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MEMORANDUM

To: Ron DeSantis, Governor of Florida

From: Ryan Newman, General Counsel, Executive Office of the Governor *RDN*

Date: March 29, 2022

Re: Constitutionality of CS/SB 102, An Act Relating to Establishing the Congressional Districts of the State

Congressional District 5 in both the primary and secondary maps enacted by the Legislature violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it assigns voters primarily on the basis of race but is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.

"Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools," the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the State also "may not separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race." *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (internal citations omitted). "When the State assigns voters on the basis of race," the Court explained, "it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.'" *Id.* at 911-12 (quoting *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).


For these reasons, the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to prohibit state legislatures from using race as the "predominant factor motivating [their] decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district," *id.* at 916, unless they can prove that their "race-based sorting of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly tailored' to that end," *Cooper v. Harris*, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017) (citation omitted). That race was the predominant factor motivating a legislature's line-drawing decision can be shown "either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose." *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916.

Although non-adherence to traditional districting principles, which results in a non-compact, unusually shaped district, is relevant evidence that race was the predominant motivation of a legislature, such evidence is not required to establish a constitutional violation. “Race may predominate even when a reapportionment plan respects traditional principles, . . . if ‘[r]ace was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised,’ and race-neutral considerations ‘came into play only after the race-based decision had been made.’” *Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 137 S. Ct. 788, 798 (2017) (quoting *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) (alteration in original)). “The racial predominance inquiry concerns the actual considerations that provided the essential basis for the lines drawn, not *post hoc* justifications the legislature in theory could have used but in reality did not.” *Id.* at 799. A legislature “could construct a plethora of potential maps that look consistent with traditional, race-neutral principles,” but “if race for its own sake is the overriding reason for choosing one map over others, race still may predominate.” *Id.* It is the “racial purpose of state action, not its stark manifestation,” that offends the Equal Protection Clause. *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 913.

In light of these well-established constitutional principles, the congressional redistricting bill enacted by the Legislature violates the U.S. Constitution. The bill contains a primary map and secondary map that include a racially gerrymandered district—Congressional District 5—that is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. *See generally* Fla. H.R. Comm. on Redist., recording of proceedings, at 0:00-2:55:19 (Feb. 25, 2022), <https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/2-25-22-house-redistricting-committee/> (committee presentation and discussion of the maps later passed by the Legislature).


In the secondary map, which was the original map reported out of the House Congressional Redistricting Subcommittee, District 5 is a sprawling district that stretches approximately 200 miles from East to West and cuts across eight counties to connect a minority population in Jacksonville with a separate and distinct minority population in Leon and Gadsden Counties. The district is not compact, does not conform to usual political or geographic boundaries, and is bizarrely shaped to include minority populations in western Leon County and Gadsden County while excluding non-minority populations in eastern Leon County. Because this version of District 5 plainly subordinates traditional districting criteria to avoid diminishment of minority voting age population, there is no question that race was “the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision” to draw this district. *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916.

District 5 in the Secondary Map (Purple)



In response to federal constitutional concerns about the unusual shape of District 5 as it was originally drawn, and which is now reflected in the secondary map, the House Redistricting Committee drew a new version of District 5, which is reflected in the primary map. This configuration of the district is more compact but has caused the adjacent district—District 4—to take on a bizarre doughnut shape that almost completely surrounds District 5. The reason for this unusual configuration is the Legislature’s desire to maximize the black voting age population in District 5. The Chair of the House Redistricting Committee confirmed this motivation when he explained that the new District 5 was drawn to “protect[] a black minority seat in north Florida.” Fla. H.R. Comm. on Redist., recording of proceedings, at 19:15-19:26 (Feb. 25, 2022).

District 5 in the Primary Map (Purple)



Despite the Legislature’s attempt to address the federal constitutional concerns by drawing a more compact district, the constitutional defect nevertheless persists. Where “race was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised, and race-neutral considerations came into play only after the race-based decision had been made,” it follows that race was the predominant factor, even though the district

otherwise respects traditional districting principles. *Bethune-Hill*, 137 S. Ct. at 798 (cleaned up).

Such was the case here. Even for the more compact district, the Legislature believed (albeit incorrectly) that the Florida Constitution required it to ensure “a black minority seat in north Florida.” Fla. H.R. Comm. on Redist., recording of proceedings, at 19:15-19:26 (Feb. 25, 2022). Specifically, according to the House Redistricting Chair, the primary map’s version of District 5 is the House’s “attempt at continuing to protect the minority group’s ability to elect a candidate of their choice.” *Id.* at 19:45-19:54. The Legislature thus used “an express racial target” for District 5 of a black voting age population sufficiently large to elect a candidate of its choice. *Bethune-Hill*, 137 S. Ct. at 800.

Because racial considerations predominated even in drawing the new District 5, the Legislature must satisfy strict scrutiny, the U.S. Supreme Court’s “most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review.” *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 920. And to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Legislature “must demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” *Id.* That, the Legislature cannot do.

There is no good reason to believe that District 5 needed to be drawn as a minority-performing district to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), because the relevant minority group is not sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a geographically compact area. In the primary map, the black voting age population of District 5 is 35.32%, and even in the secondary map, with the racially gerrymandered, non-compact version of District 5, the black voting age population increases only to 43.48%. Compare Fla. Redist. 2022, H000C8019, <https://bit.ly/3uczOXb> (available at floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans) (last visited Mar. 28, 2022), with Fla. Redist. 2022, H000C8015, <https://bit.ly/36hFRBB> (available at floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans) (last visited Mar. 28, 2022). “When a minority group is not sufficiently large to make up a majority in a reasonably shaped district, § 2 simply does not apply.” *Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1472 (citing *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1, 18-20 (2009) (plurality opinion)); see also *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (explaining that one of the threshold conditions for proving vote dilution under Section 2 is that the minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority”).

Nor is there good reason to believe that District 5 is required to be drawn to comply with Section 5 of the VRA. Section 5 is no longer operative now that the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the VRA’s formula for determining which jurisdictions are subject to Section 5. See *Shelby Cnty. v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529, 553-57 (2013); see also *Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 575 U.S. 254, 279 (2015) (suggesting that continued compliance with Section 5 may not remain a compelling interest in light of *Shelby County*). In any event, even before the coverage formula was invalidated, the State of

Florida was not a covered jurisdiction subject to Section 5. *See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176 (Apportionment I)*, 83 So. 3d 597, 624 (Fla. 2012). Only five counties in Florida were covered – Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe – and none of them are in northern Florida where District 5 is located. *See id.*

The only justification left for drawing a race-based district is compliance with Article III, Section 20(a) of the Florida Constitution. But District 5 does not comply with this provision. Article III, Section 20(a) provides that “districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice.” The Florida Supreme Court has noted that these “dual constitutional imperatives follow almost verbatim the requirements embodied in the Federal Voting Rights Act.” *Id.* at 619 (cleaned up). The first imperative, which prohibits districts that deny or abridge the equal opportunity of minority groups to participate in the political process, is modeled after Section 2 of the VRA, and the second imperative, which prohibits districts that diminish the ability of minority groups to elect representatives of their choice, is modeled after Section 5. *Id.* at 619-20.

Like the VRA, these provisions of the Florida Constitution “aim[] at safeguarding the voting strength of minority groups against both impermissible dilution and retrogression.” *Id.* at 620. Although judicial interpretation of the VRA is relevant to understanding the Florida Constitution’s non-dilution and non-diminishment provisions, the Florida Supreme Court nonetheless recognizes its “independent constitutional obligation” to interpret these provisions. *Id.* at 621.

Relevant here is the Florida Constitution’s non-diminishment requirement. Unlike Section 5 of the VRA, this requirement “applies to the entire state.” *Id.* at 620. Under this standard, the Legislature “cannot eliminate majority-minority districts or weaken other historically performing minority districts where doing so would actually diminish a minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates.” *Id.* at 625. The existing districts “serve[] as the ‘benchmark’ against which the ‘effect’ of voting changes is measured.” *Id.* at 624 (cleaned up). Where a voting change leaves a minority group “less able to elect a preferred candidate of choice” than the benchmark, that change violates the non-diminishment standard. *Id.* at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also id.* at 702 (Canady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the dictionary definition of “diminish” means “to make less or cause to appear less” (citation omitted)).

The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that “a slight change in percentage of the minority group’s population in a given district does not necessarily have a cognizable effect on a minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidate of choice.” *Id.* at 625. The minority population percentage in each district need not be

“fixed” in perpetuity. *Id.* at 627. But where the reduction in minority population in a given district is more than “slight,” such that the ability of the minority population to elect a candidate of choice has been reduced (even if not eliminated), the Legislature has violated the Florida Constitution’s non-diminishment requirement as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court.

Given these principles, there is no good reason to believe that District 5, as presented in the primary map, complies with the Florida Constitution’s non-diminishment requirement. The benchmark district contains a black voting age population of 46.20%, whereas the black voting age population of District 5 in the primary map is only 35.32%.¹ Compare Fla. Redist. 2022, FLCD2016, <https://bit.ly/3Iv6FeW> (available at floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans) (last visited Mar. 28, 2022), with Fla. Redist. 2022, H000C8019, <https://bit.ly/3uczOXb> (available at floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans) (last visited Mar. 28, 2022). This nearly eleven percentage point drop is more than slight, and while the House Redistricting Chair represented that the black population of the district could still elect a candidate of choice, *see* Fla. H.R. Comm. on Redist., recording of proceedings, at 59:44-1:00:17 (Feb. 25, 2022), there appears to be little dispute that the ability of the black population to elect such a candidate had nevertheless been reduced, *see id.* at 1:00:18-1:00:58 (noting that the benchmark district performed for the minority candidate of choice in 14 of 14 previous elections and that the new district would not perform for the minority candidate of choice in one-third of the same elections).

Moreover, the House Redistricting Chair claimed that the only criterion that mattered was whether the new district still performed at all. *See id.* at 1:06:09-1:06:30 (“It is not a diminishment unless the district does not perform.”); *see also id.* at 1:05:05-1:05:13 (“Is it less likely to perform? Honestly, I don’t know.”). But that view is plainly inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court precedent described above, which prohibits any voting change that leaves a minority group “less able to elect a preferred candidate of choice.” *Apportionment I*, 83 So. 3d at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, because the reduction of black voting age population is more than slight and because such reduction appears to have diminished the ability of black voters to elect a candidate of their choice, District 5 does not comply with the non-diminishment requirement of Article III, Section 20(a) of the Florida Constitution. Therefore, compliance with the Florida Constitution cannot supply the compelling reason to justify the Legislature’s use of race in drawing District 5 in the primary map.

¹ The benchmark district itself is a sprawling, non-compact racial gerrymander that connects minority communities from two distinct regions of the State; however, for purposes of this point, I assume that the district can be used as a valid benchmark against which to judge the new maps.

In the secondary map, by contrast, District 5 complies with the Florida Constitution's non-diminishment requirement, but in doing so, it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that a "reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." *Shaw*, 509 U.S. at 647. As described earlier, District 5 in the secondary map does precisely this.

That the district is believed to be necessary to comply with the Florida Constitution's non-diminishment requirement does not alone suffice to justify the use of race in drawing bizarre, non-compact district boundaries for the sole purpose of cobbling together disparate minority populations from across northern Florida to form a minority-performing district. Mere compliance with a state constitutional requirement to engage in race-based districting is not, without more, a compelling interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the VRA, which enforces the Fifteenth Amendment, exist to *prevent* states from engaging in racially discriminatory electoral practices. Indeed, one such weapon that states long used, and that the VRA was designed to combat, "was the racial gerrymander—the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries for racial purposes." *Id.* at 640 (cleaned up).

Here, the Florida Constitution's non-diminishment standard would be satisfied only by a sprawling, non-compact district that spans 200 miles and repeatedly violates traditional political boundaries to join minority communities from disparate geographic areas. Such a district is not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of protecting the voting rights of a minority community in a reasonably cohesive geographic area. As applied to District 5 in the secondary map, therefore, the Florida Constitution's non-diminishment standard cannot survive strict scrutiny and clearly violates the U.S. Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, Congressional District 5 in both maps is unlawful.