

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION**

Common Cause Florida, FairDistricts Now,
Dorothy Inman-Johnson, Brenda Holt,
Leo R. Stoney, Myrna Young, and Nancy
Ratzan,

Plaintiffs,

Michael Arteaga, et al.,

Intervenor Plaintiffs,

v.

Laurel M. Lee, in her official capacity as
Florida Secretary of State,

Defendant.

Case No.: 4:22-cv-109

DECLARATION OF MATTHEW A. BARRETO, PH.D.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare as follows:

I. Introduction

A. Qualifications

1. I, Matthew A. Barreto, am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify.

2. I am a Professor of Political Science and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”). I was appointed to the position of Full Professor with tenure at UCLA in 2015. Prior to that, I was a tenured professor of Political Science at the University of Washington from 2009 to 2014 and Assistant Professor from 2005 to 2009. At UCLA, I am the faculty director of the Voting Rights Project in the Luskin School of Public Affairs and teach a year-long course on the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), focusing specifically on social science statistical analysis, demographics, and district mapping analysis that are relevant in redistricting expert reports. I have written expert reports and been qualified as an expert witness more than three-dozen times in federal and state voting rights and civil rights cases. I have published peer-reviewed, social science articles specifically about minority representation, voting patterns and racially polarized voting and have co-authored a software package for use in understanding district performance and racial voting patterns in redistricting cases.

3. I have been retained as an expert consultant by counties and states across the country in 2021 to advise them on redistricting as it relates to compliance with state and federal requirements. As an expert witness in VRA lawsuits, my testimony has been relied on by courts to find in favor of challenges to maps drawn by both Republicans and Democrats. Most recently, in March 2022, a federal court relied on my analysis of district boundaries and voting patterns to strike down defendants' maps that favored Democrats over Republicans and order a new, fairer map in Baltimore, Maryland.

4. I hold a Ph.D. in Political Science from University of California at Irvine. I have attached my Curriculum Vitae as **Appendix B**.

5. In this matter, I have been assisted by Dr. Kassra Oskooii, tenured professor of Political Science at the University of Delaware. Dr. Oskooii and I have worked on previous voting rights analyses together, including mapping and districting analyses, and we have co-authored peer-reviewed social science articles on racially polarized voting patterns.

B. Scope of Work

6. In this matter, I was retained by Plaintiffs' counsel to assess the appropriateness of different Congressional map proposals in the state of Florida under federal and Florida constitutional redistricting standards and as compared to

the existing benchmark map, FLCD2016 (the “Benchmark Map”).¹ In addition to the Benchmark Map, the proposed Congressional maps that I reviewed included:

- a. S035C8060, a map passed by the Florida Senate on January 19, 2022, (“Map 8060”);
- b. H000C8019, a map passed by both the Florida House and Senate on March 4, 2022 (“Map 8019”);
- c. H000C8015, a map passed by both the Florida House and Senate on March 4, 2022 as a secondary map that was intended to be enacted if the primary map (*i.e.*, Map 8019) was found to be invalid by any court (“Map 8015”).

7. I understand that Plaintiffs intend to propose Map 8060 as the remedial redistricting plan to this Court. Therefore, I used a variety of traditional redistricting criteria to examine Map 8060 and, where appropriate for purposes of comparison, the two additional maps proposed by the Florida legislature (Maps 8015 and 8019).

¹ The Benchmark Map was approved by the Florida Supreme Court on December 2, 2015 after a finding that the 2012 Congressional redistricting plan had violated the constitutional standards under the Fair District Amendment, Fla. Const. Art. III, § 20. *League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner (Apportionment VIII)*, 179 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2015). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Benchmark Map complies with the requirements of Article III, Section 20. *Id.* at 297–98. The Benchmark Map and relevant related data can be accessed at: <https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans>.

8. Plaintiffs' counsel also requested that I evaluate the various plans' compliance with the Fair Districts Amendments to the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const. Art. III, § 20. I understand that Section 20 of the Florida Constitution regulates Congressional reapportionment. This provision includes "Tier 1" standards and "Tier 2" standards. Tier 1 standards require that: (1) no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; (2) districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and (3) districts shall consist of contiguous territory. Tier 2 standards, which are subordinate to Tier 1 standards in the event of a conflict, require that: (1) districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; (2) districts shall be compact; and (3) where feasible, districts shall utilize existing political and geographical boundaries. The Fair Districts Amendment section applicable to Congressional redistricting is attached as **Appendix C.**

9. I obtained map boundaries and relevant data files from the Florida Redistricting website. See <https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans>. I also obtained Voting Age Population and Citizen Voting Age Population demographic data by race and ethnicity from the United States Census

Bureau website. *See* <https://data.census.gov/cedsci/>. The Voting and Election Science Team at the Wichita State University and the University of Florida provided the election data for our composite partisan measures. *See* <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/electionscience>. Finally, I used two mapping and analytics resources (DRA 2020 and ArcGIS) for our reported results, as well R (<https://www.r-project.org>), which is an open-source statistical computing software. Any other data analytics resources that I relied upon for my conclusions (*e.g.*, <https://planscore.campaignlegal.org/#!2020-ushouse>) are clearly identified in this declaration. Representations of the data I used to form my opinions and that are referenced in this declaration are included in the tables in **Appendix A**.

10. I am being compensated for my work on this case at my standard rate of \$450 per hour. My compensation is not contingent upon my findings or on the result of this proceeding.

11. References to documents and data I include in this declaration are meant to provide examples of supporting information but are not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive lists of all known support. The information in this declaration is based upon information that has been made available to me or known to me to date. My work in this matter is ongoing, and I reserve the right to modify

or supplement my conclusions as additional information is made available to me or as I perform further analysis.

II. Summary of Opinion

12. I have carefully reviewed the Congressional district maps drawn by the Florida state legislature. Based on my examination of the materials available to me, it is my opinion that Map 8060 complies with federal and state Congressional redistricting requirements, including Section 20 of the Florida Constitution, and that it represents less of a change from the Benchmark Map than the other maps proposed by the state legislature (Maps 8015 and 8019).

13. This conclusion is based on the measured level of partisan advantage and on the number of districts that allow minority voters to elect their candidates of choice. My analyses also illustrate that Map 8060 meets equal population requirements with contiguous and compact districts. Furthermore, I understand that the Florida Supreme Court previously determined that the Benchmark Map was constitutional; my analyses show that that Map 8060 offers the most continuity and least change as compared to the existing Benchmark Map among the three legislative maps. In particular, Map 8060 has the highest core retention rating, meaning that it does not make dramatic changes to district boundaries, and instead retains the core components of the existing benchmark districts. The other maps I reviewed scored worse on core retention.

III. Analysis

A. Map 8060 Does Not Reflect Intent to Favor or Disfavor a Political Party or Incumbent

14. The first Tier 1 standard set forth in Article III, § 20 of the Florida Constitution is that the map must not be drawn “with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.” According to the Florida Supreme Court, “there is no acceptable level of improper intent.” *In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176 (Apportionment I)*, 83 So.3d 597, 684–85 (Fla. 2012). As such, I focused my analysis on the partisan makeup of each district in the proposed maps compared to the corresponding districts in the Benchmark Map in order to determine the extent to which the various maps might be motivated by partisan interests. For each map, I evaluated (i) composite partisan scores, (ii) the performance of competitive range districts, and (iii) several PlanScore metrics. As compared to the benchmark, Map 8060 exhibits the most partisan consistency. However, Maps 8019 and 8015 display a clear pattern of partisan bias in favor of the Republican party.

1. Composite Partisan Scores

15. To evaluate the partisan makeup of the districts across the three proposed maps and the Benchmark Map, I used data from past statewide elections to construct a mean composite partisan score for each district. By combining the results of several elections into a “composite,” I am able to make reliable

inferences about the likely partisan makeup of each district without relying on any single election outcome. In constructing the composite score, I relied on the following statewide contests: 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, 2016 and 2018 senatorial elections, 2018 gubernatorial election, and the 2018 election for attorney general.²

16. I report partisan lean composite percentages by districts in Tables 1–4 of Appendix A. For purposes of delineating potential election outcomes, a district can be considered to “lean” in favor of one party over the other when greater than 55% of the voters of that district support one party. One common measure in the political science literature is to consider a district to be “competitive” or “toss-up” if neither party attracts support of 55% of the voters and elections swing back and forth depending on the political currents of the year.

17. As Table 1 illustrates, the Benchmark Map produces 13 districts that lean Republican, 8 districts that lean Democratic, and 6 that fall in the competitive range. I understand that in 2015, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that this map complied with the requirements of the Florida Constitution, including the

² I use state-wide races as opposed to Congressional races because scholars and other experts in redistricting cases have shown those data to be reliable predictors of future behavior. State-wide races also provide a constant set of factors that take into account all voters.

prohibition on intentionally favoring or disfavoring a political party or incumbent.

See Apportionment VIII, 179 So. 3d at 297–98.

18. In comparison, Table 2 shows that Map 8060 produces 12 districts that lean Republican, 8 districts that lean Democratic, and 8 districts in the competitive range. Based on this metric, Map 8060 creates somewhat more competition between the two parties than the Benchmark Map, as Map 8060 contains one fewer district that leans Republican and two more competitive districts. As such, I conclude that Map 8060 was drawn without intentional partisan gerrymandering.

19. Table 3 shows that Map 8015 produces 13 districts that lean Republican, 8 districts that lean Democratic, and 7 districts in the competitive range. Table 4 illustrates that Map 8019 retains the 13 districts that lean Republican, but lowers the districts that lean Democratic to 7, while increasing the competitive range districts to 8. In other words, Maps 8019 and 8015 create somewhat less competition between the two parties than the Benchmark Map and Map 8060, therefore, the possibility that Maps 8019 and 8015 may be tainted by partisan intent cannot be excluded. Accordingly, a closer look at the competitive districts is instructive to assess the likelihood of an improper intent to favor or disfavor a party.

Summary of Partisan Composite Scores

	Benchmark	Map 8060	Map 8019	Map 8015
Lean R	13	12	13	13
Lean D	8	8	7	8
Competitive	6	8	8	7

2. Performance of Competitive Range Districts

20. Looking closer at the competitive range districts also reveals which political party has an advantage within these swing districts. The data in Tables 1–4 of Appendix A reports which political party has a higher composite score among the competitive range districts. This information can be used to create a final tally of estimated partisan performance. Map 8060’s estimated performance is the closest to the Benchmark Map’s performance. By comparison, Map 8015 and Map 8019’s competitive range districts are more likely to favor Republicans.

Summary of Partisan Scores Including Competitive Districts

	Benchmark	Map 8060	Map 8019	Map 8015
Republican	14	14	16	16
Democrat	13	14	12	12

21. Based on this analysis, I conclude that Map 8060 is most similar to the Benchmark Map in terms of the partisan makeup of the districts. Again, these data provide no basis to infer that Map 8060 was drawn with any intentional partisan gerrymandering; on the other hand, it does cast some doubt on the partisan

intentions underlying Maps 8019 and 8015, because they skew significantly in favor of Republicans.

3. PlanScore Metrics

22. In addition to the composite score analyses, we also report three other partisan gerrymandering metrics provided by PlanScore, which is a project of the nonpartisan Campaign Legal Center.³ We use the metrics provided by PlanScore because they are widely used by state legislatures, scholars, and experts when analyzing partisan gerrymandering in redistricting plans. These metrics are intended to detect levels of partisan gerrymandering by focusing on “packing” or “cracking.” “Packing” occurs when members of a party are placed into a small number of districts to expand their margin of victory in those districts, thereby producing inefficient or “wasted” votes in the sense that those votes could have been useful by contributing to a candidate’s election in other districts. “Cracking,” on the other hand, occurs when voters from one party are split across numerous districts to prevent them from having sufficient voting power in any of these districts. Through the use of intentional packing and cracking, mapmakers can produce tremendous partisan advantages or disadvantages.

³ See “What is PlanScore?,” available at <https://planscore.campaignlegal.org/about/>.

23. The first metric I used is called the “Efficiency Gap” (EG), which considers inefficient or “wasted” votes to evaluate the extent to which a party’s supporters are cracked or packed across districts to produce an advantage for one party over another. Wasted votes in the EG analysis are the sum of (i) all votes for the losing party in losing districts and (ii) all votes for that party in winning districts that are more than half the total votes in the district. A positive efficiency gap indicates more Democrat wasted votes (*i.e.*, a pro-Republican bias), while a negative efficiency gap indicates more Republican wasted votes (*i.e.*, a pro-Democrat bias).⁴ As a general rule, the closer the EG score is to zero, the better; a low EG score indicates a low likelihood of partisan gerrymandering.

24. A comparison of the EG scores reveals that Map 8060 has fewer inefficient/wasted votes when compared to Maps 8015 and 8019. For Map 8060, votes for Republican candidates are estimated to be inefficient at a rate of 6.8% lower than votes for Democratic candidates, which favors the Republican party. However, Map 8015 is noticeably more pro-Republican with an EG of 7.9%, and Map 8019 is even more favorable to Republicans with an estimated EG of 8.3%.

25. The second metric I use is called “Declination,” which considers threshold-related asymmetry in the distribution of votes across districts to evaluate

⁴ Further details on how the Efficiency Gap is calculated can be found here: <https://planscore.campaignlegal.org/metrics/efficiencygap/>.

possible partisan gerrymandering. A declination value near 0 is indicative of a fair districting map, and the greater the declination value, the greater likelihood that the map is a partisan gerrymander.⁵

26. Map 8060, with a declination value of 0.15 in favor of Republicans, appears to be more fair than Maps 8015 and 8019, which are more skewed in favor of Republicans with declination values of 0.19 (Map 8015) and 0.20 (Map 8019).

27. The third metric I use is called “Partisan Bias,” which is the difference between each party’s seat share and 50 percent in a hypothetical tied election. For example, if a party would win 55% of the plan’s districts, but only received 50% of the statewide vote, the plan would have a bias of 5% in this party’s favor.⁶

28. Under this metric, Republicans would be expected to win 5.2% extra seats in Map 8015 and 8019. This means that both Maps 8015 and 8019 are more biased in favor of the Republican Party than Map 8060.

Summary of PlanScore Metrics (*lower is better*)

	Map 8060	Map 8019	Map 8015
Efficiency Gap	6.8% R	8.3% R	7.9% R
Declination	0.15	0.20	0.19
Partisan Bias	4.0% R	5.2% R	5.2% R

⁵ Details on how declination is calculated can be found here: <https://planscore.campaignlegal.org/metrics/declination/>.

⁶ Information about partisan bias calculations can be found here: <https://planscore.campaignlegal.org/metrics/partisanbias/>.

29. In conclusion, when measuring excessive partisanship using the metrics of composite score, efficiency gap, declination score, and partisan bias, Map 8060 exhibits the least degree of partisan bias and most closely resembles the Benchmark Map.

B. Map 8060 Does Not Dilute or Diminish Minority Voters' Ability to Elect a Candidate of Their Choice

30. The second Tier 1 standard under Section 20 of the Florida Constitution is that the map must not be drawn “with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice.” Fla. Const., Art. III, § 20. I understand that the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as “impos[ing] two requirements that plainly serve to protect racial and language minority voters in Florida: prevention of impermissible vote dilution and prevention of impermissible diminishment of a minority group’s ability to elect a candidate of its choice.” *Apportionment I*, 83 So.3d at 619. Based on my preliminary analysis of opportunity districts, majority-minority districts, and the Florida Senate’s functional analysis, I conclude that Map 8060 exhibits no signs of impermissible minority vote dilution or vote diminishment.

1. No Vote Dilution

31. Vote “dilution” is “the practice of reducing the potential effectiveness of a group’s voting strength by limiting the group’s chances to translate the

strength into voting power.” *Id.* at 622. A vote dilution issue arises when “a minority group was denied a majority-minority district that, but for the purported dilution, could have potentially existed.” *Id.* Map 8060 retains the same number of majority-minority districts as the Benchmark Map. *See* Appendix A, Table 8. Therefore, I do not find any indication of vote dilution in Map 8060.

2. No Vote Diminishment

32. Vote “diminishment,” sometimes referred to as “retrogression,” refers to the elimination of majority-minority districts or the weakening of other historically performing minority districts “where doing so would actually diminish a minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates.” *Apportionment I*, 83 So.3d at 625. This is assessed by determining “whether the ability to elect exists in the benchmark plan and whether it continues in the proposed plan.” *Id.* I understand that the Florida Supreme Court has also previously held that an evaluation of vote diminishment typically requires “an inquiry into whether a district is likely to perform for minority candidates of choice. This has been termed a ‘functional analysis,’ requiring consideration not only of the minority population in the districts, or even the minority voting-age population in those districts, but of political data and how a minority population group has voted in the

past.” *Id.* Courts and scholars sometimes describe this form of analysis as a “performance analysis.”

33. One way to analyze potential vote diminishment is to compare the number of majority-minority districts and opportunity or performing districts in a proposed map with the number of such districts in the Benchmark Map. In my analysis, I used Citizen Voting-Age Population (CVAP) data. CVAP refers to individuals who are 18 years old or older and are U.S. citizens. I used CVAP data because I understand that courts, including the 11th Circuit, utilize CVAP to measure minority voting strength and to determine whether minority voters have equal opportunities to elect their preferred candidates of choice.⁷ Opportunity districts are those in which a minority group has a large and cohesive voting population, thereby influencing which candidate wins. This is especially the case where minority voters outnumber other voters in their preferred partisan primary. Performing districts are those in which a minority population is able to elect its candidate of choice by exerting a sufficiently cohesive influence on the primary election for a party that is expected to prevail in the general election; this can be demonstrated through the kind of performance analysis (functional analysis) the

⁷ See *Negron v. City of Miami Beach, FL*, 113 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1997); see also *Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, TX*, 586 F.3d 1019 (5th Cir. 2009); *Barnett v. City of Chicago*, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998); *Romero v. City of Pomona*, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989), *overruled on other grounds*, *Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.*, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990).

Florida Supreme Court described. Whether in consideration of majority-minority districts, minority opportunity districts, or minority performing districts, of the three proposed maps, Map 8060 hews closest to the Benchmark Map.

34. As shown in Table 2, Map 8060 does not eliminate any majority-minority districts. Reviewing the numbers, Map 8060 maintains the Benchmark Map's one Black Majority district (District 20)⁸ and three Hispanic Majority districts (Districts 25, 26, and 27).

35. As shown in Table 2, Map 8060 also preserves minority opportunity districts where possible. Map 8060 preserves the Benchmark Map's two Black opportunity districts (Congressional Districts 5 and 24) and *adds* one Hispanic opportunity district (District 9).

36. I reviewed the performance analysis provided by the Florida State Senate for Senate Map 8040 (attached as **Appendix D**), which was unchanged in Map 8060 with respect to Congressional Districts 5, 10, and 20, and made minor changes to Congressional District 24. According to the Senate's analysis, these 4 districts in the Benchmark Map were all Black performing districts. According to the Senate's performance analysis, Congressional Districts 5, 10, and 20 all remain as Black performing districts. Furthermore, as discussed above, Congressional District 24 in Map 8060 remains as a Black opportunity district. In addition,

⁸ District 20 contains 50.04% Black VAP and 49.63% Black CVAP.

through my own analysis, I have carefully reviewed the racial demographics and partisan composite scores of Map 8060 in Table 2 and conclude that Districts 5, 10, 20, and 24 will perform for Black candidates of choice.

37. Thus, in terms of majority-minority districts, minority opportunity districts, and minority performing districts, Map 8060 most resembles the Benchmark Map, which has been deemed constitutionally acceptable by the Florida Supreme Court. Moreover, the Senate’s performance analysis, and my own review of Table 2, both support the conclusion that Congressional Districts 5, 10, 20, and 24 will remain as performing districts for Black voters. In sum, I found no evidence that Map 8060 would lead to the unconstitutional diminishment of minority voting power.

C. Map 8060 Satisfies All Other Relevant Redistricting Requirements

38. Map 8060 also adheres to all other relevant redistricting requirements under the U.S. Constitution and Florida Constitution.

1. Contiguous

39. The third Tier 1 standard under the Florida Constitution is that the districts “shall consist of contiguous territory.” Fla. Const., Art. III, § 20. Based on a visual review, each district in Map 8060 satisfies this requirement.

2. Complies with Equal Population / One-Person One-Vote

40. Article 1, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that members of the U.S. House of Representatives “shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers.” The Florida State Constitution similarly provides, in a Tier 2 standard, “[D]istricts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable.” Fla. Const., Art. III, § 20.

41. I provide summary population statistics for Map 8060 in Table 2. In Map 8060, each of the 28 districts has a total population of either 769,220 or 769,221. This plan has a maximum deviation (*i.e.*, the difference between the ideal population of a district and the actual population of a district) of one person. Therefore, the equal population requirements of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and Article III, Section 20(b) of the Florida Constitution are met.

3. Reasonably Compact

42. Under the Florida Constitution’s Tier 2 standard, districts “shall be compact.” Fla. Const., Art. III, § 20. “Compactness refers to the shape of the district; the goal is to ensure that districts are logically drawn and that bizarrely shaped districts are avoided. Compactness can be evaluated both visually and by employing standard mathematical measurements.” *Apportionment I*, 83 So.3d at 685.

43. I provide compactness statistics for Map 8060 in Table 2 of Appendix A. Table 2 reports compactness scores generated by *Dave's Redistricting Application* (DRA). Specifically, the table provides the map's overall Reock⁹ and Polsby-Popper¹⁰ scores—two of the most widely-referenced measures of compactness. I provide comparable compactness statistics for Maps 8015 and 8019 in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Higher scores indicate higher compactness.

Summary of Compactness Scores

	Map 8060	Map 8019	Map 8015
Reock	0.4553	0.4519	0.4439
Polsby-Popper	0.4337	0.4236	0.3982

44. There is no bright-line rule on deciding what constitutes an ideal or acceptable compactness score. Depending on the justification, acceptable scores can vary significantly. The average compactness scores for Map 8060 compare favorably to the scores for Maps 8019 and 8015. In my opinion, the districts in Map 8060 are reasonably compact, particularly in light of the other redistricting requirements at play.

⁹ Reock scores measure how dispersed district shapes are. Higher scores (*i.e.*, closer to 1) are more compact.

¹⁰ Polsby-Popper scores measure how indented district shapes are. As with Reock scores, higher scores (*i.e.*, closer to 1) are more compact.

4. Utilizes Existing Political and Geographical Boundaries

45. Under the Florida Constitution’s Tier 2 standard, districts “shall, where feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.” Fla. Const., Art. III, § 20. Among the various metrics that may be used to measure utilization of existing political and geographical boundaries, one of the most straightforward analyses is a splitting analysis. In my splitting analysis, I provide two key metrics:

- a. County-Splitting Score: Measures the extent to which counties are split by districts. The ideal value is 1.0 (that is, no splitting), and larger values mean *more* splitting.
- b. District-Splitting Score: Measures the extent to which districts are split by counties. The ideal value is 1.0 (that is, no splitting), and larger values mean *more* splitting.

46. Map 8060 achieves better results in the two metrics than the Benchmark Map:

Summary of Splitting Scores

	Benchmark Map	Map 8060
County-Splitting Score	1.51	1.47
District-Splitting Score	1.41	1.39

47. As with compactness, there is no bright-line rule regarding what constitutes ideal or acceptable splitting scores. In my opinion, the districts in Map 8060 fall clearly within the general range for acceptable splitting ranges. As such,

I consider this map to reasonably utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.


D. Map 8060's Core Retention Further Supports Its Acceptability

48. When there is a dispute over district maps, courts may look to core retention as another factor in deciding which map is preferable. This is because core retention is an important method of evaluating the fairness of a new map vis-à-vis the existing, court-approved benchmark map.

49. Of course, perfect retention is neither possible nor desirable, given population changes that have occurred in Florida over the past decade. Due to Florida's population growth and a shift in population patterns, some Congressional districts are currently underpopulated while others are quite overpopulated. Florida gained a new Congressional seat for the 2022 General Election as a result of population growth. Thus, shifts in population in any new Congressional map are unavoidable in order to ensure equal population between districts and to create a new district. Nevertheless, higher core retention is still a useful metric under these circumstances for understanding how much any new proposed map changes the populations from the current Benchmark Map. In a core retention analysis, a map that relocates the lowest percentage of the population into a new district represents the least change from the benchmark.

50. Figure 1, below, shows a side-by-side boundary comparison of the Benchmark Map and Map 8060. Based on a visual comparison, Map 8060 balances population equality while also keeping districts roughly the same as the Benchmark. The notable exception is in Central Florida where the newly created 28th Congressional district has been drawn. Significant changes in this region were unavoidable as population growth in Central Florida exceeded that of all other regions of the state. In Northern and Southern Florida, Map 8060 closely resembles the existing Benchmark Map. This means that existing boundaries have largely remained the same.

Figure 1



51. Core retention scores for the individual districts as well as the average score for the overall map are used to determine what percentage of the population moved to a new district or was retained. The data presented in Table 5 shows how

the populations in the old 27-district Benchmark Map relate to the populations in the new 28-district plan under Map 8060, district by district, as well as for the plan as a whole. For example, Congressional District 1 has a core retention of 100%, meaning that its new boundaries encompass only residents of the former District 1. For District 2, 87.65% of the new District 2 comes from the old District 2. And 98.25% of the new District 3 comes from the old District 3. This pattern can be evaluated for every single district. At the bottom of this table is the core retention calculation for the map as a whole, which is 84.0%. Given the population growth and density changes in Florida, and the addition of a new district, the core retention value of 84.0% for Map 8060 is quite high and represents the least change of any of the maps (see Tables 6 and 7) as compared to the existing Benchmark Map, which was the most recent map found constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court.

Summary of Average Core Retention

Map 8060	Map 8019	Map 8015
84.0%	77.2%	81.1%

IV. Conclusion

52. Based on the foregoing analysis, it is my opinion that Map 8060 complies with federal and Florida constitutional requirements for congressional redistricting and makes fewer changes to the current, court-approved benchmark congressional map than the other maps initially proposed by the Florida legislature.

53. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 18th day of April, 2022.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matt A. Barreto", written over a horizontal line.

Matthew A. Barreto
Agoura Hills, CA

Appendix A

Table 1

Benchmark Districts	Partisan Lean (Composite Score)				2020 Voting Age Population								2019 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates							
	Total Pop	Democrat	Republican	Other	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Total CVAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific
1	807881	29.5%	67.9%	2.6%	636380	72.70%	27.30%	6.60%	13.23%	4.09%	3.18%	0.37%	588886	76.80%	23.20%	5.00%	13.46%	2.79%	1.56%	0.09%
2	727856	31.6%	66.2%	2.1%	588566	75.85%	24.15%	6.68%	12.42%	2.39%	2.48%	0.19%	561458	79.22%	20.78%	4.79%	13.26%	1.48%	1.06%	0.06%
3	766133	41.3%	56.5%	2.2%	609560	66.87%	33.13%	10.29%	16.10%	4.74%	2.13%	0.22%	562752	71.93%	28.07%	8.25%	16.03%	2.75%	0.81%	0.04%
4	871884	35.2%	62.7%	2.1%	691279	72.71%	27.29%	8.84%	10.36%	6.02%	1.89%	0.26%	604250	78.39%	21.61%	6.68%	9.94%	3.93%	0.72%	0.04%
5	748910	61.5%	36.6%	1.9%	580527	40.24%	59.76%	9.14%	46.20%	3.54%	1.84%	0.22%	538334	44.77%	55.23%	6.06%	45.88%	2.28%	0.77%	0.05%
6	796254	40.4%	57.4%	2.3%	658454	73.51%	26.49%	12.07%	10.12%	2.37%	2.01%	0.15%	608719	77.11%	22.89%	10.62%	9.85%	1.61%	0.66%	0.03%
7	788518	51.8%	45.4%	2.8%	634763	56.12%	43.88%	24.65%	12.19%	6.42%	1.85%	0.23%	578104	62.59%	37.41%	22.44%	10.15%	3.95%	0.53%	0.05%
8	783753	39.0%	58.6%	2.5%	645163	74.59%	25.41%	10.35%	9.68%	3.22%	2.02%	0.22%	594924	79.28%	20.72%	8.58%	9.00%	2.14%	0.69%	0.08%
9	955602	52.8%	45.0%	2.2%	737088	40.37%	59.63%	41.53%	14.26%	4.16%	2.00%	0.25%	598313	47.27%	52.73%	36.87%	12.06%	2.92%	0.57%	0.06%
10	873804	60.7%	37.2%	2.1%	669945	35.99%	64.01%	28.95%	26.70%	6.50%	1.69%	0.29%	537016	42.82%	57.18%	24.33%	26.67%	5.20%	0.62%	0.10%
11	820835	33.0%	64.8%	2.3%	694239	78.79%	21.21%	10.12%	7.22%	1.85%	1.90%	0.15%	636548	83.03%	16.97%	8.36%	6.52%	1.25%	0.72%	0.01%
12	807137	40.1%	57.3%	2.6%	653760	76.19%	23.81%	12.50%	5.83%	3.55%	1.92%	0.17%	593747	81.77%	18.23%	10.29%	4.75%	2.38%	0.67%	0.06%
13	727465	50.5%	46.9%	2.6%	614181	71.82%	28.18%	9.81%	11.88%	4.48%	1.85%	0.18%	575476	76.83%	23.17%	7.58%	11.73%	3.02%	0.64%	0.08%
14	787447	56.1%	41.6%	2.3%	626311	45.20%	54.80%	30.15%	17.89%	6.62%	1.62%	0.22%	546461	52.49%	47.51%	25.09%	17.74%	3.85%	0.58%	0.06%
15	819853	43.7%	53.9%	2.5%	639081	56.75%	43.25%	22.74%	15.39%	3.99%	2.23%	0.20%	568961	64.39%	35.61%	17.87%	14.27%	2.51%	0.76%	0.08%
16	884047	43.6%	54.2%	2.2%	715022	70.16%	29.84%	15.94%	9.33%	3.03%	1.68%	0.15%	620310	78.38%	21.62%	10.88%	8.12%	1.91%	0.50%	0.04%
17	779955	35.3%	62.6%	2.2%	650151	76.17%	23.83%	13.26%	7.15%	1.66%	1.67%	0.12%	602886	80.66%	19.34%	10.62%	6.75%	1.10%	0.69%	0.08%
18	794724	45.3%	53.1%	1.6%	649064	67.13%	32.87%	15.60%	12.95%	2.85%	1.56%	0.17%	581803	74.16%	25.84%	11.98%	11.31%	1.91%	0.47%	0.04%
19	835012	36.5%	61.8%	1.7%	700605	71.63%	28.37%	18.08%	6.78%	2.14%	1.33%	0.12%	610195	79.18%	20.82%	12.41%	6.21%	1.63%	0.43%	0.03%
20	776283	79.6%	19.3%	1.2%	593894	18.00%	82.00%	26.75%	52.37%	3.67%	1.18%	0.20%	491190	23.76%	76.24%	20.56%	51.96%	2.89%	0.45%	0.03%
21	788007	58.5%	40.1%	1.4%	643275	57.45%	42.55%	22.58%	14.97%	3.50%	1.44%	0.15%	538591	67.27%	32.73%	16.57%	12.88%	2.53%	0.42%	0.06%
22	785756	57.2%	41.4%	1.4%	645611	56.06%	43.94%	21.37%	15.22%	4.26%	1.12%	0.16%	531103	65.74%	34.26%	17.03%	13.74%	2.81%	0.38%	0.04%
23	769356	60.5%	38.0%	1.5%	613268	39.11%	60.89%	39.74%	15.21%	5.50%	1.10%	0.17%	509256	46.44%	53.56%	34.86%	13.84%	4.00%	0.53%	0.10%
24	742542	80.3%	18.4%	1.3%	587681	11.72%	88.28%	44.87%	43.62%	2.09%	1.07%	0.13%	450354	13.59%	86.41%	35.64%	48.99%	1.26%	0.26%	0.07%
25	771434	40.8%	57.6%	1.6%	623579	19.92%	80.08%	74.37%	4.86%	1.60%	0.90%	0.08%	443443	26.17%	73.83%	68.40%	3.99%	1.05%	0.29%	0.02%
26	787914	51.4%	47.0%	1.7%	623565	15.15%	84.85%	72.44%	11.34%	2.22%	1.13%	0.10%	465680	19.91%	80.09%	66.49%	11.42%	1.80%	0.20%	0.01%
27	739825	53.6%	44.8%	1.6%	614220	21.37%	78.63%	70.35%	5.95%	2.74%	0.93%	0.10%	448763	24.72%	75.28%	67.83%	5.18%	1.98%	0.20%	0.01%
Summary	797709	47.4%	50.6%	2.0%	642194	54.65%	45.35%	24.99%	15.54%	3.68%	1.70%	0.18%	555093	61.88%	38.12%	19.90%	14.89%	2.48%	0.61%	0.05%

Table 2

8060 Districts	Compactness Measures		Partisan Lean (Composite Score)			2020 Voting Age Population							2019 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates										
	Total Pop	Deviation	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Democrat	Republican	Other	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Total CVAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific
1	769221	0%	0.5071	0.4917	30.0%	67.4%	2.7%	605559	72.15%	27.85%	6.69%	13.55%	4.24%	3.18%	0.38%	560537	76.40%	23.60%	5.08%	13.75%	2.89%	1.48%	0.09%
2	769221	0%	0.2619	0.2516	32.2%	65.7%	2.1%	618732	75.47%	24.53%	6.21%	13.32%	2.28%	2.55%	0.19%	594910	78.72%	21.28%	4.53%	13.84%	1.49%	1.21%	0.06%
3	769221	0%	0.7020	0.5130	41.5%	56.3%	2.2%	612746	66.76%	33.24%	10.45%	16.08%	4.72%	2.13%	0.21%	562829	71.93%	28.07%	8.27%	16.06%	2.71%	0.81%	0.04%
4	769221	0%	0.3498	0.1846	35.3%	62.6%	2.1%	608885	71.32%	28.68%	9.27%	10.79%	6.65%	1.84%	0.27%	526739	77.63%	22.37%	6.98%	10.04%	4.31%	0.68%	0.04%
5	769221	0%	0.1005	0.1118	59.1%	39.0%	1.9%	599323	42.86%	57.14%	9.04%	43.73%	3.41%	1.84%	0.21%	552728	46.61%	53.39%	5.93%	44.26%	2.21%	0.75%	0.05%
6	769221	0%	0.3596	0.3268	40.1%	57.6%	2.3%	636146	74.86%	25.14%	11.04%	9.70%	2.41%	1.98%	0.16%	591421	78.50%	21.50%	9.76%	9.27%	1.65%	0.68%	0.03%
7	769221	0%	0.6183	0.4937	50.8%	46.4%	2.8%	616250	55.44%	44.56%	25.39%	12.32%	6.26%	1.89%	0.23%	557636	62.00%	38.00%	23.00%	10.25%	3.91%	0.51%	0.06%
8	769221	0%	0.3455	0.4010	39.0%	58.5%	2.5%	633688	74.71%	25.29%	10.30%	9.58%	3.24%	2.02%	0.22%	585309	79.39%	20.61%	8.45%	9.04%	2.15%	0.66%	0.08%
9	769221	0%	0.4950	0.3720	59.1%	38.6%	2.3%	590784	31.66%	68.34%	50.24%	12.81%	5.92%	1.87%	0.31%	462570	38.08%	61.92%	46.67%	9.69%	4.62%	0.42%	0.13%
10	769221	0%	0.5486	0.5511	59.8%	38.1%	2.2%	592086	40.11%	59.89%	23.38%	28.33%	6.06%	1.71%	0.27%	492177	46.69%	53.31%	19.66%	28.17%	4.50%	0.69%	0.04%
11	769221	0%	0.3078	0.2721	33.8%	64.1%	2.1%	650206	76.62%	23.38%	10.59%	8.61%	2.17%	1.87%	0.16%	581275	81.50%	18.50%	8.39%	7.83%	1.49%	0.69%	0.02%
12	769221	0%	0.5032	0.5776	37.9%	59.5%	2.6%	617279	74.34%	25.66%	14.04%	6.55%	3.09%	2.11%	0.17%	555749	80.14%	19.86%	11.94%	5.20%	1.84%	0.70%	0.05%
13	769221	0%	0.5437	0.5945	49.4%	48.0%	2.6%	650583	74.09%	25.91%	9.05%	10.72%	4.11%	1.80%	0.18%	612052	78.82%	21.18%	6.88%	10.60%	2.90%	0.64%	0.06%
14	769220	0%	0.5304	0.5747	50.3%	47.4%	2.4%	623401	55.90%	44.10%	26.93%	11.13%	5.36%	1.63%	0.18%	556867	63.16%	36.84%	21.86%	10.79%	3.40%	0.55%	0.07%
15	769221	0%	0.6142	0.7229	51.8%	45.8%	2.4%	585717	46.71%	53.29%	24.65%	21.98%	6.30%	2.10%	0.24%	511742	54.24%	45.76%	20.57%	20.66%	3.48%	0.75%	0.07%
16	769221	0%	0.5733	0.6095	42.7%	55.1%	2.1%	639143	74.68%	25.32%	13.73%	7.23%	2.63%	1.58%	0.13%	563978	82.01%	17.99%	8.90%	6.79%	1.63%	0.52%	0.03%
17	769221	0%	0.4259	0.4875	36.7%	61.2%	2.1%	633379	71.06%	28.94%	16.71%	9.02%	1.59%	1.70%	0.12%	578330	76.90%	23.10%	12.79%	8.29%	1.08%	0.73%	0.07%
18	769221	0%	0.4587	0.4343	44.6%	53.8%	1.6%	628718	68.59%	31.41%	14.87%	12.22%	2.78%	1.57%	0.16%	568334	75.42%	24.58%	11.45%	10.61%	1.88%	0.49%	0.05%
19	769221	0%	0.3382	0.4282	35.0%	63.3%	1.6%	658909	76.93%	23.07%	15.06%	4.37%	2.20%	1.19%	0.11%	577366	83.81%	16.19%	10.17%	3.90%	1.64%	0.38%	0.02%
20	769221	0%	0.5430	0.3275	77.4%	21.4%	1.2%	599373	24.47%	75.53%	22.15%	50.04%	3.31%	1.15%	0.21%	482771	29.89%	70.11%	17.44%	49.63%	2.22%	0.49%	0.02%
21	769221	0%	0.4789	0.4572	59.2%	39.4%	1.4%	623193	54.04%	45.96%	25.39%	16.53%	3.30%	1.56%	0.16%	517924	64.16%	35.84%	18.06%	14.57%	2.44%	0.43%	0.06%
22	769221	0%	0.5140	0.2970	56.2%	42.4%	1.4%	632682	58.86%	41.14%	20.40%	12.74%	4.49%	1.06%	0.15%	527552	68.64%	31.36%	16.62%	11.07%	3.03%	0.39%	0.04%
23	769221	0%	0.3998	0.4577	61.6%	37.0%	1.5%	607373	34.97%	65.03%	42.18%	16.90%	6.08%	1.25%	0.18%	508943	42.83%	57.17%	36.39%	15.29%	4.53%	0.46%	0.11%
24	769221	0%	0.4796	0.5165	78.5%	20.2%	1.3%	613497	18.86%	81.14%	38.31%	41.47%	2.30%	0.92%	0.13%	482242	20.18%	79.82%	31.23%	46.49%	1.52%	0.33%	0.08%
25	769221	0%	0.3876	0.3514	45.4%	53.0%	1.6%	615294	15.34%	84.66%	76.34%	8.45%	1.41%	0.97%	0.08%	428969	20.44%	79.56%	69.78%	8.44%	0.95%	0.29%	0.01%
26	769221	0%	0.2004	0.2340	50.9%	47.4%	1.7%	609129	15.23%	84.77%	73.35%	10.32%	2.23%	1.15%	0.10%	456368	19.84%	80.16%	68.13%	9.97%	1.74%	0.16%	0.03%
27	769221	0%	0.7132	0.7269	52.2%	46.3%	1.6%	636004	16.88%	83.12%	74.18%	7.07%	2.62%	0.86%	0.09%	461398	20.15%	79.85%	70.87%	6.79%	1.86%	0.21%	0.01%
28	769221	0%	0.4484	0.3772	41.5%	56.1%	2.3%	601153	58.49%	41.51%	23.18%	14.78%	2.43%	2.15%	0.18%	528807	66.17%	33.83%	17.37%	13.82%	1.83%	0.67%	0.07%
Summary	769219	0%	0.4553	0.4337	47.4%	50.6%	2.0%	619258	54.65%	45.35%	24.99%	15.54%	3.68%	1.70%	0.18%	535269	61.88%	38.12%	19.90%	14.89%	2.48%	0.61%	0.05%

Table 3

8015 Districts	Compactness Measures		Partisan Lean (Composite Score)			2020 Voting Age Population							2019 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates										
	Total Pop	Deviation	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Democrat	Republican	Other	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Total CVAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific
1	769221	0%	0.5071	0.4579	30.0%	67.4%	2.7%	605557	72.16%	27.84%	6.69%	13.54%	4.24%	3.18%	0.38%	560311	76.37%	23.63%	5.09%	13.76%	2.89%	1.48%	0.09%
2	769221	0%	0.2849	0.2493	33.2%	64.6%	2.2%	618534	74.06%	25.94%	6.32%	14.53%	2.43%	2.53%	0.19%	594549	77.33%	22.67%	4.66%	15.14%	1.45%	1.22%	0.06%
3	769221	0%	0.6816	0.5426	41.5%	56.4%	2.2%	612356	66.71%	33.29%	10.49%	16.11%	4.72%	2.12%	0.22%	564412	71.88%	28.12%	8.30%	16.07%	2.72%	0.80%	0.04%
4	769221	0%	0.3560	0.1863	35.0%	62.9%	2.1%	607965	72.53%	27.47%	8.94%	10.24%	6.26%	1.85%	0.27%	528065	78.47%	21.53%	6.91%	9.38%	4.21%	0.69%	0.05%
5	769221	0%	0.0963	0.1051	58.4%	39.7%	1.9%	596074	42.54%	57.46%	9.24%	43.48%	3.76%	1.86%	0.22%	549441	46.94%	53.06%	5.96%	43.76%	2.37%	0.73%	0.05%
6	769221	0%	0.4788	0.3489	38.6%	59.1%	2.2%	638003	75.48%	24.52%	9.76%	10.23%	2.37%	2.00%	0.15%	586892	79.49%	20.51%	8.07%	10.07%	1.56%	0.70%	0.03%
7	769221	0%	0.4737	0.4044	46.8%	50.4%	2.8%	618936	61.03%	38.97%	21.14%	11.42%	5.40%	1.94%	0.21%	566764	67.44%	32.56%	18.96%	9.41%	3.35%	0.54%	0.04%
8	769221	0%	0.3151	0.4020	38.9%	58.6%	2.5%	633917	74.95%	25.05%	10.00%	9.69%	3.17%	2.01%	0.21%	585233	79.64%	20.36%	8.28%	9.00%	2.06%	0.70%	0.08%
9	769221	0%	0.4958	0.3489	58.9%	38.8%	2.3%	589255	31.28%	68.72%	50.84%	13.13%	5.68%	1.93%	0.30%	474937	37.22%	62.78%	47.61%	10.02%	4.27%	0.42%	0.10%
10	769221	0%	0.5081	0.3939	60.7%	37.0%	2.2%	598880	40.26%	59.74%	24.60%	28.80%	5.06%	1.80%	0.27%	513934	46.69%	53.31%	21.01%	27.55%	3.72%	0.75%	0.04%
11	769221	0%	0.3100	0.3087	38.3%	59.7%	2.1%	640420	69.14%	30.86%	15.88%	8.35%	4.22%	1.67%	0.19%	536674	75.94%	24.06%	12.24%	7.78%	3.23%	0.59%	0.07%
12	769221	0%	0.3852	0.2698	37.6%	59.8%	2.6%	632295	80.07%	19.93%	10.60%	4.53%	2.63%	2.02%	0.16%	576191	84.97%	15.03%	8.71%	3.75%	1.71%	0.69%	0.05%
13	769221	0%	0.6700	0.6325	50.2%	47.2%	2.6%	649755	72.35%	27.65%	9.77%	11.46%	4.43%	1.83%	0.18%	609566	77.30%	22.70%	7.53%	11.33%	3.00%	0.65%	0.08%
14	769221	0%	0.4224	0.5148	53.0%	44.6%	2.4%	595724	48.56%	51.44%	26.06%	20.26%	4.84%	1.99%	0.22%	526243	54.86%	45.14%	22.18%	19.19%	2.78%	0.72%	0.08%
15	769221	0%	0.4548	0.4865	48.1%	49.5%	2.4%	605567	52.67%	47.33%	26.65%	13.09%	6.90%	1.77%	0.21%	532970	61.33%	38.67%	21.84%	11.85%	4.11%	0.63%	0.05%
16	769221	0%	0.5005	0.4263	41.0%	56.6%	2.4%	599690	58.38%	41.62%	23.21%	14.94%	2.34%	2.17%	0.18%	529349	66.30%	33.70%	17.16%	14.07%	1.69%	0.65%	0.07%
17	769221	0%	0.5716	0.5738	42.9%	55.0%	2.1%	636680	73.79%	26.21%	14.29%	7.55%	2.66%	1.60%	0.13%	561203	81.40%	18.60%	9.25%	7.07%	1.63%	0.52%	0.03%
18	769221	0%	0.4282	0.4403	35.9%	62.0%	2.1%	637796	73.31%	26.69%	15.79%	7.69%	1.56%	1.66%	0.12%	585028	78.74%	21.26%	12.18%	7.02%	1.13%	0.72%	0.07%
19	769221	0%	0.3332	0.3878	35.9%	62.5%	1.6%	655897	74.99%	25.01%	15.79%	5.58%	2.21%	1.23%	0.12%	572772	82.16%	17.84%	10.63%	5.15%	1.57%	0.39%	0.02%
20	769221	0%	0.5032	0.2805	77.7%	21.1%	1.2%	595408	23.54%	76.46%	22.98%	50.11%	3.37%	1.19%	0.21%	478632	29.02%	70.98%	17.87%	50.11%	2.23%	0.46%	0.02%
21	769221	0%	0.5005	0.4994	44.8%	53.6%	1.6%	629736	68.09%	31.91%	15.14%	12.48%	2.80%	1.55%	0.16%	567839	74.99%	25.01%	11.57%	10.94%	1.88%	0.46%	0.04%
22	769220	0%	0.4545	0.4244	58.8%	39.8%	1.4%	625981	55.32%	44.68%	24.65%	15.88%	3.35%	1.52%	0.15%	522739	65.34%	34.66%	17.73%	13.67%	2.48%	0.43%	0.06%
23	769221	0%	0.5066	0.2949	56.4%	42.2%	1.4%	632647	58.41%	41.59%	20.51%	13.17%	4.43%	1.06%	0.15%	526105	68.21%	31.79%	16.69%	11.47%	2.99%	0.39%	0.04%
24	769221	0%	0.4954	0.4872	78.6%	20.1%	1.3%	611792	18.23%	81.77%	38.46%	42.17%	2.22%	0.92%	0.13%	481333	19.66%	80.34%	31.07%	47.22%	1.49%	0.32%	0.07%
25	769221	0%	0.3961	0.3773	61.8%	36.7%	1.5%	607264	34.35%	65.65%	42.26%	17.52%	6.02%	1.26%	0.18%	509600	42.11%	57.89%	36.37%	16.02%	4.52%	0.48%	0.10%
26	769221	0%	0.3843	0.3455	44.1%	54.3%	1.6%	617970	17.34%	82.66%	75.41%	7.11%	1.50%	0.97%	0.08%	428975	22.44%	77.56%	69.49%	6.65%	1.02%	0.29%	0.01%
27	769221	0%	0.7142	0.7261	52.2%	46.3%	1.6%	636002	16.88%	83.12%	74.18%	7.07%	2.62%	0.86%	0.09%	461621	20.15%	79.85%	70.87%	6.79%	1.86%	0.21%	0.01%
28	769221	0%	0.2004	0.2340	50.9%	47.4%	1.7%	609131	15.23%	84.77%	73.35%	10.32%	2.23%	1.15%	0.10%	456145	19.83%	80.17%	68.13%	9.97%	1.74%	0.17%	0.03%
Summary	769219	0%	0.4439	0.3982	47.4%	50.6%	2.0%	619258	54.65%	45.35%	24.99%	15.54%	3.68%	1.70%	0.18%	535269	61.88%	38.12%	19.90%	14.89%	2.48%	0.61%	0.05%

Table 4

8019 Districts	Compactness Measures		Partisan Lean (Composite Score)			2020 Voting Age Population							2019 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates										
	Total Pop	Deviation	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Democrat	Republican	Other	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Total CVAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific
1	769221	0%	0.5071	0.4579	30.0%	67.4%	2.7%	605557	72.16%	27.84%	6.69%	13.54%	4.24%	3.18%	0.38%	560311	76.37%	23.63%	5.09%	13.76%	2.89%	1.48%	0.09%
2	769221	0%	0.4195	0.4659	43.6%	54.3%	2.2%	619356	65.48%	34.52%	6.42%	23.09%	2.78%	2.34%	0.18%	602689	68.54%	31.46%	4.68%	23.81%	1.64%	1.09%	0.06%
3	769221	0%	0.0874	0.5333	41.2%	56.7%	2.1%	623606	68.61%	31.39%	9.97%	15.61%	3.88%	1.95%	0.16%	574332	73.15%	26.85%	7.35%	16.45%	2.13%	0.81%	0.04%
4	769221	0%	0.4188	0.1696	31.0%	66.9%	2.0%	599181	75.97%	24.03%	7.96%	8.91%	4.92%	2.05%	0.27%	540043	80.74%	19.26%	6.75%	8.07%	3.34%	0.72%	0.05%
5	769221	0%	0.504	0.4511	52.8%	45.2%	2.1%	598494	46.99%	53.01%	10.75%	35.32%	5.75%	1.93%	0.27%	521353	52.57%	47.43%	7.30%	35.23%	3.84%	0.75%	0.05%
6	769221	0%	0.6599	0.5096	38.2%	59.7%	2.2%	634932	75.00%	25.00%	9.69%	10.89%	2.20%	2.08%	0.16%	584341	78.79%	21.21%	7.90%	11.00%	1.44%	0.76%	0.03%
7	769221	0%	0.4737	0.4044	46.8%	50.4%	2.8%	618936	61.03%	38.97%	21.14%	11.42%	5.40%	1.94%	0.21%	566764	67.44%	32.56%	18.96%	9.41%	3.35%	0.54%	0.04%
8	769221	0%	0.3151	0.402	38.9%	58.6%	2.5%	633917	74.95%	25.05%	10.00%	9.69%	3.17%	2.01%	0.21%	585233	79.64%	20.36%	8.28%	9.00%	2.06%	0.70%	0.08%
9	769221	0%	0.4958	0.3489	58.9%	38.8%	2.3%	589255	31.28%	68.72%	50.84%	13.13%	5.68%	1.93%	0.30%	474937	37.22%	62.78%	47.61%	10.02%	4.27%	0.42%	0.10%
10	769221	0%	0.5081	0.3939	60.7%	37.0%	2.2%	598880	40.26%	59.74%	24.60%	28.80%	5.06%	1.80%	0.27%	513934	46.69%	53.31%	21.01%	27.55%	3.72%	0.75%	0.04%
11	769221	0%	0.3439	0.3245	38.2%	59.7%	2.1%	637783	68.90%	31.10%	15.87%	8.53%	4.29%	1.69%	0.20%	537275	75.95%	24.05%	12.21%	7.83%	3.20%	0.59%	0.06%
12	769221	0%	0.3852	0.2698	37.6%	59.8%	2.6%	632295	80.07%	19.93%	10.60%	4.53%	2.63%	2.02%	0.16%	576191	84.97%	15.03%	8.71%	3.75%	1.71%	0.69%	0.05%
13	769221	0%	0.67	0.6325	50.2%	47.2%	2.6%	649755	72.35%	27.65%	9.77%	11.46%	4.43%	1.83%	0.18%	609566	77.30%	22.70%	7.53%	11.33%	3.00%	0.65%	0.08%
14	769221	0%	0.4224	0.5148	53.0%	44.6%	2.4%	595724	48.56%	51.44%	26.06%	20.26%	4.84%	1.99%	0.22%	526243	54.86%	45.14%	22.18%	19.19%	2.78%	0.72%	0.08%
15	769221	0%	0.4548	0.4865	48.1%	49.5%	2.4%	605567	52.67%	47.33%	26.65%	13.09%	6.90%	1.77%	0.21%	532970	61.33%	38.67%	21.84%	11.85%	4.11%	0.63%	0.05%
16	769221	0%	0.5005	0.4263	41.0%	56.6%	2.4%	599690	58.38%	41.62%	23.21%	14.94%	2.34%	2.17%	0.18%	529349	66.30%	33.70%	17.16%	14.07%	1.69%	0.65%	0.07%
17	769221	0%	0.5716	0.5738	42.9%	55.0%	2.1%	636680	73.79%	26.21%	14.29%	7.55%	2.66%	1.60%	0.13%	561203	81.40%	18.60%	9.25%	7.07%	1.63%	0.52%	0.03%
18	769221	0%	0.4282	0.4403	35.9%	62.0%	2.1%	637796	73.31%	26.69%	15.79%	7.69%	1.56%	1.66%	0.12%	585028	78.74%	21.26%	12.18%	7.02%	1.13%	0.72%	0.07%
19	769221	0%	0.3332	0.3878	35.9%	62.5%	1.6%	655897	74.99%	25.01%	15.79%	5.58%	2.21%	1.23%	0.12%	572772	82.16%	17.84%	10.63%	5.15%	1.57%	0.39%	0.02%
20	769221	0%	0.5032	0.2805	77.7%	21.1%	1.2%	595408	23.54%	76.46%	22.98%	50.11%	3.37%	1.19%	0.21%	478632	29.02%	70.98%	17.87%	50.11%	2.23%	0.46%	0.02%
21	769221	0%	0.5005	0.4994	44.8%	53.6%	1.6%	629736	68.09%	31.91%	15.14%	12.48%	2.80%	1.55%	0.16%	567839	74.99%	25.01%	11.57%	10.94%	1.88%	0.46%	0.04%
22	769220	0%	0.4545	0.4244	58.8%	39.8%	1.4%	625981	55.32%	44.68%	24.65%	15.88%	3.35%	1.52%	0.15%	522739	65.34%	34.66%	17.73%	13.67%	2.48%	0.43%	0.06%
23	769221	0%	0.5065	0.2939	56.4%	42.2%	1.4%	632647	58.41%	41.59%	20.51%	13.17%	4.43%	1.06%	0.15%	526105	68.21%	31.79%	16.69%	11.47%	2.99%	0.39%	0.04%
24	769221	0%	0.4954	0.4872	78.6%	20.1%	1.3%	611792	18.23%	81.77%	38.46%	42.17%	2.22%	0.92%	0.13%	481333	19.66%	80.34%	31.07%	47.22%	1.49%	0.32%	0.07%
25	769221	0%	0.3961	0.3773	61.8%	36.7%	1.5%	607264	34.35%	65.65%	42.26%	17.52%	6.02%	1.26%	0.18%	509600	42.11%	57.89%	36.37%	16.02%	4.52%	0.48%	0.10%
26	769221	0%	0.3843	0.3455	44.1%	54.3%	1.6%	617970	17.34%	82.66%	75.41%	7.11%	1.50%	0.97%	0.08%	428975	22.44%	77.56%	69.49%	6.65%	1.02%	0.29%	0.01%
27	769221	0%	0.7142	0.7261	52.2%	46.3%	1.6%	636002	16.88%	83.12%	74.18%	7.07%	2.62%	0.86%	0.09%	461621	20.15%	79.85%	70.87%	6.79%	1.86%	0.21%	0.01%
28	769221	0%	0.2004	0.234	50.9%	47.4%	1.7%	609131	15.23%	84.77%	73.35%	10.32%	2.23%	1.15%	0.10%	456145	19.83%	80.17%	68.13%	9.97%	1.74%	0.17%	0.03%
Summary	769219	0%	0.4519	0.4236	47.4%	50.6%	2.0%	619258	54.65%	45.35%	24.99%	15.54%	3.68%	1.70%	0.18%	535269	61.88%	38.12%	19.90%	14.89%	2.48%	0.61%	0.05%

Table 5

8060 Districts	District Demographics									Partisan Lean (Composite 2016-2020)		Comparison to Benchmark Map		
	Total Pop	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Dem	Rep	Pct From	Bechmark Districts	% Moved
1	769221	605559	72.2%	27.9%	6.7%	13.6%	4.2%	3.2%	0.4%	30.0%	67.4%	100.00%	1	0.00%
2	769221	618732	75.5%	24.5%	6.2%	13.3%	2.3%	2.6%	0.2%	32.2%	65.7%	87.65%	2	12.35%
												7.33%	5	
												5.03%	1	
3	769221	612746	66.8%	33.2%	10.5%	16.1%	4.7%	2.1%	0.2%	41.5%	56.3%	98.25%	3	1.75%
												1.75%	2	
												0.0001%	11	
4	769221	608885	71.3%	28.7%	9.3%	10.8%	6.7%	1.8%	0.3%	35.3%	62.6%	95.99%	4	4.01%
												4.01%	5	
5	769221	599323	42.9%	57.1%	9.0%	43.7%	3.4%	1.8%	0.2%	59.1%	39.0%	86.02%	5	13.98%
												8.75%	4	
												5.23%	2	
6	769221	636146	74.9%	25.1%	11.0%	9.7%	2.4%	2.0%	0.2%	40.1%	57.6%	91.39%	6	8.61%
												8.61%	4	
7	769221	616250	55.4%	44.6%	25.4%	12.3%	6.3%	1.9%	0.2%	50.8%	46.4%	92.35%	7	7.65%
												4.60%	6	
												2.76%	9	
												0.16%	10	
												0.13%	8	
8	769221	633688	74.7%	25.3%	10.3%	9.6%	3.2%	2.0%	0.2%	39.0%	58.5%	99.76%	8	0.24%
												0.24%	7	
9	769221	590784	31.7%	68.3%	50.2%	12.8%	5.9%	1.9%	0.3%	59.1%	38.6%	76.51%	9	23.49%
												20.97%	10	
												2.38%	7	
												0.14%	8	
10	769221	592086	40.1%	59.9%	23.4%	28.3%	6.1%	1.7%	0.3%	59.8%	38.1%	92.47%	10	7.53%
												7.53%	7	
11	769221	650206	76.6%	23.4%	10.6%	8.6%	2.2%	1.9%	0.2%	33.8%	64.1%	81.42%	11	18.58%
												9.71%	15	
												7.52%	6	
												1.35%	3	
12	769221	617279	74.3%	25.7%	14.0%	6.6%	3.1%	2.1%	0.2%	37.9%	59.5%	74.71%	12	25.29%
												25.29%	11	
13	769221	650583	74.1%	25.9%	9.1%	10.7%	4.1%	1.8%	0.2%	49.4%	48.0%	86.24%	13	13.76%
												13.76%	12	
14	769220	623401	55.9%	44.1%	26.9%	11.1%	5.4%	1.6%	0.2%	50.3%	47.4%	75.21%	14	24.79%
												16.45%	12	
												8.33%	13	
15	769221	585717	46.7%	53.3%	24.7%	22.0%	6.3%	2.1%	0.2%	51.8%	45.8%	53.14%	15	46.86%
												27.16%	14	
												19.71%	16	
16	769221	639143	74.7%	25.3%	13.7%	7.2%	2.6%	1.6%	0.1%	42.7%	55.1%	95.22%	16	4.78%
												4.78%	17	
17	769221	633379	71.1%	28.9%	16.7%	9.0%	1.6%	1.7%	0.1%	36.7%	61.2%	84.83%	17	15.17%
												15.17%	19	
18	769221	628718	68.6%	31.4%	14.9%	12.2%	2.8%	1.6%	0.2%	44.6%	53.8%	95.29%	18	4.71%
												1.99%	20	
												1.86%	8	
												0.86%	21	
19	769221	658909	76.9%	23.1%	15.1%	4.4%	2.2%	1.2%	0.1%	35.0%	63.3%	92.11%	19	7.89%
												7.40%	25	
												0.48%	17	
20	769221	599373	24.5%	75.5%	22.2%	50.0%	3.3%	1.2%	0.2%	77.4%	21.4%	71.25%	20	28.75%
												10.55%	23	
												10.17%	22	
												8.03%	18	
												0.00%	21	
21	769221	623193	54.0%	46.0%	25.4%	16.5%	3.3%	1.6%	0.2%	59.2%	39.4%	90.35%	21	9.65%
												9.01%	20	
												0.63%	22	
22	769221	632682	58.9%	41.1%	20.4%	12.7%	4.5%	1.1%	0.2%	56.2%	42.4%	87.69%	22	12.31%
												11.23%	21	
												1.08%	20	
23	769221	607373	35.0%	65.0%	42.2%	16.9%	6.1%	1.3%	0.2%	61.6%	37.0%	77.60%	23	22.40%
												10.03%	20	
												8.72%	24	
												3.66%	22	
24	769221	613497	18.9%	81.1%	38.3%	41.5%	2.3%	0.9%	0.1%	78.5%	20.2%	68.67%	24	31.33%
												11.91%	27	
												11.87%	23	
												7.56%	20	
25	769221	615294	15.3%	84.7%	76.3%	8.5%	1.4%	1.0%	0.1%	45.4%	53.0%	78.90%	25	21.10%
												17.08%	24	
												2.75%	27	
												1.27%	19	
26	769221	609129	15.2%	84.8%	73.4%	10.3%	2.2%	1.2%	0.1%	50.9%	47.4%	93.08%	26	6.92%
												6.92%	25	
												0.00%	27	
27	769221	636004	16.9%	83.1%	74.2%	7.1%	2.6%	0.9%	0.1%	52.2%	46.3%	81.52%	27	18.48%
												9.35%	26	
												7.06%	25	
												2.07%	24	
28	769221	601153	58.5%	41.5%	23.2%	14.8%	2.4%	2.2%	0.2%	41.5%	56.1%	44.96%	9	55.04%
												43.73%	15	
												11.30%	17	

* How the districts in the comparison map (existing FL Congressional Boundaries) flow into the districts in the Senate Proposal 8060.

% Core Retained = 84.0%

Table 6

8015 Districts		District Demographics								Partisan Lean (Composite 2016-2020)		Comparison to Benchmark Map		
	Total Pop	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Dem	Rep	Pct From	Bechmark Districts	% Moved
1	769221	605557	72.2%	27.8%	6.7%	13.5%	4.2%	3.2%	0.4%	30.0%	67.4%	100.00%	1	0.00%
2	769221	618534	74.1%	25.9%	6.3%	14.5%	2.4%	2.5%	0.2%	33.2%	64.6%	85.67%	2	14.33%
												9.30%	5	
												5.03%	1	
3	769221	612356	66.7%	33.3%	10.5%	16.1%	4.7%	2.1%	0.2%	41.5%	56.4%	98.24%	3	1.76%
												1.75%	2	
												0.01%	11	
4	769221	607965	72.5%	27.5%	8.9%	10.2%	6.3%	1.9%	0.3%	35.0%	62.9%	97.56%	4	2.44%
												2.37%	5	
												0.07%	6	
5	769221	596074	42.5%	57.5%	9.2%	43.5%	3.8%	1.9%	0.2%	58.4%	39.7%	85.69%	5	14.31%
												12.30%	4	
												2.01%	2	
6	769221	638003	75.5%	24.5%	9.8%	10.2%	2.4%	2.0%	0.2%	38.6%	59.1%	75.43%	6	24.57%
												19.74%	11	
												3.49%	4	
												1.35%	3	
7	769221	618936	61.0%	39.0%	21.1%	11.4%	5.4%	1.9%	0.2%	46.8%	50.4%	72.35%	7	27.65%
												27.65%	6	
8	769221	633917	75.0%	25.1%	10.0%	9.7%	3.2%	2.0%	0.2%	38.9%	58.6%	99.63%	8	0.37%
												0.37%	6	
9	769221	589255	31.3%	68.7%	50.8%	13.1%	5.7%	1.9%	0.3%	58.9%	38.8%	79.27%	9	20.73%
												9.54%	10	
												8.93%	7	
												2.26%	8	
10	769221	598880	40.3%	59.7%	24.6%	28.8%	5.1%	1.8%	0.3%	60.7%	37.0%	78.78%	10	21.22%
												21.22%	7	
												0.00%	9	
11	769221	640420	69.1%	30.9%	15.9%	8.4%	4.2%	1.7%	0.2%	38.3%	59.7%	54.08%	11	45.92%
												25.27%	10	
												15.45%	15	
												5.19%	2	
												0.01%	3	
12	769221	632295	80.1%	19.9%	10.6%	4.5%	2.6%	2.0%	0.2%	37.6%	59.8%	67.11%	12	32.89%
												32.89%	11	
												0.00%	13	
13	769221	649755	72.4%	27.7%	9.8%	11.5%	4.4%	1.8%	0.2%	50.2%	47.2%	94.57%	13	5.43%
												5.43%	12	
14	769221	595724	48.6%	51.4%	26.1%	20.3%	4.8%	2.0%	0.2%	53.0%	44.6%	43.62%	14	56.38%
												39.05%	15	
												17.33%	16	
15	769221	605567	52.7%	47.3%	26.7%	13.1%	6.9%	1.8%	0.2%	48.1%	49.5%	58.75%	14	41.25%
												32.39%	12	
												8.85%	15	
16	769221	599690	58.4%	41.6%	23.2%	14.9%	2.3%	2.2%	0.2%	41.0%	56.6%	44.96%	9	55.04%
												43.22%	15	
												11.30%	17	
												0.51%	16	
17	769221	636680	73.8%	26.2%	14.3%	7.6%	2.7%	1.6%	0.1%	42.9%	55.0%	97.08%	16	2.92%
												2.92%	17	
18	769221	637796	73.3%	26.7%	15.8%	7.7%	1.6%	1.7%	0.1%	35.9%	62.0%	87.18%	17	12.82%
												12.82%	19	
19	769221	655897	75.0%	25.0%	15.8%	5.6%	2.2%	1.2%	0.1%	35.9%	62.5%	94.43%	19	5.57%
												5.57%	25	
20	769221	595408	23.5%	76.5%	23.0%	50.1%	3.4%	1.2%	0.2%	77.7%	21.1%	73.23%	20	26.77%
												12.51%	23	
												8.94%	22	
												5.25%	18	
												0.06%	21	
21	769221	629736	68.1%	31.9%	15.1%	12.5%	2.8%	1.6%	0.2%	44.8%	53.6%	98.06%	18	1.94%
												1.77%	20	
												0.17%	21	
22	769220	625981	55.3%	44.7%	24.7%	15.9%	3.4%	1.5%	0.2%	58.8%	39.8%	92.90%	21	7.10%
												6.48%	20	
												0.62%	22	
23	769221	632647	58.4%	41.6%	20.5%	13.2%	4.4%	1.1%	0.2%	56.4%	42.2%	88.89%	22	11.11%
												9.31%	21	
												1.80%	20	
24	769221	611792	18.2%	81.8%	38.5%	42.2%	2.2%	0.9%	0.1%	78.6%	20.1%	70.53%	24	29.47%
												11.91%	27	
												10.19%	23	
												7.37%	20	
25	769221	607264	34.4%	65.7%	42.3%	17.5%	6.0%	1.3%	0.2%	61.8%	36.7%	77.32%	23	22.68%
												10.27%	20	
												8.72%	24	
												3.69%	22	
26	769221	617970	17.3%	82.7%	75.4%	7.1%	1.5%	1.0%	0.1%	44.1%	54.3%	80.74%	25	19.26%
												15.22%	24	
												2.75%	27	
												1.30%	19	
27	769221	636002	16.9%	83.1%	74.2%	7.1%	2.6%	0.9%	0.1%	52.2%	46.3%	81.52%	27	18.48%
												9.35%	26	
												7.06%	25	
												2.07%	24	
28	769221	609131	15.2%	84.8%	73.4%	10.3%	2.2%	1.2%	0.1%	50.9%	47.4%	93.08%	26	6.92%
												6.92%	25	

* How the districts in the comparison map (existing FL Congressional Boundaries) flow into the districts in the House Proposal 8015.

% Core Retained = 81.10%

Table 7

8019 Districts		District Demographics									Partisan Lean (Composite 2016-2020)		Comparison to Benchmark Map		
	Total Pop	Total VAP	White	Minority	Hispanic	Black	Asian	Native	Pacific	Dem	Rep	Pct From	Benchmark Districts	% Moved	
1	769221	605557	72.2%	27.8%	6.7%	13.5%	4.2%	3.2%	0.4%	30.0%	67.4%	100.00%	1	0.00%	
2	769221	619356	65.5%	34.5%	6.4%	23.1%	2.8%	2.3%	0.2%	43.6%	54.3%	63.56%	2	36.44%	
												31.41%	5		
												5.03%	1		
3	769422	623755	68.6%	31.4%	10.0%	15.6%	3.9%	2.0%	0.2%	41.2%	56.7%	59.02%	3	40.98%	
												30.76%	2		
												7.01%	5		
												3.19%	11		
												0.03%	22		
4	769221	599181	76.0%	24.0%	8.0%	8.9%	4.9%	2.1%	0.3%	31.0%	66.9%	71.60%	4	28.40%	
												28.37%	3		
												0.03%	6		
5	769221	598494	47.0%	53.0%	10.8%	35.3%	5.8%	1.9%	0.3%	52.8%	45.2%	58.94%	5	41.06%	
												41.06%	4		
6	769221	634932	75.0%	25.0%	9.7%	10.9%	2.2%	2.1%	0.2%	38.2%	59.7%	75.47%	6	24.53%	
												12.19%	3		
												11.65%	11		
												0.69%	4		
7	769221	618936	61.0%	39.0%	21.1%	11.4%	5.4%	1.9%	0.2%	46.8%	50.4%	72.35%	7	27.65%	
												27.65%	6		
8	769221	633917	75.0%	25.1%	10.0%	9.7%	3.2%	2.0%	0.2%	38.9%	58.6%	99.63%	8	0.37%	
												0.37%	6		
9	769221	589255	31.3%	68.7%	50.8%	13.1%	5.7%	1.9%	0.3%	58.9%	38.8%	79.27%	9	20.73%	
												9.54%	10		
												8.93%	7		
												2.26%	8		
10	769221	598880	40.3%	59.7%	24.6%	28.8%	5.1%	1.8%	0.3%	60.7%	37.0%	78.78%	10	21.22%	
												21.22%	7		
												0.001%	9		
11	769221	637783	68.9%	31.1%	15.9%	8.5%	4.3%	1.7%	0.2%	38.2%	59.7%	58.98%	11	41.02%	
												25.27%	10		
												15.45%	15		
												0.30%	2		
												0.00%	6		
12	769221	632295	80.1%	19.9%	10.6%	4.5%	2.6%	2.0%	0.2%	37.6%	59.8%	67.11%	12	32.89%	
												32.89%	11		
												0.00%	13		
13	769221	649755	72.4%	27.7%	9.8%	11.5%	4.4%	1.8%	0.2%	50.2%	47.2%	94.57%	13	5.43%	
												5.43%	12		
14	769221	595724	48.6%	51.4%	26.1%	20.3%	4.8%	2.0%	0.2%	53.0%	44.6%	43.62%	14	56.38%	
												39.05%	15		
												17.33%	16		
15	769221	605567	52.7%	47.3%	26.7%	13.1%	6.9%	1.8%	0.2%	48.1%	49.5%	58.75%	14	41.25%	
												32.39%	12		
												8.85%	15		
16	769221	599690	58.4%	41.6%	23.2%	14.9%	2.3%	2.2%	0.2%	41.0%	56.6%	44.96%	9	55.04%	
												43.22%	15		
												11.30%	17		
												0.51%	16		
17	769221	636680	73.8%	26.2%	14.3%	7.6%	2.7%	1.6%	0.1%	42.9%	55.0%	97.08%	16	2.92%	
												2.92%	17		
18	769221	637796	73.3%	26.7%	15.8%	7.7%	1.6%	1.7%	0.1%	35.9%	62.0%	87.18%	17	12.82%	
												12.82%	19		
19	769221	655897	75.0%	25.0%	15.8%	5.6%	2.2%	1.2%	0.1%	35.9%	62.5%	94.43%	19	5.57%	
												5.57%	25		
20	769221	595408	23.5%	76.5%	23.0%	50.1%	3.4%	1.2%	0.2%	77.7%	21.1%	73.23%	20	26.77%	
												12.51%	23		
												8.94%	22		
												5.25%	18		
												0.06%	21		
21	769221	629736	68.1%	31.9%	15.1%	12.5%	2.8%	1.6%	0.2%	44.8%	53.6%	98.06%	18	1.94%	
												1.77%	20		
												0.17%	21		
22	769220	625981	55.3%	44.7%	24.7%	15.9%	3.4%	1.5%	0.2%	58.8%	39.8%	92.90%	21	7.10%	
												6.48%	20		
												0.62%	22		
23	769020	632498	58.4%	41.6%	20.5%	13.2%	4.4%	1.1%	0.2%	56.4%	42.2%	88.89%	22	11.11%	
												9.32%	21		
												1.80%	20		
24	769221	611792	18.2%	81.8%	38.5%	42.2%	2.2%	0.9%	0.1%	78.6%	20.1%	70.53%	24	29.47%	
												11.91%	27		
												10.19%	23		
												7.37%	20		
25	769221	607264	34.4%	65.7%	42.3%	17.5%	6.0%	1.3%	0.2%	61.8%	36.7%	77.32%	23	22.68%	
												10.27%	20		
												8.72%	24		
												3.69%	22		
26	769221	617970	17.3%	82.7%	75.4%	7.1%	1.5%	1.0%	0.1%	44.1%	54.3%	80.74%	25	19.26%	
												15.22%	24		
												2.75%	27		
												1.30%	19		
27	769221	636002	16.9%	83.1%	74.2%	7.1%	2.6%	0.9%	0.1%	52.2%	46.3%	81.52%	27	18.48%	
												9.35%	26		
												7.06%	25		
												2.07%	24		
28	769221	609131	15.2%	84.8%	73.4%	10.3%	2.2%	1.2%	0.1%	50.9%	47.4%	93.08%	26	6.92%	
												6.92%	25		

* How the districts in the comparison map (existing FL Congressional Boundaries) flow into the districts in the House Proposal 8019.

% Core Retained = 77.2%

Appendix B

MATT A. BARRETO – BARRETOM@UCLA.EDU

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, 3345 BUNCHE HALL, LOS ANGELES CA 90095 / 909.489.2955

EMPLOYMENT:

Professor, Political Science, University of California Los Angeles (2015 – present)
Professor, Chicana/o Studies, University of California Los Angeles (2015 – present)
Co-Founder & Faculty Director, Latino Policy & Politics Initiative (LPPI)
Co-Founder & Faculty Director, UCLA Voting Rights Project (VRP)

Dept. Political Science, University of Washington

Professor (2014 – 2015)

Associate Professor (2009 – 2014)

Assistant Professor (2005 – 2009)

Co-Founder & Director, Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race

Founding Director, Center for Democracy and Voting Rights, UW School of Law

Affiliated Research Centers

Latino Policy & Politics Initiative (LPPI), University of California, Los Angeles

Chicano Studies Research Center (CSRC), University of California, Los Angeles

Center for the Study of Los Angeles (CSLA), Loyola Marymount University

PERSONAL:

Born: June 6, 1976
San Juan, Puerto Rico

High School: 1994, Washburn Rural HS, Topeka, KS

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Political Science, June 2005

University of California – Irvine

Sub Fields: American Politics / Race, Ethnicity and Politics / Methodology

Thesis: *Ethnic Issues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation*

Thesis Committee: Bernard Grofman (chair), Louis DeSipio, Katherine Tate, Carole Uhlaner

Thesis Awards: *Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship for Minorities, 04-05*

University of California President's Dissertation Fellowship, 04-05

University of California Institute for Mexico & the U.S. Dissertation Grant, 04-05

Master of Science, Social Science, March 2003

University of California – Irvine

Bachelor of Science, Political Science, May 1998

Eastern New Mexico University, Portales, NM

Minor: English. Cumulative GPA: 3.9, *Summa Cum Laude*

PUBLICATION RECORD

Google Scholar citation indices: Cites: 4,768 h-index: 35 i10-index: 60 i100-index: 12 Cites/year: 280

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30. Barreto, Matt, Matt Streb, Fernando Guerra, and Mara Marks. 2006. "Do Absentee Voters Differ From Polling Place Voters? New Evidence From California." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 70 (Summer): 224-34.
29. Barreto, Matt, Fernando Guerra, Mara Marks, Stephen Nuño, and Nathan Woods. 2006. "Controversies in Exit Polling: Implementing a racially stratified homogenous precinct approach." *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 39 (July) 477-83.
28. Barreto, Matt, Ricardo Ramirez, and Nathan Woods. 2005. "Are Naturalized Voters Driving the California Latino Electorate? Measuring the Impact of IRCA Citizens on Latino Voting." *Social Science Quarterly*. 86 (December): 792-811.
27. Barreto, Matt. 2005. "Latino Immigrants at the Polls: Foreign-born Voter Turnout in the 2002 Election." *Political Research Quarterly*. 58 (March): 79-86.

26. Barreto, Matt, Mario Villarreal and Nathan Woods. 2005. "Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior: Turnout and Candidate Preference in Los Angeles." *Journal of Urban Affairs*. 27(February): 71-91.
25. Leal, David, Matt Barreto, Jongho Lee and Rodolfo de la Garza. 2005. "The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election." *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 38 (January): 41-49.
24. Marks, Mara, Matt Barreto and Nathan Woods. 2004. "Harmony and Bliss in LA? Race and Racial Attitudes a Decade After the 1992 Riots." *Urban Affairs Review*. 40 (September): 3-18.
23. Barreto, Matt, Gary Segura and Nathan Woods. 2004. "The Effects of Overlapping Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review*. 98 (February): 65-75.
22. Barreto, Matt and Ricardo Ramirez. 2004. "Minority Participation and the California Recall: Latino, Black, and Asian Voting Trends 1990 – 2003." *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 37 (January): 11-14.
21. Barreto, Matt and José Muñoz. 2003. "Reexamining the 'politics of in-between': political participation among Mexican immigrants in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*. 25 (November): 427-447.
20. Barreto, Matt. 2003. "National Origin (Mis)Identification Among Latinos in the 2000 Census: The Growth of the "Other Hispanic or Latino" Category." *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*. 15 (June): 39-63.

Edited Volume Book Chapters

19. Barreto, Matt and Gary Segura. 2020. "Latino Reaction and Resistance to Trump: Lessons learned from Pete Wilson and 1994." In Raul Hinojosa and Edward Telles (eds.) Equitable Globalization: Expanding Bridges, Overcoming Walls. Oakland: University of California Press.
18. Barreto, Matt, Albert Morales and Gary Segura. 2019. "The Brown Tide and the Blue Wave in 2018" In Larry Sabato, Kyle Kondik, Geoffrey Skelley (eds.) The Blue Wave. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
17. Gutierrez, Angela, Angela Ocampo and Matt Barreto. 2018. "Obama's Latino Legacy: From Unknown to Never Forgotten" In Andrew Rudalevige and Bert Rockman (eds.) The Obama Legacy. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
16. Barreto, Matt, Thomas Schaller and Gary Segura. 2017. "Latinos and the 2016 Election: How Trump Lost Latinos on Day 1" In Larry Sabato, Kyle Kondik, Geoffrey Skelley (eds.) Trumped: The 2016 Election that Broke All the Rules. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
15. Walker, Hannah, Gabriel Sanchez, Stephen Nuño, Matt Barreto 2017. "Race and the Right to Vote: The Modern Barrier of Voter ID Laws" In Todd Donovan (ed.) Election Rules and Reforms. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
14. Barreto, Matt and Christopher Parker. 2015. "Public Opinion and Reactionary Movements: From the Klan to the Tea Party" In Adam Berinsky (ed.) New Directions in Public Opinion. 2nd edition. New York: Routledge Press.
13. Barreto, Matt and Gabriel Sanchez. 2014. "A 'Southern Exception' in Black-Latino Attitudes?." In Anthony Affigne, Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Marion Orr (eds.) Latino Politics en Ciencia Política. New York: New York University Press.
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12. Barreto, Matt, Ben Gonzalez, and Gabriel Sanchez. 2014. "Rainbow Coalition in the Golden State? Exposing Myths, Uncovering New Realities in Latino Attitudes Towards Blacks." In Josh Kun and Laura Pulido (eds.) Black and Brown in Los Angeles: Beyond Conflict and Coalition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
11. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Ben Gonzalez, and Christopher Parker. 2011. "Tea Party Politics in a Blue State: Dino Rossi and the 2010 Washington Senate Election" In William Miller and Jeremy Walling (eds.) Stuck in the Middle to Lose: Tea Party Effects on 2010 U.S. Senate Elections. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.
10. Jason Morin, Gabriel Sanchez and Matt Barreto. 2011. "Perceptions of Competition Between Latinos and Blacks: The Development of a Relative Measure of Inter-Group Competition." In Edward Telles, Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Mark Sawyer (eds.) Just Neighbors? Research on African American and Latino Relations in the US. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

9. Grofman, Bernard, Frank Wayman and Matt Barreto. 2009. "Rethinking partisanship: Some thoughts on a unified theory." In John Bartle and Paolo Bellucci (eds.) Political Parties and Partisanship: Social identity and individual attitudes. New York: Routledge Press.
8. Barreto, Matt, Ricardo Ramírez, Luis Fraga and Fernando Guerra. 2009. "Why California Matters: How California Latinos Influence the Presidential Election." In Rodolfo de la Garza, Louis DeSipio and David Leal (eds.) Beyond the Barrio: Latinos in the 2004 Elections. South Bend, ID: University of Notre Dame Press.
7. Francisco Pedraza and Matt Barreto. 2008. "Exit Polls and Ethnic Diversity: How to Improve Estimates and Reduce Bias Among Minority Voters." In Wendy Alvey and Fritz Scheuren (eds.) Elections and Exit Polling. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons.
6. Adrian Pantoja, Matt Barreto and Richard Anderson. 2008. "Politics *y la Iglesia*: Attitudes Toward the Role of Religion in Politics Among Latino Catholics" In Michael Genovese, Kristin Hayer and Mark J. Rozell (eds.) Catholics and Politics. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press..
5. Barreto, Matt. 2007. "The Role of Latino Candidates in Mobilizing Latino Voters: Revisiting Latino Vote Choice." In Rodolfo Espino, David Leal and Kenneth Meier (eds.) Latino Politics: Identity, Mobilization, and Representation. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
4. Abosch, Yishaiya, Matt Barreto and Nathan Woods. 2007. "An Assessment of Racially Polarized Voting For and Against Latinos Candidates in California." In Ana Henderson (ed.) Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power. Berkeley, CA: UC Berkeley Public Policy Press.
3. Barreto, Matt and Ricardo Ramírez. 2005. "The Race Card and California Politics: Minority Voters and Racial Cues in the 2003 Recall Election." In Shaun Bowler and Bruce Cain (eds.) Clicker Politics: Essays on the California Recall. Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
2. Barreto, Matt and Nathan Woods. 2005. "The Anti-Latino Political Context and its Impact on GOP Detachment and Increasing Latino Voter Turnout in Los Angeles County." In Gary Segura and Shawn Bowler (eds.) Diversity in Democracy: Minority Representation in the United States. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
1. Pachon, Harry, Matt Barreto and Frances Marquez. 2004. "Latino Politics Comes of Age in the Golden State." In Rodolfo de la Garza and Louis DeSipio (eds.) Muted Voices: Latino Politics in the 2000 Election. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

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RESEARCH AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

June 2020	WK Kellogg Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$2,500,000 – 24 months
June 2020	Casey Family Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$900,000 – 18 months
Aug 2018	Provost Initiative for Voting Rights Research UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Chad Dunn]	\$90,000 – 24 months
April 2018	Democracy Fund & Wellspring Philanthropic UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$200,000 – 18 months
March 2018	AltaMed California UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$250,000 – 12 months
Dec 2017	California Community Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$100,000 – 12 months
July 2013	Ford Foundation UW Center for Democracy and Voting Rights	\$200,000 – 12 months
April 2012	American Values Institute [With Ben Gonzalez] Racial Narratives and Public Response to Racialized Moments	\$40,000 – 3 months
Jan 2012	American Civil Liberties Union Foundation [With Gabriel Sanchez] Voter Identification Laws in Wisconsin	\$60,000 – 6 months
June 2011	State of California Citizens Redistricting Commission An Analysis of Racial Bloc Voting in California Elections	\$60,000 – 3 months
Apr 2011	Social Science Research Council (SSRC) [With Karam Dana] Muslim and American? A national conference on the political and social incorporation of American Muslims	\$50,000 – 18 months
Jan 2011	impreMedia [With Gary Segura] Latino public opinion tracking poll of voter attitudes in 2011	\$30,000 – 6 months
Oct 2010	National Council of La Raza (NCLR) [With Gary Segura] Measuring Latino Influence in the 2010 Elections	\$128,000 – 6 months
Oct 2010	We Are America Alliance (WAAA) [With Gary Segura] Latino and Asian American Immigrant Community Voter Study	\$79,000 – 3 months
May 2010	<small>C926 4-SS-CA-00108-VM-WAL DOCUMENT 83-5 E1169 04\T8\SS 6906 45 01 22</small> National Council of La Raza (NCLR) [With Gary Segura] A Study of Latino Views Towards Arizona SB1070	\$25,000 – 3 months
Apr 2010	Social Science Research Council (SSRC) [With Karam Dana] Muslim and American? The influence of religiosity in Muslim political incorporation	\$50,000 – 18 months
Oct 2009	American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) [With Gary Segura] Health care reform and Latino public opinion	\$25,000 – 3 months
Nov 2008	impreMedia & National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) [With Gary Segura] 2008 National Latino Post-Election Survey, Presidential Election	\$46,000 – 3 months

RESEARCH GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS CONTINUED...

July 2008	National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) [With Gary Segura] Latino voter outreach survey – an evaluation of Obama and McCain	\$72,000 – 3 months
June 2008	The Pew Charitable Trusts, Make Voting Work Project [with Karin MacDonald and Bonnie Glaser] Evaluating Online Voter Registration (OVR) Systems in Arizona and Washington	\$220,000 – 10 months
April 2008	National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) & National Council of La Raza (NCLR), 2008 Latino voter messaging survey	\$95,000 – 6 months
Dec. 2007	Research Royalty Fund, University of Washington 2008 Latino national post-election survey	\$39,000 – 12 months
Oct. 2007	Brenan Center for Justice, New York University [with Stephen Nuño and Gabriel Sanchez] Indiana Voter Identification Study	\$40,000 – 6 months
June 2007	National Science Foundation, Political Science Division [with Gary Segura] American National Election Study – Spanish translation and Latino oversample	\$750,000 – 24 months
Oct. 2006	University of Washington, Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education Absentee voter study during the November 2006 election in King County, WA	\$12,000 – 6 months
Mar. 2006	Latino Policy Coalition Public Opinion Research Grant [with Gary Segura] Awarded to the Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race	\$40,000 – 18 months
2005 – 2006	University of Washington, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Research Grant	\$8,000 – 12 months
Mar. 2005	Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Foundation Grant [with Fernando Guerra] Conduct Exit Poll during Los Angeles Mayoral Election, Mar. 8 & May 17, 2005 Awarded to the Center for the Study of Los Angeles	\$30,000 – 6 months
2004 – 2005	Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship for Minorities	\$21,000 – 12 months
2004 – 2005	University of California President’s Dissertation Fellowship	\$14,700 – 9 months
2004 – 2005	University of California Mexico-US (UC MEXUS) Dissertation Grant	\$12,000 – 9 months
Apr – 2004	UC Regents pre-dissertation fellowship, University of California, Irvine,	\$4,700 – 3 months
2003 – 2004	Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Foundation Grant [with Fernando Guerra] Awarded to the Center for the Study of Los Angeles	\$20,000 – 12 months
2002 – 2003	CSRE # 055-CA-00108-V/M-WAL DOCUMENT# 83-5 FILED 04/18/05 6:06 43 01 22 Ford Foundation Grant on Institutional Inequality [with Harry Pachon] Conducted longitudinal study of Prop 209 on Latino and Black college admittance Awarded to Tomás Rivera Policy Institute	\$150,000 – 12 months
2002 – 2003	Haynes Foundation Grant on Economic Development [with Louis Tornatzky] Knowledge Economy in the Inland Empire region of Southern California Awarded to Tomás Rivera Policy Institute	\$150,000 – 18 months
2001 – 2002	William F Podlich Graduate Fellowship, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine	\$24,000 – 9 months

RESEARCH UNDER REVIEW/WORKING PAPERS:

Barreto, Matt, and Christopher Parker. The Great White Hope: Donald Trump, Race, and the Crisis of American Politics. Under Contract, University of Chicago Press, *expected 2020*

Barreto, Matt and Christopher Parker. "The Great White Hope: Existential Threat and Demographic Anxiety in the Age of Trump." Revise and Resubmit.

Barreto, Matt, Natalie Masuoka, Gabe Sanchez and Stephen El-Khatib. "Religiosity, Discrimination and Group Identity Among Muslim Americans" Revise and Resubmit

Barreto, Matt, Gabe Sanchez and Barbara Gomez. "Latinos, Blacks, and Black Latinos: Competition, Cooperation, or Indifference?" Revise and Resubmit

Walker, Hannah, Matt Barreto, Stephen Nuño, and Gabriel Sanchez. "A comprehensive review of access to valid photo ID and the right to vote in America" [Under review]

Gutierrez, Angela, Angela Ocampo, Matt Barreto and Gary Segura. "From Proposition 187 to Donald Trump: New Evidence that Anti-Immigrant Threat Mobilizes Latino Voters." [Under Review]

Collins, Jonathan, Matt Barreto, Gregory Leslie and Tye Rush. "Racial Efficacy and Voter Enthusiasm Among African Americans Post-Obama" [Under Review]

Oskooii, Kassra, Matt Barreto, and Karam Dana. "No Sharia, No Mosque: Orientalist Notions of Islam and Intolerance Toward Muslims in the United States" [Under Review]

Barreto, Matt, David Redlawsk and Caroline Tolbert. "Framing Barack Obama: Muslim, Christian or Black?" [Working paper]

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CONSULTING EXPERT:

- Pennsylvania, 2020, *Boockvar v. Trump*, Expert for Intervenors, (Perkins Coie) related to voter intimidation
- Missouri, 2020, *Missouri NAACP vs. State of Missouri*, Expert for plaintiffs related to vote by mail
- Georgia, 2020, *Black Voters Matter vs. Raffesnsperger*, Expert for plaintiffs related to vote by mail
- New York, 2019, Expert for NYAG New York v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 1:19-cv-08876
- North Carolina, 2019, Expert for Plaintiffs in North Carolina voter ID lawsuit, *NAACP v. Cooper*
- East Ramapo CSD, 2019, Expert for Plaintiffs in Section 2 VRA lawsuit, assessed polarized voting
- New York, 2018, Expert for Plaintiffs in Census Citizenship Lawsuit, *New York v. U.S. Dept of Commerce* (also an expert related cases: *California v. Ross* and *Kravitz v. Dept of Commerce*)
- Dallas County, TX, 2017, Expert for Defense in Section 2 VRA lawsuit, *Harding v. Dallas County*
- Kansas, 2016, Expert for Plaintiffs in Kansas voter registration lawsuit, *Fish v. Kobach* 2:16-cv-02105-JAR
- North Dakota, 2015, Expert for Plaintiffs in North Dakota voter ID lawsuit, *Brakebill v. Jaeger* 1:16-cv-00008-CSM
- Alabama, 2015, Expert for Plaintiffs in Alabama voter ID lawsuit, *Birmingham Ministries v. State of Alabama* 2:15-cv-02193-LSC
- Texas, 2014, Testifying Expert for Plaintiffs in Texas voter ID lawsuit, *Veasey v. Perry* 2:13-cv-00193
- Galveston County, TX Redistricting, 2013, Expert report for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, vote dilution analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit Galveston County JP/Constable districting
- Pasadena, TX Redistricting, 2013, Expert report for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit within Pasadena School District
- Harris County, TX Redistricting, 2011, Testifying Expert for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit within Harris County
- Pennsylvania, 2012, Testifying Expert for ACLU Foundation of Pennsylvania in voter ID lawsuit, *Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* No. 330 MD 2012
- Milwaukee County, WI, 2012, Testifying Expert for ACLU Foundation of Wisconsin in voter ID lawsuit, *Frank v. Walker* 2:11-cv-01128(LA)
- Orange County, FL, 2012, Consulting Expert for Latino Justice/PRLDEF, Racially polarized voting analysis in Orange County, Florida
- Anaheim, CA, 2012, Consulting Expert for Goldstein, Demchak & Baller Legal, Racially polarized voting analysis for CVRA redistricting case Anaheim, CA
- Los Angeles County, CA, 2011, Consulting Expert for Goldstein, Demchak & Baller Legal, Racially polarized voting analysis for three redistricting cases in L.A.: Cerritos Community College Board; ABC Unified Schools; City of West Covina
- Harris County, TX Redistricting, 2011, Consulting Expert for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, for Section 5 objection within Harris County
- Monterey County, CA Redistricting, 2011, Consulting Expert for City of Salinas, Demographic analysis, creation of alternative maps, and racially polarized Voting analysis within Monterey County
- Los Angeles County Redistricting Commission, 2011, Consulting Expert for Supervisor Gloria Molina, Racially Polarized voting analysis within L.A. County
- State of California, Citizens Redistricting Commission, 2011, Consulting Expert, Racially Polarized Voting analysis throughout state of California
- Asian Pacific American Legal Center, 2011, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Asian American candidates in Los Angeles for APALC redistricting brief

- Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Arnold & Porter, LLP, 2010-12, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino and Asian candidates in San Mateo County, concerning San Mateo County Board of Supervisors
- ACLU of Washington, 2010-11, preliminary analysis of Latino population patterns in Yakima, Washington, to assess ability to draw majority Latino council districts
- State of Washington, 2010-11, provided expert analysis and research for *State of Washington v. MacLean* in case regarding election misconduct and voting patterns
- Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association, 2008-10, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino candidates in L.A. County for VRA case, concerning L.A. County Board of Supervisors redistricting (6 reports issued 08-10)
- Brennan Center for Justice and Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, 2009-10 Amicus Brief submitted to Indiana Supreme Court, *League of Women Voters v. Rokita*, regarding access to voter identification among minority and lower resource citizens
- State of New Mexico, consulting expert for state in *AAPD v. New Mexico*, 2008,
- District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), statistical consultant for survey methodology of opinion survey of parents in DCPS district (for pending suit), 2008,
- Brennan Center for Justice, 2007-08, Amicus Brief submitted to U.S. Supreme Court, and cited in Supreme Court decision, *Crawford v. Marion County*, regarding access to voter identification among minority and lower-resource citizens
- Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association, 2002-07, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino candidates in L.A. County for VRA case, concerning L.A. County Board of Supervisors redistricting (12 + reports issued during 5 years)
- Monterrey County School Board, 2007, demographic and population analysis for VRA case
- Sweetwater Union School District, 2007-08, Racially Polarized Voting analysis, and demographic and population analysis for VRA case
- Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, 2007-08, Racially Polarized Voting analysis for Latino candidates, for City of Whittier city council races, for VRA case
- ACLU of Washington, 2008, preliminary analysis of voting patterns in Eastern Washington, related to electability of Latino candidates
- Nielsen Media Research, 2005-08, with Willie C. Velasquez Institute, assessed the methodology of Latino household recruitment in Nielsen sample

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**TEACHING
EXPERIENCE:**

UCLA & UW	2005 – Present
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minority Political Behavior (Grad Seminar) • Politics of Immigration in the U.S. (Grad Seminar) • Introduction to Empirical/Regression Analysis (Grad Seminar) • Advanced Empirical/Regression Analysis (Grad Seminar) • Qualitative Research Methods (Grad Seminar) • Political Participation & Elections (Grad Seminar) • The Voting Rights Act (Law School seminar) • Research methodology II (Law School Ph.D. program seminar) • U.S. Latino Politics • Racial and Ethnic Politics in the U.S. • Politics of Immigration in the U.S. • Introduction to American Government • Public Opinion Research • Campaigns and Elections in the U.S. • Presidential Primary Elections 	

Teaching Assistant University of California, Irvine	2002 – 2005
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intro to American Politics (K. Tate) • Intro to Minority Politics (L. DeSipio) <p>Recognized as Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Winter 2002</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statistics and Research Methods (B. Grofman) <p>Recognized as Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Winter 2003</p>	

**BOARD &
RESEARCH
APPOINTMENTS**

Founding Partner Barreto Segura Partners (BSP) Research, LLC	2021 - Present
Founding Partner Latino Decisions	2007 – 2020
Board of Advisors American National Election Study, University of Michigan	2010 – 2017
Advisory Board States of Change: Demographics & Democracy Project <i>CAP, AEI, Brookings Collaborative Project</i>	2014 – Present
Research Advisor American Values Institute / Perception Institute	2009 – 2014
Expert Consultant State of California, Citizens Redistricting Committee	2011 – 2012
Senior Scholar & Advisory Council Latino Policy Coalition, San Francisco, CA	2006 – 2008
Board of Directors CASA Latina, Seattle, WA	2006 – 2009
Faculty Research Scholar Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, University of Southern California	1999 – 2009

PHD STUDENTS

UCLA & UW

Committee Chair or Co-Chair

- Francisco I. Pedraza – University of California, Riverside (UW Ph.D. 2009)
- Loren Collingwood – University of California, Riverside (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Betsy Cooper – Public Religion Research Institute, Washington DC (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Sergio I. Garcia-Rios – Cornell University (UW Ph.D. 2015)
- Hannah Walker – Rutgers University (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Kassra Oskooii – University of Delaware (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Angela Ocampo – Arizona State University (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Ayobami Laniyonu – University of Toronto (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Bryan Wilcox-Archuleta – Facebook Analytics (UCLA 2019)
- Tyler Reny – Claremont Graduate University (UCLA 2020)
- Adria Tinin – Environmental Policy Analyst (UCLA Ph.D. 2020)
- Angie Gutierrez – University of Texas (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Vivien Leung – Bucknell University (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Marcel Roman – University of Texas (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Shakari Byerly-Nelson – *in progress* (UCLA)

Committee Member

- Jessica Stewart – Emory University (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Jonathan Collins – Brown University (UCLA Ph.D., 2017)
- Lisa Sanchez – University of Arizona (UNM Ph.D., 2016)
- Nazita Lajevardi – Michigan State University (UC San Diego Ph.D., 2016)
- Kiku Huckle – Pace University (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Patrick Rock (Social Psychology) – (UCLA Ph.D. 2016)
- Raynee Gutting – Loyola Marymount University (Stony Brook Ph.D. 2015)
- Christopher Towler – Sacramento State University (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Benjamin F. Gonzalez – San Diego State University (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Marcela Garcia-Castañon – San Francisco State University (UW Ph.D. 2013)
- Justin Reedy (Communications) – University of Oklahoma (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Dino Bozonelos – Cal State San Marcos (UC Riverside Ph.D. 2012)
- Brandon Bosch – University of Nebraska (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Karam Dana (Middle East Studies) – UW Bothell (UW Ph.D. 2010)
- Joy Wilke – *in progress* (UCLA ABD)
- Erik Hanson – *in progress* (UCLA)
- Christine Slaughter – Princeton (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Lauren Goldstein (Social Psychology) – *in progress* (UCLA)
- Barbara Gomez-Aguinaga – University of Nebraska (UNM Ph.D. 2020)
- Bang Quan Zheng – Florida International University (UCLA Ph.D. 2020)

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Appendix C

West's Florida Statutes Annotated
Florida Constitution--1968 Revision (Refs & Annos)
Article III. Legislature

West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 3 § 20

§ 20. Standards for establishing congressional district boundaries

Currentness

In establishing congressional district boundaries:

(a) No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of contiguous territory.

(b) Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a)¹ or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.

(c) The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and (b)¹ of this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any priority of one standard over the other within that subsection.

Credits

Added, general election, Nov. 2, 2010.

Footnotes

¹ Revisor's Note--2010: The subsections of section 20, as it appeared in Amendment No. 6, proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State September 28, 2007, and adopted in 2010, were designated (1)-(3); the editors redesignated them as (a)-(c) to conform to the format of the State Constitution.

West's F. S. A. Const. Art. 3 § 20, FL CONST Art. 3 § 20
Current through the November 3, 2020, General Election

End of Document

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Appendix D

Functional Analysis - Summary

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Dist.	2020 Census		2020 General Election Registered Voters																
	VAP who are:		RV who are:			RV who are:		Black Voters who are:			Hispanic Voters who are:			DEM who are:		REP who are:		NPAOth who are:	
	Black	Hisp	DEM	REP	OTH	Black	Hisp	DEM	REP	NPAOth	DEM	REP	NPAOth	Black	Hisp.	Black	Hisp.	Black	Hisp.
5	43.73%	9.04%	54.34%	26.24%	19.43%	43.53%	4.83%	84.10%	2.75%	13.14%	44.56%	21.04%	34.20%	67.38%	3.96%	4.57%	3.87%	29.43%	8.50%
9	12.81%	50.24%	41.80%	23.16%	35.03%	9.28%	44.52%	71.84%	4.02%	24.11%	46.58%	13.81%	39.60%	15.95%	49.60%	1.61%	26.55%	6.39%	50.32%
10	28.33%	23.38%	45.07%	26.06%	28.86%	24.37%	16.10%	77.81%	3.25%	18.92%	45.58%	15.94%	38.45%	42.08%	16.28%	3.04%	9.85%	15.98%	21.45%
20	50.04%	22.15%	61.23%	13.99%	24.78%	46.67%	14.84%	81.44%	2.55%	16.00%	46.41%	17.36%	36.20%	62.07%	11.25%	8.50%	18.42%	30.12%	21.67%
24	42.02%	37.76%	60.07%	12.45%	27.48%	43.75%	26.79%	82.51%	2.43%	15.05%	42.80%	20.02%	37.16%	60.09%	19.09%	8.53%	43.09%	23.96%	36.22%
25	7.96%	76.83%	31.43%	36.54%	32.03%	6.97%	64.09%	79.64%	3.94%	16.25%	29.23%	35.98%	34.77%	17.66%	59.60%	0.75%	63.10%	3.54%	69.57%
26	10.32%	73.35%	33.92%	32.58%	33.51%	8.67%	63.92%	77.59%	3.48%	18.90%	28.78%	35.47%	35.74%	19.84%	54.23%	0.93%	69.60%	4.89%	68.18%
27	7.07%	74.18%	34.57%	33.39%	32.04%	6.14%	62.79%	78.61%	3.67%	17.61%	28.03%	38.96%	33.00%	13.97%	50.91%	0.67%	73.27%	3.38%	64.68%

Functional Analysis - Summary

Plan S000C8040

Dist.	2020 Census		Average Primary Election Turnout				Average General Election Turnout												General Election Performance in Statewide Elections 2012-2020									
	VAP who are:		DEM who are:		REP who are:		Voters who are:			DEM who are:		REP who are:		NPAOth who are:		Black Voters who are:			Hisp. Voters who are:			Avg. Perf.		Wins		Margins		
	Black	Hisp	Black	Hisp.	Black	Hisp.	DEM	REP	NPAOth	Black	Hisp.	Black	Hisp.	Black	Hisp.	DEM	REP	NPAOth	DEM	REP	NPAOth	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	MAX	MIN	AVG
5	43.73%	9.04%	66.22%	1.13%	2.81%	1.51%	58.13%	28.64%	13.23%	65.88%	2.59%	3.31%	2.83%	25.94%	6.77%	89.70%	2.22%	8.05%	45.52%	25.69%	28.14%	58.5%	40.1%	14	0	D +32.4%	D +7.1%	D +18.8%
9	12.81%	50.24%	18.82%	35.24%	1.05%	14.10%	43.37%	29.02%	27.61%	17.51%	43.60%	1.32%	19.42%	6.11%	41.61%	78.50%	3.95%	17.46%	52.57%	15.53%	31.90%	57.3%	40.9%	12	2	D +34.4%	D +0.9%	D +16.7%
10	28.33%	23.38%	48.65%	7.79%	1.94%	4.80%	45.72%	32.02%	22.26%	44.50%	12.76%	2.18%	7.05%	13.88%	16.65%	84.23%	2.88%	12.87%	49.38%	19.11%	31.43%	57.5%	40.9%	12	2	D +29.1%	R +1.5%	D +17.2%
20	50.04%	22.15%	64.04%	4.47%	6.25%	9.69%	66.46%	14.61%	18.92%	62.17%	8.59%	6.94%	14.36%	28.30%	18.16%	86.61%	2.12%	11.23%	50.45%	18.81%	30.57%	78.1%	21.0%	14	0	D +65.1%	D +50.7%	D +57.3%
24	42.02%	37.76%	67.48%	10.63%	7.00%	47.13%	66.57%	12.13%	21.30%	62.81%	15.65%	7.51%	42.22%	23.92%	34.11%	87.45%	1.90%	10.62%	45.30%	22.77%	31.86%	80.3%	18.8%	14	0	D +68%	D +49.4%	D +61.6%
25	7.96%	76.83%	26.60%	42.55%	0.43%	61.13%	32.92%	41.38%	25.70%	20.79%	53.26%	0.57%	61.19%	3.39%	66.94%	85.82%	2.98%	11.07%	29.10%	42.27%	28.61%	45.0%	53.8%	3	11	R +20.4%	D +2.6%	R +8.6%
26	10.32%	73.35%	22.58%	36.25%	0.57%	65.42%	35.69%	36.75%	27.56%	21.18%	47.57%	0.77%	66.17%	4.67%	64.29%	82.77%	3.10%	14.10%	28.65%	41.33%	30.00%	50.7%	48.0%	9	5	D +15.7%	R +2.2%	D +3%
27	7.07%	74.18%	17.87%	36.73%	0.39%	75.66%	35.72%	38.10%	26.18%	15.24%	45.38%	0.52%	72.02%	3.19%	63.12%	83.83%	3.09%	12.93%	26.85%	45.71%	27.44%	50.6%	48.3%	9	5	D +17.4%	R +0.6%	D +2.7%

Functional Analysis - Returns

			5	9	10	20	24	25	26	27	
Plan 5000C8040			BVAP	43.73%	12.81%	28.33%	50.04%	42.02%	7.96%	10.32%	7.07%
Primary Elections			HVAP	9.04%	50.24%	23.38%	22.15%	37.76%	76.83%	73.35%	74.18%
2018	Governor (REP)	R_Baldauf	0.70%	0.84%	0.71%	1.36%	1.92%	1.93%	1.83%	1.50%	
		R_DeSantis	52.44%	52.75%	52.09%	62.76%	66.52%	65.93%	67.74%	67.69%	
		R_Devine	1.13%	1.98%	1.43%	2.20%	3.24%	2.92%	3.34%	3.09%	
		R_Langford	1.13%	1.44%	1.65%	1.86%	1.97%	1.41%	1.72%	1.53%	
		R_Mercadante	0.42%	1.28%	0.76%	1.51%	2.13%	1.93%	2.06%	2.14%	
		R_Nathan	0.71%	1.00%	0.82%	1.54%	2.72%	1.13%	1.42%	1.39%	
		R_Putnam	41.63%	37.93%	40.26%	25.36%	17.05%	21.84%	18.17%	18.84%	
	R_White	1.62%	2.61%	2.11%	2.89%	3.92%	2.63%	3.54%	3.46%		
	Governor (DEM)	D_Gillum	58.39%	29.99%	45.49%	52.96%	50.35%	32.88%	31.83%	28.95%	
		D_Graham	22.26%	29.75%	28.40%	13.34%	11.17%	19.31%	21.15%	22.65%	
		D_Greene	5.72%	13.96%	8.69%	10.39%	9.34%	9.66%	10.62%	7.94%	
		D_King	1.43%	4.29%	3.76%	0.94%	0.75%	2.33%	2.11%	1.54%	
		D_Levine	10.71%	19.18%	12.46%	21.58%	27.53%	32.70%	32.23%	37.17%	
		D_Lundmark	0.49%	1.12%	0.44%	0.30%	0.38%	1.37%	0.91%	0.78%	
		D_Wetherbee	0.83%	1.64%	0.66%	0.38%	0.32%	1.27%	0.97%	0.68%	
	Attorney General (REP)	R_Moody	57.78%	54.44%	55.46%	55.57%	53.16%	52.08%	54.82%	54.79%	
		R_White	42.22%	45.50%	44.57%	44.27%	46.64%	47.88%	45.11%	45.20%	
	Attorney General (DEM)	D_Shaw	78.66%	61.11%	74.44%	81.44%	82.10%	67.77%	69.58%	74.09%	
		D_Torrens	21.31%	38.88%	25.57%	18.56%	17.89%	32.10%	30.43%	25.91%	
	Agriculture Commissioner (REP)	R_Caldwell	35.67%	36.42%	34.83%	43.50%	39.73%	42.29%	42.07%	40.18%	
		R_Grimsley	21.36%	31.97%	31.49%	25.91%	31.44%	29.71%	31.57%	32.70%	
		R_McCalister	8.68%	16.25%	15.43%	21.17%	17.11%	12.78%	16.62%	16.76%	
	Agriculture Commissioner (DEM)	R_Troutman	34.12%	15.22%	18.23%	9.04%	11.06%	15.05%	9.61%	10.37%	
		D_Fried	60.09%	55.10%	55.25%	63.92%	59.04%	52.18%	53.25%	59.89%	
D_Porter		20.04%	18.57%	17.46%	16.10%	17.36%	20.02%	20.45%	15.13%		
US Senate (REP)	D_Walker	19.86%	26.32%	27.30%	19.96%	23.60%	27.59%	26.21%	24.88%		
	R_De La Fuente	10.20%	10.06%	11.29%	14.88%	15.74%	9.81%	12.28%	12.63%		
2016	US Senate (REP)	R_Scott	89.71%	89.89%	88.72%	84.91%	84.06%	90.09%	87.66%	87.32%	
		R_Beruff	22.31%	17.11%	17.64%	14.64%	8.73%	8.85%	6.43%	5.58%	
		R_Rivera	3.70%	3.21%	2.45%	5.03%	3.26%	2.20%	2.94%	1.88%	
		R_Rubio	68.00%	71.92%	74.53%	70.56%	80.12%	85.24%	85.70%	88.87%	
	US Senate (DEM)	R_Young	5.81%	7.56%	5.31%	9.37%	7.44%	3.59%	4.86%	3.46%	
		D_De La Fuente	4.12%	14.95%	3.93%	3.17%	5.51%	19.30%	13.76%	12.16%	
		D_Grayson	17.53%	45.27%	40.72%	9.95%	10.82%	11.17%	11.16%	11.19%	
		D_Keith	15.18%	9.79%	12.71%	14.56%	13.82%	13.73%	15.63%	17.86%	
	Governor (REP)	D_Luster	12.08%	1.26%	2.28%	2.23%	2.68%	2.02%	1.68%	1.54%	
		D_Murphy	50.94%	28.53%	40.28%	69.89%	66.91%	53.19%	57.51%	56.90%	
		R_Adeshina	1.29%	1.69%	1.67%	2.66%	2.97%	1.46%	1.77%	1.80%	
		R_Cuevas-Neunder	8.09%	12.04%	9.60%	14.56%	16.32%	10.61%	15.19%	13.26%	
	Governor (DEM)	R_Scott	90.47%	86.09%	88.64%	82.42%	80.36%	87.73%	82.95%	84.83%	
		D_Crist	74.34%	76.41%	78.84%	82.85%	84.35%	76.74%	78.42%	73.98%	
		D_Rich	25.58%	23.44%	21.17%	17.09%	15.61%	22.84%	21.48%	25.89%	
	Attorney General (DEM)	D_Sheldon	60.86%	60.66%	49.68%	39.26%	46.77%	58.73%	61.40%	65.55%	
		D_Thurston	39.17%	39.26%	50.37%	60.66%	53.21%	40.91%	38.48%	34.37%	
	2012	US Senate (REP)	R_Mack	57.58%	49.35%	58.32%	65.26%	71.78%	73.46%	73.64%	77.15%
			R_McCalister	18.65%	11.93%	10.93%	13.11%	6.85%	8.01%	7.36%	5.18%
			R_Stuart	5.92%	6.58%	4.88%	7.25%	13.13%	12.37%	13.26%	12.99%
			R_Weldon	17.45%	31.96%	25.74%	13.85%	8.00%	5.92%	5.67%	4.46%
		US Senate (DEM)	D_Burkett	22.03%	19.38%	13.66%	14.24%	14.02%	21.21%	18.40%	14.76%
			D_Nelson	77.91%	80.61%	86.30%	85.70%	85.93%	78.58%	81.49%	85.11%

Functional Analysis - Returns

			5	9	10	20	24	25	26	27
Plan S000C8040		BVAP	43.73%	12.81%	28.33%	50.04%	42.02%	7.96%	10.32%	7.07%
General Elections		HVAP	9.04%	50.24%	23.38%	22.15%	37.76%	76.83%	73.35%	74.18%
2020	President	D_Biden	60.23%	58.79%	61.66%	75.53%	74.41%	40.98%	46.43%	49.44%
		R_Trump	38.62%	40.22%	37.34%	23.88%	25.06%	58.48%	52.99%	50.01%
2018	Governor	D_Gillum	62.51%	61.81%	62.29%	79.65%	81.56%	46.17%	52.49%	53.18%
		R_DeSantis	36.60%	36.87%	36.70%	19.73%	17.74%	52.44%	46.31%	45.75%
	Attorney General	D_Shaw	59.25%	58.41%	58.50%	78.13%	80.14%	44.45%	50.86%	51.99%
		R_Moody	39.21%	39.61%	39.86%	20.54%	18.30%	53.53%	46.94%	46.10%
	Chief Financial Officer	D_Ring	60.38%	60.81%	60.33%	79.52%	81.61%	45.82%	51.93%	52.59%
		R_Patronis	39.62%	39.19%	39.67%	20.46%	18.38%	54.17%	48.07%	47.41%
Agriculture Commissioner	D_Fried	61.38%	62.27%	62.23%	79.77%	82.11%	46.93%	53.44%	54.63%	
	R_Caldwell	38.63%	37.73%	37.77%	20.22%	17.88%	53.06%	46.56%	45.38%	
US Senate	D_Nelson	62.25%	60.52%	62.11%	79.66%	81.49%	46.47%	53.46%	54.47%	
	R_Scott	37.75%	39.48%	37.89%	20.33%	18.51%	53.52%	46.54%	45.52%	
2016	President	D_Clinton	58.51%	61.95%	60.09%	77.52%	81.10%	52.56%	56.46%	57.42%
		R_Trump	38.61%	34.53%	36.37%	20.71%	17.23%	45.16%	40.81%	40.05%
	US Senate	D_Murphy	52.82%	54.92%	54.84%	75.52%	76.02%	42.42%	47.69%	47.78%
R_Rubio		43.90%	41.03%	41.35%	22.53%	21.88%	55.35%	49.92%	50.17%	
2014	Governor	D_Crist	56.54%	52.80%	54.65%	79.64%	82.25%	43.00%	51.20%	50.00%
		R_Scott	39.85%	42.13%	40.77%	18.20%	16.17%	54.28%	45.89%	47.55%
	Attorney General	D_Sheldon	53.20%	49.01%	51.79%	75.88%	79.86%	38.72%	45.82%	46.03%
		R_Bondi	44.31%	48.13%	45.30%	22.66%	18.70%	58.94%	51.75%	51.96%
	Chief Financial Officer	D_Rankin	53.57%	48.88%	49.22%	75.36%	79.06%	40.24%	45.88%	43.49%
		R_Atwater	46.43%	51.12%	50.78%	24.62%	20.94%	59.75%	54.12%	56.53%
Agriculture Commissioner	D_Hamilton	55.57%	47.75%	49.27%	76.85%	79.82%	39.79%	46.04%	44.31%	
	R_Putnam	44.41%	52.25%	50.73%	23.15%	20.18%	60.19%	53.95%	55.69%	
2012	President	D_Obama	61.03%	61.43%	58.97%	80.43%	82.82%	51.07%	54.83%	52.22%
		R_Romney	38.14%	37.76%	40.24%	19.14%	16.82%	48.44%	44.61%	47.27%
	US Senate	D_Nelson	65.00%	65.98%	63.62%	81.94%	83.49%	52.79%	56.33%	54.47%
		R_Mack	32.61%	31.57%	34.51%	16.83%	15.47%	45.07%	42.03%	44.15%