the American South in countless ways. In the once sparsely populated, mostly rural region of western South Carolina, the arrival of thousands of highly educated scientists and engineers heralded the beginning of a process to break down the political parochialism of the South. Just as New Deal labor legislation initiated the decline of the South's economic isolation, so too did the influx of the corporate Cold War footsoldiers mark the beginning of the end of the South's political isolation. In Aiken, South Carolina, the thrust for civic involvement and institution-building seemed to evolve naturally from Du Pont's internal culture and the larger culture of the Cold War. Perhaps what is most surprising about the transition of Aiken from a sleepy, wealthy enclave to bustling small city was not *that* it happened, but how quickly change came to this one community. By all accounts the early years of the plant (essentially 1950–1957) were frantic. The pressure to develop the hydrogen bomb and expand the nation's nuclear arsenal was enormous. In this harried context, such a high level of civic involvement makes sense only from the perspective of the employees themselves, who viewed community involvement as an integral part of their

overall mission. The result was a more modern South. The efforts of plant employees to create a viable Republican Party laid the critical groundwork for a two-party system in a region that had not known true political competition since the nineteenth century. The creation of a more democratic, competitive political system in which the local Republican Party drew on themes resonating in communities around the nation ultimately made the South less peculiar, and more like the rest of the country.

NOTES

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7. David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr., *Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902–1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 221–86.
8. Martin, "Corporate Cold Warriors," 174–77.
9. Statement by the President on Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R., September 23, 1949, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman; Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1949* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), 485. Many of the nation's leading scientists opposed the creation of the superbomb on moral and ethical grounds, equating its destructive power with genocide. In

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10. U.S. Department of Energy, *The Savannah River Plant of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission*, 1963, 3.
 11. "Wizards of Wilmington," 94.
 12. Daniel Lang, "Camellias and Bombs," *New Yorker*, July 7, 1951, 42.
 13. P. Stuart Chapin, Jr., et al., *In the Shadow of a Defense Plant: A Study of Urbanization in Rural South Carolina; A Final Report of the Savannah River Urbanization Study*, Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, June 1954, 1. The head of DuPont's Explosives Department, H. L. Brown, wrote a memo on November 6, 1950, that detailed comparisons between a Paris, Texas, site and the Savannah River location. Brown noted that the Savannah River location had a lower wage scale. Further, the Texas site was occupied by two large cattle ranchers, while the Savannah River site was occupied by "colored agricultural workers" whose "houses are of low value." Presumably, they would be easier to dislocate. See Jobie Turner, "Aiken for Armageddon: The Savannah River Site and Aiken, South Carolina" (Master's thesis, University of Georgia, 1998), 20–22.
 14. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Press Release, November 28, 1950, in Atomic Plant—Miscellaneous file, Burnet R. Maybank Papers, Special Collections, Marlene and Nathan Addlestone Library, College of Charleston, Charleston, South Carolina; U.S. Department of Energy, *Facts and Data on The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Savannah River Plant in South Carolina* (n.p., n.d.), 3–5; U.S. Department of Energy, *The Savannah River Plant* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), 9. The literature on the Korean War is extensive. Standard works include Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990); William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: M. Joseph, 1987). For the domestic consequences of the Korean War, see especially Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999); and Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
 15. *Aiken Standard and Review*, November 29, 1950.

16. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, "Savannah River Plant Construction History," Volume I: Administration (January 1957), 35–36; Chapin et al., *In the Shadow of a Defense Plant*, 14.
17. Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Agriculture, 1940*, Vol. 1, Part 3: *Statistics for Counties* (Washington, D.C., 1942), 442; Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Agriculture: 1950*, Vol. 1, Part 16: *Counties and State Economic Areas: North and South Carolina* (Washington, D.C., 1952), 456; Chapin et al., *In the Shadow of a Defense Plant*, 5–10, 16. "Tenant farmers had composed 70% of Aiken and Barnwell Counties' farmers in 1925. Only 49% of all county farmers were tenants twenty-five years later"; Mary Beth Reed, et al., *Savannah River Site at Fifty* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 112–13 (quotation in note) and 155.
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20. Lang, "Camellias and Bombs," 40.
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22. "Wizards of Wilmington," 95.
23. Crawford H. Greenewalt, "The Slow and Steady Way of Progress," p. 2, speech, December 5, 1951, New York City, Pamphlet Collection, Duke University Library.
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29. McKibben, interview; Joseph, interview.
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33. Crawford H. Greenewalt, "A Philosophy of Business Leadership," speech, International Industrial Conference, San Francisco, September 13, 1965, 10–11; Walt Joseph, telephone interview with author, September 15, 2006.
34. Arthur W. Rich, interview with author, October 15, 2005, Aiken, South Carolina, tape recording.
35. Owen Clary, telephone interview with author, October 26, 2005.
36. *Aiken Standard and Review*, March 11, 1954, 2.
37. *Ibid.*, March 13, 1956, 2; March 20, 1956, 3.
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39. Minutes, Aiken City Council, April 27, 1953, May 11, 1953.
40. Crosland Park Civic Association, Resolution, March 5, 1955, included in Minutes, Aiken City Council, March 8, 1955.
41. Minutes, Aiken City Council, May 23, 1955.
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43. Laura Jane Gifford, "'Dixie Is No Longer in the Bag': South Carolina Republicans and the Election of 1960," *Journal of Policy History* 19 (2007), 208.
44. Kalk, *Origins of the Southern Strategy*, 30.
45. For information on the early years of the Republican Party in Aiken, see Harbor McClaren, interview with author, Aiken, South Carolina, December 2004, tape recording; Joseph quoted in Reed, *Savannah River Site at Fifty*, 251–52.
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48. For information on Johnston's career, see Bryant Simon, *A Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910–1948* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), and Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932–1968* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
49. William D. Workman to Barry Goldwater, January 14, 1962, in campaign files, 1962, box 4, William D. Workman Papers, Modern Political Collections, University of South Carolina, Columbia.
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53. Workman speech, August 25, 1962, Rock Hill, S.C., campaign files, box 5, Workman Papers.
54. Workman advertisement, *Aiken Standard and Review*, October 26, 1962. Also see *Aiken Standard and Review*, July 15, 1962.

55. Workman, acceptance speech, Republican state Convention, March 17, 1962, campaign files, 1962, box 5, Workman Papers.
56. Gus Robinson to Workman, January 4, 1962, includes typed notes from Workman on bottom, in campaign files, box 5, Workman Papers.
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59. "Aiken County Vote Tallies," n.d., campaign files, box 5, Workman Papers.
60. Merritt, "The Senatorial Election of 1962," 289 (quoting Dent); Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 358.



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KARI FREDERICKSON

Creating a "Respectable Area": Southerners and the Cold War

When Strom Thurmond and a host of future political leaders returned to the American South following their service overseas in World War II, they came home determined to remake the South in a more progressive mold. Intense and prolonged interaction with men from other regions of the country and immersion in the large and powerful armed forces bureaucracy shaped their thinking about the future of the South in new and profound ways. Convinced that the South lagged behind the rest of the nation economically, and that the South's stunted, colonial economy had perpetuated the political control of an entrenched moss-back elite committed to low-wage extractive industries, men like Thurmond were equally convinced that the road to economic transformation was paved with federal dollars. Many of these new funds were funneled through the military-industrial complex. As the South's political leaders from the late 1940s through the 1980s (and, in Thurmond's case, into the next century), these men were consistent supporters of a strong military and a foreign policy that took a hard line in its dealings with Communist nations.¹

As a regional historian, it is not at all surprising that I take as orthodox the notion that the peculiar, historic forces that shaped and defined the South likewise played an important role in determining the foreign policy positions of its political leaders. Their support for a strong military, as Andy Fry notes, was predicated in part on the economic benefits that the expansion of the military industrial complex brought to their communities and states. By the early 1970s, the Southern states were providing the Pentagon with 52 percent of its ships, 46 percent of its airframes, 42 percent of its petroleum products, and 27 percent of its ammunition.² The relationship between Southern states and the national security state was strong and vital.

1. James C. Cobb, "World War II and the Mind of the Modern South," in *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South*, ed. Neil R. McMillen (Jackson, MS, 1997); Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1964* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 171.

2. Bruce J. Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the American South, 1938-1980* (Durham, NC, 1994), 136; Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York, 1991); "Southern Militarism," *Southern Exposure* (Spring 1973): 61.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Vol. 36, No. 3 (June 2012). © 2012 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

Having spent the better part of the last ten years examining how decisions regarding the expansion of the arms race affected Southern communities, I would argue for a further refinement of this position. Military contracts and Cold War industrial facilities brought more than jobs: they possessed the power to remake entire regional economies, bringing the fruits of modernization that had alluded the South for so long. From Tenneco's Newport News shipbuilding plant in Hampton Roads, Virginia, to General Dynamics and LTV Corporation in Texas, the military and the federal government created a new high-tech industrial workforce whose cultural tastes, spending habits, and political allegiances changed the face of the South. The arrival of the military-industrial complex into underdeveloped Southern communities helped the region to overcome some of its more unsavory regional attributes. The Cold War made the South less "Southern."

Developments in Strom Thurmond's home state of South Carolina provide examples of how Cold War decision makers at the highest levels took regional patterns into account. In January 1950, on the advice of his special advisory committee, President Harry Truman authorized an accelerated program to develop the hydrogen bomb. The production of the "super" required a new facility to produce plutonium, tritium, and other products. During the spring and summer of 1950, officials from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and DuPont Corporation (recruited by President Truman to operate the vast weapons complex) crisscrossed the nation, investigating over one hundred potential sites. They ultimately settled on a site in western South Carolina that bordered the Savannah River. While factors, such as the water quality of the Savannah and the drainage properties of the region's sandy soil, played an important role in the decision of where to locate the plant, so too did more historic, particularly Southern, attributes. Of the handful of sites that made it into the final round of consideration, the South Carolina location was notable for its construction wage rates—the lowest among all possible sites. South Carolina's low wage rates reflected the state's historically weak labor movement and hostile antiunion atmosphere. AEC officials responsible for making recommendations regarding the placement of the site likewise noted that most of those living inside the proposed plant boundaries were black tenant farmers. These "colored agricultural workers," noted one official, resided in houses that were of "low value." Removing such residents would be easier than removing residents at alternate sites where property values were higher.³ Here, government officials

3. "Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council to the President," January 31, 1950, U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950* (Washington, DC, 1977), 1: 513–23. Site specifics found in C. H. Topping, Engineering Department, E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, "Plant 124 Site Survey," November 27, 1950, box H-10-1, series 43, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Records, Record Group 326, National Archives and Records Administration, Southeast Region, Morrow, Georgia; H. F. Brown to Heads of Departments and Branch Offices, Works, and Divisions of Explosives Department, July 11, 1950, file 7, box 6, subseries C, series II, Acc.

exploited the historically vulnerable position of rural blacks trapped in the economic vice that was the South's tenant system. Such residents possessed neither the financial resources nor the political clout to fight their removal from the land. An awareness of how specific regional characteristics, such as an underpaid skilled labor force and a captive black rural population, played into decisions regarding the expansion of the arms race made at the highest levels of government only lends an appreciation of the complexity of the workings of the national security state.

The dynamic social, cultural, economic, and political transformation that accompanied the arrival of what eventually was called the Savannah River Plant (SRP) helps to explain why leaders such as Thurmond were such strong supporters of the nation's military and of an aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy. Prior to the SRP's arrival, this section of South Carolina was primarily rural, dominated by low-wage jobs in agriculture and textiles, and had one of the most abysmal rates of high school graduation in the state. Within ten years and after the arrival of nearly 25,000 new residents, the region was highly suburbanized, home to several national retail outlets, and boasted more Ph.Ds per capita than any area of the state. Simply put, the new SRP employees remade the region. They improved its schools, created a cornucopia of civic and arts organizations, and revamped the structure of local government, among other developments. They imbued the region with a notion of modernization and progress that even the long-term residents bought into. Recalling the impact of the arrival of scientists and engineers to the town of Aiken, South Carolina, located within commuting distance to the SRP, textile worker Lenwood Melton speculated that their presence had somehow brought the region into the modern era. "It [the plant and the new permanent residents] upgraded things, really, because we had never had that level of people amongst us. When you got those types coming in, and of course, they were more well-to-do [than the textile mill workers and farmers], and they built some fine houses, they brought the shopping malls, they started new churches, they started doing things like big city folks. . . . As far as the community of [greater] Aiken is concerned, it grew up into a very respectable area."⁴ As Melton's observation implies, over time, residents saw themselves as members of a progressive, modern community, a new vision of themselves that was intimately tied to their role in the Cold War arms race. This new vision was profoundly shaped by DuPont's corporate culture. DuPont fostered a local culture that privileged modernization, innovation, efficiency, consumption, and civic involvement as indispensable components in the Cold War battle with communism. DuPont relentlessly encouraged the connection between the SRP and the achievement of "the good life." In fact, few

1957, Atomic Energy Division/Savannah River Plant Papers, Hagley Library, Wilmington, Delaware (quotation).

4. Lenwood Melton, interview with author, May 2003, Graniteville, South Carolina.

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corporations in the postwar era better represented the American Cold War promise of economic prosperity through mass consumption than DuPont.

For residents and leaders of South Carolina, support for a strong national defense and a staunchly anti-Communist foreign policy, then, went beyond mere dollars and cents. Their support had a deeper, more nuanced meaning. It spoke to their best hopes for themselves and their community as well as to their sense of their place in the nation.

Charles S. Bullock and Mark Rozell, eds., *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021)

13

Alabama

Polarized and Uncompetitive

David A. Hughes



Over the past several decades, southern politics have been in a state of partisan flux. Long the sole governing faction in the American South, state Democratic parties began losing their stranglehold on political institutions from the 1980s up through the 2000s (Black and Black 2002). In most southern states, this transitional period led back to one-party control, though this time by Republicans. More recently, however, several southern states have seen the reemergence of two-party competition as urbanization, in-migration, and generational replacement have propelled a more liberal brand of southern Democrats back into a position of genuine competition (Bullock et al. 2019).

For example, Virginia has voted Democratic in every presidential election since 2008, and in 2019, Virginia state Democrats won their first trifecta since 1993.¹ In Georgia in 2020, the Democratic candidate for president won the state's Electoral College votes for the first time since 1992, and in a runoff election held two months later, two Democratic candidates defeated two incumbent Republican U.S. senators to unify Democratic control of the state's Senate seats for the first time since 2003. In other Rim South states like Texas, Florida, and North Carolina, Democrats continue to improve their performance in state elections and threaten Republicans up and down the ticket.

With few exceptions, Alabama has not been among these “New South” states.² While its political factions might resemble those where Democrats once again vie for power, looks can be deceiving. The Alabama Republican Party reigns supreme, and its status is under no serious doubt at this time. In what follows, I review modern developments in Alabama politics, including partisanship, elections, factional control of institutions, and issue development. I conclude that while the state experienced a transformational period of democratization in the latter parts of the twentieth

century, its core set of factions and animating political issues have largely remained invariant to changes in partisanship.

VOTER TURNOUT AND REALIGNMENT

Alabama realigned from the Democratic Party more slowly compared to other southern states (Hust, Kidd, and Morris 2012). Prior to the 1960s, Jim Crow restrictions on the franchise such as the literacy test limited citizens' ability to register to vote or to cast ballots, especially among African Americans (Key 1949). With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, and with it the requirement that states like Alabama preclear new voting laws with the federal government, participation in Alabama elections swelled (Bullock and Gaddie 2009).

In figure 13.1, we see the percent of the voting-age population (VAP) that cast ballots in each of the presidential and gubernatorial elections held between 1952 and 2020. Between 1952 and 1964, an average of only about 30 percent of the VAP cast ballots in Alabama's presidential elections, and fewer still, only about 17 percent, participated in gubernatorial elections. Following the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, however, turnout increased by approximately 45 percent between the




Figure 13.1. Voting age population turnout in Alabama's presidential and gubernatorial elections (1952–2020). Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1952–2011; and the Alabama Secretary of State's Office, 2011–2020.

1964 and 1968 presidential elections and by a stunning 160 percent between the 1962 and 1966 gubernatorial elections. Furthermore, these gains have been persistent over the years, and in 2020, VAP turnout in the presidential election climbed to a record high of 61 percent.

With Jim Crow barriers to the franchise eliminated, a wave of new voters joined the electorate, and a transformation of Alabama politics was underway. During this period, African American voters overwhelmingly registered to vote as Democrats and increasingly elected representatives who looked like themselves. The first African American state legislators since Reconstruction assumed office in 1971. As seen in figure 13.2, over the next twenty-five years, the proportion of Black legislators in both the Alabama House of Representatives and the Alabama Senate steadily increased until achieving parity with their proportion of the state population. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, African Americans comprise approximately 27 percent of the state's population.³ And since 1995, Black Democrats have maintained an average control of nearly 25 percent of state House seats and approximately 22 percent of state Senate seats.⁴

The mobilization of minority voters had a twofold and complementary effect on state politics. First, the increasing participation and representation of African Americans in the Democratic Party transformed it from the party of White supremacy to




Figure 13.2. Percent of the Alabama legislature's two chambers represented by African Americans (1960–2020). Sources: Bullock and Gaddie (2009), 1960–2007. Remaining years gathered by author.

the party of biracial politics in a remarkably short time (Black and Black 2002). If White politicians wanted to win Democratic primaries, they would need to compete for African Americans' votes, which would require them to moderate their positions on critical issues like race. Indeed, no less a personage than George Wallace built a political coalition for his final, successful, gubernatorial race of 1982 based in no small part upon appealing to the very people he'd victimized as the onetime standard-bearer for White supremacy (Frederick 2007).

Second, the increased presence of African Americans in the Democratic Party caused an exodus of conservative Whites to the Republican Party (Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2012). During this period, a paradox emerged across the South whereby Democrats—many of whom had ample conservative bona fides from years past—were forced to run more moderate campaigns to win primary elections, but such moderation put them at risk of losing to more conservative, Republican candidates in the general election, particularly in open elections where Democrats could not point to seniority in legislatures as a justification for retention (Black and Black 2002).

These two complementary phenomena—the surge of Black voters and the exodus of White voters—in Democratic politics resulted in a brief period in Alabama between the early 1980s and late 2000s where Democrats and Republicans competed on a nearly equal footing for power. On one side, Democrats organized coalitions of voters largely based on the electoral strategy of George Wallace's 1982 victory. The Wallace coalition laid the groundwork for virtually every statewide Democratic campaign waged since. It consisted of African Americans, labor unions, metropolitan voters, and poorer voters (Cotter and Stovall 2009). On the other side, the Republican coalition consisted overwhelmingly of White voters, especially White Evangelicals, middle- and upper-class voters such as those moving to the suburbs, and business interests as represented by the traditional big males.

Alabama voters first began voting Republican at the top of the ticket before abandoning Democrats at the local level. Figure 13.3 displays support for Democratic performance in state elections. In the left-hand pane is the percent of the vote Democratic candidates for president and governor received in each election between 1952 and 2020. With the exception of the anomalous 1968 election featuring the independent candidacy of George Wallace for president, the steady downward trend in support for state and federal Democrats is clear. Alabama has not voted for a Democratic presidential candidate since 1976 and has not elected a Democratic governor since 1998.

Democrats at the local level tended to outperform statewide candidates well into the late 2000s. In the right-hand pane of figure 13.3, we see the share of the Alabama House and Senate controlled by Democrats. Until passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Democrats regularly controlled every legislative seat. Since the 1970s, however, Democrats have lost seats in almost every election cycle, including the most recent ones in 2018 and 2020, due largely to their loss of support among rural White voters. Democrats formally lost control of both chambers of the state legislature in




Figure 13.3. Democratic performance in presidential, gubernatorial, and state House and Senate elections (1952–2020). *Sources:* U.S. Census Bureau, *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1952–2011 and the Alabama Secretary of State's Office, 2011–2020.

2010, and today, nearly every Democratic lawmaker is African American and every Republican lawmaker is White.

Despite a series of blunders by Alabama Republicans, today's state Democrats have, with few exceptions, been unable to capitalize on them. In 2016, the Alabama Speaker of the House, Republican Mike Hubbard, was convicted on twelve felony charges related to violations of state ethics law and removed from office (Cason 2016). Later that year, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary removed Republican Roy Moore, the chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, from office for his efforts to thwart the U.S. Supreme Court's 2015 decision invalidating the state's ban on same-sex marriage (Faulk 2016).⁶ And the following year, Republican governor Robert Bentley was forced to resign after pleading guilty to campaign finance violations related to an affair with a member of his staff (Koplowitz 2017).

Despite these missteps, Republicans have paid no discernible electoral penalty with voters. Republicans retained the governorship in 2018 in a twenty-point landslide, increased their supermajorities in the Alabama legislature, and elected a new chief justice who was once a protégé of Roy Moore's (Brown 2018). Republicans control every elected position in the executive branch of government and all nineteen

elected positions on the state's three appellate courts. It controls six out of seven U.S. House seats and both of the state's seats in the U.S. Senate. As of this writing, every statewide position in Alabama is occupied by a Republican.

MODERN PARTISANSHIP

The changing tides in Alabama elections are reflected by voters' evolving party preferences. In the early 1980s, over half of all Alabamians identified as Democrats compared to fewer than one in five identifying as Republicans. Even as late as 2005, about as many Alabamians identified as Democrats as they did Republicans—approximately 38 percent each (Cotter and Stovall 2009). Today, around 54 percent of Alabamians consider themselves Republicans compared to only about 30 percent who consider themselves Democrats—a twenty-four-point Democratic deficit (AUM Poll 2020b).⁷ And in virtually any given statewide election, Republican candidates typically defeat Democrats by twenty to thirty percentage points.

Despite all of the issues Alabama Democrats face, there have been some positive developments in recent years indicating that their worst days are perhaps behind them. To begin, it appears that in statewide campaigns, Democratic support finally bottomed out sometime in the mid-2010s, as there appear to be no more White voters for them to lose and a few of them to gain among younger voters and in urban and suburban areas. In 2016, Hillary Clinton earned just 34.4 percent of the state's total presidential vote—the smallest general election vote share for any Democratic presidential candidate since 1968 when George Wallace ran against Democrat Hubert Humphrey as an Independent. In 2020, Joe Biden received 36.6 percent of the vote—a modest improvement of 2.2 points. In gubernatorial politics, the Democratic candidate, Parker Griffith, won 36.4 percent of the 2014 vote; whereas in 2018, Democrat Walt Maddox won 40.4 percent, for an improvement of four points.

By far the greatest Democratic success in recent years was in the 2017 U.S. Senate special election when Doug Jones defeated embattled Republican candidate Roy Moore to become the first Democratic senator to win election in Alabama since Richard Shelby in 1992. Upon Donald Trump's election as president in 2016, Alabama's junior Republican senator, Jeff Sessions, became Trump's pick for U.S. attorney general, creating a vacancy for Governor Bentley to fill. Bentley, who was already ensnared in his extramarital affair scandal, was under investigation by the state's attorney general, Luther Strange. In what became widely interpreted as a corrupt bargain, Bentley appointed Strange to the vacant Senate seat, thereby giving Bentley an opportunity to appoint a new attorney general—one who would presumably inherit Strange's investigation into the governor (Hughes 2017).

Bentley's appointment of Strange to the U.S. Senate infuriated voters, and following Bentley's resignation as governor, a special election was announced to consider his future. At this time, Roy Moore, already suspended from office by the Court of

the judiciary, resigned his post as chief justice to run against Strange in the Republican primary. Moore had extensive experience in statewide campaigns, and due to his frehanded conservatism, he was the darling of White, rural, evangelical voters. After forcing Strange into a runoff, Moore defeated the incumbent to face Democratic nominee Doug Jones in a December general election (Hughes 2017).⁸ But just over a month before the election, the *Washington Post* published a bombshell story alleging that Moore, as a younger man, had behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner toward women as young as fourteen (McCrutcher, Reinhard, and Crites 2017).

The accusations against Moore, who denied all wrongdoing, upended the election. Democratic voters surged to the polls while Republican turnout sagged. On Election Day, Jones narrowly defeated Moore by 1.6 percentage points, or by fewer than twenty-two thousand votes—a margin smaller than the number of voters casting write-in ballots. Propelling Jones to victory was a better-than-average performance in some of the state's more suburban and better-educated counties like Madison, Tuscaloosa, and Leno—counties that typically vote Republican given their large White and affluent populations (Hughes 2017). Jones's victory proved anomalous, however, as two years later, former Auburn University football coach, Republican Tommy Tuberville, defeated Jones in his reelection effort by more than twenty percentage points.

Doug Jones's temporary success, however, illuminates another potential bright spot for state Democrats in light of developments in neighboring states like Georgia (Bullock et al. 2019). Since Alabama's conservative White population realigned into the Republican Party, Democrats have struggled to break the 40 percent vote threshold in any statewide election. Jones's 2017 victory not only relied on the foundation of Democratic support in Alabama—African American voters in cities and in the Black Belt—but made significant inroads into areas traditionally won by Republicans—suburban areas with wealthier, better-educated voters—and among groups of Whites traditionally aligned with Republicans.

According to an exit poll by NBC News conducted during the Jones-Moore election, Jones performed better than expected among younger voters, voters with a college education, and female voters (NBC News 2018). According to the poll, Jones won voters aged eighteen to forty-four by over twenty-two percentage points. Voters with a college degree preferred Jones to Moore by a margin of eleven percentage points, and female voters preferred Jones to Moore by sixteen percentage points. And while Jones only received 30 percent of the White vote, he polled significantly better among Whites with a college education and White women. According to the survey, Jones received eight percentage points more support from White women compared to White men, and he received eighteen percentage points more support among White college graduates compared to non-college graduates.

While Jones lost his reelection effort, public opinion research suggests that some of the demographics previously mentioned might be primed to realign toward the Democratic Party should current trends continue. In October 2020, a survey conducted by Auburn University at Montgomery gauged 948 likely Alabama voters

Table 13.1. Alabama Demographics and Partisanship

	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Republican</i>
Race			
Black	62.9	15.5	15.3
White	17.0	9.7	70.3
Gender			
Female	33.0	11.5	50.6
Male	27.5	11.5	57.6
Age			
18–24	41.4	14.9	30.8
25–34	32.9	13.1	47.1
35–44	39.9	13.6	44.4
45–54	32.5	16.3	50.0
55–64	25.0	10.5	61.4
65+	16.7	3.7	78.1
Education			
High school	29.1	11.4	57.0
Some college	31.0	6.1	60.0
College degree	25.6	14.6	57.4
Graduate degree	37.9	8.8	51.5
Income			
Less than \$25k	37.7	15.5	39.1
\$25k–\$49.9k	29.2	9.6	59.2
\$50k–\$74.9k	25.0	14.0	56.1
\$75k–\$99.9k	24.7	7.7	65.3
\$100k–\$149.9k	28.0	8.6	59.6
\$150k+	31.4	8.7	59.2
Total	30.2	11.5	54.0

Note: Table entries represent percentages. Survey conducted October 23–28, 2020, by Auburn University at Montgomery's AUM Poll. *N* = 948 likely Alabama voters.

party preferences and found similarities with the 2017 special election (AUM Poll 2020b). I present the findings from this survey in table 13.1, which shows not only remnants of the old Wallace and anti-Wallace coalitions of the 1980s to 2000s but also the prospect for Democratic expansion now that the political realignment of that era is complete.

We can see remnants of the previous party era's coalitions from table 13.1 by examining race and income. Wallace and his Democratic successors relied heavily (and increasingly) on African American support as the Reagan Revolution swept increasing numbers of Whites into the Republican Party (Cotter and Stovall 2009). The partisan gap between Black and White respondents who identify as Democrats is forty-six percentage points, and the gap between the percent of Black and White Republicans is even bigger at fifty-five percentage points. The Wallace coalition also relied on poorer voters as Alabama Republicanism became increasingly the party of better-off voters. We see from table 13.1 that while Democrats enjoy support from

the poorest voters, Republicans today have a partisan advantage in nearly every income bracket. This is good evidence that the realignment of poorer (especially rural) Whites into the Republican Party is all but complete.

Now that the previous era of partisan realignment is passed, however, we can examine issues like age, education, and gender to get a potential glimpse of the next era in Alabama's partisan politics. Over the last several years, aside from their deficit among non-White voters, the national Republican Party has struggled with younger, better-educated, and female voters in particular (Pew Research Center 2020). Among all Americans, Democrats have opened up an eighteen-percentage-point lead over Republicans among female voters, a twenty-point lead among college graduates, and a sixteen-point lead among voters under the age of forty.

Though less stark in degree, many of the same trends can be found in Alabama politics today. Examining results from table 13.1, observe that in all but one age cohort, more Alabamians identify as Republicans compared to Democrats. Nevertheless, the youngest cohort of voters—those aged eighteen to twenty-four—are approximately ten percentage points more Democratic than Republican. By comparison, the oldest cohort of Alabamians—those aged sixty-five or older—are sixty-one percentage points more Republican than Democratic. Should this trend continue, Democrats could eventually begin to contest elections as younger voters age and begin voting en masse and as older voters are generationally replaced in the electorate.

We also see evidence from survey data that the modern Alabama Republican Party might have issues with female voters. Again, since Republicans don't face the same steep obstacles as their national counterpart, but we see from table 13.1 that female respondents are indeed less likely to identify as Republicans. Compared to males, female respondents are 7 percentage points less Republican and 5.5 percentage points more Democratic.

Finally, education in Alabama shows modest signs that it is affecting partisanship. Though Republicans enjoy majority support among all categories of education in table 13.1, we see that individuals with a postgraduate education are more likely to identify as Democrats. Only about 29 percent of Alabamians with less than a postgraduate degree identify as Democrats compared to 38 percent of postgraduates who identify as Democrats. Even still, postgraduates only make up approximately 10 percent of Alabama adults aged twenty-five or older according to U.S. Census estimates.⁹

An additional development may bode well for the future of Alabama Democrats. A perennial complaint among state party members has been that the party's State Democratic Executive Committee (SDEC) was poorly organized, neglected grassroots organization, was uncompetitive, and was monopolized by an older generation of Democratic leaders who no longer represented younger, more progressive interests. In 2019, the party ousted Nancy Worley as chair of the SDEC and elected Chris England, a young state legislator from Tuscaloosa, as its first Black chair (Cason 2019). Proponents of the move, including Doug Jones, argued that new leadership would reinvigorate the party moving forward, especially among younger voters,

Given the demographic trends just explored, one might be tempted to conclude that Alabama might begin to vote like other southern states such as Georgia and Virginia, where Democrats have begun contesting and winning statewide elections. Closer inspection, however, makes clear that it will be many years before Democrats can once again compete on an even footing with Republicans for statewide office.

Principally, Alabama has not experienced the same economic growth or social immigration compared to these other, more competitive states. With the exception of recent booms in the Birmingham and Huntsville areas, the Alabama populace has remained largely stagnant over time.¹⁰ As of the 1970 decennial census, 58.6 percent of the state lived in an urban area. According to the 2010 census, 59.0 percent of the population lived in an urban area—an increase of 0.7 percent over a forty-year period. By comparison, over the same forty-year period, Georgia became 24.5 percent more urban as it went from 60.3 percent urban to 75.1 percent urban.¹¹

Alabama's failure to attract major new industries has also inhibited its ability to attract a vibrant and diverse new workforce. In 1970, Alabama and Georgia looked quite similar demographically. Alabama's population was approximately 3.4 million, and Georgia's was approximately 4.6 million. Each state was approximately 26 percent African American and 74 percent White. Nearly a half century of growth in Georgia, however, has left its western neighbor lagging far behind. By 2019, Georgia's population had grown by 127 percent to 10.4 million, while Alabama's had grown just 42 percent to 4.9 million. This massive in-migration has also left Georgia significantly less White. Today, it is just 59 percent White (a decline of 21 percent over forty-nine years), while Alabama remains 68 percent White (a decline of just 7 percent).

Alabama has experienced considerable partisan change over the past half century. Long a solidly Democratic state, White voters began abandoning the Democratic Party as Black voters registered as Democrats following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A brief period from the 1980s to the 2000s emerged in which Democrats and Republicans competed on a near even footing before Republicans consolidated the White vote and assumed virtually unchecked control of state government. In recent years, Democrats have shown some signs of improving their electoral fortunes among younger, better-educated, and female voters, but they continue to lose most statewide offices by at least twenty percentage points due in part to Alabama's stagnant population and economy. Thus, for the foreseeable future, Alabama is likely to remain tightly under the control of Republicans.

ISSUES IN ALABAMA POLITICS

Alabama politics have evolved significantly over the past half century. Racist politicians of yesteryear would hardly recognize a political system in which African Americans comprise a total of 26 percent of all registered voters,¹² where 26 percent of the state House of Representatives and 20 percent of the state Senate are African Ameri-

can, where one representative to the U.S. House of Representatives is an African American, and where the mayors of two of the state's largest cities in Birmingham and Montgomery—long bastions of White supremacy—are African Americans.

And yet, despite such monstrous change, much of Alabama's politics remains little altered. To begin, race, even when not directly on the surface, lurks beneath nearly every issue in state politics. According to results presented in table 13.1, Alabama's political parties are badly racially polarized. Only 17 percent of White voters identify as Democrats, and only 15 percent of Black voters identify as Republicans (AUM Poll 2020b). Because African Americans only make up about 27 percent of the state's population, Whites win virtually every statewide office. And political campaigns for those offices, in addition to the policy struggles that happen there, are oftentimes symbolically racial.

Take, for example, the Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017. The legislation prohibits the removal of monuments that have been in place for at least forty years and is widely interpreted as intended to protect monuments erected in honor of Confederate causes (Cason 2017). The original legislation was controversial at the time of its passage, but following the 2020 death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police and the wave of protests it sparked against police brutality of African Americans, criticism of such Confederate symbols only increased. Following the protests, Democratic lawmakers filed proposals to repeal the Alabama Memorial Preservation Act, but these efforts have thus far faltered in light of Republican opposition (Cason 2021).

Public opinion is divided over issues like Confederate symbols in Alabama, and these divisions often trace directly to racial cleavages in the population. In July 2020, a survey conducted by Auburn University at Montgomery measured registered voters' opinions on several salient topics (AUM Poll 2020a). I report some key findings from the survey in table 13.2. By far the biggest polarizing force among Alabama's White and Black population was Donald Trump.¹³ Nearly 66 percent of the White

Table 13.2. Public Opinion in Alabama on Salient Political Issues

Issue	All Voters		Black Voters		White Voters	
	Support	Oppose ^a	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Confederate Monuments	52.3	25.1	44.3	24.5	57.4	23.1
Southern Border wall	53.5	29.9	25.9	45.7	65.7	21.9
Peaceful BLM protests	61.9	12.0	79.3	5.6	54.4	22.0
Noncriminal citizenship	54.5	21.7	63.7	7.0	50.0	27.8
President Donald Trump	53.3	38.3	23.5	65.1	65.9	27.3

Note: Table entries represent percentages. Survey conducted July 2–9, 2020, by Auburn University at Montgomery's AUM Poll, $N = 595$ registered Alabama voters.

population supports the former president compared to only 24 percent of African Americans -- a forty-two-percentage-point gap.

Donald Trump's biggest issue during his 2016 presidential campaign was immigration and support for a southern border wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Consequently, racial attitudes toward immigration closely mirror those toward Trump himself. According to the results of the survey, nearly 66 percent of White Alabamians support construction of a border wall compared to only 26 percent of African Americans. A smaller racial gap exists regarding a potential pathway to citizenship for residents who were unlawfully brought into the United States as children and have no criminal record. According to the survey, approximately 64 percent of African Americans support such a policy proposal compared to only 50 percent of Whites.

Issues related to Confederate symbols and the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests that erupted throughout the summer of 2020 also show signs of racial polarization, though not as much compared to immigration. According to survey results, 57 percent of White Alabamians approve of legislation preventing the removal of Confederate monuments compared to only 44 percent of Black respondents. Nevertheless, while 79 percent of Black respondents reported their support of peaceful BLM protesters, only 54 percent of Whites showed such support (AUM Poll 2020a).

Further investigation of survey results indicates that not only is race an important predictor of support for President Trump, restrictive immigration policies, and Confederate symbols, but adherence to Evangelicalism also appears to drive such support. In table 13.3, I present results from the same survey and questions with results drawn only from White respondents. Responses are divided by a respondent's religious affiliation: Evangelical or otherwise.

We see from table 13.3 that, even when focusing only on White respondents, Evangelicals are disproportionately more likely to voice support for policies or politicians that have racially conservative implications. Again, the most polarizing factor from this set of survey results is Donald Trump and immigration. There is a nearly fifteen-percentage-point gap in support for Trump between White Evangelicals and non-Evangelicals. Evangelical Whites are also significantly more likely than non-Evangelical Whites in support a southern border wall, to oppose a path to citizenship for undocumented children with no criminal record, to support Confederate

Evangelical
+
race

Table 13.3. Public Opinion in Alabama among Whites

Issue	White Evangelical		White Non-Evangelical	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Confederate monuments	65.7	18.0	51.3	26.8
Southern border wall	71.1	18.5	62.0	24.3
Peaceful BLM protests	50.6	23.7	57.2	20.7
Noncriminal citizenship	40.7	30.2	56.8	26.0
President Donald Trump	74.3	19.7	59.7	34.5

Note: Table entries represent percentages. Survey conducted July 2–9, 2020, by Auburn University at Montgomery's AUM Poll. *N* = 596 registered Alabama voters.

monuments, and to oppose peaceful BLM protests (AUM Poll 2020a). Thus, in looking for the root causes of polarization in Alabama politics, race and adherence to evangelicalism are two critical issues.

Evangelical politics in Alabama touch on other social issues unrelated directly to race but that arise from the so-called culture wars stemming from the emergence of groups such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, and The Tea Party movement. This is especially true with respect to issues surrounding women's access to abortion.

In recent years, a spate of new legislation restricting women's access to abortion has been enacted.¹⁴ In 1997, the state passed sweeping antiabortion legislation that, among other things, made it a felony to abort a fetus that had achieved viability.¹⁵ In 2002, the state passed an informed-consent law requiring, among other things, verification that women seeking an abortion had seen or waived seeing an ultrasound of the fetus.¹⁶ In 2013, the state restricted the availability of abortion-inducing drugs.¹⁷ In 2014, the state amended its statutes governing abortions for minors seeking to obtain an abortion without parental consent via judicial bypass to allow judges to appoint counsel to represent the interests of the unborn.¹⁸ And in 2019, the state enacted its strictest antiabortion measure yet when it banned—without exceptions for cases of rape or incest—nearly all abortions such that violators would be sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprisonment (Lyman 2019).

Since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made it the only state to recognize same-sex marriage in 2003,¹⁹ Alabama legislators have also been keen to restrict the rights of sexual or other gender minorities. In 2006, voters and the state legislature approved a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in the state.²⁰ This effort was renewed after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the state's ban in 2015.²¹ In 2017, the state passed new legislation allowing private agencies to deny same-sex couples' applications to adopt children (Bendix 2017). And during the 2021 legislative session, Republican lawmakers introduced new legislation that would criminally ban doctors from treating transgender children with therapies such as puberty blockers (Burkhalter 2021).

Evangelicalism, however, has lost some of its potency in recent years with respect to other political affairs. This is especially true of the third rail of Alabama politics—gambling. Gambling has long been a major issue in Alabama dating back at least to the administration of Democratic governor Don Siegelman (Stewart 2016). The issue pits several interests against one another in Alabama, including the Poarch Creek Indians, who operate legal casinos across Alabama and who are significant donors to numerous politicians, dog track owners and other small bingo sites that compete with the Poarch Creeks, and Evangelicals with a long-held moral opposition to gambling.

In 1999, Alabama voters rejected a cornerstone of Siegelman's 1998 gubernatorial campaign—an education lottery akin to that established in Georgia—by a margin of ten percentage points, largely due to the opposition of religious groups (Manuel 1999). During the 2000s, the so-called gaming wars only escalated as Republican

governor Bob Riley went to battle with his own attorney general and cracked down on what he viewed as illegal bingo halls (Stewart 2016). Since then, lawmakers have consistently endeavored to create a lottery to shore up the state's perennially embattled Education Trust Fund. Nevertheless, politicians beholden to donors like the Pouch Creek Indians or other regional gaming interests have struggled to thread the legislative needle in a manner that would create a state lottery to fund education without earmarking the funds for other projects or affording any one gaming interest a monopoly on gambling revenue.

Today, a major roadblock to an education lottery has been cleared as, after more than twenty years, Evangelical opposition to gambling has significantly waned. According to survey research, a majority of Alabamians (56 percent) support a state-run education lottery (AUM Poll 2020a). This even includes a majority of Evangelical respondents, who support the creation of a state-run education lottery at a rate of 54 percent. And for the first time in a generation, legislators appear poised to pass a major piece of gaming legislation. During the 2021 legislative session, lawmakers introduced an ambitious new grand compromise on gambling aiming to satisfy each of the key players in the lottery debate that appears to have better odds of passage than any other bill in recent memory (Moon 2021).

Overt racism is no longer a viable campaign strategy in Alabama politics. Nevertheless, the politics of race, which dominated state life for generations, are never far from the surface. Over time, conservative Whites, and especially White Evangelicals, gravitated toward new political issues that similarly authorize vulnerable minorities, including women and sexual minorities. Today, one is as likely to hear conservative politicians demonize welfare recipients (long considered a symbolic attack on racial minorities and especially African Americans) as transgender persons. So long as White Evangelicals continue to dominate state politics, this trend is unlikely to change.

CONCLUSION

Alabama politics is a story of political and social division, demagoguery, and one-party rule. Historically, Alabamians have been divided by race and party. Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, these divisions were codified via Jim Crow restrictions on the franchise. The Voting Rights Act proved a critical juncture for state politics, however. The mass mobilization of African American voters who joined the Democratic Party in overwhelming numbers ushered in a period of biracial politics that lasted for roughly a generation between the 1980s and 2000s. Nevertheless, conservative Whites, unwilling to share their party with Black voters, gradually realigned to form a new party of White identity politics-- the modern Alabama Republican Party.

Today, Alabama's political realignment of yesteryear is complete, and a new party era has begun. Alabamians are overwhelmingly divided by race such that most Whites are Republicans, and most Blacks are Democrats. Given the state's inabil-

ity to develop a highly educated, diverse workforce, population patterns today are similar to those fifty years ago. Consequently, White identity politics—specifically Evangelical politics—continue to dominate Alabama as voters and legislators push new policies that glorify symbols of the Confederacy, restrict women's access to abortion, and limit the rights and liberties of sexual minorities. Republican hegemony is therefore thorough and under no serious or immediate threat from Democrats.

Nevertheless, we can begin to see how Alabama politics might begin to change should nascent patterns persist over the long run. The 2017 U.S. Senate special election in which the Democratic candidate, Doug Jones, prevailed lays the groundwork for the future of Alabama Democrats. Younger Alabamians are far less likely to identify as Republicans compared to their elders and will eventually begin to vote in large numbers as they generationally replace older cohorts of Republicans. And should population centers such as Birmingham and Huntsville continue to grow and attract a highly educated workforce, they too could begin to vote more Democratic.

NOTES

1. A “trifecta” refers to unified partisan control of both chambers of the state legislature and the governorship. Parties that enjoy trifectas can much more easily advance their political agendas.

2. Numerous eras in southern history have been so described as representing a “New South” (e.g., Woodward 1971). In this context, however, I refer to a renewed period of two-party competition that emerged sometime in the late 2000s during which Democrats represented racially progressive, diverse interests that were unaligned with their White, conservative forebears.

3. See U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles>.

4. The Alabama Senate has fewer seats compared to the state House of Representatives. With geographically larger districts, it is therefore more difficult for African Americans to achieve parity with their proportion of the state population in the Senate.

5. The “big moles” are a collection of business interests that have played an outsized role in state politics for generations (Key 1949). Historically, the moles were a coalition of agricultural and industrial interests from the state's Black belt and metropolitan centers (Permaloff 2008).

6. See *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. ____ (2015). This was, in fact, Moore's second (time being removed from the position of chief justice. The first occurred in 2003 when he refused to obey a federal court order to remove a giant monument of the Ten Commandments he had installed in the Alabama Supreme Court building. See *Glassroth v. Moore*, 335 F.3d 1282 (2003).

7. See table 13.1.

8. Doug Jones had gained notoriety as a federal attorney who successfully prosecuted members of the Ku Klux Klan for their role in the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama (Edmondson 2020).

9. See U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles>.

10. In recent years, Birmingham has become a hub for the health care industry given the dominant role of the University of Alabama at Birmingham's medical hospital. According to a

UAB study, the university creates \$7.2 billion annually in Alabama economic growth and employs one in every thirty-one Alabama workers (University of Alabama at Birmingham 2017). Birmingham has additionally attracted a slate of new technology startups, such as the grocery delivery service Shipt (Hogan 2019). Huntsville, with its aerospace industry, including NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, Redstone Arsenal, and the recently announced U.S. Space Command headquarters, has been one of Alabama's fastest-growing cities, with high rates of education and income and low rates of unemployment (McDonald 2019; Roop 2021).

11. Census population data is available at the following web address: <http://www.t.ly/q8xW>.

12. Voter registration figures are available from the Alabama Secretary of State's office and include registration by race: <http://www.t.ly/YpNs>.

13. Indeed, Trump has been accused of embodying the politics of symbolic White, Christian nationalism (e.g., Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018).

14. Much of this legislative agenda has been challenged in court, however, with partial success.

15. See Alabama Code § 26-22-3.

16. See Alabama Code § 26-3A-4.

17. See Alabama Code § 26-23E-7.

18. See Alabama Code § 26-21-4.

19. See *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health*, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).

20. See Alabama Constitution of 1901, Amendment 774.

21. See note 6 above.

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The Rational Southerner

*Black Mobilization, Republican Growth,
and the Partisan Transformation of the
American South*

M.V. HOOD III, QUENTIN KIDD, AND
IRWIN L. MORRIS

2012

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for all intents and purposes, no Republican Party at all until the 1970s. We also showed that by the beginning of the twenty-first century, Southern Republicanism was ubiquitous in every state in both the Rim South and the Deep South.

The growth in Southern Republicanism was matched by a similar growth in the mobilization of the black population. In 1960, fewer than 30 percent of voting-age African Americans in the South had registered to vote. By 2008, nearly three-quarters of all voting-age African American Southerners had registered to vote. Although there is evidence that black mobilization was growing before the passage of the VRA in 1965 (see Timpone 1995), there is little question that the VRA provided the impetus for this broad and dramatic increase in voter registration.

The mobilization of the African American population was a regionwide phenomenon in the South over the past half-century, but as we showed in chapter 8, the extent of black mobilization was not uniform across states and counties. The data clearly indicate that some areas experienced significantly greater mobilization than others. It is also apparent that mobilization occurred more rapidly in some areas than in others. The areas with the largest increase in mobilization, however, were not often the same areas in which mobilization increased most rapidly.

As the existing literature would suggest, we see that black mobilization spiked with significant political events, such as the Jackson campaign in 1984 and the Obama campaign and election in 2008. But other patterns in black mobilization are not easily explained by existing research. In chapter 8, we highlighted the fact that we find no evidence of a positive relationship between income and black mobilization at either the state or the substate level. There is little reason to think that the particular type of political participation on which we focus—registering to vote—is likely to be primarily a function of black empowerment, another important aspect of the research on black political participation.

The theory of *relative advantage* outlined in chapter 3 helps us understand this dramatic Southern transformation. It also provides a logic that highlights the intersection of the two pillars of the disintegration of the “Solid South”—the mobilization of African Americans and the growth of the GOP. As African Americans flowed into the electorate (and overwhelmingly the Democratic Party), white conservatives bolted for the Republican Party. Although the competitiveness of the Southern Republicans and the organizational strength of the Republican Party in the South had an independent impact on subsequent GOP growth, we saw a strong relationship between black electoral strength and GOP growth even when accounting for variation

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in the strength of other factors. In chapter 4, we illustrated the dynamics of relative advantage with detailed case studies and a wealth of archival data.

We saw this dynamic in patterns of GOP growth clearly and consistently at the state level (in chapter 5) and at the county/parish level (in chapter 6). Somewhat surprisingly given the limitations of the data, we also found evidence of this dynamic at the individual level (although this effect was mediated). We also found that the mobilization of the African American electorate had a substantial effect on GOP growth in the face of controls for other traditional explanations, such as income growth, in-migration, and evangelicalism. Simply put, we found, as the theory of relative advantage predicted, that the growth of Southern Republicanism was *primarily* driven by racial dynamics, not class, demographic factors, or religion, as others have suggested. Through we are suggesting a distinctive dynamic, in this important respect our work mirrors Key's (1949) seminal work on Southern politics. At the midpoint of the last century, according to Key, Southern politics revolved around the issue of race. Southern politics in the early twenty-first century still revolves around the issue of race.

Much of the recent research on Southern politics—Lattin (2004) and Shafer and Johnston (2009, 2006) are prominent examples—argues that the role of race in modern Southern politics has been overemphasized and that the key to understanding the postwar partisan transformation in the South is class conflict driven by economic growth. We are not arguing that the economic transformation of the South did not play a role in the development of the Republican Party in the region, but it is not the key aspect of—or the primary mover behind—the growth of the Southern wing of the GOP. To understand the temporal and spatial dynamics of GOP growth in the region, we would argue that one must understand the politics of race. Stated succinctly, the partisan and political transformation of the South over the past half-century has, most centrally, revolved around the issue of race.

But is it possible that this racial dynamic has played itself out? If we are correct about the political dynamics that have gotten us to this point, then we may be very near the high-water mark of Southern Republicanism. Based on our analysis, the primary impetus for the growth of the Southern wing of the GOP was the increasing electoral strength of the African American population. A significant increase in black electoral strength would require one of the following: (1) a sizeable jump in the mobilization rate of the existing African American population, (2) a large increase in the relative size of the African American population, or (3) some non-trivial increase in both mobilization rates and population among African Americans.

relationship that resonates strongly into the present.”²³ The practice of racial segregation was supported by southern religious leaders and laypeople. According to historian Fred Bailey, southern Baptists and other white clergy “gave the sanction of religion to a society in which white men of substance were born to rule, lesser whites to follow, and blacks to obey.” The relegation of Blacks to an inferior social status was required in “a virtuous Christian society.”²⁴ This imagined virtuous Christian society was a patriarchal one of order based on rigid and interlocking racial and gender hierarchies in which white women and all Black people were subservient to white men.

The Civil Rights Movement profoundly threatened the southern social order, and white evangelicals marshalled religion in defense of segregation as the movement accelerated. In Alabama specifically, site of critical victories for the cause of racial equality, ministers and laypeople invoked religion in defense of racial segregation. Historian Paul Harvey writes that ministers such as Henry L. Lyon of Birmingham “defended segregation as positively God-ordained. In ‘Why Racial Integration is UnChristian,’ an address he delivered often, he argued that ‘separation of the races is the commandment and law of God.’”²⁵ The *Alabama Baptist* printed the opinion of the Reverend J.M. Drummond, who claimed that “integration is nothing but Communism, and it is strictly against God’s Holy Word.”²⁶

Ultimately, white southerners lost the fight to maintain segregation. But the anger of conservative evangelicals with the relatively moderate position on desegregation enunciated by their national organizations led conservatives to organize. Beginning in the 1970s, conservatives in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) staged a rout of moderates and assumed control over the convention’s numerous agencies and its significant budget.²⁷

Conservative Christians found their next fight in the expanding women’s liberation movement, which involved not only the right to terminate a pregnancy but also the fight for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Anti-feminists, especially those who considered themselves part of the Christian Right, labeled ERA supporters and pro-choice activists as anti-family and worse. Dr. Carrington ignores the role of the expanding women’s liberation movement and the reactionary anti-feminism that sought to thwart it as key elements in the Republican Party’s agenda beginning in 1980. Just as the women’s liberation movement (and the broader rights revolution) drew strength and momentum from the Civil Rights Movement, the expanding rights terrain precipitated a shift in focus for religious conservatives, who recoiled at the challenges feminists posed to traditional gender roles.²⁸ Religious conservatives lost much of the traditional

²³ Glenn Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2005), 3.

²⁴ Fred Bailey, “That Which God Hath Put Asunder: White Baptists, Black Aliens, and the Southern Social Order, 1890-1920,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 12, 27.

²⁵ Paul Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South, 1945-1990,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 106.

²⁶ Mark Newman, *Getting Right with God: Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-1999* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 58.

²⁷ Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South,” 101.


²⁸ Robert Self, *All in the Family: Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012).

ideological undergirding for their race politics, but they found new inspiration in the defense of traditional gender roles. In the process, the conservatives jettisoned the familiar arguments for racial hierarchy, replacing these now-discredited views with a renewed and updated defense of gendered hierarchies. This rejection of feminism and reproductive choice was embraced by the Republican Party beginning in the 1980s.

Summary

Racial politics has a long history in the United States, the American South, and in Alabama. For the first half of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party's dominance in the one-party South was dependent on its defense of white supremacy. White voters' allegiance to the Democratic Party was deeply engrained in southern culture, and breaking that allegiance took time. For much of the twentieth century, the Republican Party in the South was not competitive; the Great Depression relegated the Republican Party nationally to minority status. My original report argued that, in order to become competitive, the Republican Party made a deliberate decision to court southern white voters, both through its policy positions and through its adoption of historical cultural symbols. This decision paid off to the point where the party's continued growth relied on winning white majorities in the southern states. In Alabama, the political parties are racially polarized. While the overt racism of the past no longer animates Alabama politics, I agree with political scientist David A. Hughes, who writes that "the politics of race...are never far from the surface."²⁹

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 25th day of July 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.



Kari Frederickson, Ph.D.

²⁹ David A. Hughes, "Alabama: Polarized and Uncompetitive," in Charles S. Bullock and Mark Rozell, eds., *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), 84.



Milligan v. Allen

Caster v. Allen

Singleton v. Allen

N.D. Alabama

Expert Report of Adam M. Carrington, Ph.D.

June 27, 2024

Qualifications

I am an Associate Professor of Politics at Hillsdale College where I have taught since 2014. I received my M.A. and Ph.D. from Baylor University in that same year. At Hillsdale, I hold the William and Patricia LaMothe Chair in the U.S. Constitution. I also hold an appointment and teach regularly in the Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship at Hillsdale. My scholarship has focused on American political institutions in their historical context, including the judiciary, the presidency, and political parties. I have published work concerning these topics focused on the American South as well. Along these lines, I have had scholarly articles published on Southern judicial history in *Southern Legal History* and *Journal of American Legal History*.¹ These pieces focused on the Reconstruction Era. I also have an article on Congressional attempts to curb the Supreme Court through proposing Constitutional amendments, which links those efforts to changing political party dynamics in the latter half of the 20th century.² Moreover, I have taught courses on political parties, the presidency, the U.S. Constitution, and Constitutional law throughout my time at Hillsdale College.

For my work on this report, I was compensated at the rate of \$300 an hour. I was not directed to come to any particular result but to submit my findings based on my own research and conclusions.

Findings and Conclusions

In this report, I analyze the historical development of party affiliations among Alabama voters from comprising the core of the Democratic "Solid South" to becoming a dependably Republican-voting state. I give special focus to the shifting patterns of Southern white voters from reliably Democrat to dependably Republican. This development will reach back to the 1920s, though particular attention will be given to the region's and state's histories since the 1950s.

As I will recount, many explain the historical partisan shift with a decided if not entire focus on race: The end of legal segregation and the gains made by the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s caused racially-focused Democrats to abandon the party of Jefferson Davis. They then moved to the Republican camp because the GOP, no longer the party of Lincoln, had adopted the race-conscious, even white-supremacist views once the commitment of the Democratic Party. In short: the two parties switched and Southern whites, unchanged in their views, switched parties in response.

¹ Adam M. Carrington, "Running the Robed Gauntlet: Southern State Courts' Interpretation of the Emancipation Proclamation" *Journal of American Legal History* 57(4)(December 2017): 556-584; Adam M. Carrington, "Equality, Prejudice, and the Rule of Law: Alabama Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Peters' Protection of African-American Rights During Reconstruction" *Journal of Southern Legal History* 25(2017): 205-234.

² See Curt Nichols, David Bridge, and Adam M. Carrington, "Court Curbing via Attempt to Amend the Constitution" *Justice Systems Journal* 35(4)(2014): 331-343.

So the story goes. But I will discuss how this focus fails to tell the full tale. A singular or even dominant focus on race is insufficient in explaining the development of the current partisan landscape in the broader American South generally and in Alabama specifically. This report will seek to give a fuller picture of the development of political parties in the 20th century and into the 21st century that describes other, crucial factors that contributed to the partisan shift in the South from Democrat to Republican.

First, I will set up the concept of American political parties, examining how the history and scholarship regarding them points toward parties as voter coalitions with significant fluidity. Voters in most cases are not defined by one issue or identity in their electoral choices. Second, I apply this theory to Southern partisan voting patterns since the 1920s, with special attention paid to the post-1950 history. In that examination, I do note how pervasive the issue of race was during the post-Civil War and early 20th century periods. However, as other scholars argue, too, I will describe how the post-Civil Rights era marked the South's transition toward acting more in line with the scholarly theories of parties and thus closer to the rest of the country. Historically, this story moves from the New Deal Democratic Coalition to the rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party and the rise of Modern Conservatism within the Republican Party. Those developments in the parties in the 1950s and 1960s inaugurated a slow but definite partisan shift. On a host of non-racial issues—economic, foreign policy, and social—Democrats moved away from the preferences of a majority of Southern voters, making the Republican Party, especially its Modern Conservative element, more attractive. Moreover, the South itself evolved in ways that aligned it more naturally with the GOP, especially on economic policy.

This analysis is relevant to the totality of circumstances test required by §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Specifically, it appears to touch on the issue of redistricting in relation to at least three of the factors put forth by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its 1982 amendment of §2. The first Senate factor considers the “extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process.” While not focused on particular laws, executive orders, or like public policy actions (though some will receive direct attention), this report will discuss the matters that precede and often underly government action. Government actions result from those holding office who obtain those offices either directly or indirectly by elections. Election results stem from the actions of voters taken in relation to their political views. These views closely relate to the political parties and other coalitions with which they align. Understanding the significant roles played by issues other than race in Southern and Alabama party affiliations can help to understand whether racial discrimination features in Alabama's political processes.

This report also comments on redistricting in relation to the second factor, which concerns the “extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” By this factor, I understand polarization to involve more than simply the question of whether whites and blacks generally vote for different political parties and candidates. That African-American and white voters tend to vote more for Democrats or Republicans nationally, regionally, and in Alabama particularly is largely true. However, just because racial polarization might technically or statistically exist does not mean that it *substantively* exists. Statistical racial polarization in itself reveals nothing about the motivations underlying voter behavior. I understand substantive racial polarization to mean that race, rather than other factors like political partisanship, predominantly explain voting patterns. My report will give evidence that partisanship fueled by political issues not directly tied to nor driven by racial

views better explains the statistical racial polarization seen in Alabama. In other words, the evidence suggests that party politics, not race, explains why Alabama voters vote the way they do.

Finally, this report bears on the sixth factor, which confronts the question of whether or not, “political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.”³ While some attention will be paid to particular comments made by public persons, this report will focus on the deeper and broader coalitional developments among Southern voters that have helped shift the South, including Alabama, from reliably Democratic in voting patterns to generally Republican. These developments will examine a combination of policies, platforms, and public perceptions related to the two major political parties. Here, the report will contend, again, that the appeals that have effectively shifted partisan leanings in the South include appeals to economic, foreign policy, and social issues not focused on race.

Ultimately, the broader story of the partisan shift in the South, including Alabama, speaks to race as not the exclusive or even dominant factor in enduring voting changes. Instead, the success of the Civil Rights Movement helped in the ability for other political matters to come to prominence. Those other matters then took on a significant role in the partisan changes among Southern voters, including voters in Alabama.

Methodology

I have taken an approach that is both theoretical and historical. I begin with theory, discussing the concept of political parties in the scholarly literature. I then turn to history, using the theory as a lens through which to see the historical development of parties with a special comparative focus on the South. My focus will predominately be on Southern white voters, whose shift in voting tendencies formed the main statistical reason for the change in expected partisan election results. My analysis also will tend to focus on the South generally and the Deep South in particular, though specific instances and data related to Alabama will be noted. In this approach, I agree with the general scholarly view that Alabama is not an outlier within the Deep South in significant ways on the issues this report addresses.⁴

To construct this analysis, I draw heavily on historical scholarship and also draw on primary documents such as speeches at national conventions, party platforms, national legislation, presidential executive orders, and state ballot initiatives. Given the party and coalitional lens, prominence will be given to party-related documents.

The Nature of American Political Parties

In 1942, E.E. Schattschneider wrote that “democracy is unthinkable save in terms of [political] parties.”⁵ Historically, political parties have formed the basic structure by which Americans organize themselves around principle and policy commitments. In this light, they structure their choices for public offices — national, state, and local. Political parties also aid in the functioning of government, providing

³ United States Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 97-417, 28-29.

⁴ Placing Alabama as a generally typical state within the Deep South is longstanding. See Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966); Seth C. McKee and Melanie J. Springer, “A Tale of ‘Two Souths’” *Social Science Quarterly* 96(2)(June 2015): 588-607.

⁵ E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government: American Government in Action* (New York: Routledge, 2003[1942]), 1.

an institution and an identity that facilitates cooperation between Constitutional offices such as the House and the Senate, Congress and the President, as well as state and national governments.⁶

John Aldrich, in his 1995 work, *Why Parties?*, points up that, “[a]ll democracies that are Madisonian, extended republics, which is to say all democratic nations, have political parties.”⁷ By speaking of James Madison and an extended republic, Aldrich grounds the study of American political parties in that Framers’ possibly most famous written work, *Federalist 10*.

In 1787-1788, the Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the then-proposed Constitution argued that America already was too large to operate as a functioning republic. Taking a cue from the French philosopher Montesquieu, these Anti-Federalists argued that republics must be small in size. When they grew too large, they morphed into empire and went from a government of, by, and for the people into a despotism either of one person or of a few elites. *Brutus*, one of the leading Anti-Federalists, made this argument in his first paper critiquing the proposed constitution. He wrote “that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a high number of inhabitants...as that of the whole United States.”⁸ He recounted how the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, having “extended their conquests over large territories of country” that “the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.”⁹

In *Federalist 10*, James Madison responded to this and like critiques as part of a broader argument to ratify the Constitution. He did so first by bringing up a different problem that plagued popular governments. This problem was so dangerous it proved to have “been the mortal diseases under which popular governments everywhere have perished.”¹⁰ This hideous monster he called faction. It consisted of either “a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”¹¹ These factions were driven not by cool, thoughtful reflection on the common good but by impulsive, emotional prejudices to oppress others or to do some other kind of public harm. Factions caused instability and injustice to seize the political process, often sending the republic in a tumultuous pendulum swinging between anarchy and tyranny, ending in the regime’s demise.

By his own account, Madison’s most important solution for the problem of faction was an extended or large republic—the very set-up the Anti-Federalists feared. However, Madison argued that an extended or large republic would contain significant advantages over a small one in addressing faction’s pernicious effects. Small republics tended to have a very homogenous population with super-majorities sharing a wide swath of characteristics, principles, and policy positions. This homogeneity allowed for majority factions to organize and to act on their disordered, oppressive injustice with relative ease.

⁶ See Harry V. Jaffa, *A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 434.

⁷ John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 3.

⁸ *Brutus*, “No. 1,” *The Anti-Federalist*, edited by Hebert J. Storing, Selected by Murray Dry from *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985[1981]), 113.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹¹ *Publius* (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay), *The Federalist, Gideon Edition* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 43.

A large republic countered this problem. It did so by subverting factions' ability to organize and to act as majorities. The logic was fairly common-sense. A large republic meant more people involved in politics across a wider expanse of territory. Usually, that enlarging of the population introduced much greater diversity within the people regarding their characteristics, their principles, and their preferences. Doing so undermined the ability of homogenous majorities to realize their existence and organize politically around it. Even more important, though, this diversity then restricted if not eliminated the existence of broad and deep majorities in the first place.

This heterogeneous population held two important ramifications for this report's purposes. First, majorities usually needed to be created by means of forming coalitions. In other words, persons not exactly alike must agree to work together to reach the needed vote threshold to win elections. On religion, for example, no one sect tended to garner over 50% of the vote. Thus, Baptists might need to make common cause with Lutherans or Presbyterians or Roman Catholics or other faiths (or no faith) to achieve the majority needed to enact principles and policies. Doing so tended to keep the majorities from agreeing to the plans of oppressive factions. Instead, they had to find common ground more on basic human rights and the common good of the general public.

Second, the coalitional nature of majorities made those majorities much more fragile and fluid than they would be in a small republic with a largely homogeneous population. Persons or groups did not tend to have only one issue that drove them. Various matters could ignite their interest and influence their vote at the same or at different times. Thus, these persons or groups may unite on one issue or set of issues but not on others. Views on taxes or foreign policy might be the main point holding the coalition together, for instance. But if other issues became primary, ones on which the coalition did not agree, they could split the coalition and make way for new majorities formed by other primary points of agreement.

As Aldrich implied, much of the modern political science literature on American political parties traces its theory, whether consciously or not, back to Madison's observations in *Federalist 10*. For political parties are seeking majorities in the House, Senate, state legislatures, governorships, and in the Electoral College that selects the president. Given our extended (and ever more extending) republic, competitive American political parties must be coalitional. They cannot rely on one region, one subgroup, or one issue to win and maintain majorities. Thus, parties act like coalitions as described above. They form around basic like characteristics and on agreement regarding a set of issues. In fact, recent party literature has focused on the claim that, "groups of organized policy demanders are the basic units of our theory of parties."¹² Therefore, parties consist of "coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals."¹³ The party usually tries to focus its stances on issues that accentuate its unity. However, new issues arise and secondary matters become primary. Parties, then, whether as a whole or in regard to particular members, may be forced to take other stances that threatens to undermine its unity.¹⁴ The 19th century Whig Party, for example, formed around common views about internal improvements and tariffs (known as the "American System"), legislative supremacy within the elected branches of government, and opposition to President

¹² Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and Johnny Zaller, "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics" *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3)(August 2012): 575.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 571.

¹⁴ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S." *Perspectives on Politics* 6(3)(2008): 433.

Andrew Jackson. Yet in the 1850s, the party was ripped into pieces and ceased to exist when slavery, an issue it tried to relegate to secondary status, rose to a place where it no longer could be avoided.¹⁵

This background brings us to the focus of this report. In discussing voting patterns and coalitional arrangements in the South, including Alabama, race has been exalted as the dominant factor influencing voters up to the present.¹⁶ And race did play an out-sized part through a significant portion of Southern political history. In fact, this matter showed the explanatory limits of the extended republic as Madison described it in *Federalist 10*. Sometimes, though rarely, one issue or identity could overwhelm the others. In this instance, race and its institutionalization in slavery or, later, in segregation, overwhelmed other factors that might have undermined this majority faction and created fluid coalitions. Economic class, for instance, did not have the explanatory power that *Federalist 10* and other theories held for it in defining party alignments and developments.¹⁷ A 1958 article noted, “[t]he emphasis on unity among the ‘whites’ in the south’s one-party system de-emphasizes class differences or issues involving conflict within the white group.”¹⁸ Glen Feldmen observed the longstanding tendency “to put race regularity and white supremacy above all other competing factors.”¹⁹ Moreover, the predominance of race and slavery over all other issues in the 1850s helped lead to the American Civil War. The issue of race was perpetuated by voter suppression and Jim Crow segregation in the post-Reconstruction South as well. There was some white dissent in the South even during these periods, especially in the mountain regions of Eastern Tennessee and Western North Carolina that had opposed secession and, post-war, clung to Republican Party loyalty, despite finding little statewide electoral success.²⁰ But these were exceptions, not the rule. Therefore, the preceding points must be seen and acknowledged as deeply influential on Southern politics in the 19th and early to mid-20th centuries.

Yet, as introduced earlier, this focus on race does not tell the whole story of Southern coalitions and voting patterns, especially since the middle of the 20th century. Instead, that history shows the South moving toward and finally realizing the more diversity and fluidity in coalitions that marked the logic of *Federalist 10* and the theory of political parties as coalitions that occur within extended republics. It was a turn toward the normalized politics Madison envisioned and that usually occurred within other parts of the country. Thus, Byron Schafer and Richard Johnston titled their book, one giving non-racial factors as the dominant reasons for partisan re-alignment in the South, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism*.²¹

Other scholars also admit, even if grudgingly, that the partisan shift in the South involved much more than race. Carmines and Stanley wrote that, “[w]hile racial conflict may have precipitated, in part,

¹⁵ See Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Gerald R. Webster, “Demise of the Solid South” *Geographical Review* 82(1)(Jan. 1992): 43-55.

¹⁷ Madison said in *Federalist 10* that, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.” See Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 44.

¹⁸ James W. Prothro, Ernest Q. Campbell, and Charles M. Griff, “Two-Party Voting in the South: Class vs. Party Identification” *American Political Science Review* 52(1)(March 1958): 131.

¹⁹ Bruce Feldmen, *The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013), xii. The time period of Feldmen’s book is particularly helpful since his report argued that politics in the covered period (1865-1944) was mostly defined by race with changes coming in subsequent decades.

²⁰ Sundquist, 103. Gordon B. McKinney, “Southern Mountain Republicans and the Negro” *Journal of Southern History* 41(4)(Nov. 1975): 493-516.

²¹ Byron E. Schafer and Richard Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

conservative movement away from the Democratic Party, the transformation has been sustained by other issues.”²² In fact, the same influential political party scholars wrote in 1990 that, “Southern political conservatives are now out of tune with the Democratic party on a wide range of issues.”²³ In 2001, Aubrey Jewett concluded his study of increased GOP strength in Southern state legislatures between 1946-1995 by writing that, “the evidence supporting many other explanations of Republican legislative growth suggests that scholars who emphasize only race to the exclusion of other causal factors are being overly simplistic.”²⁴ Along the same lines, Earl and Merle Black in the 2002 book, *The Rise of Southern Republicans*, noted that, “modern southern politics involves more than its obvious racial divisions.”²⁵ By 2004, David Lublin declared about Southern politics, “I find little evidence of continuing white backlash” to the rise of full participation by African-Americans in the political process.²⁶ While still giving a significant place for race, Matthew D. Lassiter’s *Silent Majority* (2006) argued against “race reductionist” readings of American history that failed to account for how Southern metropolitan areas came to operate much like Northern counterparts and the place that social and economic class played in conscious political motivations of voters and policy-makers.²⁷

This report accepts as true that race once played a predominant role in Southern politics, including Alabama as part of the Deep South. But it will examine reasons to question the claim that race continues to possess the dominant explanatory power often given to it in this story. In so doing, it will look to other factors beyond race which made significant contributions to partisan re-alignment in the American South, including the state of Alabama, especially starting in the second half of the 20th century. This report, then, will argue that explaining the status of partisan politics in 2024 solely or predominately in racial terms leaves out too much of the backstory and too much other, reasonable explanations for current party alignment and voting patterns. For some time, a wide range of other issues have played a significant role. Those issues arose out of a broader, national ideological change within both parties to which we turn next.

Party Change—The Rise of the New Left and Modern Conservatism

1) *The Rise of the New Left*

The story of partisan alignment in the South, including Alabama, must begin with the Democratic Party. The South had been the base for the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, the precursor to the modern Democratic Party. It continued to be the stronghold for the Democratic Party that formed under Andrew Jackson’s leadership in the 1820s and 1830s.²⁸ The Democratic Party’s base

²² Edward G. Carmines and Harold W. Stanley, “Ideological Re-Alignment in the Contemporary South: Where Have All the Conservatives Gone?” in *The Disappearing South*, edited by Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 32.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Aubrey W. Jewett, “Partisan Changes in Southern Legislatures, 1946-1995” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(3)(August 2001): 479.

²⁵ Earle Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4.

²⁶ Lublin, 28.

²⁷ Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

²⁸ Aldrich, 107-119.

remained in the South after the Civil War, too, intensified by the Republican Party's connection to the Union cause. Some attempts were made during Reconstruction to make the GOP competitive in the South but such efforts failed, especially once federal troops were withdrawn.²⁹ Still, the Republican Party became the national majority party after the end of the Civil War. Periods of closely contested elections and of divided government existed, especially at the end of Reconstruction in the latter 1870s and throughout the 1880s. However, the GOP reigned as the majority party through the greater portion of the years spanning 1865-1932.

The Great Depression opened up the potential for a new majority coalition. The Republican Party under President Herbert Hoover was thoroughly discredited in light of the economic collapse that shook the country and then settled into a new and harsh reality far different from the heady days of the "Roaring '20s." The Democratic landslide of 1932, under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, railed against the GOP's failures as part of asserting their own ascent to political power.³⁰

The consequent New Deal coalition established the Democrats as the country's majority party for the first time since before the American Civil War. The Democratic Party built on the New Deal focused on economic issues. FDR's program sought much greater government involvement in regulating as well as participating in the economy. Thus, the coalition was defined predominately in economic terms, with working class or "blue-collar" Americans identifying decidedly with Democrats in their attempt to alleviate the hardships the Great Depression involved. This link we can see in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's rhetoric in the period. In his First Inaugural, Roosevelt had lambasted, "the unscrupulous money changers" who "know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers."³¹ On the eve of his decisive re-election in 1936, FDR said, "I should like to have it said of my first Administration that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second Administration that in it these forces met their master."³² This placement of the Democratic Party with the working class, and against the wealthy, had a long pedigree going back to the original party system between the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans and the Hamiltonian Federalists and then to Andrew Jackson railing against the "monied interests" that he equated with the Whig Party. However, the New Deal did more than renew that old distinction; it intensified it to a degree not seen since before the Civil War, if ever.

This coalition crossed racial bounds. A majority of African-Americans first began voting for the Democratic Party nationwide during the Great Depression.³³ This meant that Southern segregationists and African-Americans voted for decades for the same party.³⁴ Such a broad coalition wielded dominant results at the national and state levels with massive margins of victory for FDR in 1932 and 1936 as well

²⁹ Gordon B. McKinney, "Southern Mountain Republicans and the Negro" *Journal of Southern History* 41(4)(Nov. 1975): 493-516.

³⁰ Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*, 288-289. See also H.W. Brands, *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 238-239, 264-265.

³¹ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address" *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 2: 12.

³² Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Address at Madison Square Garden, New York City" *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 5: 568-569.

³³ See Nancy Joan Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of F.D.R.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Sidney M. Milkis, "Ideas, Institutions, and the New Deal Political Order" *American Political Thought* 3(1)(Spring 2014): 172.

³⁴ James C. Cobb, *South Atlantic Urban Studies* 1(1977): 255.

as huge majorities in Congress, governorships, and state legislatures. The GOP had been reduced to a rump party with little chance of contesting for a national majority.

However, the Madisonian-based theory of parties says that coalitions can be tenuous and fluid, especially when in the majority. New issues arise, both from competing parties but also from within the coalition itself. The New Deal coalition that had made the Democrats the dominant majority party began to show serious, enduring signs of strain in the early 1960s. The strain came internally when that period saw the rise of the self-defined “New Left.” Prominent intellectual C. Wright Mills penned “A Letter to the New Left” in 1960 working out how this form of liberalism distinguished itself from the now decades-dominant Old Left.³⁵

Mills argued that the Left’s primary focus on economic class no longer worked in the effort to pursue social justice. In the past, “the historic agency [of change] has been the working class...also parties and unions variously composed of members of the working class.”³⁶ But that no longer was true; the working class had become part of the problem of oppression, not the central means for finding new solutions to it. Instead, Mills pointed toward a new coalition that looked at the world as involving oppressors and oppressed but in relationships beyond labor versus capital. This perspective paved the way for a liberalism that focused on issues of racial justice and which began to discuss matters of women’s rights and LGBTQ rights. It also opened the door to expressing frustrations with American Cold War policy, especially on the nuclear arms race,³⁷ as well as a concern for environmental matters such as water and air pollution.³⁸ Taken together, the New Left was more willing to criticize American policy but, even more radical for the time, to also condemn America itself as inherently unjust, something that the much more patriotic-speaking New Deal Democrats did not do and would not have done.

Given the shift away from a focus on economic class, the New Left’s intellectual center would not be the union hall. Instead, its foundation would build from the college campus and include those with college degrees—itsself a growing population among the Baby Boomers. “It is with this problem of agency in mind,” Mills wrote, “that I have been studying, for several years now, the cultural apparatus, the intellectuals — as a possible, immediate, radial agency of change.”³⁹ Thus, the “Port Huron Statement” presented one of the most famous declarations of this new ideology’s views. Published on June 15, 1962, the document was written by Tom Hayden on behalf of the group “Students for a Democratic Society.”⁴⁰ The document claimed the perspective of a new generation, “housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.” That document further spoke of “the Southern struggle against racial bigotry.” The “Port Huron Statement” further observed the fear many had at the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.⁴¹ It stated that “tarnish appear[ed] on our image

³⁵ C. Wright Mills, *The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings of C. Wright Mills*, edited by John H. Summers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 255-266.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 262.

³⁷ Paul Boyer, “From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980” *Journal of American History* 70(4)(1984): 837-844.

³⁸ Keith M. Woodhouse, “The Politics of Ecology: Environmentalism and Liberalism in the 1960s” *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2(2)(Fall 2008): 53-84.

³⁹ Mills, 264.

⁴⁰ Jim Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); See also *The Port Huron Statement: Sources and Legacies of the New Left’s Founding Manifesto*, edited by Richard Flacks and Nelson Lichtenstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

⁴¹ “Port Huron Statement,” 3.

of American virtue” and it spoke of “the hypocrisy of American ideals.”⁴² As the movement developed, these critiques also extended to the working class that had formed the backbone of the Democratic New Deal coalition. In a 1980 article, Sidney M. Wilhelm noted that, “working-class racism” challenged the Marxist economic paradigm which itself had sought to explain racism as the product of capitalism. Though he attempted to re-configure an economic underlying basis, he had to admit that working class Americans could take the side of oppressors.⁴³ As time would go on, certain intellectuals on the Left would make harsher critiques of working-class voters on their views regarding the issues on which the New Left now gave greater focus. They would more and more be seen as part of the problem rather than a full partner in the solution.

The rise of the New Left created a rift within the Democratic Party. Perhaps the best-known and most dramatic manifestation of this rift came during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The New Left subset sought renewed focus on civil rights and an end to the Vietnam War. Nicolas Proctor, in his book on the 1968 Convention, noted that, “conservative Democrats—particularly those from the South—argued the opposite.”⁴⁴ They gave much greater support to American foreign policy and much less support to civil rights efforts. Chicago’s Democratic Mayor, Richard Daley, sent police in to violently break-up these protesters in the streets, using clubs and tear-gas. Doing so did not result in restored peace and harmony within the Democratic Party, however. Subsequent changes in presidential selection strengthened the New Left within the Democratic Party as well. A mixed system had existed that permitted some say by voters in primaries but left substantial nominating power to the party itself regarding presidential candidates. In response to the McGovern-Fraiser Commission, the Democratic Party moved to a system where the voters took effective control of the nomination-making through a process dominated by primaries or caucuses.⁴⁵ Nicol C. Rae noted that, starting in the 1970s, the new nomination process, “was structurally biased in favor of candidates from the party’s neoliberal and New Left factions, with little appeal to most southern white voters.”⁴⁶

In 1972, the New Left got one of their own nominated on the Democratic ticket for president: George McGovern.⁴⁷ He went on to a crushing defeat against sitting president Richard Nixon, winning only Massachusetts and D.C. for meagre 17 electoral votes to Nixon’s 520. But the New Left would continue to exert a serious and growing influence over the Democratic Party. Bruce Miroff declared that, after McGovern, “the party would never again look like the urban-labor coalition of the New Deal era.”⁴⁸ The New Left would move the Democratic Party’s coalition to include more college-educated voters and to focus more on non-economic issues of gender, race, the environment, gun regulation, and other matters. Working Class voters would remain in the coalition but with increasing unease and decreasing

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴³ Sidney M. Wilhelm, “Can Marxism Explain America’s Racism?” *Social Problems* 28(2)(December 1980): 98-112.

⁴⁴ Nicolas Proctor, *Chicago, 1968: Policy and Protest at the Democratic National Convention* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

⁴⁵ See Adam Hilton, *True Blues: The Contentious Transformation of the Democratic Party* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 66-87; James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 260-303.

⁴⁶ Nicol C. Rae, *Southern Democrats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46.

⁴⁷ Bruce Miroff, *The Liberals’ Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party* (Leavenworth University of Kansas Press, 2007).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

numbers.⁴⁹ For, in these developments, a growing section of the Democratic Party would expand on C. Wright Mills' implicit critique of the working class, arguing in more explicit terms that it perpetuated the forces of oppression on issues sex, sexuality, and race.

As time went on, the rise of the New Left bore fruit for the Democratic Party in some regions while hurting its electoral prospects in others. Jonathan Bell described how the new liberalism helped turn California into a reliably Democratic and Progressive state.⁵⁰ States like Massachusetts and others in the Northeast also became increasingly Democratic, despite for a long time being the regional electoral base for Republicans. But in the South, including Alabama, this turn in the Democratic Party bode ill for its long-term electoral viability, for reasons we will turn to soon.

2) *The Rise of Modern Conservatism*

The Republican Party developed during this time as well. In the 1920s, the party had been defined by policies of lower taxes, fiscal responsibility, and limited government linked to leaders like President Calvin Coolidge.⁵¹ This approach gained significant popularity during the economic boom of the 1920s but fell into disrepute, as noted above, during the Great Depression and in response to FDR's critiques. The Republican party did not regain any majority in Congress from 1932 until 1946. They did not recapture the White House until Dwight D. Eisenhower, hero of World War II, won the office in 1952. During the 1950s, the GOP had largely followed the "New Republicanism" of Eisenhower.⁵² This view sought moderation, arguing it would follow the New Deal consensus and manage its governmental programs in a restrained and efficient manner. It also looked to contain, not roll back, the forces of Communism led by the Soviet Union and China.⁵³

But portions of the Republican Party chafed under this new approach.⁵⁴ These men included Robert Taft, an Ohio Senator who was the main rival to Eisenhower for the GOP presidential nomination in 1952. First, this group sought to renew the GOP's pre-New Deal economic philosophy, critiquing FDR's policies as undermining American liberty. Second, many of the same Republicans wished to take a hard line against global Communism, defeating it outright rather than merely limiting its expansion. Third, they began to emphasize federalism on the level of governmental structure against an ever-growing national government. Fourth and finally, this group wished to emphasize traditional views on issues of religion and morality.

One can see this synthesis encapsulated in William F. Buckley's editorial announcing the first issue of *National Review*, published in November of 1955. Buckley wrote of "Conservatives" as those

⁴⁹ White working-class voters saw some limited success nationally, such as with the presidential candidacies of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. These national victories tended to need special circumstances, such as Watergate for Carter and the crushing defeats suffered by more New Left-aligned candidates preceding Carter's (McGovern) and Clinton's (Mondale, Dukakis) candidacies.

⁵⁰ See Jonathan Bell, *California Crucible: The Forging of Modern American Liberalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

⁵¹ See Amity Shlaes, *Coolidge* (New York: Harper Collins, 2013).

⁵² Randall Bennett Woods, *Quest for Identity: America Since 1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 73-98.

⁵³ John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 41-43.

⁵⁴ John Andrew, "The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960" *The Historian* 59(3)(Spring 1997): 613-631.

“who have not made their peace with the New Deal.”⁵⁵ Buckley decried a “relativism” that downplayed belief in God and would doubt, “the superiority of capitalism to socialism, of republicanism to centralism.”⁵⁶ Anticipating Mills, he saw this view as growing on college campuses in particular.⁵⁷ In similar fashion, the Sharon Statement, put together in 1960 by young conservatives, with Buckley’s help, praised the U.S. Constitution in that it, “reserves primacy to the several states, or to the people, in those spheres not specifically delegated to the Federal government.” The document also lauded the “market economy,” and declared that, “the forces of international Communism are, at present, the greatest single threat to these liberties.”⁵⁸

These views would begin to cause tensions within the Republican Party at a similar time as the New Left threatened the cohesion and peace of the Democratic Party. Republicans’ base had been in the North, especially New England. That was the home of what became known as “Rockefeller Republicans” after Nelson Rockefeller, long-time governor of New York and Vice-President under Gerald Ford. These Republicans held more moderate views, especially on social but also on economic issues, and were out-of-step with the emerging conservatism.⁵⁹ This upstart conservatism seemed more at home in the Western states instead. Thus, in 1964, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater captured the GOP presidential nomination. Goldwater represented the emerging conservatism Buckley had articulated nearly a decade prior. In his acceptance speech, given in San Francisco, Goldwater declared that Republicans would act toward, “encouraging a free and a competitive economy” while also upholding “law and order.” Goldwater spoke of a philosophy of limited government where the best place for its exercise was, “closest to the people involved.” And he railed against the Soviet threat, saying, “communism and the governments it now controls are enemies of every man on earth who is or wants to be free.”⁶⁰

Goldwater lost in decisive fashion to Lyndon Johnson in the Fall of 1964. He won only five states—his home state of Arizona and five states within the Deep South, including Alabama. But, as with the New Left in the Democratic Party, this emerging conservatism would not go away. It did suffer from the 1964 electoral setback. Richard Nixon would win the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections for the Republican Party. He rejected significant elements of Modern Conservatism, and, among other acts that frustrated conservatives, he instituted wage and price controls,⁶¹ created the Environmental Protection

⁵⁵ William F. Buckley, “Publisher’s Statement” *National Review* November 19, 1955, 5. For a helpful discussion of Buckley’s shift on race from the 1950s to the 1960s, one that included a rejection of southern segregation, see Alvin Felzenberg, *A Man and His Presidents: The Political Odyssey of William F. Buckley, Jr.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See also William F. Buckley, *God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of Academic Freedom* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951).

⁵⁸ See Greg L. Schneider, *Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 34.

⁵⁹ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, “Activists and Partisan Realignment in American Politics” *The American Political Science Review* 97(2)(May 2003): 257.

⁶⁰ Barry Goldwater, “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco” July 16, 1964. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-san>. Retrieved 3/18/2024.

⁶¹ Executive Order 11615 of August 15, 1971, Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and Salaries, 36 FR 17813; Executive Order 11627 of October 15, 1971, Further Providing for the Stabilization of the Economy, 36 FR 20139.

Agency,⁶² and signed both the National Environmental Policy Act⁶³ and the Clean Water Act.⁶⁴ In fact, a conservative Ohio Congressman, John Ashbrook, primaried the sitting president with the campaign slogan, “No Left Turns.”⁶⁵ However, with Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, a Buckley-Goldwater kind of conservatism had gone mainstream, becoming the driving force within the Republican Party. Reagan had been a Goldwater supporter, giving one of the 1964 campaign’s most famous speeches in his favor, “A Time for Choosing.”⁶⁶ Then and in the 1980 campaign, Reagan spoke of limited government, private enterprise, deep opposition to communism, and traditional moral values. While some of these views continued to keep a significant portion of white-collar, highly educated voters in the GOP, working-class voters began to see elements of the GOP’s conservative positions as attractive, too. The decisive shift in the GOP thus had ramifications for partisan alignments around the country, including the South.

In the pages that follow, this report will detail how the above developments in the Democratic and Republican parties participated in the South’s slow-motion move from solidly Democratic to solidly Republican.

Civil Rights and voting patterns within the South

We begin with the focus for most discussions of Southern voting patterns: race and the Civil Rights Movement. The narrative states that Southern Democrats became frustrated with the national party over its embrace of African-American civil rights, first in 1948 and then again in 1964. The story of GOP gains in the South tends to focus especially on the 1964 election. There, Republican Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater won the Deep South for the GOP for the first time since Reconstruction. Alabama not only voted for Goldwater but gave him a massive 71% of the vote even though the state had not gone Republican since the Reconstruction era election of 1872. The story goes that the South broke with the Democratic Party over President Johnson shepherding through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Southern white voters abandoned Democrats and ran to Republicans to maintain their race-based partisanship in a new political party, ironically the party formerly (but no more) of Abraham Lincoln, emancipation, Northern aggression, and Reconstruction.⁶⁷

The focus on 1964 applies one influential strain of the broader political party literature. This strain focused on critical elections that marked a significant and lasting shift in the composition of party coalitions as well as which of the major parties held lasting majority status. V. O. Key, a giant in the field of political parties’ scholarship, was an early and influential articulator of this perspective.⁶⁸ A number of other scholars followed suit, pointing to elections such as 1800, 1832, 1860, possibly 1896, 1932, and

⁶² See “Reorganization Plan Nos. 3 of 1970.” July 9, 1970. U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 91st Congress--2nd Session, Vol. 3, 1970.

⁶³ National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).

⁶⁴ An Act to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).

⁶⁵ Alfred S. Regnery, *Upstream: The Ascendancy of American Conservatism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 141. Ashbrook would receive less than 10% of the vote in the primaries in which he participated before dropping out.

⁶⁶ *The Reagan Manifesto: A Time for Choosing and Its Influence*, edited by Eric D. Patterson and Jeffrey H. Morrison (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 137-138.

⁶⁷ Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields, *The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

⁶⁸ See V. O. Key, “A Theory of Critical Elections” *Journal of Politics* 17(1955): 3-18; Key, “Secular Re-alignment and the Party System” *Journal of Politics* 21(1959): 3-18.

1980 as examples that inaugurated new, dominant party coalitions in American politics. In his influential work on the presidency, Stephen Skowronek placed American presidents within “political time,” which concerns cycles of political coalitions that ascend to power, struggle to maintain that dominance, and eventually get disrupted by a new ascendant coalition.⁶⁹ He also used a theory of critical or realigning elections to help explain his “political time.” In much of this scholarship, 1964 can mark a critical election that did not create a new electoral majority but did shift the South to the GOP.⁷⁰

Other scholars rightly pushed back against this theory as not fully explaining the historical development of political parties. One strain argued that some realignments occur more slowly, across multiple elections, spanning even decades before coming to some form of completion.⁷¹ While some have tried to explain the South’s move from predominately Democratic-leaning to Republican through the critical election theory (mostly focused on 1964), others have committed to a more gradual model that says the racial component slowly worked its way toward the partisan shift.

This report will challenge both those narratives. One cannot reduce the shift in political loyalties in the South either to one election or to one issue set like race. As noted above, the fuller story spans close to a century of American history.

Potential GOP prospects in the South arose as early as 1928. At the presidential level, Republicans won what is known in scholarship as the “peripheral South.” This sub-region included Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida. But that election had notable results even in the Deep South, defined as Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.⁷² In Alabama, for example, Democrat Al Smith won with only 51% of the vote and over 43% in Georgia. Some attribute this outcome to race-based issues, since Smith was more open than most Democrats of the time to African-American civil rights.⁷³ But the bigger issue in 1928, other than economic prosperity of the “Roaring 20s” being credited to Republicans, was that Al Smith was Roman Catholic. This point caused consternation in the very Protestant Southern portion of the Democratic Party, where centuries-old views questioning Roman Catholic loyalty and capacity to adapt to non-authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, this report must note where within those states the GOP did well. Republican gains were focused in urban or metropolitan centers, not rural areas, both in the Peripheral and the Deep South.⁷⁴ V. O. Key pointed out as early as 1949 that Republican strength in that earlier election was higher in urban as opposed to rural portions of the South.⁷⁵ This trend continued in subsequent electoral contests. Even in the wipeout election of 1932, Herbert Hoover performed better in Southern cities like Charlotte, Richmond, and Dallas than Republican candidates had in their decisive national victories

⁶⁹ See Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*

⁷⁰ Black & Black, 4, 28; James E. Campbell, “Party Systems and Realignments in the United States, 1868-2004” *Social Science History* 30(3)(Fall 2006): 370.

⁷¹ See Edward G. Carmines and James A. Simpson, “Issue Evolution, Population Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change” *American Political Science Review* 75(1981): 107-118.

⁷² Earle Black and Merle Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 14.

⁷³ At the same time, Herbert Hoover garnered a paltry 18% of the vote in Mississippi and under 9% in South Carolina.

⁷⁴ The Deep South included Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment in the Modern South: The Untold Story* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2022), 12.

⁷⁵ Key, 328.

throughout the 1920s.⁷⁶ In the 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower's victories in the Peripheral South as well as his improved percentages in the Deep South came overwhelmingly from urban or metropolitan areas. For example, Donald Strong pointed out that, in the 1950 census, Mountain Brook, Alabama had the highest median income of any city in the state. In 1952, it voted for Republican Eisenhower over Democrat Adlai Stevens by a margin of nearly 4-1.⁷⁷ The three counties that contained Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery all voted by margins notably above the state average of 35% for Eisenhower. Strong would find a similar urban, upper-class strength in the Deep South, including Alabama, for Eisenhower in his 1956 re-election. Bernard Cosman then continued the examination in 1960, finding Richard Nixon, though in a losing national effort, garnered strong margins in the urban South comparable to Ike.⁷⁸

Scholars see this as the start of what has been called, "Metropolitan Republicanism" in the South. The Republican Party's revived prospects came not just in the South's periphery. It also developed *within* Southern states in particular areas, not others. Most notably, as the phrase, "Metropolitan Republicanism" relates, the GOP gained not in rural but in urban portions of the states. As these areas grew in population, so would Republican prospects. Therefore, James C. Cobb in 1977 noted that, "[t]he South's cities seem to be the logical place to begin further analyses of southern Republicanism."⁷⁹ These cities, especially in what later came to be distinguished as "suburbs," proved the base for the rising GOP successes.

The main point to consider here is that, as Sundquist noted, these gains were "durable."⁸⁰ Slow and steady, they formed a definite and consistent trend in Southern voting patterns. Contrast these gains with two elections which some point to as hard moves away from Democrats and toward Republicans in the South. The first was in 1948. The Democratic Party experienced a temporary revolt from its Southern ranks in the form of Dixiecrats who were angry at President Truman and the national party's stance on African-American civil rights. Led by Senator Strom Thurmond, this contingent won Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and one electoral vote from the state of Tennessee.⁸¹ Yet these disgruntled Democrats did not move into the Republican ranks.⁸² In fact, Thurmond won those states in part because he was made the official Democratic nominee on the ballot within them. After the election, these voters mostly returned to the Democratic fold; they did not join the Republican party.⁸³ Moreover, Thurmond's best voting regions were not predominately from groups and areas trending toward Republicans but from regions of continued Democratic strength.⁸⁴ Thurmond would switch to

⁷⁶ Phillips, *Emerging Republican Majority*, 161.

⁷⁷ Donald S. Strong, "The Presidential Election in the South, 1952" *Journal of Politics* 17(3)(August 1955): 343.

⁷⁸ Bernard Cosman, "Presidential Republicanism in the South, 1960" *Journal of Politics* 24(2)(May 1962): 303-322. See also Black & Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 265.

⁷⁹ James C. Cobb, "Urbanization and the Changing South: A Review of the Literature" *South Atlantic Urban Studies* 1(1977): 263.

⁸⁰ Sundquist, 279.

⁸¹ Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 52-53.

⁸² Sundquist, 275.

⁸³ Black and Black, *Rise of Southern Republicanism*, 208.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 276. Thurmond would switch to the Republican Party but not until September of 1964. See Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 450-452.

the GOP though not until 1964—16 years later. Even then, as Dr. Kari Frederickson notes in her report, “Strom Thurmond’s party-switching remained a singular act”⁸⁵ with very few politicians following suit.

The other election—1964—is where many scholars focus the narrative of Republican ascendance in the South. As noted above, that election saw a sudden rise in GOP support, most of it concentrated in the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater did very well in the Deep South and the rural portions of it, the opposite of the trends for the GOP up to that point. Republicans did make some gains below the presidential ticket, including gaining five seats in United States House delegation from Alabama. However, Republicans gave back a significant portion of these gains. In the next congressional election, Alabama’s house delegation reverted to majority Democratic, not to change back again until 1996. In 1968, Richard Nixon received just shy of 14% of the state’s vote, coming in third place behind avowed segregationist and Alabama Governor George Wallace as well as Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey. Governor Wallace did especially well in rural areas, not those where GOP strength had been growing slowly in previous decades.⁸⁶

Thus, the GOP’s lasting growth occurred in the metropolitan and suburban areas during this period, not rural. Rural areas, with the exception of 1964, remained the bedrock group voting for Democrats or for splinter Democratic candidates like George Wallace. This observation matters in assessing the growth of the GOP among white voters in Southern states like Alabama. Rural areas were considered the most committed to maintaining the old ways and most resistant to reform, especially on matters of race.⁸⁷ Those areas, more than urban ones, would seem more likely to seek party change in response to Democrat deviation from racial orthodoxy as the voting patterns in most of these elections support. Metropolitan areas tended to be more diverse in population and open to reform, including on matters related to race. Moreover, the metropolitan areas during these decades saw an influx of persons immigrating from other parts of the country, including the Midwest, bringing with them more GOP votes and less segregationist attitudes. In fact, by 2009 about 1/3 of those living in the South were born in other regions of the country. And most transplants were to urban/suburban areas where Republicans did increasingly well electorally and who fit well within traditionally Republican-friendly constituencies.⁸⁸ Thus, Key observed that, even in the deep South, it was true that at times “urbanism apparently outweighed racial restraints.”⁸⁹

After 1968, the South showed greater willingness to vote Republican at the presidential level. It voted for Nixon in 1972 and for Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the 1980s. However, these all were landslide elections where the Republican candidate dominated across the country. It also did not translate elsewhere down the ticket: the region remained dominantly, stubbornly Democrat in every other electoral sphere. Lublin noted that a shift in the South to a Republican majority anywhere below

⁸⁵ Kari Frederickson, “Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century Alabama,” Initial Report, 25.

⁸⁶ David Knoke and Constance Henry, “The Political Structure of Rural America” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 429(January 1977): 56.

⁸⁷ Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” *American Journal of Sociology* 64 (July 1938): 1-24; 5 Charles O. Lerche, *The Uncertain South* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 236.

⁸⁸ Irwin L. Morris, *Movers and Stayers: The Partisan Transformation of 21st Century Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). See also Richard K. Scher, *Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and Leadership in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd Ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). In the 21st century, this in-migration tended to help Democrats more, though that shift came well after the GOP became not just competitive but favored in the region. See Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 251-253.

⁸⁹ Key, 321.

the presidential level seemed to be a political version of “waiting for Godot.”⁹⁰ For thirty years after the Civil Rights Movement supposedly drove the South into the arms of the GOP, Democrats “held the preponderance of governorships as well as congressional seats” while “Democratic dominance appeared even greater at the state legislative and local levels.”⁹¹ For instance, as late as 1991 Democrats held a 77 to 39 advantage over the GOP—essentially 2-1—among Congressional delegations.⁹²

It was not until 1994 that Republicans won a majority of House districts in the South—thirty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and twenty-nine after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Republicans also won a majority in the North in that election, a double-feat not accomplished since 1872.⁹³ Even crossing this threshold did not result in the immediate collapse of the Democratic Party in the South, which gained some seats in Congress, governorships, and state legislatures back in subsequent elections during the rest of the 1990s and ceded the ground it did in the South only begrudgingly.⁹⁴ It took till the 2000 presidential election for a Republican to win the entire South in a non-blowout contest.

The slowness of this change matters considering the actual voters involved. By 1994, a significant generational shift in voting population from 1964 had taken place. This shift only becomes more pronounced in the 2020s. The most recent census data showed that only 18% of Alabama residents are over the age of 65.⁹⁵ The voters that revolted against the Democrats in 1948 and 1964, then generally returned, comprise a small and shrinking portion of the electorate. The rise of Republican strength in the region in the post-Civil Rights era coincided with not only migration from other parts of the country but also new generations accounting for an increasing segment of the voting public. In fact, research has pointed to “replacement” of older, native voters as one notable contributor to the GOP’s ascendancy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. From the 1980s till 2000, for instance, the average rural Southerner who identified as a Republican was ten years younger than his Democratic-affiliated counterpart.⁹⁶ Green, Palmquist, and Schickler claim that as much as half of white Southern voters’ migration to the GOP was generational replacement.⁹⁷

Moreover, this story includes a further normalization of Southern voting patterns. Consider the slow-motion change in rural partisan preferences between North and South. For most post-Civil War history, the Republican Party’s Northern base was rural with Democrats doing better among the more Roman Catholic, immigrant populations of cities. In the South, as noted before, Republicans did better in cities, though not that well, while Democrats dominated among that region’s rural voters. However, that began to change after the era of Civil Rights. Rural voting patterns began to converge between North and South. Thus, Southern rural voters began to vote more like their counterparts across the country. By 2004, southern rural voters were slightly more Republican in voting patterns than their corresponding

⁹⁰ David Lublin, *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004S), 1.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Black & Black, 13.

⁹³ Black & Black, 2.

⁹⁴ Lublin, 2.

⁹⁵ “Quick Facts: Alabama,” United States Census Bureau.

⁹⁶ <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AL/PST045223>. Accessed 3/27/2024.

⁹⁷ Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 28.

⁹⁷ Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

Northern rural voters.⁹⁸ It marked the South becoming more like the rest of the country in its voting patterns rather than maintaining a distinctiveness that before more comported with voting in a dominantly race-conscious manner. Not until the 2010s did rural Southerner whites align with the GOP more than urban whites.⁹⁹

In sum, this move from Democrat to Republican in the South hardly seems explainable predominantly by race. Beyond the statistics, we also have evidence that the Republican Party did not seek to go to the segregationists who had supported Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968. Some have argued that Republicans made sustained racial appeals but in more subdued or cloaked terms. Black and Black, for instance, argue in their 2002 book that Republicans from Nixon onward took this route with Goldwater as an earlier set-up.¹⁰⁰ This theory became known as the GOP's "Southern Strategy," which, some insist, continues to this day. For example, Dr. Frederickson opines that "white identity politics occup[ies] the center of Republican politics"¹⁰¹ now and since at least the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-20th century. She relies heavily on the GOP's "Southern Strategy" as inherently and perpetually grounded in white supremacy to make this argument. There are a number of concerns with her interpretation of the relevant history and with that of others who accept race as dominant in this tale.

For one, consider the case of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and campaigned vigorously in the South in the Fall of 1964, downplaying the civil rights issue there for the sake of getting votes. But he was far from a model segregationist. He had voted for the 1957 and 1960 civil rights bills, desegregated his own family business, integrated the Arizona Air National Guard and U.S. Senate cafeteria.¹⁰² And his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act rested on grounds that the law, while moral in intent, violated the Constitutional distribution of powers, especially between state and national governments.¹⁰³

For another, take the campaigns and presidency of Richard Nixon. Frederickson admits that Nixon was no George Wallace. She says, though, that Nixon wooed Southern white segregationists in that he, "established a politically safe terrain by simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles of equality while opposing the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance."¹⁰⁴

Nixon indeed consistently affirmed his belief in racial equality before the law. In his first inaugural address, Nixon declared:

No man can be fully free while his neighbor is not. To go forward at all is to go forward together. This means black and white together, as one nation, not two. The laws have caught up with our conscience. What remains is to give life to what is in the law: to

⁹⁸ Seth E. McKee, "Rural Voters and Polarization of American Presidential Elections" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41(1)(January 2008): 102.

⁹⁹ Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 24.

¹⁰⁰ Black & Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans*, 216, 277.

¹⁰¹ Frederickson, 4.

¹⁰² See "Where Barry Stands" *Time* August 2, 1963. <https://time.com/archive/6807933/nation-where-barry-stands/>. Accessed August 11, 2024; Lee Edwards, *Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution* (Regnery: 1995).

¹⁰³ See Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, *Legacies of Losing in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 110.

¹⁰⁴ Frederickson, 24.

insure at last that as all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before man.¹⁰⁵

Statements of this kind were not atypical for Nixon nor new in his political career. In fact, Richard Nixon hardly fit the bill for the person to morph the GOP into the party of white supremacy. He held a long record of support for civil rights, including *Brown v. Board of Education* and the civil rights acts of 1957 and 1960. Unlike Barry Goldwater, Nixon also had endorsed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and efforts leading to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.¹⁰⁶ In 1967, Nixon granted an interview with the *New York Times* where he said, “people in the ghetto have to have more than an equal chance. They should be given a dividend” in response to the history they had experienced of discrimination.¹⁰⁷

Frederickson argues Nixon’s policies regarding civil rights supports the racial element of the “Southern Strategy.” The Nixon Administration did pursue a moderate approach to enforcing civil rights. As president, Nixon opted for fewer hard deadlines for desegregation, moving much of its enforcement from the executive branch to the judiciary as well as supporting more cooperative efforts to get Southern schools to integrate.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, he opposed school busing as the means to integrate public schools.

But hanging the hat of white supremacy on these factors does not hold up well in light of the broader history. While making an argument for a Southern Strategy, Black & Black note that, “Nixon positioned himself to southern voters as opposed to segregation but favoring only voluntary integration.”¹⁰⁹ Such a position would be quite the concession for white supremacists to take in their voting preferences. But even that description does not fairly describe Nixon’s policies. Nixon’s desegregation plan still included substantial Justice Department-initiated litigation, which Dean Kotlowksi notes, “offended many white southerners” and thus made “questionable whether Nixon had swapped civil rights enforcement for southern votes as his critics complained.”¹¹⁰ After these executive branch lawsuits began, a record number of African-American school children went to integrated schools in the Fall of 1969.

The school busing policies, moreover, were not the only method or necessarily considered the best method for pursuing integration. They also were deeply unpopular, not merely the scourge of Southern segregationists. A Harris Poll from 1975 found that Americans supported desegregation by a 56%-35% margin while the same sample opposed busing 75%-20%.¹¹¹ Thus, a number of voters did not

¹⁰⁵ Richard Nixon, “Inaugural Address” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and States of the President: 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ronald Sullivan, “Back Rights Bill, Nixon Urges” *New York Times* June 16, 1964, 22. Joseph A. Loftus, “Senate’s Leaders Seek Voting Bill: Mansfield and Dirksen Say They Want a Simple Plan” *New York Times* March 11, 1965, 19.

¹⁰⁷ “Nixon Gives Views on Aid to Negroes and to the Poor” *New York Times*, December 20, 1967, 22.

¹⁰⁸ Hugh Davis Graham, “Richard Nixon and Civil Rights: Explaining an Enigma” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26(1)(Winter 1996): 94.

¹⁰⁹ Black & Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans*, 210.

¹¹⁰ Kotlowksi, 24.

¹¹¹ *New York Times*, October 5, 1975, pg. 59. A Washington Post poll in 1978 found that only 25% of Americans agreed with the statement that ““racial integration of the schools should be achieved even if it requires busing.” See Laura Meckler, “Effective But Never Popular, Court-Ordered Busing is a Relic Few Would Revive” *Washington Post*, July 7, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/effective-but-never-popular-court-ordered-busing-is-a-relic-few-would-revive/2019/07/07/dce439c8-9d40-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html. Retrieved 6/3/2024.

see busing as essential to achieving the goal of desegregation, a goal with which they agreed. Importantly, these statistics also revealed far from boisterous support from African-Americans. In a 1973 Gallup poll, for example, only 9% of African-Americans rated school busing at the top of their list of the best means for integration.¹¹²

Dr. Frederickson quotes an Alabama newspaper from the time heralding that “Nixon Keeps His Word.” But if Nixon was trying to signal subtly to white supremacists that he was on their side, he sold them a false bill of goods. His rhetoric hardly gave much to them in the first place, extolling racial equality. And his policies did not deliver on segregationist priorities. Simply put, Nixon failed to stop desegregation, instead helping bear considerable fruit on that front. In 1968, 68% of black children in the South attended single-race schools. That number had plummeted to 8% by 1972, the year Nixon ran for re-election. Far from coming despite Nixon, these welcome results happened in part due to his administration’s efforts.

In addition, Nixon compiled a number of other concrete policy accomplishments on civil rights. His budget proposals to Congress asked to increase funding for enforcing civil rights from \$75 million to \$2.6 billion between 1969 and 1972.¹¹³ In 1970, he approved a new IRS policy denying tax exempt status to all-white private schools, a move that especially went after institutions in the South trying to avoid public school integration.¹¹⁴ Nixon privately declared the move would not help him politically but made the call regardless.¹¹⁵ Nixon also played a significant part in the development of affirmative action programs. His “Revised Philadelphia Plan” built upon existing policies requiring those receiving federal funds to show some kind of affirmative action in their procedures. Rather than gut this program, he revived and enhanced it. In particular, the Revised Philadelphia Plan” focused on government contracts for construction jobs. Nixon did not take this route for political ease. He faced significant pressure from Congress to end all affirmative action requirements within the bureaucracy with Elmer P. Staats, the Comptroller General, declaring such plans illegal in November of 1968, the same month Nixon was elected president.¹¹⁶ This opposition included Southern politicians, among them Democratic Senators John McClellan of Arkansas and Sam Earvin of North Carolina.¹¹⁷ But Nixon forged ahead, doing something the Johnson Administration had not on this issue: establishing numerical requirements for minority hiring among those entities eligible for government contracts with concrete timetables attached.¹¹⁸ This policy, far from a new attempt to woo Southern segregationists, went beyond Nixon’s former position in favor of persuasion over coercion when he was Vice-President under Eisenhower.¹¹⁹

¹¹² “Gallup Finds Few Favor Busing for Integration” *New York Times*, September 9, 1973, 55.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1973/09/09/archives/gallup-finds-few-favor-busing-for-integration.html>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

¹¹³ Graham, 95.

¹¹⁴ Eileen Shanahan, “Private Schools that Bar Blacks to Lose Tax Aid” *New York Times* July 11, 1970, 1.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/11/archives/private-schools-that-bar-blacks-to-lose-tax-aid-irs-policy-is.html>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

¹¹⁵ Kotlowski, 25.

¹¹⁶ J. Larry Hood, “The Nixon Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan for Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding Presidential Power and Divided Government” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23(1)(Winter 1993): 147-150.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 150.

¹¹⁸ Dean J. Kotlowski, “Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action,” *The Historian* 60(3)(Spring 1998): 528-530.

¹¹⁹ See also Kotlowski, “Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action,” 533.

In fact, Joan Hoff has argued that Nixon has received too little credit for his advancement of civil rights during his career, including his presidency.¹²⁰ Any assessment of his so-called “Southern Strategy” that is based in alleged subtle racial language must account for the above (and additional) explicit words and deeds promoting the advancement of civil rights. Thus, while Nixon’s less-aggressive approach to civil rights might have been more attractive to segregationist elements in the South than Humphrey in 1968 or McGovern in 1972, Nixon’s policies nevertheless seriously undermined the segregationist and white supremacist agenda. White supremacists’ choice came down more on how to lose the legal and political battle, not whether they would lose.

One point sometimes lost in these discussions is the weak position Southern segregationists were in as the Civil Rights Movement won out and how the Republican Party itself understood this weakness. In 1968, Nixon won the presidency without the votes of the Southerners who cast ballots in droves for the Southern segregationist.¹²¹ Though the margin was narrow, the GOP still could win without the Deep South. In 1969, Kevin Phillips, who then worked in the Nixon Administration, published his famous book, *The Emerging Republican Majority*. In summing up trends toward the GOP in the South, Phillips emphasized the incapacity of segregationists to continue as a relevant factor in American politics. He wrote that “For national political reasons, the Republican Party cannot go to the Deep South, but...the Deep South must soon go to the GOP.”¹²² In other words, the South’s move to the GOP would be more on the latter’s terms, not the former’s. And these terms would have less to do with race and more to do with a combination of economic, foreign policy, and social issues then percolating within the parties and across the country due to the New Left and Modern Conservatism.

Studies bore this point out at least as early as the 1980s. In an examination of voter attitudes between 1980-1988, Alan Abramowitz found that the claim of the centrality of race in explaining partisan behavior was “quite limited,” despite so many scholars assuming its truth.¹²³ He critiqued the findings focused on race for the same basic reason this report questions them: failure to account for other issues, events, and developments that have as much or more explanatory power. The narrow view obscured the broader story.

Dr. Frederickson also claims the race-based “Southern Strategy” continued with Reagan. Her very quick assessment, as with Nixon, makes claims that unnoted evidence points against. To give one example: in 1982, President Reagan signed an extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In doing so, he agreed to amendments strengthening the law’s power by replacing §2’s discriminatory intent requirement with an effects test. In fact, African-American civil rights leaders declared that Reagan had given them “everything we wanted.”¹²⁴

Though her short analysis effectively ends with the end of the 20th century, Frederickson concludes that the Republican Party continues to this day to be the “white party” and that it has, “adopted a host of conservative policy positions that had race at their core.”¹²⁵ In fact, she asserts that basically all major conservative and Republican positions, including, “taxes, spending, education, crime,

¹²⁰ Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

¹²¹ Gerard Alexander, “The Myth of Racist Republicans,” *Claremont Review of Books* IV(2)(Spring 2004).

¹²² Phillips, 233.

¹²³ Alan I. Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate” *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1)(February 1994) :2.

¹²⁴ “Voting Rights Act Extension by the Senate Seen Likely as Dole Engineers Compromise,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 4, 1982.

¹²⁵ Frederickson, 29.

and welfare, as well as the promotion of what came to be known as ‘family values’ issues” all really were driven by racial attitudes.¹²⁶

This broad-brush claim shows serious difficulties with the narrative of a race-dominant Southern Strategy. It often falls back on what Dr. Joseph Bagley calls “colormasking”—subtle appeals to racial anxiety or animosity hidden underneath overt language of racial equality.¹²⁷ Thereby, as Frederickson claims, nearly all if not all Republican and conservative appeals ultimately are racial in origin and intent, regardless of what is explicitly stated.

Likely for support on this claim, she ends with a quote from Maxwell and Fields’ book, *The Long Southern Strategy*. That work demonstrates wider problems with the attempt to make race so central to Southern politics in particular and even to American politics more generally. It attempts to place alleged racial appeals within a broader strategy by the GOP regarding sex, sexuality, and religion. It paints a picture of a GOP committed to oppression across most cultural and political questions with race as only one element. But whatever the merits of that argument, it undermines the dominance of race as an explanatory factor by admitting that many other issues distinct from race contributed to the South’s move to the GOP. It attributes increasing prominence to questions regarding women’s rights and economics. At least one of its author’s even emphasizes a religious basis underlying and thus cohering many of these views.¹²⁸

Moreover, a related issue is the problem of deciphering the masked motivation undergirding a particular view or policy as dominated by race. As noted above, it is not clear that opposition to busing was due primarily to racist attitudes, since some did oppose these policies while still supporting integration. Affirmative action is another example. Does the evidence show that Republicans by and large oppose affirmative action and other race-conscious policies because they desire to discriminate against blacks or because they believe in a “color-blind” Constitution, the very argument raised by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his dissent against legalized segregation in *Plessy v. Ferguson*?¹²⁹ Similarly, some, like Dr. Bagley, interpret advocacy for “school choice” along with opposition to the teaching of critical race theory in primary schools as racially motivated rather than coming from a commitment to bettering education for all children.¹³⁰ But that cannot be reconciled with the fact that school choice, for example, continues to garner significant and increasing backing from members of all races.¹³¹ Non-racial reasons certainly can explain policy preferences on these issues. Likewise, a belief in greater border security regarding immigration is seen by Dr. Bagley and others as signaling racial

¹²⁶ Frederickson, 29.

¹²⁷ Joseph Bagley, Declaration, *Milligan v. Merrill*, December 10, 2021, at 1, 3, 26; Bagley, Third Expert Report, *Milligan v. Allen*, May 17, 2024, at 1, 24.

¹²⁸ “[T]he [Republican] party worked to reframe its positions on a host of domestic issues, ranging from health care to foreign policy, into matters of religious belief.” See Angie Maxwell, “What We Get Wrong About the Southern Strategy” *Washington Post*, July 26, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/26/what-we-get-wrong-about-southern-strategy/>. Retrieved 6/5/2014.

¹²⁹ Compare Richard Johnson, “The 1982 Voting Rights Act Extension as a ‘Critical Juncture’: Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole, and Republican Party-Building” *Studies in American Political Development* 35(2)(October 2021): 224; with Matthew Lassiter, *The Silent Majority*, and Abramowitz, *supra* note 123.

¹³⁰ Bagley, Third Expert Report, at 30-31

¹³¹ See Mike McShane, “A Decade of Public Polling on Education” *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemcshane/2022/09/30/a-decade-of-public-opinion-on-education/>. Retrieved 6/27/2024; Denisha Allen, “School Choice Really is the Civil Rights Issue of Our Time” *The Hill* February 14, 2024. <https://thehill.com/opinion/education/4465271-school-choice-really-is-the-civil-rights-issue-of-our-time/>. Retrieved 6/27/2024.

animosity, even when substantial numbers of Latino and African-American voters support such policies.¹³²

This practice of casting each and every conservative policy as containing some element of white supremacy paints a simplistic picture and inappropriately diminishes non-racial reasons explaining voter behavior. Unfortunately, this continues to infect the scholarship.¹³³ But it has also gained new traction in the public arena. For example, former attorney general Eric Holder recently claimed that Alabama's redistricting actions in this case "mirrored the sordid history of the Jim Crow era."¹³⁴ And President Biden described Georgia's attempts to regulate its elections as "Jim Crow 2.0."¹³⁵ And his questioning whether a "real" black person could vote for Republicans suffered from the same problem of assuming rather than showing racial animus.¹³⁶

In what follows, we will look beyond the numbers at the ways that the South came to the GOP and moved away from the Democratic Party. Shifts in all three—the South, GOP, and Democrats—contributed to these changes.

Economics and Role of Government

First, this report will discuss the issue of economic development. In 2008, Gary Miller and Normal Schofield pegged the Republican Party's unity to being "pro-business."¹³⁷ The American public held this view of the GOP going back into the 19th century, when post-Civil War Republicans sought to protect American business through tariffs and spent significant government dollars helping develop railroads and other infrastructure. In the North, this power stretched to rural areas, in part due to the

¹³² Bagley, Third Expert Report, at 30. An April poll found that 42% of Latinos in the US supported a border wall with significant support for deportation (38%) and majority (64%) for shutting down the Southern border as a potential policy tool. See Russell Contreras, "Exclusive Poll: Latino support for border wall, deportation jumps" *Axios* April 11, 2024. <https://www.axios.com/2024/04/11/poll-latino-support-border-wall-deportations-jumps>. Retrieved June 10, 2024. In a Pew poll this Spring, 33% of surveyed Latinos said that increasing deportations of those here against the law would make the current situation "better" while 26% said "worse" (with 19% saying it would not make much of a difference). See, "Latino's Views on the Migrant Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border" Pew Research Center, March 4, 2024. <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2024/03/04/latinos-views-on-the-migrant-situation-at-the-us-mexico-border/>. Retrieved 6/10/2024.

¹³³ One academic example would be Alan Abramowitz, whose 1990s work was cited earlier. His later work also tends to code certain issues, like opposition to affirmative action, school busing, and greater restrictions on immigration, as inherently racial in nature. See Alan I. Abramowitz, *The Great Realignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018). On this point, see also Larry M. Bartels, "Ethnic Antagonism Erodes Republicans' Commitment to Democracy" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 117(37)(September 15, 2020).

¹³⁴ Quoted in Joseph D. Bryant, "Supreme Court Ruling 1 Year Ago Today Changed Alabama's Congressional Map" *AL.com* June 8, 2024. <https://www.al.com/news/2024/06/supreme-court-ruling-1-year-ago-today-changed-alabamas-congressional-map.html>. Accessed June 11, 2024.

¹³⁵ See Joseph Biden, "Remarks by President Biden on Protecting the Right to Vote" *The White House* <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/11/remarks-by-president-biden-on-protecting-the-right-to-vote/>. Retrieved June 11, 2024.

¹³⁶ Quote by President Biden in Eric Bradner, Sarah Mucha, and Arlette Saenz, "Biden: 'If You Have a Problem Figuring Out Whether You're for Me or Trump, then You Ain't Black'" *CNN.com*. <https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/politics/biden-charlamagne-tha-god-you-aint-black/index.html>. Retrieved June 11, 2024.

¹³⁷ Miller and Schofield, 433-436.

GOP expanding its protective tariffs to certain agricultural products. While Democrats had electoral strength in Northern cities due to immigration and Roman Catholic voters, the Southern wing was more aligned with agriculture, making the agrarians a natural base for that portion of the Democratic Party.

Republicans had tried in the post-Reconstruction era to make inroads into the South on economic grounds. President Rutherford B. Hayes sought to attract Southern whites through providing government funding for internal improvements, especially the development of railroad systems.¹³⁸ These efforts failed to make significant change to a South still traditional in culture, agricultural in economy, and embittered by the memory of the Civil War. However, changes in both major parties, as well as economic developments in the South, later caused the region to see its interests as fulfilled more in the GOP than in the Democratic Party.

Since the times of Andrew Jackson, if not even Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic Party had a significant component that desired a government limited in size and scope. This included circumscribed government involvement in the economy, exemplified by Jefferson's and Jackson's opposition to the national bank. The Progressives of the late 19th and early 20th centuries sought to change that philosophy, desiring to reorient the Democrats (and Republicans) toward a more expansive view of governmental powers. Yet this effort only changed portions of the Democratic Party, making little inroads in its Southern portion.

FDR's election and subsequent implementation of the New Deal brought decisive change for the view of government and the economy within the Democratic Party. The New Deal included a massive expansion of governmental regulation, especially of banks. It also involved significant government involvement in the economy with the many programs the Democratic President and Congress put in place to employ American workers.¹³⁹

Though quite popular within the party and across the country, the Democratic Party had its own opponents to the New Deal. Carter Glass and Harry F. Byrd, Democratic Senators from Virginia, both criticized it publicly.¹⁴⁰ Georgia Governor Gene Talmadge won his 1932 race calling for lower taxes and limiting government's size. He later called the New Deal "a combination of wet nursin', frenzied finance, downright Communism and plain dam-foolish."¹⁴¹ By 1938, a discernable and substantial (though certainly minority) group of these Democrats existed and vocally so. Regionally, the highest concentration of them resided in the South. That year, President Franklin Roosevelt attempted a purge of New Deal opponents from the Democratic Party.¹⁴² He did so by pushing more liberal challengers to defeat these anti-New Deal Democrats in the 1938 primaries. He failed miserably in this effort. A strain of Southern Democratic thought, one believing in more limited government and state authority, continued to wield significant power and often aligned with Northern Republicans on matters of common cause. This alliance with Northern Republicans was not built on support for segregation but in

¹³⁸ Vincent P. de Santis, "Republican Efforts to 'Crack' the Democratic South" *Review of Politics* 14(2)(April 1952):248.

¹³⁹ Amity Schlaes, *The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

¹⁴⁰ See A. Cash Koeniger, "The New Deal and the States: Roosevelt Versus the Byrd Organization in Virginia" *The Journal of American History* 68(4)(March 1982): 876-896.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in Howard N. Mead, "Russell v. Talmadge: Southern Politics and the New Deal" *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 65(1)(Spring 1981): 31.

¹⁴² See Susan Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

a continued rejection of the economic philosophy that retooled the 1920s *laissez faire* GOP for modern conservatism.¹⁴³

Moreover, as an economic program of free markets and a political philosophy of smaller government took hold within the GOP, certain developments in the South made those positions even more attractive to voters in the region. The South had been considered economically backward and thus besieged by poverty and slow growth from Antebellum times into the middle of the 20th century. In 1937, the South's per capita income barely attained half the level in the rest of the country, a fact which was blamed mostly on the South's continued agrarian base and thus lack of industrial development.¹⁴⁴ That began to change in the second half of the 20th century. The South began a period of sustained economic growth that continues to this day. A new, vibrant middle class arose. In fact, in the 1940s, 30% of Southerners were considered middle class. That number had doubled to 60% by the 1980s.¹⁴⁵ This economic growth came disproportionately in the suburbs, a category of community that did not exist in the political science literature on Southern politics in the 1950s but was a strength electorally for Republicans for decades prior.

This growth in jobs and other opportunities accelerated migration from other parts of the country to the South. These new Southerners overwhelmingly consisted of white-collar workers who already formed a foundational component of the GOP elsewhere.¹⁴⁶ Economic development of a rising middle class continued to accelerate GOP gains in the South in the 1980s during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.¹⁴⁷ Reagan had argued in his First Inaugural that, "Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem."¹⁴⁸ He had cut taxes and spoke of the need to restrain federal spending, though that latter goal would prove a failing effort. The GOP continued to be identified with those positions, which became increasingly attractive to the growing, upwardly mobile suburban sections of the South.

Since that time, the growth in the South has continued to be urban and suburban, with nearly 90% of job growth coming in those portions of the South between 1987 and 2007.¹⁴⁹ Those changes continued to benefit the GOP. Thus, in the 1990s, the base of the Republican Party in Congress had not only moved to the South, with Georgia's Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House and Texans Dick Armey and Tom Delay serving as majority leader and majority whip, but its base came to a great degree from the region's growing suburbs.¹⁵⁰ Gingrich's 1995 book, *To Renew America*, preached an economic gospel of free trade, low regulation, restored federalism, and a market economy dynamic in wealth creation

¹⁴³ Hood & McKee, 14. See also Erick Schickler, *Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism 1932-1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

¹⁴⁴ Bruce J. Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sun Belt: Federalist Policy, Economic Development, 1938-1980* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 3-4.

¹⁴⁵ Joseph A. Aistrup, *The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). See also James C. Cobb, *Redefining Southern Culture: Mind and Identity in the Modern South* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999).

¹⁴⁶ Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, *Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1996).

¹⁴⁷ Ferrel Guillory, "The South in Red and Purple: Southernized Republicans, Diverse Democrats" *Southern Cultures* 18(3)(Fall 2012): 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ronald Reagan, "First Inaugural Address" *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum*. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/inaugural-address-1981>. Retrieved 3/17/2024.

¹⁴⁹ Guillory, 13.

¹⁵⁰ Matthew D. Lassiter and Kevin M. Kruse, "The Bulldozer Revolution: Suburbs and Southern History Since World War II" *The Journal of Southern History* 75(3)(August 2009): 693.

and uplifting to hardworking Americans.¹⁵¹ It thereby continued basically to follow the blueprint articulated by Buckley in the 1950s, Goldwater in the 1960s, and Reagan in the 1980s. Dr. Bagley tries to cast Gingrich's conservative politics, especially his attempts to reform entitlements, as dominated by disparaging racial views of African-Americans.¹⁵² His accusation would have to strain history to find credible support. Gingrich's views showed the decidedly suburban, middle-class focus of the GOP at the time not a subliminal attempt to play racial politics.

The scholarship has noted these components helping the GOP to slowly gain strength in the South below the presidential level. Lublin found that "economic issues most quickly began to differentiate Republicans and Democrats after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."¹⁵³ Richard Nadeau and Harold W. Stanley found that, since the mid-1970s, economic class has become the defining line for partisan preferences between Democrats and Republicans.¹⁵⁴ Even works emphasizing the racial answers to Southern re-alignment admit the existence and even the importance of a "free-market" economic philosophy in the development of Republican prospects in the 1940s and 1950s South. Challenging that thesis directly, Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston declared that economic change was the "first and foremost" driver of the partisan shift in the South from Democrat to Republican.¹⁵⁵

The combination of Southern economic development, Democratic movement to the left on economic issues, and the GOP embrace of and emphasis on free markets, lower regulation, and limiting government's size and scope, all aided a shift in voter identification toward the Republican party and away from the Democrats. Increasingly numbers of Southerners began to see the national Democratic party as the party of high taxes, irresponsible spending, and thereby the party whose policies stifled individual economic liberty and the economic pursuit of the American Dream.

Foreign Policy: Communism and the Cold War

Next, I turn to the development of the parties regarding the dominant foreign policy issue from 1945-1990: the Cold War against the forces of communism, especially Soviet Russia.

President Roosevelt officially recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, despite the Revolution of 1917 having brought the communists to power sixteen years prior.¹⁵⁶ However, the issue of America's response to national and international communism did not rise to a primary concern until after the end of World War II, when the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan shifted international sphere toward the developing Cold War conflict between Soviet Communism and Western capitalist democracies.

Both parties generically opposed communism and saw it as a significant threat to the United States. President Harry Truman had initiated the foreign policy approach known as "Containment,"

¹⁵¹ Newt Gingrich, *To Renew America* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).

¹⁵² See Bagley, *Third Expert Report*, 30.

¹⁵³ Lublin, 30.

¹⁵⁴ Richard Nadeau and Harold W. Stanley, "Class Polarization and Partisanship Among Native Southern Whites, 1952-90" *American Journal of Political Science* 37(3)(1993): 900-919.

¹⁵⁵ See Schafer and Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Post-War South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

¹⁵⁶ Alonzo Hamby, *For the Survival of Democracy: Franklin Roosevelt and the World Crisis of the 1930s* (New York: Press Press, 2004), 152-153.

which sought to stop further Soviet territorial expansion.¹⁵⁷ Eisenhower essentially continued that policy during his presidency even if he tried to place some rhetorical distance between himself and his predecessor.¹⁵⁸ But the GOP as a whole tended to articulate a more antagonistic opposition than the Democrats. Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, for example, infamously pushed the issue of communism to the forefront of American politics in the 1950s. GOP leadership proved more cautious. However, Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower, leaders of the more conservative and moderate wings of the party, were as careful to not fully repudiate McCarthy as they were not to fully embrace him. Moreover, in 1952 and 1956, Eisenhower picked Richard Nixon as his running mate.¹⁵⁹ Nixon had risen to prominence in large part due to his large participation in the hearings between Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers, where the latter accused the former of acting within the national government as a communist spy.¹⁶⁰ In 1948, Nixon campaigned tirelessly for Republican Presidential candidate Thomas Dewey in his presidential campaign against sitting president Harry Truman, focusing on the communist threat within the national government.¹⁶¹ The critiques Nixon made of Truman went beyond Democrat inability to find and oust Soviet infiltrators. International developments like the loss of China in 1949 and the war in Korea all opened up attacks on the Democratic Party as soft on our communist enemies.

As Sundquist notes, McCarthy's strident and often erratic anti-communism crusade had surprising popularity with a segment of the population decidedly outside the GOP coalition: Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholic church, however, already had engaged in significant efforts internationally against the rising Red menace.¹⁶² Though it did not result in immediate lasting gains, the move by the GOP to become the more unapologetically anti-Communist would aid in later efforts, mostly through social issues like abortion, to bring Roman Catholics into the party's fold.¹⁶³

The modern conservative movement that began to develop in the 1950s, the movement that became the base of the GOP, defined itself in large part by its anti-communism.¹⁶⁴ We saw this before in William F. Buckley's opening salvo in *National Review*, when he said we must seek the defeat of this foe. Goldwater's acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in 1964 minced no words about his antipathy toward communism, an antagonism Lyndon Johnson used to great effect to paint Goldwater as an extremist who might lead us into nuclear war.¹⁶⁵

The approach to the Soviet Union and to the broader communist threat solidified as a significant party issue with the Vietnam War. America's participation in the conflict was largely escalated by

¹⁵⁷ Elizabeth Spaulding discusses the critiques leveled at Truman's policy during the time which included claims of being too soft on the Soviets as well as too provocative. See Elizabeth Edwards Spaulding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2006).

¹⁵⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 127-128.

¹⁵⁹ Sundquist, 338-339.

¹⁶⁰ Irwin F. Gellman, *The Contender: Richard Nixon, the Congress Years, 1946-1952* (Yale University Press, 2017 [originally The Free Press, 1999]), 196-224.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 255-261.

¹⁶² Sundquist, 339.

¹⁶³ This report does not focus on the movement of Roman Catholics into the GOP due to the small number of self-identified Catholics in Alabama and other portions of the Deep South historically, except for Louisiana.

¹⁶⁴ Donald T. Critchlow, *The Conservative Ascendancy: How the Republican Right Rose to Power in Modern America* (Leavenworth: University of Kansas Press, 2011), 1; Jeffrey D. Howinson, *The 1980 Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 13-16.

¹⁶⁵ Stephen Skowronek, 340.

Democratic presidents, namely John F. Kennedy and LBJ, even as the rising New Left not only questioned our approach toward the Soviet Union but deeply opposed our involvement in Vietnam. The clashes in and around the 1968 Democratic National Convention largely concerned Vietnam.

Moving to the 1980s, President Reagan continued and even amplified the GOP antagonism toward the Soviet Union. He famously called the Soviets an “Evil Empire” in March of 1983, speaking in the kind black and white moral language that appealed to traditional voters. Moreover, he did not push for containment of the communist threat. Instead, in 1987, he called on the Russians to tear down the Berlin Wall while speaking in front of the Brandenburg Gate.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Reagan increased defense spending in relation to the Soviet threat, all of which positioned him in the public mind as fulfilling the longstanding conservative hardline toward communism.¹⁶⁷

The above developments in foreign policy had significant effects on partisanship in the South. As elements of the Democratic Party protested the Vietnam War, Southern Democrats found themselves again out of step with the leftward move. On communism, the clear opposition the GOP articulated became increasingly distinct from Democrats and attractive to Southern voters. Southerners held decidedly negative views of communism.¹⁶⁸ They tended to see it as against their economic and religious views. Carmines and Stanley see political import to this point, attributing Reagan’s success in the South in part to his strident anti-communism.¹⁶⁹ Reagan tied his critique of Communist Russia to broader conservative principles such as economic liberty, American patriotism, and to religious faith, telling news anchor Walter Cronkite that “their ideology is without God, without our idea of morality in the religious sense.”¹⁷⁰

Some have tried to tie the South’s anti-communism back to race, arguing that communism and civil rights were considered linked foes.¹⁷¹ However, this view falls prey to the reductionism previously noted. Anti-communism connected with Southern patriotism and religiosity, not to mention the South’s generally free-market economic views.¹⁷² These shifts all point to the Cold War as being one way that the GOP became more attractive to Southerners.

Social issues

Finally, this report turns to social issues. Social issues concern political reaction to cultural and moral matters. As discussed above, the New Deal coalition united around economic policy, differentiating itself with the GOP on those grounds primarily. Social issues were “submerged in the New

¹⁶⁶ See Romesh Ratnesar, *Tear Down This Wall: A City, A President, and the Speech that Ended the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).

¹⁶⁷ Robert M. Collins, *Transforming America: Politics and Culture During the Reagan Years* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007), 193-218.

¹⁶⁸ Joseph A. Fry, *Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789-1973* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 223.

¹⁶⁹ Edward G. Carmines and Harold W. Stanley, “Ideological Re-Alignment in the Contemporary South: Where Have All the Conservatives Gone?” in *The Disappearing South*, edited by Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 23-24.

¹⁷⁰ Quoted in H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 279.

¹⁷¹ See Jeff R. Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism, 1948-1968* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).

¹⁷² James C. Cobb, “World War II and the Mind of the Modern South,” *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South*, edited by Neil R. McMillen (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press 1997).

Deal years.”¹⁷³ Yet they did not stay so in the 1960s and beyond. In fact, the changes in the two major parties on this front did much to create greater distance between the average Southern voter and the Democrats and to push Southern voters closer to the Republican Party.

As a social issue, race of course came to the forefront in the 1960s in a way that severely tested the Democratic New Deal coalition. However, we have discussed how these intra-party battles did not produce an immediate move to the Republican Party of any durability. Separate from race’s effect on voters, other social issues arose from the 1960s and beyond that contributed mightily to the changing partisan landscape in the South.

1) *Religious Identity*

First, we turn to the issue of religious identity. The South has a reputation for high levels of religious adherence, especially to some iteration of Christianity. It is part of the so-called “Bible Belt” and for good reason. Baptists and Methodists have traditionally been the two largest demographics, as from 1850-1926 they combined for about 70% of Southern residents as a whole.¹⁷⁴ Alabama is no different on this score. In a book chapter released in 2005, Ted Ownby found that over 42% of Alabama residents identified as Baptist alone.¹⁷⁵ In its 2014 “Religious Landscape Study,” Pew Research found that 86% of surveyed Alabamians identified as Christians. Forty nine percent of the population claimed “Evangelical Protestant” as their self-designation.¹⁷⁶ This religious connection goes beyond mere identification. More than half of Alabamians reported going to religious services at least once a week, which is well above the national average.¹⁷⁷

For most of American history, this high religiosity did not matter for partisan alignment. Particular denominations tended toward one political party or the other with mainline Protestants forming the backbone of the GOP. Thus, the joke went that the Episcopal Church was, “the Republican Party at prayer.”¹⁷⁸ Democrats did better among Roman Catholics in the North and Baptists in the South. However, these were far from hard and fast distinctions. FDR, for example, was Episcopalian. Warren G. Harding was a Baptist.¹⁷⁹ Regardless, both parties were seen as homes for religious persons, especially those adhering to some form of Christianity.

However, the alignments within Christianity have changed. At first, the change concerned a divide between more theologically liberalizing denominations and those who retained a theologically traditional set of beliefs. Episcopalians and other mainline Christian denominations who liberalized

¹⁷³ Everett C. Ladd, “Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics” *Polity* 22(3)(Spring 1990): 523.

¹⁷⁴ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, *The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 157-160.

¹⁷⁵ Ted Ownby, “Evangelical but Differentiated: Religion by the Numbers” *Religion and Public Life in the South*, edited by Charles Wilson Reagan and Mark Silk (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 41.

¹⁷⁶ “Adults in Alabama” *Religious Landscape Study* <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/state/alabama/>. Accessed 3/13/2024.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Daniel K. Williams, *The Politics of the Cross: A Christian Alternative to Partisanship* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2021), 19.

¹⁷⁹ Pew Research Center, “The Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents” January 15, 2009. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2009/01/15/the-religious-affiliations-of-us-presidents/>. Retrieved 3/20/2024.

theologically now tend to be more aligned with the Democratic Party, though even here laypersons tended to be more Republican than the clergy. Southern Baptists and theologically traditionalist versions of Lutheran, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, and non-denominational churches have moved overwhelmingly into the GOP. The rise of the “Moral Majority” in the 1980s and the “Christian Coalition” in the 1990s further cemented the link between the theologically traditionalist group of churches, political conservatism, and Republican political identity.¹⁸⁰ The “Moral Majority” was formed by Jerry Falwell, founder of Liberty University and founding pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church, both in Lynchburg, VA. Falwell had been angered by *Roe v. Wade* and by the IRS’s efforts to revoke Bob Jones University’s tax exempt status based on its ban for interracial dating and marriage (though he argued for the latter largely on grounds of religious liberty and limitations on governmental power). Falwell then established the “Moral Majority” in June of 1979 through which Falwell endorsed candidates, raised and donated money to political campaigns, and registered evangelicals to vote. Falwell focused on social issues like prayer, traditional marriage, but also anti-communism, warning of God’s judgment if Americans did not turn back to God.¹⁸¹ The Christian Coalition, formed in the late 1980s, was created by another important figure in the American conservative religious landscape: Pat Robertson. Like Falwell, Robertson also founded a college—Regent University in Virginia Beach. The “Christian Coalition” gave special focus to local elections while also putting out voting guides with “scorecards” for United States Congressmen that rated them based largely on their conformity to conservative values.¹⁸² The identification of Republicans with traditional moral or “family” values also attracted an increasing number of Roman Catholics, once solidly in the Democratic column, especially on issues like abortion and marriage.

These developments also continued to push mainline Protestants out of the GOP and toward the Democratic Party. The Episcopal Church, for example, consecrated its first gay bishop in 2003, approved its first liturgy for same-sex relationships in 2012, and officially permitted same-sex marriages within its churches in 2015. The Presbyterian Church (USA) changed its rules to permit the same unions in 2015 as well. This report will discuss below the movements of the parties on LGBTQ rights. But these liberalizing trends in Mainline Protestantism had significant effects on party affiliation as well.

More importantly for this report, the divide *within* religious adherents has been supplemented by a bigger one *between* religious adherents and those who do not identify with any organized religion at all.¹⁸³ The so-called “nones” have ballooned in size, especially among millennials and Generation Z.¹⁸⁴ These persons, either secular or at least unaffiliated with any organized religion, have become one of

¹⁸⁰ See Daniel K. Williams, *God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹⁸¹ Williams, *God’s Own Party*, 171-179.

¹⁸² Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, “Second Coming: The Strategies of the New Christian Right” *Political Science Quarterly* 111(2)(Summer 1996): 274-275.

¹⁸³ Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, “Secularists, Anti-Fundamentalists, and the New Religious Divide in the American Electorate” *From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Religious Mosaic*, edited by J. Matthew Wilson (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 251-276.

¹⁸⁴ Gregory A. Smith, “About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Are Now Religiously Unaffiliated” *Pew Research Center* December 14, 2021. <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/12/14/about-three-in-ten-u-s-adults-are-now-religiously-unaffiliated/>. Retrieved 3/21/2024; Jason DeRose, “Religious ‘Nones’ Are Now the Largest Single Group in the United States. NPR, January 24, 2024. <https://www.npr.org/2024/01/24/1226371734/religious-nones-are-now-the-largest-single-group-in-the-u-s>. Retrieved 3/20/2024.

the most reliable constituencies for the Democratic Party in the 21st century.¹⁸⁵ By contrast, those who identify with some form of institutional Christianity, but especially theologically conservative evangelical or Roman Catholic iterations, vote overwhelmingly Republican.¹⁸⁶

Given the continuing high levels of religiosity in the American South, especially in Alabama, it makes sense that these trends would affect partisan affiliations on the political front. Thus, a number of works have shown how the religious-secular divide has had a significant impact on the partisan splits within the voting public.¹⁸⁷ Religious adherence or non-adherence has become a fairly reliable marker for partisan identity as well, this research shows. As the GOP has become identified more exclusively with religious voters and Democrats with more secular, the decidedly religious South would likely feel more at home with the former party.

As this report turns to other social issues that have affected the Southern partisan landscape, religion will play a role in each of them. On abortion and LGBTQ rights, the divide between the parties is in part fueled by a divide between religious conservatives on the GOP side and either religious progressives or secularists anchoring the Democratic Party. We turn next to those issues and their importance to this discussion.

2) Abortion

Another issue to develop after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts was abortion. Alabama's legislature passed the first statutory ban on terminating pregnancies in 1841. The penalties attached to violating that law were enhanced in 1894. In 1951, however, the legislature reduced the penalties, though evidence points toward this reduction as trying to secure better enforcement through increased likelihood of convictions.¹⁸⁸

On January 22, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in *Roe v. Wade*.¹⁸⁹ By a 7-2 vote, the justices determined that the Constitution protected a right to privacy that included a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. This decision voided the laws restricting abortion across the South, including those in place in Alabama.

Though reaction at first was mixed between the parties, the Republicans moved toward affirming the Pro-Life cause with Democrats increasingly siding with the Pro-Choice movement. The 1976 GOP Party platform included an acknowledgment that persons in the party existed across the spectrum of wanting near-total allowance and near-total bans on abortion. But, with language

¹⁸⁵ Peter Smith, "Non-Religious Voters Wield Clout, Tilt Heavily Democratic" December 3, 2022. <https://apnews.com/article/abortion-pennsylvania-reproductive-rights-e5eb366a76995619a2c9bae200f414e6>. Retrieved 3/21/2024.

¹⁸⁶ For a breakdown of Gallup Polling on this issue in the 2020 election, see Frank Newport, "Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election" November 13, 2020. <https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/324410/religious-group-voting-2020-election.aspx>. Accessed 3/20/2024.

¹⁸⁷ David E. Campbell, Geoffrey C. Lehman, John C. Green, and Nathanael G. Sumaktoyo, "Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations" *American Journal of Political Science* 62(3)(July 2018): 551-565; William V. D'Antonio, Steven A. Tuch, and Josiah R. Baker, *Religion, Politics, and Polarization: How Religiopolitical Conflict is Changing Congress and American Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

¹⁸⁸ See also Brian Lyman and Evan Mealins, "A History of Abortion Law and Abortion Access in Alabama" *Montgomery Advertiser* June 24, 2022. <https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/2022/06/24/abortion-law-access-alabama-roe-vs-wade-history/7702753001/>. Retrieved 3/14/2024.

¹⁸⁹ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

introduced by Kansas Senator Bob Dole, the platform said, “[t]he Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children.”¹⁹⁰ The Democratic Party platform of that year took a less decided stance. It merely said, “[w]e fully recognize the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion. We feel, however, that it is undesirable to attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court decision in this area.”¹⁹¹

In 1980, the GOP platform enhanced its Pro-Life stance. It reiterated support for a Constitutional amendment protecting unborn life, adding, “[w]e also support the Congressional efforts to restrict the use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion.”¹⁹² Democrats that year also moved toward the Pro-Choice position. Their platform restated that some opposed abortion for ethical and moral reasons. However, it added that “[w]e also recognize the belief of many Americans that a woman has a right to choose whether and when to have a child.” Beyond recognizing these competing views, it also declared that, “[t]he Democratic Party supports the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abortion rights as the law of the land and opposes any constitutional amendment to restrict or overturn that decision.”¹⁹³

Moving on to 1984, the differences between the parties became stark. The GOP declared, “[t]he unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed.” From that statement, the platform not only reiterated a call for a human life amendment but also “legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to unborn children.” It restated the party’s opposition to government funding for abortion and commended those private organizations that provided alternatives to abortion for pregnant women.¹⁹⁴ The Democrats’ 1984 platform, by contrast, spoke of, “the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive freedom” that Reagan’s reelection threatened. In 1988, the Democratic Party would add a provision declaring, “that the fundamental right of reproductive choice should be guaranteed regardless of ability to pay,” thus calling for government funding of abortion for those women living in poverty.

The scholarship reveals that voters paid attention to these hardenings in the parties on the issue of abortion. Louis Bolce, in a 1988 study, argued that a significant shift occurred in voter views of how each party approached abortion.¹⁹⁵ Greg Adams displayed how, by 1997, the Republican and Democratic parties had clarified their abortion stances, with the GOP becoming the clear home for Pro-Life advocates and the Democrats more welcoming to the Pro-Choice movement.¹⁹⁶ Second, he showed how a significant number of voters have switched their party identification in response to abortion.

¹⁹⁰ “The Republican Party Platform of 1976” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1976>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹¹ “The Democratic Party Platform of 1976” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1976-democratic-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/19/2024.

¹⁹² “The Republican Party Platform of 1980” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1980>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹³ “The Democratic Party Platform of 1980” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1980-democratic-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹⁴ “The Republican Party Platform of 1984” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1984>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

¹⁹⁵ Louis Bolce, “Abortion and Presidential Elections: The Impact of Public Perceptions of Party and Candidate Positions” in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18(4)(Fall 1988): 815-829.

¹⁹⁶ Greg D. Adams, “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution” *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3)(July 1997): 718-737.

Third and finally, he displayed how vocal Pro-life and Pro-choice commitments among party elites has affected the way regular people view major party views on abortion. All of these points direct toward the public, including in the South, seeing the GOP as the Pro-life party.

Moreover, overturning *Roe v. Wade* and then its reaffirmation in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*¹⁹⁷ became rallying cries for conservatives and many within the GOP. In the 1990s, the Democratic Party's Pro-choice stance did include President Clinton's formulation that abortion should be, "safe, legal, and rare." However, since that time, Progressives and the Democratic Party more broadly have made the case for broader and less apologetic support for abortion rights and the women exercising that right.¹⁹⁸

These movements within the two parties clearly placed the GOP closer to, and the Democratic Party further from, the preferences of Southern voters. The South has opposed legalized abortion by higher margins than the country as a whole. Alabama in particular has taken a much more anti-abortion stance than the average American. In a 2014 Pew Research survey, Alabama had the lowest support for legalized abortion in the entire nation.¹⁹⁹ In 2018, Alabama voters passed an amendment to their state constitution by a 59-41% margin.²⁰⁰ The text read that, "[t]his state acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to recognize and support the sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life" and pledged the state's public policy-making to "the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." Then, in 2019, Alabama passed one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country.²⁰¹ It banned nearly all abortions except for fetuses with a "lethal anomaly" or where continued pregnancy would, "present serious health risk" to the woman.

In addition, we have data showing that a significant number of people vote on the basis of abortion. In the 2016 presidential election, for instance, the next president's capacity to nominate new justices to the Supreme Court proved deeply consequential to the election of Donald Trump. A CNN exit poll found that those who said Supreme Court appointments were "the most important factor" reported voting for Donald Trump by a 56%-41% margin.²⁰² This voter focus on the Supreme Court was concerned predominantly with the prospect of overturning *Roe v. Wade* and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*.

The motivations for a pro-life or a pro-choice position does not seem to be based in race. In an early study after the Court handed down *Roe*, Donald Granberg found attitudes about abortion most strongly correlated to religious belief, not economic class, geography, or race.²⁰³ One example pertinent to Alabama politics is the Southern Baptist Convention. In 2024, an estimated 1.25 million Alabama residents, or one in four, considered themselves Southern Baptist, whose adherents overwhelmingly

¹⁹⁷ 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

¹⁹⁸ See Katha Pollitt, *Pro: Reclaiming Abortion Rights* (New York: Picador, 2014); *Shout Your Abortion*, edited by Amelia Bonow and Emily Nokes (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2018); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich and Alesha E. Doan, *Abortion Regret: The New Attack on Reproductive Freedom* (Santa Barbara, Praeger, 2019).

¹⁹⁹ Pew Research Center, "Views About Abortion by State" 2014 U.S. Religious Landscape Study <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/compare/views-about-abortion/by/state/>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

²⁰⁰ Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. I, § 36.06.

²⁰¹ See "Human Life Protection Act" or HB 314.

²⁰² Jane Coaston, "Polling Data Shows Republicans Turned Out for Trump in 2016 because of the Supreme Court" June 29, 2018. <https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-kennedy-retire>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

²⁰³ Donald Granberg, "Pro-Life or Reflection of Conservative Ideology: An Analysis of Opposition to Legalized Abortion" *Sociology and Social Research* 62(April 1977/1978): 414-429.

oppose abortion.²⁰⁴ That denomination's stated positions on abortion did evolve. It gave its first official position in 1971, before the Supreme Court handed down *Roe v. Wade*. This statement and others in the 1970s gave some opening to permitting abortion for certain reasons. However, the Southern Baptist Convention settled on a decidedly pro-life stance by 1980, when it called for amending the Constitution to ban abortion except for when the life of the mother was at risk.²⁰⁵ Also opposing any government funding for abortion, the SBC has maintained a consistent and strident anti-abortion position to the present day.

Thus, it is reasonable to see that Alabama voters highly motivated by that issue would align with the political party closest to their views on abortion. That party clearly is the GOP, not the Democrats. Given the sensitive, emotional nature of the issue, it also is reasonable that the abortion positions of parties and their candidates would make a significant difference in voter decisions at the polls.

3) LGBTQ Rights

Another issue of importance for Southern partisan identification concerned LGBTQ rights. On the Supreme Court, gay rights began to receive consistent protection in *Romer v. Evans* (1996),²⁰⁶ which struck down a Colorado amendment prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for gay persons. This trend continued with *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003)²⁰⁷ that voided a Texas law banning homosexual sodomy. In *United States v. Windsor* (2013),²⁰⁸ the Court struck down portions of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that had defined marriage in traditional terms for federal law. These legal efforts culminated in the 2015 Supreme Court decision *Obergefell v. Hodges*²⁰⁹ which recognized a constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples.

Though neither party officially supported same-sex marriage until the 21st century, the Democratic Party always showed greater openness to and support for the legal and cultural claims of gay persons. As early as 1972, Madeline Davis argued for inclusion of gay rights in the Democratic Party Platform.²¹⁰ Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man elected to office in California, joined the Democratic Party in 1972 before being elected San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1977.²¹¹ One of the first openly gay members of Congress, Barney Frank from Massachusetts, was a prominent Democrat as well.

Beyond persons, official Democratic Party positions moved toward greater recognition about, and advocacy for, gay rights. The 1992 Democratic Party Platform committed to policies that would "provide civil rights protection for gay men and lesbians and an end to Defense Department

²⁰⁴ See Pew Research Center, "Views About Abortion Among Members of the Southern Baptist Convention" <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/religious-denomination/southern-baptist-convention/views-about-abortion/>. Retrieved 3/15/2024.

²⁰⁵ See Southern Baptist Convention, "Resolution on Abortion" June 1, 1980. <https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/resolution-on-abortion-6/>. Retrieved 3/20/2024.

²⁰⁶ 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

²⁰⁷ 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

²⁰⁸ 570 U.S. 744 (2013).

²⁰⁹ 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

²¹⁰ Madeline Davis, "Address to the Democratic National Convention," *Speaking for Our Lives: Historic Speeches and Rhetoric for Gay and Lesbian Rights, 1892-2000*, edited by Robert B. Ridinger (New York: Harrington Park Press, 2004), 179-180.

²¹¹ Lillian Faderman, *Harvey Milk: His Lives and Death* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 142-149. Due to his open homosexuality, Milk was murdered after less than a year after taking office on November 27, 1978.

discrimination”²¹² in response to the ban on such persons from serving in the military. Yet this movement was far from smooth. In 1996, Congress passed, and Democratic President Bill Clinton signed, the previously mentioned “Defense of Marriage Act”.²¹³ Again, the law defined marriage for federal government purposes in exclusively heterosexual terms. It also declared that states would not have to recognize marriage between same-sex couples that took place in other states. In Congress, Democratic officeholders voted 118-65 for the bill in the House and 32-14 for it in the Senate. These votes came in addition to nearly unanimous support from the GOP. Yet even here, differences between the parties still existed. Not only did a number of Democrats vote against DOMA, unlike with the GOP; the party platforms for 1996 took very different approaches, with the Republican platform giving full-throated support to the law and the Democratic platform avoiding the issue entirely.

While support for gay rights generally continued to grow within the Democratic Party, it took until 2012 for the Party’s platform to explicitly endorse same-sex marriage.²¹⁴ President Obama, then running for re-election, had stood against legalizing such relationships in his 2008 campaign. But he had announced a change of opinion in the lead-up to the 2012 election,²¹⁵ becoming the first presidential candidate of a major political party to take that stance.

The Republican Party, by contrast, vigorously supported traditional marriage as the exclusive definition of the institution, at least it did through the handing down of *Obergefell*. Some Republicans voiced opposition to this position, including Vice-President Dick Cheney and Ohio Senator Rob Portman.²¹⁶ However, these were decidedly minority views within the party.

For example, in a well-publicized speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention, Pat Buchanan criticized the Democratic ticket of Bill Clinton and Al Gore as “the most pro-lesbian and pro-gay ticket in history.” He also decried, “the amoral idea that gay and lesbian couples should have the same standing in law as married men and women.” He was one of six speakers to advocate for traditional marriage and family structures at the Convention.²¹⁷ In the 2000 presidential election, when Al Gore supported “civil unions” for same-sex couples, George W. Bush strongly opposed them.²¹⁸ The public took notice of these party positions. In a 2003 article, Paul Brewer noted that, “[i]n American politics, support for gay rights has typically been associated with liberalism and the Democratic party, whereas opposition to gay rights has typically been associated with conservatism and the GOP.”²¹⁹

These perceptions were only reinforced by subsequent events. The GOP’s 2004 party platform attacked, “hard-left” judges who, “threaten America’s dearest institutions and our very way of life. In

²¹² “1992 Democratic Party Platform.” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1992-democratic-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/16/2024.

²¹³ 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).

²¹⁴ “We support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal treatment under law for same-sex couples.” See “2012 Democratic Party Platform.” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2012-democratic-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/19/2024.

²¹⁵ Kerry Eleveld, *Don’t Tell Me To Wait: How the Fight for Gay Rights Changed America and Transformed Obama’s Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), xvi.

²¹⁶ Andrew Reynolds, *The Children of Harvey Milk: How LGBTQ Politicians Changed the World* (New York: Oxford University Press 2019), 239.

²¹⁷ Sean Cahill, “The Anti-Gay Marriage Movement” *The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage*, edited by Craig A. Rimmerman and Clyde Wilcox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 169.

²¹⁸ John Kenneth White, *Barack Obama’s America: How New Conceptions of Race, Family, and Religion Ended the Reagan Era* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 130.

²¹⁹ Paul R. Brewer, “The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion on Gay Rights” *Journal of Politics* 65(4)(November 2003): 1210.

some states, activist judges are redefining the institution of marriage.”²²⁰ The same platform also said that President Bush would defend DOMA. In the same section, it said President Bush supported a Constitutional Amendment that “fully protects marriage” and that, “[w]e further believe that legal recognition and the accompanying benefits afforded couples should be preserved for that unique and special union of one man and one woman which has historically been called marriage.”²²¹

Like with abortion, the party development on this issue opened up a significant gap between the majority of Southern voters and the Democratic Party while the GOP better aligned with those voters. In a 2007 survey of Alabama voters, 60% of respondents agreed with the statement that homosexuality “should be discouraged.” In the 2014 survey, that number dipped a little. However, 52% of respondents still agreed with that statement” In the same report, 57% of Alabama respondents opposed the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Alabama was the state with the least support for legal recognition of same-sex marriage in the entire country according to the Pew study.

These opinion surveys played out in voting patterns. In 2006, Alabama voters approved Amendment 774, also known as the “Sanctity of Marriage Amendment.” Among its provisions, this amendment said, “[m]arriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman” and therefore, “[a] marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.” In addition, the amendment specified that, “The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued.”²²²

The voters passed this new addition to the state constitution by an overwhelming margin, 81%-19%. This move by Alabama voters participated in a much broader trend. Between 2004 and 2012, thirty states passed referenda defining marriage exclusively in traditional terms. Thirteen did so in 2004 alone.²²³

Again, these trends give a non-racial reason for the voting preferences of a majority of Alabama voters in the 21st century. The conservative argument for more traditional values on matters of sexuality has proven more in-line with voter preferences in the state and the region, even as LGBTQ rights have received increased legislative and judicial protection nationally. As with abortion, those voters placing a high importance on these issues in the state and region would tend to see Republicans as their more natural ally.

Conclusion

In this report, I have sought to provide a fuller context for how Alabamians in 2024 come to identify with and vote for one of the two major political parties. This context came from a broader discussion of political parties in America and a more focused inquiry into party history in the South, of

²²⁰ “2004 Republican Party Platform” <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2004-republican-party-platform>. Retrieved 3/16/2024.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Alabama Constitution of 1901, Amendment 774. <https://constitutii.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/alabama.pdf>. Retrieved 3/19/2024.

²²³ Haeyoun Park, “Gay Marriage State by State: From a Few States to a Whole Nation” *New York Times*, March 31, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/gay-marriage-state-by-state.html>. Retrieved 3/16/2024; Thomas M. Keck, “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights” *Law and Society Review* 43(1)(March 2009): 153-154. See also Cary Franklin, “Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights” *Virginia Law Review* 100(5)(September 2014): 845.

which Alabama comprises an important a consistent example of the Deep South. We know that the once solid Democratic South turned from the Democratic Party, now voting reliably Republican at the national and state levels. With the anomaly of 1964 in the Deep South, it did so slowly and incrementally, starting at the presidential level, in the Peripheral South, and through urban and then suburban areas. Democrats remained the clear majority party on nearly all non-presidential offices for decades after the Civil Rights movement triumphed in the region. Only in the mid-1990s did the South really start to turn to a majority Republican region at the Congressional and state government levels, a trend that continued slowly into the 21st century, with Alabama's legislature only turning fully to the GOP in 2010.

Southern voters, including in Alabama, slow-motion forsook the Democrats and gradually embraced the GOP for a variety of reasons. The rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party caused it to diverge sharply from Southern voters' beliefs on a number of issues. At the same time, developments in the GOP, based in the growth of Modern Conservatism, eventually led many in the South to see Republicans as embodying their views better. These issues included economics and the role of government, communism, abortion, and LGBTQ rights. We could add more to the list, including gun control and environmental policy, where the GOP has come to align decidedly with the preferences of a majority of Southern voters. However, the above gives a good amount of evidence to make the same point: race alone does not account for the partisan realignment of the last 60 plus years.

The explanatory dominance of race could come even more into question in the current election cycle. While very preliminary, polling for the 2024 election has consistently shown significant shifts within minority voters toward the GOP.²²⁴ In fact, Democrats in minority communities have expressed alarm on this point.²²⁵ We should not read too much into these polling numbers and political reactions to them yet. However, they give additional evidence that the political alignments at work today are driven by factors other than race such as economics, foreign policy, and moral issues and that social and economic class also plays a significant role in persuasion toward partisan identities.

In conclusion, I should make clear that these observations do not give a moral approval or disapproval of the views held and actions taken on the above matters. I neither defend nor critique Alabama voters on their views about economics, government, communism, religion, abortion, and gay rights. Instead, what the above clearly show are issues distinct from race that significantly influenced Alabama party affiliation and voting patterns. Nor do I deny that race plays any factor whatsoever in the minds of any voters in Alabama in 2024. As noted in the introduction, these other elements do not eliminate race entirely as a factor in how voters, including white voters, cast their ballots. Still, the above history and scholarship gives solid evidence that other factors beyond race have had an important, consequential effect on partisan realignment in the South, including the state of Alabama. That fuller narrative matters for considering the role of race in redistricting. I believe this evidence should be taken

²²⁴ Jeffrey M. Jones and Lydia Saad, "Democrats Lose Ground With Black and Hispanic Adults" *Gallup* February 7, 2024. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/609776/democrats-lose-ground-black-hispanic-adults.aspx>. Retrieved 6/5/2024; Philip Bump and Lenny Bronner, "Another Lens into the Rightward Shift of Black and Hispanic Americans" *Washington Post* March 11, 2024. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/03/11/black-hispanic-republican-votes-polling/>. Retrieved 6/4/2024; Russell Contreras, "Democrats' big vulnerability: Why they're losing Black, Hispanic voters" *Axios* March 13, 2024. <https://www.axios.com/2024/03/13/why-democrats-black-hispanic-vote-republican>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

²²⁵ Maya King, "Behind the Republican Effort to Win Over Black Men" *New York Times*, June 10, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/10/us/politics/2024-election-gop-black-men-voters.html>. Retrieved June 10, 2024.

into account by any judicial body considering redistricting plans, including the current one under consideration by this court.

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Books

Liberty in Full: Justice Stephen Field's Cooperative Constitution of Liberty (Lexington Books 2017. Paperback 2019).

Academic Articles/Book Chapters

- "Power Struggle: Locke and Montesquieu on Separation of Powers" in collected volume honoring Dr. David Nichols (under contract with Lexington Books).
- "Ship as State: the Political Philosophy of *Master and Commander*" in *The Politics of Contemporary Hollywood Films* (forthcoming from Lexington Books).
- "Self-Defined, Self-Expressed, Societally-Approved: Justice William J. Brennan's Jurisprudence of Human Dignity" in *The Catholic Supreme Court Justices* (Forthcoming 2024 from Catholic University of America Press).
- "Story Time With Whittington: Judicial Review in *Repugnant Laws and Commentaries on the Constitution*" in *The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy* 19(Summer 2021).
- "No 'Piece of Cake': Applying Liberty and Equality in *Masterpiece Cakeshop*" in *Society, Law and Ethics*, Edited by David Mackey (Jones & Bartlett 2021).
- "Alexander Hamilton and Popular Government: Friendly Defender and Friendly Critic" in *Democracy and the History of Political Thought*. Edited by Patrick Cain, Steve Block, and Stephen Sims (2021 with Lexington Books).
- "The Statesmanship of Job: Puritan Joseph Caryl on Job as the Model Magistrate" in *Evangelical Quarterly* 90(3)(2019).

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Book Reviews

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<http://thefederalist.com/2016/04/23/how-we-the-people-can-reclaim-our-constitution/>.

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Review of *The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution* by Paul Horwitz in *Journal of Church and State* (Summer 2012).

Conferences and Talks

“*Energy's Scaffold: Edward Bates on Separation of Powers in the Lincoln Administration*” submitted for “Abraham Lincoln and the American Experiment in Self-Government” Ashland University, 11/17-18/2023.

“Power Struggle: Locke and Montesquieu on Separation of Powers” conference honoring legacy of Dr. David Nichols 10/14-15/2022.

“Songs in the King’s Key: The Political Thought of the Psalms” given at the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs 10/22/2021.

“Supreme Court Preview: Cases to Keep an Eye on in the Upcoming Term” Webinar for the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs 9/29/2021.

“The First Amendment and Pornography: Drawing a Line in the Sand.” Talk given at 2019 Love & Fidelity Conference, 11/10/2019.

“Still Imperial? The Presidency and the Constitution” (discussant) APSA 2019, Washington, D.C. (8/31/2019).

“ ‘Full of Fears and Full of Hopes’: Conversations with Tocqueville on the Problems of Democracy in America” at Baylor University (panelist) (6/30-7/1/2019).

James Wilson Institute XVI at the Kirby Center (panelist) (5/3-5/5/2019).

5th Annual Salmon Chase Lecture & Colloquium at Georgetown Law (panelist) (11/30-12/1/2018).

APSA in Boston (chaired panel) (8/30-9/2/2018).

“In Substance, Not Name: Antebellum Court Seeds of the Administrative State.” Talk at Baylor University, 3/16/18.

“The Statesmanship of Job: Joseph Caryl on Job as the Model Magistrate.” Panel at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, 1/6/18.

Roundtable: The Electoral College: Time to Re-Evaluate? Panel at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 9/3/2017.

Roundtable: Checks on Executive Power Under Obama And Trump. Panel at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 9/2/2017.

“Presidential Opinions, Congressional Recommendations: The Ambivalent Constitutional Status of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton.” Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, 9/4/2015.

“Free and Happy Bonds: The Nineteenth Century Courts on Marriage and the Pursuit of Happiness,” at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Boston, MA, November 2014.

“Author Meets Critics: Nicholas Buccola’s *The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass: In Pursuit of American Liberty*,” at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2013 (Discussant).

“Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court: Court-Curbing from a Regime Politics Perspective,” paper with Curt Nichols and David Bridge, accepted at the (cancelled) *American Political Science Association* meeting, New Orleans, LA, September 2012.

“Western Natural Law Tradition” Alexander Hamilton Institute, Clinton, New York, June, 2012 (Discussant).

“Enforced Satisfaction: Justice Field on Government’s Role in the Pursuit of Happiness” paper presented at the annual meeting of the *Northeastern Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, PA, November, 2011.

“Presidential Success and Failure,” panel at the annual meeting of the *Northeastern Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, PA, November, 2011 (Chair, Discussant).

“The ‘City on a Hill’ Unglued?: John Winthrop and the Problem of Faction” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, Houston, TX, 2010.

Other Professional Experience

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Awards and Honors

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Presidential Scholar, Baylor University, Graduate School, 2009-Present.

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Teaching Experience

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POL 101: *U.S. Constitution*

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POL 597: *Statesmanship of Lincoln* (Independent Study)

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POL 832: *Teaching Apprenticeship*

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Collegiate Scholars 259: *Hamilton: The Man; the Musical*

Collegiate Scholars 259: *Politics in the Bible*

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George Wallace – From the Heart

By Colman McCarthy

Friday, March 17, 1995; Page A27

In the annals of religious and political conversions, few shiftings were as unlikely as George Wallace's. In Montgomery, Ala., last week, the once irrepressible governor – now 75, infirm, pain-racked and in a wheelchair since his 1972 shooting – held hands with black southerners and sang "We Shall Overcome."

What Wallace overcame is his past hatred that made him both the symbol and enforcer of anti-black racism in the 1960s. On March 10, Wallace went to St. Jude's church to be with some 200 others marking the 30th anniversary of the Selma-to-Montgomery civil rights march.

It was a reaching-out moment of reconciliation, of Wallace's asking for – and receiving – forgiveness. In a statement read for him – he was too ill to speak – Wallace told those in the crowd who had marched 30 years ago: "Much has transpired since those days. A great deal has been lost and a great deal gained, and here we are. My message to you today is, welcome to Montgomery. May your message be heard. May your lessons never be forgotten."

In gracious and spiritual words, Joseph Lowery, a leader in the original march and now the president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, thanked the former separatist "for coming out of your sickness to meet us. You are a different George Wallace today. We both serve a God who can make the desert bloom. We ask God's blessing on you."

This scene at St. Jude's – he is the patron saint of hopeless causes – invites an obvious and skeptical question: Was Wallace, the one-time spewer of venom, sincere? Or was it nothing more than a ploy at going out on positive publicity rather than being embedded in history as the racist blocking a schoolhouse door?

Related Items

- [Wallace Remembered](#)

The evidence suggests genuineness. In 1979 at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery – where Martin Luther King Jr. pastored in the 1950s – Wallace made an unpublicized and unannounced Sunday morning visit to the congregation. As recounted by Stephen Leshner in his 1994 book, "George Wallace: American Populist," the former governor was pushed up the aisle and spoke: "I have learned what suffering means. In a way that was impossible {before the shooting}, I think I can understand something of the pain black people have come to endure. I know I contributed to that pain, and I can only ask your forgiveness."

In 1982 Wallace expressed the same sentiment before the SCLC. He has apologized during a television interview. In 1987 he reconciled and prayed with Jesse Jackson.

In Wallace's last term as governor in the late 1980s, he hired a black press secretary, appointed more than 160 blacks to state governing boards and worked to double the number of black voter registrars in Alabama's 67 counties. In part, it was the politics of patronage – in his last race for governor he won with 60 percent of the vote and well over 90 percent of the black vote – but on a deeper level it was using his waning political power to bond with those he once scorned. Tuskegee Institute responded with an honorary degree.

Leshner saw Wallace's change as revealing "a humanity too often lacking in his actions: alone and crippled, forced to introspection for the first time in his life, he realized that though he had purported to be the champion of the poor and the helpless, he had trampled on the poorest and most helpless of all his constituents – the blacks."

By word and act, Wallace comes close to being a living example of one of Martin Luther King's most enduring sermons, delivered on Christmas 1957 at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. It was on forgiveness as both a theological virtue and a practical way of life.

"Forgiveness," King said, "does not mean ignoring what has been done or putting a false label on an evil act. It means, rather, that the evil act no longer remains as a barrier to the relationship. ... While abhorring segregation, we shall love the segregationist. This is the only way to create the beloved community."

George Wallace is as much a part of that community as any other repentant who seeks and receives forgiveness. Wallace didn't create segregation. For much of his early political life, anti-black racism was constitutional, as it has been for most of America's life.

How many more Wallaces still need to come forward and show the courage of asking forgiveness? Whatever the number, no shortage exists of large-hearted blacks like Joe Lowery willing to ask God's blessings for them.

excerpt, Lee Atwater 1981 Interview with Alexander P. Lamis



What happened is that the South went from being behind the times to being the mainstream. In other words, what you had was two things happening that totally washed away the Southern strategy, the Harry Dent-type southern strategy. That is, that whole strategy was based—although it was more sophisticated than a Bilbo or a George Wallace—it was nevertheless based on coded racism. The whole thing: bussing; we want a supreme court judge that won't have bussing. Anything you look at could be traced back to *the* issue in the old Southern strategy. Now it was not done in a blatantly discriminatory way.

But the Reagans did not have to do a Southern strategy for two reasons. Number one, race was not a dominant issue. And number two, the mainstream issues in this campaign had been “Southern issues” since way back in the '60s. So Reagan goes out and campaigns on the economics and on national defense, the whole campaign was devoid of any kind of racism, any kind of reference.

And I'll tell you another thing y'all need to think about that's even surprised me is the lack of interest, really, a lack of knowledge right now in the South among white voters on this Voting Rights Act. I brought all these Republican State chairmen up here to just kind of soothe them down and say, “Look, before we have this meeting, look we may not do exactly what y'all like.” And what I found out about it is all of them were very passive and they said “we'll pretty well go along with whatever you want.” And I looked at polls in the last four to five months, and there's just no interest or no intensity on that thing among white voters.



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Edited by W. Fitzhugh Brundage

Laura F. Edwards & Jon F. Sensbach, ASSOCIATE EDITORS

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LAURA F. EDWARDS AND JON F. SENSBACH, ASSOCIATE EDITORS



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The South and the State in the Twentieth Century

Campaigning for a seat in the Alabama state legislature in August 1902, John Bankhead Jr. of Walker County enthusiastically defended the state's new constitution approved by voters a year earlier. White Democrats had conducted massive voter fraud in the majority Black counties and thus had ensured the constitution's ratification, but the new document made future fraud unnecessary. As Bankhead giddily declared, the near-elimination of African American voters, as well as a significant decline in the number of poor whites through the implementation of numerous obstacles—a poll tax, a property requirement, a literacy test, and so on—had indeed created “a new order of things.”¹

White southerners had spent the 1870s and 1880s manipulating and suppressing Black votes, and they spent the 1890s and 1900s eliminating them altogether. By rewriting their constitutions, white southerners appeared to have achieved a permanent solution to the problem of African American political participation. Certainly the numbers of registered Black voters confirmed the establishment of white Democracy. In Louisiana, for example, in 1897, before disfranchisement, over 130,000 African Americans turned out to vote. By 1910, this number was a mere 730. Alabama boasted 181,000 Black voters in 1900; by 1902, that number was about 3,000. Accompanying the decimation of the Black electorate was the elimination of any existing, viable political competition. At the same time that southern states were rewriting their constitutions, state Democratic organizations rewrote their rules to bar African American voters from their primaries. John Bankhead Jr.'s “new order” was buttressed by a one-party political system in which white Democrats reigned supreme.² At the state level, a one-party system meant a relatively issueless politics, often driven by individual personalities, in which the needs of the poor—both Black and white—were safely ignored. Despite sustained and often heroic efforts by Black southerners, the protections and benefits delivered by state governments accrued almost exclusively to white southerners for much of the twentieth century.




FIGURE 12.3. Events in the 1970s and beyond would prove this postcard to be prophetic: all of the United States was potentially "Wallace Country." Courtesy of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

The prospects for any Democratic Party presidential candidates in the South continued to sink. In 1972, Nixon was determined to contain Wallace. Specifically, he wanted to make him the Democrats' problem. A third-party effort by Wallace would once again draw conservative whites who might otherwise vote Republican. Nixon hoped to effect a party realignment, with Republicans capturing the votes of white southerners, which would create what he and his supporters hoped would be an enduring Republican majority nationally. To accomplish this, he had to undercut Wallace on social and cultural issues. To Nixon's great relief, in 1972 Wallace ran as a Democrat, throwing fear into the hearts of Democratic Party stalwarts. Wallace won the Democratic primaries in Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, Michigan, and Maryland, and came in second in primaries in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. He was well on his way to trouncing his closest competitors—Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern. Then would-be assassin Arthur Bremer, a mentally ill young man from Milwaukee, shot Wallace four times at a campaign stop in Laurel, Maryland. One of the bullets lodged in Wallace's spine, leaving him forever paralyzed from the waist down. Wallace somehow survived the attack, but his presidential ambitions (although not his political career) were over. The eventual Democratic nominee, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, garnered only 29 percent of the popular vote in the South. The national Democratic Party had hit an all-time

low. After 1968, the national Democratic Party underwent a transformation, becoming more liberal, with stronger representation among previously underrepresented groups. The party staked out progressive positions on women's rights, particularly support for the Equal Rights Amendment and the support for a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, that were at odds with many culturally conservative white voters in the South.

The country's involvement in the Vietnam War had caused serious rifts in the national Democratic Party but had left southern politicians relatively unscathed. The increasingly confrontational and violent protests against the country's military involvement in Southeast Asia provided fertile ground for southern politicians such as Wallace to attack his fellow Democrats. The South itself was more supportive of the war generally and for longer than the rest of the nation. The southern economy benefited from the war, making residents of that region more likely to support its expansion. Political leaders from the region played key roles in the Vietnam drama, including President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Senators Richard Russell and John Stennis, and Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, as well as military leaders such as General William Westmoreland and Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore. Southern men served in Vietnam in numbers that far surpassed the region's share of the population. White southern college students remained more consistently pro-war than their peers elsewhere in the nation. Many even supported the U.S. invasion of Cambodia—an action that sparked massive protests on campuses elsewhere—and rated President Richard Nixon's handling of the war as “excellent” or “pretty good.” A minority of white college students in the South protested the war, and the tactics used by these minority dissenters tended to be less violent and less radical than tactics used by college students elsewhere.

Black southerners' relationship to the Vietnam War was different from that of their white counterparts. For African American college students in the region, antiwar activities took a backseat to agitation for domestic racial issues. African American students remained “acutely aware of the deadly force directed at the protestors” on Black college campuses. Protesting the war was much riskier for Black college students than for white. As for military service, the motives of Black soldiers from southern states differed from those of white soldiers. The prevalence of poverty, the racism of draft boards, and African Americans' inability to join Army Reserve and National Guard units meant that southern Blacks faced fewer options and consequently served in numbers greater than their share of the population. They also were more likely than white soldiers to be drafted, to serve in combat, and to be wounded or killed.⁴¹

With their prospects in presidential contests at an all-time low, Democrats confronted challenges at the state level. If Democrats were going to remain competitive in gubernatorial and congressional races, they had to build viable biracial coalitions. The 1970s witnessed the rise of what came to be known as New South governors, moderate Democrats who won the support of the majority of Black voters and enough suburban white voters to overcome white majorities that backed Republican candidates. To accomplish this, Democratic candidates had to mix relatively conservative positions on social and economic issues to appeal to whites with moderate positions on race to satisfy Black constituents. Their positions diverged from those of the national Democratic Party, which was moving further to the Left in the early 1970s. Included in this group were Reubin Askew of Florida, Jimmy Carter of Georgia, Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, James Hunt of North Carolina, and William Winter of Mississippi. Among Deep South states, only Alabama failed to elect a New South moderate. These Democratic governors focused on providing efficient and honest government, and continued the goal of modernizing the South through the attraction of outside investment and the capture of federal dollars. They understood as well as anyone that investment dollars would not come to a region roiled by racial strife. They prided themselves on promoting racial harmony and on acquiring funding for public infrastructure, health, and education. They eschewed generous spending on welfare or other programs designed to help the impoverished. Despite the U.S Supreme Court's explosive 1971 decision that school districts could use busing to achieve racial balance, most New South leaders studiously avoided the issue.

Much of the federal spending that occurred in the South was related to the military. Because the South had a strong presence in the Pentagon and southern leaders enjoyed congressional seniority, southern states received more than their fair share of military installations and military contracts. Facilities for the space program and for military and nuclear weapons programs abounded in the South. Such spending became a huge part of the region's growth. Between 1959 and 1980, the South led all regions in economic growth. But defense spending did little to aid the poor, particularly the Black poor. Jobs in many of these new industries were at the skilled or professional level, and most went to recent transplants from elsewhere in the country. As one historian has put it, the growth strategy of southern leaders privileged place over people.⁴²

Perhaps the most consequential of these New South governors was Jimmy Carter of Georgia, elected in 1970. Declaring at his inauguration that "the time for racial discrimination is over. ... No poor, rural, weak, or black person should ever have to bear the additional burden of being

deprived of the opportunity of an education, a job, or simple justice," Carter focused on making state government more efficient and government services more effective. Carter's 1976 nomination as the Democratic Party's candidate for president was nothing short of phenomenal. A proud Southern Baptist and lifelong resident of the rural Deep South, Carter's outsider status and image as a man of integrity made him an appealing choice for many voters disgusted by the corruption of Republican Richard Nixon and the Watergate scandal. Nixon's resignation had rebounded in Democrats' favor in Congress and in southern statehouses in 1974, where Democrats reclaimed a number of seats. But in 1976, although Carter won every southern state except Virginia, he only garnered 46 percent of the white vote despite his conservative religious credentials and southern roots. His victory was largely the work of African American voters who went to the polls in even greater numbers than they had in 1968.



FIGURE 12.4. Black southerners made the greatest gains in public officeholding at the municipal and county levels in the 1970s. Among these new city leaders was Richard Arrington Jr. (*standing*), elected mayor of Birmingham in 1979. Courtesy of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

The increase in the number of Black voters between 1970 and 1980, from 3.4 million to 4.3 million, also had an impact on Black officeholding. In the South in 1965, only 72 Black citizens

held public office; Mississippi had no Black public officials. By 1980, there were roughly 2,500 Black officeholders. The bulk of these positions were at the municipal and county levels. Blacks won mayoral contests, mostly in small and mid-sized towns such as Tuskegee but also in large cities such as Atlanta and Birmingham. Victories for Black politicians brought heightened expectations from Black constituents. Although Black voters finally had the ear of the officials who ran their communities, the tax bases in urban areas were seldom sufficient to deal with the myriad problems. Despite these gains at the polls, as of 1982 Blacks constituted a paltry 7 percent of state legislators.

As Democrats worked to create biracial coalitions to remain viable in the South, their power in Congress—especially their ability to kill what they considered threatening legislation—was diluted. Since the 1930s, the ability of southern representatives and senators to gain seniority, occupy important committee chairmanships, and operate as a bloc had been critical to protecting white supremacy. Since the late 1940s, liberals in the Democratic Party had been working to handicap conservative members of their party (mainly those from the South), who were increasingly out of step with the party's agenda. By the late 1950s, liberal Democrats were irate that the party's conservative members voted with Republicans roughly 80 percent of the time. Change followed the Supreme Court's decision in the 1962 case *Baker v. Carr*, which mandated redistricting. The result was a decline in the number of congressional districts with overrepresented rural population majorities and an increase in representatives who were less conservative and less wedded to the old ways. The impact in states such as Florida was profound, flip-flopping the preponderance of political power from the mostly white and rural panhandle to the racially and ethnically diverse urban regions and wealthy suburbs from Orlando south. The reapportionment took into consideration the enfranchisement of millions of Black voters; conservative rural white bastions as the sole means of electoral support were a thing of the past.

A reform movement within Congress simultaneously increased the power of members from underrepresented suburban districts and others who rejected the old hierarchical structure of Congress, which had granted enormous power to committee chairmen. The 1970s Legislative Reorganization Act required committee hearings to be public; many were broadcast on radio and television. Congressional reformers also succeeded in requiring the vote of the caucus for committee chairs; agreed that the Speaker, majority leader, and whip should serve on the powerful Ways and Means Committee; and succeeded in stripping the Ways and Means chair of the power to appoint committee members. New members to the House had sufficient power

to demand that all committee chairs be interviewed to determine whether they deserved reappointment. Three committee chairmen, all from the South, made bad impressions, and the caucus voted to remove them. The ironclad system of seniority in the House had been shattered. The Senate, likewise, underwent reform. Committee chairs were chosen by secret ballot. Most committee hearings were open to the public. The biggest reform, though, addressed the filibuster. For decades, southern Democrats had used this tool to paralyze the Senate and kill civil rights legislation. In 1975, the Senate voted to reduce the number of votes for cloture (which ends a filibuster) from two-thirds of the Senate (sixty-seven votes) to three-fifths (sixty votes). Southern politicians' ability to hold the Senate in a stranglehold had finally been broken.

At the state level, the Republican Party was practically nonexistent in the 1970s and 1980s. Republican success remained a top-down affair. Republican candidates struggled to dislodge Democratic incumbents who delivered federal projects—many related to defense work—for their districts. Beyond Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond, the Republicans could claim no southern congressman or senator of any stature some ten years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act. In the 1960s and 1970s, Republicans had little success electing candidates to Congress. Democratic candidates during these two decades won 97 percent of all congressional races.

Republican prospects in the region began to change with the development of two phenomena. The first was the rise of the Christian Right and its political mobilization of conservative Christian voters. The so-called Rights Revolution, which drew inspiration and power from the civil rights revolution, prompted a political backlash. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court handed down decisions that banned organized school prayer, protected the rights of accused persons, and, most important in this context, protected a woman's right to seek an abortion. In 1972, Congress approved the Equal Rights Amendment and sent it out to the states for ratification. For conservative evangelical Christians in both the North and the South, the nation was in cultural crisis. The survival of the family and traditional gender roles was at stake. Organizing nationally under the auspices of groups such as the Moral Majority, founded in 1979, and the Christian Coalition, founded in 1989, but operating locally through thousands of evangelical churches, Christian conservatives flexed their political muscles. They were almost universally wedded to the Republican Party. According to one historian of southern religion, evangelical churches essentially served as precinct headquarters for the Republican Party. This grassroots political realignment unfolded with stunning speed. In 1980, only 29

percent of Southern Baptist ministers identified as Republicans; within five years—by 1985—that number had grown to 66 percent.

The support of politically energized evangelicals was critical to the election of Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan in 1980. A former actor, corporate spokesman, and most recently governor of California, Reagan was a conservative icon. During the campaign, he appeared sympathetic to evangelicals' desires for a school prayer amendment and other conservative cultural ambitions but spent little political capital making them a reality once in office. Significantly for Republican prospects in the South, issues of culture and religion—framed broadly as “family values”—cut across class lines, giving the Republicans access to the allegiance of the region's working-class whites who had previously supported George Wallace. Also propelling Reagan to the White House was a backlash against the welfare state, which had expanded under Lyndon Johnson's Great Society agenda. To Reagan, government was the enemy; free enterprise was the people's friend. The downturn in the economy in the 1970s focused white conservatives' attention on government programs that, in their estimation, primarily benefited the Black poor. Beginning with the resounding defeat of Carter and the election of Reagan, and accelerating thereafter, Republicans began to pick up southern seats in Congress and state legislatures on platforms promoting cultural conservatism, low taxes, a strong military, and limited government. Before Reagan's election, 40 percent of southern white conservatives identified with the Republican Party; by the end of Reagan's presidency, 60 percent proudly did so.



FIGURE 12.5. Senator Strom Thurmond's switch to the Republican Party and the popularity of President Ronald Reagan among white southern conservatives set off a two-decade-long transition of white Democrats to the Republican Party. Congressman Floyd D. Spence (*left*) began his political career as a Democrat; in 1970 he won a congressional seat as a Republican. Courtesy of Floyd D. Spence Papers, South Carolina Political Collections, University of South Carolina.

Other issues cemented the Republican Party's strength in the South. Demographic change and the continued growth of the military-industrial complex worked in the party's favor. Cuban exiles from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 developed strong ties to the Republican Party in Florida because of its strong stance against communism and its support of conservative cultural causes. By 1980, the South was the recipient of 40 percent of the defense budget. Industries such as aircraft building and chemicals moved south, drawn by generous tax breaks and attracted by the antiunion climate. Still, success at winning congressional seats was slow. Between 1980 and 1992, the number of Senate seats and governorships the Republicans controlled remained about the same. At the state level, in 1988, only 23 percent of state legislators were Republican.

The consolidation of Republican power in the South occurred during the presidency of Democrat Bill Clinton, a white southerner. He won only 43 percent of the popular vote; the third-party candidacy of Texas businessman Ross Perot cut into the Republican vote for Pres-

ident George H. W. Bush. Already a minority president, Clinton's first two years were marred by political missteps. Republican whip Newt Gingrich of Georgia sensed an opportunity to flip seats during the 1994 midterm elections. Gingrich staged a national campaign for Republican House candidates, who pledged themselves to uphold the "Contract with America," a list of conservative agenda items that included lower taxes, decreased welfare spending, and legislation dedicated to promoting "family values." The Democrats were steamrolled, losing fifty-five seats and control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. Republicans also picked up seats in the Senate. The Republican Party's increased presence in the South was obvious: they added sixteen new seats in the House to the nine they had won in 1992. The Republican Party now held a slim majority—51 percent—of the South's representation in the House of Representatives. The Republicans controlled the South's delegations in the House and the Senate and captured a majority of the statehouses.

Republican prospects were made considerably brighter by reapportionment of congressional districts following the 1990 census. Population growth had given the South nine new congressional seats. With no Democratic incumbents to challenge, Republican chances improved considerably. In redrawing congressional district lines, every southern state except Arkansas created a Black-majority district. Although these new Black-majority districts essentially ensured an increase in Black representatives, the remaining districts left African Americans in the minority, making them easier for Republicans to win. With the tremendous victories of 1994, Republican candidates seemed like a better bet to opportunistic donors. Funds flowed into campaign coffers. Republicans cemented their presence as the decade wore on. During the 2000 election, Republicans won 71 of the South's 125 House seats, 19 of 33 Senate seats, and 43 percent of seats in state legislatures.

The Republican Party was firmly entrenched in the South by the year 2000, little more than three decades since the landmark civil rights bills of the mid-1960s. It was clearly identified as the conservative party. Republicans in the region could point to some pockets of ethnic diversity, including Cuban Americans in Florida and Mexican Americans in Texas; otherwise the party was overwhelmingly white. Republican voters were attracted to the party's "family values" and low-tax orientation, as well as its probusiness agenda. Increased spending on social programs—which many white voters associated with poor Blacks—was anathema to Republican voters in the South. The Black poor were routinely demonized and scapegoated, and programs such as affirmative action and welfare were frequent targets of Republican wrath.

Racial exclusivity was key to the Republican Party's success, and the Republicans were the primary recipients of the "politics of rage" previously stoked by George Wallace.

Republican election gains were bolstered by conservative judicial decisions that further undermined the ability of the Democratic Party to successfully compete across the South. In 2013, in *Shelby County v. Holder*, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an important provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: it declared that the coverage formula for determining which jurisdictions had to "preclear" changes to their elections rules was out of date and no longer necessary. The response from southern states was immediate. Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo ID law for voter registration, while Alabama and Mississippi declared that they would enforce similar laws that had been banned under the preclearance requirement. Studies have demonstrated that photo ID laws disproportionately disadvantage minority and elderly populations. In Texas alone, such a law would result in the purging of some 600,000 voters.

The Democrats remained viable, but their task was exceedingly difficult. They received the support of the vast majority of African American voters, but needed to attract between 30 and 40 percent of the white vote to remain competitive. A pledge to promote growth and high-quality public education became the default stance of most Democratic office seekers. Promoting agendas that kept this biracial coalition together would prove exceedingly difficult as the twenty-first century dawned.

Will a democratic, representative politics survive, if not entirely thrive, in the South? That remains an open question. By the end of the first decade of the new century, Black officeholding at the state level continued to lag behind the actual demographics. In Mississippi, for example, Black people made up roughly 38 percent of the population but held only 29 percent of the seats in the state's legislature. The picture looked a little brighter in Alabama, where Black people constituted 26 percent of the population and Black legislators held roughly a quarter of the seats. Partisanship has grown more extreme in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Republican state legislatures have used their power to deprive Democrats of representation, replicating the antidemocratic tools of an earlier era. Strict voter ID laws have fallen most heavily on the Democrats' core constituency, and grassroots advocates continue to fight hard to prevent voter purges. In addition, Democrats in southern states have seen their election prospects diluted by Republican gerrymandering. In North Carolina, despite a relatively evenly split electorate, Democrats garnered only three of the state's thirteen congressional seats following a 2016 redrawing of district lines by Republicans. Amplified by an expanding,

noisy right-wing media environment, Republicans in the South and nationwide have doubled down on a politics of white grievance, questioning the legitimacy of the nation's first African American president and using every possible political and legal tactic to effectively disfranchise people of color. Democrats in the South have been able to overcome these obstacles only through the most heroic of efforts. In this hyperpartisan political climate, race remains the defining factor of southern political life, and Republicans continue to practice a politics of subtraction. John Bankhead Jr.'s "new order of things" has returned, only this time it is Republicans erecting the barriers. A truly democratic South remains elusive.

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Republican demands Congress vote on Pentagon abortion policy: 'We are not a communist country'

Tommy Tuberville aims to block policy offering aid to service members and dependents forced to travel for abortions



Tommy Tuberville at the Capitol on Tuesday. He said of his refusal to back down: 'I think they're starting to believe that I meant what I said'. Photograph: Jacquelyn Martin/AP

Defending his blocking promotions that has left hundreds of military officers in limbo and the US army, navy and marines without Senate-confirmed leaders, the Alabama Republican Tommy Tuberville demanded a congressional vote on Pentagon abortion policy.

He added: "We are not a communist country."

In return, one Democrat invoked a Republican president revered for standing up to communism, and said Ronald Reagan was "rolling in his grave".

Tuberville explained his stance to Bloomberg TV, saying: "I got a briefing about a year ago, what they were gonna do with the new abortion policy. We didn't need one ... Joe Biden and the Democrats ... just decided to change it."

The policy offers aid to service members and dependents forced to travel for abortions because they are based in a state which restricts it, as many Republican-run states have since the US supreme court removed the right last year.

Tuberville continued: "They voted [Pentagon abortion policy] through Congress in 1984, but in 2023 they want to change it with a memo from the White House.

"We're not a communist country. Everything that makes policy and law goes through Congress. And I told them, 'If you change it, I'm gonna block your admirals and generals.' At that time there was one or two. Now we're up to 300. I think they're starting to believe that I meant what I said."

At the top of the US military, the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, Gen Mark Milley, is due to step down this month. His replacement, Gen CQ Brown, is in the queue held up.

Officials have pointed to the plight of lower-ranked officers. In a Washington Post column, the secretaries of the army, navy and air force said: "We know officers who ... are facing genuine financial stress because they have had to relocate their families or unexpectedly maintain two residences.

"Military spouses who have worked to build careers of their own are unable to look for jobs because they don't know when or if they will move. Children haven't known where they will go to school, which is particularly hard given how frequently military children change schools already."

Tuberville, who coached the Auburn University football team before entering politics, has been criticised for not having served. He told Bloomberg he was a "military brat" whose father "died on active duty".

Critics also say Tuberville is affecting preparedness to face national security threats.

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Mark Warner, a Democratic senator from Virginia, told Bloomberg Radio: "Ronald Reagan has to be rolling over in his grave. These kinds of political antics are making our military less strong and our country more weak by playing politics on this issue. I hope and pray that that my Republican colleagues, a lot of whom have expressed concerns to me privately ... will put ... pressure on."

The Maine Republican Susan Collins said Tuberville should limit his holds to "only those individuals who have policy responsibilities".

Tuberville said Democrats who control the Senate "can be clearing these nominations one at a time, two hours each. They don't want to do that."

That would be extremely time-consuming. So far, more pressure has built on Tuberville than on the majority leader, Chuck Schumer of New York.

Tuberville said: "We're not gonna have any movement on my side unless they change this [policy] back. Let's vote on it. And if it passes, it passes. Done is done."

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COLD WAR DIXIE

MILITARIZATION AND MODERNIZATION
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH

KARI FREDERICKSON



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CHAPTER SEVEN

Shifting Landscapes

Politics and Race in a Cold War Community

From 1941 to 1948, Aiken County was represented in the South Carolina state senate by Fred Brinkley, a physician from the tiny town of Ellenton. In addition to being one of the town's two doctors, Brinkley was also a part-time farmer and owner of the one of the town's gristmills. A longtime resident of Ellenton, Brinkley was closely tied to the region's agricultural rhythms and was active in community affairs. And like every other state senator, Brinkley was a Democrat in a state that reviled Republicans. In the early 1950s, after Ellenton was condemned to make room for the Savannah River Plant (SRP), Brinkley moved to the city of Barnwell. He died relatively soon after the evacuation, in June 1952, with his passing serving as poignant symbol of the larger transformations under way in the area.¹

The influx of thousands of new residents from communities across the nation altered not only the region's demographics, built environment, economic profile, and cultural identity but also its politics. In 1968, fifteen years after operations commenced at the SRP, Aiken County voters elected George McMillan to represent them in the State Senate. A Republican and former Du Pont supervisor at the SRP, McMillan was just one of a growing number of Republicans elected to public office in Aiken County and in the expanding suburban regions across South Carolina and other southern states in the 1960s and 1970s. The origins of the Republican Party lay in the communities housing the plant employees; the party drew strength from their conservative, middle-class values, forged not only by opposition to certain New Deal-era programs and staunch anticommunism but also from notions of efficiency and modernization as they applied to the political process. Such values were also deeply engrained in Du Pont's corporate culture.

The growth of the Republican Party in Aiken County coincided with and at times appeared synonymous with the acceleration of school integration. Although the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 motivated thousands of white southerners to vote Republican, the party's roots in South Carolina went further back and were tied to the changes brought on by the Cold War. Integration in this region was in part shaped by Du

Pont's corporate culture. Although the company encouraged employees to participate in local and state politics, there was an understanding that employees were not to engage overtly in the desegregation debate and were to let the issue run its course. As with its employment strategy, Du Pont preferred to follow local custom rather than challenge it directly.

School integration proceeded as slowly in Aiken County as it did in other towns across the South, but without the extreme public acrimony and outright violence present in some communities. Although whites in Aiken County—both longtime residents and newcomers—were content to drag their feet on the issue, the impending threat of a loss of federal funds as well as the judicial dismantling of freedom-of-choice school-assignment plans in the late 1960s finally brought desegregation to the region. When meaningful integration finally came to the county in 1970, white resistance died with a whimper.

The relatively uneventful process of integration partly resulted from factors related to Aiken's particular historical development as well as the more recent changes brought about by the Cold War. White resistance in this corner of South Carolina was muted by a variety of factors, including changing demographics, the influence of Du Pont's particular corporate culture, the central role given to large corporations for securing prosperity and security, the reputation of black schools, and the presence of Winter Colony residents. The intense backlash and white flight to private academies found in other communities simply was not present in Aiken. While not exactly welcoming of the prospect of integration, white parents also were unwilling to take extreme measures to stop it.



Following company president Crawford H. Greenewalt's advice, Du Pont employees became involved in the city's political institutions, initiating innovations that were based on their desire for modern, efficient, representative government, something that seemed lacking in this one-party region. The majority of Du Pont's permanent operations staff took up residence in Aiken's burgeoning suburbs and in the highly suburbanized town of North Augusta. To bring order and efficiency to the development chaos that was the result of rapid residential expansion, residents of these suburban enclaves organized civic associations that would regularly and collectively bring particular neighborhood issues before the city council. The first such group organized was the Crosland Park Civic Association. By the early 1960s, every suburb boasted a neighborhood association.²

These new civic associations were in the forefront of promoting a change in city government from the commission form to a city manager system. Crosland Park Civic Association took the lead among newcomers in supporting the transition to a full-time city manager system, which, members believed, would promote "sound principles of efficient city administration." A full-time city manager would be better equipped to handle the problems associated with rapid growth, something Crosland Park residents knew only too well. The five-hundred-plus-home subdivision was cursed with chronic sewage overflow, a complaint regularly brought before the city council.³ Crosland Park residents likewise supported the "appointment of city employees on the basis of merit apart from political considerations or influence," as well as "planning and zoning provisions which provide for orderly growth, stabilize property values, and protect the citizens of Aiken from the inconvenience, danger, and expense which can result from irresponsible real property development." Finally, the association called for "a carefully developed system of public hearings which assure that the citizens of Aiken shall have the opportunity to be heard in matters of basic policy determination." By calling for a merit system and a transparent decision-making process, the new residents were advocating not only for a more democratic and representative government but for a process that in many ways resembled the scientific process, in which all variables are carefully weighed.⁴ With the new neighborhood associations in the lead, Aiken residents overwhelmingly approved the adoption of the city manager system.⁵

Du Pont employees likewise were instrumental in bringing two-party politics to what had been a one-party state. Du Ponters took the lead in promoting Republican candidates in national elections and in organizing the first county-level Republican Party, joining other white-collar suburbanites around the state and region in developing a viable second party. South Carolina's one-party system had grown out of historical racial and political animosities. Since Reconstruction, the Republican Party had been anathema to South Carolina's white voters, synonymous with "negro control." The return to Democratic Party rule in the 1870s was marred by violence, perhaps nowhere worse than in Aiken County, which had seen two of the worst race riots in state history in 1876. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, South Carolina was the region's most reliably Democratic state, refusing to bolt the party in 1928 and polling huge numbers for Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s. The Republicans rarely fielded candidates for office even at the state's highest levels, and Democrats dominated local politics in all forty-six counties. According to one account, by midcentury, "the South Carolina GOP was merely a quaint relic of the past, widely accused of graft, corrup-

tion, and gross mismanagement.”⁶ Republican conventions were derided as “the semi-annual gathering of the pie brigade” where the spoils of party patronage were distributed.⁷

Dissatisfaction with the national Democratic Party began to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s as changes brought on by the Great Depression, New Deal, and World War II began to chip away at a southern caste system grounded in low-wage labor and white supremacy. By the late 1940s, a growing number of whites were becoming increasingly hostile toward the national Democratic Party’s position on civil rights. In 1948, outraged at President Harry S. Truman’s civil rights initiatives and the inclusion of a civil rights plank in the Democratic Party platform, South Carolina Democrats joined white conservatives from several other southern states and bolted the national party, throwing their support behind the States’ Rights Democratic Party, more commonly known as the Dixiecrats. Led by presidential candidate and South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrats hoped to wrest enough votes from Truman to throw the election into the House of Representatives. In the end, the Dixiecrats won only four states, but their campaign constituted a shot across the political bow, serving notice to the national Democratic Party that white southerners’ political allegiance could no longer be taken for granted. Still, despite their misgivings about the direction of the national party, wrenching a majority of southern whites away from the Democratic Party was going to be extremely difficult. Once “liberated,” where would they go? By the early 1950s, the South still had no meaningful Republican Party organization. Southern whites unhappy with the direction of the Democratic Party continued to express their displeasure in presidential elections, voting in unprecedented numbers for the Republican candidate, but not as members of any local Republican organization. The existing party apparatus was too weak, too corrupt. Any viable Republican Party would have to be built from scratch by individuals free of the historical political baggage carried by white southerners.⁸

Much of the impetus behind the growth of the Republican Party was the particular economic change that accompanied the Cold War. Between 1950 and 1970, 90 percent of growth in employment in industry in the South took place in high-wage industries, many of them considered part of the military-industrial complex.⁹ These white-collar employees, housed in expanding urban and suburban areas, increasingly identified their economic interests as resting with the Republican Party.¹⁰ South Carolina’s employment profile changed dramatically. Aiken County was one of the state’s fastest growing in terms of industrial expansion. In Aiken County in 1940, 31.5 percent of adults were employed in agriculture; by 1970, that percentage had dropped to 2 percent. In 1940, Aiken County was roughly 18 percent urban; by 1970, 44.4

percent of the population lived in metropolitan areas. Over the same period, the percentage of Aikenites employed in white-collar jobs shot from 15 percent to 41 percent. As part of this transition, the county had become wealthier. From 1953 to 1962, purchasing power in the county rose by five hundred dollars per capita and two thousand dollars per household, and retail sales doubled in dollar volume.¹¹ Such changes were not limited to Aiken. Overall, South Carolina's suburban population grew by nearly 400 percent between 1950 and 1970.¹² Aiken joined rapidly expanding counties such as Richland (Columbia), Greenville, Lexington, and Charleston in the white-collar suburban boom.

Profound political change followed this economic transformation. From 1946 to 1963, South Carolina had the lowest level of party competition in the South. Between 1964 and 1974, however, it moved into first place in the Deep South and seventh overall in the region. No other Deep South state experienced increasingly competitive two-party gubernatorial elections between 1960 and 1975.¹³

The expanding metropolitan areas were the source of the reborn Republican Party. In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower drew support from wealthier whites in the urban and suburban areas of South Carolina, as well as more race-conscious whites in the majority black lowcountry who were disturbed at the role of civil rights in the Democratic Party platforms of the late 1940s and early 1950s. By 1956, skeleton Republican Party organizations existed in roughly half of the state's forty-six counties. Between 1956 and 1963, the party had no paid staff and no official, continuing central headquarters. Party leadership came from a mishmash of businessmen, disaffected Democrats, and newcomers, most of them political novices.¹⁴

The early leaders of South Carolina's retooled Republican Party were recent transplants. Gregory D. Shorey Jr., for example, was born in Massachusetts and educated at Boston University, ultimately earning a graduate degree in public relations and marketing communications. He served in the U.S. Navy during World War II and subsequently became active in the Massachusetts Republican Party. In 1950, he moved to Greenville, South Carolina, where he founded a company that manufactured marine safety and water sports equipment and moved quickly to the top of the state Republican Party hierarchy. He served as state chair of Eisenhower for President in 1952 and 1956, a Republican elector in 1952 and 1956, state executive chair from 1954 to 1956, and state chair from 1956 to 1962.¹⁵ The nascent GOP received financial backing from Roger Mil-iken, president of the family owned Deering-Milliken Textile Corporation, the world's third-largest textile firm. Milliken had contributed extensively to the national Republican Party but had avoided the dysfunctional state party until the revamped version emerged



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Corporate Culture, the Cold War, and the American South in the 1950s and 1960s



KARI FREDERICKSON

IN 1956, William Faulkner lamented that agriculture no longer stood at the center of the southern economy. “Our economy,” he remarked, “is the Federal Government.”¹ Beginning in the immediate post-World War II era, the region that once had been dominated by cotton fields, tenant shacks, and textile mill villages was rapidly giving way to defense installations, aerospace engineering facilities, and suburbs. Within three decades, federal spending changed the South’s economic base and demographics to such a degree that by the early 1980s the region that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had once identified as “the nation’s number one economic problem” had become one of the nation’s leading industrial producers. Much of this federal spending was filtered through the rapidly expanding military-industrial complex necessitated by the Cold War. Consequently, although federal dollars constituted the engine that drove change in the South, the direction and shape of change was very much determined by the various corporate entities that moved south in the 1950s and 1960s to capitalize on this federal largesse.

To date, studies of the impact of the Cold War on the American South have been largely confined to examining the complex impact of anticommunism on southern politics and the budding civil rights movement. Anti-communism poisoned the liberal political well and fueled the massive resistance movement, making even the most tepid statement on racial progress by an elected official a sure road to political oblivion. But the Cold War contributed more than just toxic anticommunism to the South’s political

landscape. The economic and demographic impact of the military-industrial complex throughout the region was profound. The development of new aerospace facilities around Atlanta, the growth of the space industry in Huntsville and on the east coast of Florida, the development of the Research Triangle in North Carolina, and the proliferation of military contracts generally brought thousands of new, highly educated workers to the region.² Many of these new workers brought their Republican politics with them. At the very least, few possessed the historically based, reflexive support of the Democratic Party on matters of race that had plagued the South since the turn of the century. Unencumbered by the region's historic hostility to the Republican Party, these Cold War immigrants became the foot-soldiers in the creation of a modern civic politics and of the two-party system in the South.

This was nowhere more true than in western South Carolina. In 1950, the Atomic Energy Commission chose Du Pont Corporation to build and operate the Savannah River Plant, a vast industrial site dedicated to producing plutonium and tritium for the hydrogen bomb. Encompassing over 200,000 acres and employing a permanent operations staff of 6,000, the Savannah River Plant had a significant impact on the region. The arrival of thousands of highly trained scientists and engineers and their families spurred the creation of sprawling suburbs and hastened the arrival of national department store chains. A significant portion of these new residents came from outside the South, bringing with them political traditions and beliefs unencumbered by the peculiar forces of southern history. Their political activities in this region of South Carolina were, however, influenced by the newcomers' specific Cold War environment. The particular political changes that befell the region were shaped by Du Pont's specific corporate culture. Corporate America was a key player in the Cold War. On the national level, the ideas and actions of elite business leaders were critical in shaping President Dwight Eisenhower's Cold War policies and were crucial to the evolution of American culture during this period.³ Henry Luce, publisher of *Time* magazine, had recruited corporate leaders to the Cold War cause in 1947, calling corporations the "front line soldiers and battalions in the battle of freedom."⁴ Du Pont arrived in South Carolina, ready to do battle in the Cold War. With 150 years of industrial experience, a complex reputation, and a well-defined corporate culture that privileged modernization and innovation, Du Pont and its employees had a dramatic effect on the region, particularly its politics. During the 1950s and 1960s, Du Pont employees were instrumental in creating a more efficient and transparent

city government, as well as a vibrant two-party system in a region that, for the previous 80 years, had been dominated by the Democratic Party.



The history of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company is intertwined with the history of the nation. Founded in 1802 on the banks of Brandywine Creek near Wilmington, Delaware, Du Pont is one of the nation's oldest companies. Originally a manufacturer of gun powder, Du Pont received its first government contract from President Thomas Jefferson. It was the beginning of a long relationship. Du Pont gun powder was used in the War of 1812, the Mexican American War, and the American Civil War. Pioneers used Du Pont powder to clear the wilderness for settlement, build railroads, raise factories.⁵ During World War I, Du Pont supplied 40 percent of all the powder used by the Allied powers, chalking up more than \$1 billion in sales.⁶ Such unseemly profits came under the scrutiny of the Senate Munitions Investigation Committee—more popularly known as the Nye Committee—which investigated the cause of America's involvement in the First World War. The committee's final report harshly criticized Du Pont's excessive wartime profits, and the company whose very success was tied to the country's own had earned a grisly, new nickname: "merchants of death." Du Pont worked hard to rid itself of this public relations disaster, downplaying its munitions production and turning to the research and development of consumer and consumer-related products, like nylon, cellophane, and Freon.⁷

But World War II drew Du Pont back to its munitions roots and back to government contracts. Du Pont built and maintained the Hanford Engineering Works, part of the Manhattan Project, and was responsible for creating weapons-grade plutonium that went into the bomb used in the Trinity test and the "Fat Man" bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Eager to avoid the label "war profiteer," Du Pont agreed to participate in the project under two conditions: one, that the company would not make any profits from its association with the atomic project; and two, that any patents resulting from the work accomplished would become the property of the federal government. The government agreed to both conditions, paying Du Pont one dollar a year over costs for its contribution.

Following the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, Du Pont expressed reluctance to continue at the center of the nation's weapons complex. In 1946, the company turned over the maintenance of the Hanford works to General Electric. In the postwar era, Du Pont invested heavily in

research and development, particularly of consumer products and textiles. By 1952, it offered more than 100 products in a wide range of industries. Readily accepting Henry Luce's earlier corporate call to arms, Du Pont positioned itself as the provider of a veritable cornucopia of products, and created a patriotic perception of itself that did not rely on the production of munitions. President Eisenhower in particular embraced this perspective in his foreign policy, expanding it to characterize the nation at large in its global struggle with Communism. With companies like Du Pont in the lead, America would be the provider of goods and services superior to those offered by the rest of the world.⁸

But world events soon overtook the company. On the morning of September 23, 1949, armed with scientific data from American and British experts, a somber President Harry Truman informed the nation that the Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb. In four short years, America's nuclear monopoly was ended. The world had become a much more dangerous place.

The discovery that the Soviet Union possessed nuclear capabilities escalated discussions at the nation's highest levels over whether the United States should proceed with the production of the hydrogen bomb, a thermonuclear device whose destructive capabilities were projected to be one hundred times greater than those of the existing atomic weapons. On January 31, 1950, Truman authorized an accelerated program to develop the hydrogen bomb.⁹ To build this new plant, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) turned to Du Pont.¹⁰ Du Pont executives remained anxious to avoid anything that might revive the "merchants of death" stigma. But the federal government persisted. Said one atomic energy expert, "To ask anybody else to build the plant when you could get Du Pont would be like settling for a rookie when you could get Babe Ruth in his prime."¹¹ Du Pont relented.

In mid-1950, AEC and Du Pont officials criss-crossed the country, investigating some 114 potential production sites.¹² The ideal location would combine "low population density, proximity to a fairly large urban center, a local labor supply, and an adequate supply of water of specified purity."¹³ Their assignment acquired heightened urgency when, in the early hours of Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, thousands of North Koreans poured southward over the 38th parallel. The Korean War had begun. Five months later, on November 28, 1950, only a few days after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, threatening to turn the Korean conflict into a larger Asian land war, the AEC announced that it had chosen a South Carolina site that bordered the Savannah River along the western edge of the state.¹⁴ A massive undertaking, the plant, ultimately known as the Savannah River Plant,

would encompass great swaths of land in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties.¹⁵

The tri-county region out of which the Savannah River Plant was to be carved was already undergoing change in the late 1940s, before AEC officials arrived. The declining cotton economy of large land owners and sharecroppers had begun to give way to a more diversified agricultural mix.¹⁶ The rural areas of Aiken County had lost population since 1940, with sharecroppers in particular leaving in droves during the decade. The scores of vacant farm houses bore testimony to the region's decline.¹⁷ This small human tributary joined the larger rushing torrent of four million — a quarter of the region's farm population — that left the South during the war years. Horse Creek Valley — known to locals as "the Valley" — stretched across the county's northwest quadrant. Home to some of the South's oldest textile mills and mill villages, the Valley likewise had entered a period of transition during the 1940s and early 1950s.

Whereas depopulation and transition characterized the countryside and mill villages, the city of Aiken retained much of its nineteenth-century charm. Though Aiken lay only a few miles outside the Valley and numerous rural hamlets, the residents of the farms, the mill villages, and Aiken lived in different worlds. Incorporated in 1835, Aiken boasted a population of only 7,000 on the eve of the plant's construction.¹⁸ Prior to 1950, Aiken existed peacefully as a wealthy enclave, serving the needs and whims of the nation's upper crust. Mrs. Lulie Hitchcock of Long Island came to Aiken in the 1870s after she discovered that its temperate climate and sandy soil were ideal for raising and training thoroughbreds. Mrs. Hitchcock and her husband owned a stable of race horses and they brought their equine passion to Aiken. She soon convinced many of her wealthy friends in the horsey set to make Aiken their winter home. Collectively they became known as the "Winter Colonists"; they typically arrived in January and left in April. They built sprawling mansions that they called "cottages," and which they christened with names — some stately, some whimsical — like "Rosehill," "Whitehall," "Banksia" and "Joye Cottage."¹⁹ The cottages lined the beautifully landscaped 150-foot-wide boulevards. Dividing the boulevards were lovely parks, lush with towering magnolias and filled with the riotous color of that magnificent southern trifecta of dogwoods, camellias, and azaleas. The city proudly adopted the slogan the City of Parkways. Most of these broad avenues were still unpaved in 1950, out of consideration for the sensitivity of horses' hooves.²⁰ The horses of some of the nation's leading racing stables, the majority of which were owned by northerners, wintered in

Aiken. Many Kentucky Derby winners held their debuts at the annual Aiken trials, on the beautifully laid-out Mile Track.

Novelist Pat Conroy once observed that Aiken was socially schizophrenic, a town of well-defined categories and an obvious pecking order. The Winter Colonists stood high above the “Old Aikenites”—the town’s merchants and politicians whose families had lived in Aiken for generations and whose livelihood depended on the Winter Colonists; both groups considered themselves superior to the mill folk of the Valley. Politically, however, Aiken—like the rest of South Carolina—was solidly Democratic.

The demographic and economic impact of the Savannah River Plant on this primarily rural region was profound and is relatively easy to document. Between 1950 and 1952, more than 30,000 temporary construction workers and 6,000 permanent employees and their families, as well as proprietors of businesses and services that catered to the plant personnel—nearly 180,000 persons in all—flooded into the region.²¹ Even though the Savannah River Plant was crucial to the national security state’s expanding nuclear arsenal, and although the Korean War had presented the specter of a constant state of total war, the Truman administration rejected the garrison state. They chose not to impose excessive controls by the federal government or the military and decided to rely instead on existing cities, such as Aiken, and private enterprise to absorb the new residents. Ultimately, two-thirds of the permanent employees—managers, scientists, engineers, and technicians—chose to live in and around Aiken. By 1953, the city’s permanent population had tripled. The city’s square mileage had grown 139 percent as a result of suburban annexation and development. Private developers created twenty-seven new “modern and convenient” subdivisions within commuting distance of the plant. The town hired eighty additional teachers in 1952 and added 40 permanent classrooms and 36 temporary classrooms. The Savannah River Plant commenced operations in late 1952, and the first shipment of plutonium left the plant in December 1954. The region, which at the close of World War II was categorized as underdeveloped and primarily rural, now represented an important outpost on the frontier of nuclear science as well as an integral component of the national defense state.

But sheer numbers do not convey the impact of the Savannah River Plant on this region of South Carolina. As important in determining the shape of change was Du Pont’s specific corporate culture. Intent on promoting itself primarily as an innovator and creator of consumer products, such as nylon and cellophane, and downplaying its role in weapons manufacturing, Du Pont had crafted a culture that heralded scientific discovery, innovation, and creativity, and that emphasized consumption and material

well-being as the cornerstone of a free people. Shaping this culture from the top was company president Crawford Greenewalt, who personified the company's emphasis on innovation and achievement. A graduate of MIT and a chemical engineer by training, Greenewalt was technical director of Du Pont's Graselli Chemical Department. He was among a tiny group of civilians invited to the University of Chicago in 1942 to witness the first nuclear reaction. After Du Pont joined the Manhattan Project, the company's president chose Greenewalt to serve as liaison at Hanford between the production team and the physicists. When he took over management of the Hanford project, the nuclear physicists were suspicious of him because he was not a nuclear physicist. Greenewalt boned up so well on nuclear physics that in six months he could talk to the scientists in their own language. He was such a quick study, in fact, that when Du Pont turned the operation of Hanford over to GE after the war, pioneering atomic scientist Enrico Fermi asked Greenewalt to quit Du Pont and devote his life to pure research.²² Greenewalt's wartime managerial success, in addition to his marriage to the daughter of former company president Irene Du Pont, thrust him into the corporate limelight, and in 1948, he became one of the youngest men (as well as only the second non-blood relative) to become president of Du Pont.

Greenewalt possessed a restless mind and creative spirit. An accomplished musician, he played the clarinet, cello, and piano; he built model steam engines, grew orchids, and developed high-speed photographic equipment to study hummingbirds. Greenewalt had a hand in crafting the company's corporate structure, which likewise reflected its emphasis on innovation. Du Pont's industrial operations were divided into ten departments directing such diverse projects as electrochemicals, explosives, and rayon. Du Pont frequently switched employees among departments to "cross-fertilize" the company and to broaden the employees' experience. For example, an organic chemist might be put in charge of sales, where he was left to sink or swim. Within these positions, employees and managers were given great latitude. If the manager did a good job, the general staff did not meddle.

Because of Du Pont's concerns about image and its desire to foreground its consumer products, Greenewalt maintained a very high profile, and the public record of his thoughts concerning science, the scientist, and society is voluminous. Science, Greenewalt proclaimed, was "the source of [our] national strength, of material progress, of added leisure, and of enriched cultural opportunities."²³ Science relied on creativity; it also was a communal effort in which no idea is ever lost or destroyed.²⁴ And the creative process, of course, relied on intellectual freedom.²⁵ As innovators and

problem-solvers, scientists, Greenewalt argued, had a duty to contribute to civic life.²⁶ This belief applied to Du Pont employees in particular. Greenewalt consistently remarked on the potential of research and innovation to improve Americans' material well-being, and encouraged his employees to expand their creativity to pursuits beyond the laboratory. He and other corporate leaders put their industrial pursuits into a larger Cold War context. Improvement in the material status of mankind can proceed only in a free society, and innovation and creativity in science can take place only where there are no restrictions placed on freedom of thought. This freedom extended beyond the laboratory to participation in democratic institutions. Greenewalt's philosophy about the role of scientists in society jibed with a general faith in scientists, a belief that they might legitimately offer expertise not only as scientists, but might weigh in on a number of policy issues. Greenewalt consistently maintained that leaders of industry and business had a responsibility to involve themselves in political affairs, and Du Pont regularly urged its employees to be politically active.²⁷

Potential employees were attracted to Du Pont because of its diverse industrial profile, its emphasis on research and development, and the potential for growth and experience within the company. Two highly sought-after young scientists — chemist Mal McKibben and nuclear physicist Walt Joseph — are good examples of the Du Pont scientists of the 1950s. With his B.S. in chemistry from Emory University, McKibben considered an offer from Chemstrand Corporation. Later, after joining the Savannah River Plant, he received offers from General Electric, the International Atomic Energy Commission, and Allied General Nuclear Services. Joseph, then a doctoral student in nuclear physics at the University of Pennsylvania, was interviewed twice by what he assumes was the Central Intelligence Agency. Both chose Du Pont because of its wide range of consumer products, its focus on pure research, and its reputation as an innovator. As McKibben stated frankly, "Du Pont was Cadillac, the others were Fords." Now retired, neither is disappointed in his career path. Both men recalled the sense of excitement and discovery that pervaded their work at the Savannah River Plant. Recalls McKibben, "We were always encouraged to think creatively, and we were given the latitude necessary to solve problems. Many employees extended this creativity and problem-solving ability outside the plant."²⁸

Of course, the Savannah River Plant was different from Du Pont's other manufacturing concerns. Because it was dedicated to developing components for the hydrogen bomb, secrecy and security inside the plant were paramount. Nonetheless, within the parameters laid down by the AEC, Du Pont still found ways to "cross fertilize." Nuclear physicist Joseph was as-

signed to no fewer than eight different divisions within the plant during his long tenure. At one point, he was put in charge of plant traffic. Chemist McKibben was moved from heavy-water production to fuel and target fabrication to separations — all extremely different processes — while employed by the company.²⁹ Outside of the plant, employees were forbidden to talk about their work. Employee Ronnie Bryant noted that he and his fellow workers in the heavy-water production sector joked that, when asked about their jobs, they would reply that they were making lipstick. Turning more serious, Bryant observed that the constant reminders not to talk about your work outside the plant “made us feel that what we were doing was really important.”³⁰ Spouses and children were kept in the dark regarding the work that was done at the site. Du Pont acknowledged that such secrecy could cause tension at home. In a “memo for housewives,” the company told spouses of plant employees that even dinner-table conversation about the plant was potentially dangerous. “SRP is not an ordinary plant,” Du Pont reminded the wives of workers. “Its mission is national defense; its job is important and secret.”³¹ Such extreme secrecy in a time of heightened international tension caused stress for area families. Children often came up with imaginative explanations for the secrecy that invaded their family lives. Walt Joseph’s son recalled that “[My father’s] job and work were not the topics of conversation at our dinner table. He left in the early hours of the morning, riding with a group of other men in a carpool, and came home just in time for dinner. Some weekends there would be a late night phone call and he would leave for work in the middle of the night. . . . Every few weeks, . . . my mother, my sister, and I would get in the car in the early evening and drive to pick my father up, and when we did we picked him up at a barber shop in a shopping center on the highway which ran from Aiken to New Ellenton. This was the only business I could associate my father with in the first six years of my life, so I made the logical assumption. My father was a barber.”³²

Everything about the plant seemed to dictate that it existed as an entity wholly separate from the surrounding communities. It was located in a remote region. It sat on 325 square miles of real estate — roughly the size of the city of Chicago. Plant operations and administrative buildings were secluded behind miles of wooded buffer. Traffic streamed into the plant in the morning and out at night. Employees needed an identification badge to enter. It was a curious, secret place. Nevertheless, this insistence upon secrecy and security, rather than isolating the employees and heightening the distance between employees and town, actually facilitated community involvement. For many, the sense of mission that accompanied their work did not stop when they left the workplace. Many took seriously Greenewalt’s — and

Du Pont's— notion about their role in improving the standard of living. "Better living"—a well-known Du Pont slogan—was achieved not only through the acquisition of consumer goods, but through the creation and improvement of community institutions. Recalled Walt Joseph, "it was expected that you were involved in civic affairs."³³

Within the larger Aiken community, these scientists and engineers were referred to collectively not as Savannah River Plant employees but as "Du Ponters." The identification with the company was that strong. Buzz Rich, an Aiken attorney whose family moved to the region in the early 1950s and whose mother worked at the plant, recalled the impact of the Du Pont employees on the region. "All those Du Ponters had a lot of energy, . . . all that brain power, coming into that small southern town. They had time on their hands, in the evenings and weekends. . . . [T]hey got involved and started all of these activities."³⁴ Owen Clary, who grew up in the town of Warrenville in the Valley and who eventually worked for the Savannah River Plant before heading up a local food bank, remarked that many of the Du Pont employees were civic-minded. "They were generous with their time and always volunteered for fundraising activities."³⁵ The activities of Du Pont employees were covered in the local newspaper and highlighted in the company newsletter, the Savannah River News. Du Pont employees started the community theater group, the United Way, and the Rotary Club, and raised money for a new library. Despite their recent arrival, employees of the plant were instrumental in organizing the area's first historical society, with the plant's official historian listed as its first secretary. Plant supervisors and employees worked very hard to relate their work to the community at large. Farmers of Aiken County flocked to a public program on radioisotopes and their applicability to agricultural research.³⁶ The YWCA sponsored a popular lecture series on subjects that ranged from the nature of matter to nuclear reactors. Over 600 school teachers attended an all-day seminar on the incorporation of atomic energy into the school curriculum. Employees founded local chapters of their professional associations and made them relevant to the community. For example, the Savannah River Subsection of the American Chemical Society contributed \$125 for science books for the local high school and counseled students on careers in chemistry and atomic energy.³⁷ Arthur Tackman, assistant manager of the Savannah River Plant, was named Aiken County "Citizen of the Year" for 1953. He had served as campaign chairman of the American Red Cross–Community Chest, coordinator of committees of the Cotton Festival, and chairman of the Boy Scouts in the area. He had only been a resident of the area for two

years.³⁸ SRP employees provided volunteer labor to build a public swimming pool in nearby Williston, and SRP employees organized and staffed various suburban fire departments. By 1955, only five years after the decision to build the plant was made, Du Pont employees were either leading or participating in the major community institutions in Aiken.

Following Greenewalt's advice, employees likewise became involved in the city's political institutions, initiating innovations that were based on their desire for modern, efficient, representative government. The majority of Du Pont's permanent operations staff took up residence in Aiken's burgeoning suburbs. To bring order to development chaos, these new neighborhoods organized themselves into civic associations that would regularly and collectively bring their particular issues before the city council. The first such group organized was the Crosland Park Civic Association, the first suburb built to house plant employees.

These new civic associations were in the forefront of promoting a change from the extant commission form of city government to a city manager system. Crosland Park Civic Association took the lead among newcomers in supporting the transition to a full-time city manager system which, residents believed, "contain[ed] sound principles of efficient city administration. . . ." A full-time city manager would be better equipped to handle the problems associated with rapid growth, something Crosland Park residents knew only too well. The 500-plus home subdivision was cursed with chronic sewage overflow, a complaint regularly brought before the city council.³⁹ Crosland Park residents likewise supported the "appointment of city employees on the basis of merit apart from political considerations or influence," as well as "planning and zoning provisions which provide for orderly growth, stabilize property values, and protect the citizens of Aiken from the inconvenience, danger, and expense which can result from irresponsible real property development." Finally, the association called for "a carefully developed system of public hearings which assure that the citizens of Aiken shall have the opportunity to be heard in matters of basic policy determination." By calling for a merit system and a transparent decision-making process, the new residents were advocating not only for a more democratic and representative government, but for a process that in many ways resembled the scientific process, in which all variables are carefully weighed.⁴⁰ Aiken voters overwhelming approved the adoption of the city manager system.⁴¹ The arrival of the plant and its thousands of employees likewise precipitated a more visual change in the city's identity. By the mid-1950s, the city's crest reflected its new, modern identity: joining images of a golfer,

a thoroughbred, and a plantation home was the symbol for nuclear energy with the word “progress” emblazoned across it.

Du Pont employees likewise were instrumental in lending support to Republican candidates in national elections and in organizing the first county-level Republican Party. South Carolina’s one-party system grew out of historical racial and political animosities. Since Reconstruction, the Republican Party had been anathema to South Carolina’s white voters. The Republican Party became synonymous with “negro control,” and the return to Democratic Party rule in the 1870s was marred by violence, perhaps none worse than in western South Carolina. Aiken County alone witnessed two of the worst race riots in state history in 1876. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, South Carolina was the region’s most reliably Democratic state, refusing to bolt along with its sister states in 1928, and polling huge numbers for Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s. The Republicans rarely fielded candidates for office even at the highest levels, and the Democrats utterly dominated local politics in all forty-six counties. Against such daunting odds, the fate of the state Republican Party was sealed. According to one account, by mid-century, “the South Carolina GOP was merely a quaint relic of the past, widely accused of graft, corruption, and gross mismanagement.”⁴²

Political scientists have noted how, in the postwar era, residents of the urban and suburban South “gradually began to identify their economic interests as resting with the Republican Party.”⁴³ As Aiken’s population exploded with the creation of the Savannah River Plant, they joined the growing numbers of urban and suburban residents across the South as they pulled the lever for Dwight Eisenhower and other Republican candidates. In 1952 in South Carolina, Eisenhower drew support from wealthier whites in the urban and suburban areas, as well as more race-conscious whites in the low country who were disturbed at the role of civil rights in the Democratic Party platforms of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1956, in the wake of the *Brown* decision (in which the Eisenhower administration submitted an *amicus curiae* brief supporting the NAACP’s position), Eisenhower lost much of his race-based low country support. Dissatisfied with the president’s position on race, whites living in majority black counties threw their votes to unpledged electors. In fact, the only county the Republican president carried in 1956 was Aiken. Led by the county’s new residents, the Republicanism of Aiken County was shaped by an opposition to New Deal-style liberalism rather than an overt racism. The party leadership reflected the more cosmopolitan nature of the rank and file, with most key leaders coming from out of state.⁴⁴

Not content to express their Republican sensibilities in presidential elections alone, Republicans in Aiken, led by Du Pont employees, built the party from the roots up, and by the late 1950s they were contesting seats on the city council. Their affiliation with the Republican Party was as much ideological as it was practical: the local Democratic Party appeared to many to be a “closed” body of established elites, so the Republican Party simply offered a vehicle for involvement. Efforts to organize the party on the county level occurred in the early 1960s. SRP employee Walt Joseph remembers the first Aiken County Republican Party Convention. “The law required political conventions to be held in public buildings so the group reserved the courthouse for the designated evening. When the small band of party faithful arrived for the convention, they discovered the courthouse dark and locked. Repeated attempts to phone the building custodian and other political figures were unsuccessful. Finally, in desperation, but within the letter of the law, the convention was held in the courthouse parking lot.” In 1967, Aiken County became the first county in South Carolina to hold a Republican primary.⁴⁵

By the early 1960s, the state Republican Party had been transformed, drawing strength from expanding suburban areas in Aiken, Richland, and Charleston Counties and their middle- and upper-middle-class residents. Contemporary commentators observed that presidential Republicanism in South Carolina was stronger than that in any other southern state.⁴⁶ In the presidential election of 1960, Republican candidate Richard Nixon lost the state by fewer than 10,000 votes, and 63.2 percent of all city and suburban residents voted Republican.⁴⁷ South Carolina Republicans adopted a brand of conservatism that mirrored in important respects the conservatism taking hold in the country as a whole during this period. Popular conservative themes included concerns about the influence of organized labor, the conduct of the Cold War, and the burgeoning civil rights movement. Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona was the poster child of this new conservatism, and he enjoyed widespread popularity among South Carolina Republicans.

By 1962, the state Republican Party felt confident enough to take on three-term U.S. Senator Olin D. Johnston. Johnston’s political credentials were formidable. Elected governor in 1934 and 1942, Johnston had served as the state’s senator since 1945. He was a reliable New Deal Democrat, a strong supporter of organized labor and the limited welfare state. Johnston had remained a loyal—if not enthusiastic—supporter of Harry Truman in the presidential election of 1948, when many states’ rights conservatives in South Carolina bolted the party over the Democrats’

civil rights platform. Likewise, Johnston had remained in the Democratic camp during the tumultuous 1950s, when many disgruntled southern Democrats voted as independents.⁴⁸

The Republicans nominated well-known syndicated newspaper columnist William D. Workman to run against Johnston. A life-long newspaper man, the 47-year-old Workman had always maintained a politically neutral position. However, in a letter to Barry Goldwater, Workman revealed that he had “opposed the [national] Democratic tickets since Roosevelt’s second term.”⁴⁹ Devising a winning strategy proved difficult for the South Carolina Republicans. They considered trying to yoke Johnston to liberal president John Kennedy and the increasingly disruptive civil rights movement, but painting Johnston as a racial liberal was futile. Although hardly a virulent white supremacist, he had established his anti-civil rights credentials in the 1940s and had not wavered since. Although this was his first try at public office, Workman’s conservative criticisms of the civil rights movement and the welfare state were well known. Those not familiar with Workman’s journalism could familiarize themselves with his racial views by reading *A Case for the South*, published in 1960. Declaring his position to be that of “the [white] man in the middle,” *A Case for the South* is Workman’s attempt to explain the white South’s opposition to integration. Workman’s “case” was built on the tired, time-worn arguments of southern apologists: that hundreds of years of cohabitation had given southern whites special insight into the nature of the black man; that African Americans, as a whole were an adolescent race only recently moving into civic adulthood; and that southern whites were most capable of directing their own racial affairs without interference from the courts or the federal government.⁵⁰ Having made his own position clear, Workman stated confidentially on a number of occasions that he did not wish to bring race into the campaign. Most likely this was because it was not an issue with which he could attack Johnston. Johnston deftly kept his distance from certain elements of Kennedy’s program, telling South Carolina voters that he never supported civil rights measures or “wasteful foreign aid give-aways.”⁵¹

Unwilling to take on Johnston directly, Workman attacked liberalism generally and Washington liberals in particular, whom he called a “group of arrogant intellectuals surrounding the Kennedy clan...”⁵² Workman railed against the evils of an activist federal government with its expansive, meddling bureaucracy, which he considered one step away from Communism. He opposed federal aid to education, as well as any federal intervention into health care for the elderly. The expanding welfare state had become “cradle to the grave protection . . . indulgence by the federal government at

taxpayers' expense."⁵³ He endorsed "national defense to whatever degree and at whatever cost is essential to the security of the United States," and championed an unrelenting resistance to world Communism. One Workman advertisement criticized Johnston for supporting arms control and disarmament, warning voters that by advocating arms reduction Johnston threatened national sovereignty and supported the notion of a Soviet superstate.⁵⁴ Such heated rhetoric was red meat to defense workers on the front lines of the Cold War. An arms agreement threatened the livelihood of folks who made their livings developing materials for the hydrogen bomb. Workman did his best to craft his message in the Goldwater mold, making his campaign part of the broader push for "a new conservatism which is spreading throughout America," which sought to stem "the liberal tide which has been sweeping the United States toward the murky depths of socialism."⁵⁵

In Aiken County, Savannah River Plant and Atomic Energy Commission employees became heavily involved in Workman's campaign. Gus Robinson, who worked in the Atomic Energy Commission's Office of Public Information, and Don Law, editor of the *Savannah River Plant News*, provided key information on the political temper of plant employees, assuring Workman that they could "predict good a Republican vote . . . from AEC and DuPont personnel."⁵⁶ Plant physicist Walt Joseph served as a precinct captain for Workman, while North Augusta — a town heavily populated by plant personnel — was considered a lock for the challenger.⁵⁷

Workman made an impressive showing in an improbable race, garnering 44 percent of the statewide vote from an electorate that only a decade before had possessed an almost visceral distaste for all things Republican. Aiken County was one of only three counties to give a majority of votes to Workman.⁵⁸ His most lopsided victories within the county came from precincts in Aiken and North Augusta heavily populated by middle-class plant personnel.⁵⁹

Although defeated, South Carolina Republicans had made tremendous strides in building their party, and they looked forward to the presidential contest of 1964. In September of that year, U.S. Senator and Aiken resident Strom Thurmond announced he was leaving the Democratic Party and joining the Republicans to support standard-bearer Barry Goldwater. Thurmond's party switch was a tremendous coup for South Carolina's Republicans. Garnering the affiliation of the state's most popular politician lent the fledgling party instant credibility. Many observers have since credited Thurmond with bringing two-party politics to the state; however, a closer look demands that more credit be given to party operatives, changing

demographics, and the 1962 campaign in making Thurmond's switch something less than suicidal. Ever the astute politician, Thurmond no doubt had observed the changes in the political terrain wrought by the Cold War. After leaving the governor's mansion and losing the race for U.S. Senate to Olin Johnston in 1950, Thurmond settled in Aiken, joining a local law firm. For the next several years, he represented numerous landowners displaced by the Savannah River Plant in their quest for what they considered more equitable appraisals of their property. Although a private citizen, Thurmond was never out of the public eye, appearing frequently at community events. His professional and possibly his social circle came to involve individuals from the Savannah River Plant. And although it is impossible to know the extent to which he was influenced by the burgeoning Republican sentiment in Aiken, he was certainly aware of it. Within this context, then, Thurmond's switch seems less an example of political soothsaying than a well-timed and sensible political accommodation. Although Thurmond and his aides always maintained that the senator's high-profile switch was a singular act of political bravery, former aid Harry Dent confided to Thurmond's biographer that Workman's challenge to Johnston in 1962 provided "a pretty good poll" of potential Republican support.⁶⁰



The onset of the Cold War and the disbursement of billions of dollars in federal funds through the military-industrial complex transformed regions of the American South in countless ways. In the once sparsely populated, mostly rural region of western South Carolina, the arrival of thousands of highly educated scientists and engineers heralded the beginning of a process to break down the political parochialism of the South. Just as New Deal labor legislation initiated the decline of the South's economic isolation, so too did the influx of the corporate Cold War footsoldiers mark the beginning of the end of the South's political isolation. In Aiken, South Carolina, the thrust for civic involvement and institution-building seemed to evolve naturally from Du Pont's internal culture and the larger culture of the Cold War. Perhaps what is most surprising about the transition of Aiken from a sleepy, wealthy enclave to bustling small city was not *that* it happened, but how quickly change came to this one community. By all accounts the early years of the plant (essentially 1950–1957) were frantic. The pressure to develop the hydrogen bomb and expand the nation's nuclear arsenal was enormous. In this harried context, such a high level of civic involvement makes sense only from the perspective of the employees themselves, who viewed community involvement as an integral part of their

overall mission. The result was a more modern South. The efforts of plant employees to create a viable Republican Party laid the critical groundwork for a two-party system in a region that had not known true political competition since the nineteenth century. The creation of a more democratic, competitive political system in which the local Republican Party drew on themes resonating in communities around the nation ultimately made the South less peculiar, and more like the rest of the country.

NOTES

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4. *Ibid.*, 5; Luce quoted in Bruce Cumings, "The American Century and the Third World," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Spring 1999), 360.
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6. Zilg, *Behind the Nylon Curtain*, 151, 156–59; "Wizards of Wilmington," 98.
7. David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr., *Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902–1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 221–86.
8. Martin, "Corporate Cold Warriors," 174–77.
9. Statement by the President on Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R., September 23, 1949, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman; Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1949* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), 485. Many of the nation's leading scientists opposed the creation of the superbomb on moral and ethical grounds, equating its destructive power with genocide. In

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10. U.S. Department of Energy, *The Savannah River Plant of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission*, 1963, 3.
 11. "Wizards of Wilmington," 94.
 12. Daniel Lang, "Camellias and Bombs," *New Yorker*, July 7, 1951, 42.
 13. F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., et al., *In the Shadow of a Defense Plant: A Study of Urbanization in Rural South Carolina; A Final Report of the Savannah River Urbanization Study*, Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, June 1954, 1. The head of DuPont's Explosives Department, H. L. Brown, wrote a memo on November 6, 1950, that detailed comparisons between a Paris, Texas, site and the Savannah River location. Brown noted that the Savannah River location had a lower wage scale. Further, the Texas site was occupied by two large cattle ranchers, while the Savannah River site was occupied by "colored agricultural workers" whose "houses are of low value." Presumably, they would be easier to dislocate. See Jobie Turner, "Aiken for Armageddon: The Savannah River Site and Aiken, South Carolina" (Master's thesis, University of Georgia, 1998), 20–22.
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37. *Ibid.*, March 13, 1956, 2; March 20, 1956, 3.
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KARI FREDERICKSON

Creating a "Respectable Area": Southerners and the Cold War

When Strom Thurmond and a host of future political leaders returned to the American South following their service overseas in World War II, they came home determined to remake the South in a more progressive mold. Intense and prolonged interaction with men from other regions of the country and immersion in the large and powerful armed forces bureaucracy shaped their thinking about the future of the South in new and profound ways. Convinced that the South lagged behind the rest of the nation economically, and that the South's stunted, colonial economy had perpetuated the political control of an entrenched moss-back elite committed to low-wage extractive industries, men like Thurmond were equally convinced that the road to economic transformation was paved with federal dollars. Many of these new funds were funneled through the military-industrial complex. As the South's political leaders from the late 1940s through the 1980s (and, in Thurmond's case, into the next century), these men were consistent supporters of a strong military and a foreign policy that took a hard line in its dealings with Communist nations.¹

As a regional historian, it is not at all surprising that I take as orthodox the notion that the peculiar, historic forces that shaped and defined the South likewise played an important role in determining the foreign policy positions of its political leaders. Their support for a strong military, as Andy Fry notes, was predicated in part on the economic benefits that the expansion of the military industrial complex brought to their communities and states. By the early 1970s, the Southern states were providing the Pentagon with 52 percent of its ships, 46 percent of its airframes, 42 percent of its petroleum products, and 27 percent of its ammunition.² The relationship between Southern states and the national security state was strong and vital.

1. James C. Cobb, "World War II and the Mind of the Modern South," in *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South*, ed. Neil R. McMillen (Jackson, MS, 1997); Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1964* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 171.

2. Bruce J. Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the American South, 1938-1980* (Durham, NC, 1994), 136; Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York, 1991); "Southern Militarism," *Southern Exposure* (Spring 1973): 61.

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Having spent the better part of the last ten years examining how decisions regarding the expansion of the arms race affected Southern communities, I would argue for a further refinement of this position. Military contracts and Cold War industrial facilities brought more than jobs: they possessed the power to remake entire regional economies, bringing the fruits of modernization that had alluded the South for so long. From Tenneco's Newport News shipbuilding plant in Hampton Roads, Virginia, to General Dynamics and LTV Corporation in Texas, the military and the federal government created a new high-tech industrial workforce whose cultural tastes, spending habits, and political allegiances changed the face of the South. The arrival of the military-industrial complex into underdeveloped Southern communities helped the region to overcome some of its more unsavory regional attributes. The Cold War made the South less "Southern."

Developments in Strom Thurmond's home state of South Carolina provide examples of how Cold War decision makers at the highest levels took regional patterns into account. In January 1950, on the advice of his special advisory committee, President Harry Truman authorized an accelerated program to develop the hydrogen bomb. The production of the "super" required a new facility to produce plutonium, tritium, and other products. During the spring and summer of 1950, officials from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and DuPont Corporation (recruited by President Truman to operate the vast weapons complex) crisscrossed the nation, investigating over one hundred potential sites. They ultimately settled on a site in western South Carolina that bordered the Savannah River. While factors, such as the water quality of the Savannah and the drainage properties of the region's sandy soil, played an important role in the decision of where to locate the plant, so too did more historic, particularly Southern, attributes. Of the handful of sites that made it into the final round of consideration, the South Carolina location was notable for its construction wage rates—the lowest among all possible sites. South Carolina's low wage rates reflected the state's historically weak labor movement and hostile antiunion atmosphere. AEC officials responsible for making recommendations regarding the placement of the site likewise noted that most of those living inside the proposed plant boundaries were black tenant farmers. These "colored agricultural workers," noted one official, resided in houses that were of "low value." Removing such residents would be easier than removing residents at alternate sites where property values were higher.³ Here, government officials

3. "Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council to the President," January 31, 1950, U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950* (Washington, DC, 1977), 1: 513–23. Site specifics found in C. H. Topping, Engineering Department, E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, "Plant 124 Site Survey," November 27, 1950, box H-10-1, series 43, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Records, Record Group 326, National Archives and Records Administration, Southeast Region, Morrow, Georgia; H. F. Brown to Heads of Departments and Branch Offices, Works, and Divisions of Explosives Department, July 11, 1950, file 7, box 6, subseries C, series II, Acc.

exploited the historically vulnerable position of rural blacks trapped in the economic vice that was the South's tenant system. Such residents possessed neither the financial resources nor the political clout to fight their removal from the land. An awareness of how specific regional characteristics, such as an underpaid skilled labor force and a captive black rural population, played into decisions regarding the expansion of the arms race made at the highest levels of government only lends an appreciation of the complexity of the workings of the national security state.

The dynamic social, cultural, economic, and political transformation that accompanied the arrival of what eventually was called the Savannah River Plant (SRP) helps to explain why leaders such as Thurmond were such strong supporters of the nation's military and of an aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy. Prior to the SRP's arrival, this section of South Carolina was primarily rural, dominated by low-wage jobs in agriculture and textiles, and had one of the most abysmal rates of high school graduation in the state. Within ten years and after the arrival of nearly 25,000 new residents, the region was highly suburbanized, home to several national retail outlets, and boasted more Ph.Ds per capita than any area of the state. Simply put, the new SRP employees remade the region. They improved its schools, created a cornucopia of civic and arts organizations, and revamped the structure of local government, among other developments. They imbued the region with a notion of modernization and progress that even the long-term residents bought into. Recalling the impact of the arrival of scientists and engineers to the town of Aiken, South Carolina, located within commuting distance to the SRP, textile worker Lenwood Melton speculated that their presence had somehow brought the region into the modern era. "It [the plant and the new permanent residents] upgraded things, really, because we had never had that level of people amongst us. When you got those types coming in, and of course, they were more well-to-do [than the textile mill workers and farmers], and they built some fine houses, they brought the shopping malls, they started new churches, they started doing things like big city folks. . . . As far as the community of [greater] Aiken is concerned, it grew up into a very respectable area."⁴ As Melton's observation implies, over time, residents saw themselves as members of a progressive, modern community, a new vision of themselves that was intimately tied to their role in the Cold War arms race. This new vision was profoundly shaped by DuPont's corporate culture. DuPont fostered a local culture that privileged modernization, innovation, efficiency, consumption, and civic involvement as indispensable components in the Cold War battle with communism. DuPont relentlessly encouraged the connection between the SRP and the achievement of "the good life." In fact, few

1957, Atomic Energy Division/Savannah River Plant Papers, Hagley Library, Wilmington, Delaware (quotation).

4. Lenwood Melton, interview with author, May 2003, Graniteville, South Carolina.

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corporations in the postwar era better represented the American Cold War promise of economic prosperity through mass consumption than DuPont.

For residents and leaders of South Carolina, support for a strong national defense and a staunchly anti-Communist foreign policy, then, went beyond mere dollars and cents. Their support had a deeper, more nuanced meaning. It spoke to their best hopes for themselves and their community as well as to their sense of their place in the nation.

Charles S. Bullock and Mark Rozell, eds., *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021)

13

Alabama

Polarized and Uncompetitive

David A. Hughes



Over the past several decades, southern politics have been in a state of partisan flux. Long the sole governing faction in the American South, state Democratic parties began losing their stranglehold on political institutions from the 1980s up through the 2000s (Black and Black 2002). In most southern states, this transitional period led back to one-party control, though this time by Republicans. More recently, however, several southern states have seen the reemergence of two-party competition as urbanization, in-migration, and generational replacement have propelled a more liberal brand of southern Democrats back into a position of genuine competition (Bullock et al. 2019).

For example, Virginia has voted Democratic in every presidential election since 2008, and in 2019, Virginia state Democrats won their first trifecta since 1993.¹ In Georgia in 2020, the Democratic candidate for president won the state's Electoral College votes for the first time since 1992, and in a runoff election held two months later, two Democratic candidates defeated two incumbent Republican U.S. senators to unify Democratic control of the state's Senate seats for the first time since 2003. In other Rim South states like Texas, Florida, and North Carolina, Democrats continue to improve their performance in state elections and threaten Republicans up and down the ticket.

With few exceptions, Alabama has not been among these "New South" states.² While its political factions might resemble those where Democrats once again vie for power, looks can be deceiving. The Alabama Republican Party reigns supreme, and its status is under no serious doubt at this time. In what follows, I review modern developments in Alabama politics, including partisanship, elections, factional control of institutions, and issue development. I conclude that while the state experienced a transformational period of democratization in the latter parts of the twentieth

century, its core set of factions and animating political issues have largely remained invariant to changes in partisanship.

VOTER TURNOUT AND REALIGNMENT

Alabama realigned from the Democratic Party more slowly compared to other southern states (Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2012). Prior to the 1960s, Jim Crow restrictions on the franchise such as the literacy test limited citizens' ability to register to vote or to cast ballots, especially among African Americans (Key 1949). With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, and with it the requirement that states like Alabama preclear new voting laws with the federal government, participation in Alabama elections swelled (Bullock and Gaddie 2009).

In figure 13.1, we see the percent of the voting-age population (VAP) that cast ballots in each of the presidential and gubernatorial elections held between 1952 and 2020. Between 1952 and 1964, an average of only about 30 percent of the VAP cast ballots in Alabama's presidential elections, and fewer still, only about 17 percent, participated in gubernatorial elections. Following the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, however, turnout increased by approximately 45 percent between the




Figure 13.1. Voting age population turnout in Alabama's presidential and gubernatorial elections (1952–2020). Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1952–2011; and the Alabama Secretary of State's Office, 2011–2020.

1964 and 1968 presidential elections and by a stunning 160 percent between the 1962 and 1966 gubernatorial elections. Furthermore, these gains have been persistent over the years, and in 2020, VAP turnout in the presidential election climbed to a record high of 61 percent.

With Jim Crow barriers to the franchise eliminated, a wave of new voters joined the electorate, and a transformation of Alabama politics was underway. During this period, African American voters overwhelmingly registered to vote as Democrats and increasingly elected representatives who looked like themselves. The first African American state legislators since Reconstruction assumed office in 1971. As seen in figure 13.2, over the next twenty-five years, the proportion of Black legislators in both the Alabama House of Representatives and the Alabama Senate steadily increased until achieving parity with their proportion of the state population.³ And since 1995, Black Democrats have maintained an average control of nearly 25 percent of state House seats and approximately 22 percent of state Senate seats.⁴

The mobilization of minority voters had a twofold and complementary effect on state politics. First, the increasing participation and representation of African Americans in the Democratic Party transformed it from the party of White supremacy to




Figure 13.2. Percent of the Alabama legislature's two chambers represented by African Americans (1960–2020). Sources: Bullock and Gaddie (2009), 1960–2007. Remaining years gathered by author.

the party of biracial politics in a remarkably short time (Black and Black 2002). If White politicians wanted to win Democratic primaries, they would need to compete for African Americans' votes, which would require them to moderate their positions on critical issues like race. Indeed, no less a personage than George Wallace built a political coalition for his final, successful, gubernatorial race of 1982 based in no small part upon appealing to the very people he'd victimized as the onetime standard-bearer for White supremacy (Frederick 2007).

Second, the increased presence of African Americans in the Democratic Party caused an exodus of conservative Whites to the Republican Party (Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2012). During this period, a paradox emerged across the South whereby Democrats—many of whom had ample conservative bona fides from years past—were forced to run more moderate campaigns to win primary elections, but such moderation put them at risk of losing to more conservative, Republican candidates in the general election, particularly in open elections where Democrats could not point to seniority in legislatures as a justification for retention (Black and Black 2002).

These two complementary phenomena—the surge of Black voters and the exodus of White voters—in Democratic politics resulted in a brief period in Alabama between the early 1980s and late 2000s where Democrats and Republicans competed on a nearly equal footing for power. On one side, Democrats organized coalitions of voters largely based on the electoral strategy of George Wallace's 1982 victory. The Wallace coalition laid the groundwork for virtually every statewide Democratic campaign waged since. It consisted of African Americans, labor unions, metropolitan voters, and poorer voters (Cotter and Stovall 2009). On the other side, the Republican coalition consisted overwhelmingly of White voters, especially White Evangelicals, middle- and upper-class voters such as those moving to the suburbs, and business interests as represented by the traditional big mules.

Alabama voters first began voting Republican at the top of the ticket before abandoning Democrats at the local level. Figure 13.3 displays support for Democratic performance in state elections. In the left-hand pane is the percent of the vote Democratic candidates for president and governor received in each election between 1952 and 2020. With the exception of the anomalous 1968 election featuring the independent candidacy of George Wallace for president, the steady downward trend in support for state and federal Democrats is clear. Alabama has not voted for a Democratic presidential candidate since 1976 and has not elected a Democratic governor since 1998.

Democrats at the local level tended to outperform statewide candidates well into the late 2000s. In the right-hand pane of figure 13.3, we see the share of the Alabama House and Senate controlled by Democrats. Until passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Democrats regularly controlled every legislative seat. Since the 1970s, however, Democrats have lost seats in almost every election cycle, including the most recent ones in 2018 and 2020, due largely to their loss of support among rural White voters. Democrats formally lost control of both chambers of the state legislature in




Figure 13.3. Democratic performance in presidential, gubernatorial, and state House and Senate elections (1952–2020). *Sources:* U.S. Census Bureau, *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1952–2011 and the Alabama Secretary of State's Office, 2011–2020.

2010, and today, nearly every Democratic lawmaker is African American and every Republican lawmaker is White.

Despite a series of blunders by Alabama Republicans, today's state Democrats have, with few exceptions, been unable to capitalize on them. In 2016, the Alabama Speaker of the House, Republican Mike Hubbard, was convicted on twelve felony charges related to violations of state ethics law and removed from office (Cason 2016). Later that year, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary removed Republican Roy Moore, the chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, from office for his efforts to thwart the U.S. Supreme Court's 2015 decision invalidating the state's ban on same-sex marriage (Faulk 2016).⁶ And the following year, Republican governor Robert Bentley was forced to resign after pleading guilty to campaign finance violations related to an affair with a member of his staff (Koplowitz 2017).

Despite these missteps, Republicans have paid no discernible electoral penalty with voters. Republicans retained the governorship in 2018 in a twenty-point landslide, increased their supermajorities in the Alabama legislature, and elected a new chief justice who was once a protégé of Roy Moore's (Brown 2018). Republicans control every elected position in the executive branch of government and all nineteen

elected positions on the state's three appellate courts. It controls six out of seven U.S. House seats and both of the state's seats in the U.S. Senate. As of this writing, every statewide position in Alabama is occupied by a Republican.

MODERN PARTISANSHIP

The changing tides in Alabama elections are reflected by voters' evolving party preferences. In the early 1980s, over half of all Alabamians identified as Democrats compared to fewer than one in five identifying as Republicans. Even as late as 2005, about as many Alabamians identified as Democrats as they did Republicans—approximately 38 percent each (Cotter and Stovall 2009). Today, around 54 percent of Alabamians consider themselves Republicans compared to only about 30 percent who consider themselves Democrats—a twenty-four-point Democratic deficit (AUM Poll 2020b).⁷ And in virtually any given statewide election, Republican candidates typically defeat Democrats by twenty to thirty percentage points.

Despite all of the issues Alabama Democrats face, there have been some positive developments in recent years indicating that their worst days are perhaps behind them. To begin, it appears that in statewide campaigns, Democratic support finally bottomed out sometime in the mid-2010s, as there appear to be no more White voters for them to lose and a few of them to gain among younger voters and in urban and suburban areas. In 2016, Hillary Clinton earned just 34.4 percent of the state's total presidential vote—the smallest general election vote share for any Democratic presidential candidate since 1968 when George Wallace ran against Democrat Hubert Humphrey as an independent. In 2020, Joe Biden received 36.6 percent of the vote—a modest improvement of 2.2 points. In gubernatorial politics, the Democratic candidate, Parker Griffith, won 36.4 percent of the 2014 vote; whereas in 2018, Democrat Walt Maddox won 40.4 percent, for an improvement of four points.

By far the greatest Democratic success in recent years was in the 2017 U.S. Senate special election when Doug Jones defeated embattled Republican candidate Roy Moore to become the first Democratic senator to win election in Alabama since Richard Shelby in 1992. Upon Donald Trump's election as president in 2016, Alabama's junior Republican senator, Jeff Sessions, became Trump's pick for U.S. attorney general, creating a vacancy for Governor Bentley to fill. Bentley, who was already ensnared in his extramarital affair scandal, was under investigation by the state's attorney general, Luther Strange. In what became widely interpreted as a corrupt bargain, Bentley appointed Strange to the vacant Senate seat, thereby giving Bentley an opportunity to appoint a new attorney general—one who would presumably inherit Strange's investigation into the governor (Hughes 2017).

Bentley's appointment of Strange to the U.S. Senate infuriated voters, and following Bentley's resignation as governor, a special election was announced to consider his future. At this time, Roy Moore, already suspended from office by the Court of

the Judiciary, resigned his post as chief justice to run against Strange in the Republican primary. Moore had extensive experience in statewide campaigns, and due to his firebrand conservatism, he was the darling of White, rural, Evangelical voters. After forcing Strange into a runoff, Moore defeated the incumbent to face Democratic nominee Doug Jones in a December general election (Hughes 2017).⁸ But just over a month before the election, the *Washington Post* published a bombshell story alleging that Moore, as a younger man, had behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner toward women as young as fourteen (McCrummen, Reinhardt, and Crites 2017).

The accusations against Moore, who denied all wrongdoing, upended the election. Democratic voters surged to the polls while Republican turnout sagged. On Election Day, Jones narrowly defeated Moore by 1.6 percentage points, or by fewer than twenty-two thousand votes—a margin smaller than the number of voters casting write-in ballots. Propelling Jones to victory was a better-than-average performance in some of the state's more suburban and better-educated counties like Madison, Tuscaloosa, and Lee—counties that typically vote Republican given their large White and affluent populations (Hughes 2017). Jones's victory proved anomalous, however, as two years later, former Auburn University football coach, Republican Tommy Tuberville, defeated Jones in his reelection effort by more than twenty percentage points.

Doug Jones's temporary success, however, illuminates another potential bright spot for state Democrats in light of developments in neighboring states like Georgia (Bullock et al. 2019). Since Alabama's conservative White population realigned into the Republican Party, Democrats have struggled to break the 40 percent vote threshold in any statewide election. Jones's 2017 victory not only relied on the foundation of Democratic support in Alabama—African American voters in cities and in the Black Belt—but made significant inroads into areas traditionally won by Republicans—suburban areas with wealthier, better-educated voters—and among groups of Whites traditionally aligned with Republicans.

According to an exit poll by NBC News conducted during the Jones-Moore election, Jones performed better than expected among younger voters, voters with a college education, and female voters (NBC News 2018). According to the poll, Jones won voters aged eighteen to forty-four by over twenty-two percentage points. Voters with a college degree preferred Jones to Moore by a margin of eleven percentage points, and female voters preferred Jones to Moore by sixteen percentage points. And while Jones only received 30 percent of the White vote, he polled significantly better among Whites with a college education and White women. According to the survey, Jones received eight percentage points more support from White women compared to White men, and he received eighteen percentage points more support among White college graduates compared to non-college graduates.

While Jones lost his reelection effort, public opinion research suggests that some of the demographics previously mentioned might be primed to realign toward the Democratic Party should current trends continue. In October 2020, a survey conducted by Auburn University at Montgomery gauged 948 likely Alabama voters'

Table 13.1. Alabama Demographics and Partisanship

	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Republican</i>
Race			
Black	62.9	15.5	15.3
White	17.0	9.7	70.3
Gender			
Female	33.0	11.5	50.6
Male	27.5	11.5	57.6
Age			
18–24	41.4	14.9	30.8
25–34	32.9	13.1	47.1
35–44	39.9	13.6	44.4
45–54	32.5	16.3	50.0
55–64	25.0	10.5	61.4
65+	16.7	3.7	78.1
Education			
High school	29.1	11.4	57.0
Some college	31.0	6.1	60.0
College degree	25.6	14.6	57.4
Graduate degree	37.9	8.8	51.5
Income			
Less than \$25k	37.7	15.5	39.1
\$25k–\$49.9k	29.2	9.6	59.2
\$50k–\$74.9k	25.0	14.0	56.1
\$75k–\$99.9k	24.7	7.7	65.3
\$100k–\$149.9k	28.0	8.6	59.6
\$150k+	31.4	8.7	59.2
Total	30.2	11.5	54.0

Note: Table entries represent percentages. Survey conducted October 21–28, 2020, by Auburn University at Montgomery's AUM Poll. *N* = 948 likely Alabama voters.

party preferences and found similarities with the 2017 special election (AUM Poll 2020b). I present the findings from this survey in table 13.1, which shows not only remnants of the old Wallace and anti-Wallace coalitions of the 1980s to 2000s but also the prospect for Democratic expansion now that the political realignment of that era is complete.

We can see remnants of the previous party era's coalitions from table 13.1 by examining race and income. Wallace and his Democratic successors relied heavily (and increasingly) on African American support as the Reagan Revolution swept increasing numbers of Whites into the Republican Party (Cotter and Stovall 2009). The partisan gap between Black and White respondents who identify as Democrats is forty-six percentage points, and the gap between the percent of Black and White Republicans is even bigger at fifty-five percentage points. The Wallace coalition also relied on poorer voters as Alabama Republicanism became increasingly the party of better-off voters. We see from table 13.1 that while Democrats enjoy support from

the poorest voters, Republicans today have a partisan advantage in nearly every income bracket. This is good evidence that the realignment of poorer (especially rural) Whites into the Republican Party is all but complete.

Now that the previous era of partisan realignment is passed, however, we can examine issues like age, education, and gender to get a potential glimpse of the next era in Alabama's partisan politics. Over the last several years, aside from their deficit among non-White voters, the national Republican Party has struggled with younger, better-educated, and female voters in particular (Pew Research Center 2020). Among all Americans, Democrats have opened up an eighteen-percentage-point lead over Republicans among female voters, a twenty-point lead among college graduates, and a sixteen-point lead among voters under the age of forty.

Though less stark in degree, many of the same trends can be found in Alabama politics today. Examining results from table 13.1, observe that in all but one age cohort, more Alabamians identify as Republicans compared to Democrats. Nevertheless, the youngest cohort of voters—those aged eighteen to twenty-four—are approximately ten percentage points more Democratic than Republican. By comparison, the oldest cohort of Alabamians—those aged sixty-five or older—are sixty-one percentage points more Republican than Democratic. Should this trend continue, Democrats could eventually begin to contest elections as younger voters age and begin voting en masse and as older voters are generationally replaced in the electorate.

We also see evidence from survey data that the modern Alabama Republican Party might have issues with female voters. Again, state Republicans don't face the same steep obstacles as their national counterpart, but we see from table 13.1 that female respondents are indeed less likely to identify as Republicans. Compared to males, female respondents are 7 percentage points less Republican and 5.5 percentage points more Democratic.

Finally, education in Alabama shows modest signs that it is affecting partisanship. Though Republicans enjoy majority support among all categories of education in table 13.1, we see that individuals with a postgraduate education are more likely to identify as Democrats. Only about 29 percent of Alabamians with less than a postgraduate degree identify as Democrats compared to 38 percent of postgraduates who identify as Democrats. Even still, postgraduates only make up approximately 10 percent of Alabama adults aged twenty-five or older according to U.S. Census estimates.⁹

An additional development may bode well for the future of Alabama Democrats. A perennial complaint among state party members has been that the party's State Democratic Executive Committee (SDEC) was poorly organized, neglected grassroots organization, was uncompetitive, and was monopolized by an older generation of Democratic leaders who no longer represented younger, more progressive interests. In 2019, the party ousted Nancy Worley as chair of the SDEC and elected Chris England, a young state legislator from Tuscaloosa, as its first Black chair (Cason 2019). Proponents of the move, including Doug Jones, argued that new leadership would reinvigorate the party moving forward, especially among younger voters.

Given the demographic trends just explored, one might be tempted to conclude that Alabama might begin to vote like other southern states such as Georgia and Virginia, where Democrats have begun contesting and winning statewide elections. Closer inspection, however, makes clear that it will be many years before Democrats can once again compete on an even footing with Republicans for statewide office.

Principally, Alabama has not experienced the same economic growth or social immigration compared to these other, more competitive states. With the exception of recent booms in the Birmingham and Huntsville areas, the Alabama populace has remained largely stagnant over time.¹⁰ As of the 1970 decennial census, 58.6 percent of the state lived in an urban area. According to the 2010 census, 59.0 percent of the population lived in an urban area—an increase of 0.7 percent over a forty-year period. By comparison, over the same forty-year period, Georgia became 24.5 percent more urban as it went from 60.3 percent urban to 75.1 percent urban.¹¹

Alabama's failure to attract major new industries has also inhibited its ability to attract a vibrant and diverse new workforce. In 1970, Alabama and Georgia looked quite similar demographically. Alabama's population was approximately 3.4 million, and Georgia's was approximately 4.6 million. Each state was approximately 26 percent African American and 74 percent White. Nearly a half century of growth in Georgia, however, has left its western neighbor lagging far behind. By 2019, Georgia's population had grown by 127 percent to 10.4 million, while Alabama's had grown just 42 percent to 4.9 million. This massive in-migration has also left Georgia significantly less White. Today, it is just 59 percent White (a decline of 21 percent over forty-nine years), while Alabama remains 68 percent White (a decline of just 7 percent).

Alabama has experienced considerable partisan change over the past half century. Long a solidly Democratic state, White voters began abandoning the Democratic Party as Black voters registered as Democrats following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A brief period from the 1980s to the 2000s emerged in which Democrats and Republicans competed on a near-even footing before Republicans consolidated the White vote and assumed virtually unchecked control of state government. In recent years, Democrats have shown some signs of improving their electoral fortunes among younger, better-educated, and female voters, but they continue to lose most statewide offices by at least twenty percentage points due in part to Alabama's stagnant population and economy. Thus, for the foreseeable future, Alabama is likely to remain tightly under the control of Republicans.

ISSUES IN ALABAMA POLITICS

Alabama politics have evolved significantly over the past half century. Racist politicians of yesteryear would hardly recognize a political system in which African Americans comprise a total of 26 percent of all registered voters,¹² where 26 percent of the state House of Representatives and 20 percent of the state Senate are African Ameri-

can, where one representative to the U.S. House of Representatives is an African American, and where the mayors of two of the state's largest cities in Birmingham and Montgomery—long bastions of White supremacy—are African Americans.

And yet, despite such momentous change, much of Alabama's politics remains little altered. To begin, race, even when not directly on the surface, lurks beneath nearly every issue in state politics. According to results presented in table 13.1, Alabama's political parties are badly racially polarized. Only 17 percent of White voters identify as Democrats, and only 15 percent of Black voters identify as Republicans (AUM Poll 2020b). Because African Americans only make up about 27 percent of the state's population, Whites win virtually every statewide office. And political campaigns for those offices, in addition to the policy struggles that happen there, are oftentimes symbolically racial.

Take, for example, the Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017. The legislation prohibits the removal of monuments that have been in place for at least forty years and is widely interpreted as intended to protect monuments erected in honor of Confederate causes (Cason 2017). The original legislation was controversial at the time of its passage, but following the 2020 death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police and the wave of protests it sparked against police brutality of African Americans, criticism of such Confederate symbols only increased. Following the protests, Democratic lawmakers filed proposals to repeal the Alabama Memorial Preservation Act, but these efforts have thus far faltered in light of Republican opposition (Cason 2021).

Public opinion is divided over issues like Confederate symbols in Alabama, and these divisions often trace directly to racial cleavages in the population. In July 2020, a survey conducted by Auburn University at Montgomery measured registered voters' opinions on several salient topics (AUM Poll 2020a). I report some key findings from the survey in table 13.2. By far the biggest polarizing force among Alabama's White and Black population was Donald Trump.¹³ Nearly 66 percent of the White

Table 13.2. Public Opinion in Alabama on Salient Political Issues

Issue	All Voters		Black Voters		White Voters	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Confederate Monuments	52.3	25.1	44.3	24.5	57.4	23.1
Southern Border wall	53.5	29.9	25.9	45.7	65.7	21.9
Peaceful BLM protests	61.9	12.0	79.3	6.6	54.4	22.0
Noncriminal citizenship	54.5	21.7	63.7	7.0	50.0	27.8
President Donald Trump	53.3	38.3	23.5	65.1	65.9	27.3

Note: Table entries represent percentages. Survey conducted July 2–9, 2020, by Auburn University at Montgomery's AUM Poll. *N* = 596 registered Alabama voters.

population supports the former president compared to only 24 percent of African Americans--a forty-two-percentage-point gap.

Donald Trump's biggest issue during his 2016 presidential campaign was immigration and support for a southern border wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Consequently, racial attitudes toward immigration closely mirror those toward Trump himself. According to the results of the survey, nearly 66 percent of White Alabamians support construction of a border wall compared to only 26 percent of African Americans. A smaller racial gap exists regarding a potential pathway to citizenship for residents who were unlawfully brought into the United States as children and have no criminal record. According to the survey, approximately 64 percent of African Americans support such a policy proposal compared to only 50 percent of Whites.

Issues related to Confederate symbols and the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests that erupted throughout the summer of 2020 also show signs of racial polarization, though not as much compared to immigration. According to survey results, 57 percent of White Alabamians approve of legislation preventing the removal of Confederate monuments compared to only 44 percent of Black respondents. Nevertheless, while 79 percent of Black respondents reported their support of peaceful BLM protesters, only 54 percent of Whites showed such support (AUM Poll 2020a).

Further investigation of survey results indicates that not only is race an important predictor of support for President Trump, restrictive immigration policies, and Confederate symbols, but adherence to Evangelicalism also appears to drive such support. In table 13.3, I present results from the same survey and questions with results drawn only from White respondents. Responses are divided by a respondent's religious affiliation: Evangelical or otherwise.

We see from table 13.3 that, even when focusing only on White respondents, Evangelicals are disproportionately more likely to voice support for policies or politicians that have racially conservative implications. Again, the most polarizing factor from this set of survey results is Donald Trump and immigration. There is a nearly fifteen-percentage-point gap in support for Trump between White Evangelicals and non-Evangelicals. Evangelical Whites are also significantly more likely than non-Evangelical Whites to support a southern border wall, to oppose a path to citizenship for undocumented children with no criminal record, to support Confederate

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Table 13.3. Public Opinion in Alabama among Whites

Issue	White Evangelical		White Non-Evangelical	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Confederate monuments	65.7	18.0	51.3	26.8
Southern border wall	71.1	18.5	62.0	24.3
Peaceful BLM protests	50.6	23.7	57.2	20.7
Noncriminal citizenship	40.7	30.2	56.8	26.0
President Donald Trump	74.3	19.7	59.7	34.5

Note: Table entries represent percentages. Survey conducted July 2–9, 2020, by Auburn University at Montgomery's AUM Poll. *N* = 596 registered Alabama voters.

monuments, and to oppose peaceful BLM protests (AUM Poll 2020a). Thus, in looking for the root causes of polarization in Alabama politics, race and adherence to evangelicalism are two critical issues.

Evangelical politics in Alabama touch on other social issues unrelated directly to race but that arise from the so-called culture wars stemming from the emergence of groups such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, and the Tea Party movement. This is especially true with respect to issues surrounding women's access to abortion.

In recent years, a spate of new legislation restricting women's access to abortion has been enacted.¹⁵ In 1997, the state passed sweeping antiabortion legislation that, among other things, made it a felony to abort a fetus that had achieved viability.¹⁶ In 2002, the state passed an informed-consent law requiring, among other things, verification that women seeking an abortion had seen or waived seeing an ultrasound of the fetus.¹⁶ In 2013, the state restricted the availability of abortion-inducing drugs.¹⁷ In 2014, the state amended its statutes governing abortions for minors seeking to obtain an abortion without parental consent via judicial bypass to allow judges to appoint counsel to represent the interests of the unborn.¹⁸ And in 2019, the state enacted its strictest antiabortion measure yet when it banned—without exceptions for cases of rape or incest—nearly all abortions such that violators would be sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprisonment (Lyman 2019).

Since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made it the only state to recognize same-sex marriage in 2003,¹⁹ Alabama legislators have also been keen to restrict the rights of sexual or other gender minorities. In 2006, voters and the state legislature approved a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in the state.²⁰ This effort was renewed after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the state's ban in 2015.²¹ In 2017, the state passed new legislation allowing private agencies to deny same-sex couples' applications to adopt children (Bendix 2017). And during the 2021 legislative session, Republican lawmakers introduced new legislation that would criminally ban doctors from treating transgender children with therapies such as puberty blockers (Burkhalter 2021).

Evangelicalism, however, has lost some of its potency in recent years with respect to other political affairs. This is especially true of the third rail of Alabama politics—gambling. Gambling has long been a major issue in Alabama dating back at least to the administration of Democratic governor Don Siegelman (Stewart 2016). The issue pits several interests against one another in Alabama, including the Poarch Creek Indians, who operate legal casinos across Alabama and who are significant donors to numerous politicians, dog track owners and other small bingo sites that compete with the Poarch Creeks, and Evangelicals with a long-held moral opposition to gambling.


In 1999, Alabama voters rejected a cornerstone of Siegelman's 1998 gubernatorial campaign—an education lottery akin to that established in Georgia—by a margin of ten percentage points, largely due to the opposition of religious groups (Manuel 1999). During the 2000s, the so-called gaming wars only escalated as Republican

governor Bob Riley went to battle with his own attorney general and cracked down on what he viewed as illegal bingo halls (Stewart 2016). Since then, lawmakers have consistently endeavored to create a lottery to shore up the state's perennially embattled Education Trust Fund. Nevertheless, politicians beholden to donors like the Poarch Creek Indians or other regional gaming interests have struggled to thread the legislative needle in a manner that would create a state lottery to fund education without earmarking the funds for other projects or affording any one gaming interest a monopoly on gambling revenue.

Today, a major roadblock to an education lottery has been cleared as, after more than twenty years, Evangelical opposition to gambling has significantly waned. According to survey research, a majority of Alabamians (56 percent) support a state-run education lottery (AUM Poll 2020a). This even includes a majority of Evangelical respondents, who support the creation of a state-run education lottery at a rate of 54 percent. And for the first time in a generation, legislators appear poised to pass a major piece of gaming legislation. During the 2021 legislative session, lawmakers introduced an ambitious new grand compromise on gambling aiming to satisfy each of the key players in the lottery debate that appears to have better odds of passage than any other bill in recent memory (Moon 2021).

Overt racism is no longer a viable campaign strategy in Alabama politics. Nevertheless, the politics of race, which dominated state life for generations, are never far from the surface. Over time, conservative Whites, and especially White Evangelicals, gravitated toward new political issues that similarly otherize vulnerable minorities, including women and sexual minorities. Today, one is as likely to hear conservative politicians demonize welfare recipients (long considered a symbolic attack on racial minorities and especially African Americans) as transgender persons. So long as White Evangelicals continue to dominate state politics, this trend is unlikely to change.

CONCLUSION

Alabama politics is a story of political and social division, demagoguery, and one-party rule. Historically, Alabamians have been divided by race and party. Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, these divisions were codified via Jim Crow restrictions on the franchise. The Voting Rights Act proved a critical juncture for state politics, however. The mass mobilization of African American voters who joined the Democratic Party in overwhelming numbers ushered in a period of biracial politics that lasted for roughly a generation between the 1980s and 2000s. Nevertheless, conservative Whites, unwilling to share their party with Black voters, gradually realigned to form a new party of White identity politics-- the modern Alabama Republican Party. 

Today, Alabama's political realignment of yesteryear is complete, and a new party era has begun. Alabamians are overwhelmingly divided by race such that most Whites are Republicans, and most Blacks are Democrats. Given the state's inabil-

ity to develop a highly educated, diverse workforce, population patterns today are similar to those fifty years ago. Consequently, White identity politics—specifically Evangelical politics—continue to dominate Alabama as voters and legislators push new policies that glorify symbols of the Confederacy, restrict women's access to abortion, and limit the rights and liberties of sexual minorities. Republican hegemony is therefore thorough and under no serious or immediate threat from Democrats.

Nevertheless, we can begin to see how Alabama politics might begin to change should nascent patterns persist over the long run. The 2017 U.S. Senate special election in which the Democratic candidate, Doug Jones, prevailed lays the groundwork for the future of Alabama Democrats. Younger Alabamians are far less likely to identify as Republicans compared to their elders and will eventually begin to vote in large numbers as they generationally replace older cohorts of Republicans. And should population centers such as Birmingham and Huntsville continue to grow and attract a highly educated workforce, they too could begin to vote more Democratic.

NOTES

1. A “trifecta” refers to unified partisan control of both chambers of the state legislature and the governorship. Parties that enjoy trifectas can much more easily advance their political agendas.

2. Numerous eras in southern history have been so described as representing a “New South” (e.g., Woodward 1971). In this context, however, I refer to a renewed period of two-party competition that emerged sometime in the late 2000s during which Democrats represented racially progressive, diverse interests that were unaligned with their White, conservative forebears.

3. See U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles>.

4. The Alabama Senate has fewer seats compared to the state House of Representatives. With geographically larger districts, it is therefore more difficult for African Americans to achieve parity with their proportion of the state population in the Senate.

5. The “big mules” are a collection of business interests that have played an outsized role in state politics for generations (Key 1949). Historically, the mules were a coalition of agricultural and industrial interests from the state's Black belt and metropolitan centers (Permaloff 2008).

6. See *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. ____ (2015). This was, in fact, Moore's second time being removed from the position of chief justice. The first occurred in 2003 when he refused to obey a federal court order to remove a giant monument of the Ten Commandments he had installed in the Alabama Supreme Court building. See *Glassroth v. Moore*, 335 F.3d 1282 (2003).

7. See table 13.1.

8. Doug Jones had gained notoriety as a federal attorney who successfully prosecuted members of the Ku Klux Klan for their role in the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama (Edmondson 2020).

9. See U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles>.

10. In recent years, Birmingham has become a hub for the health care industry given the dominant role of the University of Alabama at Birmingham's medical hospital. According to a

UAB study, the university creates \$7.2 billion annually in Alabama economic growth and employs one in every thirty-one Alabama workers (University of Alabama at Birmingham 2017). Birmingham has additionally attracted a slate of new technology startups, such as the grocery delivery service Shipt (Hogan 2019). Huntsville, with its aerospace industry, including NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, Redstone Arsenal, and the recently announced U.S. Space Command headquarters, has been one of Alabama's fastest-growing cities, with high rates of education and income and low rates of unemployment (McDonald 2019; Roop 2021).

11. Census population data is available at the following web address: <http://www.t.ly/q8xW>.

12. Voter registration figures are available from the Alabama Secretary of State's office and include registration by race: <http://www.t.ly/YpNs>.

13. Indeed, Trump has been accused of embodying the politics of symbolic White, Christian nationalism (e.g., Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018).

14. Much of this legislative agenda has been challenged in court, however, with partial success.

15. See Alabama Code § 26-22-3.

16. See Alabama Code § 26-3A-4.

17. See Alabama Code § 26-23E-7.

18. See Alabama Code § 26-21-4.

19. See *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health*, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).

20. See Alabama Constitution of 1901, Amendment 774.

21. See note 6 above.

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The Rational Southerner

*Black Mobilization, Republican Growth,
and the Partisan Transformation of the
American South*

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2012

OXFORD

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for all intents and purposes, no Republican Party at all until the 1970s. We also showed that by the beginning of the twenty-first century, Southern Republicanism was ubiquitous in every state in both the Rim South and the Deep South.

The growth in Southern Republicanism was matched by a similar growth in the mobilization of the black population. In 1960, fewer than 30 percent of voting age African Americans in the South had registered to vote. By 2008, nearly three-quarters of all voting-age African American Southerners had registered to vote. Although there is evidence that black mobilization was growing before the passage of the VRA in 1965 (see Timpona 1995), there is little question that the VRA provided the impetus for this broad and dramatic increase in voter registration.

The mobilization of the African American population was a regionwide phenomenon in the South over the past half-century, but as we showed in chapter 8, the extent of black mobilization was not uniform across states and counties. The data clearly indicate that some areas experienced significantly greater mobilization than others. It is also apparent that mobilization occurred more rapidly in some areas than in others. The areas with the largest increase in mobilization, however, were not often the same areas in which mobilization increased most rapidly.

As the existing literature would suggest, we see that black mobilization spiked with significant political events, such as the Jackson campaign in 1984 and the Obama campaign and election in 2008. But other patterns in black mobilization are not easily explained by existing research. In chapter 8, we highlighted the fact that we find no evidence of a positive relationship between income and black mobilization at either the state or the substate level. There is little reason to think that the particular type of political participation on which we focus—registering to vote—is likely to be primarily a function of black empowerment, another important aspect of the research on black political participation.

The theory of *relative advantage* outlined in chapter 3 helps us understand this dramatic Southern transformation. It also provides a logic that highlights the intersection of the two pillars of the disintegration of the “Solid South”—the mobilization of African Americans and the growth of the GOP. As African Americans flowed into the electorate (and overwhelmingly the Democratic Party), white conservatives bolted for the Republican Party. Although the competitiveness of the Southern Republicans and the organizational strength of the Republican Party in the South had an independent impact on subsequent GOP growth, we saw a strong relationship between black electoral strength and GOP growth even when accounting for variation

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in the strength of other factors. In chapter 4, we illustrated the dynamics of relative advantage with detailed case studies and a wealth of archival data.

We saw this dynamic in patterns of GOP growth clearly and consistently at the state level (in chapter 5) and at the county/parish level (in chapter 6). Somewhat surprisingly given the limitations of the data, we also found evidence of this dynamic at the individual level (although this effect was mediated). We also found that the mobilization of the African American electorate had a substantial effect on GOP growth in the face of controls for other traditional explanations, such as income growth, in-migration, and evangelicalism. Simply put, we found, as the theory of relative advantage predicted, that the growth of Southern Republicanism was *primarily* driven by racial dynamics, not class, demographic factors, or religion, as others have suggested. Though we are suggesting a distinctive dynamic, in this important respect our work mirrors Key's (1949) seminal text on Southern politics. At the midpoint of the last century, according to Key, Southern politics revolved around the issue of race. Southern politics in the early twenty-first century still revolves around the issue of race.

Much of the recent research on Southern politics—Lublin (2004) and Shafer and Johnston (2004, 2006) are prominent examples—argues that the role of race in modern Southern politics has been overemphasized and that the key to understanding the postwar partisan transformation in the South is class conflict driven by economic growth. We are not arguing that the economic transformation of the South did not play a role in the development of the Republican Party in the region, but it is not the key aspect of—or the primary mover behind—the growth of the Southern wing of the GOP. To understand the temporal and spatial dynamics of GOP growth in the region, we would argue that one must understand the politics of race. Stated succinctly, the partisan and political transformation of the South over the past half-century has, most centrally, revolved around the issue of race.

But is it possible that this racial dynamic has played itself out? If we are correct about the political dynamics that have gotten us to this point, then we may be very near the high-water mark of Southern Republicanism. Based on our analysis, the primary impetus for the growth of the Southern wing of the GOP was the increasing electoral strength of the African American population. A significant increase in black electoral strength would require one of the following: (1) a sizeable jump in the mobilization rate of the existing African American population, (2) a large increase in the relative size of the African American population, or (3) some non-trivial increase in *both* mobilization rates and population among African Americans.