## IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNIY, FLORIDA

BLACK VOTERS MATTER CAPACITY
BUILDING INSTITUIE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
vS.
CASE NO. 2022 CA 000666
CORD BYRD, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(FINAL TRIAL ON THE ISSUES)

DATE TAKEN: August 24, 2023
TIME: 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
PLACE: Leon County Courthouse 301 South Monroe Street, Room 3G Tallahassee, Florida 32301

BEFORE: J. LEE MARSH CIRCUIT JUDGE

This cause came on to be heard at the time and place aforesaid, when and where the following proceedings were stenographically reported by:

SANDRA L. NARGIZ, RPR, CM, CRR, CRC, CCR

## APPEARANCES:

ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS BLACK VOTERS MATTER, et al.:

ELIAS IAN GROUP, LTP
10 G Street NE
Washington, DC 20002
202.968.4490

BY: ABHA KHANNA, ESQUIRE
akhanna@elias.law
BY: CHRISTINA FORD, ESQUIRE
cford@elias.law
BY: JYOTI JASRASARIA, ESQUIRE
jjasrasaria@elias.law

KING BLACKWELL ZEHNDER \& WERMUTH
25 E. Pine Street
Orlando, FL 32802
407.422.2472

BY: FREDERICK WERMUTH, ESQUIRE
fwermuth@kbzwlaw.com

ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT SECRETARY OF STATE:
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN TORCHINSKY \& JOSEFIAK
119 South Monroe Street, \#500
Tallahassee, FL 32301
850.508 .7775

BY: MOHAMMAD O. JAZIL, ESQUIRE
mjazil@holtzmanvogel.com
BY: MICHAEL ROBERT BEATO, ESQUIRE
mbeato@holtzmanvogel.com
BY: JOSHUA E. PRATT, ESQUIRE
jpratt@holtzmanvogel.com

## APPEARANCES: (Continued.)

ON BEHALF OF THE DEEENDANT FLORIDA SENATE:

## SHUTTS AND BOWEN

215 S. Monroe Street, \#800
Tallahassee, FL 32301
850.241 .1717

BY: DANIEL E. NORDBY, ESQUIRE
dnordby@shutts.com

ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

GRAY|ROBINSON
301 S. Bronough Street, \#600
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
850.577 .9090

BY: ANDY BARDOS, ESQUIRE
andy.bardos@gray-robinson.com

ALSO PRESENT:
Carlos Rey, Florida Senate Kyle Gray, Florida Senate
Deputy Secretary Brad McVay, Secretary of State

I N D E X

LEGAL ARGUMENT by Ms. Khanna 7

IEGAL ARGUMENT by Mr. Jazil 35

IEGAL ARGUMENT by Mr. Bardos 85
LEGAL ARGUMENT by Mr. Nordby 146
REBUTTAL LEGAL ARGUMENT by Ms. Khanna
176

$$
\text { CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER } 205
$$

The following proceedings began at 9:00 a.m.
THE COURT: We'll go ahead and go on the record.

Good morning. We're here today in the Leon County Case 2022-CA-666, Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Incorporated, and others, versus Cord Byrd in his official capacity as the Florida Secretary of State, and others.

We're here today for final trial on the issues. Now, that being said, on the 11th of August 2023, the parties entered into a joint stipulation to narrow the issues for resolution, thereby replacing our two-week nonjury trial with legal argument today. The parties have made a number of factual stipulations, and the like, and they'll obviously talk about those a little more as we proceed. But it is the parties' belief that that will leave the remaining issues to be -legal issues to be decided by this Court.

Then, to the extent there are some other agreements, the enforceability of which is not in front of this Court, and we'll deal with that when need to or the appropriate entities
will, but they've agreed to some certain flow paths after this Court enters a ruling whenever that may be.

So without further ado, I'll let the parties announce their appearances today, and then we'll proceed, but I'll let them announce that for the record first.

MS. KHANNA: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank You. Abha Khanna on behalf of the plaintiffs. With me at counsel table are Christina Ford, Jyoti Jasrasaria, and Fritz Wermuth.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Counsel.
MR. JAZIL: Good morning, Your Honor. Mohammad Jazil on behalf of Secretary Byrd. With me are Michael Beato and Joshua Pratt, also on behalf of Secretary Byrd, and Deputy Secretary McVay.

MR. BARDOS: Your Honor, thank you. Andy Bardos with the GrayRobinson law firm on behalf of the Florida House of Representatives.

MR. NORDBY: Good morning, Your Honor. Daniel Nordby from Schutts and Bowen on behalf of the Florida Senate. With me are Kyle Gray and Carlos Rey, in-house counsel for the

Florida Senate.
THE COURT: All right. And with that, Ms. Khanna.

MS. KHANNA: Thank you. I believe we are waiting for one question on the tech. I will need the screen.

And with Your Honor's permission, I will be using a PowerPoint during the presentation. We have a copy in front of you, we'll have a copy for defendants' counsel as well.

THE COURT: All right. I've got both a paper copy and then I've got right here on this video screen.

MS. KHANNA: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honor.

May it please the Court, Abha Khanna on behalf of the plaintiffs.

This is a case about the Florida Constitution. In 2010, an overwhelming majority of Floridians voted to adopt the Fair District Amendments to the Florida Constitution. Pursuant to those amendments, Article III, Section $20(a)$, specifically prohibits redistricting plans drawn with the intent or the result of diminishing the ability
of racial minorities to elect representatives of their choice.

Plaintiffs claims that the Congressional map passed by the Florida legislature and signed into law by Governor DeSantis violates the nondiminishment provision of the Florida Constitution by eliminating the ability of Black voters to elect a representative of their choice in North Florida.

The facts relevant to plaintiffs' diminishment claim are not in dispute. Defendants have stipulated that plaintiffs have standing to bring their claim. Defendants have stipulated that Black voters in North Florida had the ability to elect their candidate of choice under the preexisting map in Benchmark CD-5. And defendants have stipulated that the Enacted Map eliminates the ability of Black voters in North Florida to elect their candidates of choice.

These facts, Your Honor, track precisely the elements of a diminishment claim under the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court has required nothing more and nothing less.

Now, in his initial brief, the Secretary tried to suggest that this Court could interpret the nondiminishment provision to add an extra threshold, a 50 percent Black voting age population requirement, before the nondiminishment provision is even triggered. But defendants have since run away from any such argument. And that's for good reason. It is simply false.

The Florida Supreme Court and the Florida legislature have disavowed any such standard. In fact, in asking the Florida Supreme Court whether its nondiminishment precedent would apply to North Florida even without a majority Black population, even Governor DeSantis had to acknowledge that the answer is yes. As a result, under the governing legal standard, plaintiffs have proven their diminishment claim.

Now, defendants don't really argue otherwise. Instead, rather than defend the Enacted Map under the legal standard established by the Florida Supreme Court, they seek to upend that standard altogether, turning a straightforward claim by Florida voters
against Florida officials for violating the Florida Constitution into an affirmative assault on the constitution itself by those same state officials.

This Court should have none of it. Defendants' dispute is not with plaintiffs, but with the Florida Supreme Court. And their argument boils down to little more than that the Florida Supreme Court got it wrong.

But that is not for this Court to decide. As far as this Court is concerned, the law is clear and binding, and the facts are undisputed. The Court should, therefore, enter a judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their diminishment claim in North Florida.

So the question remains what exactly are we arguing about today if the facts and the law about diminishment are now beyond dispute? As we've made clear in our briefs, defendants are here arguing an entirely different case, on an entirely different claim, about a very different map.

Defendants' story is that even though they have violated the Florida Constitution, to do otherwise would have required a racial
gerrymander in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Now, defendants' story moves us away from the diminishment standard under Florida law toward the racial gerrymandering standard under federal law.

So what is the racial gerrymandering standard? In order to establish a racial gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, the challenger must show that they have -- that they are challenging a specific electoral district, that they have standing to challenge that district based on their residence in the district, and that race predominated in configuration of those district lines. The defendants fall hopelessly short at every step and failure at any one of these steps dooms any racial gerrymandering claim.

Let's talk first about that first element, specific electoral district. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that racial gerrymandering claims must not be diffuse or hypothetical or even about maps as a whole. Instead, racial gerrymandering claims can only be brought against one or more specific
electoral districts. The basic unit of the racial gerrymandering inquiry is the district lines itself.

But what is the specific district being challenged here? Throughout the four briefs submitted by the defendants over the last couple of weeks, even they appear to be confused about this very basic question. At some point they seem to be challenging Benchmark District 5. But Benchmark CD-5 is not the law. None of these defendants actually objected to it when it was the law. And this Court has no basis or authority to strike down a district that no longer exists.

Now, at some points defendants seem to be challenging Plan 8015's CD-5, but that also is not the law. Governor DeSantis vetoed that district and that map.

Now, in their most recent brief, the legislature seems to be attacking, quote, the east-west district that plaintiffs seek.

THE COURT: Counsel, let me ask you -- and it's something I noticed, and eventually they'll have to answer this question, the legislature's brief, the Senate didn't have an
affirmative defense in this case that survived, did they?

MS. KHANNA: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So is this the House's brief?
MS. KHANNA: Correct, Your Honor. Only the House can be affirmative defense.

THE COURT: All right. Continue.
MS. KHANNA: Thank you, Your Honor.
In our most recent brief, the legislature seems to be attacking this east-west district that plaintiffs seek, but nowhere in count 1 of their complaint do plaintiffs seek a specific district.

Now, while in our summary judgment briefing we do point to CD-5 in Plan 8015 that the legislature actually passed as one example of a compliant map, at no point have plaintiffs said there is only one remedy to the diminishment violation.

And in his most recent brief, the Secretary seems to be challenging any Black performing district in North Florida. Now that refers to any number of unknown districts and would appear to include even CD-5 as drawn by the legislature in Plan 8019, which is entirely
contained in Duval County.
The Chair of the House Congressional Districting Conmittee asserted that the configuration of this district, although very visually different than the Benchmark District, is still a protected Black performing district. And these are just some examples of potential North Florida districts that could be at issue in a potential racial gerrymandering claim.

But in order for this Court to rule for defendants on their racial gerrymandering claim, Your Honor would have to be confident that every potential district that complies with the nondiminishment provision, including any number of districts not identified here, is necessarily a racial gerrymander, without knowing what the district actually looks like, who drew it and under what criteria.

At the end of the day, plaintiffs and the Court are left to guess what actual district defendants purport to be challenging as a racial gerrymander. And that is because the defendants' racial gerrymandering claim is shadowboxing against any number of hypothetical districts that simply are not before this

Court.
So defendants' racial gerrymandering claim fails at step one because it fails to challenge a specific electoral district. Now, based on that alone, their affirmative defense fails.

But even if they were challenging a specific district, they would still have to establish that they have standing to do so.

Now, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear who has standing to bring racial gerrymandering claims. And it is the individual voters who reside in the challenged district and who allege that they have been subject to the unlawful racial classification.

Defendants have provided no information whatsoever to establish their standing to even raise a racial gerrymandering claim, and that is hardly a surprise. The district or districts that they appear to be challenging don't actually exist, so nobody actually resides in them.

And defendants are not even here before the Court in their personal capacity as voters who they allege have been subject to some racial classification. They are here in their
official capacity as state officials. The only voters before this Court are among the plaintiffs, Black voters from North Florida who saw their ability to elect their preferred candidates eliminated under the Enacted Map in violation of their constitutional rights.

Now, this fact, the -- the fact that it is the defendants here who are -- who are here in their official capacity is also the reason why their racial gerrymandering defense is barred by the Florida -- by Florida's Public Official Standing Doctrine.

I know the Court has already heard argument and read extensive briefing on the Public Official Standing Doctrine. So with Your Honor's permission, I'll just highlight one key point here, although of course I'll be happy to answer any questions.

The doctrine was developed precisely to avoid what is happening in this case, for the political officials have highjacked or are highjacking the judicial process to preemptively nullify their own duties under Florida law by picking and choosing to comply only with the laws they like, while
disregarding the others. Florida's elected officials have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the laws and duties that they took an oath to uphold.

So whether under state law or federal law, defendants' racial gerrymandering claim fails for lack of standing to be asserted in the first place.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, though, Counsel, as it -- as it relates -- as it relates -- because it was a nonfinal order that the Court previously issued. As it relates to the Secretary of State, though, it's not saying I'm not going to follow the law. He says I am going to follow the law, he's saying duly enacted by the legislature. So -- and signed into law by the Governor.

So he's not -- he's saying I intend to follow the law. Isn't the -- isn't the official standing is that he can't say I'm not going to follow the law because the law is unconstitutional?

It's different than the legislature who is saying we're going to -- we're not going to go with this restriction that the people have put
on us in districting because it is unconstitutional.

The Secretary's argument is a little different. It's, I'm going to follow the law as passed, and so it's not challenging the action that is allegedly unconstitutional.

Talk to me about that distinction.
MS. KHANNA: Yes, Your Honor. And I think that -- so, yes, the Secretary has decided to follow the law as passed by the Florida House and Senate and enacted into law there. But in bringing the matter before this Court, the Secretary is challenging the law of Florida, is challenging the constitution that the Secretary took an oath to uphold, and is basically saying that any other law, any law that actually complies with the Florida Constitution is not one that the Secretary believes is one worth following, the Secretary believes is constitutional.

And the Public Official Standing Doctrine, and the principle that is meant to address these separation of powers concerns, that executive and legislative branches don't get to decide in advance what laws are constitutional
and what laws are not; that is solely the purview of the judiciary. And by very -- and by even bringing the claim, whether they were to raise it as a -- you know, as a lawsuit on their own or in their attempt to raise it as an affimative defense, they have no ability, no standing -- frankly, no juris -- the Court has no jurisdiction to hear their dispute with the Florida Constitution.

The First DCA has made clear that there's just no justiciable controversy there when it comes to public officials who take issue with their own constitutional duties. And that is the standing that the -- that's what the Secretary's offering here.

The Secretary, in fact, is leading the charge against the Florida Constitution and, as a legal matter, he and all the defendants, we believe, are precluded from that.

But even if we set aside the Public Official Standing Doctrine, there's no getting around the fact that the Racial Gerrymandering Doctrine requires -- says -- Black letter law -- you have to be an actual resident of the district you're challenging and you've got
to --
THE COURT: Do you have to be a voter or just a resident?

MS. KHANNA: I believe, in most cases, they are voters. Usually, if we're talking about the affected voters, I think sometimes you can be -- I actually don't know the distinction sitting here, Your Honor. But certainly you have to be a resident and you have to be a resident in your individual capacity who is then saying, I've been subject to a racial classification --

THE COURT: Does the case law say it has to be a resident in their individual capacity or can it be a -- because, you would agree, I mean, there's no issue with the Court noting that the House and the Senate and the Secretary of State, the offices all reside right here in Tallahassee, Florida, in the affected district here, correct?

MS. KHANNA: Well, I guess the question is --

THE COURT: Arguably -- well, I know the districts -- I get the district argument, but arguably in the affected North Florida, when
we're talking about -- this is about what has now been limited to plaintiffs' limited Count 1 in their amended complaint to North Florida. You would agree that the House, the Senate and the official office of the Secretary of State are in North Florida, Tallahassee in particular?

MS. KHANNA: Yes, Your Honor. And the case law does -- it does, indeed, talk about voters and individuals in their individual capacity as residents who they believe have been subject to a racial classification. And I don't -- I'm not aware of a single racial gerrymandering case that has ever been brought by a government entity because a government entity is not the one saying that you treated me as subject of my race and, therefore, I have a claim.

And, certainly, none of the defendants have put forward any facts, as would be their burden, to establish that they have that capacity here, and none of them have been sued in their individual capacities.

So, again, they're arguing a different case that's not even theirs to bring in the
first place.
So whether under a state law or federal
law the defendants' racial gerrymandering claim fails for lack of standing to even assert it in the first place -- again, on this basis alone -- their affirmative defense fails.

But even if they were challenging a specific district that they actually reside in, they would still have to establish that race predominated in the drawing of actual district lines.

Now, this is no easy feat. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, racial predominance is an intensely fact-based inquiry that relies on a host of factors. And the Court has made clear that it is not enough that race was one of the factors that informed the map.

In fact, just this summer, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its well-established distinction between race consciousness and racial predominance in a case called Allen v. Milligan out of Alabama, despite Governor DeSantis' prediction that the Court would eradicate that distinction in that case.

So again, the racial predominance inquiry is made all the more difficult here because of the guessing game that defendants are playing about what district is actually being challenged.

But for the present purposes, for the purposes of this presentation, Your Honor, we will assume that we're talking about CD-5 as drawn in Plan 8015, one of the plans actually passed by the legislature and the only potential remedy that the parties have even analyzed at this stage of the litigation.

Now, under the predominance inquiry, the Supreme Court has instructed that we examine a variety of race neutral objective criteria known as the traditional districting principles to determine if a district is unexplainable on grounds other than race. And an examination of those criteria here indicates that CD-5, as drawn in Plan 8015, falls squarely within the norm of Florida districts.

Now defendants' main gripe with this district is that they say it's over 150 miles long. But Florida is no stranger to long districts, particularly in the northern rural
parts of the state where many counties are sparsely populated.

In 2002, the Florida legislature drew CD-2 to span from Leon County to Duval County in a district that is not unlike CD-5. Defendants also complain about the size of CD-5's footprint. But CD-5 has a smaller footprint than at least six districts in the Enacted Map, several of which are two to three times larger in area.

Defendants also make much of the number of counties spanned and split by CD-5. But the Enacted Map passed by the legislature, signed by the Governor, includes several districts with similar county configurations. $C D-5$ is hardly an outlier. The same goes for the --

THE COURT: Counsel, I want to make sure the record is clear which CD-5 we're talking about. This is the CD-5, Plan 8015, not CD-5, the one that was the result of the last redistricting case that the Florida Supreme Court ultimately approved, correct?

MS. KHANNA: Yes, Your Honor. The statistics that I'm providing today are for the Plan 8015's CD-5 on the assumption that that is
perhaps one of the districts being challenged here.

So when it comes to county splits and county dis -- and the number of counties, it is hardly outlier.

And the same goes for city splits. It is well within the norm of enacted districts when it comes to how many cities it splits and, in fact, in some cases, the Enacted Map splits far more county -- far more cities.

Now, in fact, when we look at the actual lines of the district, it undermines any contention that they are only explainable by race.

Let's start from left to right on this map. These first two boundaries over here, these kind of squiggly lines, that is the Gadsden County line. Nearly all of the district then in Leon County coincides with major highways and interstates such as I-10. That is the line that's being followed.

Next, it follows to the T the Madison County line. Then it follows to the $T$ the Hamilton County line. Again, that curve is the county line.

Then it follows I-10 in Columbia, it proceeds to take all of Baker County, and then it follows the Duval County lines at the bottom and the top of the district, while the rest of the district primarily tracks major highways in Jacksonville.

In fact, Your Honor, CD-5 in Plan 8015 does better at adhering to political and geographic boundaries than all but one district, in the Enacted Map. With only 2 percent of its boundaries not following these established race-neutral lines.

The defendants also complain about the shape of the district in Jacksonville. Well, let's take a closer look at that.

This here on the left, this is the Benchmark District that was adopted and blessed by the Florida Supreme Court under the Florida Constitution last cycle.

This here in the middle is Plan 8015, which significantly smooths out the district lines to more closely follow the Duval County boundaries and major roadways in Jacksonville.

Indeed the legislature also drew Plan 8019 to track those boundaries even more closely.

Now, if that on the left was acceptable to the Florida Supreme Court under the compactness principle, surely these other two would have been as well.

In short, Your Honor, defendants tried to paint CD-5 as this monstrous district, this extreme outlier that defies all traditional criteria, but the facts tell a very different story. And, in fact, the law tells a different story as well.

The defendants are quick to parrot the language from U. S. Supreme Court racial gerrymandering cases, but these are the districts where the Court found race predominated in those cases.

Starting with North Carolina. The original Shaw District, CD- 12 is that shaded-in district right there (indicating), that kind of long and skinny district that snakes around to the -- from the middle of the state to the west.

As one legislator remarked, if you drove down the interstate with both car doors open in this district, you would kill almost all the people in the district. That is -- that is the
original racial gerrymander on what the whole doctrine is built on, that is the Shaw District.

I'd also like to take a look at CD-1 in this map. It's hard to tell because it's not shaded in, but CD-1 is over there in the northeast. And if you look closely, you'll see it has one, two, three, at least three, and maybe four tendrils that stick out in appendages that basically span the entire state from north to south.

This also was challenged as a racial gerrymander in this case, and the lower court found that race predominated in this district as well. But the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed that racial gerrymandering claim because none of the plaintiffs actually resided in that district.

Let's look at Bush v. Vera. These are the three Texas districts where the Court, U.S. Supreme Court found that race predominated. The Court found in these cases -- in these districts the candidates had to carry around a map when campaigning because the district boundaries changed from block to block and
voters had no idea what district they resided in, whether they were across the street from a neighbor who resided in an entirely different district. Those were the racial predominant districts at issue in Texas.

Let's go back to Louisiana. In Louisiana, looking at this black shaded district here, the federal court likened this District 4 to the mark of Zoro, slashing a jagged $Z$ across almost the entire statement.

Now, notably, the U.S. Supreme Court, once again, dismissed this racial gerrymandering claim for lack of standing because nobody, none of the plaintiffs, challenging the district actually resided in the district. That's in the U.S. v. Hays case.

Next, turn to Florida's map from the 1990s. The federal court found that race predominated in CD-3, that light blue district that forms that horseshoe across -- around CD-6, the court referred to this district as an elongated Rorschach inkblot that zigzags its way from Orlando to Jacksonville. Now CD-5, as drawn in Plan 8015, by contrast, comes nowhere close to the bizarre
districts struck down by these courts. As a result, even if this Court were to consider whether defendants have established that race predominated in a nonexistent district that they don't live in, the answer would be resoundingly no.

As a result, even defendants -- defendants attempt to piece together some racial gerrymandering claim out of plaintiffs' diminishment case fails literally every applicable legal standard.

And at bottom, Your Honor, the case that defendants want to argue before this Court that is their case against the Florida Constitution is built on a series of mischaracterizations, and misrepresentations about the law at issue.

To highlight just a few. Defendants mischaracterize the nondiminishment provision as a permanent entitlement, regardless of the size and geography of the minority population.

Not true. The test articulated by the Florida Supreme Court imposes clear limits on when and where a minority group is protected from diminishment. Specifically, only when they vote cohesively and only where they're
able to elect their preferred candidates in the Benchmark District.

Pursuant to these limiting principles, Your Honor, the Florida Supreme Court has rejected diminishment claims where the minority population is insufficiently cohesive. And just this cycle, the legislature itself determined that Congressional District 10, a previously protected district, is now exempt from coverage under the nondiminishment provision based on demographic changes.

The Secretary also misrepresents that the nondiminishment provision requires the state to hit a numerical racial target, a specific population percentage of Black voters.

Not true. The Florida Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain terms we reject any argument that the minority population percentage in each district is somehow fixed to an absolute number under Florida's minority protection provision.

In fact, it went on to explain that the reason it rejected any numerical racial target was specifically to avoid running the risk of permitting the legislature to engage in racial
gerrymandering in the name of nondiminishment.
The defendants further misrepresent that in the event that defendants could establish standing in a specific district, and racial predominance, that then plaintiffs would have to satisfy strict scrutiny under the racial gerrymandering standard.

Again, not true. Strict scrutiny is a legal standard that evaluates the constitutionality of state action. I'm not aware of a single case in Florida or federal law where private plaintiffs have had to bear the burden of strict scrutiny. And defendants' upside down burden shifting approach just illustrates how nonsensical their procedural posture is, trying to force plaintiffs to defend hypothetical districts that don't exist and that plaintiffs have no authority to enact into law.

Finally, defendants misrepresent that Florida does not have a race-based problem that needs to be resolved.

Not true. The record of racial discrimination in Florida voting systems, and in particular against Black voters in North

Florida, has been well documented in U. S. Supreme Court case law, in Florida Supreme Court case law, and in the 11th Circuit case law.

The defendants' willingness to shrug -shrug this off as a problem that's not compelling enough to solve is a stick in the eye of the Florida voters who enshrined this provision into their constitution to prevent their elected officials from ignoring and suppressing minority voting rights as had been the case for far too long.

These misrepresentations, Your Honor, tell an important story, the story that defendants need to sell this Court for their racial gerrymandering narrative to hold water. They need to make the nondiminishment provision into something it is not. They need to twist the plain language of Supreme Court precedent into something other than what it says; to prop up their claim that actually adhering to that provision and actually abiding by that precedent would violate federal law.

That story, Your Honor, is the only reason we are here continuing to argue this case even
after the only remaining claim is essentially undisputed.

But defendants' story, Your Honor, is just that. It is a story, with no basis in law or fact. It is a yarn that defendants are spinning in an effort to convince this Court to follow their lead and turn its back on the Florida Constitution, on the Florida voters who ratified this provision into their constitution, and on the Florida Supreme Court precedent interpreting that constitution.

This Court should reject defendants' narrative and enforce the law as written.

I'm happy to answer any other questions the Court has or, otherwise, I can wait for rebuttal as well.

THE COURT: Likely when we talk on the part of plaintiffs' comments.

MS. KHANNA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything for the defense?
Who's going to go first? I see Mr. Jazil here.
MR. JAZII: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor, with the Court's permission, I'll use an easel rather than the screen.

THE COURT: All right. I do like how
counsel had a backup plan as, obviously, you guys are well prepared. Technology always does what technology does or half the time it does what it does.

That will work just fine.
If we can either black out or kill the blue screen there so we're not projecting on. If you want to bring up your presentation, hit the B , and it will black it out.

MR. JAZIL: Thank you, Your Honor. And may it please the Court, Mo Jazil on behalf of Secretary Byrd.

Your Honor, this is the Enacted Plan. This is the plan the plaintiffs are challenging. In Count 1 of their complaint, the plaintiffs are asking for declaration from this Court saying that that Enacted Plan violates the Florida Constitution.

To get that declaration, what they need to show the Court, their burden as the plaintiffs, what they need to show the Court is that Article III, Section 20A, requires the creation of a Black performing district in North Florida and that the U.S. Constitution allows the creation of a --

THE COURT: How does -- where do you get that from the text that said you can't diminish? It doesn't say it requires creation. So talk to me about where in the text it says that.

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor. And that gets to a broader concern about what it is we're looking at.

To figure out how nondiminishment works, we first have to figure out where nondiminishment is applying. Right? What is the district to which we're applying nondiminishment? What is the district that Article III, 20A, is saying that cannot have the ability to elect a candidate of choice produced? That's this district, Your Honor, Benchmark CD-5.

So this is the district we're arguing about. This is the district the plaintiffs are saying the nondiminishment standard applies to; this is the district they're saying is the one that needs to be protected. That's the Benchmark District. That's the one that needs to be protected under the nondiminishment standard.

That's also the district their expert put forward the last redistricting cycle, that's the district in substantially the same form their expert put together in this redistricting cycle during the temporary injunction stage and the summary judgment stage. It's the only remedy that the parties could agree would be a viable way to comply with the Florida Constitution if it also complied with the Federal Constitution. It's the one that the plaintiffs said in their temporary injunction motion needed to be the remedy in substantially the same form.

And I'm quoting here from the plaintiffs' April 26th, 2022 filing, Your Honor, page 8: Until the very last moment, every single Congressional plan proposed by the House and Senate redistricting committees maintain the general configuration of Benchmark CD-5. Page 15, every -- every is emphasized in their filing -- every draft Congressional plan proposed and debated by the legislature until the very last one maintains the general configuration of Benchmark District 5. And most significantly, Your Honor, on
page 4 of that filing from the temporary injunction stage, this is what the plaintiffs say: The Court -- referring to the Florida Supreme Court -- ordered the legislature to redraw Congressional District 5 in this east-west manner, concluding that this configuration was the only alternative option that complied with the constitutional nondiminishment standard; the only alternative option, their words, not mine. The legislative record --

THE COURT: Was that option this map or east-west was the only one that complied?

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, it was an east-west configuration, is the only one that would comply.

And let's look, Your Honor, at what that east-west configuration would be like. And, for the record, Your Honor, the legislature confirmed during its various committees that the east-west configuration is really the only one that is workable.

Alex Kelly testified in front of the legislature, said he tried as well, the east-west configuration is the only way to
comply with the nondiminishment test.
This is a closeup of the east-west configuration, that is the Benchmark District, Your Honor. You'll note the odd shapes in Duval County, the odd shapes in Leon County. This is relying on the demographic information from the Florida redistricting website, a heat map showing where the Black population is in the very census blocks in the area. The dark green tells us that that is where the Black population is.

As you can see, Your Honor, with surgical precision, the Benchmark District captures Black population in Duval; with surgical precision, it captures the Black population in Leon.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Are you challenging the map that is -- was the law in the State of Florida? Are we looking back and you challenging what the Supreme Court did prior?

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, I am not. Here's what I am saying.

If we're going to go from an Enacted Plan that is race neutral to something else that
requires an east-west configuration that is compelled by the Florida Supreme Court, as they put it, how do we do that?

We do that by first saying that this is a benchmark to which the nondiminishment test applies, and this is a benchmark worth protecting.

How do you protect it? And that's what I'm trying to show, Your Honor, that the only way to protect it, the only viable option, in their words, is an east-west configuration that picks up the population centers, and the population centers, Your Honor, are in Duval and are in Leon.

MS. KHANNA: Your Honor, I just want to -for the record, I want to lodge our objection. We've made defendants aware we object to these heat maps as demonstratives. They are not anywhere in any of the exhibits. We are not aware of where they came from, who drew them. They are usually the subject of an expert report. That's not at issue here.

THE COURT: All right, Counsel, that's -that's one of the things that I was going to talk to both of you about more procedurally.

I want to get through the arguments first, but, you know, we're not here for two weeks, and this is the stuff we would have been doing for two weeks. So, again, what this Court plans to consider as facts are in paragraph 3A, B, C and D of the stipulation.

Now, I have a big question as to all of you, you say certain other things are judicially noticeable and -- you know, because I'm looking at the stipulation of facts, and Exhibit 1 is five pages, but then it talks about all these numbers, all this data that -does the Court just go searching and I can rummage through that?

I don't really intend to do that. But, I mean, when you start talking about judiciably -- judicially noticeable, transcript of legislative committee and floor proceedings. Well, which ones and how extensive is that?

When you start talking about the Governor's vetoed messages, that's easy enough, but Florida's prior Congressional plans. Well, how far back does that go? And where does the Court find that and where does, more importantly, the Appellate Court find that?

And so these -- these are the questions I have as far as what I'm allowed to consider and what I'm not.

What I can -- what is a lot more easy for the Court to understand and quantify as evidence is paragraph 3, that it gives specific voting age populations, paragraph 3B, population breakdown by county, you know, all of -- all of paragraph 3 of Exhibit 1, all of paragraph 4. Those are easy, it's all this other stuff.

So with that in mind, the objection is overruled as far as, you know, he can argue what he wants, but whether that's actually something the Court can rely on in coming to a decision, you have to tell me where I can cite that in any factual capacity.

With that, Mr. Jazil, you may proceed.
MR. JAZIL: Thank you, Your Honor. And I will note that the stipulation also talks about taking into account demographic information from the Florida redistricting website. This all comes from the redistricting website. Should the Court so desire, it can turn on the appropriate layers for heat maps, and this is
what will come out.
THE COURT: Well, I guess that gets me back to, Counsel, these are judicially noticeable. I don't have to take judicial notice of any of that stuff, do I?

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, there are a line of federal cases from the Northern District of Florida from two cycles ago where the Court said you don't have to ignore the obvious either. The demographic numbers are obvious, where the racial concentrations are is obvious.

THE COURT: Well, then why are we having this? Because then, when you get to the Appellate Courts and get to the Supreme Court, you start bringing up stuff you never showed me.

Well, you know, I can take judicial notice of it. That's the reason we had this set for a two-week trial, folks, so that this Court is very clear on what facts it's going to use in reaching a decision. Not today, I'm not issuing -- I don't plan on ruling from the bench today.

But again, am I just going to go rummaging through this and deciding what is what? I
mean, that -- that was the -- that's the reason I blocked two weeks of this Court's schedule, canceled everything else, put 900 cases on hold, so that we could talk about the facts in this case.

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor. And I would commend for the Court's consideration the Florida Supreme Court's discussion in Apportionment 1. In Apportionment 1, the Florida Supreme Court had a facial challenge to the state House and state Senate maps. And the Florida Supreme Court, without any fact finding, without any witness credibility determinations, said that certain maps from the Florida Senate were unconstitutional.

How did the Florida Supreme Court do that? Precisely by doing this exercise, relying on material that was available in the Maptitude application at the time and making its conclusions that way.

Your Honor, we presented this in our papers. We've highlighted the --

THE COURT: Didn't they do that through a Special Master?

MR. JAZIL: No, they did not, it's my
understanding.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, we can look that up later. Okay. Proceed.

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, the stipulation does, however, show this; that when you take a look at Benchmark CD-5, it cuts across eight counties, it splits Florida. 60.5 percent of the population is drawn from Duval, 22.2 percent of the population is drawn from Leon, so 60 percent from Duval, 22 percent from Leon. We've got the cuts into south Tallahassee to try to capture the population, we've got the cuts in Leon County to try to capture the population.

I would suggest that in drawing this Congressional district, Benchmark CD-5, the one that we're supposed to protect, the one I can't talk about, the one they like, they're race predominant. And we know this because the U.S. Supreme Court case law from Shaw talks about how deviation from traditional redistricting criteria is one way to figure out whether or not race predominated.

And how do we know we have deviation here?

Look at the shape, Your Honor. This is not how --

THE COURT: This gets me back to -- I mean, if you're -- if you're laying a record to have the Supreme Court throw out its own ruling, you can do that. You know, Crawford v. Washington is a prime example of that. I cite that to folks all the time.

You had a criminal defense attorney that said they're getting it wrong and they've got it wrong for hundreds of years, but that fight was at the U.S. Supreme Court.

Again, what you're talking about here is, if I'm hearing you correctly -- and if not, please correct me -- you're saying the Florida Supreme Court violated the U.S. Constitution in doing what it did; in fact, I'm not going there. I'm not -- I don't think I have the power to say, you know what, the Florida Supreme Court got it wrong. That's their business or the U.S. Supreme Courts to do.

But why am I not stuck -- and that's not a good word, I'm not trying to use that pejoratively. But why am I not bound -- how about that as better word -- bound by

Congressional District 5 as done in the last apportionment -- reapportionment cycle? Why am I not bound with that as a benchmark?

That's the problem I'm -- I'm saying I understand your argument. But I don't see where this Court has the power to not go back and use Congressional District 5 from the last reapportionment cycle, and why am I'm not bound to use that as my benchmark?

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor. So CD-5 from the last redistricting cycle, no one raised the issue of it possibly violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The issue was never presented to the Court, it was never decided. It's an issue lurking in the background, so there is no specific holding in regards --

THE COURT: Why is that not waived then? Weren't some of the same parties -- wasn't this -- wasn't the Secretary, I know it's a different person, but wasn't the Secretary, or the League of Women Voters, who are both parties in this case, weren't they both parties in the last case? Shouldn't the -- aren't -isn't there some waiver there?

MR. JAZIL: No, Your Honor, there isn't. The issue before this Court is whether or not the Enacted Plan is or isn't constitutional. And to conclude that the Enacted Plan isn't constitutional, where do we start?

We start with assessing what the benchmark is and whether or not the nondiminishment test applies to that benchmark.

So this is a whole new proceeding, we're judging whether or not the Florida legislature had an obligation to use CD-5 in the benchmark as something worthy of protection under the nondiminishment case. That's the fundamental question.

No one disagrees, Your Honor -- another way to put it is this, no one disagrees that there's not a Black performing district in North Florida. The question is whether or not a Black performing district is required in North Florida. Right? Because if the nondiminishment test applies to the former CD-5, and the nondiminishment test requires the preservation of a district like CD-5, then there needs to be something like the former

CD-5 in North Florida.
That, in a nutshell, is what we're arguing about.

And my point, then, is, okay, if we agree that there is no Black performing district in North Florida, and the question is, is one required? How do we get it? How do we show that a Black performing district is, indeed, required in North Florida?

And the way we get there is to show that the nondiminishment standard applies to the benchmark, right; that the nondiminishment standard hasn't been met for the benchmark and that the Federal Constitution allows for the nondiminishment test to be applied in some manner in North Florida.

And it's the question of, does it apply to CD-5 that we disagree with? And the question of is it required under the Equal Protection Clause? Is it -- pardon me. Is it allowed under the Equal Protection Clause that we disagree with?

On the first question of does it apply, the answer we believe is no; because we think that, though the issue was never presented to
the Florida Supreme Court, we put forward a textural argument of Article III,

Section 20 (a). It's one that allows this Court to avoid a constitutional issue, it's one that we believe is consistent with Apportionment 8.

THE COURT: This is the Gingles test.
MR. JAZIL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's talk about that.
MR. JAZIL: Sure.
THE COURT: Talk to me about why in re:
Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 100 that this Supreme Court issued that opinion in March 3rd of 2022 -that's at 334 So.3d of 1282 -- why they used the words -- because when I go back to the text, and this -- they talk about -- I want to give you the page, it looks like it's page 1289 -- why they talk about the nondiminishment -- now, granted, this is -this is not Article III, Section 20. This is the companion that is worded almost identically, and they say that the nondiminishment protection afforded talks about majority-minority districts or weak and other historically performing minority districts.

So doesn't that preclude Gingles right there, that Gingles requires majority-minority districts? Isn't that surplusage language? I mean, they've readopted that language from their 2012 opinion, but why is that a -- why would they put both of those, if it had to be majority-minority as Gingles holds?

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor.
And so, number 1, this specific argument was presented by the Governor in his request for an advisory opinion. The Florida Supreme Court specifically said it's not deciding it one way or the other.

Number 2, Your Honor, what I'm suggesting about applying the Gingles' test to figure out whether or not the nondiminishment standard applies is not mutually exclusive with nondiminishment applying to cross over a coalition district, right; it's something that's not a majority-minority district.

And my analysis is this: Once you identify a majority-minority district, using the nonvote dilution provision, you specify a race-based problem that needs a race-based solution. And you've got specific evidence of
it and you've got that provision, the nonvote dilution provision, that creates the district.

And then our argument is that the nondiminishment provision preserves that district so if that district continues performing for Black voters, for example, but it over time becomes a crossover district, you can continue protecting it under the nondiminishment test because it was created under the nonvote dilution provision with a specific identified problem and it created a solution, a district for it; and then as the BVAP goes down, but it's still a Black performing district, it continues being protected.

There is some point at which -- and we don't need to reach that in this case. There is some point at which the BVAP goes down so much that you can't continue justifying the application in the nondiminishment test of what was once a majority Black district.

And that's how I reconcile our reading of what the Florida Supreme Court has said, because our reading would then apply to crossover districts and coalition districts,
but it would apply in a way that puts the Article III, Section 20 (a) requirement on a firmer footing.

Your Honor, take the Article III, Section 20 (a), race requirements out of the analysis that I've just explained where I'm using the Gingles test. Section III, 20 (a) at that point would be saying that race must predominate in redistricting decisions, right? Because if you look at Section $20(a)$ and then you look at Section $20(\mathrm{~b})$, the Florida Constitution says, Section 20 (b) has a traditional redistricting right here, compactness, political geographical boundaries, et cetera, where they can conflict with the race-based provisions, the race-based provisions must prevail. Right?

And think about that, Your Honor. It's saying that the race-based provisions must prevail. But unlike the Voting Rights Act, which had a voluminous record to support its creation, there isn't something like that for Article III, Section 20 (a). And unlike the Voting Rights Act, Your Honor, where the 15th Amendment specifically said that Congress is
authorized to implement this, there is no specific authorization for the states to do something similar, so you're divorced from a specific federal constitutional power to implement the amendment and you're divorced from a specific record that justifies the existence of a race-based problem, yet you have --

THE COURT: How are we divorced from that record? Don't -- don't originalists argue what do the words mean at the time of passing? At the time of passing this, didn't the voters of Florida and the Fair Districts folks that proposed this, wasn't Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act there? Wasn't Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act there? Isn't that -- doesn't that all -- weren't those -- those terms, weren't they defined, all that was known at the time of passing?

MR. JAZIL: I'm glad you bring that up, Your Honor.

So the fair districting amendments came about when the Voting Rights Act was in place, right? The Voting Rights Act, Section 5, is the one that's usually used to justify the
existence of provisions like this, and Section 5 had a preclearance formula.

The preclearance formula was very specific. It highlighted jurisdictions with persistent racism, problems that were so persistent that federal intervention through the Section 5 non-retrogression standard was necessary.

Florida had five counties that were subject to preclearance. Never the state as a whole, none of those five counties are in the affected area here in North Florida, Your Honor.

So then I -- so then I again ask, where is the specific record of a race-based problem in North Florida that justifies a race-based solution in North Florida?

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, then, Counsel, because I had that same question. I went back -- and I know this is an elections clause case, but Brown versus Secretary of State -- and I think, if I'm not mistaken, I think one or two Counsel from here was involved in that case. That's at 668 Federal Third 1271, that's from back in 2012, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 11th Circuit -- again, I know it's -- I know it's an elections clause case, but they talk about -- this is on page 1284. They said, again, it is irrelevant that only five Florida counties are subject to Voting Rights Act preclearance requirement. More generally, if the appellate's arguments were correct, then no state would be allowed to consider the effect of its Congressional districts on minorities, even if the entire state were subject to Section 5 preclearance.

So haven't they kind of talked about that argument? I know it's a -- I know it's an elections clause case, but haven't they talked about that very argument, and that's from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit dealing with that very argument.

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, I refer you to a more recent U.S. Court of Appeals case, League of Women Voters versus -- from 2023. It details how Florida has continued to make voting easier, how Florida is no longer tied to its past, how things have improved in Florida, and Florida should -- in reversing a Federal District Court -- should not be subject to
preclearance requirement. And implicit in that is that the past discrimination cannot be used to justify some kind of extraordinary race-based intervention now.

THE COURT: But that's how many years after -- I mean, the Fair Districts was passed before all this. So this is -- we've got more contemporaneous from the 11th Circuit back -again, if we're locking in the words at the time of passage.

MR. JAZII: Sure, Your Honor.
And so, my position is this, Your Honor. There was no record at the time of the passage of the Fair Districting amendments that's analogous to the Voting Rights Act. Even if there were -- let's remember, the Voting Rights Act, the Section 5 provision, every 25 years, you need new material to justify it.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, non-vote dilution, you have a very specific test to identify a problem on the ground now that needs a solution. Article III, Section 20 (a) requirements, no such limitations.

My friends for the other side suggest that
the functional approach might be a solution to this, that it may impose some kind of temporal limit. Because, remember, if you're going to have a race-based solution, you need a geographic limit. There is none in Article III, Section 20 (a); it applies everywhere, apparently. And you need some kind of temporal limit; there is none in Article III, Section 20 (a). There's no sunset provision as in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

My friends for the other side say that a functional analysis can be a substitute for a temporal limit, is my understanding of their papers.

But it isn't really, Your Honor. The functional analysis looks at, is the minority community voting cohesively? Is there a person winning the primary election? Is there a person winning the general election?

We can do a thought experiment, Your Honor. In the former Congressional District 5, let's assume that the BVAP goes down 5 percent but it's still a solidly blue county, right? So BVAP goes down to 5 percent, solidly blue county. President Obama decides he's going to
run for Congress in that seat. He gets
90 percent of the Black vote in the Democratic primary. He gets 70 percent of the white vote in that primary, he wins. He then wins in the general because it's a solidly blue district.

And so, under the functional analysis with a BVAP of 5, you check the box for the Black communities candidate of choice winning the primary, winning the general, yet it's under the functional analysis still a performing district that needs to be protected even though the BVAP is 5 percent?

That, to me, doesn't make sense. And again, there's no inherent geographic limit in using the functional analysis as a way to hem in this race-boased solution.

Your Honor, I'd like to next move on to the burden of proof. My friend noted that this is an unusual procedural posture because ordinarily it's someone challenging a state map. Right?

Here we have a state map that's neutral and my friends for the other side are saying that that state map is unconstitutional. My friends are the ones who are saying that based
on the Florida nondiminishment standard, you need to use race as a component to draw a district somewhere in North Florida that's Black performing.

So my friends are the proponents for this race-based solution. Logically, they would have the burden then to show that race would not predominant in the drawing of some district in North Florida, and if it did, that there isn't a compelling interest in narrow tailoring.

Your Honor, I go back to the points I made about this district being 200 miles long connecting the first coast to the Big Bend, splitting counties being 3 miles wide at its dip, and, to me, that shows that race predominates.

Another way to look at it, Your Honor, is this. Unlike North Carolina, unlike Texas, unlike all the other states, Florida does have Article III, Section 20 (b) which lays out standards like compactness. You must draw things that are compact. The only way you can deviate from that is if you are taking race into account, the partisanship incumbency
things don't really matter because they're sort of a negative.

THE COURT: Wait, wait. What? You're saying words in the Constitution don't matter?

MR. JAZIL: No, no, no. No, Your Honor.
My point is this: The partisanship and the incumbency provisions, it's a direction for the legislature not to take partisanship into account, it's a direction not to take incumbency into account. So if you're deviating from the Article III, Section 20 (b) requirements of compactness adherence to political geographical boundaries, the race factor would be the only reason why you would deviate from compactness; because you can't deviate if you're trying to get Democrats together in a district and you can't deviate if you're trying to get Republicans into a district.

So when we take a look at this map, Your Honor, here (indicating), there's no way someone could say that we're adhering to compactness principles. Here, there is no way we can say that we're adhering to compactness principles, which are --

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. That map you're holding up is the one the Florida Supreme Court said met the compactness threshold.

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, it said that the map was the best alternative. And remember, the Florida Supreme Court --

THE COURT: It said -- it said it was okay with compactness, and I'm bound by that, am I not?

MR. JAZIL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I mean, they looked at compactness for that one. They said it was fine for compactness. Am I not bound by the Florida Supreme Court decision that says that map, as far as compactness, is fine?

MR. JAZIL: They said it's not a model of compactness, but it's better than the alternatives.

THE COURT: So, let me ask that question again. Is that map -- does that map meet the compactness standards that the Florida Supreme Court has set out?

MR. JAZIL: Pardon me, Your Honor, the compactness standards that the Florida

Supreme Court has set out or the compactness standards that would apply to any map that needs to comply with both the Florida Constitution and the Federal Constitution?

THE COURT: Both.
MR. JAZIL: And so that second part, the Federal Constitution, the Federal Constitution issue, again, wasn't before the Court.

Second, Your Honor, the point I'm trying to get to, just overall, is this: They're the ones who want to draw a map that replaces the race-neutral map; they are the ones who want to inject race into it. As proponents of that, they have the burden, they have to show compelling interest and narrow tailoring.

THE COURT: Well, wait. Let's go back. And this is the case we talked about last time. I said we might get some guidance from the Supreme Court.

So doesn't Allen versus Milligan specifically talk about that when it talks about when it comes to considering race in the context of districting? We have made clear that there is a difference between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated by
them. The former is permissible, the latter is usually not. That's because -- that is because redistricting legislatures will almost always be aware of racial demographics.

And so, what we're really arguing about is that split, are we not? Whether their awareness and using race is okay, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, as long as it doesn't predominate.

So let's stick only on the predomination because they're allowed to use race, and they're saying that it -- that it meets that standard. So you're saying -- you're saying it's not and, therefore, there's strict scrutiny. But you've got to show that it's not, do you not? That it does predominate; don't you have to show that race predominates?

MR. JAZIL: No, Your Honor. I'm not the one asking for a new map. They're the ones asking for a new map; they're the ones saying that there needs to be some kind of replacement for the race-neutral map that is race conscious, right?

I'm saying that this map (indicating), the Enacted Map, is perfectly constitutional. We
don't need to do anything more.
They're the ones who are saying that, look, this map violates Article III, Section 20 (a), and so we need to replace it with something. That something is race conscious. But that race --

THE COURT: Well, that something is up to the legislature, is it not? Nobody expects me to put a map in place -- and that was where this Court erred back on a temporary injunction, is it -- is it solved the problem.

The Constitution is very clear, the legislature is the one that draws the map, and even the prior redistricting says, you got to give them a chance and, ultimately, if you can't, then the Florida Supreme Court, in essence, does that.

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor.
Now you're getting to another point that my friends were making, the distinction between the liability and remedy phase of this.

And my position is this, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Yeah, I was going to talk to them about that on rebuttal.

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, my position is
this. If there's no valid remedy, there can be no liability. And let me illustrate that more concretely.

What the plaintiffs are asking for is the Court to ignore the presumption of validity that applies to legislative enactments and declare this law that created this Enacted Plan invalid. And let's suppose that the Florida Supreme Court affirms this Court. The Florida Supreme Court says that the nondiminishment standard has been violated, go back down, come up with a remedial plan and see if it passes muster.

So we go through the remedial phase, we figure out that there's no workable remedy because, again, in their words, the only workable alternative is to combine Duval with Leon 200 miles away.

If we, on a remand, come to the conclusion that there's no workable remedy, what happens? The courts give the legislature an apology saying, you know, we declared this to be unconstitutional, it turns out there's no remedy, so go back to the Enacted Plan? Is that how it would play out?

So, fundamentally, Your Honor, I don't think we can divorce remedy from liability in this instance. If they can't show there is a viable remedy that passes Federal Constitutional muster but there's a viable race-conscious remedy or race either does not predominate or race predominates but there's a compelling interest in narrow tailoring, the presumption of validity applies and the Enacted Plan should be upheld.

THE COURT: All right. But there's a presumption of validity as to the statute, I agree. Isn't there a presumption of validity to the Florida Constitutional provision enacted by the voters of this state?

MR. JAZIL: Sure, there is, Your Honor. And what I'm saying is, there is a presumption of validity that applies to the Enacted Plan and there should be presumption of validity that applies to the Florida constitutional provision.

But again, what is the fundamental task we're being asked to do here? We're being asked to take the race-neutral map, the Enacted Map, and insert in there a race-based district.

At that point, how do we do that? We do that by complying with both the Florida Constitution and the Federal Constitution so long as the two don't conflict. If they do, the Florida Constitution has no --

THE COURT: But that's where the burden issue is. Isn't it then your burden to show that you cannot meet both the Florida Constitution and the Federal Constitution? Would that not -- because -- and again, this Court hasn't made any decisions, but step one, they've got to show it doesn't comport -- under their -- under their complaint, step one, they've got to show it does not comport with the Florida Fair District Amendment. Step one.

And if they show that, why is that not a -- then it becomes your burden to show -- and they can show -- here's a map, this Plan 8015, that will -- that will comport with the Florida Constitution.

Why is it not your burden to show it does not comport with the Federal Constitution and there's no possibility of comporting with the Federal Constitution?

MR. JAZIL: Because, Your Honor, we're not
the ones who are the proponents of this race-based plan under the Federal Constitution. And we cite cases for the proposition that the proponent of the race-based solution needs to bear the burden.

And, admittedly, as my friend pointed out, there's no case directly on point where if someone challenging the state's race-neutral test can mandate the creation of a race-conscious or race-based district, however you characterize it.

And so our position is, they have the burden 1A and 1B of saying that the Florida Constitution requires the creation of a race-based district up here and the Federal Constitution allows for their creation of a race-based district here.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, we've been talking a bit about the Public Official Standing Doctrine as well in this case. The Court has made some oral rulings. The Court has previously denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike our affirmative defenses untimely. We've made the waiver arguments in our papers.

It's a reading of the rules.
I'll let that stand for what it is, and we maintain those. I'd like to make just a more fundamental point about the Public Official Standing Doctrine, Your Honor.

The first case, the Atlantic Railroad's case from 1922, the most recent case, it's the Miami-Dade Expressway Authority case from the First District where Mr. Nordby and I tried.

In both those cases, you had a situation where there was an executive branch official, in the railroad case it was the Attorney General, saying, hey, I think a statute passed by the legislature is just unconstitutional so we're not going to implement it.

In the Miami-Dade Expressway Authority case it was a state agency and local expressway challenging a state constitution -- a state statute -- saying that, look, we can't be dissolved because this is violative of other provisions of law.

In both instances you had executive branch officials taking issue with state statutes. Here, the Secretary is simply saying, as Your Honor pointed out, we're going to enforce the

Enacted Plan. If someone wants us to enforce something else, they need to tell us that that something else comports with all available law, the Florida Constitution and the U.S.

Constitution; because we cite cases in our briefs, Your Honor, going back to McCulloch versus Maryland. If a federal law is in conflict with a state law, the state law has no effect and we're not obligated to follow it. And requiring the Secretary of State to sit idly by and implement a map that may violate the Federal Constitution just doesn't seem consistent with his duties and obligations.

THE COURT: But -- okay, but why is that pertinent in this case? Why is it the Secretary -- in the event this Court were ultimately to grant relief, how does that harm the Secretary in any way? Why doesn't the Secretary wait until whatever comes out comes out at the end of the thing?

Then wouldn't the Secretary have a basis to challenge it and say, now what's in place violates the Constitution. Because the remedy, likely here -- and again, I've got questions
for the plaintiffs. The remedy is just throw out -- throw out the bill, throw out the statute and say, legislature, do it again.

And they very well may come up with something that may or may not offend the Secretary's feelings on constitutionality.

So why is this not an advisory opinion as far as that goes for the Secretary? This Court wouldn't be requiring the Secretary to do anything, other than to not use this map. That would be the only remedy I think that, realistically, this Court can order. Don't use this map. I'm not telling you which one to use. The legislature will do that. So why can the Secretary challenge them challenging this? That's what -- that's the part that's a little sticky, and it's not like the other cases, because they -- we've got this state constitutional provision and a federal constitutional provision.

MR. JAZIL: So if I understand the Court correctly, the point is this; that if the Court requires the Secretary simply to not implement this map, what exists for the Secretary to challenge is possibly unconstitutional under
the Federal Constitution?
THE COURT: Well, that's the issue. Isn't that best laid at the feet of the legislature and the Governor?

But I will note, the Governor asked to be removed from this case and this Court did remove him. He might have had the ability to say, you're requiring me to either enact -although the legislature is free to enact legislation over his veto, if they so choose, so I'm not sure the Governor could make that.

We are not there. I'm not issuing advisory opinions. But aren't the people constrained -- or the groups, I shouldn't say the people because that's an awkward word here we'll talk about later, but aren't the groups constrained by Section 20 of Article III? Isn't -- aren't the groups constrained, the House and the Senate and the Governor? Those are the ones constrained by this, correct? Tells them how they are to redistrict?

MR. JAZIL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: How is the Secretary constrained in any way by Article III, Section 20?

MR. JAZIL: Well, the Secretary ends up implementing whatever is passed. The Secretary, the House, the Senate are also all constrained by the Federal Constitution.

And I go back, Your Honor, to my point about there being a false distinction between liability and remedy in this case. If a remedy simply is not possible, how then can you have liability?

And here again, Your Honor, I point the Court to what the plaintiff said in their temporary injunction filings, the only alternative is to combine Duval with Leon and Gadsden.

THE COURT: I get that. But why does the Secretary get to make that argument instead of -- or in addition to the House? Isn't that the House's argument? And I'll hear from the House shortly.

I don't think the Senate has properly raised it. I'm not so sure. We're going to talk to Counsel about that in a moment, because that's not their affirmative defense. They don't have any left.

So the question is, why does the Secretary
get to raise this argument? This is that legal technicality stuff, but why does the Secretary get to raise this, that's properly raised by the House that says, we can't comply with the remedy. The Secretary doesn't have to comply with any remedy. The remedy is -- other than you can't enforce that. When you have an operative map, then you use it.

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor. And so, just taking a step back.

The Secretary is your appropriate executive branch official who would be implementing any remedial map, right? I mean, the county of Volusia case goes through this and talks about how the Secretary of Elections are ever implicated is on the hook. And so the Secretary would be the only executive branch official whose duties would be implicated at the state level because the Secretary would be responsible for implementing any remedy.

THE COURT: So why doesn't the Secretary now have the burden to show that there isn't any remedy that is workable?

MR. JAZIL: Because, Your Honor, again, the Secretary is not the one who is saying that
there needs to be a race-based remedy here. If the Secretary were the one -- if we had separate elections for Secretary of State as we used to before the executive branch was reorganized and the Secretary were in that position advocating for a race-based district saying essentially what the plaintiffs are saying, right, that there needs to be some kind of district here that comports with the nondiminishment test and we think it's possible, then the Secretary would have that burden.

The Secretary isn't doing that. All the Secretary here is doing is defending the Enacted Plan as enacted. The Secretary isn't saying that you should shoehorn a district from Duval to Leon that captures Gadsden and call it a day. That's -- if the Secretary were doing that, it'd be the Secretary's burden, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This takes me back to that rummaging through the record that the parties have asked. And isn't that exactly what the legislature had said, is taking all these different factors into account, here's one that
we think works? And so how does race predominate when they're saying we've taken all these factors into account? And I'm paraphrasing.

MR. JAZIL: Sure. If you go through the legislative record, Your Honor, the argument was in a nutshell this: That if we draw a district from Duval to Leon, we can justify it because trying to comply with the State Constitution is a compelling interest. That argument gave way as the proceedings went forward, and I believe my friends are in agreement with me that saying that we're trying to comply with the State Constitution isn't a compelling interest, number 1.

Number 2, there is that district in 8019, Your Honor, this was a Duval district, Mr. Gallo, we point this out in our papers -pardon me, Representative Geller, I believe -was pointing out that if you had run the functional analysis on that district, it doesn't perform a third of the time for Black voters in the 14 test elections that were used.

So, you can take the Florida
Supreme Court's language over slight changes
making it less likely that you elected a candidate of the minority choice. Regardless of how you read it, not performing in a third of elections means you're not complying with the nondiminishment test. You're making it a less likely.

The word diminish, what's it mean? To make less likely. You're diminishing the minorities' ability to elect a candidate of their choice. So every configuration the legislature had was Duval to Leon, except for one. That one configuration didn't actually perform for Black voters.

And finally, Your Honor, you saw how things were fixed at the edges of Leon and Duval in 8015. I refer the Court to Apportionment 7, page 403. In Apportionment 7, the Florida legislature put forward a configuration of a district that was a lot like the one that the trial court found had improper partisan impact. And the Florida Supreme Court said it was error to have a district that retained the same basic shape or merely tweaking of a few aspects of the district where 80 percent of the district was retained, when
judged against the benchmark.
So my point with the legislature's valiant effort to try to take away the most egregious forms of gerrymandering in Duval and Leon is this: You're still retaining pretty much the same district and tweaking on the edges, which for partisan gerrymandering, the Florida Supreme Court said in Apportionment 7 was inappropriate and shouldn't be used to come up with a remedy.

Your Honor, a couple final points about race predominating here. Again, I'd ask you to consider the following points.

Why was that district drawn the way it was? Race. Florida Supreme Court said so. But no one questioned the equal protection issues.

Why do the plaintiffs want to preserve that district? Race.

What's the basis for their claim? Race.
Heck, Your Honor, the caption of this case is Black Voters Matters versus Byrd. It's not Concerned Citizens for Compactness versus Byrd. And what can't the legislature do, Your Honor? You can't take race as a predominant
factor when it's drawing a district, whether the one enacted in the special session or any remedial.

And so, Your Honor, I would ask that the Court enter judgment for the defendants in this case, and I'll cede the remainder of my time to Mr. --

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to -one, I'm going to let -- we're going to answer a couple more questions, or maybe one or two, we'll see, and then we'll take a break because we've been in here for a while.

But talk to me about the difference -because this is going to be different for Mr. Bardos, the facial challenge versus the --

MR. JAZII: As-applied.
THE COURT: As-applied -- well, the facial versus the as-applied, because -- and stick with the as-applied because the facial challenge, unless you need to add anything, Mr. Bardos is going to be talking about that, I would imagine. Maybe he's not.

But talk to the distinction because he doesn't have -- he doesn't have the as-applied to challenge. He has facial challenge.

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, I think it's the other way around. I think he has the as-applied challenge and not the facial challenge.

MR. BARDOS: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's right, he does have the as-applied. Okay.

MR. JAZIL: Sure, Your Honor. And so I've been focusing on the as-applied one, that there's no conceivable way to draw a district in North Florida where race doesn't predominant because you have to connect the Black population in Duval to the Black population in Tallahassee and Gadsden.

The facial argument is this, Your Honor: Article III, Section 20 (a), right, on its face, race predominant. There's no durational limit, there's no geographic limit, there is no record showing that Article III, Section 20 (a) was adopted to fix some kind of specific racial problem and that its racial solution was narrowly tailored, i.e. there was a --

THE COURT: All right. Where's the standing, though? Because when you -- what language in the 14th Amendment are you saying
applies here?
MR. JAZIL: What language am I saying applies?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. JAZIL: It's a requirement that people be treated alike.

THE COURT: Yeah, but doesn't it start with all persons born or naturalized in the United States? Isn't that a quantifier on the persons involved there?

The Secretary of State, in the official capacity, was not born and naturalized in the United States, doesn't that -- wouldn't that go to an individual person, not a government entity person --

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, I'd have to go --
THE COURT: -- or a corporation or --
MR. JAZIL: True, Your Honor. I'd have to go back and see what happens when someone raises an affirmative defense of facial unconstitutionality, right, because if I'm raising it as an affirmative defense, I'm being hauled into Court, I'm being told to do something that would, in my view, not comply with federal law.

THE COURT: All right. But where is it, no state shall make or enforce any law which shall bridge the privileges or immunity of the citizens of the United States? Is the office of a Secretary of State a citizen? It's not, is it?

MR. JAZIL: It's not, Your Honor, but I believe that the language you're reading says that the state official can't do something that abridges equal opportunities for --

THE COURT: Right. And so it gets back to standing. How does the Secretary of State have the standing to assert that on behalf of the other individuals?

MR. JAZIL: On behalf of the House and Senate members and the Governor?

THE COURT: Well, no, that's all official capacity. So, again, and it talks about a person of life, liberty or property.

Again, what liberty interest -- again, is that in association with standing argument for the Secretary of State that they're able to argue that? We don't have individuals that came in and said -- and let's say individuals from this district that intervened said, hey,
it's -- they're discriminating against me based on my race. So how can the Secretary raise that argument?

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, I understand the point of this lawsuit to be this: Come up with a new map for North Florida. My client is saying that that would require him to violate the Federal Constitution, the 14th Amendment. And my client would like not to violate the 14th Amendment.

THE COURT: How would it -- how would it make him -- that's the part --

MR. JAZII: Because he would be implementing a map that sorts people based on race without having a compelling reason or narrow tailoring for doing so.

That's the point. You can't force a state official to go and violate the Federal Constitution. And the state official surely has the ability to say, look, you can't compel me to do this, you can't compel me to take official action that would sort people based on race and, therefore, violate the Equal Protection Clause. And that's the basis for the Secretary putting this argument forward.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Jazil.

MR. JAZIL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. With that, folks, why don't we take about 10 minutes.
(A recess took place from 10:30 a.m. to 10:45 a.m.)

THE COURT: Mr. Bardos, you may proceed.
MR. BARDOS: Good morning, Your Honor, thank you. Andy Bardos representing the Florida House.

Your Honor, I would like to start by placing this in practical terms and taking ourselves back into the position that the legislature was in when it was undertaking redistricting. So I will address what the legislature had to consider, and then I will go back and address some of the issues that the plaintiffs raised as to why the Court shouldn't consider what the legislature had to consider.

Redistricting is governed by a hierarchy of standards, beginning with the Federal Constitution, federal statutes, the VRA, and the State Constitution; and within the State Constitution there is a hierarchy of standards
as well, Tier 1 and then we have Tier 2.
In the legislative process, the legislature does not have the luxury of taking them one at time. It has to consider them all, and it has to come up with a map that it thinks accommodates all of those legal obligations and reconciles them in the best possible way.

It doesn't have the luxury of doing what the plaintiffs are asking this Court to do, which is to take them one standard at a time, render a ruling on them seriatim, and then address the others later in a remedial case or perhaps some other case in the future.

That's why our affirmative defense is so essential, because it asks the Court to consider all of the standards in combination, just like the legislature had to do when it was drawing the map. And there is no other good way to adjudicate the validity of a map than to do it simultaneously, considering all the standards.

And we saw this play out during the last cycle, not in a conflict between the Federal Constitution and the State Constitution, but in a conflict between the two tiers.

We saw frequently where there were districts that were less than compact; they didn't satisfy the Tier 2 criteria. And the legislature asserted in litigation, we did that because the higher standard, Tier 1, required it. We did it because we had an obligation to not diminish in that district.

And the Court considered that. And the Court always weighed that, the Florida Supreme Court did it, even in imposing this district that we are here about today. It didn't say no, we are just focused on the compactness standard. You can't assert nondiminishment rights in this litigation. You don't have standing. And that has to be done later.

Let's start with a map that has compact districts throughout the state, and if someone has a problem with that, we can deal with that in subsequent litigation. It didn't do that. The Courts adjudicated these claims in a practical way, just like the legislature has to address redistricting in a practical way, taking everything together, not splitting them up, not kicking cans down the road.

So from our perspective, Your Honor, we have asserted one defense here, and that is the as-applied equal protection claim or defense. And we think that's a two-step inquiry. There's the predominance inquiry, and then we get to the question of whether there's a compelling interest.

We are not making an argument on the narrow tailoring branch of that analysis.

So starting with predominance, what is the evidence for predominance? It's a number of things.

One, we took at the shape of the district.
THE COURT: Hold on, Counsel, you are starting the affirmative defense.

MR. BARDOS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that's fine. Is there any concession that they make out their primary case based on facts before this Court?

MR. BARDOS: Yeah, there is no district in North Florida that performs for minority voters in the Enacted Map. We think that's justified because of equal protection requirements. So that where we think the dispute is.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BARDOS: So we begin with predominance. And we look at the shape of the district and we see that there is a district that is very unlike what we typically see in any sort of redistricting map, where we would expect to see a compact district more like District 3. District 2 takes in counties as it moves through the Big Bend area, as it must to reach its population threshold.

But District 5 is a very unusually shaped district. It has eight counties, but it strings them in a line, instead of like District 3 where it combines those districts into a compact shape. It strings it in a line from Jacksonville all the way up to Gadsden County, which runs 200 miles, with a height of 20 miles. So it's basically a 10-by-1 district. And then at the two ends is where the population is. So it's clearly trying to combine two very far-flung cormunities with each other, and it gets very little of its population from the five counties in between.

So we see in Tallahassee and Jacksonville the district has some unusual features. It has some fingers and some arms, so it's contoured
to capture certain communities there. And it goes out even further to Gadsden.

The plaintiffs said they don't know exactly what district is at issue and they are too confused to know which district we are challenging, whether it's the Benchmark District or the districts consider during the legislative process. But every district that went from east to west and that anyone purported did not diminish looks something like that, very much like that, in fact. There is very little difference between these districts. Some of them might have been contoured, some are differently in Leon County or Jacksonville, where it captured certain position populations, but they all looked very much the same.

And so we know what district we are talking about. It's that district, the district that includes Gadsden and the district that includes portions of Tallahassee and that stretches to Jacksonville. All of the districts that we were talking about look like that.

This is visually, at least, a very noncompact district, and there is no other
district quite like it in the map. So we know that there is something happening here. There is something motivating this district other than compliance with simple Tier 2 criteria.

I don't think the Florida Supreme Court ever held that this district is compact. I think it was responding to the dissent's argument that going from a north-south district to an east-west district makes the map less compact. So the Court was simply saying this does not make the map less compact; what it was doing was putting a district in place that would not diminish.

The second indication that we have is that the population is at the two ends of the district, so we know that there is something going on there that is trying -- where the map drawer is trying to capture population that is at a great distance from the two -- that the two population centers are a great distance from each other.

The stipulation that we entered into shows 82.7 percent of the district's population comes from two counties that are 150 miles apart, Ieon County and Duval County. 11.5 percent of
the district's population, just over 1/9th of it comes from the five counties in between, so those counties really are serving simply as a corridor to connect two population centers that are 150 miles apart.

THE COURT: If I drive down I-10, don't I see a lot of empty space there?

MR. BARDOS: Yes, Your Honor. That's the point. So why would a map drawer try to connect two very populous areas, 150 miles apart, that have pretty much empty space in between?

THE COURT: And again, I know this is a very, very diverse state. Don't the people all along the noncoastal Florida northern border of Georgia have a lot more in common with one another than, say, the people that live on the Florida Gulf Coast? Isn't that -- somebody from Gadsden, don't they have a lot more in common with somebody in Baker County than maybe they do from somebody that is a shrimp fisherman in Gulf County?

MR. BARDOS: Well, we don't have those sorts of facts in the record, Your Honor, but what I can say is that this very clearly
combines different types of communities.
We know that Jacksonville is a highly urban, densely populated area. It's much like Orlando or Tampa, it's one of Florida's major urban centers.

And then in between we have counties that are at the opposite end of that spectrum. They are among Florida's most rural counties.

So I think that any sort of argument based on a commonality of interest on its face I think is refuted by the way this district is constructed.

What does someone living in downtown Jacksonville have in common with someone who is living out in Quincy? I think those are two very different communities, and Tallahassee itself is a very different community from either.

So I don't think that the community of interest argument stands either.

We saw in the maps that Mr. Jazil put here that the district line very closely follows those communities where there is a high concentration of minority voters. So we see that, that data comes from census data that's
also available in the Florida legislature's redistricting website.

In looking at additional Tier 2
indications, this district splits four counties as it goes from Gadsden to Jacksonville. It contains eight counties. And again the unusual feature is that it strings them in a line instead of putting them together in a compact shape.

We know from the constitution the only factor that can justify a deviation from compactness is race. It's the only standard in the Tier 1 set of standards that would justify a deviation from compactness, so right there is a strong indicator as to why the district was drawn the way that it was.

We know from the history of this district, going back to 1992, what has been the big issue in this district. This district has been litigated now four decades. It was drawn originally by the Courts back in 1992, the Johnson versus Mortham case that we cited sets forth that history.

It was initially drawn by the Court and then invalidated as a racial gerrymander by the

Court. It was litigated in 2002 in Martinez versus Bush, last decade, and Voters versus Detzner, and here we are again. And the issue every time was race. That has been the defining issue in all of the litigation that has surrounded this district for four decades, another indication that race is a predominant factor in the design of this district.

We also don't have to look much beyond what the Florida Supreme Court said about this district when it ordered this district be put in place in 2015. In the Court's discussion decision of this district, the one affimative virtue that it stated that this district has was that it avoided diminishment for racial minorities. So that was the Florida Supreme Court's reason, stated reason for ordering this district to be put in place. And what it said is that the legislature cannot prove that the north-south configuration is necessary to avoid diminishing the ability of Black voters to elect candidates of their choice, therefore we hold that District 5 must be drawn in an east-west manner. So if the Court believed that there was
some other way to avoid diminishment for minority voters, they likely would not have ordered this particular configuration of it. And in fact it went on to say that an east-west orientation is the only alternate option.

What the plaintiff said about that in their memorandum of law according to their temporary injunction motion early in this litigation is that the Florida Supreme Court ordered the legislature to redraw CD-5 in an east-west manner, concluding that this configuration was the only alternative option that complied with the constitutional nondiminishment standard.

So we know the stated reason from the Florida Supreme Court was to avoid diminishment on the basis of race. And so all of the indications that we have point to race being the predominant consideration.

And it is also telling that the plaintiffs don't point out what the predominant consideration was, if it wasn't race. We didn't hear anything about that today. If it wasn't race, what was it? What caused somebody to draw a district from Gadsden County, a very
rural district in the Big Bend Area, to Jacksonville?

THE COURT: Again -- and I asked this question of Mr. Jazil. So are you asking this Court to find that the Florida Supreme Court violated the Federal Constitution when they put this in place? Is that -- at the end of the day, is that what you are asking?

MR. BARDOS: I think, Your Honor, I think more directly what we are asking is that the Court find that the legislature was right in its analysis in 2022, that drawing a district that goes from east to west would violate the Equal Protection Clause.

THE COURT: What you just said --
MR. BARDOS: Yes. So does it follow that the Florida Supreme Court's district was contrary to the Equal Protection Clause? I don't think the Court has to address that directly. Like the plaintiffs said, that district is not the law anymore, but I think that would be the fair inference.

THE COURT: It is the Benchmark. So what I am hearing -- you are not saying it, and that's why I am asking you very pointedly, I've
got to go with the Benchmark. That is the one that was there before.

And you are telling me that it was done -it was predominated by the racial considerations. And you are telling me that a map drawn with predominated racial considerations violates the U.S. Constitution.

So it logically follows, are you asking me to say that the Florida Supreme Court violated the U.S. Constitution back in the prior redistricting cycle? Because if they didn't, I am stuck with this. If I did, you need to tell me that is exactly what you are asking me to do.

MR. BARDOS: Again, I don't think that the relief we are requesting requires the Court to say that.

I think that the question is whether the legislature, in the here and now, drawing the map when it's considering the 2022, what it needs to do and what its obligations are, that at that time the legislature was right in its evaluation of this district.

I agree with Your Honor, though, that it logically follows that that district as well
would have been a racial gerrymander.
THE COURT: If it's not, if I don't have to decide that, isn't it the burden of the legislature to show that there is no district that could be drawn that would preserve, so that there is no racial diminishment based on this Benchmark District?

MR. BARDOS: Yeah, I think, Your Honor, that is what the record shows. I think what --

THE COURT: I want you to be very specific with what you mean by the record. This goes back to my admonishment of counsel that appears they have agreed on the facts, but they really haven't. The only facts I have -- I talked to you about the ones that are very articulate.

But when we start going off to you can find it on a website, I don't know, when was that last changed; whenever you cite things, it's when it was last visited, and what it says, et cetera, et cetera.

So again, I want you to be very precise on what you mean by the record shows.

MR. BARDOS: Yes. And I will do that, Your Honor. And we'll walk through from 2015, when the Florida Supreme Court itself said the
east-west orientation is the only alternative option.

THE COURT: It was back then. But you are trying to say now it's not. So --

MR. BARDOS: That's right, Your Honor. And we'll walk through from there to the current time all of the evidence that supports our position.

So back in 2015 the Court said that was the only alternative option. Since then, what has happened?

In the legislative process, this configuration, this basic configuration, is the only one that was ever proposed; that's the one that would diminish the ability to elect. There was a district that was drawn entirely in Duval County which the legislature hoped would perform, but we also said that was a singular exception to the diminishment standard.

You can have a district that minimally performs, while at the same time diminishing the district from where it was before, and that was the position we took with that.

Throughout the legislative process there was never another district proposed by anybody
on either side of the aisle that did not diminish besides that one. I think that's very strong evidence that there is no other district out there that does it. And why is that?

Well, for the same reason that the district runs 200 miles. You have to connect the population in Jacksonville to the population in Tallahassee in order to get to a district that doesn't diminish. There is no other way to do it because, as Your Honor said, there is nothing in between. There is no significant population centers in between.

So that's why there is no other way to do it. That's why the Florida Supreme Court said there is no other way to do it; that's why the legislative process --

THE COURT: Again, this rummaging through the record, I saw that -- this is the great thing about computers, but I will note I think all populations were exactly equal or within plus or minus one. That's not required under the law, is it? Couldn't you have gone a hundred or a thousand this way or that way and maybe come up with something different but nobody proposed this?

MR. BARDOS: In drawing districts, Congressional districts specifically, plus or minus one is the standard. The Court, U.S. Supreme Court has allowed some minimal deviation where some exceptional justifications have been shown, but absolute mathematical quality has otherwise been the standard --

THE COURT: Did anybody do that here or there to propose something different?

MR. BARDOS: Well, I think what we have is the legislative record that shows this was the only district that was drawn.

The other part of that, Your Honor, is this very litigation. Never in this litigation have plaintiffs proposed anything else that they say --

THE COURT: Again that's -- I get that. That's a big argument on whether they have to propose it or you do. And we are getting there.

MR. BARDOS: Right. I am simply saying that's part of our evidence, that this is the only way to draw this district. So we have the Florida Supreme Court saying it's the only way to do it. Nobody in the legislative process
proposed a way to do it that doesn't diminish. Nobody in this litigation has proposed another way to do it that doesn't diminish.

They talk about the east-west district in their pleading. They talk about it in their temporary injunction papers as what they wanted before. It's what was in their expert disclosures. It's what they presented in their summary judgment papers. And it's the only remedy that's stipulated to in the stipulation the parties entered into.

One would think that if we have the Florida Supreme Court, every member of the legislature, and these plaintiffs in this case and nobody ever proposes an alternative to this, I think that's very strong evidence that this is what we are talking about; that this is what was really the choice before the legislature when it had to choose between that district and its equal protection obligations.

THE COURT: I guess what I am saying is not that exact district. Obviously things have changed, but some of this is a problem when you talk about up in Tallahassee, whether that can be solved by pushing around some things.

MR. BARDOS: Well, we have seen --
THE COURT: That would change a lot of compactness, wouldn't it?

MR. BARDOS: We have seen different iterations in the legislative process. Tallahassee was drawn a little bit differently in different versions, Jacksonville was drawn a little bit differently.

In terms of compactness scores, it might move the needle a little bit. That district though would never qualify as being compact in itself.

If race were not an issue with this district, that district would be invalidated on its face if someone brought a compactness challenge, because its compactness scores don't measure up to what the Florida Supreme Court has always insisted on for compactness.

It's not visually compact, now matter how Tallahassee and Jacksonville are contoured. Its compactness scores, the Reock score is around .12, which is extraordinarily low. Its Polsby-Popper score is extraordinarily low.

If there were not Tier 1 considerations in place, that district would be invalided on

Tier 2 grounds. And I think that's hardly disputable. That's not -- if that's the district that's permitted under Tier 2 and the legislature can draw the entire state that way, then Tier 2 really doesn't have teeth and Tier 2 doesn't really mean much.

I don't think that any alternative consideration of Tallahassee or Jacksonville really changes that. The district basically remains the same.

So what was the predominant motive? We didn't hear it today, but in their papers plaintiffs proposed certain alternative explanations. They say, well, the legislature was simply trying to preserve the benchmark, and preservation is an end in itself.

We see that refuted in cases like the City of Jacksonville and the District Court in Bethune Hill where the Court said, well, that would simply be a loop hole that allows the jurisdiction to draw a racial gerrymander once, and then the second time, when it comes along and simply asserts that it's simply preserving that district that it drew before, for whatever reason, then that immunizes that district
against challenge going into the future.
We still have to ask why was that district drawn? Why are we preserving it? Why was it drawn that way in the first place?

Racial gerrymanders don't become immunized the second they are enacted.

Legal compliance, our attempts to comply with the Tier 1 standard is an end in itself and that's the predominant motive. The Supreme Court has never reasoned that way. Jurisdictions frequently have said we drew this to comply with the Voting Rights Act.

Well, the U.S. Supreme Court has still said, okay, your predominant motive was race, then we'll figure on the back end whether your efforts to comply with the VRA justifies that. So efforts for legal compliance don't mean that that the district was drawn for reasons other than race.

Third is litigation avoidance. They say that we were simply trying to avoid litigation.

Number 1, there is no evidence that that was the motivation for that particular district which ultimately we didn't enact anyway. But that -- really, that motivation would be
available to all states. All states hire outside counsel to help them through the redistricting process. All states try to avoid litigation. That has never been recognized, and they don't cite any case where that has been recognized as an interest.

I think we explain in our response brief why Abbott versus Perez is not on point.

So they, we don't think, cite any precedent to support any of those as predominant motives in a racial gerrymandering case.

So we are left with no alternative explanation as to why that district has been drawn if not for racial reasons, and a significant volume of evidence showing that it was drawn for racial reasons.

They show you districts, Your Honor, like this, District 30, one of the images that they have shown the Court, and they say well, this district doesn't quite look like that. And sure, they can cherrypick examples of districts that look like Rorschach blocks and say that this might be a little bit better that those, but that doesn't that mean to prevail on a
racial gerrymandering defense we have to show the district looks like this.

That, in the Bethune Hill, the United States Supreme Court said that there doesn't even have to be any conflict between traditional redistricting principles and race-based motivation in order to find a race-based motivation.

You can have a district that doesn't look ungamely and still have a predominantly racially motivation. The Supreme Court explained that in Bethune versus Hill, and it explained that in Miller versus Johnson when it said that our original decision in Shaw versus Reno really emphasized the bizarre shape of the district; that's not so much what racial gerrymandering is necessarily about; that can definitely be powerful evidence of a raced-based motive, but it's not required in order to show a race-based district.

So we don't think that the fact that Texas drew a district that looks like this means that that district necessarily is not drawn predominantly on the basis of race.

So your Honor, that's the evidence on
predominance. We think that that evidence is very much well cited, it supports a finding that this district was drawn on the basis of race.

So that brings us to the second part of the inquiry, and that is the compelling state interest. And this, Your Honor, is where we think they bear the burden of proof, because our constitution -- there are certain things that the United States Constitution abhors. One is speech restrictions, another one is raced-based government decision-making.

And in those cases we apply strict scrutiny. And strict scrutiny is basically a shifting of the burden to the proponent of those measures, that the Constitution disfavors so strongly that we are going to put the burden on the proponent, the party that proposes, say, speech restrictions, or is the proponent of race-based government action; they have to bear the burden on that to show that's consistent with the Constitution.

It's not the party that opposes race-based government decision-making or the party that opposes speech restrictions that has to show
that nothing could possibly justify that.
THE COURT: Their point, Counsel, and this is the question I have, is the plaintiffs aren't imposing that. The state is through its constitution.

And again, prior litigation aside, in this case, why isn't the Attorney General here defending the constitutionality of the Florida Constitution?

Isn't the government is imposing this restriction upon itself through -- this provision is in the Florida Constitution. Why does an individual citizen or a group, in this case -- well, what we got both -- why do they have to justify the actions of the State of Florida, because the State of Florida has imposed this upon its own legislature?

MR. BARDOS: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Why do they have to defend the constitutional provision? Why isn't that upon the government to defend its own constitution?

MR. BARDOS: First of all, I think it's important that we are not -- at least the House is not bringing a facial challenge in this case. All we are saying in this case is that
this particular district was drawn predominantly on the basis of race, and then there has to be a showing of a compelling interest in order to justify that. That part is black letter law.

And so the predominance inquiry is a district-by-district inquiry. So it's not a matter of us challenging our State Constitution. It's a matter of us saying that that state constitutional provision doesn't apply in that circumstance because we have a federal provision that prevails.

It's just like if there were a conflict between Tier 1 and Tier 2 within the State Constitution, and we have to deviate from compactness in order to serve the Tier 1 interest. That's the balancing.

So from the House's perspective here, I think once we show racial predominance, which I think we have done in space, I think that at that point, under our Federal Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, we then have -- they then bear the burden to show a compelling interest, because we get into that strict scrutiny analysis.

And so have they shown that compelling interest? I don't think so. They only cite one compelling interest for this district. And I think it's very telling, Your Honor, that the one compelling district interest they cite really has nothing to do with the sorts of considerations that typically go into redistricting.

They are not saying there is a community of interest here. They are not saying this is a compact district. They are really simply saying that complying with the nondiminishment standard in itself is a compelling interest, period, no matter what the circumstance, no matter what the district. Simply legal compliance with that nondiminishment standard is in itself a compelling state interest.

And what that would mean is that the State could establish in its constitution its own compelling interest. If any state could put a nondiminishment standard in its constitution, and then any district that it draws pursuant to that nondiminishment standard gets a free pass under equal protection, because it's got that compelling interest built in the State

Constitution.
If only Texas had thought of that, then this district would be constitutional, because if Texas had had a nondiminishment provision in its constitution and this district had preexisted, and the legislature drew this, then according to their theory, there would be a compelling interest in Texas' case --

THE COURT: Wouldn't a challenge then be the -- if the Florida House or the Florida Senate felt that the State Constitution improperly restrained them under the Federal Constitution, for them to go sue in Federal Court and get a declaratory action that the State Constitution provision was not violating the U.S. Constitution prior to districting, wouldn't that --

Again, I am having a problem seeing where the plaintiffs have to show -- the compelling interest is to follow the presumably -- and again, this gets into your colleague's argument. If this Court were to find it facially not to violate the Equal Protection Clause, then if it doesn't facially violate equal protection, why is it not a compelling
interest to follow it?
MR. BARDOS: I think that's a great question, Your Honor.

I don't think -- and this is what they do in their papers. They basically make the case that the plaintiffs do, that this is facially constitutional. That's the argument that they made.

THE COURT: Well, has any Court found nondiminishment to be facially unconstitutional, whether that be from the Voting Rights Act or a state provision? There is a number of states that have had placed similar things in their constitution.

Has there been any single case that has found nondiminishment to be facially unconstitutional?

MR. BARDOS: No, I am not aware of that, Your Honor, but I don't think that that equates to having a compelling interest. Simply showing that something is barely facially constitutional, it's simply valid, doesn't show that the State has a compelling interest in pursuing that.

A compelling interest is an
extraordinarily high bar. Facial validly is a low bar. Until it's declared unconstitutional, every statute is presumed facially valid. That doesn't mean that every one of them establishes a compelling interest.

THE COURT: The argument here by the House is we just decided it was not valid, this provision of the Florida Constitution, and so we disregard it, as opposed to getting it found unconstitutional.

MR. BARDOS: Which is precisely what the legislature has to do in every redistricting process because of that hierarchy of standards.

Think about again -- and I will analogize the Tier 1 and Tier 2 hierarchy within the State Constitution.

The legislature has to make those judgments countless times in drawing its state legislative and congressional maps. To what extent do we have to sacrifice Tier 2 considerations in order to satisfy Tier 1?

Should the legislature have to go to a Court in advance and get a declaratory judgment every time it has to deviate from Tier 2 to serve Tier 1, or every time it has to deviate
from the State Constitution to comply with a Federal statute, or every time it has to comply with the State -- Federal Constitution? That would be entirely unworkable.

All of these factors, all of these criteria are in play at the same time, and the legislature has to figure out which one takes precedence, or can they be reconciled; and it's simply unworkable to require the legislature to pursue a DAC action every time that that sort of tension exists between those standards.

The Florida Supreme Court recognized, there will always be tension between these standards. Sometimes they will conflict. The State Constitution itself expressly assumes that.

THE COURT: So thus your argument that -or not joining the argument of the Secretary that there is no facial -- there is no facial unconstitutionality of the Florida provisions?

MR. BARDOS: We have not asserted that defense, Your Honor. We are asserting --

THE COURT: If it were facially, then that's when you would need to go ahead. It is facially, at the time Florida voters put it in,
then if you know it's facially improper, if the voters of Florida were to put something into the constitution saying you can discriminate based on race, sex, et cetera, then that would be incumbent to go ahead and take care of that right then.

MR. BARDOS: Yeah. And our focus in this litigation, speaking for the House, has been the as-applied challenge, is simply just say that district doesn't satisfy equal protection, and that's why we had to go with the different configuration.

And that's the sort of district-by-district analysis of what -- which standards take precedence, how to balance those standards, that the legislature has to make; those judgment calls the legislature has to make throughout the legislative process. And it simply can't pursue a declaratory judgment action every time it has that sort of conflict to resolve.

So the compelling interest, Your Honor, they assert only the one, which is compliance with the nondiminishment standard. And again, that would afford a blanket safe harbor to
every district in the state that's drawn pursuant to the diminishment standard. It would say this district is basically untouchable by equal protection because it has its own built-in compelling interest.

I think that sort of approach, Your Honor, is unprecedented, especially given the fact that --

THE COURT: Or is the corollary that that means nondiminishment is constitutional?

MR. BARDOS: I am sorry, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Would the corollary mean that the nondiminishment provision is constitutional and that is a compelling interest to avoid nondiminishment?

MR. BARDOS: So again, we are not challenging the facial validity. We are accepting that for purposes of this argument.

But again, I think there is a difference between saying it's constitutional, which is a relatively low bar, facially constitutional, versus being a compelling interest.

The compelling interest is an extraordinary high bar, and that's why the strict scrutiny test has been described as
strict in theory and fatal in fact, because it is an extraordinarily high bar.

And one doesn't get there simply by saying it's facially valid. Facially is a minimal bar. Showing compelling interest is much more difficult. That's why the U.S. Supreme Court, in evaluating even the Federal Voting Rights Act, has never held that the compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest.

It has always said we simply assume this. And I don't want to gloss over that. I think that's very significant. We have never -- if this Court --

THE COURT: Why shouldn't this Court assume?

MR. BARDOS: Why should the Court? Well, this Court would have to decide that. The U.S. Supreme Court has been able to avoid making a decision on this issue, a preliminary decision on this issue on different grounds. For example, it says -- in some cases it has said, okay, you are citing the Voting Rights Act but you are misinterpreting it. It didn't require this district; or okay, even if that were a compelling interest, you didn't narrowly tailor the district.

So there have always been alternative grounds on which the Court has been able to dispose of those sorts of cases. It has never come to the point where it has actually had to decide is this a compelling interest or is it not.

This Court is being asked to make that decision, and in a sense get out ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court, which has never decided that, even as to the Voting Rights Act; and I think what really makes a difference on the compelling interest analysis is the significant differences between the Voting Rights Act and the nondiminishment provision.

So the Voting Rights Act, let's look at Section 5, which is what the nondiminishment provision was based on. There are significant differences, not necessarily in substantive application of it, but in other respects.

One is that the Section 5 was clearly designed to be a very narrow targeted remedial provision. When it was enacted, it had both geographical limits and durational limits. It
applied only to certain states, certain counties, and it was based on Congressional findings, and then data showing where are the jurisdictions in this country that have exceptionally low voter turnout rates and voter registration rates among minority voters. And those are the specific areas of the country that were targeted by Section 5 and subjected to Section 5.

In 2011, when Section 5 was -- it was the last redistricting cycle to which Section 5 applied. There were only nine states in the country to which it applied and a handful of counties and municipalities in addition.

In Florida, it applied to only five counties, none of them in the North Florida area. So it was very much targeted to certain areas.

It was also subject to durational limits. Congress reauthorized Section 5 multiple times, each time for a limited period of time. It was never meant to be a long-term open-ended provision that continued on into the future indefinitely.

And why are these things important? They are important because the only -- apart from prison riots, you know, a very niche type of compelling interest, the only compelling interest the United States Supreme Court has ever actually held justifies racial discrimination is the remediation of a specific identified instance of race discrimination.

And that's why I think the U.S. Supreme Court has been willing to assume that the Voting Rights Act serves as a compelling interest, is because it was designed to remediated specific identified instances of race discrimination. It was narrowly drawn that way. It was designed to do that.

Plaintiffs say that the functional analysis essentially achieves that purpose, because you could have a district where suddenly the minority voters move away from the district and no longer has the ability to elect -- or the minority voters suddenly are no long politically cohesive, and so there is no candidate of choice in that district.

But that's not the sort of time limit limitation or restriction on remediation that the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted on in equal
protection cases.
Just this last June, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down the higher ed admission policies that favored certain races over others. The Supreme Court could have said, well, it's possible, we suppose, that minority applicants who will no longer apply to Harvard, and so there is a built-in limitation. Maybe one day this racial preference will no longer apply to anyone. So there is an inherent built-in limitation, but that's not the sort of limitation that the U.S. Supreme Court has ever --

THE COURT: Counsel, isn't -- again, this goes back to that rummaging through the record, again to the extent it is a record; and we talked again -- I want to know more about that as we wrap up.

But isn't that apples and oranges? You got, at least in the Harvard case according to the opinion, a certain number of slots every year and lots and lots and lots of extra people applying, whereas at least the data that drew the numerous filings you guys have sent over, you see a shift, say even in the White
population of Florida, the amount by which they are a majority is going down, at least according -- I am not making that a finding. It just seems anecdotally it shows at some point Caucasians may be a minority in this state. There may not be a majority race. There may be plurality.

You look at some of the other districts in Florida -- 25, 26, 27, et cetera, like that -you have got -- I don't know if you call them majority-minority; you may call them that now. They may not be. Eventually they may just be majority districts.

So why are those the same, the college admissions, where they get to select who they put in their population, whereas the population of Florida, no individual, no group, nobody gets to decide what makes up that population.

MR. BARDOS: I think one thing, too, to keep in mind is that the purpose here is to find a compelling interest of remediating racial discrimination. And so because of that, there have to be limitations on the government action, and the nondiminishment provision doesn't have the sorts of limitations that the

Voting Rights Act has.
To your point, Your Honor, in 1992 in the Johnson versus Mortham case, when the districts were created, '92 is when districts were first drawn that would enable minority voters to elect the candidates of their choice, there were three, just like now. So that hasn't changed.

And so those sorts of changes, that's not a real durational limit. Sure, can it happen? Will there be population changes? There will be population changes. Can it be that perhaps one day we might find that it's not possible to redraw that district? It's possible.

THE COURT: How many times since '92 have the Courts thrown out the districts that were originally enacted?

MR. BARDOS: Well, the original district that was drawn in North Florida was thrown about by the Court itself just a few years after it was drawn. When it was first drawn, it was the district the plaintiff shows that looked like a horseshoe, went up from Orlando to St. Augustine and around to Gainesville, and a few years later the Court threw out its own
district as a racial gerrymander.
THE COURT: How many times has it thrown out the ones the legislature has enacted?

MR. BARDOS: On specifically racial gerrymandering grounds?

THE COURT: No, just thrown it out for violating the Florida or Federal Constitution as it relates to the standards in place at the time.

MR. BARDOS: That happened last cycle. There were a number of districts the Florida Supreme Court found to be invalid in the Congressional map.

It happened during the -- with some of the state legislative districts last cycle as well, not this cycle with any district yet. So, yes, it has happened.

THE COURT: How about going further back into the '60s, hasn't there been a number of maps thrown out?

MR. BARDOS: I don't recall the exact history, Your Honor, but there have been. I can't give you a precise number, but there have been on various grounds. But I think the important --

THE COURT: Isn't that a compelling interest to tell the legislature how to get it right?

MR. BARDOS: How to get it right, sure, but is there a compelling interest in drawing this district with racial predominance? And again, is it a blanket compelling interest in every single case to draw a district that doesn't diminish? And what do they cite in support of that compelling interest?

They say, well, there is a long history of race discrimination in Florida. They cite the white primaries from the 1940s. They cite various decisions that invalidated at large districting on a local basis from 1982 to 1990.

So they have to go back that far. That's the history of race discrimination that they say justifies the nondiminishment standard.

But exactly how the nondiminishment standard remediates the white primaries from the 1940s or the at-large districting in local elections in the 1980s, they don't quite explain.

And I think, Your Honor, the League of Women Voters case that the 11th Circuit decided
very recently at 66 Fed. 4th 905 is telling. It was not a racial gerrymandering claim, but it was an intentional discrimination claim. And the Court said there is not an unlimited look back. We don't look back forever to what happened in 1865 in determining whether there is a need for race-based remediation of a history of race discrimination. If that were so, every state certainly in the southeastern part of the United States would have a compelling interest in these provisions forever.

But the plaintiffs don't cite anything more recent than 1990 to support their history of race discrimination that they say makes the nondiminishment standard a compelling interest.

So I don't think that they have shown remediation. And I think the way the nondiminishment standard is drafted in a blanket way, I don't think that's comparable to the remedial provisions that are in the Voting Rights Act.

I think there are other differences between the Voting Rights Act and the nondiminishment provision. The Voting Rights

Act is considered perhaps the most successful piece of Civil Rights legislation in the country. It was enacted a hundred years after the Civil War in the midst of the Civil Rights movement to bring the Jim Crow era to an end and it was based on significant Congressional findings.

None of that is applicable to the nondiminishment standard. The nondiminishment standard was put into the constitution in 2010 without that same pedigree.

THE COURT: How could it have that pedigree, because it was obvious that -- and they are not required to, but the legislature, which develops that kind of pedigree, chose not to act, so people under the Florida Constitution chose to act. And they are not able to have that kind of -- but don't they have all of that history that goes behind the Voting Rights Act when they make a decision to put a provision in the constitution?

I mean, we got -- we have pregnant pigs, that's where it all started in the constitution. Aren't the people limited by the constitution on what background they are able
to show in a record?
MR. BARDOS: And I would say I don't think pregnant pigs is a compelling interest either --

THE COURT: Well, it made the constitution.

MR. BARDOS: -- officially valid, but it's not a compelling interest.

But I think, Your Honor, to your point, so, yes, there is -- we have the history of the Voting Rights Act. Well, as the U.S. Supreme Court said in the City of Richmond case, a state cannot simply lean on Congressional findings from what Congress has done, for example, in the Voting Rights Act and say, okay, that justifies what we are going to do.

And I think that leads into the third thing.

THE COURT: The state can't, as in the state through its elected legislature, or the people of the state can't even rely on that?

MR. BARDOS: The state. So the Equal Protection Clause applies to the states. It says no state shall.

And so whether it's enacted in this method
or that method, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the states cannot simply enact what they consider to be perhaps benign race-based provisions leaning on Congressional findings.

And I think that leads into the third point that differentiates the Voting Rights Act from the nondiminishment provision, and that is the expressed authority that the federal government has, Congress specifically has with respect to race.

And this is discussed in the City of Richmond case as well. And what the 14th Amendment says is that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection laws.

So it places that limit on states. And then it says that Congress shall have the power to enforce the provisions of this article, so it grants power to Congress.

And what the U.S. Supreme Court in the plurality portion of its opinion said in the City of Richmond case is that that effected a dramatic change in the balance of power between the federal government and the states with respect to race.

And so what that provision, the 14th Amendment embodies, Your Honor, is a policy of deference towards Congress with respect to race and a policy of skepticism towards the states with respect to race.

The federal government does not place states and Congress on the same footing when it comes to race. It trusts Congress more than it trusts the states. And that's what the City of Richmond case says.

It says, a state might not be able to enact under the Equal Protection Clause the very same provision that Congress might, or the state might have to make a greater showing than the federal government does in order to justify the same provision.

THE COURT: Hasn't this group also recently just said that the states have the primary function of apportionment in making sure that they get -- they get to do that, they get to control that, because there was a school of thought that independent legislature and State Constitution and state courts couldn't touch it. And that didn't go through.

MR. BARDOS: That's true, Your Honor. So
that is a general principle applicable to redistricting. It's a matter primarily for the states, the states take the lead on it, state legislatures take the lead on it.

But within that, we have specific federal restrictions. We have federal limitations. And so the general principle that states are responsible for redistricting doesn't somehow limit or supplant what the Equal Protection Clause tells us.

There are certain things that are carved out, and the supremacy clause makes those primary. The plaintiffs cited a couple of cases in their response brief where the courts have said states has leeway in drawing minority districts.

I will note that both of the cases that they cite predate Shaw versus Reno, which established the racial gerrymandering cause of action, that line of cases.

So Your Honor, we think that they have not shown a compelling interest, and for all those reasons, the district that they propose was -is unconstitutional and the legislature made the right judgment, and the Court should
validate that judgment.
Now to go back to some of the issues that they say barred this Court's consideration of equal protection, one that they raise is standing. And what they seem to be arguing now is the basic standing concept that we are familiar with -- injury, traceability, redressability, that type of standing, rather than Public Official Standing Doctrine.

I will note that that injury-based standing doctrine that they are advancing here is not in their reply that they filed for our affirmative defenses, and it's not one of the issues that was identified in the parties' stipulation as one that remains at issue in this case.

The stipulation identified four issues that this Court has to decide. And the defendants' standing to assert their defense is not one of the four issues that is identified in that stipulation.

But the other thing I think is the real clincher, Your Honor, they don't cite any case for the proposition that before a defendant can assert an affirmative defense, the defendant
must prove that type of standing, an injury-based standing. That is a standing doctrine that applies to claims that are brought by plaintiffs, claims that -counterclaims perhaps.

But I have not yet seen the Florida case that says that a defendant, in order to assert an affirmative defense, must satisfy requirements of that sort of injury-based standing doctrine.

And, in fact, we know that the Florida Supreme Court entertained very similar defenses during the last cycle when it was again a conflict between the two provisions within the state constitutional hierarchy. And we said, well, we introduced these districts because we were trying to avoid diminishment, so we didn't draw a compact district; we drew it to avoid diminishment. Florida Supreme Court entertained those defenses and decided those defenses.

So we think the standing doctrine doesn't apply here. It is not in the stipulation, it wasn't pleaded, and it's not something the defendants have to prove to assert an
affirmative defense.
They argue, well, it's speculative. We are not sure what district we are talking about, we discussed that. They are not left to guess, all of the districts that were ever at issue as potential nondiminishing districts in North Florida are the same.

THE COURT: Let's talk about that, though. This is what I round about talked about it, that the district we are talking about is this benchmark that is no longer in effect.

And so isn't that what they are talking about? And again, I think you answered the question, but are you challenging this Benchmark District?

MR. BARDOS: Again, technically no, we are not challenging the Benchmark District, recognizing though that any district -- so the legislature had a choice to make. It could either preserve a district that is that district or very much like that district, or it could draw something different.

And so the challenge is not to that specific district, but the challenge is to the district that would be a nondiminishing
alternative, which is the same basic configuration. Everybody agreed on that basic configuration. Every district that they would to show you as a nondiminishing alternative adopts that very same configuration. And so, again, it's not the specific Benchmark District that we are challenging. But again, I think it's helpful if the Court puts itself in the legislature's shoes. It's having to make a decision about whether to reenact a district like that one, that runs from Gadsden to Duval. And it had to make a decision about that.

So the district line is a little bit different in Tallahassee, that's not the issue. The issue is did we have to preserve a district like that?

The Court --
THE COURT: What is the Court to make that you didn't pass one? I get that it was vetoed, and the Governor was perfectly within his constitutional rights to do that. That is what the people elected him to do, is to make those kind of calls. But you didn't pass one.

MR. BARDOS: Right. And I think that
reflects, Your Honor, the complexity of the task of redistricting. As the U.S.

Supreme Court has said, redistricting is not easy. We have a hierarchy of standards, beginning with the Federal Constitution and going down to Tier 2 in our State Constitution. It's a balancing.

And the other thing that makes redistricting so difficult and complex is all of the population, demographics and the geography of the state, there is an infinite number of ways to divide the state into 28 districts. And so until someone spends a lot of time moving district lines around, which we did throughout the process, you really don't know what's possible and what's not possible.

THE COURT: Allen versus Milligan kind of dealt with that and the computers and the craziness, didn't it?

MR. BARDOS: Yeah, but it is still the fact. So the question Your Honor asked is then didn't the legislature pass a district like that? But that is part of the complexity of the task. We are always grappling with these issues. The thought process is always
developing throughout every redistricting process. That's true in every redistricting process.

So ultimately, we came to the same conclusion that the Governor did, and that is that equal protection does not permit the creation of that district because race predominates and because we didn't see the compelling interest in preserving that district. And I think the facts in the record bear it out.

Now Your Honor expressed I believe some perhaps reservation about the Florida Supreme Court perhaps having validated that district and the Court second guessed that.

I think it's important to keep in mind that the racial gerrymandering claim or defense was not presented in that case. And Appellate Courts operate on a principle that is often called a party presentation principle.

Appellate courts will decide the issues that the parties present to them and they won't go outside of that, unless it's something that affects subject matter jurisdiction or something of that nature.

But because it wasn't presented, it wasn't something that was considered. We saw this in the Johnson v. Mortham cases where the Federal District Court established this district originally in '92 and then struck it down a couple of years later.

So it is not unprecedented, and certainly courts, appellate courts don't generally decide issues that are not presented to them and it wasn't presented to them.

I think Your Honor also asked, well, isn't the right remedy to simply hold on the nondiminishment piece that the Enacted Map diminishes? Let's just declare the Enacted Map unconstitutional and then send it back for remediation.

But if the Court's order doesn't address the equal protection defense, then there is no reason to think that the legislature would reach a different conclusion about what equal protection requires of it.

And so if the Court limits itself to nondiminishment and says this district diminishes, end of story, judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court hasn't really told us
anything that we don't already know. We already know that there is no performing district in North Florida. And so when we go back to the drawing board, we still have to consider the Equal Protection Clause because we took an oath to do that. Your Honor did as well, as Your Honor mentioned in the hearing on the Public Official Standing Doctrine. So then we have to go back to the drawing board without any guidance on the equal protection issue.

THE COURT: This gets us back to what we have in the record. What do we have in the record, and specifically where, about all this, what is equal protection, what is not, because there is a big opaque portion of this record, and it's justified -- we litigated the privileges here -- but there is a big opaque portion of this record as to okay, yes, we have -- we have some veto messages regarding this, this does not reach equal protection.

But there is a big gap there. And that's allowable. I am not saying that's bad or good or otherwise. That's our constitution, and the principles of privilege and separation of
powers.
But where do we have in the record all this extensive trying to find something else that says equal protection is -- we can't get there without violating equal protection?

Where do we have that, because again, I haven't considered anything until you guys give me specifics, but the little bit I have seen is I don't like these maps, they are vetoed, they violate equal protection.

That very well may be right. That's one of the things the Court is asking -- the Court is being asked, but not the -- but -- here's how we try to satisfy both conditions.

I need to know specifically page, line, where in the record that is?

MR. BARDOS: Again, I would point Your Honor to what the Florida Supreme Court said in 2015 when it adopted this district, 172 Southern 3rd 363 at page 403, when it says this is the only alternative option.

THE COURT: That was back in 2015.
MR. BARDOS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So you are telling me that I am not finding that to be unconstitutional. So
where is it that that was attempted in 2022 to not violate equal protection. I have -- this is what -- we don't have people sitting in here giving testimony when I move these lines here, there and yonder, and I was not able to come up with something that did not diminish, but at the same time was not racially predominated, I was unable to do it in an east-west configuration. Where do I have that?

MR. BARDOS: I think answer the record gives Your Honor is the uniformity beginning with Florida Supreme Court's decision of going through the legislative process and through this litigation, nobody --

THE COURT: How do you know where in the legislative process, because the House and Senate passed things that looked similar to this. That was vetoed, and that's -- again, I am not questioning the veto, that is the Governor's prerogative to veto any legislation he wants to, and then it again leaves those tough policy choices to the House and Senate.

Do they let the veto go or do they override the veto. That's a policy decision that the people that elect them.

But then we had basically one map, this is
it. So at least -- again, I am not finding that, I am -- because I don't know exactly where all that is in the record based on the stipulation you have given me.

But that's my general understanding to guide the Court's questions.

MR. BARDOS: Right. And I think, Your Honor, the answer is simply that throughout the legislative process, this was the one alternative that anybody ever proposed. It's the only alternative the plaintiffs proposed. I think that's the answer that the record furnishes.

I don't think anyone has ever proposed a different district that does not diminish with -- obviously with somewhat different lines in Leon County and Duval County.

THE COURT: That doesn't mean it's not possible. That goes back to the Allen versus Milligan, well, we showed you 2 million and the Court specifically addressed that, and they said but what about the other 14 trillion, or whatever numbers were.

So just because somebody moved those
specific ones around differently doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

MR. BARDOS: Yeah. So I think the record provides that consistency, and I think that's a very strong -- that's very strong evidence that that is -- otherwise, it would have been proposed. I think that's very strong evidence that that's the option that we had before us.

And I think that sort of argument comes up in the sorts of claims that this Florida Supreme Court adjudicated the last cycle when it was finding that, okay, you had to draw this district to avoid diminishment, or whatever the other arguments were within the hierarchy within the State Constitution. It had to make judgments about --

THE COURT: But didn't -- I was going to go back -- this is why, when we are done today, I am going to ask for proposed orders so that you can cite exactly where that shows it, because at least in those, you had weeks-long trials, you had experts testify, you had documentary evidence, you had something the Court could go back and look at.

All I've got is a couple of pages and then
you can go troll the record for the rest of it, and read these things. I don't necessarily plan to do that -- party presentation principles.

So where is the presentation of -- you know, that there is no other way to do this?

MR. BARDOS: We'll be happy in the proposed order to be as specific as we can be about where the record would reveal that.

So -- but I think, Your Honor, that unless Your Honor has any additional questions, I think that I touched on everything that I wanted to cover.

And so again, for us it's a very practical inquiry. We had a choice to make, do we preserve the district or do we not?

Race predominates. We think the evidence is very strong on that. Is there a compelling interest? We don't think the plaintiff demonstrated that and we would ask Your Honor to uphold the Enacted Map.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Nordby.

MR. NORDBY: Good morning, Your Honor, Dan Nordby for the Florida Senate.

I want to address first the issue you raised earlier about the affirmative defenses. I think the point there is the difference between a legal defense and something that might be pled as an affirmative defense or otherwise is waived.

We believe that constitutional compliance of the sort that has been discussed here is not an affirmative defense that must be pleaded or is otherwise waived.

Sometimes parties raise those sorts of things as an affirmative defense in an abundance of caution to ensure that there is not a waiver, but we don't think in this case compliance with the 14th Amendment is something that must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. Similarly, separation of powers is sometimes pled as an affirmative defense by a party. A failure of a defendant to plead separation of powers as an affirmative defense certainly doesn't mean that Your Honor can start exercising executive or legislative power simply because it was not raised in that particular manner. So we certainly join the arguments of --

THE COURT: Hold on. Doesn't one have to, like you have done in this case, assert privilege; if you don't assert privilege, then, yes, the Court can absolutely go there?

MR. NORDBY: We have asserted privilege.
THE COURT: Right. But that was required to be asserted. If the Senate had not or the Governor or the House had not asserted privilege, then wouldn't that be waived and the Court could have ordered these things that normally would have been separation of powers?

MR. NORDBY: Oh, I agree with that. What I am saying here is the difference between a legal defense or legal arguments in defense of the Enacted Map and something that must be separately pleaded as an affirmative defense.

We think the claims that are being made here, the as-applied arguments, are arguments in defense of the Enacted Map rather than affirmative defenses.

Your Honor, to the extent necessary, I suppose I can make an ore tenus motion to amend our answer to align with the arguments that have been made. As Your Honor knows, the rules of Court say that leave to amend should be
freely granted, unless there is futility of use of the amendment process or prejudice.

I don't see where the plaintiffs here would be prejudiced in any way by the Senate aligning its arguments with the House on these particular points. If it's necessary to make that motion, I will be happy to do so.

THE COURT: I am not going to tell you what motions to make and which ones you don't.

You may proceed.
MR. NORDBY: Okay. I will try not to replow a lot of the same ground Mr. Bardos did because, as you mentioned, we filed a joint brief here. But I do want to hit on a few highlights.

I thought the argument Mr. Bardos made about Tier 2 being the standard that always applies, unless Tier 1 requires otherwise, in the Florida Constitution is an important point here, because it illustrates that within the Florida Constitution, there are contradictions and trade-offs that must be made.

Sometimes a Tier 1 requirement may supersede the requirement for compactness in Tier 2.

The essence of our equal protection argument here is that the supremacy clause creates a Tier 0, above Tier 1 and Tier 2, which say that federal law and Federal Constitution always supersedes the requirements of the State Constitution; and that they must be considered when the legislature is weighing all of these competing considerations.

So the legislature, going through these trade-offs, tries to clarify with Tier 2 by drawing compact districts, by drawing districts that respect political and geographical boundaries. If there is a superseding requirement in Tier 1, however, those requirements yield to. Requirements of Tier 2 yield to Tier 1, and the requirements of Tier 1 as well yield to Tier 0, the Equal Protection Clause and the federal Voting Rights Act provisions that apply in the case of redistricting.

So the essence of our claim here is that it's not possible in weighing all of these competing considerations in their appropriate hierarchy, it's simply not possible to draw a Congressional district in North Florida that
both satisfies the nondiminishment requirement of the Tier 1 Florida Constitution and satisfies the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, which is the superior law under the supremacy clause.

Your Honor asked for the evidence for why is it not possible. Of course, that raises the difficult question of proving a negative. But I think we do have in this legislative record -- and we can point to you certainly in proposed orders -- we have what the Senate's professional redistricting staff tried to do to accomplish nondiminishment as compared to benchmark Congressional District 5. It looked a lot like that.

The House's professional redistricting staff separately tried to draw maps that would satisfy the nondiminishment requirement as compared to Benchmark District 5. It also looked like a lot like that.

The plaintiffs in this case have not proposed anything else that would satisfy the nondiminishment requirement as compared to Benchmark District 5.

THE COURT: This gets back to the burden
of who is going to show that?
MR. NORDBY: I think they have the burden. I agree with Mr. Bardos, the party that is asserting a race-based justification has the burden to show that is something that is justified by the Federal Constitution.

We are in an unusual situation here with a race-neutral North Florida that is being challenged on the basis that race should be considered, contrary to the usual standard which is that race is a suspect class for the legislature to consider.

THE COURT: Let me ask this. In that Congressional record that you are going to point out to me, you said, well, the House, the Senate tried to satisfy the constitution provision of the Florida Constitution. But at the time, weren't they operating under the premise -- they weren't operating under the premise that that violated the Equal Protection Clause.

So is there anywhere in the record that says we are operating under the premise that it violates the Equal Protection Clause, and we tried to still satisfy Tier 1 and Tier 2
criteria of Florida redistricting?
MR. NORDBY: Speaking for the Senate, the Senate did not presume that the Benchmark District violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Senate took the Benchmark District as a premise, accepted it and tried to draw a district in a new map, accounting for the 2020 census, that accomplished nondiminishment as compared to that. And what the Senate was able to come up with, something that looked a lot like it.

And I think that's really a function, more than anything else, of the population. If you were attempting to satisfy nondiminishment in North Florida, you by necessity have to join downtown Jacksonville with downtown Tallahassee and Gadsden County. And that's a function in the Congressional district of trying to achieve that ideal population of 769,221 people.

The population in North Florida and down to Central Florida has always reflected that you need to join Jacksonville with either Tallahassee or, what was done originally last decade, with downtown Orlando in order to accomplish nondiminishment and these Tier 1
requirements.
I haven't seen plaintiffs proposing a district that goes down to Orange County again. We have been talking about districts that goes east-west in this.

The plaintiffs have not, at any point in this, attempted to show a district that would satisfy nondiminishment in a manner that complies with the Equal Protection Clause.

Your Honor, there are other places in the Enacted Map that it is possible to satisfy both nondiminishment and the Equal Protection Clause. If I can approach the easel, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. NORDBY: We have District 9, District 24, District 27, District 28. These districts are compact districts that also satisfy the nondiminishment requirement and the Equal Protection Clause. Those districts, District 27, looks like a circle. That's a district that's explainable on grounds other than race in a manner that contrasts sharply with the sprawling district across the northern half of the state.

THE COURT: Isn't that a function of population density? I could draw probably a perfect circle if I got enough people.

MR. NORDBY: That's exactly right, though, because the population density and the demographics in North Florida are very different from where they are separately in the state.

And that's why the Senate is asserting this an as-applied argument; because it may be possible to comply with nondiminishment and equal protection elsewhere in the state, and to draw districts that are explainable on grounds other than race that consider race but where race does not predominate.

But it's simply not possible in North Florida, for the same reasons that it's probably not possible in North Florida to draw a district that performs for Native Americans or for Asians Americans.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand it, but why isn't this whole population density, in just getting enough people, enough to say that that is not a predomination? We are going to have to stretch to get the Tallahassee -- we
are going to have to stretch it somewhere. So why is that not a nonpredomination of race? We've got to stretch -- that district is going to stretch in some way, shape or form.

MR. NORDBY: The districts in North Florida are larger than the districts in South Florida, I agree with that.

But if you are looking at a district that's large and rectangular, taking in counties going from west to east, that's very different from a district that joins the downtown of one major metropolitan area and the downtown of a different major metropolitan area in the manner that east-west CD-5 does.

THE COURT: I get that, and this is the very reason -- I don't want to say I prejudge, but this came back in this case when there was a Motion for Summary Judgment on the earlier, now abandoned, compactness. And I said that's a geometry problem.

And ultimately, sure, when you are looking at compactness. But when you are looking at other factors about making sure that there is the same number of people in a district, you are going to have to lose compactness. So
sure, you can have a more compact, but that doesn't mean it's an overriding factor that raises the predominant, does it?

MR. NORDBY: I think it does, and here's why.

The Florida Supreme Court, in its initial review of the legislative maps last cycle, said that where a district's configuration is irregular, where it has appendages, that raises a presumption that there was something else going on here.

So what is that something else that's going on in this North Florida district? If not race, what is it? Is the argument being made that there was a partisan purpose in combining downtown Jacksonville with downtown Tallahassee?

THE COURT: That's been abandoned. That was initially --

MR. NORDBY: Well, the plaintiffs have disclaimed any intent to join those for partisan reasons. So if not that, if it's not a partisan interest, what would be the reason for an irregularly shaped district in North Florida?

THE COURT: But doesn't that go back to my discussions with Mr. Jazil and Mr. Bardos; doesn't mean that that wasn't there; they are just not challenging it on that anymore. Correct?

MR. NORDBY: I am not sure what you mean. We are defending, of course, in this map.

THE COURT: Right. But it could have been done for political reasons, they are just not challenging it anymore and, thus, race doesn't predominant. Correct?

I am not saying I agree with it, but it could have been done -- I am not saying it was, but it could have been done for a host of other reasons where race didn't predominate.

It could be done for political reasons, and they are not challenging it, just like the Secretary didn't challenge the equal protection on the last cycle.

That doesn't mean -- now they are saying we still get to kind of argue it. Can't they still argue it here?

MR. NORDBY: Are you saying -- are the plaintiffs able to argue that an east-west district should be imposed for partisan
reasons?
THE COURT: No. I am saying there is reasons it can be drawn that are not race dominant.

MR. NORDBY: Your Honor, I don't think there are any justifications that the plaintiffs have put forward for drawing a nonTier 2 compliant east-west district other than race. They have not made those arguments that it should be drawn in that manner other than for racial reasons.

Going back to the last cycle and why certain arguments may or may not have been made, you remember, Your Honor, in that litigation, the Secretary of State and the legislature were defending the Enacted Map, which had an equally sprawling north-south district, so equal protection argument would have been an odd claim to have been made in that litigation.

Of course, here we have a district that follows the St. Johns River in northeast Florida, and the equal protection argument has really come to the forefront, I mean, comparing the Enacted Map with a map that attempts to
apply with the nondiminishment requirement in North Florida here.

And for that reason, we certainly agree with the question you asked, that where the Florida Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the question, this Court is bound by that. We agree with that.

At an earlier hearing on legislative privilege, I think you asked the appropriate question and we answered it, that we were making arguments there for preservation purposes, seeking to have some precedent overturned. We're waiting on that still, up in the Appeals Court.

We are not making those arguments here today though. The arguments we are making here today have not been previously addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in last cycle's redistricting litigation.

What we are arguing here is the question that the Governor presented to the Florida Supreme Court in his request for an advisory opinion; a request that the legislature joined in, by the way. The legislature filed a brief asking the Court to consider that question to
avoid post-enactment litigation, which is where we are now.

Of course, the Court always has the discretion to not answer the question and believed it needed a more thorough record than it had in front of it at that stage. But that's the question. What the unresolved question that the Governor posed is the question here today; it's not been previously addressed by Florida Supreme Court precedent.

And the question is this: Where the only way to draw a district that satisfies the nondiminishment requirement would conflict with the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against racial gerrymandering, must the legislature comply with the nondiminishment requirement?

And we suggest the answer to that question is no, because of the supremacy laws. So if the only way to comply with the nondiminishment requirement is to draw a district that violates Equal Protection Clause, the superior law, Tier 0 must prevail. And that's what the Enacted Map does.

The Enacted Map complies with the
nondiminishment clause of the Florida Constitution in every place that it can without violating the Equal Protection Clause.

This challenge has been limited now to North Florida. So we'll just talk about that part of the map, and on Tier 2 grounds, and on every other ground of the Florida Constitution, North Florida presents no challenges whatsoever, the plaintiffs have not challenged anything in that part.

THE COURT: Again, this gets back and the same question is, as to step one of this process, does the enacted district result in nondiminishment or result in diminishment in this case -- do you agree that may be, as applied, violative of equal protection; but do they get past step one to show facially that this is in violation of the Florida Constitutional provision that you can't have this diminishment?

MR. NORDBY: I don't think the Senate has ever disputed that as compared to benchmark CD-5, the Enacted Map does not have a district that satisfies the nondiminishment requirement.

THE COURT: Okay. Is the equal
protection -- and this goes back to -- I asked it 14 different ways because it's worth looking at -- whose burden is it to show is that it is impossible to comply with both the Florida constitutional provision and the Equal Protection Clause? Whose burden is that to show?

MR. NORDBY: We submit it's the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have the ultimate burden in this case to prove their cause of action and to prove that a remedy is possible.

Redistricting litigation is a little unusual in that sense. They are not seeking money damages, which is always something that the Court can award, or a prohibitory injunction alone, which is always something the Court can award to prohibit a defendant from doing something.

The plaintiffs here are seeking the imposition of a remedy, either by the Court or by the legislature within the confines outlined by a Court order.

THE COURT: That's where I am slowly getting to. Okay. The remedy they are really asking for is don't use this map.

Now to the extent of we'll put some other map out there, what if the Court's answer is the remedy you get is don't use this map; legislature, do it right?

So isn't it the legislature's responsibility to show that it can't be done? Why is it theirs to show that the legislature ultimately -- because that's not really the remedy they are asking for. They are asking for not this map.

And then you know what, there is a process by which enactment -- you guys, I am not ruling on whether they are appropriate or not, but that's the flow path you see anyway in how this case, if this case were to throw out that map, to return to it to the legislature anyway. That's their job, not this Court's job.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court, under the prior precedent, they may have to adopt a map, whatever. We are not there.

Why isn't step one, not this map, legislature, try it again. And so if the legislature wants to skip the step of trying again, why doesn't the legislature got to prove right here and now that it is impossible?

MR. NORDBY: Well, a couple of answers to that.

First, as the plaintiffs here, they bear the burden of proof of proving their cause of action and proving that there is a remedy that is available here.

THE COURT: The remedy is you can't use this map. Why isn't that available?

MR. NORDBY: Because not using a map, not using a map or not having a map is not an option here.

THE COURT: Why not? I know it's extreme, but is there a requirement that Florida is required to send representatives to the Congress, or could Florida just sit it out?

I know that's extreme, nobody wants that, but is there a requirement that requires that, or is the state, under the constitution, allowed to send them and this is how you do it?

MR. NORDBY: Florida -- I am not aware of any cases saying Florida could choose not to send its delegation to Washington, D.C., to Congress. If Florida were to have a portion of the state unrepresented, because their challenge is limited to North Florida, if there
were citizens in North Florida who would be unrepresented as a result of a judicial decision, I think that would raise some serious equal protection challenges.

THE COURT: Right, and those citizens could bring an equal protection challenge as to the provision of the Florida Constitution, right?

MR. NORDBY: Well, Your Honor -- so I mentioned a couple of answers to the question you had on the burden.

The first is I believe the plaintiffs have the burden, because they are the plaintiffs, of showing that they have a right and that a remedy is available to them. They have not attempted, again at any point in this litigation, to show that the district that looks something more like that or that or that, could be created that would satisfy nondiminishment.

They raise -- they put up a slide earlier showing that Duval-only version of the district that was passed as part of the legislative process early; I don't think there is any serious question that district would diminish
as compared to benchmark CD-5.
THE COURT: Isn't that theirs to raise?
What if they are okay with that?
MR. NORDBY: Well, the legislature I don't think has the ability to enact a district that would violate either of those two constitutional provisions.

In the event of a conflict, the Federal Constitution provision has to prevail there. So we are defending obviously the Enacted Map and not an alternative that was vetoed or didn't pass here.

THE COURT: But we are talking about the alternatives, because you are saying that they are required to provide an alternative. So we do need to talk about under your logic, we have to talk about an alternative.

MR. NORDBY: Correct. And they have not provided an alternative that satisfies both nondiminishment and equal protection in North Florida.

So the other point I raise on that is to your question about deciding only that -- the nondiminishment issue first and then wait for another day to decide other things, whether
it's until the appeals are done or until some subsequent legislative action.

We think it's far more appropriate to decide everything concurrently here, when it's squarely presented to Your Honor, than to sequentially handle these things.

The plaintiffs' approach, particularly their arguments on standing, which we think are inapplicable for all the reasons in our briefs, what they would have this Court do is issue a ruling solely on nondiminishment without considering the federal constitutional issues, not withstanding the oath to protect -support, protect and defend the constitution of Florida and the constitution of the United States that legislators take and that Your Honor takes.

They would to have to decide just the Florida constitutional issue; find nondiminishment, not allow for a defense for that, and then after the legislature enacts a map that doesn't diminish, then and only then could a citizen file a new complaint in the spring of next year raising a racial gerrymandering claim under a Shaw cause of
action.
THE COURT: Don't we do that all the time in the law? We tick off three issues, and yep, this is still hanging out there, but we'll leave that.

Doesn't the U.S. Supreme Court and Florida Supreme Court say that all the time, we have to leave that for another day?

MR. NORDBY: This is not an issue that can be left for another day. The legislature's authority and obligations under the Florida Constitution and the Federal Constitution will necessarily have to be addressed in any remedial phase if Your Honor finds for the plaintiffs; because as Mr. Bardos said, if the Court addresses only nondiminishment and sends it back to the legislature without addressing what the Equal Protection Clause requires --

THE COURT: But let's talk about the Equal Protection. So it's not -- I know Mr. Jazil says we've got a facial problem, but as applied; as applied to what? It's got to be to a specific district.

If the Court just throws out the map, how am I addressing what district it's violating of
the equal protection, unless one of the parties -- and that's what we are getting to -has to show that there is no possible conceivable map that will do this, that will satisfy nondiminishment and yet doesn't violate equal protection.

MR. NORDBY: So your Honor, I go back to a couple of things I touched on.

I think the population figures in North Florida illustrate why it's not possible to do that without going from Jacksonville to Tallahassee, or from Jacksonville to Orlando.

The legislature had a long process, where it tried pretty hard to satisfy nondiminishment and equal protection. The House staff and the Senate staff both came out with proposals that looked very similar to the benchmark map. And the plaintiffs also have not submitted any alternatives that would illustrate how it can be done, other than through a district that looks like this.

Any district that spans that length of the state, that joins the downtown population area in Jacksonville and Tallahassee, would raise the same sort of equal protection issues that
we are talking about here, whether it's possible to change a couple of the lines to follow a road instead of a river would not resolve those sort of equal protection issues that we are talking about here.

A district like that is unexplainable on any grounds other than race, period. And there has not been anything in this record -- we'll certainly cite in our proposed orders. I hope Your Honor got the exhibits with the transcripts, and so forth, that's what we would look at the record here that we have an obligation to point you to.

THE COURT: I know, but that gets back into, and I hear it time and time again from some of these very defendants, that you can't determine legislative intent by what some legislator says on the floor or in a committee, because I had plaintiff after plaintiff come in and try to cite to me to the Congressional -not in this case -- the legislative record and time and time again, the response, appropriately so, is I don't know why those 27 out of 40 or 38 out of 40 , or whatever senators, voted a certain way. That's why that
one maybe did it.
So again, how am I to resolve that?
Justice Scalia was pretty pointed when he talks about looking at Congressional records and committee hearings and things like that.

MR. NORDBY: I agree with all of that. What we are asking you to look at here is not legislative history in that sense, the intent of a single member.

We are asking you to look at the legislative process that played out here through the introduction of bills, the introduction of amendments. Those are the sort of things that Justice Scalia said are appropriately considered.

THE COURT: Then what do we have between the veto, which is perfectly all right; what do we have between the veto of things that looked like the benchmark and the enacted legislation that gives us any idea of this process other than it was, this is the one that will be signed if you pass it? What do we have?

MR. NORDBY: So what we have is not post-veto but pre-veto. The legislative process that began in October of 2021, through
the committee process, through the presentation of draft proposals to the legislative committees, all the way through to passage on the Senate floor of a proposal in January. All through that process, of course, members could file amendments, if they believed there was a different way to do it.

The same process happening in parallel on the House side of the building: Committee meetings, draft alternatives, introduced or proposed, amendments voted up or down. The House came up with a proposal and as always happens in the legislative process, you need bicameralism, and presentment and signature.

And the bodies came together here, after the special session, with what we needed at the end of that process, which is a map that was agreed to by the House and the Senate and signed by the Governor.

The alternative here in the case of redistricting is, it's not that legislation doesn't pass and let's try again next year. The alternative -- if the political branches here had not gotten together on a map would have been Court-drawn map.

We had the malapportionment the lawsuit in federal Court that was filed even before that special session. So what happened here was the resolution of a lot of difficult issues, as always happens in redistricting.

Federal standards, state standards, competing state standards; we cited to Abbot versus Perez in our papers about the competing litigation risks that always face legislatures in the redistricting year.

The legislature could enact a map that would perhaps accomplish nondiminishment, but it would be opening itself up to a racial gerrymandering lawsuit; or they could pass a map that complies with the Equal Protection Clause, but open themselves up to a nondiminishment lawsuit.

In weighing those considerations, the legislature ultimately in the Enacted Map appropriately considered all of the federal requirements and the state requirements and particularly which prevail over others.

Tier 2 applies, unless Tier 1 requires otherwise. But Tier 1 doesn't apply if Tier 0 requires otherwise. And that's what the

Enacted Map does.
Your Honor, in an abundance of caution, I will make that ore tenus motion to amend our answer to adopt the equal protection as applied arguments as raised by the House, unless the plaintiffs have an objection.

THE COURT: Plaintiff?
MS. KHANNA: We do have an objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: With that, Mr. Nordby I will let you put it in writing. That way it will give anybody that reviews this the opportunity to see what you put in writing. It will give the plaintiff appropriate notice and ability to respond. So you will need to do that.

I am looking at where we are today. I will let you do that by noon tomorrow. And I will give the -- and then I will give the plaintiff until the end of the day on Monday to respond.

MR. NORDBY: Thank you.
THE COURT: With that, Ms. Khanna.
MS. KHANNA: With the Court's indulgence, if we can take a quick break --

THE COURT: Let me see -- and I don't
necessarily need the court reporter. This is a scheduling issue. Let's see one counsel from each party at sidebar.
(Discussion off record.)
THE COURT: What we are going to do, let's take a 10-minute recess. And then we are going to let the plaintiff respond in rebuttal. And I think we should wrap everything up by lunch.
(A recess took place from 12:15 p.m. to 12:30 p.m.)

THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? It looks like Ms. Khanna is ready.

All right, with that, back on the record.
All right. Ms. Khanna, you may proceed.
MS. KHANNA: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a few points I'd like to make on rebuttal.

The first question that this Court has been asking throughout this entire proceeding is, what are the facts here? And as Your Honor has pointed out, you have before you our stipulation of facts that includes paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 that detail the facts relevant to our diminishment claim. And the facts relevant to our diminishment claim are spelled out in black and white. And as the counsel for
the defendants have represented today, they are not in dispute.

I believe counsel for the Senate said that they've never disputed that apparently the Enacted Map violates the nondiminishment provision of the Florida Constitution, which is -- you know, it's taken us some time to get here, but I believe the Court has in front of it everything it needs to find on the diminishment claim that is actually the subject of this litigation, that is actually the plaintiffs' claim before this Court.

Now, the extent to which the Court chooses to take judicial notice of the Florida redistricting website from the state, defendants and all the data and maps in there, that is all I think the question for the extent to which the Court really wants to engage in the defendants' convoluted affirmative defense in their attempt to make this case about something it certainly is not.

The district. This has been a huge question throughout this hearing this morning. What district are we talking about? The defendants have kept up the picture of the

Benchmark District here and kept pointing to this as the district, something like it, something close to it.

I mean, it's telling, of course, I think they all agreed that that's not the district at issue, that's not for this Court to strike down or opine on and, of course, that was a district that was ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.

But then there's -- we did hear from the defendants a lot of things about, well, it's got to be an east-west district. And why is that? It's because the legislature apparently -- we learned during this argument that the legislature apparently believed there was no way to comply with the Florida Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The legislature apparently was tangling with this conflict and this tension that it did not know how to resolve and it had no choice, but the legislative record says something very different, Your Honor.

The legislative record shows, as we have on slide 8 of our presentation, the legislature passed a plan as -- they called it Plan A, their primary plan was a plan that was -- CD-5
was located in Duval County only, and the chair of the House Reapportionment Cormittee for Congressional Redistricting specifically said that this is a Black performing district. It is a reliable Black performing district from the functional analysis.

Now, I don't have today the full record of what he was relying on or what anybody else was relying on, but apparently what Mr. Jazil is choosing to rely on to say otherwise.

But it is puzzling, indeed, how the legislative record can reflect that the legislature passed a primary plan that apparently their counsel now says that they believed all along -- what, was it -- were they misrepresenting what it did to the voters? Were they misrepresenting it to each other? It's entirely unclear.

It seems that the counsel for the House and Senate are now taking the position that is contrary to the legislature itself and it is -it is -- we have to be able to take the legislature at its word at some point, that it thought it could do something.

This idea that they had no choice, what
could they possibly do? Well, they could do what they did. They passed a Plan A, and then after that they passed a Plan B. So this idea that the legislature, by the time it got around to the post-veto era was -- was -- you know, was essentially choiceless, seems to defy the entire legislative record up until that point.

In that same passage on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8, on page 8, where we quote the chair of the House Redistricting Committee speaking about the performance of Plan 8019, in that same transcript, that same chair says that Plan 8015 is, quote, legally compliant under current law.

This Court asked defendants where in the record will I find this supposed tension that the legislature did not believe it could comply with all of the applicable laws? Well, you have in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8 the transcript, page 23, line 16 to 20 , the chair of the House Redistricting Committee saying that Plan 8015 is legally compliant under current law. And now, his counsel is now saying something else, apparently they didn't believe it was compliant under current law.

That is really just defies the record before us.

THE COURT: Well, Ms. Khanna, why can't they say, you know what, we've considered the arguments by the Governor and, you know what, we were wrong and the Governor was right that it violates equal protection? Why can't they make that decision? Because ultimately, whether it's legal or not is a legal question, not a political question, that we asked the legislature to decide political questions. So why can't they change their mind?

MS. KHANNA: Certainly they're allowed to take any litigation strategy they want. I think it's a -- it's a -- it's a questionable litigation strategy that undermines the actual legislative record that they have put forward to this Court as evidence in this case. But are they allowed to change their argument, change their view of the law? Yes, I suppose so.

But I think this -- that pivot point is exactly why this posture makes no sense. Because now we are in Court where plaintiffs have challenged the map actually enacted into
law, and the defendants, rather than defend that map under the law being challenged by, have challenged -- kind of reversed course to say, well, if we had done some hypothetical thing or the thing we actually did do or tried to do, turns out that would have been a violation of the law.

It is -- in trying to turn this case into something it's not, we've all kind of lost our bearings here about who's challenging what. And sure, can somebody make an argument that -of the kind that they're advancing now in violation -- you know, in contradiction to what their own clients said? I suppose so. But does it provide this Court any factual basis to actually find in favor of their affirmative defense? I do not think so.

THE COURT: What about the remedy?
Mr. Jazil brought up the remedy. If this Court ultimately cannot -- I mean, yes, this Court -I can just throw it out, but what if this Court were to throw it out and there literally is no way to meet that standard and not violate the Equal Protection Clause, why is he not right that the plaintiff loses?

MS. KHANNA: Well, I mean, that's a huge if, Your Honor. And as the Court I think has already pointed out, that the proof behind that is not anywhere in that packet -- in this record. Right? That there's no possible way to get it done, apparently, is their argument and is there proof?

But at the end of the day, Your Honor, I've litigated a number of redistricting cases. And when plaintiffs challenge an Enacted Map, what they are able to ask the Court to do is enjoin the map. That is all we've asked this Court to do. That's all I'm able to ask this Court to do.

Now, surely, we all understand that, as a general matter, there needs to be a map for an election. But the legal precedent from this Court, from the Florida Supreme Court, from the U.S. Supreme Court, has always been that when a map is enjoined, it goes back to the legislature to revise or remedy.

And if the legislature is either unable or unwilling to do so, then it falls to the Court to devise a remedy. And so, we're not trying to leapfrog over the legislative prerogative
here. We are asking what we are only allowed to ask of this Court, which is to enjoin the map that is actually enacted into law. And if the legislature then goes back and determines that, contrary to the legislative record that it already had, contrary to the maps that it already passed, it now believes that it is incapable of drawing a lawful map, that is a question for another day. It's not a question before this Court.

THE COURT: Why does it raise to predominate, then? You keep talking about race, and, you know, the House hit on this very hard. What are the other considerations? If this Court were to throw out this map, how do you get -- how do you get a map without race predominating?

MS. KHANNA: I mean, I think we have -- we have examples from the legislative record of maps that they believed were compliant with the law. And that is pretty good evidence that you can do that when the legislature itself seemed to believe we can do it.

And even if we take the direct evidence out of it, Your Honor, we have walked through
step by step traditional redistricting factors. You've heard it from defendants' counsel, the same standard we talked about here before when it comes to racial predominance, and that is that the lines are unexplainable on any basis other than race.

Well, every single line in what we looked at in -- as the -- not even the Benchmark District, but Plan 8015 CD-5 was very explainable on basis other than race. And, in fact, more explainable by reference to political and natural boundaries than all but one district in the Enacted Map.

So I think the record here of what -- you know, again, we're talking about some district, is there a way to draw some district that doesn't violate the nondiminishment provision and is still explainable on criteria other than race, I believe we have shown that in spades. And I did not hear a single word from defendants' counsel -- three defendants' counsel got up and talked about racial gerrymandering, but I did not hear a single rebuttal to the evidence we had about the length of districts in Florida.

I believe I heard counsel for the House, Mr. Bardos, said no other district is quite like it, when he was talking about, I assume, CD-5 and the Benchmark Map, CD-5 in Plan 8015. But we showed that actually in 2002 there was a district very much like it, in CD- 2 that spanned the north part of the state. That was a majority white district. But its configuration was actually quite similar.

We showed that when it comes to county splits and county configurations, there are many districts quite like it. We showed that when it came to the area and the size of the district, there are many districts not just like it, but much bigger than the CD-5. We showed when it comes to city splits, the Plan CD-5 in 8015 is far more compliant, and we showed that when it comes to compliance with geographic and natural boundaries, CD-5 is more compliant than almost every single district in the Enacted Map.

So there's no district quite like it. I'm not exactly sure what maps counsel is looking at, but certainly they were not able to point this Court to any evidence in the record or any
objective metrics that would dispute those -that evidence, that those statements that we were able to show about the actual district lines in the map they actually drew and tried to enact into law.

Now, the question of whose burden it is I think has also been a huge football in this case, and I think we've -- I think Your Honor is clear on our position, which is that, of course, our burden is to prove diminishment and our burden here has been satisfied. I think that has been conceded to.

They have raised -- or two out of three of them have raised an affirmative defense, and it is black letter law in Florida, under Florida law, that it is the defendants' burden to prove their affirmative defenses.

Now, they're trying to say, well, racial gerrymandering is different, and so this case is different. And they're really trying to kind of put a lot on the racial gerrymandering legal standard.

But, Your Honor, again, I've litigated a lot of redistricting cases, and I've litigated racial gerrymandering cases, and I'm pretty
sure I've read every single racial gerrymandering case to come out of the U.S. Supreme Court or any Court of Appeals, and I am not aware of a single case in which a Court has held that the plaintiffs would bear a burden to show that race does not predominate in a number of nebulous and hypothetical maps that could possibly and hypothetically be drawn. I've never seen that.

And I believe I heard from Mr. Bardos that -- a new burden, that there's -apparently plaintiffs would also have the burden to show that there was some other predominant purpose.

Again, I'm not aware of a single case that has ever said, well, if it's not race, then you've got to show what was the predominant purpose. In fact, the courts have assumed that where you balance a number of district -different criteria, there is no predominant purpose. And I'm certainly not aware of any case in which private plaintiffs have been told that apparently they now bear the burden of satisfying strict scrutiny that is reserved exclusively for state action.

So the defendants' burden argument is novel, to say the least, and unprecedented. And I'm really not sure what case law this Court would have to look to, to find that they are right on it. It's certainly not in Florida law, which says that the defendants bear the burden of affirmative defenses. And it's certainly not in federal law, which makes it very clear that a person actually challenging a district has to establish racial predominance in that district.

The question -- I believe counsel also raised -- counsel for the Senate raised the question of a sequential finding. It's just -this Court should just go ahead and wrap it all up in this case, that would be the cleanest and the easiest way to do it.

But as Your Honor pointed out, that's just -- that happens all the time, particularly in redistricting cases. In fact, the very -the Florida Constitution itself, which establishes a kind of facial review process for state legislative maps, specifically contemplates a sequential redistricting process, somebody can -- the court can --

THE COURT: How many times did this go up and back last time?

MS. KHANNA: I was here last time and I didn't --

THE COURT: I think most of you were.
MS. KHANNA: Yeah, we were; we've all been here.

THE COURT: Yeah, that's what I thought. Mr. Jazil is holding up eight fingers, so...

MS. KHANNA: Yes. We've seen -- we've seen many, many maps go up and down and up and down, and it's not unusual. The whole constitutional system actually contemplates that. There's a facial review process for state legislative maps. And then the Court says, well, okay, we're going to make a facial ruling, and then you can come back and make an as-applied ruling.

The defendants here cite a case called Harris v. Cooper, a racial gerrymandering case from the U.S. Supreme Court. Harris v. Cooper has a storied history of going up and down and up and down and up and down. And after that district was struck down as a racial gerrymander, then there was a remedy map, and
then that map was challenged as partisan gerrymandering.

THE COURT: Isn't Allen v. Milligan -it's gone up and it -- wasn't that on a temporary --

MS. KHANNA: Yes, Your Honor. And I -and I know a thing about Allen v. Milligan. I was the lead trial counsel that brought the Allen v. Milligan case, and I've argued that case in front of the Supreme Court.

And, yes, exactly, it is a sequential process. And the Courts do not just say, well, why don't we just, like, opine on potential remedies, even though they're not actually before us? It's not -- it's just not that easy because Courts are in no position to make legal rulings about laws that are not before it. It's just not how the system works.

And ultimately, Your Honor, the ask the defendants are making of this Court is really monumental, and they are asking this Court to break new ground in any number of ways.

They're asking this Court to be the first Court ever to apply the Gingles' precondition to a diminishment claim under federal law or
under state law. They're asking this Court to be the first Court ever to find that a -- that I guess state officials are protected by the Equal Protection Clause, and that nonresidents, nonvoters of districts that don't exist have standing to say -- to cry foul based on racial classifications.

They're asking this Court to be the first to define that the Fair District Amendments were apparently unlawful the minute they were enacted, notwithstanding decades -- over a decade of case law from the Florida Supreme Court operating under the premise that the law is what the law is, interpreting that law, applying that law; and notwithstanding the fact that the legislature itself has drafted and defended scores of districts, state legislative districts, Congressional districts, under that nondiminishment provision which apparently now they say has been poisoned from the start.

They are asking the Court, this Court to be the first to find that the Florida Constitution --

THE COURT: Counsel, hold on. Are they really saying that? Aren't they just saying,
hey, with some of these others, we can do it, we can get there, we're not violating equal protection and we cannot diminish, but on this one, we've got a problem? Isn't that -- that's their argument, isn't it?

MS. KHANNA: I think it -- I think it's very unclear -- again, this racial gerrymandering argument is a -- it is a game of laser tag a little bit, right? We're trying to figure out what exactly are we challenging and who is challenging what. And apparently it's changing even as the course of this hearing has gone on.

But when I heard -- you know, when the -when Mr. Bardos said, well, we're not making a facial challenge, but at the same time the Florida Constitution's nondiminishment provision is not a compelling state interest, it's not even compelling, because it's -- well, it is compelling sometimes, but it's not compelling other times.

I don't -- that is a conversa -- I do not -- that doesn't make sense, Your Honor, and I think ultimately either the Florida Constitution is something that binds the

Florida legislature or it is not. Either it's something that compels the Florida legislature or it is not. It is not up to public officials to pick and choose when they think the Florida Constitution is, in fact, compelling enough to comply with.

Ultimately, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Wait, hold on. But if the Court were to say, okay, race has got to be taken into account, and if the court were to find it's predominating, we're talking about making a district to preserve racial groups' ability to choose the candidate of their choice, then what is the compelling state interest there?

MS. KHANNA: I mean, if the Court were to find -- I mean, if you were to kind of surpass all those other hurdles of even getting to that question, right, the Court were to find standing, find a specific district, and then find racial predominance in a district that we were still wondering what that is, and then say, well, what is the --

THE COURT: It goes back to that, if it's even possible. Is it even possible to do it
without race predominating?
MS. KHANNA: Well, certainly the legislature seemed to think so when it passed Plan 8019.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm not -these are all hypotheticals.

MS. KHANNA: Right.
THE COURT: And you've done this long enough to know why I ask.

Then what is the compelling state interest?

MS. KHANNA: I mean, the compelling -the -- it is hardly a controversial statement to say that complying with the Florida Constitution is a compelling state interest.

Having it be a compelling state interest does not amount to a get-out-of-jail-free card as Counsel suggested it was. The U.S. Supreme Court has in every single case assumed that the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest and yet still it finds that districts are racial gerrymanders in violation of the law.

THE COURT: Well, that's why it leads me to, if following the Florida Constitution is
not a compelling state interest, doesn't it -and obviously in order to not diminish, one has to consider race. I mean, is that just a backdoor attack on saying nondiminishment violates equal protection, we ought to throw the whole thing out, and this Court will be the first in the country to say that, you know, even the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional? I mean, is that a far stretch?

MS. KHANNA: I think that is exactly the implication that the defendants are asking of this Court. That is the heavy ask that they are making of this Court, to break that new ground. And ultimately, they're asking this Court to say that the consideration of race in redistricting, whether it's because of the Fair District Amendments, the Voting Rights Act, or anything else, is per se unconstitutional.

And we've heard talk -- the defendants talk about the Allen case and, like I said, I know a couple of things about the Allen case. And in the Allen case, the State of Alabama said -- weighed the exact same argument.

The consideration of race in redistricting is per se unlawful under the Equal Protection

Clause, and that the constitution demands race-blind consideration.

And when that case was taken away -- we won that case at the trial court, and then the Supreme Court took that case up. And while that case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Governor of Florida pointed to the existence of that case.

THE COURT: Well, I pointed to the existence of that case back in, what, April. I said we're going to have some more guidance, so that's...

MS. KHANNA: Exactly. But he -- but in so -- in pointing to it, he also assured that, oh, the reason they took that case is because they're about to change the law and say that any consideration of race in redistricting is a violation of the constitution. But they said no such thing; they rejected that argument. They rejected the very same argument that the defendants are advancing here.

And so ultimately, the defendants are asking this Court to be the first to say I guess that the U.S. Supreme Court got it wrong and to say the opposite of that and to do what
the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to do, despite multiple invitations to do it.

And at the end of the day, this Court -this Court's task is actually not that monumental, certainly not as monumental as the defendants would have this Court believe or -ultimately, this Court is asked to look at the law, and look at the facts, the facts and the law when it comes to the plaintiffs' claim and the actual law, the actual map before this Court are undisputed and beyond dispute. And on those facts and law, plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction against the Enacted Map.

Unless the Court has any further questions...

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Khanna.
MS. KHANNA: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: So what I want to do -- what I want to talk about now, folks, is timing on proposed orders. You all have worked long and hard on this case and I appreciate that. You've come to a lot of agreements that have helped everybody. It's not hidden my consternation with some of the agreements and what that does with our record and, you know, I
think I'm not going to speak for the Florida Supreme Court, obviously, but when they talk about, you know, full records before them, you know, often that is the result of weeks of trial and cross examination and experts and other experts so that we get to hear all these facts, not what somebody says in a committee, not what just, you know, some individual report is, but it's that robust adversarial process -we have what we have. It goes back to that presentment, what the parties have presented.

So based on that, what I would like is the parties to submit written proposed orders in Word format, that's what I use; sorry if you use Word Perfect or one of those other programs. I'm not advocating you buy it, that's just what I use, and that's what the taxpayers have paid for me to use, so that's what I'll use, Word format.

But timing, I want ask the parties, because I will tell you, I blocked two full weeks for this trial. I did not give that time back up to the other 900-and-some odd -- well, I guess you've got to multiply it by at least, probably, about three or four because I'm
civil, it's not one party versus another -with that number of parties; I didn't give that back to them to have.

So I will be working on this case for that period of time and putting everything else, pretty much, on the back burner, other than emergency motions.

But I want to know what realistically is the quickest you can get it to me, because I will independently be writing an order as well and then ultimately I would like to issue a ruling, because I've read it. You know, I have notions -- you know, this is that important of a matter to the people of the State of Florida, maybe people elsewhere, but what this deals with, this deals with the right of people to elect the electors of their choice. This deals with the right of the legislature to do what the Federal Constitution has given to them to do, which is to decide how to district, and go back -- it goes back to the right of the -- and recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court -the right of the state courts to be involved in that process to ensure that the legislature is following the law.

And so it's important all around and, ultimately for the people of the State of Florida to be properly -- whatever that entails -- represented in the U.S. House of Representatives.

So what is the earliest reasonable, like on -- you know, don't tell me one thing and ask for more. That's why most of the time when attorneys on a regular case, they'll say, Judge, 15 days. I'm, like, I know attorney time, I'll give you 30.

But I also understand the heavy lift you guys are doing. And I also understand some of you are involved, some of you are not; there's another trial that need not concern this Court, but that many of you are working on in the near future with very similar issues, and I don't want to be, you know, get this done, compartmentalize, get this gone and then get that done.

So for the parties, how quickly do you think you can reasonably get that done, knowing that your clients are going to have to pay for this?

MS. KHANNA: So from plaintiffs'
perspective, Your Honor, certainly we can get this done before the end of next week. We would say even the middle of next week.

MR. JAZIL: Your Honor, I would suggest next Friday, a week from tomorrow, spending some time with Judge Hinkle earlier in the week and, as you noted, the federal trial starts on the 25th, so that might be the sweet spot.

THE COURT: Mr. Bardos?
MR. BARDOS: Next Friday would be fine with us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- I'm not saying I'm going to give you until Friday, because Friday I turn into a pumpkin and have 900 -- the latest 913 other cases that I am going to be working on.

Mr. Nordby?
MR. NORDBY: Friday would certainly work. We could probably do it, from my schedule, a day or two earlier, but I would cede to the Secretary's counsel on this case.

THE COURT: All I know is that a capable firm that is more than one -- this is what I'm going to do, I'm going to give you the end of day Wednesday. That gives me undivided time on

Thursday and Friday. And then my time gets more divided at that point with other hearings and other trials.

So let's do by the end of -- let me make sure I've got -- that's the 30th, correct? By the end of the day. I mean, if you want to do it at 11:59, that's fine, because if you do it at 5:00 or you do it at -- you know -- if you do it at 5:00 or -- as long as the next morning when I get to work, I can be reading them.

I'll probably read them before then. But you come in -- you know, you don't have to wait until 11:59. I will read them whenever they come in, so -- but I appreciate that.

All right. With that, and I've already talked about the other motion from Mr. Nordby. What other issues do we need to discuss?

MS. KHANNA: Nothing from plaintiffs, Your Honor.

MR. JAZIL: Nothing further from us, Your Honor.

MR. BARDOS: Nothing further, Your Honor.
MR. NORDBY: That's it.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I appreciate Counsel, again, a lot of heavy lifting,
discovery that, yes, I've seen a little bit of it in in-camera review, but I don't even want to imagine the volume that you've dealt with, and I appreciate everyone's hard work, interesting legal briefs.

And so with that, the Court will retire and consider the matter, subject to your proposed orders.
(Proceedings concluded at 1:00 p.m.)
STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF LEON )
I, SANDRA L. NARGIZ, RPR, CM, CRR, CRC,
CCR, certify that I was authorized to and did
stenographically report the foregoing proceedings,
and that the transcript is a true and complete
record of my stenographic notes.
DATED on August 28, 2023.
SANDRA L. NARGIZ
RPR, CM, CRR, CRC, CCR-GA
snargiz@comcast.net



A Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF alternatives [4] 62/19 167/14 170/19 173/10
although [3] 14/4 16/17 73/9 altogether [1] 9/24
always [19] 35/2 64/3 87/9 104/18 116/13 119/11 120/3 138/24 138/25 149/17 150/5 153/21 161/3 163/14 163/16 173/12 174/5 174/9 183/19 am [40] 17/14 39/22 39/23 43/24 46/22 46/24 47/2 47/8 62/9 62/14 82/2 97/24 97/25 98/12 102/21 103/21 113/18 114/18 118/11 124/3 141/23 142/25 143/19 144/2 144/3 145/19 148/13 149/8 158/6 158/12 158/13 159/2 163/23 164/12 165/20 169/25 172/2 175/16 188/4 202/15 amend [3] 148/22 148/25 175/3 amended [1] 21/3 amendment [11] 11/10 53/25 54/5 68/15 81/25 84/8 84/10 131/13 132/2 147/15 149/2
amendments [9] 7/21 7/22 54/22 57/14 172/13 173/6 173/11 192/9 196/17
Americans [2] 155/19 155/20
among [3] 16/2 93/8 121/6
amount [2] 124/1 195/17
analogize [1] 115/14
analogous [1] 57/15
analysis [15] 51/21 53/6 58/12 58/16 59/6 59/10 59/15 77/21 88/9 97/12
111/25 117/14 120/14 122/16 179/6 analyzed [1] 23/12
ANDY [3] 3/12 6/19 85/10
andy.bardos [1] 3/12
anecdotally [1] 124/4
announce [2] 6/5 6/6
another [14] 48/16 60/18 65/19 92/17
95/7 100/25 103/2 109/11 167/25 169/8 169/10 184/9 200/1 201/15 answer [15] 9/16 12/24 16/18 30/5 34/14 49/24 80/9 143/10 144/9 144/13 148/23 161/4 161/18 164/2 175/4 answered [2] 136/13 160/10 answers [2] 165/1 166/10 any [73] 9/7 9/11 11/17 11/18 13/21 13/23 14/15 14/24 16/18 18/16 18/16 21/20 25/12 31/17 31/23 34/14 40/19 42/17 43/5 44/12 44/13 63/2 68/11 71/19 73/24 74/24 75/6 75/13 75/20 75/23 80/2 83/2 88/17 89/5 93/9 105/7 107/5 107/9 107/10 108/5 112/20 112/22 114/9 114/15 126/16 131/14 134/23 136/18 141/10 143/20 146/11 149/4 154/6 157/21 159/6 165/21 166/16 166/24 169/13 170/18 170/22 171/7 172/20 181/14 182/15 185/5 186/25 186/25 188/3 188/21 191/22 197/17 198/14
anybody [5] 100/25 102/8 144/11 175/12 179/8
anymore [3] 97/21 158/4 158/10 anyone [3] 90/9 123/10 144/15 anything [14] 34/20 65/1 72/10 80/20 96/23 102/15 128/13 141/1 142/7 151/22 153/13 162/10 171/8 196/18 anyway [3] 106/24 164/14 164/16 anywhere [3] 40/19 152/22 183/4

and apparently [14] 58/7 177/4 178/13 178/14 178/17 179/9 179/14 180/24 183/6 188/12 188/23 192/10 192/19 193/11
appeals [6] 56/1 56/16 56/19 160/14 168/1 188/3
appear [3] 12/7 13/24 15/19
appearances [3] 1/23 2/21 6/5 appears [1] 99/12
appellate [5] 41/25 43/14 139/18 139/21 140/8
appellate's [1] 56/7
appendages [2] 28/10 157/9
apples [1] 123/19
applicable [4] 30/11 129/8 133/1 180/18 applicants [1] 123/7
application [3] 44/19 52/20 120/21
applied [22] 49/15 80/16 80/17 80/18 80/19 80/24 81/3 81/7 81/9 88/3 117/9 121/1 121/12 121/13 121/15 148/18 155/10 162/16 169/22 169/22 175/4 190/18
applies [17] 36/20 40/6 48/9 48/22 49/11 51/17 58/6 66/6 67/9 67/18 67/20 82/1 82/3 130/23 135/3 149/18 174/23 apply [15] 9/14 49/17 49/23 52/24 53/1 63/2 109/13 111/11 123/7 123/10 135/23 150/19 160/1 174/24 191/24 applying [6] 36/11 36/12 51/15 51/18 123/23 192/15
apportionment [9] 44/9 44/9 47/2 50/5
50/12 78/17 78/17 79/8 132/19
appreciate [4] 198/21 203/14 203/24 204/4
approach [5] 32/14 58/1 118/6 154/13 168/7
appropriate [8] 5/25 42/25 75/11 150/23 160/9 164/13 168/3 175/14
appropriately [3] 171/23 172/15 174/20 approved [1] 24/22
April [2] 37/15 197/10
April 26th [1] 37/15
are [254]
area [11] 24/10 39/9 55/12 89/8 93/3 97/1 121/17 156/12 156/13 170/23 186/13
areas [3] 92/10 121/7 121/18
aren't [7] 47/24 73/13 73/16 73/18 110/4
129/24 192/25
arguably [2] 20/23 20/25
argue [10] 9/20 30/13 33/25 42/13
54/10 83/23 136/2 158/21 158/22
158/24
argued [1] 191/9
arguing [8] 10/17 10/20 21/24 36/18 49/2 64/5 134/5 160/20
argument [51] 5/15 9/8 10/8 16/14 18/3 20/24 31/18 47/5 50/2 51/9 52/3 56/13 56/15 56/17 74/16 74/18 75/1 77/6 77/11 81/15 83/21 84/3 84/25 88/8 91/8 93/9 93/20 102/18 113/22 114/7 115/6 116/17 116/18 118/18 145/9 149/16 150/2 155/10 157/14 159/18 159/23 178/13 181/19 182/11 183/6 189/1 193/5 193/8 196/23 197/19 197/20 arguments [18] 41/1 56/7 69/25 145/14

449/5 159694599191601 P1 160/15 160/16 168/8 175/5 181/5

## arms [1] 89/25

around [12] 19/22 27/20 28/23 29/20 81/2 103/25 104/22 125/24 138/14 145/1 180/4 201/1
article [19] 7/23 35/22 36/14 50/2 50/20
53/2 53/4 53/23 57/22 58/5 58/8 60/21 61/11 65/3 73/17 73/24 81/16 81/19 131/18
articulate [1] 99/15
articulated [1] 30/21
as [185] $1 / 75 / 85 / 187 / 10$ 9/16 10/11 10/11 10/18 11/23 13/16 13/24 14/21 15/23 16/1 17/10 17/10 17/10 17/12 18/5 18/10 19/4 19/4 19/5 19/17 21/11 21/17 21/20 22/12 23/8 23/16 23/19 25/20 27/4 27/6 27/10 27/22 28/12 28/15 29/21 29/24 30/1 30/7 30/19 33/6 33/11 34/13 34/16 35/1 35/20 38/24 39/12 40/2 40/18 41/5 41/7 42/2 42/2 42/5 42/13 42/13 46/25 47/1 47/3 47/9 48/13 51/7 52/12 55/10 58/9 59/15 60/2 62/16 62/16 63/13 64/8 64/8 67/12 68/4 69/6 69/21 70/24 72/7 72/8 76/3 76/15 77/11 79/25 80/16 80/17 80/18 80/19 80/24 81/3 81/7 81/9 82/22 85/19 86/1 88/3 89/7 89/8 92/3 94/5 94/15 94/25 98/25 101/10 103/6 104/11 107/6 107/10 107/14 115/9 117/9 118/25 120/12 122/10 123/18 126/1 126/8 126/15 130/11 130/19 131/12 134/15 136/6 137/4 138/2 141/7 141/7 141/19 146/8 146/8 147/5 147/12 147/16 147/18 147/20 148/16 148/18 148/24 149/13 150/17 151/13 151/18 151/23 153/5 153/8 155/10 162/12 162/15 162/22 165/3 166/2 166/6 166/23 167/1 169/15 169/21 169/22 173/12 174/4 175/4 175/5 176/19 176/25 178/2 178/22 178/24 181/18 183/2 183/15 185/8 189/18 190/18 190/24 191/1 193/12 195/18 198/5 198/5 200/10 202/7 203/9 203/9
as-applied [13] 80/16 80/17 80/18 80/19 80/24 81/3 81/7 81/9 88/3 117/9 148/18 155/10 190/18
Asians [1] 155/20
aside [2] 19/20 110/6
ask [20] 12/22 17/9 39/17 55/14 55/18 62/20 79/12 80/4 106/2 145/19 146/20 152/13 183/11 183/13 184/2 191/19 195/9 196/12 199/20 201/7
asked [17] 67/23 67/24 73/5 76/23 97/3 120/9 138/21 140/11 142/13 151/6 160/4 160/9 163/1 180/15 181/10 183/12 198/7
asking [29] 9/12 35/16 64/19 64/20 66/4 86/9 97/4 97/8 97/10 97/25 98/8 98/13 142/12 160/25 163/25 164/9 164/9 172/7 172/10 176/18 184/1 191/21 191/23 192/1 192/8 192/21 196/11 196/14 197/23
asks [1] 86/15
aspects [1] 78/24
assault [1] 10/3
assert [10] 22/4 83/13 87/13 117/23

A Case 4:22-CV-00109-AW-MAFB Document 189-1 Filed 09/13 assert... [6] 134/19 134/25 135/7 135/25 back [67] 29/6 34/7 39/20 41/23 43/3 148/2 148/3
asserted [8] 14/3 17/7 87/4 88/2 116/21 148/5 148/7 148/8
asserting [3] 116/22 152/4 155/9
asserts [1] 105/23
assessing [1] 48/7
association [1] 83/21
assume [6] 23/8 58/22 119/11 119/16 122/9 186/3
assumed [2] 188/18 195/19
assumes [1] 116/15
assumption [1] 24/25
assured [1] 197/14
at [123] $1 / 18$ 5/1 6/10 11/16 11/17 12/8
12/15 13/17 14/8 14/19 15/3 23/12 24/8
25/11 26/3 26/8 26/15 28/4 28/8 28/19
29/5 29/7 30/12 30/16 36/8 38/17 40/22 41/10 44/19 45/7 46/1 46/12 50/14 52/16 52/18 53/7 53/10 53/11 54/11 54/11 54/18 55/24 57/9 57/13 58/16 60/15 60/18 61/20 62/12 68/1 71/21 73/3 75/18 78/15 86/4 86/10 88/13 89/2 89/18 90/4 90/24 91/15 91/19 93/7 94/3 97/7 98/22 100/21 110/23 111/20 116/6 116/25 120/17 123/20 123/23 124/2 124/4 124/8 126/8 127/14 127/21 128/1 134/15 136/5 142/20 143/6 144/2 145/21 145/24 152/17 154/6 156/8 156/22 156/22 160/8 161/6 163/3 166/16 171/12 172/4 172/7 172/10 173/16 175/16 176/3 178/5 179/23 179/23 183/8 185/8 186/24 193/16 197/4 198/3 198/7 198/8 199/24 203/2 203/7 203/8 203/8 203/9 204/9
at 1:00 p.m [1] 204/9
at-large [1] 127/21
Atlantic [1] 70/6
attack [1] 196/4
attacking [2] 12/20 13/10
attempt [3] 19/5 30/8 177/20
attempted [3] 143/1 154/7 166/16
attempting [1] 153/14
attempts [2] 106/7 159/25
attorney [4] 46/9 70/12 110/7 201/10
attorneys [1] 201/9
August [3] 1/13 5/12 205/15
Augustine [1] 125/24
authority [6] 12/13 32/18 70/8 70/16 131/8 169/11
authorization [1] 54/2
authorized [2] 54/1 205/11
available [7] 44/18 71/3 94/1 107/1
165/6 165/8 166/15
avoid [14] 16/20 31/24 50/4 95/21 96/1 96/16 106/21 107/3 118/14 119/19
135/17 135/18 145/13 161/1
avoidance [1] 106/20
avoided [1] 95/15
award [2] 163/15 163/17
aware [11] 21/13 32/11 40/17 40/20
63/24 64/4 114/18 165/20 188/4 188/15 188/21
awareness [1] 64/7
away [6] 9/7 11/3 66/18 79/3 122/18 197/3
awkward [1] 73/15

46/3 47/6 50/15 55/20 55/25 57/8 60/12 63/16 65/10 66/11 66/24 71/6 74/5 75/10 76/21 82/19 83/11 85/14 85/18 94/18 94/21 98/10 99/12 100/3 100/9 106/15 123/15 126/18 127/16 128/5 128/5 134/2 140/15 141/4 141/9 141/12 142/22 144/20 145/18 145/24 151/25 156/17 158/1 159/12 162/11 163/1 169/17 170/7 171/14 176/13 183/20 184/4 190/2 190/17 194/24 197/10 199/10 199/23 200/3 200/6 200/21 200/21
backdoor [1] 196/4
background [2] 47/16 129/25
backup [1] 35/1
bad [1] 141/23
Baker [2] 26/2 92/20
balance [3] 117/15 131/23 188/19
balancing [2] 111/17 138/7
bar [6] 115/1 115/2 118/21 118/24 119/2 119/5
BARAN [1] 2/16
BARDOS [16] 3/12 4/6 6/20 80/15 80/21 85/8 85/10 149/12 149/16 152/3 158/2 169/15 186/2 188/10 193/15 202/9
barely [1] 114/21
barred [2] 16/10 134/3
based [52] 11/13 15/4 22/14 31/11
32/21 51/24 51/24 53/16 53/16 53/19
54/7 55/15 55/16 57/4 58/4 59/16 59/25 60/6 67/25 69/2 69/4 69/10 69/15 69/17 76/1 76/6 84/1 84/14 84/22 88/19 93/9 99/6 108/7 108/8 108/19 108/20 109/12 109/20 109/23 117/4 120/19 121/2
128/7 129/6 131/3 134/10 135/2 135/9
144/4 152/4 192/6 199/12
basic [7] 12/1 12/8 78/23 100/13 134/6 137/1 137/2
basically [8] 18/15 28/10 89/17 105/9
109/14 114/5 118/3 144/1
basis [15] 12/13 22/5 34/4 71/22 79/20
84/24 96/17 108/24 109/3 111/2 127/15
152/9 182/15 185/5 185/10
be [167] $1 / 185 / 205 / 216 / 37 / 811 / 22$
11/25 12/7 12/9 12/15 12/20 13/6 13/10
13/21 14/8 14/12 14/21 15/19 16/17
17/7 19/24 20/2 20/7 20/9 20/10 20/14 20/15 21/20 30/5 32/22 36/22 36/24
37/7 37/12 38/18 48/25 49/15 51/6 53/8 56/8 56/25 57/2 58/1 58/12 59/11 61/14 64/4 64/21 66/1 66/22 67/10 67/19 70/19 72/9 72/11 73/5 75/12 75/17 75/18 75/19 76/1 76/8 76/19 79/9 80/14 80/21 82/6 84/5 84/13 87/15 95/11 95/18 95/24 97/22 99/5 99/10 99/21 103/25 104/14 104/25 105/20 106/25 107/24 108/5 108/18 111/3 113/3 113/7 113/9 114/10 114/11 114/16 116/4 116/8 116/13 117/5 120/23 121/22 124/5 124/6 124/7 124/12 124/12 124/23 125/11 125/12 125/12 126/12 131/3 132/11 134/5 136/25 142/11 142/25 146/7 146/8 146/8 147/5 147/9 147/16 148/7 148/9 148/15 148/25
149/4 149/7 149/22 150/7 152/9 155/10

157/23 158/16158/25,159/3 159/10
 169/13 169/22 170/20 172/21 174/13 178/11 179/22 183/16 188/8 189/16 191/23 192/2 192/8 192/22 194/9 195/16 196/6 197/23 200/4 200/10 200/23 201/3 201/18 202/8 202/10 202/16 203/10
bear [10] 32/12 69/5 109/8 109/20 111/23 139/11 165/3 188/5 188/23 189/6
bearings [1] 182/10
BEATO [2] 2/19 6/16
because [111] 14/22 15/3 17/11 17/21
18/1 20/15 21/15 23/2 28/5 28/16 28/24 29/13 41/9 43/13 45/20 48/21 49/24 50/15 52/9 52/24 53/10 55/19 58/3 59/5 59/19 61/1 61/15 64/2 64/2 64/11 66/16 68/10 68/25 70/20 71/5 71/24 72/18 73/15 74/22 75/19 75/24 77/9 80/11 80/14 80/18 80/19 80/23 81/12 81/24 82/21 84/13 86/15 87/5 87/6 88/23 98/11 101/10 104/16 109/8 110/16 111/11 111/24 112/24 113/3 115/13 118/4 119/1 122/1 122/11 122/17 124/22 129/13 132/21 135/16 139/7 139/8 140/1 141/6 141/15 142/6 143/16 144/3 144/25 145/21 147/23 149/13 149/20 155/5 155/10 161/19 163/2 164/8 165/9 165/24 166/13 167/14 169/15 171/19 178/12 181/8 181/24 191/16 193/19 196/16 197/15 199/21 199/25 200/9 200/12 202/14 203/7 become [1] 106/5 becomes [2] 52/7 68/17
been [63] 15/13 15/24 20/11 21/2 21/12 21/14 21/22 27/4 33/1 33/11 41/3 49/13 66/11 69/19 80/12 81/9 90/13 94/18 94/19 95/4 99/1 102/6 102/7 107/4 107/6 107/14 114/15 117/8 118/25 119/19 120/3 120/4 122/9 126/19 126/22 126/24 145/6 147/8 148/11 148/24 154/4 157/18 158/8 158/13 158/14 159/13 159/19 159/19 160/17 161/9 162/4 171/8 173/25 176/18 177/22 182/6 183/19 187/7 187/11 187/12 188/22 190/6 192/20
before [32] 1/17 9/5 14/25 15/22 16/2 18/12 30/13 48/2 57/7 63/8 76/4 88/19 98/2 100/22 103/7 103/18 105/24 134/24 145/8 174/2 176/20 177/12 181/2 184/10 185/3 191/15 191/17 197/6 198/10 199/3 202/2 203/11 began [2] 5/1 172/25
begin [1] 89/1
beginning [3] 85/22 138/5 143/11
behalf [13] $2 / 2$ 2/15 3/2 3/8 6/9 6/15 6/17 6/20 6/23 7/17 35/11 83/13 83/15 behind [2] 129/19 183/3
being [25] 5/11 12/4 23/4 25/1 25/21
52/14 60/13 60/15 63/24 63/25 67/23
67/23 74/6 82/22 82/23 96/18 104/11
118/22 120/9 142/13 148/17 149/17
152/8 157/14 182/2
belief [1] $5 / 19$
believe [22] 7/4 19/19 20/4 21/11 49/24 50/5 77/12 77/19 83/8 139/12 147/7 166/12 177/3 177/8 180/17 180/24

B Case 4:22-cv-00109-AW-MA believe... [6] 184/23 185/19 186/1 188/10 189/12 198/6
believed [6] 95/25 161/5 173/6 178/14 179/15 184/20
believes [3] 18/18 18/19 184/7 bench [1] 43/23
benchmark [45] 8/17 12/10 12/10 14/5 26/17 31/2 36/17 36/23 37/19 37/24 39/3 39/13 40/5 40/6 45/7 45/17 47/3 47/9 48/7 48/9 48/12 49/12 49/13 79/1 90/6 97/23 98/1 99/7 105/15 136/11 136/15 136/17 137/7 151/14 151/19 151/24 153/3 153/5 162/22 167/1 170/17 172/19 178/1 185/8 186/4
Benchmark CD-5 [1] 8/17
Bend [3] 60/14 89/8 97/1
benign [1] 131/3
besides [1] 101/2
best [3] 62/6 73/3 86/7
Bethune [3] 105/19 108/3 108/12
better [4] 26/8 46/25 62/18 107/24
between [27] 22/21 63/24 65/20 74/6
86/23 86/25 89/22 90/12 92/2 92/12 93/6 101/11 101/12 103/19 108/5 111/14 116/11 116/13 118/20 120/15 128/24 131/23 135/14 147/4 148/13 172/16 172/18
beyond [3] 10/18 95/9 198/11
bicameralism [1] 173/14
big [9] 41/7 60/14 89/8 94/18 97/1
102/18 141/16 141/18 141/22
bigger [1] 186/15
bill [1] $72 / 2$
bills [1] 172/12
binding [1] 10/12
binds [1] 193/25
bit [9] 69/20 104/6 104/8 104/10 107/24 137/14 142/8 193/9 204/1
bizarre [2] 29/25 108/15
black [43] 1/3 2/2 5/5 8/8 8/14 8/19 9/4
9/15 13/21 14/6 16/3 19/23 29/7 31/15
32/25 35/6 35/9 35/23 39/8 39/10 39/14
39/15 48/18 48/20 49/5 49/8 52/6 52/13
52/21 59/2 59/7 60/4 77/22 78/13 79/22
81/12 81/13 95/22 111/5 176/25 179/4 179/5 187/15
BLACKWELL [1] 2/10
blanket [3] 117/25 127/7 128/20
blessed [1] 26/17
blind [1] 197/2
block [2] 28/25 28/25
blocked [2] 44/2 199/21
blocks [2] 39/9 107/23
blue [5] 29/19 35/7 58/23 58/24 59/5
board [2] 141/4 141/10
bodies [1] 173/15
boils [1] 10/8
border [1] 92/15
born [2] 82/8 82/12
both [21] 7/11 27/23 40/25 47/22 47/23 51/6 63/3 63/5 68/2 68/8 70/10 70/22 110/14 120/24 133/17 142/14 151/1 154/11 163/4 167/19 170/16
bottom [2] 26/3 30/12
bound [7] 46/24 46/25 47/3 47/8 62/9 62/14 160/6
boundaries [11] 25/16 26/9 26/11 26/23


BOWEN [2] 3/36/23
box [1] 59/7
Brad [1] 3/17
branch [6] 70/11 70/22 75/12 75/17 76/4 88/9
branches [2] 18/24 173/23
break [4] 80/11 175/24 191/22 196/13
breakdown [1] 42/8
bridge [1] 83/3
brief [10] $9 / 1$ 12/19 12/25 13/4 13/9 13/20 107/7 133/14 149/14 160/24
briefing [2] 13/15 16/14
briefs [5] 10/19 12/5 71/6 168/9 204/5
bring [7] $8 / 1315 / 1021 / 2535 / 8$ 54/20 129/5 166/6
bringing [4] 18/12 19/3 43/15 110/24
brings [1] 109/5
broader [1] 36/7
Bronough [1] 3/10
brought [6] 11/25 21/14 104/15 135/4 182/19 191/8
Brown [1] 55/21
building [3] 1/4 5/6 173/9
built [6] 28/2 30/15 112/25 118/5 123/8
123/11
built-in [3] 118/5 123/8 123/11
burden [41] 21/21 32/13 32/14 35/20
59/18 60/7 63/14 68/6 68/7 68/17 68/21
69/5 69/13 75/22 76/12 76/19 99/3
109/8 109/15 109/17 109/21 111/23
151/25 152/2 152/5 163/3 163/6 163/10
165/4 166/11 166/13 187/6 187/10
187/11 187/16 188/6 188/11 188/13
188/23 189/1 189/7
burner [1] 200/6
Bush [2] 28/19 95/2
business [1] 46/21
but [200] $5 / 196 / 16 / 69 / 7$ 10/6 10/10 12/4 12/10 12/16 13/11 14/10 15/6
18/11 19/20 20/8 20/24 22/7 23/6 23/24
24/7 24/12 26/9 27/8 27/13 28/6 28/15
34/3 41/2 41/11 41/15 41/22 42/14
43/24 46/11 46/22 46/24 47/5 47/21
51/5 52/6 52/13 53/1 53/20 55/21 56/3 56/14 57/5 58/15 58/23 62/18 64/15 65/6 67/5 67/7 67/11 67/22 68/6 68/11 71/15 71/15 73/5 73/13 73/16 74/15 75/2 79/16 80/13 80/23 82/7 83/1 83/7 86/24 89/10 89/11 90/8 90/16 92/24 97/21 99/13 99/16 100/3 100/18 101/19 101/24 102/6 103/23 105/12 106/24 107/25 108/19 114/19 118/19 119/23 120/21 122/23 123/11 123/19 126/22 126/23 126/24 127/5 127/19 128/2 128/13 129/14 129/18 130/7 130/9 133/5 134/22 135/6 136/14 136/24 137/8 137/24 138/20 138/23 140/1 140/17 141/18 141/22 142/2 142/8 142/13 142/13 143/6 144/1 144/6 144/23 145/17 146/10 147/14 148/6 149/14 151/8 152/17 155/14 155/16 155/21 156/8 156/17 156/22 157/1 158/1 158/8 158/12 158/14 161/6 162/16 164/13 165/13 165/17 167/13 169/4 169/19 169/21 171/14 172/24 174/12 174/16 174/24 177/8 178/9

185/12 185/23 186/5 186/8 186/15 186/24 187/23 189/18 193/3 193/14 193/16 193/20 194/8 197/13 197/13 197/18 199/2 199/9 199/20 200/8 200/15 201/12 201/16 202/20 203/11 203/14 204/2
buy [1] 199/16
BVAP [6] 52/13 52/18 58/22 58/24 59/7 59/12
BYRD [7] 1/6 5/7 6/15 6/17 35/12 79/22 79/23

## C

CA [2] 1/6 5/5
call [3] 76/17 124/10 124/11
called [4] 22/22 139/20 178/24 190/19 calls [2] 117/17 137/24
came [10] 1/18 40/20 54/22 83/24 139/4
156/17 170/16 173/12 173/15 186/13
camera [1] 204/2
campaigning [1] 28/24
can [77] 11/24 13/6 20/7 20/15 34/15
35/6 39/12 41/13 42/4 42/13 42/15
42/16 42/24 43/17 45/2 46/6 52/8 53/15 58/12 58/20 60/23 61/24 66/1 67/2 68/18 69/9 72/12 72/15 74/8 77/8 77/24 84/2 87/19 92/25 94/11 99/16 100/20 103/24 105/4 107/22 108/9 108/17 116/8 117/3 125/10 125/12 134/24 145/20 146/1 146/8 147/21 148/4 148/22 151/10 154/13 157/1 159/3 162/2 163/15 163/17 169/9 170/19 175/24 179/12 182/11 182/21 184/22 184/23 189/25 189/25 190/17 193/1 193/2 200/9 201/22 202/1 203/10 can't [31] 17/20 36/2 45/18 52/19 61/15 61/17 65/16 67/3 70/19 75/4 75/7 79/24 79/25 83/9 84/17 84/20 84/21 87/13 117/19 126/23 130/19 130/21 142/4 158/21 162/19 164/6 165/7 171/16 181/3 181/7 181/12
canceled [1] 44/3
candidate [7] 8/15 36/15 59/8 78/2 78/9 122/22 194/13
candidates [6] 8/20 16/5 28/23 31/1 95/22 125/6
cannot [8] 36/14 57/2 68/8 95/20 130/13 131/2 182/20 193/3
cans [1] 87/25
capable [1] 202/22
capacities [1] 21/23
capacity [14] $1 / 3$ 1/7 5/6 5/8 15/23 16/1
16/9 20/11 20/14 21/11 21/22 42/17
82/12 83/18
caption [1] 79/21
capture [4] 45/13 45/15 90/1 91/18
captured [1] 90/15
captures [3] 39/13 39/15 76/17
car [1] 27/23
card [1] 195/17
care [1] 117/5
Carlos [2] 3/16 6/25
Carolina [2] 27/16 60/19
carry [1] 28/23
carved [1] 133/11
case [118] 1/6 5/5 7/18 10/20 13/1
$C_{\text {Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF }}$ case... [113] 16/20 20/13 21/9 21/14 21/25 22/22 22/25 24/21 28/13 29/16 30/10 30/12 30/14 32/11 33/2 33/3 33/4 33/12 33/25 44/5 45/21 47/23 47/24 48/14 52/17 55/21 55/24 56/3 56/14 56/19 63/17 69/7 69/21 70/6 70/7 70/7 70/8 70/12 70/17 71/16 73/6 74/7 75/14 79/21 80/6 86/12 86/13 88/19 94/22 103/14 107/5 107/12 110/7 110/14 110/25 110/25 113/8 114/5 114/15 123/20 125/3 127/8 127/25 130/12 131/12 131/22 132/10 134/16 134/23 135/6 139/18 147/14 148/2 150/19 151/21 156/17 162/15 163/10 164/15 164/15 171/21 173/20 177/20 181/18 182/8 187/8 187/19 188/2 188/4 188/15 188/22 189/3 189/16 190/19 190/20 191/9 191/10 192/12 195/19 196/20 196/21 196/22 197/3 197/4 197/5 197/6 197/8 197/10 197/15 198/21 200/4 201/9 202/21
cases [26] 20/4 25/9 27/13 27/15 28/22 43/7 44/3 69/3 70/10 71/5 72/18 105/17 109/13 119/22 120/5 123/1 133/14 133/17 133/20 140/3 165/21 183/9 187/24 187/25 189/20 202/15 Caucasians [1] 124/5 cause [5] 1/18 133/19 163/10 165/4 168/25
caused [1] 96/24
caution [2] 147/13 175/2
CCR [3] 1/21 205/11 205/22
CCR-GA [1] 205/22
CD [47] 8/17 12/10 12/16 13/15 13/24
23/8 23/19 24/3 24/5 24/6 24/7 24/12 24/15 24/18 24/19 24/19 24/25 26/7
27/6 27/17 28/4 28/6 29/19 29/21 29/24
36/17 37/19 45/7 45/17 47/10 48/12 48/23 48/24 49/1 49/18 96/10 156/14 162/23 167/1 178/25 185/9 186/4 186/4 186/6 186/15 186/17 186/19
CD-12 [1] 27/17
CD- 2 [1] 186/6
CD-1 [2] 28/4 28/6
CD-2 [1] 24/3
CD-3 [1] 29/19
CD-5 [38] 12/10 12/16 13/15 13/24 23/8 23/19 24/5 24/7 24/12 24/15 24/18 24/19 24/19 24/25 26/7 27/6 29/24 36/17 37/19 45/7 45/17 47/10 48/12
48/23 48/24 49/1 49/18 96/10 156/14
162/23 167/1 178/25 185/9 186/4 186/4 186/15 186/17 186/19
CD-5's [1] 24/6
CD-6 [1] 29/21
cede [2] 80/6 202/20
census [3] 39/9 93/25 153/8
centers [6] 40/12 40/13 91/20 92/4 93/5 101/12
Central [1] 153/21
certain [15] 6/1 41/8 44/14 90/1 90/15
105/13 109/9 121/1 121/1 121/17 123/4 123/21 133/11 159/13 171/25 certainly [19] 20/9 21/19 128/9 140/7 147/21 147/24 151/10 160/3 171/9 177/21 181/13 186/24 188/21 189/5 189/8 195/2 198/5 202/1 202/18

CERTIFICATE $[1]$ 205/1 Filed 09/13
cetera [5] 53/15 99/20 99/20 117/4 124/9
cford [1] 2/7
chair [5] 14/2 179/1 180/9 180/12 180/20
challenge [26] 11/13 15/3 17/2 44/10 71/23 72/15 72/25 80/15 80/20 80/25 80/25 81/3 81/4 104/16 106/1 110/24 113/9 117/9 136/23 136/24 158/18 162/4 165/25 166/6 183/10 193/16 challenged [11] 12/5 15/12 23/5 25/1 28/12 152/9 162/9 181/25 182/2 182/3 191/1
challenger [1] 11/10
challenges [2] 162/8 166/4
challenging [33] 11/11 12/9 12/16 13/21
14/21 15/6 15/19 18/5 18/13 18/14
19/25 22/7 29/14 35/15 39/18 39/20
59/20 69/8 70/18 72/16 90/6 111/8
118/17 136/14 136/17 137/7 158/4
158/10 158/17 182/10 189/9 193/10 193/11
chance [1] 65/15
change [7] 104/2 131/23 171/2 181/12
181/19 181/20 197/16
changed [4] 28/25 99/18 103/23 125/8
changes [6] 31/11 77/25 105/9 125/9
125/11 125/12
changing [1] 193/12
characterize [1] 69/11
charge [1] 19/17
check [1] 59/7
cherrypick [1] 107/22
choice [18] 8/2 8/9 8/16 8/20 36/15 59/8
78/2 78/10 95/23 103/18 122/22 125/6 136/19 146/15 178/19 179/25 194/14
200/17
choiceless [1] 180/6
choices [1] 143/22
choose [5] 73/10 103/19 165/21 194/4 194/13
chooses [1] 177/13
choosing [2] 16/24 179/10
chose [2] 129/15 129/17
CHRISTINA [2] 2/7 6/11
circle [2] 154/21 155/3
CIRCUIT [8] 1/1 1/1 1/17 33/3 56/1 56/16 57/8 127/25
circumstance [2] 111/11 112/14
cite [19] 42/16 46/7 69/3 71/5 99/18
107/5 107/9 112/2 112/6 127/9 127/12
127/13 128/13 133/18 134/23 145/20
171/9 171/20 190/19
cited [4] 94/22 109/2 133/13 174/7
cities [2] 25/8 25/10
citing [1] 119/23
citizen [3] 83/5 110/13 168/23 citizens [4] 79/23 83/4 166/1 166/5 city [7] 25/6 105/17 130/12 131/11
131/22 132/9 186/16
civil [4] 129/2 129/4 129/4 200/1 claim [36] 8/11 8/13 8/22 9/19 9/25 10/15 10/21 11/18 14/9 14/12 14/23 15/2 15/17 17/6 19/3 21/18 22/3 28/16
29/13 30/9 33/21 34/1 79/20 88/3 128/2
128/3 139/17 150/21 159/19 168/25

claims [10] $8 / 3$ 11/22 11/24 15/11 31/5 87/21 135/3 135/4 145/10 148/17 clarify [1] 150/10
class [1] 152/11
classification [4] 15/14 15/25 20/12 21/12
classifications [1] 192/7
clause [35] 11/9 47/13 49/20 49/21
55/21 56/2 56/14 84/24 97/14 97/18
113/24 130/23 132/12 133/10 133/12 141/5 150/2 150/18 151/3 151/5 152/21 152/24 153/4 154/9 154/13 154/20 161/22 162/1 162/3 163/6 169/18 174/16 182/24 192/4 197/1
Clause's [1] 161/14
cleanest [1] 189/16
clear [14] 10/12 10/19 11/21 15/9 19/10 22/16 24/18 30/22 43/20 63/23 65/12 131/2 187/9 189/9
clearly [3] 89/19 92/25 120/22
client [2] 84/6 84/9
clients [2] 182/14 201/23
clincher [1] 134/23
close [2] 29/25 178/3
closely [4] 26/22 26/25 28/7 93/22
closer [1] 26/15
closeup [1] 39/2
CM [3] 1/21 205/10 205/22
coalition [2] 51/19 52/25
coast [2] 60/14 92/18
cohesive [2] 31/6 122/21
cohesively [2] 30/25 58/17
coincides [1] 25/19
colleague's [1] 113/21
college [1] 124/14
Columbia [1] 26/1
combination [1] 86/16
combine [3] 66/17 74/13 89/20
combines [2] 89/13 93/1
combining [1] 157/16
comcast.net [1] 205/23
come [18] 43/1 66/11 66/19 72/4 79/9
84/5 86/5 101/24 120/6 143/5 153/10
159/24 171/19 188/2 190/17 198/22 203/12 203/14
comes [19] 19/12 25/3 25/8 29/25 42/23
63/22 71/20 71/20 91/23 92/2 93/25
105/22 132/8 145/9 185/4 186/10
186/16 186/18 198/9
coming [1] 42/15
commend [1] 44/7
comments [1] 34/18
committee [10] 14/3 41/18 171/18 172/5
173/1 173/9 179/2 180/10 180/21 199/7
committees [3] 37/18 38/20 173/3
common [3] 92/16 92/20 93/14
commonality [1] 93/10
communities [6] 59/8 89/20 90/1 93/1 93/16 93/23
community [4] 58/17 93/17 93/19 112/9 compact [16] 60/23 87/2 87/17 89/6
89/14 91/6 91/10 91/11 94/8 104/11 104/19 112/11 135/18 150/11 154/18 157/1
compactness [31] 27/2 53/14 60/22
61/12 61/15 61/23 61/24 62/3 62/9
$C_{\text {Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF }}$ compactness... [22] 62/13 62/14 62/16 62/18 62/22 62/25 63/1 79/23 87/13 94/12 94/14 104/3 104/9 104/15 104/16 104/18 104/21 111/16 149/24 156/19 156/22 156/25
companion [1] 50/21
comparable [1] 128/20
compared [6] 151/13 151/19 151/23
153/9 162/22 167/1
comparing [1] 159/24
compartmentalize [1] 201/19
compel [2] 84/20 84/21
compelled [1] 40/2
compelling [62] 33/7 60/10 63/15 67/8 77/10 77/15 84/15 88/7 109/6 111/3 111/24 112/1 112/3 112/5 112/13 112/17 112/20 112/25 113/8 113/19 113/25 114/20 114/23 114/25 115/5 117/22 118/5 118/14 118/22 118/23 119/5 119/9 120/1 120/7 120/14 122/3 122/3 122/10 124/21 127/1 127/5 127/7 127/10 128/11 128/16 130/3 130/8 133/22 139/9 146/18 193/18 193/19 193/20 193/21 194/5 194/14 195/10 195/12 195/15 195/16 195/20 196/1 compels [1] 194/2
competing [4] 150/8 150/23 174/7 174/8 complain [2] 24/6 26/13
complaint [5] 13/12 21/3 35/15 68/13 168/23
complete [1] 205/13
complex [1] 138/9
complexity [2] 138/1 138/23
compliance [9] 91/4 106/7 106/17
112/16 117/23 119/8 147/7 147/15 186/18
compliant [8] 13/17 159/8 180/13
180/22 180/24 184/20 186/17 186/20 complied [4] 37/9 38/8 38/13 96/13 complies [5] 14/13 18/17 154/9 161/25 174/15
comply [22] 16/24 37/8 38/16 39/1 63/3 75/4 75/5 77/9 77/14 82/24 106/7 106/12 106/16 116/1 116/2 155/11 161/16 161/20 163/4 178/15 180/17 194/6
complying [4] 68/2 78/4 112/12 195/14 component [1] 60/2 comport [4] 68/12 68/14 68/19 68/22
comporting [1] 68/23
comports [2] 71/3 76/9
computers [2] 101/19 138/18
conceded [1] 187/12
conceivable [2] 81/10 170/4
concentration [1] 93/24
concentrations [1] 43/11
concept [1] 134/6
concern [2] 36/7 201/15
concerned [2] 10/11 79/23
concerns [1] 18/23
concession [1] 88/18
conclude [1] 48/4
concluded [1] 204/9
concluding [2] 38/6 96/11
conclusion [3] 66/19 139/5 140/20
conclusions [1] 44/20
concretely [1] 66/3

 confident [1] 14/12 configuration [27] 11/15 14/4 37/19 37/24 38/7 38/15 38/18 38/21 38/25 39/3 40/1 40/11 78/10 78/12 78/19 95/20 96/3 96/12 100/13 100/13 117/12 137/2 137/3 137/5 143/9 157/8 186/9 configurations [2] 24/15 186/11 confines [1] 163/21
confirmed [1] 38/20
conflict [13] 53/15 68/4 71/8 86/23
86/25 108/5 111/13 116/14 117/20
135/14 161/13 167/8 178/18
confused [2] 12/8 90/5
Congress [13] 53/25 59/1 121/20
130/14 131/9 131/17 131/19 132/3 132/7 132/8 132/13 165/15 165/23 congressional [27] 8/3 14/2 31/8 37/17 37/21 38/5 41/22 45/17 47/1 47/7 56/9 58/21 102/2 115/19 121/2 126/13 129/6 130/13 131/4 150/25 151/14 152/14 153/18 171/20 172/4 179/3 192/18 connect [4] 81/12 92/4 92/10 101/6 connecting [1] 60/14 conscious [4] 64/23 65/6 67/6 69/10 consciousness [1] 22/21
consider [18] 30/2 41/5 42/2 56/9 79/13 85/17 85/20 85/20 86/4 86/16 90/7 131/3 141/5 152/12 155/14 160/25 196/3 204/7
consideration [9] 44/7 96/19 96/22
105/8 134/3 196/15 196/24 197/2 197/17
considerations [10] 63/25 98/5 98/7 104/24 112/7 115/21 150/8 150/23 174/18 184/14
considered [9] 87/8 129/1 140/2 142/7 150/7 152/10 172/15 174/20 181/4 considering [4] 63/22 86/20 98/20 168/12
consistency [1] 145/4
consistent [3] 50/5 71/13 109/21
consternation [1] 198/24
constitution [131] 7/19 7/22 8/7 8/23
10/2 10/3 10/24 11/2 18/14 18/17 19/9
19/17 26/19 30/14 33/9 34/8 34/10
34/11 35/18 35/24 37/9 37/10 46/16
47/14 49/14 53/12 61/4 63/4 63/4 63/7 63/7 65/12 68/3 68/3 68/5 68/9 68/9 68/20 68/22 68/24 69/2 69/14 69/16 70/18 71/4 71/5 71/12 71/24 73/1 74/4 77/10 77/14 84/8 84/19 85/23 85/24 85/25 86/24 86/24 94/10 97/6 98/7 98/10 109/9 109/10 109/16 109/22 110/5 110/9 110/12 110/21 111/9 111/15 111/21 112/19 112/21 113/1 113/5 113/11 113/13 113/15 113/16 114/14 115/8 115/16 116/1 116/3 116/15 117/3 126/7 129/10 129/17 129/21 129/24 129/25 130/6 132/23 138/5 138/6 141/24 145/15 149/19 149/21 150/5 150/6 151/2 151/4 152/6 152/16 152/17 162/2 162/7 165/18 166/7 167/9 168/14 168/15 169/12 169/12 177/6 178/16 178/16 189/21 192/23 193/25 194/5 195/15 195/25 197/1 197/18 200/19
constituttokal 434 P6/648/20 18/25 19/13 38/8 48/4 48/5 50/4 54/4 64/25 67/5 67/14 67/20 72/19 72/20 96/13 110/20 111/10 113/3 114/7 114/22 118/10 118/13 118/20 118/21 135/15 137/22 147/7 162/19 163/5 167/7 168/12 168/19 190/13
constitutionality [4] 17/3 32/10 72/6 110/8
constrained [6] 73/14 73/17 73/18 73/20 73/24 74/4
constructed [1] 93/12
contained [1] 14/1
contains [1] 94/6
contemplates [2] 189/24 190/13
contemporaneous [1] 57/8
contention [1] 25/13
context [1] 63/23
continue [3] 13/7 52/8 52/19
continued [3] 3/1 56/21 121/23
continues [2] 52/5 52/14
continuing [1] 33/25
contoured [3] 89/25 90/13 104/20
contradiction [1] 182/13
contradictions [1] 149/21
contrary [5] 97/18 152/10 179/21 184/5 184/6
contrast [1] 29/25
contrasts [1] 154/23
control [1] 132/21
controversial [1] 195/13
controversy [1] 19/11
conversa [1] 193/22
convince [1] 34/6
convoluted [1] 177/19
Cooper [2] 190/20 190/21
copy [3] 7/9 7/10 7/12
CORD [2] 1/6 5/7
corollary [2] 118/9 118/12
corporation [1] 82/17
correct [10] 13/5 20/20 24/22 46/15
56/8 73/20 158/5 158/11 167/18 203/5
correctly [2] 46/14 72/22
corridor [1] 92/4
could [37] $9 / 2$ 14/8 32/3 37/7 44/4 61/22 73/11 99/5 110/1 112/19 112/20 122/17 123/5 129/12 136/19 136/22 145/24 148/10 155/2 158/8 158/13 158/14 158/16 165/15 165/21 166/6 166/19 168/23 173/5 174/11 174/14 179/24 180/1 180/1 180/17 188/8 202/19 couldn't [2] 101/22 132/23 counsel [36] 6/10 6/13 6/25 7/10 12/22 17/10 24/17 35/1 40/23 43/3 55/19 55/23 74/22 88/14 99/12 107/2 110/2 123/14 176/2 176/25 177/3 179/14 179/19 180/23 185/2 185/21 185/22 186/1 186/23 189/12 189/13 191/8 192/24 195/18 202/21 203/25
Count [3] 13/11 21/2 35/15
counterclaims [1] 135/5
counties [22] 24/1 24/12 25/4 45/8 55/9 55/11 56/5 60/15 89/7 89/11 89/22 91/24 92/2 92/3 93/6 93/8 94/4 94/6 121/2 121/14 121/16 156/10 countless [1] 115/18 country [5] 121/4 121/7 121/13 129/3

C Case 4:22-CV-00109-AW-MA country... [1] 196/7
county [41] $1 / 21 / 15$ 5/5 14/1 24/4 24/4 24/15 25/3 25/4 25/10 25/18 25/19
25/23 25/24 25/25 26/2 26/3 26/22 39/5 39/5 42/8 45/14 58/23 58/25 75/14 89/16 90/14 91/25 91/25 92/20 92/22 96/25 100/17 144/18 144/18 153/17 154/3 179/1 186/10 186/11 205/7 couple [11] 12/7 79/11 80/10 133/13
140/6 145/25 165/1 166/10 170/8 171/2 196/21
course [11] 16/17 151/7 158/7 159/21
161/3 173/5 178/4 178/7 182/3 187/10 193/12
court [307]
Court's [16] 34/23 44/2 44/7 44/8 77/25
95/12 95/17 97/17 134/3 140/17 143/12
144/7 164/2 164/17 175/23 198/4
Court-drawn [1] 173/25
Courthouse [1] 1/15
courts [17] 30/1 43/14 46/21 66/21
87/21 94/21 125/16 132/23 133/14
139/19 139/21 140/8 140/8 188/18
191/12 191/16 200/23
cover [1] 146/13
coverage [1] 31/10
Crawford [1] 46/6
craziness [1] 138/19
CRC [3] 1/21 205/10 205/22
created [5] 52/9 52/11 66/7 125/4
166/19
creates [2] 52/2 150/3
creation [8] 35/22 35/25 36/3 53/22 69/9
69/14 69/16 139/7
credibility [1] 44/13
criminal [1] 46/9
criteria [11] 14/18 23/15 23/19 27/8
45/23 87/3 91/4 116/6 153/1 185/18

## 188/20

cross [2] 51/18 199/5
crossover [2] 52/7 52/25
Crow [1] 129/5
CRR [3] 1/21 205/10 205/22
cry [1] 192/6
current [4] 100/7 180/13 180/22 180/25 curve [1] 25/24
cuts [3] 45/7 45/12 45/14
cycle [18] 26/19 31/7 37/2 37/5 47/2
47/8 47/11 86/23 98/11 121/11 126/10
126/15 126/16 135/13 145/11 157/7
158/19 159/12
cycle's [1] 160/18
cycles [1] 43/8

## D

D.C [1] 165/22

DAC [1] 116/10
Dade [2] 70/8 70/16
damages [1] 163/14
Dan [1] 146/24
DANIEL [2] 3/5 6/23
dark [1] 39/9
data [6] 41/12 93/25 93/25 121/3
123/23 177/16
DATE [1] 1/13
DATED [1] 205/15
day [15] 14/19 76/18 97/8 123/9 125/13

days [1] 201/10
demands 11.19 1.

DC [1] $2 / 5$
DCA [1] 19/10
deal [2] 5/24 87/19
dealing [1] 56/17
deals [3] 200/15 200/16 200/17
dealt [2] 138/18 204/3
debated [1] 37/22
decade [3] 95/2 153/24 192/12
decades [3] 94/20 95/6 192/11
decide [14] 10/10 18/25 99/3 119/18
120/7 124/18 134/18 139/21 140/8
167/25 168/4 168/18 181/11 200/20
decided [7] 5/21 18/9 47/15 115/7
120/11 127/25 135/20
decides [1] 58/25
deciding [3] 43/25 51/13 167/23
decision [17] 42/16 43/21 62/15 95/13
108/14 109/12 109/24 119/20 119/20
120/10 129/20 137/10 137/13 143/12
143/24 166/3 181/8
decision-making [2] 109/12 109/24
decisions [3] 53/9 68/11 127/14
declaration [2] 35/16 35/19
declaratory [3] 113/14 115/23 117/19
declare [2] 66/7 140/14
declared [2] 66/22 115/2
defend [6] 9/21 32/17 110/19 110/21
168/14 182/1
defendant [8] 2/15 3/2 3/8 134/24
134/25 135/7 147/19 163/17
defendants [52] 1/8 8/12 8/13 8/17 9/7 9/20 10/19 11/16 12/6 12/11 12/15 14/11 14/21 15/15 15/22 16/8 19/18
21/19 23/3 24/5 24/11 26/13 27/5 27/11
30/3 30/7 30/7 30/13 30/17 32/2 32/3
32/20 33/14 34/5 40/17 80/5 135/25
171/16 177/1 177/16 177/25 178/10
180/15 182/1 189/6 190/19 191/20
196/11 196/19 197/21 197/22 198/6
defendants' [20] 7/10 10/6 10/23 11/3
14/23 15/2 17/6 22/3 23/22 32/13 33/5
34/3 34/12 134/19 177/19 185/2 185/21
185/21 187/16 189/1
defended [1] 192/17
defending [5] 76/14 110/8 158/7 159/16 167/10
defense [38] 13/1 13/6 15/5 16/10 19/6
22/6 34/20 46/9 74/23 82/20 82/22
86/14 88/2 88/3 88/15 108/1 116/22
134/19 134/25 135/8 136/1 139/17
140/18 147/4 147/5 147/9 147/12
147/16 147/18 147/20 148/14 148/14
148/16 148/19 168/20 177/19 182/17
187/14
defenses [9] 69/24 134/13 135/12
135/20 135/21 147/2 148/20 187/17
189/7
deference [1] 132/3
defies [2] 27/7 181/1
define [1] 192/9
defined [1] 54/18
defining [1] 95/5
definitely [1] 108/18
defy [1] 180/6
delegation [1] 165/22

Democrats [1] 61/16
demographic [4] 31/11 39/6 42/21 43/10
demographics [3] 64/4 138/10 155/6
demonstrated [1] 146/20
demonstratives [1] 40/18
denied [1] 69/23
densely [1] 93/3
density [3] 155/2 155/5 155/22
deny [1] 131/13
Deputy [2] 3/17 6/17
DeSantis [3] 8/5 9/15 12/17
DeSantis' [1] 22/24
described [1] 118/25
design [1] 95/8
designed [3] 120/23 122/11 122/14
desire [1] 42/24
despite [2] 22/23 198/2
detail [1] 176/22
details [1] 56/21
determinations [1] 44/14
determine [2] 23/17 171/17
determined [1] 31/8
determines [1] 184/4
determining [1] 128/6
Detzner [1] 95/3
developed [1] 16/19
developing [1] 139/1
develops [1] 129/15
deviate [7] 60/24 61/15 61/16 61/17
111/15 115/24 115/25
deviating [1] 61/11
deviation [5] 45/22 45/25 94/11 94/14 102/5
devise [1] 183/24
did [33] 13/2 39/21 44/16 44/25 46/17 60/9 73/6 87/4 87/6 87/10 90/10 98/12
101/1 102/8 137/16 138/15 139/5 141/7
143/6 149/12 153/3 172/1 178/9 178/18
179/16 180/2 180/17 182/5 185/20
185/23 190/1 199/22 205/11
didn't [27] 12/25 44/23 54/12 78/12 87/3 87/12 87/20 96/23 98/11 105/12 106/24 119/24 120/1 132/24 135/17 137/20
137/24 138/19 138/22 139/8 145/17
158/15 158/18 167/12 180/24 190/4
200/2
difference [7] 63/24 80/13 90/12 118/19 120/13 147/3 148/13
differences [3] 120/15 120/20 128/23
different [36] 10/20 10/21 10/22 14/5
17/23 18/4 21/24 27/8 27/9 29/3 47/21
76/25 80/14 93/1 93/16 93/17 101/24
102/9 104/4 104/7 117/11 119/21
136/22 137/15 140/20 144/16 144/17
155/7 156/11 156/13 163/2 173/7
178/21 187/19 187/20 188/20
differentiates [1] 131/6
differently [4] 90/14 104/6 104/8 145/1
difficult [5] 23/2 119/6 138/9 151/8 174/4
diffuse [1] 11/22
dilution [4] 51/23 52/2 52/10 57/20
diminish [17] 36/3 78/7 87/7 90/10
91/13 100/15 101/2 101/9 103/1 103/3
127/9 143/6 144/16 166/25 168/22
193/3 196/2

D Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF diminishes [2] 140/14 140/24 diminishing [4] 7/25 78/8 95/21 100/21 diminishment [26] 8/11 8/22 9/18 10/15 10/18 11/4 13/19 30/10 30/24 31/5 95/15 96/1 96/16 99/6 100/19 118/2 135/17 135/19 145/13 162/14 162/20 176/23 176/24 177/10 187/10 191/25 dip [1] 60/16
direct [1] 184/24
direction [2] 61/7 61/9
directly [3] 69/7 97/10 97/20
dis [1] 25/4
disagree [2] 49/18 49/22
disagrees [2] 48/16 48/17
disavowed [1] 9/11
disclaimed [1] 157/21
disclosures [1] 103/8
discovery [1] 204/1
discretion [1] 161/4
discriminate [1] 117/3
discriminating [1] 84/1
discrimination [11] 32/24 57/2 122/6
122/7 122/13 124/22 127/12 127/17
128/3 128/8 128/15
discuss [1] 203/17
discussed [3] 131/11 136/4 147/8
discussion [3] 44/8 95/12 176/4
discussions [1] 158/2
disfavors [1] 109/16
dismissed [2] 28/15 29/12
dispose [1] 120/5
disputable [1] 105/2
dispute [8] 8/11 10/6 10/18 19/8 88/24
177/2 187/1 198/11
disputed [2] 162/22 177/4
disregard [1] 115/9
disregarding [1] 17/1
dissent's [1] 91/7
dissolved [1] 70/20
distance [2] 91/19 91/20
distinction [7] 18/7 20/8 22/21 22/25
65/20 74/6 80/23
district [347]
District 5 [1] 37/24
district's [3] 91/23 92/1 157/8
districting [9] 14/3 18/1 23/16 54/22
57/14 63/23 113/16 127/15 127/21
districts [66] 12/1 13/23 14/8 14/15
14/25 15/19 20/24 23/21 23/25 24/8 24/14 25/1 25/7 27/14 28/20 28/23 29/5 30/1 32/17 50/24 50/25 51/3 52/25 52/25 54/13 56/10 57/6 87/2 87/18 89/13 90/7 90/12 90/22 102/1 102/2 107/18 107/22 124/8 124/13 125/3 125/4 125/16 126/11 126/15 133/16 135/16 136/5 136/6 138/13 150/11 150/11 154/4 154/17 154/18 154/20 155/13 156/5 156/6 185/25 186/12 186/14 192/5 192/17 192/18 192/18 195/22
diverse [1] 92/14
divide [1] 138/12
divided [1] 203/2
divorce [1] 67/2
divorced [3] 54/3 54/5 54/9
dnordby [1] 3/6
do [136] 10/24 13/12 13/15 15/8 20/2
$34 / 2536 / 140 / 3,48 / 3,40 / 4,40 / 841 / 1512 / 193 / 22201 / 7201 / 17$ 203/12 204/2 $435441124 / 25{ }^{2} 9 / 2546 / 646 / 2948 / 3$ 49/7 49/7 54/2 54/11 58/20 64/16 65/1 67/23 68/1 68/1 68/1 68/4 72/3 72/9 72/14 79/18 79/24 82/23 83/9 84/21 86/9 86/17 86/20 87/20 92/21 98/14 98/21 99/23 101/10 101/13 101/15 102/8 102/19 102/25 103/1 103/3 110/14 110/19 112/6 114/4 114/6 115/12 115/20 122/14 127/9 130/16 132/20 137/22 137/23 141/6 141/13 142/2 142/6 143/8 143/9 143/15 143/23 143/23 146/3 146/6 146/15 146/16 149/7 149/14 151/9 151/12 162/15 162/16 164/4 165/19 167/16 168/10 169/2 170/4 170/10 172/16 172/17 172/22 173/7 175/8 175/15 175/17 176/5 179/24 180/1 180/1 182/5 182/6 182/17 183/11 183/13 183/14 183/23 184/15 184/16 184/22 184/23 189/17 191/12 193/1 193/22 194/25 197/25 198/1 198/2 198/18 200/18 200/20 201/21 202/19 202/24 203/4 203/6 203/7 203/8 203/9 203/17 doctrine [15] 16/12 16/15 16/19 18/21 19/21 19/23 28/2 69/21 70/5 134/9 134/11 135/3 135/10 135/22 141/9 documentary [1] 145/23
documented [1] 33/1
does [55] 20/13 21/9 21/9 26/8 32/21 35/2 35/3 35/3 35/4 36/1 41/13 41/23 41/23 41/24 45/6 49/17 49/23 60/20 62/21 64/16 65/17 67/6 68/14 68/21 71/18 74/15 74/25 75/2 77/1 81/6 83/12 86/3 91/11 93/13 97/16 101/4 110/13 132/6 132/15 139/6 141/21 144/16 155/15 156/14 157/3 157/4 161/24 162/13 162/23 175/1 182/15 184/11 188/6 195/17 198/25
doesn't [57] 36/3 51/1 54/16 59/13 63/20 64/8 68/12 71/12 71/19 75/5 75/21 77/22 80/24 80/24 81/11 82/7 82/13 86/8 101/9 103/1 103/3 105/5 105/6 107/21 107/25 108/4 108/9 111/10 113/24 114/22 115/4 117/10 119/3 124/25 127/9 133/8 135/22 140/17 144/19 145/1 145/2 147/21 148/1 157/2 158/1 158/3 158/10 158/20 164/24 168/22 169/6 170/5 173/22 174/24 185/17 193/23 196/1 doing [11] 41/3 44/17 46/17 76/13 76/14 76/18 84/16 86/8 91/12 163/18 201/13 dominant [1] 159/4
don't [93] 9/20 15/20 18/24 20/7 21/13 30/5 32/17 41/15 43/4 43/9 43/22 46/18 47/5 52/17 54/10 54/10 61/1 61/4 64/17 65/1 67/1 68/4 72/12 74/20 74/24 83/23 85/5 87/15 90/3 91/5 92/6 92/14 92/19 92/23 93/19 95/9 96/21 97/19 98/15 99/2 99/17 104/16 105/7 106/5 106/17 107/5 107/9 108/21 112/2 114/4 114/19 119/12 124/10 126/21 127/22 128/5 128/13 128/17 128/20 129/18 130/2 134/23 138/15 140/8 141/1 142/9 143/3 144/3 144/15 146/2 146/19 147/14 148/3 149/3 149/9 156/16 159/5 162/21 163/25 164/3 166/24 167/4 169/2 171/23 175/25 179/7 191/13 192/5
 130/14 145/18 148/2 153/23 158/9 158/13 158/14 158/16 164/6 168/1 170/20 182/4 183/6 195/8 201/18 201/20 201/22 202/2
dooms [1] 11/18
doors [1] 27/23
down [26] 10/8 12/13 27/23 30/1 32/14 52/13 52/18 58/22 58/24 66/11 87/25 92/6 123/3 124/2 138/6 140/5 153/20 154/3 173/11 178/6 190/11 190/12 190/22 190/23 190/23 190/24
downtown [9] 93/13 153/16 153/16 153/24 156/12 156/13 157/16 157/16 170/23
draft [3] 37/21 173/2 173/10
drafted [2] 128/19 192/16
dramatic [1] 131/23
draw [22] 60/2 60/22 63/11 77/7 81/10 96/25 102/23 105/4 105/21 127/8 135/18 136/22 145/12 150/24 151/17 153/6 155/2 155/13 155/18 161/12 161/21 185/16
drawer [2] 91/18 92/9
drawing [17] 22/10 45/16 60/8 80/1 86/18 97/12 98/19 102/1 115/18 127/5 133/15 141/4 141/10 150/11 150/11 159/7 184/8
drawn [36] 7/24 13/24 23/9 23/20 29/24
45/9 45/10 79/14 94/16 94/20 94/24
95/24 98/6 99/5 100/16 102/12 104/6
104/7 106/3 106/4 106/18 107/15
107/17 108/23 109/3 111/1 118/1 122/13 125/5 125/19 125/21 125/21 159/3 159/10 173/25 188/9
draws [2] 65/13 112/22
drew [11] 14/18 24/3 26/24 40/20
105/24 106/11 108/22 113/6 123/23
135/18 187/4
drive [1] 92/6
drove [1] 27/22
duly [1] 17/15
durational [4] 81/17 120/25 121/19 125/10
during [8] 7/8 37/5 38/20 86/22 90/7 126/14 135/13 178/13
duties [5] 16/23 17/3 19/13 71/13 75/18
Duval [24] 14/1 24/4 26/3 26/22 39/5
39/14 40/13 45/9 45/11 66/17 74/13
76/17 77/8 77/17 78/11 78/16 79/4
81/13 91/25 100/17 137/12 144/18 166/22 179/1
Duval-only [1] 166/22

## E

each [6] 31/19 89/21 91/21 121/21
176/3 179/17
earlier [6] 147/2 156/18 160/8 166/21
202/6 202/20
earliest [1] 201/6
early [2] 96/8 166/24
easel [2] 34/24 154/13
easier [1] 56/22
easiest [1] 189/17
east [26] 12/21 13/10 38/6 38/13 38/15 38/18 38/21 38/25 39/2 40/1 40/11 90/9 91/9 95/24 96/4 96/11 97/13 100/1

E Case 4:22-cv-00109-AW-MAF east... [8] 103/4 143/8 154/5 156/10 156/14 158/24 159/8 178/11 east-west [23] 12/21 13/10 38/6 38/13 38/15 38/18 38/21 38/25 39/2 40/1 40/11 91/9 95/24 96/4 96/11 100/1 103/4 143/8 154/5 156/14 158/24 159/8 178/11
easy [6] 22/12 41/21 42/4 42/10 138/4 191/15
ed [1] 123/3
edges [2] 78/15 79/6
effect [3] 56/9 71/9 136/11
effected [1] 131/22
effort [2] 34/6 79/3
efforts [2] 106/16 106/17
egregious [1] 79/3
eight [4] 45/7 89/11 94/6 190/9 either [15] 35/6 43/10 67/6 73/8 93/18 93/20 101/1 130/4 136/20 153/22
163/20 167/6 183/22 193/24 194/1 elect [14] 8/1 8/8 8/15 8/19 16/4 31/1
36/15 78/9 95/22 100/15 122/20 125/6 143/25 200/17
elected [5] 17/1 33/10 78/1 130/20 137/23
election [3] 58/18 58/19 183/17
elections [8] 55/20 56/2 56/14 75/15
76/3 77/23 78/4 127/22
electoral [4] 11/12 11/20 12/1 15/4
electors [1] 200/17
element [1] 11/19
elements [1] 8/22
ELIAS [1] 2/4
elias.law [3] 2/6 2/7 2/8
eliminated [1] 16/5
eliminates [1] $8 / 18$
eliminating [1] 8/7
elongated [1] 29/22
else [14] 39/25 44/3 71/2 71/3 102/15 142/3 151/22 153/13 157/10 157/12
179/8 180/23 196/18 200/5
elsewhere [2] 155/12 200/15
embodies [1] 132/2
emergency [1] 200/7
emphasized [2] 37/20 108/15
empty [2] 92/7 92/11
enable [1] 125/5
enact [9] 32/18 73/8 73/9 106/24 131/2 132/12 167/5 174/11 187/5
enacted [57] 8/18 9/22 16/5 17/16 18/11
24/8 24/13 25/7 25/9 26/10 35/13 35/17
39/24 48/3 48/5 64/25 66/7 66/24 67/9
67/14 67/18 67/24 71/1 76/15 76/15
80/2 88/22 106/6 120/24 125/17 126/3 129/3 130/25 140/13 140/14 146/21
148/15 148/19 154/11 159/16 159/25
161/24 161/25 162/13 162/23 167/10
172/19 174/19 175/1 177/5 181/25
183/10 184/3 185/13 186/21 192/11 198/13
enactment [2] 161/1 164/12
enactments [1] 66/6
enacts [1] 168/21
end [17] 14/19 71/21 93/7 97/7 105/16 106/8 106/15 129/5 140/24 173/17
175/19 183/8 198/3 202/2 202/24 203/4 203/6
ended [1] 121/22 $89_{-1,}$ Filed $09 / 13 / 230 / 21$ 174/2, $184 / 24$ 185/8 191/14
ends is umpend9tro9-1/15 Filed 09/13
enforce [6] 34/13 70/25 71/1 75/7 83/2 131/18
enforceability [1] 5/23
engage [2] 31/25 177/18
enjoin [2] 183/12 184/2
enjoined [1] 183/20
enough [8] 22/16 33/7 41/21 155/3
155/23 155/23 194/5 195/9
enshrined [1] 33/8
ensure [2] 147/13 200/24
entails [1] 201/4
enter [2] 10/13 80/5
entered [3] 5/12 91/22 103/11
enters [1] 6/2
entertained [2] 135/12 135/20
entire [6] 28/10 29/10 56/10 105/4
176/18 180/7
entirely [7] 10/20 10/21 13/25 29/3
100/16 116/4 179/18
entities [1] 5/25
entitled [1] 198/12
entitlement [1] 30/19
entity [3] 21/15 21/16 82/15
equal [72] 11/9 47/13 49/19 49/21 79/16
83/10 84/23 88/3 88/23 97/14 97/18
101/20 103/20 112/24 113/23 113/25
117/10 118/4 122/25 130/22 131/14
132/12 133/9 134/4 139/6 140/18
140/20 141/5 141/10 141/15 141/21
142/4 142/5 142/10 143/2 150/1 150/17
151/3 152/20 152/24 153/4 154/9
154/12 154/19 155/12 158/18 159/18
159/23 161/14 161/22 162/3 162/16
162/25 163/5 166/4 166/6 167/20
169/18 169/19 170/1 170/6 170/15
170/25 171/4 174/15 175/4 181/7
182/24 192/4 193/2 196/5 196/25
equally [1] 159/17
equates [1] 114/19
era [2] 129/5 180/5
eradicate [1] 22/25
erred [1] 65/10
error [1] 78/22
especially [1] 118/7
ESQUIRE [9] 2/6 2/7 2/8 2/12 2/18 2/19
2/20 3/5 3/12
essence [3] 65/17 150/1 150/21
essential [1] 86/15
essentially [4] 34/1 76/7 122/16 180/6
establish [8] 11/8 15/8 15/16 21/21 22/9
32/3 112/19 189/10
established [6] 9/23 22/20 26/12 30/3 133/19 140/4
establishes [2] 115/4 189/22
et [8] 1/4 1/7 2/3 53/15 99/20 99/20
117/4 124/9
et cetera [5] 53/15 99/20 99/20 117/4
124/9
evaluates [1] 32/9
evaluating [1] 119/7
evaluation [1] 98/23
even [44] 9/6 9/14 9/15 10/23 11/23
12/7 13/24 15/6 15/16 15/22 19/3 19/20
21/25 22/4 22/7 23/11 26/25 30/2 30/7
33/25 56/10 57/15 59/11 65/14 87/10
90/2 108/5 119/7 119/25 120/12 123/25

93/12995/19+49418 194/25 194/25
196/8 202/3 204/2
event [3] 32/3 71/17 167/8
eventually [2] 12/23 124/12
ever [14] 21/14 75/16 91/6 100/14
103/15 122/5 123/13 136/5 144/11
144/15 162/22 188/16 191/24 192/2
every [33] 11/17 14/13 30/10 37/16 37/20 37/20 37/21 57/17 78/10 90/8 95/4 103/13 115/3 115/4 115/12 115/24 115/25 116/2 116/10 117/20 118/1
123/21 127/8 128/9 137/3 139/1 139/2
162/2 162/7 185/7 186/20 188/1 195/19
everybody [2] 137/2 198/23
everyone's [1] 204/4
everything [7] 44/3 87/24 146/12 168/4
176/8 177/9 200/5
everywhere [1] 58/6
evidence [23] 42/6 51/25 88/11 100/7
101/3 102/22 103/16 106/22 107/16
108/18 108/25 109/1 145/5 145/7
145/23 146/17 151/6 181/18 184/21
184/24 185/24 186/25 187/2
exact [3] 103/22 126/21 196/23
exactly [15] 10/16 76/23 90/4 98/13
101/20 127/19 144/3 145/20 155/4
181/23 186/23 191/11 193/10 196/10 197/13
examination [2] 23/18 199/5
examine [1] 23/14
example [6] 13/16 46/7 52/6 119/22
123/2 130/15
examples [3] 14/7 107/22 184/19
except [1] 78/11
exception [1] 100/19
exceptional [1] 102/5
exceptionally [1] 121/5
exclusive [1] 51/17
exclusively [1] 188/25
executive [7] 18/24 70/11 70/22 75/12
75/17 76/4 147/22
exempt [1] 31/9
exercise [1] 44/17
exercising [1] 147/22
Exhibit [4] 41/11 42/9 180/9 180/19
Exhibit 1 [2] 41/11 42/9
Exhibit 8 [2] 180/9 180/19
exhibits [2] 40/19 171/10
exist [4] 15/20 32/17 145/2 192/5
existence [4] 54/7 55/1 197/8 197/10
exists [3] 12/14 72/24 116/11
expect [1] 89/6
expects [1] 65/8
experiment [1] 58/20
expert [4] 37/1 37/4 40/21 103/7
experts [3] 145/22 199/5 199/6
explain [3] 31/22 107/7 127/23
explainable [6] 25/13 154/22 155/13
185/10 185/11 185/18
explained [3] 53/6 108/12 108/13
explanation [1] 107/14
explanations [1] 105/14
expressed [2] 131/8 139/12
expressly [1] 116/15
expressway [3] 70/8 70/16 70/17
extensive [3] 16/14 41/19 142/3
extent [7] 5/22 115/20 123/16 148/21


G Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF gerrymandering... [5] 187/25 188/2 190/20 191/2 193/8 gerrymanders [2] 106/5 195/22 get [52] 18/24 20/24 35/19 36/1 41/1 43/13 43/14 49/7 49/10 61/16 61/18 63/10 63/18 74/15 74/16 75/1 75/3 88/6 101/8 102/17 111/24 113/14 115/23 119/3 120/10 124/15 127/2 127/4 132/20 132/20 132/21 137/20 142/4 155/25 156/15 158/21 162/17 164/3 177/7 183/6 184/16 184/16 193/2 195/17 199/6 200/9 201/18 201/19 201/19 201/22 202/1 203/10 get-out-of-jail-free [1] 195/17 gets [15] 36/7 43/2 46/3 59/1 59/3 83/11 89/21 112/23 113/21 124/18 141/12 151/25 162/11 171/14 203/1 getting [9] 19/21 46/10 65/19 102/19 115/9 155/23 163/24 170/2 194/18 Gingles [5] 50/6 51/1 51/2 51/7 53/7 Gingles' [2] 51/15 191/24 give [14] 50/17 65/15 66/21 126/23
142/7 175/12 175/13 175/18 175/18 199/22 200/2 201/11 202/13 202/24 given [3] 118/7 144/5 200/19 gives [4] 42/6 143/11 172/20 202/25 giving [1] 143/4
glad [1] 54/20
gloss [1] 119/12
go [48] 5/2 5/2 17/24 29/6 34/21 39/24
41/13 41/23 43/24 47/6 50/15 60/12
63/16 66/11 66/14 66/24 74/5 77/5 82/13 82/16 82/19 84/18 85/17 98/1 112/7 113/13 115/22 116/24 117/5 117/11 127/16 132/24 134/2 139/23 141/4 141/9 143/23 145/18 145/24 146/1 148/4 154/15 158/1 170/7 189/15 190/1 190/11 200/20
goes [23] 24/16 25/6 52/13 52/18 58/22 58/24 72/8 75/14 90/2 94/5 97/13 99/11 123/15 129/19 144/20 154/3 154/4 163/1 183/20 184/4 194/24 199/10 200/21
going [61] 17/14 17/15 17/21 17/24
17/24 18/4 34/21 39/24 40/24 43/20 43/24 46/17 58/3 58/25 65/23 70/15 70/25 71/6 74/21 80/8 80/9 80/9 80/14 80/21 91/8 91/17 94/18 99/16 106/1 109/17 124/2 126/18 130/16 138/6 143/12 145/17 145/19 149/8 150/9 152/1 152/14 155/24 156/1 156/3 156/10 156/25 157/11 157/13 159/12 170/11 176/5 176/6 190/16 190/22 197/11 199/1 201/23 202/13 202/16 202/24 202/24
gone [4] 101/22 191/4 193/13 201/19 good [12] 5/4 6/8 6/14 6/22 7/14 9/8 46/23 85/9 86/18 141/23 146/24 184/21 got [39] 7/11 7/12 10/9 19/25 45/12 45/14 46/10 46/20 51/25 52/1 57/7 64/15 65/14 68/12 68/14 71/25 72/18 98/1 110/14 112/24 123/20 124/10 129/22 145/25 155/3 156/3 164/24 169/21 169/22 171/10 178/11 180/4 185/22 188/17 193/4 194/9 197/24 199/24 203/5 gotten [1] 173/24

govenaing $\begin{aligned} & \text { governg/400 } \\ & \text { gover }\end{aligned}$ Filed 09/13
government [13] 21/15 21/15 82/14 109/12 109/20 109/24 110/10 110/21 124/23 131/9 131/24 132/6 132/15 Governor [21] 8/5 9/15 12/17 17/17 22/23 24/14 51/10 73/4 73/5 73/11 73/19 83/16 137/21 139/5 148/8 160/21 161/8 173/19 181/5 181/6 197/7
Governor's [2] 41/21 143/20
grant [1] 71/18
granted [2] 50/19 149/1
grants [1] 131/19
grappling [1] 138/24
gray [4] 3/10 3/12 3/17 6/24
gray-robinson.com [1] 3/12
GrayRobinson [1] 6/20
great [4] 91/19 91/20 101/18 114/2
greater [1] 132/14
green [1] 39/10
gripe [1] 23/22
ground [5] 57/21 149/12 162/7 191/22 196/14
grounds [10] 23/18 105/1 119/21 120/4
126/5 126/24 154/22 155/13 162/6 171/7
group [5] 2/4 30/23 110/13 124/17 132/17
groups [3] 73/14 73/16 73/18
groups' [1] 194/12
guess [8] 14/20 20/21 43/2 103/21 136/5 192/3 197/24 199/24
guessed [1] 139/15
guessing [1] 23/3
guidance [3] 63/18 141/10 197/11
guide [1] 144/7
Gulf [2] 92/18 92/22
guys [5] 35/2 123/24 142/7 164/12 201/13

## H

had [62] 8/15 9/15 28/23 29/1 32/12
33/11 35/1 43/18 44/10 46/9 48/12 51/6
53/21 55/2 55/9 55/19 70/10 70/22 73/7
76/2 76/24 77/20 78/11 78/20 85/17
85/20 86/17 87/6 103/19 113/2 113/4
113/4 113/5 114/13 117/11 120/6
120/24 136/19 137/12 144/1 145/8
145/12 145/15 145/21 145/22 145/22
145/23 146/15 148/7 148/8 159/17
161/6 166/11 170/13 171/19 173/24
174/1 178/19 179/25 182/4 184/6 185/24
half [2] 35/3 154/24
Hamilton [1] 25/24
handful [1] 121/13
handle [1] 168/6
hanging [1] 169/4
happen [1] 125/10
happened [6] 100/11 126/10 126/14
126/17 128/6 174/3
happening [3] 16/20 91/2 173/8
happens [5] 66/20 82/19 173/13 174/5
189/19
happy [4] 16/18 34/14 146/7 149/7
harbor [1] 117/25
hard [5] 28/5 170/14 184/14 198/21
204/4
harm [1] 71/18
Harris [2] 190/20 190/21
Harvard [2] 123/8 123/20
has [142] 8/24 11/21 12/13 15/9 15/10
16/13 18/9 19/7 19/10 20/13 21/1 21/14 22/13 22/16 23/14 24/7 28/8 31/4 31/16 33/1 34/15 47/6 52/23 53/12 56/21
62/23 63/1 66/11 68/5 69/21 69/22 71/8
74/20 80/25 81/2 84/20 86/4 86/5 87/15
87/17 87/19 87/22 89/11 89/24 89/24 94/18 94/19 95/4 95/6 95/14 97/19 100/11 102/4 102/7 103/2 104/18 106/10 106/13 107/4 107/5 107/14 109/25 110/16 111/3 112/6 114/9 114/15 114/15 114/23 115/12 115/17 115/24 115/25 116/2 116/7 117/8 117/16 117/17 117/20 118/4 118/25 119/8 119/11 119/19 119/22 120/4 120/5 120/6 120/11 122/4 122/9 122/19 122/25 123/13 125/1 126/2 126/3 126/17 130/14 131/1 131/9 131/9 133/15 134/18 138/3 144/15 146/11 147/8 152/4 153/21 157/9 159/23 160/6 161/3 162/4 162/21 167/5 167/9 170/3 171/8 176/17 176/20 177/8 177/22 183/2 183/19 187/7 187/11 187/12 188/5 188/16 189/10 190/22 192/16 192/20 193/12 194/9 195/19 196/2 198/1 198/14 200/19
hasn't [6] 49/13 68/11 125/7 126/19 132/17 140/25
hauled [1] 82/23
have [275]
haven't [5] 56/12 56/14 99/14 142/7 154/2
having [8] 43/12 84/15 113/18 114/20 137/10 139/14 165/10 195/16
Hays [1] 29/16
he [24] 17/14 17/20 19/18 38/24 42/13 42/14 59/1 59/3 59/4 59/4 73/7 80/23 80/24 80/25 81/2 81/6 84/13 143/21 172/3 179/8 182/24 186/3 197/13 197/14
he's [5] 17/15 17/18 17/18 58/25 80/22 hear [9] 19/8 74/18 96/23 105/12
171/15 178/9 185/20 185/23 199/6 heard [7] 1/18 16/13 185/2 186/1 188/10 193/14 196/19
hearing [6] 46/14 97/24 141/8 160/8 177/23 193/12
hearings [2] 172/5 203/2
heat [3] 39/7 40/18 42/25
heavy [3] 196/12 201/12 203/25
Heck [1] 79/21
height [1] 89/16
held [4] 91/6 119/8 122/5 188/5
help [1] 107/2
helped [1] 198/23
helpful [1] 137/8
hem [1] 59/15
here [111] $5 / 45 / 107 / 1210 / 2012 / 5$ 14/15 15/22 15/25 16/8 16/8 16/17 19/15 20/8 20/18 20/20 21/22 23/2 23/19 25/2 25/16 26/16 26/20 29/7
33/25 34/21 37/14 40/22 41/2 45/25
46/13 53/13 55/12 55/23 59/22 61/21

| $\mathrm{H}_{\text {Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF }}$ <br> here... [76] 61/23 67/23 69/15 69/17 <br> 70/24 71/25 73/15 74/10 76/1 76/9 <br> 76/14 79/12 80/12 82/1 87/11 88/2 91/2 <br> 93/21 95/3 98/19 102/8 110/7 111/18 <br> 112/10 115/6 124/20 134/11 135/23 <br> 141/18 143/3 143/4 147/8 148/13 <br> 148/18 149/3 149/14 149/20 150/2 <br> 150/21 152/7 157/11 158/22 159/21 <br> 160/2 160/15 160/16 160/20 161/9 <br> 163/19 164/25 165/3 165/6 165/11 <br> 167/12 168/4 171/1 171/5 171/12 172/7 <br> 172/11 173/15 173/20 173/24 174/3 <br> 176/19 177/8 178/1 182/10 184/1 185/3 <br> 185/14 187/11 190/3 190/7 190/19 197/21 <br> here's [5] 39/22 68/18 76/25 142/13 <br> 157/4 <br> hey [3] 70/13 83/25 193/1 <br> hidden [1] 198/23 <br> hierarchy [8] 85/21 85/25 115/13 115/15 <br> 135/15 138/4 145/14 150/24 <br> high [4] 93/23 115/1 118/24 119/2 <br> higher [2] 87/5 123/3 <br> highjacked [1] 16/21 <br> highjacking [1] 16/22 <br> highlight [2] 16/16 30/17 <br> highlighted [2] 44/22 55/4 <br> highlights [1] 149/15 <br> highly [1] $93 / 2$ <br> highways [2] 25/20 26/5 <br> Hill [3] 105/19 108/3 108/12 <br> him [4] 73/7 84/7 84/12 137/23 <br> Hinkle [1] 202/6 <br> hire [1] 107/1 <br> his [10] $1 / 65 / 8$ 9/1 13/20 51/10 71/13 <br> 73/10 137/21 160/22 180/23 <br> historically [1] 50/25 <br> history [11] 94/17 94/23 126/22 127/11 <br> 127/17 128/8 128/14 129/19 130/10 <br> 172/8 190/22 <br> hit [4] 31/14 35/8 149/14 184/13 <br> hold [8] 33/16 44/4 88/14 95/23 140/12 <br> 148/1 192/24 194/8 <br> holding [3] 47/17 62/2 190/9 <br> holds [1] 51/7 <br> hole [1] 105/20 <br> HOLTZMAN [1] 2/16 <br> holtzmanvogel.com [3] 2/19 2/20 2/21 <br> Honor [185] 6/8 6/14 6/19 6/22 7/15 <br> 8/21 $13 / 3$ 13/5 13/8 14/12 18/8 20/8 <br> 21/8 23/7 24/23 26/7 27/5 30/12 31/4 <br> 33/13 33/24 34/3 34/19 34/22 34/23 <br> 35/10 35/13 36/6 36/16 37/15 37/25 <br> 38/14 38/17 38/19 39/4 39/12 39/22 <br> 40/9 40/13 40/15 42/19 43/6 44/6 44/21 <br> 45/5 46/1 47/10 48/1 48/16 50/7 51/8 <br> 51/14 53/4 53/18 53/24 54/21 55/13 <br> 56/18 57/11 57/12 58/15 58/21 59/17 <br> 60/12 60/18 61/5 61/21 62/5 62/11 <br> 62/24 63/9 64/18 65/18 65/22 65/25 <br> 67/1 67/16 68/25 69/19 70/5 70/25 71/6 <br> 73/22 74/5 74/10 75/9 75/24 76/20 77/6 <br> 77/17 78/14 79/11 79/21 79/25 80/4 <br> 81/1 81/5 81/8 81/15 82/16 82/18 83/7 <br> 84/4 85/3 85/9 85/12 88/1 88/16 92/8 <br> 92/24 97/9 98/24 99/8 99/24 100/5 <br> 101/10 102/13 107/18 108/25 109/7 | $110 / 18112 / 41463114 / 19.116 / 229$ <br> 1 1-72 24 中 <br> 127/24 130/9 132/2 132/25 133/21 <br> 134/23 138/1 138/21 139/12 140/11 <br> 141/6 141/7 142/18 142/23 143/11 <br> 144/9 146/10 146/11 146/20 146/24 <br> 147/21 148/21 148/24 151/6 154/10 <br> 154/14 159/5 159/14 166/9 168/5 <br> 168/17 169/14 170/7 171/10 175/2 <br> 175/9 176/15 176/19 178/21 183/2 <br> 183/8 184/25 187/8 187/23 189/18 <br> 191/6 191/19 193/23 194/7 202/1 202/4 <br> 202/11 203/19 203/21 203/22 <br> Honor's [2] 7/7 16/16 <br> hook [1] 75/16 <br> hope [1] 171/9 <br> hoped [1] 100/17 <br> hopelessly [1] 11/16 <br> horseshoe [2] 29/20 125/23 <br> host [2] 22/15 158/14 <br> house [38] 3/8 6/21 6/25 13/6 14/2 <br> 18/10 20/17 21/4 37/17 44/11 73/19 <br> 74/3 74/17 74/19 75/4 83/15 85/11 <br> 110/23 113/10 115/6 117/8 143/16 <br> 143/22 148/8 149/5 152/15 170/15 <br> 173/9 173/12 173/18 175/5 179/2 <br> 179/19 180/10 180/20 184/13 186/1 <br> 201/4 <br> House's [4] 13/4 74/18 111/18 151/16 how [60] 25/8 32/15 34/25 36/1 36/9 <br> 40/3 40/8 41/19 41/23 44/16 45/22 <br> 45/25 46/2 46/24 49/7 49/7 52/22 54/9 <br> 56/21 56/22 56/23 57/5 66/25 68/1 <br> 71/18 73/21 73/23 74/8 75/15 77/1 78/3 78/14 83/12 84/2 84/11 84/11 104/19 <br> 117/15 125/15 126/2 126/18 127/2 <br> 127/4 127/19 129/12 142/14 143/15 <br> 164/14 165/19 169/24 170/19 172/2 <br> 178/19 179/11 184/15 184/16 190/1 <br> 191/18 200/20 201/21 <br> however [3] 45/6 69/10 150/14 <br> huge [3] 177/22 183/1 187/7 <br> hundred [2] 101/23 129/3 <br> hundreds [1] 46/11 <br> hurdles [1] 194/18 <br> hypothetical [5] 11/23 14/24 32/17 <br> 182/4 188/7 <br> hypothetically [1] 188/8 <br> hypotheticals [1] 195/6 <br> I <br> I'd [7] 28/4 59/17 70/3 79/12 82/16 82/18 176/16 <br> I'll [11] 6/4 6/6 16/16 16/17 34/24 70/2 <br> 74/18 80/6 199/19 201/11 203/11 <br> I'm [55] 17/14 17/20 18/4 21/13 24/24 32/10 34/14 37/14 40/9 41/10 42/2 42/3 43/21 46/14 46/17 46/18 46/23 47/4 47/4 47/8 51/14 53/6 54/20 55/22 62/9 63/9 64/18 64/24 67/17 72/13 73/11 <br> 73/12 74/21 77/3 80/8 80/9 82/21 82/22 82/23 183/13 186/22 187/25 188/15 <br> 188/21 189/3 195/5 199/1 199/16 <br> 199/25 201/10 202/12 202/12 202/13 202/23 202/24 <br> I've [18] 7/11 7/12 20/11 53/6 71/25 81/8 97/25 145/25 183/9 187/23 187/24 188/1 188/9 191/9 200/12 203/5 203/15 | [294/n <br> 2Z $8_{1} \mathrm{Of}_{2} 2355$ <br> i.e [1] 81/22 <br> idea [4] 29/1 172/20 179/25 180/3 <br> ideal [1] 153/19 <br> identically [1] 50/22 <br> identified [7] 14/15 52/11 122/7 122/12 <br> 134/14 134/17 134/20 <br> identify [2] 51/22 57/21 <br> idly [1] 71/11 <br> if [132] 10/17 15/6 19/20 20/5 22/7 <br> 23/17 27/1 27/22 28/7 30/2 35/6 35/8 <br> 37/9 39/24 46/4 46/4 46/14 46/14 48/21 <br> 49/4 51/6 52/5 53/10 55/22 56/7 56/10 <br> 57/9 57/15 58/3 60/9 60/24 61/10 61/16 <br> 61/17 65/15 66/1 66/12 66/19 67/3 68/4 68/16 69/7 71/1 71/7 72/21 72/22 73/10 <br> 74/7 76/2 76/2 76/18 77/5 77/7 77/20 <br> 82/21 87/18 92/6 95/25 96/22 96/23 <br> 98/11 98/12 99/2 99/2 103/12 104/13 <br> 104/15 104/24 105/2 107/15 111/13 <br> 112/20 113/2 113/4 113/10 113/22 <br> 113/24 116/23 117/1 117/1 119/13 <br> 119/25 124/10 128/8 137/8 140/17 <br> 140/22 148/3 148/7 149/6 150/13 <br> 153/13 154/13 155/3 156/8 157/13 <br> 157/22 157/22 161/19 164/2 164/15 <br> 164/22 165/23 165/25 167/3 169/14 <br> 169/15 169/24 172/22 173/6 173/23 <br> 174/24 175/24 182/4 182/19 182/21 <br> 183/2 183/22 184/3 184/14 184/24 <br> 188/16 194/8 194/10 194/16 194/17 <br> 194/24 195/25 199/14 203/6 203/7 <br> 203/8 <br> ignore [2] 43/9 66/5 <br> ignoring [1] 33/10 <br> III [19] 7/23 35/22 36/14 50/2 50/20 <br> 53/2 53/4 53/7 53/23 57/22 58/6 58/8 <br> 60/21 61/11 65/3 73/17 73/24 81/16 <br> 81/19 <br> illustrate [3] 66/2 170/10 170/19 <br> illustrates [2] 32/15 149/20 <br> images [1] 107/19 <br> imagine [2] 80/22 204/3 <br> immunity [1] 83/3 <br> immunized [1] 106/5 <br> immunizes [1] 105/25 <br> impact [1] 78/21 <br> implement [5] 54/1 54/5 70/15 71/11 <br> 72/23 <br> implementing [4] 74/2 75/13 75/20 84/14 <br> implicated [2] 75/16 75/18 <br> implication [1] 196/11 <br> implicit [1] 57/1 <br> important [9] 33/14 110/23 121/25 <br> 122/1 126/25 139/16 149/19 200/13 201/1 <br> importantly [1] 41/25 <br> impose [1] 58/2 <br> imposed [2] 110/17 158/25 <br> imposes [1] 30/22 <br> imposing [3] 87/10 110/4 110/10 <br> imposition [1] 163/20 <br> impossible [2] 163/4 164/25 <br> improper [2] 78/20 117/1 <br> improperly [1] 113/12 <br> improved [1] 56/23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

1 Case 4:22-cv-00109-AW-MA in [657]
in '92 [1] 140/5
in-camera [1] 204/2
in-house [1] 6/25
inapplicable [1] 168/9
inappropriate [1] 79/9
INC [1] 1/4
incapable [1] 184/8
include [1] 13/24
includes [4] 24/14 90/19 90/20 176/21
including [1] 14/14
Incorporated [1] 5/7
incumbency [3] 60/25 61/7 61/10
incumbent [1] 117/5
indeed [4] 21/9 26/24 49/8 179/11
indefinitely [1] 121/24
independent [1] 132/22
independently [1] 200/10
indicates [1] 23/19
indicating [3] 27/18 61/21 64/24
indication [2] 91/14 95/7
indications [2] 94/4 96/18
indicator [1] 94/15
individual [9] 15/11 20/10 20/14 21/10
21/23 82/14 110/13 124/17 199/8
individuals [4] 21/10 83/14 83/23 83/24
indulgence [1] 175/23
inference [1] 97/22
infinite [1] 138/11
information [3] 15/15 39/6 42/21
informed [1] 22/17
inherent [2] 59/14 123/11
initial [2] 9/1 157/6
initially [2] 94/24 157/19
inject [1] 63/13
injunction [9] 37/5 37/11 38/2 65/11 74/12 96/8 103/6 163/16 198/13 injury [4] 134/7 134/10 135/2 135/9 injury-based [3] 134/10 135/2 135/9 inkblot [1] 29/22
inquiry [10] 12/2 22/14 23/1 23/13 88/4
88/5 109/6 111/6 111/7 146/15
insert [1] 67/25
insisted [2] 104/18 122/25
instance [2] 67/3 122/7
instances [2] 70/22 122/12
instead [6] 9/21 11/24 74/16 89/12 94/8 171/3
INSTITUTE [2] $1 / 45 / 6$
instructed [1] 23/14
insufficiently [1] 31/6
intend [2] 17/18 41/15
intensely [1] 22/14
intent [4] 7/25 157/21 171/17 172/8 intentional [1] 128/3
interest [62] 60/10 63/15 67/8 77/10 77/15 83/20 88/7 93/10 93/20 107/6 109/7 111/4 111/17 111/24 112/2 112/3 112/5 112/10 112/13 112/17 112/20 112/25 113/8 113/20 114/1 114/20 114/23 114/25 115/5 117/22 118/5 118/14 118/22 118/23 119/5 119/10 120/1 120/7 120/14 122/3 122/4 122/11 124/21 127/2 127/5 127/7 127/10 128/11 128/16 130/3 130/8 133/22 139/9 146/19 157/23 193/18 194/15 195/11 195/15 195/16 195/21 196/1
interesting 11 294/5-1 Filed 09/13/(161/9163/2 163/8 165/12 168/1 168/3
interprefle on 189-1 Filed 09/13
interpreting [2] 34/11 192/14
88/4 1789/20-109/22 409/25 170/10
interstate [1] 27/23
interstates [1] 25/20
intervened [1] 83/25
intervention [2] 55/6 57/4
into [42] 5/12 8/5 10/2 17/17 18/11
32/19 33/9 33/17 33/19 34/9 42/21
45/12 60/25 61/8 61/10 61/18 63/13
76/25 77/3 82/23 85/14 89/14 91/22
103/11 106/1 111/24 112/7 113/21
117/2 121/23 126/19 129/10 130/17
131/5 138/12 171/15 181/25 182/8
184/3 187/5 194/10 202/14
introduced [2] 135/16 173/10
introduction [2] 172/12 172/13
invalid [2] 66/8 126/12
invalidated [3] 94/25 104/14 127/14
invalided [1] 104/25
invitations [1] 198/2
involved [4] 55/23 82/10 200/23 201/14
irregular [1] 157/9
irregularly [1] 157/24
irrelevant [1] 56/4
is [684]
isn't [41] 17/19 17/19 47/25 48/1 48/3
48/5 51/3 53/22 54/16 58/15 60/10 67/13 68/7 73/2 73/18 74/17 75/22 76/13 76/15 76/23 77/14 82/9 92/18 99/3 110/7 110/10 110/20 123/14 123/19 127/1 136/12 140/11 155/1 155/22 164/5 164/21 165/8 167/2 191/3 193/4 193/5
issue [36] 14/8 19/12 20/16 29/5 30/16 40/22 47/12 47/14 47/15 48/2 49/25 50/4 63/8 68/7 70/23 73/2 90/4 94/18 95/3 95/5 104/13 119/20 119/21 134/15 136/6 137/15 137/16 141/11 147/1 167/24 168/10 168/19 169/9 176/2 178/6 200/11
issued [2] 17/12 50/13
issues [21] 1/115/115/13 5/20 5/21 79/17 85/18 134/2 134/14 134/17 134/20 138/25 139/21 140/9 168/12 169/3 170/25 171/4 174/4 201/17 203/17
issuing [2] 43/22 73/12 it [489]
it'd [1] 76/19
it's [153] 12/23 17/13 17/23 18/4 18/5
23/23 28/5 28/5 37/6 37/10 42/10 43/20
44/25 47/15 47/20 49/17 50/3 50/4
50/17 51/12 51/19 52/13 53/18 56/2
56/2 56/13 56/13 58/23 59/5 59/9 59/20 61/7 61/9 62/17 62/18 64/14 64/15 70/1 70/7 72/17 76/10 79/22 80/1 81/1 82/5 83/5 83/7 84/1 88/11 89/17 89/19 89/25 90/6 90/18 93/3 93/4 94/12 98/20 99/2 99/19 100/4 102/24 103/7 103/8 103/9 104/19 105/23 108/19 109/23 110/22 111/7 111/9 111/13 112/4 112/24 114/22 115/2 116/8 117/1 118/20 119/4 123/6 125/13 125/14 130/7 130/25 133/2 134/13 135/24 136/2 137/6 137/8 137/9 138/7 139/16 139/23 141/17 144/11 144/19 146/14 149/6 150/22 150/24 155/16 155/17 157/2 157/22

171/1 173/21 177/7 178/4 178/10 178/12 179/18 181/9 181/15 181/15 181/15 182/9 184/9 188/16 189/5 189/7
189/14 190/12 191/4 191/15 191/15
191/18 193/6 193/11 193/19 193/19
193/20 194/1 194/11 194/24 196/16 198/23 199/9 200/1 201/1

## iterations [1] 104/5

its [43] 9/13 22/20 26/11 29/22 34/7 38/20 44/19 46/5 53/21 56/9 56/23 60/15 81/16 81/21 89/9 89/21 93/10 97/12 98/21 98/22 103/20 104/15
104/16 104/21 104/23 110/4 110/17 110/21 112/19 112/19 112/21 113/5 115/18 118/5 125/25 130/20 131/14 131/21 149/5 157/6 165/22 179/23 186/8
itself [20] 10/3 12/3 31/7 93/17 99/25
104/12 105/16 106/8 110/11 112/13
112/17 116/15 125/20 137/9 140/22 174/13 179/21 184/22 189/21 192/16

## J

Jacksonville [23] 26/6 26/14 26/23
29/23 89/15 89/23 90/14 90/21 93/2
93/14 94/5 97/2 101/7 104/7 104/20
105/8 105/18 153/16 153/22 157/16
170/11 170/12 170/24
jagged [1] 29/9
jail [1] 195/17
January [1] 173/4
JASRASARIA [2] 2/8 6/11
JAZIL [14] 2/18 4/5 6/15 34/21 35/11 42/18 85/2 93/21 97/4 158/2 169/20
179/9 182/19 190/9
Jim [1] 129/5
jjasrasaria [1] 2/8
job [2] 164/17 164/17
Johns [1] 159/22
Johnson [4] 94/22 108/13 125/3 140/3
join [4] 147/24 153/15 153/22 157/21
joined [1] 160/23
joining [1] 116/18
joins [2] 156/11 170/23
joint [3] 5/12 50/11 149/13
JOSEFIAK [1] 2/16
JOSHUA [2] 2/20 6/16
jpratt [1] 2/21
JUDGE [3] 1/17 201/10 202/6
judged [1] 79/1
judging [1] 48/11
judgment [12] 10/14 13/14 37/6 80/5
103/9 115/23 117/17 117/19 133/25
134/1 140/24 156/18
judgments [2] 115/18 145/16
judiciably [1] 41/17
judicial [6] 1/1 16/22 43/4 43/17 166/2 177/14
judicially [3] 41/9 41/17 43/3
judiciary [1] 19/2
June [1] 123/2
juris [1] 19/7
jurisdiction [4] 19/8 105/21 131/14 139/24
jurisdictions [3] 55/4 106/11 121/4
just [60] 14/7 16/16 19/11 20/3 22/19


L Case 4:22-cv-00109-AW-MAF limited [6] 21/2 21/2 121/21 129/24 162/4 165/25 limiting [1] 31/3 limits [5] 30/22 120/25 120/25 121/19 140/22
line [15] 25/18 25/21 25/23 25/24 25/25 43/6 89/12 89/14 93/22 94/7 133/20 137/14 142/15 180/20 185/7
line 16 [1] 180/20
lines [14] 11/16 12/3 22/11 25/12 25/17 26/3 26/12 26/22 138/14 143/4 144/17 171/2 185/5 187/4
literally [2] 30/10 182/22
litigated [6] 94/20 95/1 141/17 183/9 187/23 187/24
litigation [25] 23/12 87/4 87/14 87/20 95/5 96/9 102/14 102/14 103/2 106/20 106/21 107/4 110/6 117/8 143/14 159/15 159/20 160/19 161/1 163/12 166/17 174/9 177/11 181/14 181/16 little [15] 5/18 10/8 18/3 72/17 89/21 90/12 104/6 104/8 104/10 107/24 137/14 142/8 163/12 193/9 204/1 live [2] 30/5 92/17
living [2] 93/13 93/15
LLP [1] 2/4
local [3] 70/17 127/15 127/21
located [1] 179/1
locking [1] 57/9
lodge [1] 40/16
logic [1] 167/16
logically [3] 60/6 98/8 98/25
long [15] 23/24 23/24 27/19 33/12 60/13
64/8 68/4 121/22 122/21 127/11 145/21
170/13 195/8 198/20 203/9
long-term [1] 121/22
longer [6] 12/14 56/22 122/19 123/7 123/10 136/11
look[33] 25/11 26/15 28/4 28/7 28/19
38/17 45/2 45/7 46/1 53/10 53/11 60/18 61/20 65/3 70/19 84/20 89/2 90/22 95/9 107/21 107/23 108/9 120/17 124/8 128/5 128/5 145/24 171/12 172/7 172/10 189/4 198/7 198/8
looked [10] 62/12 90/16 125/23 143/17 151/14 151/20 153/10 170/17 172/18 185/7
looking [12] 29/7 36/8 39/19 41/10 94/3 156/8 156/21 156/22 163/2 172/4 175/16 186/23
looks [10] 14/17 50/17 58/16 90/10
108/2 108/22 154/21 166/18 170/21
176/12
loop [1] 105/20
lose [1] 156/25
loses [1] 182/25
lost [1] 182/9
lot [17] 42/4 78/19 92/7 92/16 92/19 104/2 138/13 149/12 151/15 151/20 153/10 174/4 178/10 187/21 187/24 198/22 203/25
lots [3] 123/22 123/22 123/22
Louisiana [2] 29/6 29/6
low [5] 104/22 104/23 115/2 118/21 121/5
lower [1] 28/13
lunch [1] 176/8


## M

made [25] 5/16 10/19 11/21 15/9 19/10 22/16 23/2 40/17 60/12 63/23 68/11 69/22 69/25 114/8 130/5 131/1 133/24 148/17 148/24 149/16 149/22 157/15 159/9 159/14 159/19
Madison [1] 25/22
main [1] 23/22
maintain [2] 37/18 70/3
maintains [1] 37/23
major [6] 25/20 26/5 26/23 93/4 156/12 156/13
majority [13] 7/20 9/14 50/24 51/2 51/7
51/20 51/22 52/21 124/2 124/6 124/11 124/13 186/8
majority-minority [6] 50/24 51/2 51/7 51/20 51/22 124/11
make [40] 24/11 24/17 33/17 56/21 59/13 70/3 73/11 74/16 78/8 83/2 84/12 88/18 91/11 114/5 115/17 117/16
117/18 120/9 129/20 132/14 136/19 137/10 137/12 137/19 137/23 145/15 146/15 148/22 149/6 149/9 175/3 176/16 177/20 181/8 182/11 190/16 190/17 191/16 193/23 203/4
makes [8] 91/9 120/13 124/18 128/15 133/12 138/8 181/23 189/8 making [18] 44/19 65/20 78/1 78/5 88/8 109/12 109/24 119/19 124/3 132/19 156/23 160/11 160/15 160/16 191/20 193/15 194/12 196/13
malapportionment [1] 174/1
mandate [1] 69/9
manner [9] 38/6 49/16 95/24 96/11 147/24 154/8 154/23 156/14 159/10 many [11] 24/1 25/8 57/5 125/15 126/2 186/12 186/14 190/1 190/11 190/11 201/16
map [123] 8/4 8/16 8/18 9/22 10/22 12/18 13/17 16/5 22/18 24/8 24/13 25/9 25/16 26/10 28/5 28/24 29/17 38/12 39/8 39/18 59/21 59/22 59/24 61/20 62/1 62/6 62/16 62/21 62/21 63/2 63/11 63/12 64/19 64/20 64/22 64/24 64/25 65/3 65/9 65/13 67/24 67/25 68/18 71/11 72/10 72/13 72/24 75/8 75/13 84/6 84/14 86/5 86/18 86/19 87/17 88/22 89/5 91/1 91/9 91/11 91/17 92/9 98/6 98/20 126/13 140/13 140/14 144/1 146/21 148/15 148/19 153/7 154/11 158/7 159/16 159/25 159/25 161/24 161/25 162/6 162/23 163/25 164/2 164/3 164/10 164/15 164/19 164/21 165/8 165/9 165/10 165/10 167/10 168/22 169/24 170/4 170/17 173/17 173/24 173/25 174/11 174/15 174/19 175/1 177/5 181/25 182/2 183/10 183/12 183/16 183/20 184/3 184/8 184/15 184/16 185/13 186/4 186/21 187/4 190/25 191/1 198/10 198/13 maps [19] 11/23 40/18 42/25 44/11 44/14 93/21 115/19 126/20 142/9 151/17 157/7 177/16 184/6 184/20 186/23 188/7 189/23 190/11 190/15 Maptitude [1] 44/18

March[1] 5043
mark [1] 29/9
MARSH [1] 1/17
Martinez [1] 95/1
Maryland [1] 71/7 Master [1] 44/24 material [2] 44/18 57/18 mathematical [1] 102/6 matter [17] $1 / 3$ 2/2 5/6 18/12 19/18 61/1 61/4 104/19 111/8 111/9 112/14 112/15 133/2 139/24 183/16 200/14 204/7 Matters [1] 79/22
may [25] 6/3 7/16 35/11 42/18 58/2 71/11 72/4 72/5 72/5 85/8 124/5 124/6 124/7 124/11 124/12 124/12 142/11 149/10 149/23 155/10 159/13 159/13 162/15 164/19 176/14 maybe [8] 28/9 80/10 80/22 92/20 101/24 123/9 172/1 200/15 mbeato [1] 2/20
McCulloch [1] 71/6
McVay [2] 3/17 6/18
me [49] 6/10 6/16 6/24 12/22 17/9 18/7 21/17 36/4 39/17 42/16 43/2 43/16 46/3 46/15 49/20 50/10 55/18 59/13 60/16 62/20 62/24 65/8 66/2 73/8 76/21 77/13 77/19 80/13 84/1 84/21 84/21 98/3 98/5 98/8 98/13 98/13 142/8 142/24 144/5 152/13 152/15 171/20 175/25 195/24 199/18 200/9 201/7 202/25 203/4 mean [37] 20/16 41/16 44/1 46/4 51/4 54/11 57/6 62/12 75/13 78/7 99/11
99/22 105/6 106/17 107/25 112/18
115/4 118/12 129/22 144/19 145/1
147/21 157/2 158/3 158/6 158/20
159/24 178/4 182/20 183/1 184/18
194/16 194/17 195/12 196/3 196/9
203/6
means [3] 78/4 108/22 118/10
meant [2] 18/22 121/22
measure [1] 104/17
measures [1] 109/16
meet [3] 62/21 68/8 182/23
meetings [1] 173/10
meets [1] 64/12
member [2] 103/13 172/9
members [2] 83/16 173/5
memorandum [1] 96/7
mentioned [3] 141/7 149/13 166/10
merely [1] 78/23
messages [2] 41/21 141/20
met [2] 49/13 62/3
method [2] 130/25 131/1
metrics [1] 187/1
metropolitan [2] 156/12 156/13
Miami [2] 70/8 70/16
Miami-Dade [2] 70/8 70/16
MICHAEL [2] 2/19 6/16
middle [3] 26/20 27/20 202/3
midst [1] 129/4
might [12] 58/1 63/18 73/7 90/13 104/9 107/24 125/13 132/11 132/13 132/14 147/5 202/8
miles [10] 23/23 60/13 60/15 66/18
89/16 89/17 91/24 92/5 92/10 101/6
Miller [1] 108/13
Milligan [7] 22/23 63/20 138/17 144/21
$M_{\text {Case 4:22-cv-00109-AW-MA }}$ Milligan... [3] 191/3 191/7 191/9 million [1] 144/21 mind [4] 42/12 124/20 139/16 181/12 mine [1] 38/10
minimal [2] 102/4 119/4
minimally [1] 100/20 minorities [3] 8/1 56/10 95/16 minorities' [1] 78/9 minority [25] 30/20 30/23 31/5 31/18 31/20 33/11 50/24 50/25 51/2 51/7 51/20 51/22 58/16 78/2 88/21 93/24 96/2 121/6 122/18 122/20 123/7 124/5 124/11 125/5 133/15
minus [2] 101/21 102/3
minute [2] 176/6 192/10
minutes [1] 85/5
mischaracterizations [1] 30/15
mischaracterize [1] 30/18
misinterpreting [1] 119/24
misrepresent [2] 32/2 32/20
misrepresentations [2] 30/16 33/13
misrepresenting [2] 179/16 179/17
misrepresents [1] 31/12
mistaken [1] 55/22
mjazil [1] 2/19
Mo [1] 35/11
model [1] 62/17
MOHAMMAD [2] 2/18 6/15
moment [2] 37/16 74/22
Monday [1] 175/19
money [1] 163/14
Monroe [3] 1/15 2/17 3/4
monstrous [1] 27/6
monumental [3] 191/21 198/5 198/5 more [39] 5/18 8/24 10/8 11/25 23/2 25/10 25/10 26/22 26/25 40/25 41/24 42/4 56/7 56/19 57/7 65/1 66/2 70/3 80/10 89/6 92/16 92/19 97/10 119/5 123/17 128/14 132/8 153/12 157/1 161/5 166/18 168/3 185/11 186/17 186/19 197/11 201/8 202/23 203/2 morning [9] 5/4 6/8 6/14 6/22 7/14 85/9 146/24 177/23 203/9
Mortham [3] 94/22 125/3 140/3 most [11] 12/19 13/9 13/20 20/4 37/25 70/7 79/3 93/8 129/1 190/5 201/8 motion [8] 37/12 69/23 96/8 148/22
149/7 156/18 175/3 203/16
motions [2] 149/9 200/7
motivated [1] 63/25
motivating [1] 91/3
motivation [5] 106/23 106/25 108/7 108/8 108/11
motive [4] 105/11 106/9 106/14 108/19 motives [1] 107/11
move [4] 59/17 104/10 122/18 143/4 moved [1] 144/25
movement [1] 129/5
moves [2] 11/3 89/8
moving [1] 138/14
Mr [6] 4/5 4/6 4/7 80/7 85/8 202/17 Mr. [26] 34/21 42/18 70/9 77/18 80/15 80/21 85/2 93/21 97/4 146/23 149/12 149/16 152/3 158/2 158/2 169/15 169/20 175/10 179/9 182/19 186/2 188/10 190/9 193/15 202/9 203/16 Mr. Bardos [11] 80/15 80/21 149/12
 18898 Uhbelt 202
Mr . Gallo [1] 77/18
Mr. Jazil [10] 34/21 42/18 85/2 93/21 97/4 158/2 169/20 179/9 182/19 190/9
Mr. Nordby [4] 70/9 146/23 175/10 203/16
Ms [4] 4/4 4/8 176/12 181/3
Ms. [4] 7/3 175/22 176/14 198/16
Ms. Khanna [4] 7/3 175/22 176/14 198/16
much [18] 24/11 52/19 79/5 90/11 90/16 92/11 93/3 95/9 105/6 108/16 109/2 119/5 121/17 136/21 186/6 186/15 198/17 200/6
multiple [2] 121/20 198/2
multiply [1] 199/24
municipalities [1] 121/14
must [17] 11/10 11/22 53/8 53/17 53/19
60/22 89/8 95/23 135/1 135/8 147/9
147/16 148/15 149/22 150/6 161/15 161/23
muster [2] 66/13 67/5
mutually [1] 51/17
my [33] 21/17 44/25 47/9 49/4 51/21
57/12 57/25 58/11 58/13 59/18 59/23
59/24 60/5 61/6 65/20 65/22 65/25 69/6
74/5 77/12 79/2 80/6 82/24 84/2 84/6
84/9 99/12 144/6 158/1 198/23 202/19 203/1 205/14

## N

name [1] 32/1
NARGIZ [3] 1/21 205/10 205/22 narrative [2] 33/16 34/13
narrow [7] 5/13 60/10 63/15 67/8 84/16
88/9 120/23
narrowly [3] 81/22 120/1 122/13
Native [1] 155/19
natural [2] 185/12 186/19
naturalized [2] 82/8 82/12
nature [1] 139/25
NE [1] 2/4
near [1] 201/16
Nearly [1] 25/18
nebulous [1] 188/7
necessarily [7] 14/16 108/17 108/23 120/20 146/2 169/13 176/1
necessary [4] 55/8 95/21 148/21 149/6 necessity [1] 153/15
need [27] 5/25 7/6 33/15 33/17 33/18
35/19 35/21 52/17 57/18 58/4 58/7 60/2 65/1 65/4 71/2 80/20 98/12 116/24
128/7 142/15 153/22 167/16 173/13
175/15 176/1 201/15 203/17
needed [3] 37/12 161/5 173/16
needle [1] 104/10
needs [15] 32/22 36/22 36/23 48/25
51/24 57/22 59/11 63/3 64/21 69/4 76/1
76/8 98/21 177/9 183/16
negative [2] 61/2 151/8
neighbor [1] 29/3
neutral [9] 23/15 26/12 39/25 59/22
63/12 64/22 67/24 69/8 152/8
never [17] 43/15 47/14 47/15 49/25
55/10 100/25 102/14 104/11 106/10
107/4 119/8 119/13 120/5 120/11
121/22 177/4 188/9

33/7 1896/23-188/भ1 491中22 196/13
next [10] 25/22 29/17 59/17 168/24 173/22 202/2 202/3 202/5 202/10 203/9 niche [1] 122/2
nine [1] 121/12
no [107] 1/6 12/13 12/14 13/3 13/17 15/15 17/2 19/6 19/6 19/7 19/8 19/11 19/21 20/16 22/12 23/24 29/1 30/6 31/17 32/18 34/4 44/25 47/11 47/16 48/1 48/16 48/17 49/5 49/24 54/1 56/8 56/22 57/13 57/23 58/9 59/14 61/5 61/5 61/5 61/5 61/21 61/23 64/18 66/1 66/2 66/15 66/20 66/23 68/5 68/23 69/7 71/8 79/16 81/10 81/17 81/18 81/18 83/2 83/17 86/18 87/12 88/20 90/25 99/4 99/6 101/3 101/9 101/11 101/13 101/15 106/22 107/13 112/14 112/14 114/18 116/19 116/19 122/19 122/20 122/21 123/7 123/9 124/17 124/17 126/6 130/24 131/13 136/11 136/16 140/18 141/2 146/6 159/2 161/19 162/8 170/3 178/15 178/19 179/25 181/23 182/22 183/5 186/2 186/22 188/20 191/16 197/19
no juris [1] 19/7
nobody [10] 15/20 29/13 65/8 101/25 102/25 103/2 103/15 124/17 143/14 165/16
non [2] 55/7 57/20
non-retrogression [1] 55/7
non-vote [1] 57/20
noncoastal [1] 92/15
noncompact [1] 90/25
nondiminishing [3] 136/6 136/25 137/4 nondiminishment [95] 8/6 9/3 9/6 9/13 14/14 30/18 31/10 31/13 32/1 33/17 36/9 36/11 36/13 36/20 36/24 38/9 39/1 40/5 48/8 48/14 48/22 48/23 49/11
49/12 49/15 50/19 50/23 51/16 51/18 52/4 52/9 52/20 60/1 66/10 76/10 78/5 87/14 96/14 112/12 112/16 112/21
112/23 113/4 114/10 114/16 117/24 118/10 118/13 118/15 120/16 120/18
124/24 127/18 127/19 128/16 128/19 128/25 129/9 129/9 131/7 140/13 140/23 151/1 151/13 151/18 151/23 153/8 153/14 153/25 154/8 154/12 154/19 155/11 160/1 161/13 161/16 161/20 162/1 162/14 162/24 166/20 167/20 167/24 168/11 168/20 169/16 170/5 170/14 174/12 174/17 177/5 185/17 192/19 193/17 196/4
none [11] 10/5 12/11 21/19 21/22 28/16 29/13 55/11 58/5 58/8 121/16 129/8 nonexistent [1] 30/4
nonfinal [1] 17/11
nonjury [1] 5/15
nonpredomination [1] 156/2
nonresidents [1] 192/4
nonsensical [1] 32/15
nonTier [1] 159/8
nonTier 2 [1] 159/8
nonvote [3] 51/23 52/1 52/10
nonvoters [1] 192/5
noon [1] 175/17
NORDBY [9] 3/5 4/7 6/23 70/9 146/23 146/25 175/10 202/17 203/16
$\mathrm{N}_{\text {Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF }}$ norm [2] 23/21 25/7
normally [1] 148/11
north [55] 8/9 8/14 8/19 9/14 10/15
13/22 14/8 16/3 20/25 21/3 21/6 27/16 28/11 32/25 35/23 48/19 48/21 49/1 49/6 49/9 49/16 55/12 55/16 55/17 60/3 60/9 60/19 81/11 84/6 88/21 91/8 95/20 121/16 125/19 136/7 141/3 150/25 152/8 153/15 153/20 155/6 155/16 155/18 156/5 157/13 157/24 159/17 160/2 162/5 162/8 165/25 166/1 167/20 170/9 186/7
North Carolina [2] 27/16 60/19 north-south [3] 91/8 95/20 159/17 northeast [2] 28/7 159/22
northern [4] 23/25 43/7 92/15 154/24 not [336]
notably [1] 29/11
note [6] 39/4 42/20 73/5 101/19 133/17 134/10
noted [2] 59/18 202/7
notes [1] 205/14
nothing [8] 8/24 8/25 101/11 110/1 112/6 203/18 203/20 203/22
notice [4] 43/5 43/17 175/14 177/14 noticeable [3] 41/9 41/17 43/4
noticed [1] 12/23
noting [1] 20/16
notions [1] 200/13
notwithstanding [2] 192/11 192/15 novel [1] 189/2
now [58] 5/11 9/1 9/20 10/18 11/3 12/15 12/19 13/14 13/22 15/4 15/9 16/7 21/2 22/12 23/13 23/22 25/11 27/1 29/11
29/24 31/9 41/7 50/19 57/4 57/21 65/19 71/23 75/22 94/20 98/19 100/4 104/19
124/11 125/7 134/2 134/5 139/12
156/19 158/20 161/2 162/4 164/1
164/25 177/13 179/7 179/14 179/20
180/23 180/23 181/24 182/12 183/15
184/7 187/6 187/18 188/23 192/19 198/19
nowhere [2] 13/11 29/25
nullify [1] 16/23
number [25] 5/16 13/23 14/15 14/24
24/11 25/4 31/20 51/9 51/14 77/15
77/16 88/11 106/22 114/13 123/21
126/11 126/19 126/23 138/12 156/24
183/9 188/7 188/19 191/22 200/2 number 1 [3] 51/9 77/15 106/22 Number 2 [2] 51/14 77/16 numbers [3] 41/12 43/10 144/24 numerical [2] 31/14 31/23
numerous [1] 123/24
nutshell [2] 49/2 77/7

## O

oath [4] 17/4 18/15 141/6 168/13
Obama [1] 58/25
object [1] 40/17
objected [1] 12/12
objection [4] 40/16 42/12 175/6 175/8
objective [2] 23/15 187/1
obligated [1] 71/9
obligation [3] 48/12 87/6 171/13
obligations [5] 71/14 86/6 98/21 103/20 169/11
obvious [4] 43/9,43/10 43/11129/13/13/48/1648/17 49/6, 50/3,54/4 51/13 54/25
 167/10 196/2 199/2
October [1] 172/25
odd [4] 39/4 39/5 159/19 199/23
off [4] 33/6 99/16 169/3 176/4
offend [1] 72/5
offering [1] 19/15
office [2] 21/5 83/4
offices [1] 20/18
official [23] $1 / 65 / 8$ 16/1 16/9 16/11
16/15 17/20 18/21 19/21 21/5 69/20 70/4 70/11 75/12 75/18 82/11 83/9 83/17 84/18 84/19 84/22 134/9 141/8 officially [1] 130/7
officials [10] 10/1 10/4 16/1 16/21 $17 / 2$ 19/12 33/10 70/23 192/3 194/3
offs [2] 149/22 150/10
often [2] 139/19 199/4
oh [2] 148/12 197/15
okay[23] 6/13 45/2 45/3 49/4 62/8 64/7
69/18 71/15 81/7 88/25 106/14 119/23
119/25 130/16 141/19 145/12 149/11
155/21 162/25 163/24 167/3 190/16 194/9
on [204] 1/11 1/18 $2 / 2$ 2/15 3/2 3/8 5/2
5/10 5/11 6/9 6/15 6/17 6/20 6/23 7/5
7/12 7/16 10/3 10/14 10/20 11/13 14/11
15/4 16/14 18/1 19/4 22/5 22/15 23/17
24/25 25/15 26/16 27/1 28/1 28/2 30/15
30/22 31/11 31/22 34/7 34/8 34/10
34/17 35/7 35/11 37/25 39/6 42/15
42/24 43/20 43/22 44/3 44/17 49/23
53/2 56/3 56/10 57/21 59/17 60/1 64/10 65/10 65/24 66/19 69/7 72/6 75/16
77/21 79/6 81/9 81/16 82/9 83/13 83/15
84/2 84/14 84/22 86/11 87/12 88/8 88/14 88/19 91/17 92/17 93/10 93/10 96/4 96/17 99/6 99/13 99/17 99/21
101/1 102/18 104/14 104/18 104/25 106/15 107/8 107/25 108/24 108/25 109/3 109/18 109/21 111/2 117/4 119/20 119/21 119/21 120/4 120/13 120/19 121/2 121/23 122/24 122/25 124/23 126/4 126/24 127/15 129/6 129/25 130/13 130/21 131/4 131/16 132/7 133/3 133/4 137/2 139/19 140/12 141/8 141/10 144/4 146/12 146/18 148/1 149/5 149/14 152/9 154/22 155/13 156/18 157/11 157/13 158/4 158/19 160/8 160/13 162/6 162/6 164/13 166/11 167/22 168/8 168/11 170/8 171/6 171/18 173/3 173/8 173/24 175/19 176/13 176/16 177/9 178/7
178/23 179/8 179/9 179/10 180/8 180/9
184/13 185/5 185/10 185/18 187/9
187/21 189/5 191/4 191/13 192/6
192/24 193/3 193/13 194/8 196/4 198/12 198/19 198/21 199/12 200/4 200/6 201/7 201/9 201/16 202/7 202/16 202/21 202/25 205/15
once [5] 29/11 51/21 52/21 105/21 111/19
one [110] 7/5 11/17 11/25 13/16 13/18
15/3 16/17 18/18 18/18 21/16 22/17
23/9 24/20 25/1 26/9 27/22 28/8 36/21
36/23 37/10 37/23 38/13 38/15 38/22
40/24 45/17 45/18 45/19 45/23 47/11

53/23 62q2e $62 / 43$ 64/19353/13 68/11 68/13 68/15 72/13 75/25 76/2 76/25 78/12 78/12 78/20 79/16 80/2 80/9 80/10 81/9 86/4 86/10 88/2 88/13 92/16 93/4 95/13 98/1 100/14 100/14 101/2 101/21 102/3 103/12 107/19 109/11 109/11 112/3 112/5 115/4 116/7 117/23 119/3 120/22 123/9 124/19 125/13 134/4 134/13 134/15 134/20 137/11 137/20 137/24 142/11 144/1 144/10 148/1 156/12 162/12 162/17 164/21 170/1 172/1 172/21 176/2 185/13 193/4 196/2 199/15 200/1 201/7 202/23
ones [13] 41/19 59/25 63/11 63/12 64/19 64/20 65/2 69/1 73/20 99/15 126/3 145/1 149/9
only [59] 11/24 13/5 13/18 16/1 16/25 23/10 25/13 26/10 30/24 30/25 33/24 34/1 37/6 38/7 38/9 38/13 38/15 38/21 38/25 40/9 40/10 56/5 60/23 61/14 64/10 66/16 72/11 74/12 75/17 94/10 94/12 96/5 96/12 99/14 100/1 100/10 100/14 102/12 102/23 102/24 103/9 112/2 113/2 117/23 121/1 121/12 121/15 122/1 122/3 142/21 144/12 161/11 161/20 166/22 167/23 168/22 169/16 179/1 184/1
opaque [2] 141/16 141/18
open [3] 27/23 121/22 174/16
open-ended [1] 121/22
opening [1] 174/13
operate [1] 139/19
operating [4] 152/18 152/19 152/23 192/13
operative [1] 75/8
opine [2] 178/7 191/13
opinion [7] 50/13 51/5 51/11 72/7
123/21 131/21 160/23
opinions [1] 73/13
opportunities [1] 83/10
opportunity [1] 175/12
opposed [1] 115/9
opposes [2] 109/23 109/25
opposite [2] 93/7 197/25
option [11] 38/7 38/10 38/12 40/10 96/5 96/12 100/2 100/10 142/21 145/8 165/11
or [142] 5/25 7/25 11/22 11/23 11/25 12/13 15/18 16/21 17/5 19/5 20/2 20/15 22/2 32/11 34/4 34/15 35/3 35/6 38/12 45/23 46/21 47/21 48/2 48/3 48/8 48/11 48/19 50/24 51/13 51/16 55/23 63/1 67/6 67/7 69/10 72/5 73/14 74/17 78/23 80/2 80/10 80/10 82/8 82/17 82/17 83/2 83/3 83/19 84/15 86/12 88/3 90/7 90/14 93/4 101/20 101/21 101/23 101/23 102/2 102/8 102/19 105/8 109/19 109/24 110/13 113/10 114/12 115/25 116/2 116/8 116/18 118/9 119/25 120/7 122/20 122/24 126/7 127/21 130/20 131/1 132/13 133/9 136/21 136/21 139/17 139/24 141/23 141/24 143/23 144/23 145/13 146/16 147/5 147/9 147/22 148/7 148/8 148/14 149/2 153/23 155/20 156/4 159/13 160/5 162/14 163/15 163/20 164/13 165/10 165/15 165/18 166/18 166/18 167/11
${ }^{O}$ Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF or... [28] 168/1 170/12 171/18 171/24 171/24 173/10 173/11 174/14 178/7 179/8 181/9 182/5 182/5 183/21 183/22 186/25 187/13 188/3 191/25 194/1 194/3 196/17 198/6 199/15 199/25 202/20 203/8 203/9
oral [1] 69/22
Orange [1] 154/3
oranges [1] 123/19
order [18] 11/8 14/10 17/11 72/12 101/8
108/7 108/20 111/4 111/16 115/21
132/15 135/7 140/17 146/8 153/24
163/22 196/2 200/10
ordered [6] 38/4 95/11 96/3 96/10 148/10 178/8
ordering [1] 95/18
orders [6] 145/19 151/11 171/9 198/20 199/13 204/8
ordinarily [1] 59/20
ore [2] 148/22 175/3
ore tenus [1] 175/3
orientation [2] 96/5 100/1
original [4] 27/17 28/1 108/14 125/18 originalists [1] 54/10
originally [4] 94/21 125/17 140/5 153/23
Orlando [6] 2/11 29/23 93/4 125/23 153/24 170/12
other [73] 5/22 18/16 23/18 27/3 33/20
34/14 41/8 42/11 50/24 51/13 57/25 58/11 59/23 60/20 70/20 72/10 72/18 75/6 81/2 83/14 86/13 86/18 89/21 90/25 91/3 91/21 96/1 101/3 101/10 101/13 101/15 102/13 106/18 120/21 124/8 128/23 134/22 138/8 144/23 145/14 146/6 154/10 154/22 155/14 156/23 158/14 159/8 159/10 162/7 164/1 167/22 167/25 170/20 171/7 172/20 179/17 184/14 185/6 185/10 185/18 186/2 188/13 193/21 194/18 199/6 199/15 199/23 200/6 202/15 203/2 203/3 203/16 203/17
others [7] 5/7 5/9 17/1 86/12 123/5 174/22 193/1
otherwise [12] 9/21 10/25 34/15 102/7 141/24 145/6 147/6 147/10 149/18 174/24 174/25 179/10
ought [1] 196/5
our [44] 5/14 10/19 13/9 13/14 40/16 44/21 52/3 52/22 52/24 69/12 69/24 69/25 71/5 77/18 86/14 88/1 100/8 102/22 106/7 107/7 108/14 109/9 111/8 111/21 117/7 134/12 138/6 141/24 148/23 150/1 150/21 168/9 171/9 174/8 175/3 176/20 176/23 176/24 178/23 182/9 187/9 187/10 187/11 198/25 ourselves [1] 85/14
out [67] 22/23 26/21 28/9 30/9 35/6 35/9 36/9 36/10 43/1 45/23 46/5 51/15 53/5 60/21 62/23 63/1 66/15 66/23 66/25 69/6 70/25 71/20 71/21 72/2 72/2 72/2 77/18 77/20 86/22 88/18 90/2 93/15 96/21 101/4 116/7 120/10 125/16 125/25 126/3 126/6 126/20 133/12 139/11 152/15 164/2 164/15 165/15 169/4 169/24 170/16 171/24 171/24 172/11 176/20 176/25 182/6 182/21 182/22 183/3 184/15 184/25 187/13

188/2189/18 193/10 195/17/196/69
 outlined [1] 163/21 outside [2] 107/2 139/23 over [15] 12/6 23/23 25/16 28/6 51/18 52/7 73/10 77/25 92/1 119/12 123/5 123/24 174/22 183/25 192/11
overall [1] 63/10
override [1] 143/24
overriding [1] 157/2
overruled [1] 42/13
overturned [1] 160/13
overwhelming [1] 7/19
own [10] 16/23 19/5 19/13 46/5 110/17
110/21 112/19 118/5 125/25 182/14

## P

p.m [4] 1/14 176/9 176/10 204/9
packet [1] 183/4
page [12] $4 / 2$ 37/15 37/20 38/1 50/17
50/18 56/4 78/17 142/15 142/20 180/9 180/20
page 1284 [1] 56/4
page 1289 [1] 50/18
Page 15 [1] 37/20
page 23 [1] 180/20
page 4 [1] 38/1
page 403 [2] 78/17 142/20
page 8 [2] 37/15 180/9
pages [2] 41/11 145/25
paid [1] 199/18
paint [1] 27/6
paper [1] 7/12
papers [9] 44/22 58/14 69/25 77/18 103/6 103/9 105/12 114/5 174/8
paragraph [7] 41/5 42/6 42/7 42/9 42/10 176/21 176/22
paragraph 3 [2] 42/6 42/9
paragraph 3A [1] 41/5
paragraph 4 [1] 42/10
parallel [1] 173/8
paraphrasing [1] 77/4
pardon [3] 49/20 62/24 77/19
parrot [1] 27/11
part [14] 34/18 63/6 72/17 84/12 102/13
102/22 109/5 111/4 128/10 138/23
162/6 162/10 166/23 186/7
particular [7] 21/7 32/25 96/3 106/23
111/1 147/24 149/6
particularly [4] 23/25 168/7 174/22
189/19
parties [18] 5/12 5/16 6/5 23/11 37/7 47/19 47/23 47/23 76/22 103/11 139/22 147/11 170/2 199/11 199/13 199/20 200/2 201/21
parties' [2] 5/19 134/14
partisan [7] 78/21 79/7 157/15 157/22
157/23 158/25 191/1
partisanship [3] 60/25 61/6 61/8
parts [1] 24/1
party [9] 109/18 109/23 109/24 139/20
146/3 147/19 152/3 176/3 200/1
pass [8] 112/23 137/20 137/24 138/22
167/12 172/22 173/22 174/14
passage [4] 57/10 57/13 173/3 180/8
passed [17] 8/4 13/16 18/5 18/10 23/10 24/13 57/6 70/13 74/2 143/17 166/23
178/24 179/13 180/2 180/3 184/7 195/3

Rasses [2] 66/1267/4/235/19 past [3] 56/23 57/2 162/17
path [1] 164/14
paths [1] 6/2
pay [1] 201/23
pedigree [3] 129/11 129/13 129/15
pejoratively [1] 46/24
pending [1] 197/6
people [24] 17/25 27/25 73/13 73/15
82/5 84/14 84/22 92/14 92/17 123/22
129/16 129/24 130/21 137/23 143/3
143/25 153/19 155/3 155/23 156/24
200/14 200/15 200/16 201/2
per [2] 196/18 196/25
per se [2] 196/18 196/25
percent [14] 9/4 26/11 45/8 45/10 45/11 45/11 58/22 58/24 59/2 59/3 59/12 78/25 91/23 91/25
percentage [2] 31/15 31/19
Perez [2] 107/8 174/8
perfect [2] 155/3 199/15
perfectly [3] 64/25 137/21 172/17
perform [3] 77/22 78/13 100/18
performance [1] 180/11
performing [16] 13/22 14/6 35/23 48/18 48/20 49/5 49/8 50/25 52/6 52/14 59/10 60/4 78/3 141/3 179/4 179/5
performs [3] 88/21 100/21 155/19
perhaps [9] 25/1 86/13 125/12 129/1
131/3 135/5 139/13 139/14 174/12
period [4] 112/14 121/21 171/7 200/5
permanent [1] 30/19
permissible [1] 64/1
permission [3] 7/7 16/16 34/23
permit [1] 139/6
permitted [1] 105/3
permitting [1] 31/25
persistent [2] 55/5 55/6
person [8] 47/21 58/17 58/19 82/14
82/15 83/19 131/14 189/9
personal [1] 15/23
persons [2] 82/8 82/10
perspective [3] 88/1 111/18 202/1
pertinent [1] 71/16
phase [3] 65/21 66/14 169/14
pick [1] 194/4
picking [1] 16/24
picks [1] 40/12
picture [1] 177/25
piece [3] 30/8 129/2 140/13
pigs [2] 129/22 130/3
Pine [1] 2/11
pivot [1] 181/22
place [19] 1/15 1/19 17/8 22/1 22/5
54/23 65/9 71/23 85/6 91/12 95/12
95/18 97/7 104/25 106/4 126/8 132/6
162/2 176/9
placed [1] 114/13
places [2] 131/16 154/10
placing [1] 85/13
plain [1] 33/19
plaintiff [11] 74/11 96/6 125/22 146/19 171/19 171/19 175/7 175/14 175/19 176/7 182/25
plaintiffs [72] 1/5 2/2 6/10 7/17 8/3 8/12 9/18 10/6 10/14 12/21 13/11 13/12
13/17 14/19 16/3 28/17 29/14 32/5
${ }^{P}$ Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF plaintiffs... [54] 32/12 32/16 32/18 35/14 35/16 35/20 36/19 37/11 38/2 66/4 72/1 76/7 79/18 85/19 86/9 90/3 96/20 97/20 102/15 103/14 105/13 110/3 113/19 114/6 122/15 128/13 133/13 135/4 140/25 144/12 149/3 151/21 154/2 154/6 157/20 158/24 159/7 162/9 163/9 163/9 163/19 165/3 166/12 166/13 169/15 170/18 175/6 181/24 183/10 188/5 188/12 188/22 198/12 203/18 plaintiffs' [12] 8/10 21/2 $30 / 9$ 34/18 37/14 69/23 168/7 177/12 180/8 180/19 198/9 201/25
plan [45] 12/16 13/15 13/25 23/9 23/20 24/19 24/25 26/7 26/20 26/24 29/24 35/1 35/13 35/14 35/17 37/17 37/21
39/24 43/22 48/3 48/5 66/7 66/12 66/24 67/10 67/18 68/18 69/2 71/1 76/15 146/3 178/24 178/24 178/25 178/25
179/13 180/2 180/3 180/11 180/12
180/21 185/9 186/4 186/16 195/4
Plan 8019 [2] 13/25 180/11
plans [4] 7/24 23/9 41/5 41/22
play [3] 66/25 86/22 116/6
played [1] 172/11
playing [1] 23/3
plead [1] 147/19
pleaded [4] 135/24 147/9 147/16 148/16 pleading [1] 103/5
please [3] 7/16 35/11 46/15
pled [2] 147/5 147/18
plurality [2] 124/7 131/21
plus [2] 101/21 102/2
point [46] 12/9 13/15 13/17 16/17 49/4
52/16 52/18 53/8 61/6 63/9 65/19 68/1 69/7 70/4 72/22 74/5 74/10 77/18 79/2 84/5 84/17 92/9 96/18 96/21 107/8 110/2 111/2 120/6 124/5 125/2 130/9 131/6 142/17 147/3 149/19 151/10 152/15 154/6 166/16 167/22 171/13 179/23 180/7 181/22 186/24 203/2 pointed [8] 69/6 70/25 172/3 176/20 183/3 189/18 197/7 197/9 pointedly [1] 97/25
pointing [3] 77/20 178/1 197/14
points [6] 12/15 60/12 79/11 79/13
149/6 176/16
poisoned [1] 192/20
policies [1] 123/4
policy [4] 132/2 132/4 143/22 143/24
political [11] 16/21 26/8 53/14 61/13
150/12 158/9 158/16 173/23 181/10
181/11 185/12
politically [1] 122/21
Polsby [1] 104/23
Polsby-Popper [1] 104/23
Popper [1] 104/23
populated [2] 24/2 93/3
population [46] 9/5 9/15 30/20 31/6 31/15 31/18 39/8 39/11 39/14 39/15 40/12 40/13 42/8 45/9 45/10 45/13 45/15 81/13 81/13 89/9 89/19 89/22 91/15 91/18 91/20 91/23 92/1 92/4 101/7 101/8 101/12 124/1 124/16 124/16 124/18 125/11 125/12 138/10 153/13 153/19 153/20 155/2 155/5 155/22 170/9 170/23
populations [3] 426799/15-1p1/20
populion [4] 131/21 141/16 141/19 165/23 portions [1] 90/20
posed [1] 161/8
position [12] 57/12 65/22 65/25 69/12 76/6 85/14 90/15 100/8 100/23 179/20 187/9 191/16
possibility [1] 68/23 possible [23] 74/8 76/11 86/7 123/6 125/13 125/14 138/16 138/16 144/20 150/22 150/24 151/7 154/11 155/11 155/16 155/18 163/11 170/3 170/10 171/2 183/5 194/25 194/25 possibly [5] 47/12 72/25 110/1 180/1 188/8
post [3] 161/1 172/24 180/5
post-enactment [1] 161/1
post-veto [2] 172/24 180/5
posture [3] 32/16 59/19 181/23
potential [6] 14/7 14/9 14/13 23/11
136/6 191/13
power [7] 46/19 47/6 54/4 131/17
131/19 131/23 147/22
powerful [1] 108/18
PowerPoint [1] 7/8
powers [5] 18/23 142/1 147/17 147/20 148/11
practical [4] 85/13 87/22 87/23 146/14 PRATT [2] 2/20 6/16
pre [1] 172/24
pre-veto [1] 172/24
precedence [2] 116/8 117/15
precedent [9] 9/13 33/19 33/23 34/11 107/10 160/12 161/10 164/19 183/17 precise [2] 99/21 126/23
precisely [4] 8/21 16/19 44/17 115/11 precision [2] 39/13 39/15
preclearance [6] 55/2 55/3 55/10 56/6
56/11 57/1
preclude [1] 51/1
precluded [1] 19/19
precondition [1] 191/24
predate [1] 133/18
prediction [1] 22/24
predominance [16] 22/14 22/22 23/1 23/13 32/5 88/5 88/10 88/11 89/2 109/1 111/6 111/19 127/6 185/4 189/10 194/21
predominant [18] 29/4 45/20 60/8 79/25
81/11 81/17 95/7 96/19 96/21 105/11
106/9 106/14 107/11 157/3 158/11
188/14 188/17 188/20
predominantly [3] 108/10 108/24 111/2
predominate [9] 53/9 64/9 64/16 67/7
77/2 155/15 158/15 184/12 188/6
predominated [11] 11/15 22/10 27/15
28/14 28/21 29/19 30/4 45/24 98/4 98/6 143/7
predominates [5] 60/17 64/17 67/7
139/8 146/17
predominating [4] 79/12 184/17 194/11 195/1
predomination [2] 64/10 155/24
preemptively [1] 16/23
preexisted [1] 113/6
preexisting [1] 8/16
preference [1] 123/9

prejudge [1] 156/16
prejudice [1] 149/2
prejudiced [1] 149/4
preliminary [1] 119/20
premise [5] 152/19 152/20 152/23 153/6
192/13
prepared [1] 35/2
prerogative [2] 143/20 183/25
present [3] 3/15 23/6 139/22
presentation [8] 7/8 23/7 35/8 139/20
146/3 146/5 173/1 178/23
presented [12] 44/21 47/14 49/25 51/10
103/8 139/18 140/1 140/9 140/10
160/21 168/5 199/11
presentment [2] 173/14 199/11
presents [1] 162/8
preservation [3] 48/24 105/16 160/11
preserve [7] 79/18 99/5 105/15 136/20
137/16 146/16 194/12
preserves [1] 52/4
preserving [3] 105/23 106/3 139/9
President [1] 58/25
presumably [1] 113/20
presume [1] 153/3
presumed [1] 115/3
presumption [7] 66/5 67/9 67/12 67/13 67/17 67/19 157/10
pretty [7] 79/5 92/11 170/14 172/3
184/21 187/25 200/6
prevail [6] 53/17 53/20 107/25 161/23 167/9 174/22
prevails [1] 111/12
prevent [1] 33/9
previously [5] 17/12 31/9 69/23 160/17 161/9
primaries [2] 127/13 127/20
primarily [2] 26/5 133/2
primary [9] 58/18 59/3 59/4 59/9 88/18 132/19 133/13 178/25 179/13 prime [1] 46/7
principle [6] 18/22 27/3 133/1 133/7 139/19 139/20
principles [7] 23/16 31/3 61/23 61/25 108/6 141/25 146/4
prior [7] 39/21 41/22 65/14 98/10 110/6 113/16 164/19
prison [1] 122/2
private [2] 32/12 188/22
privilege [6] 141/25 148/3 148/3 148/5 148/9 160/9
privileges [2] 83/3 141/18
probably [5] 155/2 155/18 199/25
202/19 203/11
problem [16] 32/21 33/6 47/4 51/24
52/11 54/7 55/15 57/21 65/11 81/21
87/19 103/23 113/18 156/20 169/21 193/4
problems [1] 55/5
procedural [2] 32/15 59/19
procedurally [1] 40/25
proceed [8] 5/19 6/6 42/18 45/4 85/8 149/10 176/11 176/14
proceeding [2] 48/10 176/18
proceedings [7] 1/10 1/19 5/1 41/18
77/11 204/9 205/12
proceeds [1] 26/2

P Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF process [37] 16/22 86/2 90/8 100/12 100/24 101/16 102/25 104/5 107/3 115/13 117/18 138/15 138/25 139/2 139/3 143/13 143/16 144/10 149/2 162/13 164/11 166/24 170/13 172/11 172/20 172/25 173/1 173/5 173/8 173/13 173/17 189/22 189/25 190/14 191/12 199/9 200/24
produced [1] 36/16 professional [2] 151/12 151/16
programs [1] 199/16
prohibit [1] 163/17
prohibition [1] 161/14
prohibitory [1] 163/15
prohibits [1] 7/24
projecting [1] 35/7
proof [5] 59/18 109/8 165/4 183/3 183/7 prop [1] 33/20
properly [3] 74/20 75/3 201/3
property [1] 83/19
proponent [4] 69/4 109/15 109/18 109/19
proponents [3] 60/5 63/13 69/1 proposal [2] 173/4 173/12
proposals [2] 170/16 173/2
propose [3] 102/9 102/19 133/23
proposed [23] 37/17 37/22 54/14 100/14
100/25 101/25 102/15 103/1 103/2
105/13 144/11 144/12 144/15 145/7
145/19 146/8 151/11 151/22 171/9
173/11 198/20 199/13 204/8
proposes [2] 103/15 109/18
proposing [1] 154/2
proposition [2] 69/3 134/24
protect [5] 40/8 40/10 45/18 168/13 168/14
protected [8] 14/6 30/23 31/9 36/22
36/24 52/15 59/11 192/3
protecting [2] 40/7 52/8
protection [73] 11/9 31/21 47/13 48/13
49/19 49/21 50/23 79/16 84/24 88/3
88/23 97/14 97/18 103/20 112/24
113/23 113/25 117/10 118/4 123/1 130/23 131/15 132/12 133/9 134/4 139/6 140/18 140/21 141/5 141/11 141/15 141/21 142/4 142/5 142/10 143/2 150/1 150/17 151/3 152/20 152/24 153/4 154/9 154/12 154/20 155/12 158/18 159/18 159/23 161/14 161/22 162/3 162/16 163/1 163/6 166/4 166/6 167/20 169/18 169/20 170/1 170/6 170/15 170/25 171/4 174/15 175/4 181/7 182/24 192/4 193/3 196/5 196/25
prove [8] 95/20 135/1 135/25 163/10 163/11 164/24 187/10 187/16 proven [1] 9/18
provide [2] 167/15 182/15
provided [2] 15/15 167/19
provides [1] 145/4
providing [1] 24/24
proving [3] 151/8 165/4 165/5 provision [52] 8/6 9/3 9/6 14/14 30/18 31/11 31/13 31/21 33/9 33/17 33/22 34/9 51/23 52/1 52/2 52/4 52/10 57/17 58/9 67/14 67/21 72/19 72/20 110/12 110/20 111/10 111/12 113/4 113/15

131/7 132/1 132/13 132/16 152/17 162/19 163/5 166/7 167/9 177/6 185/17 192/19 193/18
provisions [14] 53/16 53/17 53/19 55/1 61/7 70/21 116/20 128/11 128/21 131/4 131/18 135/14 150/19 167/7
public [10] 16/11 16/15 18/21 19/12 19/20 69/20 70/4 134/9 141/8 194/3
pumpkin [1] 202/14
purport [1] 14/21
purported [1] 90/10
purpose [6] 122/16 124/20 157/15
188/14 188/18 188/21
purposes [4] 23/6 23/7 118/18 160/12
pursuant [4] 7/22 31/3 112/22 118/2
pursue [2] 116/10 117/19
pursuing [1] 114/24
purview [1] 19/2
pushing [1] 103/25
put [29] 17/25 21/20 37/1 37/4 40/3
44/3 48/17 50/1 51/6 65/9 78/18 93/21
95/11 95/18 97/6 109/17 112/20 116/25
117/2 124/16 129/10 129/21 159/7
164/1 166/21 175/11 175/13 181/17
187/21
puts [2] 53/1 137/9
putting [4] 84/25 91/12 94/8 200/5 puzzling [1] 179/11

## Q

qualify [1] 104/11
quality [1] 102/7
quantifier [1] 82/9
quantify [1] 42/5
question [49] 7/5 10/16 12/8 12/24
20/21 41/7 48/15 48/19 49/6 49/17
49/18 49/23 55/19 62/20 74/25 88/6
97/4 98/18 110/3 114/3 136/14 138/21
151/8 160/4 160/6 160/10 160/20
160/25 161/4 161/7 161/8 161/9 161/11
161/18 162/12 166/10 166/25 167/23
176/17 177/17 177/23 181/9 181/10
184/9 184/9 187/6 189/12 189/14 194/19
questionable [1] 181/15
questioned [1] 79/16
questioning [1] 143/19
questions [9] 16/18 34/14 42/1 71/25
80/10 144/7 146/11 181/11 198/15
quick [2] 27/11 175/24
quickest [1] 200/9
quickly [1] 201/21
Quincy [1] 93/15
quite [7] 91/1 107/21 127/22 186/2
186/9 186/12 186/22
quote [3] 12/20 180/9 180/13
quoting [1] 37/14

## R

race [136] 11/14 21/17 22/9 22/17
22/21 23/15 23/18 25/14 26/12 27/14
28/14 28/21 29/18 30/3 32/21 39/25
45/19 45/24 51/24 51/24 53/5 53/8
53/16 53/16 53/19 54/7 55/15 55/16
57/4 58/4 59/16 60/2 60/6 60/7 60/16 60/24 61/13 63/12 63/13 63/22 64/7 64/11 64/17 64/22 64/22 65/5 65/6 67/6

67/6 67/76712467/25 69/2 69/4 69/8 69/10 69918 6צ1 5 8994976/1 76/6 77/1 79/12 79/15 79/19 79/20 79/25 81/11 81/17 84/2 84/15 84/23 94/12 95/4 95/7 96/17 96/18 96/22 96/24 104/13 106/14 106/19 108/7 108/8 108/20 108/24 109/4 109/20 109/23 111/2 117/4 122/7 122/13 124/6 127/12 127/17 128/7
128/8 128/15 131/3 131/10 131/25 132/3 132/5 132/8 139/7 146/17 152/4 152/8 152/9 152/11 154/22 155/14 155/14 155/15 156/2 157/14 158/10 158/15 159/3 159/9 171/7 184/13 184/16 185/6 185/10 185/19 188/6 188/16 194/9 195/1 196/3 196/15 196/24 197/2 197/17
race-based [29] 32/21 51/24 51/24 53/16 53/16 53/19 54/7 55/15 55/16 57/4 58/4 59/16 60/6 67/25 69/2 69/4 69/10 69/15 69/17 76/1 76/6 108/7 108/8 108/20 109/20 109/23 128/7 131/3 152/4
race-blind [1] 197/2
race-conscious [2] 67/6 69/10
race-neutral [6] 26/12 63/12 64/22 67/24 69/8 152/8
raced [2] 108/19 109/12
raced-based [2] 108/19 109/12
races [1] 123/4
racial [89] 8/1 10/25 11/5 11/7 11/8 11/18 11/21 11/24 12/2 14/9 14/11 14/16 14/22 14/23 15/2 15/10 15/14 15/17 15/25 16/10 17/6 19/22 20/12 21/12 21/13 22/3 22/13 22/22 23/1 27/12 28/1 28/12 28/16 29/4 29/12 30/8 31/14 31/23 31/25 32/4 32/6 32/23
33/15 43/11 63/25 64/4 81/20 81/21
94/25 95/15 98/4 98/6 99/1 99/6 105/21
106/5 107/11 107/15 107/17 108/1
108/16 111/19 122/5 123/9 124/22
126/1 126/4 127/6 128/2 133/19 139/17
159/11 161/15 168/24 174/13 185/4
185/22 187/18 187/21 187/25 188/1
189/10 190/20 190/24 192/6 193/7
194/12 194/21 195/22
racially [2] 108/11 143/7
racism [1] 55/5
railroad [1] 70/12
Railroad's [1] 70/6
raise [14] 15/17 19/4 19/5 75/1 75/3
84/2 134/4 147/11 166/3 166/21 167/2 167/22 170/24 184/11
raised [11] 47/12 74/21 75/3 85/19
147/2 147/23 175/5 187/13 187/14 189/13 189/13
raises [4] 82/20 151/7 157/3 157/9
raising [2] 82/22 168/24
rates [2] 121/5 121/6
rather [5] 9/21 34/24 134/8 148/19 182/1
ratified [1] 34/9
re [1] 50/10
reach [4] 52/17 89/9 140/20 141/21
reaching [1] 43/21
read [7] 16/14 78/3 146/2 188/1 200/12 203/11 203/13
reading [5] 52/22 52/24 70/1 83/8 203/10

|  | reffachl 1332 <br> refteatchmeghaze-1 Filed 09/13 <br> reflected [1] 153/21 <br> reflects [1] 138/1 <br> refused [1] 198/1 <br> refuted [2] 93/11 105/17 <br> regarding [1] 141/20 <br> regardless [2] 30/19 78/2 <br> regards [1] 47/17 <br> registration [1] 121/6 <br> regular [1] 201/9 <br> reject [2] 31/17 34/12 <br> rejected [4] 31/5 31/23 197/19 197/20 <br> relates [4] 17/10 17/11 17/12 126/8 <br> relatively [1] 118/21 <br> relevant [3] 8/10 176/22 176/24 <br> reliable [1] 179/5 <br> relief [2] 71/18 98/16 <br> relies [1] 22/15 <br> rely [3] 42/15 130/21 179/10 <br> relying [4] 39/6 44/17 179/8 179/9 <br> remainder [1] 80/6 <br> remaining [2] 5/20 34/1 <br> remains [3] 10/16 105/10 134/15 <br> remand [1] 66/19 <br> remarked [1] 27/22 <br> remedial [8] 66/12 66/14 75/13 80/3 <br> 86/12 120/23 128/21 169/14 <br> remediated [1] 122/12 <br> remediates [1] 127/20 <br> remediating [1] 124/21 <br> remediation [5] 122/6 122/24 128/7 <br> 128/18 140/16 <br> remedies [1] 191/14 <br> remedy [39] 13/18 23/11 37/7 37/12 <br> 65/21 66/1 66/15 66/20 66/24 67/2 67/4 <br> 67/6 71/24 72/1 72/11 74/7 74/7 75/5 <br> 75/6 75/6 75/20 75/23 76/1 79/10 <br> 103/10 140/12 163/11 163/20 163/24 <br> 164/3 164/9 165/5 165/7 166/15 182/18 <br> 182/19 183/21 183/24 190/25 <br> remember [4] 57/16 58/3 62/6 159/14 <br> remove [1] 73/7 <br> removed [1] 73/6 <br> render [1] 86/11 <br> Reno [2] 108/15 133/18 <br> Reock [1] 104/21 <br> reorganized [1] 76/5 <br> replace [1] 65/4 <br> replacement [1] 64/21 <br> replaces [1] 63/11 <br> replacing [1] 5/14 <br> replow [1] 149/12 <br> reply [1] 134/12 <br> report [3] 40/22 199/8 205/12 <br> reported [1] 1/19 <br> reporter [2] 176/1 205/1 <br> representative [2] 8/8 77/19 <br> representatives [5] 3/8 6/21 8/1 165/14 201/5 <br> represented [2] 177/1 201/4 <br> representing [1] 85/10 <br> Republicans [1] 61/18 <br> request [3] 51/10 160/22 160/23 <br> requesting [1] 98/16 <br> require [3] 84/7 116/9 119/24 <br> required [13] 8/24 10/25 48/20 49/7 <br> 49/9 49/19 87/5 101/21 108/19 129/14 | $23^{8 / 6165 / 14163 / 15}$ <br> 82/5 149/23 149/24 150/14 151/1 <br> 151/18 151/23 154/19 160/1 161/13 <br> 161/17 161/21 162/24 165/13 165/17 <br> requirements [12] 53/5 57/23 61/12 <br> 88/23 135/9 150/5 150/15 150/15 <br> 150/16 154/1 174/21 174/21 <br> requires [16] 19/23 31/13 35/22 36/3 <br> 40/1 48/23 51/2 69/14 72/23 98/16 <br> 140/21 149/18 165/17 169/18 174/23 <br> 174/25 <br> requiring [3] 71/10 72/9 73/8 <br> reservation [1] 139/13 <br> reserved [1] 188/24 <br> reside [3] 15/12 20/18 22/8 <br> resided [4] 28/17 29/1 29/3 29/15 <br> residence [1] 11/14 <br> resident [5] 19/24 20/3 20/9 20/10 20/14 <br> residents [1] 21/11 <br> resides [1] 15/21 <br> resolution [3] 5/14 50/11 174/4 <br> resolve [4] 117/21 171/4 172/2 178/19 <br> resolved [2] 32/22 160/6 <br> resoundingly [1] 30/6 <br> respect [5] 131/10 131/25 132/3 132/5 150/12 <br> respects [1] 120/21 <br> respond [3] 175/15 175/20 176/7 <br> responding [1] 91/7 <br> response [3] 107/7 133/14 171/22 <br> responsibility [1] 164/6 <br> responsible [2] 75/20 133/8 <br> rest [2] 26/4 146/1 <br> restrained [1] 113/12 <br> restriction [3] 17/25 110/11 122/24 <br> restrictions [4] 109/11 109/19 109/25 133/6 <br> result [9] 7/25 9/17 24/20 30/2 30/7 <br> 162/13 162/14 166/2 199/4 <br> retained [2] 78/23 78/25 <br> retaining [1] 79/5 <br> retire [1] 204/6 <br> retrogression [1] 55/7 <br> return [1] 164/16 <br> reveal [1] 146/9 <br> reversed [1] 182/3 <br> reversing [1] 56/24 <br> review [4] 157/7 189/22 190/14 204/2 <br> reviews [1] 175/12 <br> revise [1] 183/21 <br> Rey[2] 3/16 6/25 <br> Richmond [4] 130/12 131/12 131/22 132/10 <br> right [72] 7/2 7/11 7/12 13/7 20/18 <br> 25/15 27/18 34/25 36/11 40/23 48/21 <br> 49/12 51/1 51/19 53/9 53/13 53/17 <br> 54/24 58/23 59/21 64/23 67/11 75/13 <br> 76/8 80/8 81/5 81/6 81/16 81/23 82/21 <br> 83/1 83/11 85/1 85/4 94/14 97/11 98/22 <br> 100/5 102/21 117/6 127/3 127/4 133/25 <br> 137/25 140/12 142/11 144/8 146/22 <br> 148/6 155/4 158/8 164/4 164/25 166/5 <br> 166/8 166/14 172/17 176/13 176/14 <br> 181/6 182/24 183/5 189/5 193/9 194/19 <br> 195/7 200/16 200/18 200/21 200/23 <br> 203/15 203/24 <br> rights [38] 16/6 33/11 53/20 53/24 54/15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

$R_{\text {Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF }}$ rights... [33] 54/16 54/23 54/24 56/6 57/15 57/16 57/19 58/10 87/14 106/12 114/12 119/7 119/9 119/23 120/12 120/15 120/17 122/10 125/1 128/22 128/24 128/25 129/2 129/4 129/20 130/11 130/15 131/6 137/22 150/18 195/20 196/8 196/17
riots [1] 122/2
risk [1] 31/24
risks [1] 174/9
river [2] 159/22 171/3
road [2] 87/25 171/3
roadways [1] 26/23
ROBERT [1] 2/19
ROBINSON [1] 3/10
robinson.com [1] 3/12
robust [1] 199/9
Room [1] 1/15
Rorschach [2] 29/22 107/23
round [1] 136/9
RPR[3] 1/21 205/10 205/22
rule [1] 14/10
rules [2] 70/1 148/24
ruling [9] 6/2 43/22 46/6 86/11 164/12
168/11 190/17 190/18 200/12
rulings [2] 69/22 191/17
rummage [1] 41/14
rummaging [4] 43/24 76/22 101/17 123/15
run [3] 9/7 59/1 77/20
running [1] 31/24
runs [3] 89/16 101/6 137/11
rural [3] 23/25 93/8 97/1
S
sacrifice [1] 115/20
safe [1] 117/25
said [70] 5/11 13/18 22/13 36/2 37/11 38/24 43/9 44/14 46/10 51/12 52/23 53/25 56/4 62/3 62/5 62/8 62/8 62/13 62/17 63/18 74/11 76/24 78/22 79/8 79/15 83/24 83/25 90/3 95/10 95/19 96/6 97/15 97/20 99/25 100/9 100/18 101/10 101/14 105/19 106/11 106/14 108/4 108/14 119/11 119/22 123/6 128/4 130/12 131/21 132/18 133/15 135/15 138/3 142/18 144/23 152/15 156/19 157/7 169/15 172/14 177/3 179/3 182/14 186/2 188/16 193/15 196/20 196/23 197/11 197/18 same [37] 10/4 24/16 25/6 37/3 37/13 47/19 55/19 78/23 79/6 90/16 100/21 101/5 105/10 116/6 124/14 129/11 132/7 132/13 132/16 136/7 137/1 137/5 139/4 143/7 149/12 155/17 156/24 162/12 170/25 173/8 180/8 180/12
180/12 185/3 193/16 196/23 197/20 SANDRA [3] 1/21 205/10 205/22 satisfied [1] 187/11
satisfies [5] 151/1 151/3 161/12 162/24 167/19
satisfy [17] 32/6 87/3 115/21 117/10 135/8 142/14 151/18 151/22 152/16 152/25 153/14 154/8 154/11 154/18 166/19 170/5 170/14
satisfying [1] 188/24
saw [7] 16/4 78/14 86/22 87/1 93/21

Sectiog 20 [13] ${ }^{6} / 23550 / 3$ 50/20 53/2 41/8 46/19 50/22 58/11 61/22 61/24 53/5 5396553/49 53/23 59/23 58/9 71/23 72/3 73/8 73/14 83/24 84/20 87/12 92/17 92/25 96/4 98/9 98/17 100/4 102/16 105/14 106/20 107/20 107/23 109/18 117/9 118/3 122/15 123/25 127/11 127/18 128/15 130/2 130/15 134/3 148/25 150/4 155/23 156/16 169/7 179/10 181/4 182/4 187/18 189/2 191/12 192/6 192/20 194/9 194/23 195/14 196/7 196/15 197/16 197/23 197/25 201/9 202/3 saying [69] 17/13 17/15 17/18 17/24 18/15 20/11 21/16 35/17 36/14 36/20 36/21 39/23 40/4 46/15 47/4 53/8 53/19 59/23 59/25 61/4 64/12 64/13 64/13 64/20 64/24 65/2 66/22 67/17 69/13 70/13 70/19 70/24 75/25 76/7 76/8 76/16 77/2 77/13 81/25 82/2 84/7 91/10 97/24 102/21 102/24 103/21 110/25 111/9 112/9 112/10 112/12 117/3 118/20 119/3 141/23 148/13 158/12 158/13 158/20 158/23 159/2 165/21 167/14 180/21 180/23 192/25 192/25 196/4 202/13
says [30] 17/14 19/23 33/20 36/4 53/12 62/15 65/14 66/10 75/4 83/8 99/20 119/22 130/24 131/13 131/17 132/10 132/11 135/7 140/23 142/4 142/20 152/23 169/21 171/18 178/20 179/14 180/12 189/6 190/16 199/7
Scalia [2] 172/3 172/14
schedule [2] 44/2 202/19
scheduling [1] 176/2
school [1] 132/21
Schutts [1] 6/23
score [2] 104/21 104/23
scores [4] 104/9 104/16 104/21 192/17 screen [4] 7/6 7/13 34/24 35/7
scrutiny [9] $32 / 632 / 832 / 1364 / 15$
109/14 109/14 111/25 118/25 188/24
se [2] 196/18 196/25
searching [1] 41/13
seat [1] 59/1
second [8] 1/1 63/6 63/9 91/14 105/22 106/6 109/5 139/15
Secretary [65] 1/7 2/15 3/17 3/17 5/8 6/15 6/17 6/18 9/1 13/21 17/13 18/9 18/13 18/14 18/18 18/19 19/16 20/17 21/5 31/12 35/12 47/20 47/21 55/21 70/24 71/10 71/17 71/19 71/20 71/22 72/8 72/9 72/15 72/23 72/24 73/23 74/1 74/3 74/16 74/25 75/2 75/5 75/11 75/15 75/17 75/19 75/21 75/25 76/2 76/3 76/5 76/11 76/13 76/14 76/15 76/18 82/11 83/5 83/12 83/22 84/2 84/25 116/18 158/18 159/15
Secretary's [5] 18/3 19/15 72/6 76/19 202/21
Section [37] 7/23 35/22 50/3 50/20 53/2
53/5 53/7 53/10 53/11 53/12 53/23
54/14 54/15 54/24 55/2 55/7 56/11
57/17 57/19 57/23 58/6 58/9 58/10
60/21 61/11 65/4 73/17 73/25 81/16
81/19 120/18 120/22 121/8 121/9
121/10 121/11 121/20
Section 2 [2] 54/14 57/19

60/21 61/11 65/4 73/17 73/25 81/16 81/19
Section 20A [1] 35/22
Section 5 [13] 54/15 54/24 55/2 55/7 56/11 57/17 120/18 120/22 121/8 121/9 121/10 121/11 121/20
Section III [1] 53/7
see [21] 28/7 34/21 39/12 47/5 66/12
80/11 82/19 89/3 89/4 89/6 89/23 92/7
93/24 105/17 123/25 139/8 149/3
164/14 175/13 175/25 176/2
seeing [1] 113/18
seek [4] 9/24 12/21 13/11 13/12
seeking [3] 160/12 163/13 163/19
seem [4] 12/9 12/15 71/13 134/5
seemed [2] 184/22 195/3
seems [6] 12/20 13/10 13/21 124/4 179/19 180/6
seen [9] 104/1 104/4 135/6 142/8 154/2 188/9 190/10 190/11 204/1
select [1] 124/15
sell [1] 33/15
SENATE [36] 3/2 3/16 3/17 6/24 7/1
12/25 18/11 20/17 21/4 37/18 44/11
44/15 50/11 73/19 74/3 74/20 83/16
113/11 143/17 143/22 146/25 148/7
149/4 152/16 153/2 153/3 153/5 153/9
155/9 162/21 170/16 173/4 173/18
177/3 179/20 189/13
Senate's [1] 151/11
senators [1] 171/25
send [4] 140/15 165/14 165/19 165/22
sends [1] 169/16
sense [6] 59/13 120/10 163/13 172/8
181/23 193/23
sent [1] 123/24
separate [1] 76/3
separately [3] 148/16 151/17 155/7 separation [5] 18/23 141/25 147/17
147/20 148/11
sequential [3] 189/14 189/24 191/11
sequentially [1] 168/6
seriatim [1] 86/11
series [1] 30/15
serious [2] 166/3 166/25
serve [2] 111/16 115/25
serves [1] 122/10
serving [1] 92/3
session [3] 80/2 173/16 174/3
set [5] 19/20 43/18 62/23 63/1 94/13
sets [1] 94/22
several [2] 24/9 24/14
sex [1] 117/4
shaded [3] 27/18 28/6 29/7
shaded-in [1] 27/18
shadowboxing [1] 14/24
shall [5] 83/2 83/3 130/24 131/13 131/17
shape [9] 26/14 46/1 78/23 88/13 89/2 89/14 94/9 108/15 156/4
shaped [2] 89/10 157/24
shapes [2] 39/4 39/5
sharply [1] 154/23
Shaw [6] 27/17 28/2 45/21 108/14
133/18 168/25
shift [1] 123/25

S Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF shifting [2] 32/14 109/15
shoehorn [1] 76/16 shoes [1] 137/9
short [2] 11/16 27/5
shortly [1] 74/19 should [18] 10/5 10/13 34/12 42/24 56/24 56/25 67/10 67/19 76/16 115/22 119/17 133/25 148/25 152/9 158/25 159/10 176/8 189/15
shouldn't [5] 47/24 73/14 79/9 85/19 119/15
show [46] 11/10 35/20 35/21 40/9 45/6 49/7 49/10 60/7 63/14 64/15 64/17 67/3 68/7 68/12 68/14 68/16 68/17 68/18 68/21 75/22 99/4 107/18 108/1 108/20 109/21 109/25 111/19 111/23 113/19 114/22 130/1 137/4 152/1 152/5 154/7 162/17 163/3 163/7 164/6 164/7 166/17 170/3 187/3 188/6 188/13 188/17 showed [7] 43/15 144/21 186/5 186/10 186/12 186/16 186/18
showing [10] 39/8 81/19 107/16 111/3 114/21 119/5 121/3 132/14 166/14 166/22
shown [6] 102/6 107/20 112/1 128/17 133/22 185/19
shows [9] 60/16 91/22 99/9 99/22
102/11 124/4 125/22 145/20 178/22
shrimp [1] 92/21
shrug [2] 33/5 33/6
SHUTTS [1] $3 / 3$
shutts.com [1] 3/6
side [5] 57/25 58/11 59/23 101/1 173/9 sidebar [1] 176/3
signature [1] 173/14
signed [5] 8/5 17/16 24/13 172/22 173/19
significant [6] 101/12 107/16 119/13 120/14 120/19 129/6
significantly [2] 26/21 37/25
similar [8] 24/15 54/3 114/14 135/12
143/17 170/17 186/9 201/17
Similarly [1] 147/17
simple [1] 91/4
simply [29] 9/9 14/25 70/24 72/23 74/8 91/10 92/3 102/21 105/15 105/20 105/23 105/23 106/21 112/11 112/15 114/20 114/22 116/9 117/9 117/19 119/3 119/11 130/13 131/2 140/12 144/9 147/23 150/24 155/16
simultaneously [1] 86/20
since [3] 9/7 100/10 125/15
single [14] 21/13 32/11 37/16 114/15
127/8 172/9 185/7 185/20 185/23
186/20 188/1 188/4 188/15 195/19
singular [1] 100/18
sit [2] 71/11 165/15
sitting [2] 20/8 143/3
situation [2] 70/10 152/7
six [1] 24/8
size [3] 24/6 30/20 186/13
skepticism [1] 132/4
skinny [1] 27/19
skip [1] 164/23
slashing [1] 29/9
slide [2] 166/21 178/23
slight [1] 77/25
slots [1] 123/21 189-1 Filed 09/13/25/4 55/1553/28 81 $\ddagger 2029 / 10$ 121/7
sloung $41178312389-1$
Filed 09/13 273 55/15 53/20 81\&2099/10 121/7 smaller [1] 24/7 146/8 169/23 194/20 smooths [1] 26/21 specifically [14] 7/23 30/24 31/24 51/12 snakes [1] 27/20
snargiz [1] 205/23 so [236]
So.3d [1] 50/14
solely [2] 19/1 168/11 solidly [3] 58/23 58/24 59/5
solution [10] 51/25 52/12 55/17 57/22
58/1 58/4 59/16 60/6 69/4 81/21
solve [1] 33/7
solved [2] 65/11 103/25
some [62] 5/22 6/1 12/9 12/15 14/7 15/24 25/9 30/8 47/19 47/25 49/15 52/16 52/18 57/3 58/2 58/7 60/8 63/18 64/21 69/22 76/8 81/20 85/18 86/13 89/24 89/25 89/25 90/13 90/13 96/1 102/4 102/5 103/23 103/25 119/22 124/4 124/8 126/14 134/2 139/12 141/20 156/4 160/12 164/1 166/3 168/1 171/16 171/17 177/7 179/23 182/4 185/15 185/16 188/13 193/1 197/11 198/24 199/8 199/23 201/13 201/14 202/6
somebody [8] 92/18 92/20 92/21 96/24
144/25 182/11 189/25 199/7
somehow [2] 31/19 133/8
someone [10] 59/20 61/22 69/8 71/1
82/19 87/18 93/13 93/14 104/15 138/13 something [54] 12/23 33/18 33/20 39/25 42/15 48/13 48/25 51/19 53/22 54/3
65/5 65/5 65/7 71/2 71/3 72/5 82/24 83/9 90/10 91/2 91/3 91/16 101/24
102/9 114/21 117/2 135/24 136/22
139/23 139/25 140/2 142/3 143/6
145/23 147/4 147/15 148/15 152/5
153/10 157/10 157/12 163/14 163/16
163/18 166/18 177/21 178/2 178/3
178/20 179/24 180/23 182/9 193/25
194/2
sometimes [6] 20/6 116/14 147/11
147/18 149/23 193/20
somewhat [1] 144/17
somewhere [2] 60/3 156/1
sorry [2] 118/11 199/14
sort [16] 61/1 84/22 89/5 93/9 116/10
117/13 117/20 118/6 122/23 123/12
135/9 145/9 147/8 170/25 171/4 172/13
sorts [8] 84/14 92/24 112/6 120/5
124/25 125/9 145/10 147/11
south [8] 1/15 2/17 28/11 45/12 91/8
95/20 156/6 159/17
southeastern [1] 128/9
Southern [1] 142/20
space [3] 92/7 92/11 111/20
spades [1] 185/19
span [2] 24/4 28/10
spanned [2] 24/12 186/7
spans [1] 170/22
sparsely [1] 24/2
speak [1] 199/1
speaking [3] 117/8 153/2 180/10
special [4] 44/24 80/2 173/16 174/3
specific [33] 11/12 11/20 11/25 12/4
13/12 15/4 15/7 22/8 31/14 32/4 42/6
47/17 51/9 51/25 52/11 54/2 54/4 54/6

53/25 63/21 102/2 126/4 131/9 141/14
142/15 144/22 179/3 189/23
specifics [1] 142/8
specify [1] 51/23
spectrum [1] 93/7
speculative [1] 136/2
speech [3] 109/11 109/19 109/25
spelled [1] 176/24
spending [1] 202/5
spends [1] 138/13
spinning [1] 34/6
split [2] 24/12 64/6
splits [8] 25/3 25/6 25/8 25/9 45/8 94/4
186/11 186/16
splitting [2] 60/15 87/24
spot [1] 202/8
sprawling [2] 154/24 159/17
spring [1] 168/24
squarely [2] 23/20 168/5
squiggly [1] 25/17
St [2] 125/24 159/22
staff [4] 151/12 151/17 170/15 170/16 stage [5] 23/12 37/5 37/6 38/2 161/6 stand [1] 70/2
standard [46] 9/11 9/17 9/22 9/24 11/4
11/5 11/8 30/11 32/7 32/9 36/20 36/25
38/9 49/11 49/13 51/16 55/7 60/1 64/13 66/11 86/10 87/5 87/13 94/12 96/14
100/19 102/3 102/7 106/8 112/13
112/16 112/21 112/23 117/24 118/2
127/18 127/20 128/16 128/19 129/9
129/10 149/17 152/10 182/23 185/3
187/22
standards [19] 60/22 62/22 62/25 63/2
85/22 85/25 86/16 86/21 94/13 115/13
116/11 116/14 117/15 117/16 126/8
138/4 174/6 174/6 174/7
standing [39] 8/13 11/13 15/8 15/10
15/16 16/12 16/15 17/2 17/7 17/20
18/21 19/7 19/14 19/21 22/4 29/13 32/4
69/20 70/5 81/24 83/12 83/13 83/21
87/15 134/5 134/6 134/8 134/9 134/11
134/19 135/1 135/2 135/2 135/10
135/22 141/8 168/8 192/6 194/20
standing that [1] 19/14
stands [1] 93/20
start [12] 25/15 41/16 41/20 43/15 48/6
48/7 82/7 85/12 87/17 99/16 147/22
192/20
started [1] 129/23
starting [3] 27/16 88/10 88/15
starts [1] 202/7
state [126] 1/7 2/15 3/17 5/9 10/4 16/1 17/5 17/13 20/18 21/5 22/2 24/1 27/21
28/10 31/13 32/10 39/19 44/11 44/11
55/10 55/22 56/8 56/11 59/20 59/22
59/24 67/15 70/17 70/18 70/18 70/23
71/8 71/8 71/10 72/19 75/19 76/3 77/9
77/14 82/11 83/2 83/5 83/9 83/12 83/22
84/17 84/19 85/24 85/24 86/24 87/18
92/14 105/4 109/6 110/4 110/15 110/16
111/8 111/10 111/14 112/17 112/18
112/20 112/25 113/11 113/15 114/12
114/23 115/16 115/18 116/1 116/3

S Case 4:22-cv-00109-AW-MAF state... [54] 116/15 118/1 119/9 124/6 126/15 128/9 130/13 130/19 130/20 130/21 130/22 130/24 131/13 132/11 132/14 132/23 132/23 133/3 135/15 138/6 138/11 138/12 145/15 150/6 154/25 155/8 155/12 159/15 165/18 165/24 170/23 174/6 174/7 174/21 177/15 186/7 188/25 189/23 190/15 192/1 192/3 192/17 193/18 194/14 195/10 195/15 195/16 195/21 196/1 196/22 200/14 200/23 201/2 205/6 state's [1] 69/8
stated [4] 31/17 95/14 95/17 96/15 statement [2] 29/10 195/13
statements [1] 187/2
states [28] 54/2 60/20 82/9 82/13 83/4
107/1 107/1 107/3 108/4 109/10 114/13 121/1 121/12 122/4 128/10 130/23 131/2 131/16 131/24 132/4 132/7 132/9 132/18 133/3 133/3 133/7 133/15 168/16
statistics [1] 24/24
statute [6] 67/12 70/13 70/19 72/3 115/3 116/2
statutes [2] 70/23 85/23
stenographic [1] 205/14
stenographically [2] 1/19 205/12
step [13] 11/17 15/3 68/11 68/13 68/15
75/10 88/4 162/12 162/17 164/21
164/23 185/1 185/1
steps [1] 11/18
stick [4] 28/9 33/7 64/10 80/18
sticky [1] 72/17
still [20] 14/6 15/7 22/9 52/13 58/23
59/10 79/5 106/2 106/13 108/10 138/20
141/4 152/25 158/21 158/22 160/13
169/4 185/18 194/22 195/21
stipulated [4] 8/12 8/14 8/17 103/10
stipulation [13] 5/13 41/6 41/10 42/20
45/5 91/22 103/10 134/15 134/17
134/21 135/23 144/5 176/21
stipulations [1] 5/17
storied [1] 190/22
story [10] 10/23 11/3 27/9 27/10 33/14
33/14 33/24 34/3 34/4 140/24
straightforward [1] 9/25
stranger [1] 23/24
strategy [2] 181/14 181/16
street [7] 1/15 2/4 2/11 2/17 3/4 3/10 29/2
stretch [5] 155/25 156/1 156/3 156/4 196/9
stretches [1] 90/21
strict [10] 32/6 32/8 32/13 64/14 109/13
109/14 111/25 118/25 119/1 188/24
strike [3] 12/13 69/24 178/6
strings [3] 89/12 89/14 94/7
strong [7] 94/15 101/3 103/16 145/5
145/5 145/7 146/18
strongly [1] 109/17
struck [4] 30/1 123/3 140/5 190/24
stuck [2] 46/22 98/12
stuff [5] 41/3 42/11 43/5 43/15 75/2 subject [14] 15/13 15/24 20/11 21/12 21/17 40/21 55/10 56/5 56/11 56/25 121/19 139/24 177/10 204/7
subjected [1] 121/8

subsequent [2] 87/20 168/2
$160 / 5160 / 18161 / 10$ 164/18 169/7
 substantially [2] 37/3 37/12

195/19 197/5 197/7 197/24 198/1 199/2 200/22
substantive [1] 120/20
substitute [1] 58/12
successful [1] 129/1
such [5] 9/8 9/11 25/20 57/23 197/19
suddenly [2] 122/18 122/20
sue [1] 113/13
sued [1] 21/22
suggest [5] 9/2 45/16 57/25 161/18 202/4
suggested [1] 195/18
suggesting [1] 51/14
summary [4] 13/14 37/6 103/9 156/18
summer [1] 22/19
sunset [1] 58/9
superior [2] 151/4 161/22
supersede [1] 149/24
supersedes [1] 150/5
superseding [1] 150/13
supplant [1] 133/9
support [5] 53/21 107/10 127/10 128/14 168/14
supports [2] 100/7 109/2
suppose [5] 66/8 123/6 148/22 181/20
182/14
supposed [2] 45/18 180/16
suppressing [1] 33/11
supremacy [4] 133/12 150/2 151/5 161/19
supreme [121] 8/24 9/10 9/12 9/23 10/7
10/9 11/21 15/9 22/13 22/20 23/14
24/22 26/18 27/2 27/12 28/15 28/21
29/11 30/22 31/4 31/16 33/2 33/3 33/19
34/10 38/4 39/20 40/2 43/14 44/8 44/10 44/12 44/16 45/21 46/5 46/12 46/16 46/20 46/21 50/1 50/12 51/12 52/23 62/3 62/7 62/15 62/23 63/1 63/19 64/8 65/16 66/9 66/10 77/25 78/21 79/8 79/15 87/10 91/5 95/10 95/17 96/9 96/16 97/5 97/17 98/9 99/25 101/14 102/4 102/24 103/13 104/17 106/10 106/13 108/4 108/11 111/22 116/12 119/6 119/19 120/11 122/4 122/9 122/25 123/3 123/5 123/13 126/12 130/11 131/1 131/20 135/12 135/19 138/3 139/14 142/18 143/12 145/11 157/6 160/5 160/5 160/18 160/22 161/10 164/18 169/6 169/7 178/8 183/18 183/19 188/3 190/21 191/10 192/12 195/19 197/5 197/7 197/24 198/1 199/2 200/22
Supreme Court [99] 8/24 9/10 9/12 9/23 10/7 10/9 11/21 15/9 22/20 23/14 24/22 26/18 27/2 28/15 30/22 31/4 31/16 33/3 33/19 34/10 38/4 39/20 40/2 43/14 44/12 44/16 45/21 46/5 46/16 46/20 50/1 50/12 51/12 52/23 62/3 62/7 62/15 62/23 63/1 63/19 64/8 65/16 66/9 66/10 78/21 79/8 79/15 87/10 91/5 95/10 96/9 96/16 97/5 98/9 99/25 101/14 102/24 103/13 104/17 106/10 106/13 108/4 108/11 116/12 119/19 122/4 122/9 122/25 123/3 123/5 123/13 126/12 131/1 131/20 135/12 135/19 138/3 139/14 142/18 145/11 157/6 160/5

Supreme Court's [5] 44/8 77/25 95/17 97/17 143/12
Supreme Courts [1] 46/21
sure [28] 24/17 36/6 44/6 47/10 50/9
51/8 57/11 65/18 67/16 73/11 74/21
75/9 77/5 81/8 107/22 125/10 127/4
132/20 136/3 156/21 156/23 157/1
158/6 182/11 186/23 188/1 189/3 203/5
surely [3] 27/3 84/19 183/15
surgical [2] 39/12 39/14
surpass [1] 194/17
surplusage [1] 51/3
surprise [1] 15/18
surrounded [1] 95/6
survived [1] 13/1
suspect [1] 152/11
sweet [1] 202/8
system [2] 190/13 191/18
systems [1] 32/24

## T

table [1] 6/10
tag [1] 193/9
tailor [1] 120/1
tailored [1] 81/22
tailoring [5] 60/11 63/15 67/8 84/16 88/9
take [30] 19/12 26/2 26/15 28/4 43/4
43/17 45/6 53/4 61/8 61/9 61/20 67/24
77/24 79/3 79/25 80/11 84/21 85/5
86/10 117/5 117/15 133/3 133/4 168/16 175/24 176/6 177/14 179/22 181/14 184/24
taken [5] 1/13 77/2 177/7 194/10 197/3 takes [4] 76/21 89/7 116/7 168/17 taking [10] 42/21 60/24 70/23 75/10 76/24 85/13 86/3 87/24 156/9 179/20 talk [32] 5/18 11/19 18/7 21/9 34/17 36/4 40/25 44/4 45/19 50/8 50/10 50/16 50/18 56/3 63/21 65/23 73/16 74/22 80/13 80/23 103/4 103/5 103/24 136/8 162/5 167/16 167/17 169/19 196/19 196/20 198/19 199/2
talked [9] 56/12 56/14 63/17 99/14 123/17 136/9 185/3 185/22 203/16 talking [24] 20/5 21/1 23/8 24/18 41/16 41/20 46/13 69/19 80/21 90/18 90/22 103/17 136/3 136/10 136/12 154/4 167/13 171/1 171/5 177/24 184/12 185/15 186/3 194/11
talks [8] 41/11 42/20 45/21 50/23 63/21 75/15 83/18 172/4
Tallahassee [23] 1/16 2/17 3/4 3/11
20/19 21/6 45/13 81/14 89/23 90/20
93/16 101/8 103/24 104/6 104/20 105/8
137/15 153/16 153/23 155/25 157/17
170/12 170/24
Tampa [1] 93/4
tangling [1] 178/17
target [2] 31/14 31/23
targeted [3] 120/23 121/8 121/17
task [4] 67/22 138/2 138/24 198/4
taxpayers [1] 199/18
tech [1] 7/5
technicality [1] 75/2

T Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF technically [1] 136/16 technology [2] 35/2 35/3 teeth [1] 105/5
tell [10] 27/8 28/5 33/13 42/16 71/2 98/12 127/2 149/8 199/21 201/7 telling [8] 72/13 96/20 98/3 98/5 112/4 128/1 142/24 178/4
tells [4] 27/9 39/10 73/21 133/10 temporal [3] 58/2 58/7 58/13 temporary [8] 37/5 37/11 38/1 65/10 74/12 96/8 103/6 191/5
tendrils [1] 28/9
tension [4] 116/11 116/13 178/18 180/16
tenus [2] 148/22 175/3
term [1] 121/22
terms [4] 31/17 54/17 85/13 104/9
test [18] 30/21 39/1 40/5 48/8 48/22
48/23 49/15 50/6 51/15 52/9 52/20 53/7
57/21 69/9 76/10 77/23 78/5 118/25
testified [1] 38/23
testify [1] 145/22
testimony [1] 143/4
Texas [6] 28/20 29/5 60/19 108/21 113/2 113/4
Texas' [1] 113/8
text [3] 36/2 36/4 50/16
textural [1] 50/2
than [43] 9/21 10/8 14/5 17/23 23/18 24/8 26/9 33/20 34/24 62/18 72/10 75/6 86/19 87/2 91/4 92/17 92/20 106/19 128/14 132/8 132/14 134/9 148/19 153/13 154/22 155/14 156/6 159/9 159/11 161/5 168/5 170/20 171/7 172/21 182/1 185/6 185/10 185/12 185/18 186/15 186/20 200/6 202/23 thank [17] 6/9 6/13 6/19 7/4 7/14 13/8 34/19 35/10 42/19 85/1 85/3 85/10 146/22 175/21 176/15 198/16 198/17 that [1310]
that's [149] 9/8 19/14 21/25 25/21 29/15 33/6 36/16 36/22 36/23 37/1 37/2 40/8 40/22 40/23 40/24 41/21 42/14 43/18 44/1 46/20 46/22 47/4 48/14 50/14 51/20 52/22 54/25 55/24 55/25 56/15 57/5 57/14 59/22 60/3 64/2 68/6 72/16 72/16 72/17 73/2 73/15 74/23 75/3 76/18 81/5 81/6 83/17 84/12 84/17 84/24 86/14 88/4 88/17 88/22 92/8 93/25 97/25 100/5 100/14 101/2 101/13 101/14 101/15 101/21 102/17 102/18 102/22 103/10 103/16 105/1 105/2 105/2 105/3 106/9 108/16 108/25 109/21 111/17 114/2 114/7 116/24 117/11 117/13 118/1 118/24 119/6 119/13 122/8 122/23 123/11 125/9 127/16 128/20 129/23 132/9 132/25 137/15 139/2 141/22 141/23 141/24 142/11 143/18 143/24 144/6 144/13 145/4 145/5 145/7 145/8 153/12 153/17 154/21 154/22 155/4 155/9 156/9 156/10 156/19 157/12 157/18 161/7 161/23 163/23 164/8 164/14 164/17 165/16 170/2 171/11 171/25 174/25 178/5 178/6 183/1 183/13 189/18 190/8 193/4 195/24 197/12 199/14 199/17 199/17 199/18 201/8 203/5 203/7
 9/18 10/7 10/14 11/14 12/19 13/12 14/11 15/5 15/16 15/23 15/25 16/4 16/4 16/6 16/9 16/10 16/23 19/5 19/5 19/8 19/13 20/14 21/3 21/10 21/20 21/23 22/6 30/14 31/1 32/15 33/9 33/10 33/15 33/21 34/7 34/9 35/15 35/20 37/1 37/4 37/11 37/20 38/10 40/11 46/20 51/5 58/13 64/6 66/16 68/13 68/13 69/16 74/11 74/23 78/10 79/20 88/18 95/22 96/7 96/7 103/5 103/5 103/7 103/8 105/12 110/2 113/7 114/5 114/14 124/16 125/6 128/14 133/14 134/12 134/19 150/23 163/10 164/17 165/4 165/24 168/8 177/20 178/25 179/14 181/12 181/19 181/20 182/14 182/16 183/6 187/17 193/5 194/13 200/17 theirs [3] 21/25 164/7 167/2 them [39] 6/6 15/21 21/22 40/20 64/1 65/15 65/24 72/15 73/21 86/4 86/4 86/7 86/10 86/11 87/24 89/12 90/13 94/7 94/8 107/2 113/12 113/13 115/4 121/16 124/10 124/11 139/22 140/9 140/10 143/25 165/19 166/15 187/14 199/3 200/3 200/19 203/10 203/11 203/13 themselves [1] 174/16 then [97] 5/22 6/6 7/12 20/11 25/19 25/23 26/1 26/2 32/5 41/11 43/12 43/13 47/18 48/24 49/4 52/3 52/12 52/24 $53 / 10$ 55/14 55/14 55/18 56/8 59/4 60/7 65/16 68/7 68/17 71/22 74/8 75/8 76/11 80/11 85/17 86/1 86/11 88/5 89/18 93/6 94/25 100/3 100/10 105/5 105/22 105/25 106/15 111/2 111/22 111/23 112/22 113/2 113/6 113/9 113/24 116/23 117/1 117/4 117/6 121/3 131/17 138/21 140/5 140/15 140/18 141/9 143/21 144/1 145/25 148/3 148/9 164/11 167/24 168/21 168/22 168/22 172/16 175/18 176/6 178/9 180/2 183/23 184/4 184/12 188/16 190/15 190/17 190/25 191/1 194/14 194/20 194/22 195/10 197/4 200/11 201/19 203/1 203/11
theory [2] 113/7 119/1
there [175] 5/22 13/18 18/11 19/11
27/18 28/6 35/7 43/6 46/18 47/16 47/25 47/25 48/1 48/25 49/5 49/10 51/2 52/16 52/17 53/22 54/1 54/15 54/16 57/13 57/16 58/5 58/8 58/17 58/18 60/9 61/23 63/24 64/21 66/1 67/3 67/13 67/16 67/17 67/19 67/25 70/11 73/12 74/6 75/22 76/1 76/8 77/16 81/18 81/22 82/10 85/25 86/18 87/1 88/17 88/20 89/3 90/1 90/11 90/25 91/2 91/2 91/16 91/17 92/7 93/23 94/14 95/25 98/2 99/4 99/6 100/6 100/16 100/24 101/3 101/4 101/9 101/11 101/11 101/13 101/15 102/9 102/20 104/24 106/22 108/4 109/9 111/3 111/13 112/9 113/7 114/12 114/15 116/13 116/19 116/19 118/19 119/3 120/3 120/19 121/12 122/21 123/8 123/10 124/6 124/7 124/23 125/6 125/11 125/11 126/11 126/19 126/22 126/23 127/5 127/11 128/4 128/6 128/23 130/10 132/21 133/11 138/11 140/18 141/2 141/16 141/18 141/22

141/22 142/5343/5 1460 146/18 147/3
 152/22 154/10 156/17 156/23 157/10 157/15 158/3 159/2 159/6 160/11 164/2 164/11 164/20 165/5 165/13 165/17 165/25 166/24 167/9 169/4 170/3 171/7 173/6 177/16 178/14 182/22 183/7 183/16 185/16 186/5 186/11 186/14 188/13 188/20 190/25 193/2 194/15 there's [28] 19/10 19/21 20/16 48/18 58/9 59/14 61/21 64/14 66/1 66/15 66/20 66/23 67/5 67/7 67/11 68/23 69/7 81/10 81/17 81/18 88/5 88/6 178/9 183/5 186/22 188/11 190/14 201/14 thereby [1] 5/14
therefore [5] 10/13 21/17 64/14 84/23 95/23
these [48] 8/21 11/17 12/11 14/7 18/23 25/16 25/17 26/11 27/3 27/13 28/19 28/22 28/22 30/1 31/3 33/13 40/17 41/12 42/1 42/1 43/3 76/24 77/3 87/21 90/12 103/14 116/5 116/5 116/13 121/25 128/11 135/16 138/24 142/9 143/4 146/2 148/10 149/5 150/8 150/9 150/22 153/25 154/17 168/6 171/16 193/1 195/6 199/6
they [231]
they'll [3] 5/17 12/24 201/9
they're [25] 21/24 30/25 36/21 45/19 46/10 61/1 63/10 64/11 64/12 64/19
64/20 65/2 77/2 83/22 84/1 181/13 182/12 187/18 187/20 191/14 191/23 192/1 192/8 196/14 197/16
they've [6] 6/1 46/10 51/4 68/12 68/14 177/4
thing [12] 71/21 101/19 124/19 130/18 134/22 138/8 182/5 182/5 191/7 196/6 197/19 201/7
things [27] 40/24 41/8 56/23 60/23 61/1 78/15 88/12 99/18 103/22 103/25 109/9 114/14 121/25 133/11 142/12 143/17 146/2 147/12 148/10 167/25 168/6 170/8 172/5 172/14 172/18 178/10 196/21
think [130] 18/8 20/6 46/18 49/24 53/18 55/22 55/23 67/2 70/13 72/11 74/20 76/10 77/1 81/1 81/2 88/4 88/22 88/24 91/5 91/7 93/9 93/11 93/15 93/19 97/9 97/9 97/19 97/21 98/15 98/18 99/8 99/9 101/2 101/19 102/10 103/12 103/16 105/1 105/7 107/7 107/9 108/21 109/1 109/8 110/22 111/19 111/20 111/20 112/2 112/4 114/2 114/4 114/19 115/14 118/6 118/19 119/12 120/13 122/8 124/19 126/24 127/24 128/17 128/18 128/20 128/23 130/2 130/9 130/17 131/5 133/21 134/22 135/22 136/13 137/8 137/25 139/10 139/16 140/11 140/19 143/10 144/8 144/13 144/15 145/3 145/4 145/7 145/9 146/10 146/12 146/17 146/19 147/3 147/14 148/17 151/9 152/2 153/12 157/4 159/5 160/9 162/21 166/3 166/24 167/5 168/3 168/8 170/9 176/8 177/17 178/4 181/15 181/22 182/17 183/2 184/18 185/14 187/7 187/8 187/8 187/11 190/5 193/6 193/6 193/24 194/4 195/3 196/10 199/1 201/22

$U_{\text {Case 4: }}$ :22-CV-00109-AW-MA unresolved [1] 161/7
until [12] 37/16 37/22 71/20 115/2
138/13 142/7 168/1 168/1 175/19 180/7 202/13 203/13
untimely [1] 69/24
untouchable [1] 118/4
unusual [6] 59/19 89/24 94/6 152/7
163/13 190/12
unusually [1] 89/10
unwilling [1] 183/23
unworkable [2] 116/4 116/9 up [49] 33/20 35/8 40/12 43/15 45/3 54/20 62/2 65/7 66/12 69/15 72/4 74/1 79/9 84/5 86/5 87/25 89/15 101/24 103/24 104/17 123/18 124/18 125/23 143/5 145/9 153/10 160/13 166/21 173/11 173/12 174/13 174/16 176/8 177/25 180/7 182/19 185/22 189/16 190/1 190/9 190/11 190/11 190/22 190/23 190/23 191/4 194/3 197/5 199/23
upend [1] 9/24
upheld [1] 67/10
uphold [3] 17/4 18/15 146/21
upon [3] 110/11 110/17 110/20
upside [1] 32/14
urban [2] $93 / 393 / 5$
us [19] 11/3 18/1 39/10 71/1 71/2 109/5
111/8 111/9 133/10 140/25 141/12
145/8 146/14 172/20 177/7 181/2
191/15 202/11 203/20
use [21] 34/24 43/20 46/23 47/7 47/9 48/12 60/2 64/11 72/10 72/12 72/14 75/8 149/1 163/25 164/3 165/7 199/14 199/15 199/17 199/18 199/19 used [6] 50/14 54/25 57/2 76/4 77/23 79/9
using [7] 7/8 51/22 53/7 59/15 64/7 165/9 165/10
usual [1] 152/10
usually [4] 20/5 40/21 54/25 64/2
V
valiant [1] 79/2
valid [6] 66/1 114/22 115/3 115/7 119/4 130/7
validate [1] 134/1
validated [1] 139/14
validity [8] 66/5 67/9 67/12 67/13 67/18
67/19 86/19 118/17
validly [1] 115/1
variety [1] 23/15
various [3] 38/20 126/24 127/14
Vera [1] 28/19
version [1] 166/22
versions [1] 104/7
versus [23] 5/7 55/21 56/20 63/20 71/7 79/22 79/23 80/15 80/18 94/22 95/2 95/2 107/8 108/12 108/13 108/14 118/22 125/3 133/18 138/17 144/20 174/8 200/1
very [70] 10/21 12/8 14/4 19/2 27/8 37/16 37/23 39/9 43/20 55/3 56/15 56/17 57/20 65/12 72/4 89/4 89/10 89/20 89/21 90/11 90/12 90/16 90/24 92/10 92/14 92/14 92/25 93/16 93/17 93/22 96/25 97/25 99/10 99/15 99/21

19120 19
 132/13 135/12 136/21 137/5 142/11 $485 /$ /f 9 早曻 1833 of 235 145/5 145/5 145/7 146/14 146/18 155/6 156/10 156/16 170/17 171/16 178/20 184/13 185/9 186/6 189/9 189/20 193/7 197/20 198/17 201/17
veto [11] 73/10 141/20 143/19 143/20 143/23 143/24 172/17 172/18 172/24 172/24 180/5
vetoed [6] 12/17 41/21 137/20 142/9 143/18 167/11
viable [4] 37/8 40/10 67/4 67/5
video [1] 7/13
view [2] 82/24 181/20
violate [15] 33/23 71/12 84/7 84/9 84/18
84/23 97/13 113/23 113/24 142/10
143/2 167/6 170/5 182/23 185/17
violated [7] 10/24 46/16 66/11 97/6 98/9 152/20 153/4
violates [10] 8/5 35/18 65/3 71/24 98/7
152/24 161/21 177/5 181/7 196/5
violating [8] 10/1 47/12 113/15 126/7
142/5 162/3 169/25 193/2
violation [8] 11/1 13/19 16/6 162/18
182/7 182/13 195/22 197/18
violative [2] 70/20 162/16
virtue [1] 95/14
visited [1] 99/19
visually [3] 14/5 90/24 104/19
VOGEL [1] 2/16
volume [2] 107/16 204/3
voluminous [1] 53/21
Volusia [1] 75/14
vote [4] 30/25 57/20 59/2 59/3
voted [3] 7/20 171/25 173/11
voter [3] 20/2 121/5 121/5
voters [40] 1/3 2/2 5/5 8/8 8/14 8/19
9/25 15/11 15/23 16/2 16/3 20/5 20/6
21/10 29/1 31/15 32/25 33/8 34/8 47/22
52/6 54/12 56/20 67/15 77/23 78/13
79/22 88/21 93/24 95/2 95/22 96/2
116/25 117/2 121/6 122/18 122/20
125/5 127/25 179/16
voting [38] 9/4 32/24 33/11 42/7 53/20
53/24 54/14 54/16 54/23 54/24 56/6 56/22 57/15 57/16 57/19 58/10 58/17 106/12 114/12 119/7 119/9 119/23
120/12 120/15 120/17 122/10 125/1
128/21 128/24 128/25 129/20 130/11 130/15 131/6 150/18 195/20 196/8 196/17
VRA [2] 85/23 106/16
W
wait [11] 34/15 61/3 61/3 62/1 62/1 62/1
63/16 71/20 167/24 194/8 203/12
waiting [2] 7/5 160/13
waived [4] 47/18 147/6 147/10 148/9
waiver [3] 47/25 69/25 147/14
walk [2] 99/24 100/6
walked [1] 184/25
want [25] 24/17 30/13 35/8 40/15 40/16 41/1 50/16 63/11 63/12 79/18 99/10 99/21 119/12 123/17 147/1 149/14 156/16 181/14 198/18 198/19 199/20 200/8 201/18 203/6 204/2
wanted [2] 103/6 146/13

War [1] 129/4
was [197] 12/12 16/19 17/11 22/17 24/20 26/17 27/1 28/12 31/24 38/7 38/12 38/13 38/14 39/18 40/24 44/1 44/18 46/12 47/14 47/15 49/25 51/10 52/9 52/21 54/18 54/23 55/3 55/7 55/23 57/6 57/13 62/6 62/8 62/13 65/9 65/23 70/11 70/12 70/17 76/4 77/7 77/17 77/20 78/11 78/19 78/22 78/25 79/8 79/14 79/15 81/19 81/21 81/22 82/12 85/15 85/15 86/17 91/7 91/10 91/11 91/12 94/15 94/16 94/20 94/24 95/1 95/4 95/15 95/16 95/25 96/12 96/16 96/22 96/24 97/11 97/17 98/2 98/3 98/4 98/22 99/17 99/19 100/3 100/9 100/14 100/16 100/16 100/18 100/22 100/23 100/25 102/11 102/12 103/7 103/18 104/6 104/7 105/11 105/15 106/2 106/3 106/14 106/18 106/23 107/17 109/3 111/1 113/15 115/7 120/19 120/22 120/24 121/2 121/10 121/10 121/17 121/19 121/21 122/11 122/13 122/14 125/19 125/19 125/21 125/21 125/22 128/2 128/3 129/3 129/6 129/10 129/13 132/21 133/23 134/14 135/13 137/20 137/21 139/18 140/2 142/22 143/1 143/5 143/7 143/8 143/18 144/10 145/12 145/17 147/23 148/6 153/9 153/23 156/17 157/10 157/15 157/19 158/13 166/23 167/11 172/3 172/21 173/6 173/17 174/2 174/3 178/7 178/8 178/15 178/17 178/25 178/25 179/1 179/8 179/8 179/15 180/5 180/5 180/6 180/24 181/6 185/9 186/3 186/5 186/7 186/9 188/13 188/17 190/3 190/24 190/25 191/1 191/8 195/18 197/3 197/6 205/11
Washington [3] 2/5 46/7 165/22 wasn't [14] 47/19 47/20 47/21 54/14 54/15 63/8 96/22 96/24 135/24 140/1 140/1 140/10 158/3 191/4

## water [1] 33/16

way [59] 29/23 37/8 38/25 40/10 44/20 45/23 48/17 49/10 51/13 53/1 59/15 60/18 60/23 61/21 61/23 71/19 73/24 77/11 79/14 81/2 81/10 86/7 86/19 87/22 87/23 89/15 93/11 94/16 96/1 101/10 101/13 101/15 101/23 101/23 102/23 102/24 103/1 103/3 105/4 106/4 106/10 122/14 128/18 128/20 146/6 149/4 156/4 160/24 161/12 161/20 171/25 173/3 173/7 175/11 178/15 182/23 183/5 185/16 189/17 ways [3] 138/12 163/2 191/22 we [331]
we'll [15] 5/2 5/24 6/6 7/9 73/16 80/11 80/11 99/24 100/6 106/15 146/7 162/5 164/1 169/4 171/8
we're [39] 5/4 5/10 17/24 17/24 20/5
21/1 23/8 24/18 35/7 36/8 36/12 36/18 39/24 41/2 45/18 48/10 49/2 57/9 61/22 61/24 64/5 67/23 67/23 68/25 70/15 70/25 71/9 74/21 77/13 80/9 160/13 183/24 185/15 190/16 193/2 193/9 193/15 194/11 197/11
we've [22] 10/19 40/17 44/22 45/12

W Case 4:22-cV-00109-AW-MAF we've... [18] 45/14 57/7 69/19 69/25 72/18 77/2 80/12 156/3 169/21 181/4 182/9 183/12 187/8 190/6 190/10 190/10 193/4 196/19 weak [1] 50/24
website [6] 39/7 42/22 42/23 94/2 99/17 177/15
Wednesday [1] 202/25
week [6] 5/14 43/19 202/2 202/3 202/5 202/6
weeks [7] 12/7 41/2 41/4 44/2 145/21 199/4 199/22
weeks-long [1] 145/21
weighed [2] 87/9 196/23
weighing [3] 150/7 150/22 174/18 well [83] 7/10 20/21 20/23 22/20 25/7
26/14 27/4 27/10 28/15 33/1 34/16 35/2 38/24 39/17 41/19 41/22 43/2 43/12 43/17 45/2 55/18 63/16 65/7 69/21 72/4 73/2 74/1 80/17 83/17 86/1 92/23 98/25 101/5 102/10 104/1 105/14 105/19 106/13 107/20 109/2 110/14 114/9 119/17 123/6 125/18 126/15 127/11 130/5 130/11 131/12 135/16 136/2 140/11 141/7 142/11 144/21 150/17 152/15 157/20 165/1 166/9 167/4 178/10 180/1 180/18 181/3 182/4 183/1 185/7 187/18 188/16 190/16 191/12 193/15 193/19 194/23 195/2 195/24 197/9 199/23 200/10 202/12 203/24 well-established [1] 22/20
went [6] 31/22 55/20 77/11 90/9 96/4 125/23
were [68] 1/19 15/6 19/3 22/7 29/2 29/4
30/2 44/15 55/5 55/9 56/8 56/11 57/16 65/20 71/17 76/2 76/5 76/18 77/23 78/15 87/1 87/2 90/22 101/20 104/13 104/24 106/21 111/13 113/22 116/23 117/2 119/25 121/8 121/12 125/4 125/4 125/7 125/16 126/11 128/8 135/17 136/5 144/24 145/14 153/14 159/16 160/10 164/15 165/23 166/1 179/15 179/17 181/6 182/22 184/15 184/20 186/24 187/3 190/5 190/6 192/10 192/10 194/9 194/10 194/16 194/17 194/19 194/22
weren't [6] 47/19 47/23 54/17 54/18 152/18 152/19
WERMUTH [3] 2/10 2/12 6/12
west [27] 12/21 13/10 27/21 38/6 38/13
38/15 38/18 38/21 38/25 39/2 40/1
40/11 90/9 91/9 95/24 96/4 96/11 97/13
100/1 103/4 143/8 154/5 156/10 156/14 158/24 159/8 178/11
what [222]
what's [5] 71/23 78/7 79/20 138/16 138/16
whatever [8] 71/20 74/2 105/24 144/24 145/13 164/20 171/24 201/3
whatsoever [2] 15/16 162/9
when [80] 1/19 5/25 12/12 19/11 20/25 25/3 25/7 25/11 28/24 30/23 30/24 34/17 41/16 41/20 43/13 45/6 50/15 54/23 61/20 63/21 63/22 75/7 77/2 78/25 80/1 81/24 82/19 85/15 86/17 95/11 97/6 98/20 99/16 99/17 99/19 99/25 103/19 103/23 105/22 108/13
 142/19 142/20 143/4 145/11 145/18 150/7 156/17 156/21 156/22 168/4 172/3 183/10 183/19 184/22 185/3 186/3 186/10 186/13 186/16 186/18 193/14 193/14 193/15 194/4 195/3 197/3 198/9 199/2 201/8 203/10 whenever [3] 6/2 99/18 203/13 where [81] 1/19 24/1 27/14 28/20 30/23 30/25 31/5 32/12 36/1 36/4 36/10 39/8 39/10 40/20 41/23 41/24 42/16 43/8 43/11 47/6 48/5 53/6 53/15 53/24 55/14 65/9 68/6 69/7 70/9 70/11 78/24 81/11 83/1 87/1 88/24 89/5 89/13 89/18 90/15 91/17 93/23 100/22 102/5 105/19 107/5 109/7 113/18 120/6 121/3 122/17 124/15 129/23 133/14 140/3 141/14 142/2 142/6 142/16 143/1 143/9 143/15 144/4 145/20 146/5 146/9 149/3 155/7 155/14 157/8 157/9 158/15 160/4 161/1 161/11 163/23 170/13 175/16 180/9 180/15 181/24 188/19
Where's [1] 81/23
whereas [2] 123/23 124/16
whether [30] 9/13 17/5 19/3 22/2 29/2
30/3 42/14 45/23 48/2 48/8 48/11 48/19 51/16 64/6 80/1 88/6 90/6 98/18 102/18 103/24 106/15 114/11 128/6 130/25 137/10 164/13 167/25 171/1 181/9 196/16
which [64] 5/23 13/25 24/9 24/18 26/21 36/12 40/5 41/19 52/16 52/18 53/21 60/21 61/25 72/13 79/6 83/2 86/10 89/16 90/5 100/17 104/22 106/24 111/19 111/22 115/11 116/7 117/14 117/23 118/20 120/4 120/11 120/18 121/11 121/13 124/1 129/15 133/18 137/1 138/14 149/9 150/4 151/4 152/11 159/17 161/1 163/14 163/16 164/12 168/8 172/17 173/17 174/22 177/6 177/13 177/18 184/2 187/9 188/4 188/22 189/6 189/8 189/21 192/19 200/20
while [6] 13/14 16/25 26/4 80/12 100/21 197/5
white [6] 59/3 123/25 127/13 127/20 176/25 186/8
who [30] 14/18 15/10 15/11 15/12 15/24
16/3 16/8 16/8 17/23 19/12 20/11 21/11 29/3 33/8 34/8 40/20 47/22 59/25 63/11 63/12 65/2 69/1 75/12 75/25 93/14 123/7 124/15 152/1 166/1 193/11 who's [2] 34/21 182/10
whole [7] 11/23 28/1 48/10 55/11 155/22 190/12 196/6
whose [4] 75/18 163/3 163/6 187/6 why [81] 16/9 43/12 46/22 46/24 47/2 $47 / 8$ 47/18 50/10 50/14 50/18 51/5 51/5 61/14 68/16 68/21 71/15 71/16 71/19 72/7 72/15 74/15 74/25 75/2 75/21 79/14 79/18 85/5 85/19 86/14 92/9 94/15 97/25 101/4 101/13 101/14 101/15 106/2 106/3 106/3 107/8 107/14 110/7 110/12 110/14 110/19 110/20 113/25 117/11 118/24 119/6 119/15 119/17 121/25 122/8 124/14 145/18 151/6 155/9 155/22 156/2 157/5 159/12
$264 / 7164 / 21164 / 24$ 165/8 165/12
 181/7 181/12 181/23 182/24 184/11 191/13 195/9 195/24 201/8 wide [1] 60/15
will [49] 5/20 6/1 7/5 7/7 23/8 35/5 35/9 42/20 43/1 64/3 68/19 68/19 72/14 73/5 85/16 85/17 99/23 101/19 115/14 116/13 116/14 123/7 123/9 125/11 125/11 133/17 134/10 139/21 149/7 149/11 169/12 170/4 170/4 172/21 175/3 175/10 175/11 175/13 175/15 175/17 175/18 175/18 180/16 196/6 199/21 200/4 200/10 203/13 204/6 willing [1] 122/9
willingness [1] 33/5
winning [4] 58/18 58/19 59/8 59/9 wins [2] 59/4 59/4
within [14] 23/20 25/7 85/24 101/20 111/14 115/15 131/14 133/5 135/14 137/21 145/14 145/15 149/20 163/21 without [15] 6/4 9/14 14/16 44/12 44/13 84/15 129/11 141/10 142/5 162/2 168/11 169/17 170/11 184/16 195/1 withstanding [1] 168/13
witness [1] 44/13
Women [3] 47/22 56/20 127/25
won [1] 197/4
won't [1] 139/22
wondering [1] 194/22
word [9] 46/23 46/25 73/15 78/7 179/23 185/20 199/14 199/15 199/19
worded [1] 50/21
words [7] 38/10 40/11 50/15 54/11 57/9 61/4 66/16
work [4] 35/5 202/18 203/10 204/4 workable [5] 38/22 66/15 66/17 66/20 75/23
worked [1] 198/20
working [3] 200/4 201/16 202/16
works [3] 36/9 77/1 191/18
worth [3] 18/18 40/6 163/2
worthy [1] 48/13
would [123] 9/13 10/25 13/24 14/12
15/7 20/15 21/4 21/20 22/9 22/24 27/3 27/24 30/5 32/5 33/23 37/7 38/16 38/18 41/3 44/6 45/16 51/6 52/24 53/1 53/8 56/8 60/6 60/7 61/14 61/14 63/2 66/25 68/10 72/11 75/12 75/17 75/18 75/19 76/11 80/4 80/22 82/24 84/7 84/9 84/11 84/11 84/13 84/22 85/12 89/5 91/13 92/9 94/13 96/2 97/13 97/22 99/1 99/5 100/15 100/17 103/12 104/2 104/11 104/14 104/25 105/20 106/25 112/18 113/3 113/7 116/4 116/24 117/4 117/25 118/3 118/12 119/18 125/5 128/10 130/2 136/25 137/3 140/19 142/17 145/6 146/9 146/20 148/11 149/4 151/17 151/22 154/7 157/23 159/18 161/13 166/1 166/3 166/19 166/25 167/6 168/10 168/18 170/19 170/24 171/3 171/11 173/24 174/12 174/13 182/6 187/1 188/5 188/12 189/4 189/16 198/6 199/12 200/11 202/3 202/4 202/10 202/18 202/20
wouldn't [7] 71/22 72/9 82/13 104/3 113/9 113/17 148/9
wrap [3] 123/18 176/8 189/15


