

Supplemental Report

Dr. Kari Frederickson

July 25, 2024

This supplemental report provides my responses and opinions regarding the June 27, 2024, report submitted by Dr. Adam Carrington.

My concerns about his report can be summarized as follows:

1. He mischaracterizes my argument (and that of much of the scholarship on the political transformation of the South) by stating that I claim the transformation happened quickly and completely. Much of his report is a response to an argument I did not make and which most historians of southern politics do not make.
2. In order to make an argument that downplays the role of race in the post-1965 political landscape, he erases race from Alabama history almost entirely.
3. He makes a number of factual errors as well as errors of omission with regard to Alabama political history. Dr. Carrington is a political scientist whose scholarship focuses on nineteenth century legal history. He is not a recognized scholar of post-Civil War southern or Alabama history.
4. He ignores the political impact of George Wallace, both in the 1968 election and in Alabama political history generally.
5. He identifies a number of factors that he claims explain white voters' turn towards the Republican Party in 1980 and after but ignores the role of race embedded in these issues.

I. Mischaracterization of My Original Argument:

Dr. Carrington sets up his report with a simplistic and inaccurate summary of my report and much of the mainstream of historical scholarship on the issue of political transformation. He writes: "The end of legal segregation and the gains made by the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s caused racially-focused Democrats to abandon the party of Jefferson Davis. They then moved to the Republican camp because the GOP, no longer the party of Lincoln, had adopted the race-conscious, even white-supremacist views once the commitment of the Democratic Party. In short: the two parties switched and Southern whites, unchanged in their views, switched parties in response."¹ He states elsewhere that "[R]ace of course came to the forefront in the 1960s in a

¹ Adam M. Carrington, Report, June 27, 2024, p. 1. Calling the Democratic Party the "party of Jefferson Davis" is peculiar and unnecessarily inflammatory. Certainly historical figures never characterized the party in this fashion, preferring instead to identify Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson as the party's founders. The annual Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, typically held in early spring, was an annual fundraising event for Democratic Party officials. Davis was indeed a Democrat but had no discernible impact on party ideology. Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 80-81.

way that severely tested the Democratic New Deal coalition [but] did not produce *an immediate move* (emphasis mine) to the Republican Party of any durability.”² Neither I nor the preponderance of scholars of southern politics who look at the issue of race argue that the transition was immediate.³ His report seeks to disprove this faulty premise which, because it is so reductive and simplistic, relieves him of the responsibility of examining the deep historical and cultural complexity of Democratic Party allegiance stretching back to the nineteenth century. The entire transition took decades, although watershed moments, such as the elections of 1964 and 1980, exist. A complete rendering of the transition needs to take into account the political power of southern Democrats in Congress, the differences between southern Democrats and the national Democratic Party, as well as the adoption of key cultural symbols of historic importance by the Republican Party, all of which I address in my original report. In the state of Alabama specifically, this process of Republican resurgence had to grapple with the outsized presence of George Wallace, something Dr. Carrington does not discuss.

His mischaracterization of my argument also involves his careless use of terminology. In particular, he attributes to me the use of the term “white supremacy” or “white supremacist” in a way that is ahistorical and which I do not use in my report beyond a discussion of the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948. As Jason Morgan Ward has argued, overt defense of “white supremacy” per se receded around mid century to be replaced by a defense of segregation, and later by racialized (though not explicitly “white supremacist”) policy positions and politics. To attribute to me the charge that Nixon, for example, was a “white supremacist” or that the post-1964 Republican Party became the party of “white supremacy” grossly misrepresents both my argument and history of racialized political language and policies.⁴

II. Racial Erasure and Errors of Fact

Throughout his report, even when discussing historical points supposedly not in dispute in this case, Dr. Carrington downplays the significance or even the existence of racialized politics altogether. The result is an inaccurate representation of historical events and of the history of the Democratic Party in the South. Removing race from earlier political developments allows him to ignore its role in the political transformation of Alabama and the South in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Allow me to provide a few examples:

² Carrington, Report, p. 29.

³ I address the origins of this slow transition in my book *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). For support of this argument within the scholarship on southern politics see, among many others, Earl and Merle Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002); James M. Glaser, *Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

⁴ See, for example, Carrington, Report, p. 19. Jason Morgan Ward, *Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936 – 1965* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

The Republican Party During Reconstruction and in the Later Nineteenth Century: About this incredibly contentious and revolutionary moment in American history, Dr. Carrington writes that “Some attempts (emphasis mine) were made during Reconstruction to make the GOP competitive in the South but such efforts failed, especially once federal troops were withdrawn.”⁵ First, the wording of this is peculiar. Characterizing the creation of the biracial Republican coalitions in the southern states as merely “some attempts” mischaracterizes the extent of as well as the revolutionary nature of the Republican party’s biracial coalition of freedmen, white southerners, and white newcomers in Alabama and across the South. Republicans – Black and white -- were elected to local, state, and national offices. This coalition was responsible for repealing the onerous Black Codes and for ratifying the 14th and 15th amendments. Although they never dominated the Republican Party, Black Republicans continued to be elected to public office in the 1880s and 1890s.⁶ The “attempts” actually were quite successful. Second, Dr. Carrington’s representation of the connection between federal troops and Republican Party viability is misleading, implying that Republican viability was only possible with federal protection. The truth is that the number of federal troops in the South during Reconstruction was never sufficient to keep domestic order. White and Black Republicans participated in politics at great physical peril at all times, even while the region was under Union occupation. Republican Party coalitions were regarded by white Democrats as illegitimate from the moment they were created. Most historians would argue that the failure of the Republican Party – a biracial coalition – to remain competitive was due to unrelenting violence from white Democrats – violence that occurred while US troops remained in the South. Dr. Carrington’s interpretation downplays Black political agency, the existence of biracial political coalitions, and the relentless use of white terror that cast a long shadow over Alabama and southern politics.⁷

Dr. Carrington further chalks up the lack of Republican inroads in the South in the latter part of the nineteenth century to the region’s traditional culture, agricultural economy, and the fact that [white] southerners were “embittered by the memory of the Civil War.”⁸ This simply is incorrect. Most, but not all, white southerners despised the Republican Party because of the revolutionary changes wrought by Reconstruction as well as continued Republican Party support for voting rights protection such as that offered by the Federal Elections Bill of 1890, also known as the Lodge Bill. As the national party turned its focus to economic matters such as tariffs and to the

⁵ Carrington, Report, p. 8.

⁶ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Civil War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1988); Steven Hahn, *A Nation Under our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003); *Black Americans in Congress, 1870 – 2007* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008).

⁷ For white violence in Alabama during Reconstruction and the political aftermath, see Jefferson Cowie, *Freedom’s Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2022), chapters 9 and 10. For white violence during Reconstruction elsewhere in the South, see Stephen V. Ash, *A Massacre in Memphis: The Race Riot That Shook the Nation One Year After the Civil War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013); LeeAnn Keith, *The Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Richard Zuczek, *State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009).

⁸ Carrington, Report, p.24.

concerns of industrial America, it all but abandoned its earlier determination to protect the rights of Black southern voters.⁹

The Progressive Era: Dr. Carrington incorrectly states that the Progressive Movement made “little inroads in its southern portion.”¹⁰ This statement is simply wrong and demonstrates not only a lack of understanding of Alabama politics and social movements, but also again serves as a thinly veiled attempt to erase race from Alabama politics entirely. The racial disfranchisement campaigns in Alabama and across the South were promoted as a type of Progressive reform. With Black men removed from the electorate, white men were free from the necessity to commit fraud and could safely disagree on the issues without worrying about who controlled the so-called “negro block vote.”¹¹ Two of the most consequential pieces of legislation passed by Congress during what is identified as the Progressive Era – the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the Federal Road Aid Act (until the New Deal, this program resulted in the greatest transfer of federal dollars to the states) -- were authored by Congressman Henry Clayton and Senator John Bankhead respectively, both from Alabama. Alabama congressman Richmond Hobson was a leading voice on prohibition and fought long and hard for what eventually became the 18th Amendment.¹² This movement had strong support among the state’s Black and white citizens, particularly evangelical Christians. The most significant Progressive Era reform, the passage of the 19th Amendment, though not ratified by the Alabama state legislature, received strong support from Hobson who by that time was out of office. Although Alabama suffragists fought hard for ratification, they were no match for the Anti-Suffragists, who lobbied state legislators and warned that ratification of the amendment would open the voting booth to Black women and thus serve as a backdoor assault on white supremacy.¹³

Alabama was a site of fervent Progressive reform. Many of the social and political reforms undertaken were driven or warped by the desire to maintain white supremacy, but they were considered “progressive” nevertheless.

New Deal Coalition: Dr. Carrington’s incomplete description of the New Deal coalition and how it functioned likewise ignores racial complexity and plants the seeds for his later class-based explanation for why the Democratic Party fractured in the late 1960s. He is correct in pointing out that by the mid 1930s, the Democratic Party became a broad coalition in which southern white Democrats and African Americans (where they could access the vote) participated, and that New Deal policies were primarily economic in focus. These two groups were far from equal partners in this coalition, however. Southern Democrats in Congress had a significant hand in the design and passage of New Deal programs. As a result of southern political power, Blacks

⁹For the national Republican Party’s abandonment of Black voters in the South, see Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

¹⁰ Carrington, Report, p. 24.

¹¹ R. Volney Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890-1908* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); William A. Link, *The Paradox of Southern Progressivism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

¹² Kari Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022), Chapter 6. Hobson was the first congressman to introduce the amendment, which he did in 1911.

¹³ Elna C. Green, *Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 107-9.

received fewer benefits than whites (especially from programs administered at the local level) and were often left out of certain programs and protections altogether. Many popular New Deal reforms and programs were firmly locked within what political scientist Ira Katznelson calls the “southern cage.” The greatest beneficiaries of the New Deal were working class whites. The national Democratic Party’s willingness to accept racial discrimination in New Deal programs and legislation was essential for keeping this coalition together in the 1930s and 1940s.¹⁴ Why would African Americans (those who could vote) support a president and a party that so clearly was discriminatory in its programs? Black voters have never been able to afford the luxury of ideological purity (if they wanted to exercise their citizenship rights), so pragmatism was the order the day. What Black Americans received from the New Deal, however limited, was far more than they had received from any Republican administration since Reconstruction.

These three examples contradict Dr. Carrington’s dismissal of the role of race in critical moments in southern and Alabama history, as well as his general lack of understanding of Alabama history.

III. Cracks in the Democratic Party Coalition: The Role of George Wallace

Unwilling to see race anywhere in southern politics, Dr. Carrington carries this interpretation forward in attempting to explain post-1964 political change, starting with the 1968 election and changes within the Democratic Party coalition. He credits a relatively small, fractious group of left-wing intellectuals for fomenting the 1968 fracture. Dr. Carrington argues that these intellectuals drove working-class white voters out of the Democratic Party beginning in 1968 by accusing them of racism and equating them with oppressors. This interpretation simply is not supported by the facts, nor by the scholarship. Organized labor – the loudest voice of the working class, with its strong anticommunist bent and support for continuation of Lyndon Johnson’s policy in Vietnam -- remained the most powerful member of the Democratic Party coalition; the notion that labor in 1968 was cowed by a rag-tag group of leftwing intellectuals is false. Democratic Party nominee Hubert Humphrey had a strong voting record on labor issues, as did the 1972 nominee, Senator George McGovern. Any conflict between the Democratic Party nominees and white working-class voters was not based on any lack of support for working-class issues.

The biggest electoral challenge in 1968 to the Democratic Party coalition came from George Wallace, candidate of the American Independent Party, not from left-wing intellectuals. Wallace peeled off racially conservative southern voters and won five southern states in 1968, states that quite possibly would have gone to Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Just as important, though, Wallace’s appeal reached beyond the South to white working-class constituencies in the Midwest. Organized labor’s last-minute campaigning for Humphrey clawed back much of that early support by illustrating Wallace’s poor record on labor issues.¹⁵ Wallace’s appeals to white working-class grievance – both racial and to a lesser degree opposition to perceived elitism of

¹⁴ For the role of southern lawmakers in the crafting of New Deal legislation, see Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (New York: Liveright, 2013); and Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty*, chapters 9-11.

¹⁵ Luke Nichter, *The Year that Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023).

anti-war protestors – helped further the transition of many white voters (North and South) away from the Democratic Party in presidential elections. Although the numerous groups that made up the New Left coalition would eventually help shape the Democratic Party agenda after 1968, the first major fracture with electoral impact at the presidential level came about as a result of civil rights legislation and George Wallace's third-party candidacy.

George Wallace was *the* most consequential politician in Alabama in the second half of the twentieth century. His impact resonated beyond this single state and had a profound impact on politics in the latter half of the twentieth century.¹⁶ His 1968 presidential run, though not successful, introduced the rhetoric of anti-elitism and hostility to federal power (mostly as it applied to school integration and fair housing legislation) as the new language of racial grievance, a rhetoric that was adopted by conservative politicians across the country. Wallace dominated Alabama politics for roughly three decades, and any attempt to discuss the history of political parties in the state and region must take his influence into account. With the exception a few mentions specifically tied to the 1968 election, George Wallace appears nowhere in Dr. Carrington's report.

IV. Economic, Cultural, and Foreign Policy Issues and their Role in the Growth of the Republican Party in the South

Dr. Carrington holds that white southern voters gravitated to the Republican Party because of its position on economic and cultural/religious issues, as well as the staunch anticommunist foreign policy positions of Republican candidates. His discussion of the impact of free trade ideology, strident anticommunism (as enunciated by Republican candidate-then-president Ronald Reagan), and the role of politicized evangelicals at times is inaccurate and lacks evidence.

1. Anticommunism:

His analysis of white southerners' staunch anticommunism as a reason for their Republican Party allegiance is superficial, narrowly defined, and without grounding in critical historical events. He argues that anticommunism exists only in the very limited space of international Cold War fears, and that anticommunism as a position applies strictly to foreign policy. He grounds white southerners' anticommunism in their religiosity but very quickly dismisses the long history of the linkage between race and anticommunism -- a history that stretches back to 1919. This linkage and its long, tortured history are fundamental to an understanding of how white southerners understood the term "anticommunism."¹⁷

White southerners declared any challenge to the social order -- particularly, but not exclusively, the campaign for civil rights and protections for labor -- as "communist." A history exists of communists fighting for racial equality and workers' rights in Alabama. In the 1930s, the

¹⁶ Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Dan T. Carter, *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999).

¹⁷ See Timothy Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); George Lewis, *The White South and the Red Menace: Segregation, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004).

Communist Party organized Black sharecroppers into a union and staged strikes on thirty-five plantations across seven Black Belt counties in 1935. Although concessions were won in several counties, ultimately the strike and the union were destroyed by violence from landowners and law enforcement.¹⁸ More famously, lawyers with the Communist Party's International Defense Fund defended the Scottsboro Boys -- nine Black teenagers wrongfully accused of raping two white women. This incident of racial injustice received international attention. That communists would provide a legal defense for Black teenagers accused of the most heinous (in the eyes of white southerners) of crimes -- interracial rape -- cemented their place as one of the greatest threats to the southern social order.¹⁹ From the 1930s forward, then, the term "communist" was associated with any entity that appeared to threaten the region's racial or industrial status quo. At times, that entity was the federal government, the civil rights movement, the labor movement, or even the Supreme Court. So when Republican politicians such as Ronald Reagan promoted themselves as staunch anticommunists, that position had a historical resonance for white southerners that was grounded in ideas about race.

The conflation of communism with "anything that threatens the conservative social order" continues to this day. Within the past year, U.S. Senator from Alabama Tommy Tuberville grounded his fight to put a hold on military promotions until the military changed its policy regarding access to reproductive care for female servicemembers in the notion that providing abortion access to female soldiers was "communistic."²⁰ The senator's use of the term is completely divorced from any foreign policy position but rather is tied to his conservative social and cultural views. This conflation has a long history that Dr. Carrington conveniently ignores but which has powerful meaning nevertheless.

2. The Role of Class and Reagan's Economic Policy

Dr. Carrington argues that the Republican Party's economic philosophy (especially as introduced and articulated by Republican president Ronald Reagan) was the primary force behind white southerners' migration to the Republican Party. He argues that Reagan's free market orientation and tax cuts fostered economic growth, in particular white-collar jobs in southern metropolitan and suburban areas. This growth, he holds, fueled the Republican Party's resurgence in the South.

Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence from Alabama as to how Reagan's policies were received, or any evidence as to how his policies drove growth and thus political change. What we do know is that southern members of Congress were lukewarm towards Reagan's free-market ideology and possessed a decidedly different economic perspective than did the Republican president. Despite generations of overt antagonism towards federal power, southern leaders were prepared to scale back government only when it did not have a negative impact on important regional industries. Southern lawmakers were hostile to Reagan's attack on price supports for farmers, and white rural voters recoiled at the president's attack on rural electric cooperatives.

¹⁸ Robin D. G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1990).

¹⁹ James Goodman, *Stories of Scottsboro* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).

²⁰ <https://www.msn.com/en-us/video/health/tuberville-on-military/vi-AA1ijEVu>

Ultimately, agricultural interests rejected and defeated Reagan's free-market ideology by maintaining supports programs for key southern commodities, severely inhibiting Reagan's plan for a free market in agriculture. Free trade was also detrimental to the textile industry, which by 1980 was the largest industrial employer in Alabama. The industry was struggling against cheaper imports from Asia. Although Reagan initially promised to protect textiles (contradicting his own policy), he reneged, refusing to sign a bill protecting the industry, much to the chagrin of Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton and others. Alabama lawmakers were more in line with Reagan's plan to cut social spending and, to a lesser degree, to cut taxes.²¹

As far as metropolitan growth goes, Birmingham and Huntsville seem to contradict Dr. Carrington's argument that such growth was tied in with Reagan's anti-statist free market ideology. Economic growth in Huntsville was driven by defense spending and access to cheap TVA power. In Birmingham, economic vitality was linked to the University of Alabama at Birmingham. In addition, long-term, concerted efforts by numerous stakeholders in those communities to attract businesses through multi-pronged economic recruitment strategies contributed mightily to their growth.²²

3. Religiosity, Abortion, and Sexuality

Dr. Carrington argues that white southerners' religious beliefs, expressed politically in their opposition to abortion and to LGBTQ+ rights, likewise drove white southern voters toward the Republican Party, whose stance on those issues they found more congenial. He further states that these issues are wholly divorced from race. His framing of these issues and their adoption by the Republican Party again ignores the role of race. He also disregards the role played by the women's liberation movement. Race occupies a prominent place in the history of southern white evangelical Christians and their particular worldview; furthermore, prominent Christian leaders and politicians who opposed abortion and gay rights, like Jerry Falwell Sr., founder of the organization Moral Majority, and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, had sustained records of opposing civil rights advances (e.g. slow-walking desegregation at the University of North Carolina and Bob Jones University's fight to maintain racially discriminatory practices). The connection to race is found in the broader conversation regarding rights, specifically the rights demanded by women and the rights demanded by LGBTQ+ individuals. The connection to race lies not only in the actions of individuals like Falwell and Helms, but in white evangelicals' particular conceptual world.

Historian Glenn Feldman, one of the foremost experts on the history of Alabama politics in the twentieth century, notes that "politics, morality, and race...have a long history of interconnectedness and overlap in southern mind, manners, and sensibilities – an indelible

²¹ Jonathan Bartho: *Whistling Dixie: Ronald Reagan, the White South, and the Transformation of the Republican Party* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2024)

²² Matthew L. Downs, *Transforming the South: Federal Development in the Tennessee Valley, 1915-1960* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014); Wayne Flynt, *Alabama in the Twentieth Century* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 164-65.

relationship that resonates strongly into the present.”²³ The practice of racial segregation was supported by southern religious leaders and laypeople. According to historian Fred Bailey, southern Baptists and other white clergy “gave the sanction of religion to a society in which white men of substance were born to rule, lesser whites to follow, and blacks to obey.” The relegation of Blacks to an inferior social status was required in “a virtuous Christian society.”²⁴ This imagined virtuous Christian society was a patriarchal one of order based on rigid and interlocking racial and gender hierarchies in which white women and all Black people were subservient to white men.

The Civil Rights Movement profoundly threatened the southern social order, and white evangelicals marshalled religion in defense of segregation as the movement accelerated. In Alabama specifically, site of critical victories for the cause of racial equality, ministers and laypeople invoked religion in defense of racial segregation. Historian Paul Harvey writes that ministers such as Henry L. Lyon of Birmingham “defended segregation as positively God-ordained. In ‘Why Racial Integration is UnChristian,’ an address he delivered often, he argued that ‘separation of the races is the commandment and law of God.’”²⁵ The *Alabama Baptist* printed the opinion of the Reverend J.M. Drummond, who claimed that “integration is nothing but Communism, and it is strictly against God’s Holy Word.”²⁶

Ultimately, white southerners lost the fight to maintain segregation. But the anger of conservative evangelicals with the relatively moderate position on desegregation enunciated by their national organizations led conservatives to organize. Beginning in the 1970s, conservatives in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) staged a rout of moderates and assumed control over the convention’s numerous agencies and its significant budget.²⁷

Conservative Christians found their next fight in the expanding women’s liberation movement, which involved not only the right to terminate a pregnancy but also the fight for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Anti-feminists, especially those who considered themselves part of the Christian Right, labeled ERA supporters and pro-choice activists as anti-family and worse. Dr. Carrington ignores the role of the expanding women’s liberation movement and the reactionary anti-feminism that sought to thwart it as key elements in the Republican Party’s agenda beginning in 1980. Just as the women’s liberation movement (and the broader rights revolution) drew strength and momentum from the Civil Rights Movement, the expanding rights terrain precipitated a shift in focus for religious conservatives, who recoiled at the challenges feminists posed to traditional gender roles.²⁸ Religious conservatives lost much of the traditional

²³ Glenn Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2005), 3.

²⁴ Fred Bailey, “That Which God Hath Put Asunder: White Baptists, Black Aliens, and the Southern Social Order, 1890-1920,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 12, 27.

²⁵ Paul Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South, 1945-1990,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 106.

²⁶ Mark Newman, *Getting Right with God: Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-1999* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 58.

²⁷ Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South,” 101.

²⁸ Robert Self, *All in the Family: Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012).

theological undergirding for their race politics, but they found new inspiration in the defense of traditional gender roles. In the process, the conservatives jettisoned the familiar arguments for racial hierarchy, replacing these now-discredited views with a renewed and updated defense of gendered hierarchies. This rejection of feminism and reproductive choice was embraced by the Republican Party beginning in the 1980s.

Summary

Racial politics has a long history in the United States, the American South, and in Alabama. For the first half of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party's dominance in the one-party South was dependent on its defense of white supremacy. White voters' allegiance to the Democratic Party was deeply engrained in southern culture, and breaking that allegiance took time. For much of the twentieth century, the Republican Party in the South was not competitive; the Great Depression relegated the Republican Party nationally to minority status. My original report argued that, in order to become competitive, the Republican Party made a deliberate decision to court southern white voters, both through its policy positions and through its adoption of historical cultural symbols. This decision paid off to the point where the party's continued growth relied on winning white majorities in the southern states. In Alabama, the political parties are racially polarized. While the overt racism of the past no longer animates Alabama politics, I agree with political scientist David A. Hughes, who writes that "the politics of race...are never far from the surface."²⁹

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 25th day of July 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.



Kari Frederickson, Ph.D.

²⁹ David A. Hughes, "Alabama: Polarized and Uncompetitive," in Charles S. Bullock and Mark Rozell, eds., *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), 284.