

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:24-cv-21983-JB

CUBANOS PA'LANTE, *et al.*,

*Plaintiffs,*

v.

FLORIDA HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES, *et al.*,

*Defendants.*

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**Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Carolyn B. Abbott, Ph.D.**

June 20, 2025

**1 Introduction and Assignment**

1. My name is Dr. Carolyn Abbott. I previously filed an expert report on March 21, 2025 (“Initial Report”) on matters relating to the role of race in the drawing of the Florida 2022 enacted congressional and State House maps. My Initial Report describes my engagement, qualifications, prior testimony, and compensation. My resume, which provides additional details, is attached as **Appendix A**.

2. For this Rebuttal Report, Plaintiffs’ counsel has asked me to review and respond to certain opinions presented in the Expert Report of Dr. Sean Trende (“Trende Report”) and in the Expert Report of Mr. Alfredo Gonzalez (“Gonzalez Report”).

3. In preparing this Rebuttal Report, I relied on my education and professional experience, data and documents produced in discovery, and publicly available data and documents. I also relied on knowledge that I obtained in the preparation of the Initial Report.

## 2 Findings and Opinions

4. I have reviewed both the Trende Report and the Gonzalez Report. I disagree with a number of Dr. Trende's opinions, detailed below. I also disagree with Mr. Gonzalez's opinion that the Enacted Map was drawn in such a way as to follow essential political and geographical boundaries, which I elaborate upon below. Nothing contained in the Trende Report or Gonzalez Report has caused me to change the opinions in my Initial Report.

### 2.1 I disagree with Dr. Trende's opinion that the results of my analysis are not "substantively interesting"

5. Dr. Trende writes on page 46 of his Report that my Initial Report does not suggest that "...race *predominated* in the drawing of the maps" (emphasis in original) and that

...those instances where a statistically significant finding arises...simply suggests that the data we observe would be unlikely to occur were there not some type of relationship between the two variables we observe. That doesn't mean, however, that there is a substantively interesting relationship – *i.e.*, one that we would take note of or care about – nor does it give us any comparison between the detected racial effect and other factors...this analysis demonstrates race was a factor in the legislature's analysis, not that race predominated.

6. First, whether something is "substantively interesting" (or "substantively significant," *see* Trende Report, p. 15) is not a tool I have used in the analysis contained in my Initial Report. I am not sure what Dr. Trende's "substantively interesting" standard is. It is not, to my knowledge, a term that is commonly used in the fields of political science or statistics. And Dr. Trende does not offer a definition apart from noting it involves a "subjective evaluation." (Trende Report, p. 15.) Identifying "substantively interesting" relationships or creating a criterion for what is "substantively interesting" was outside the scope of the assignment given to me by Plaintiffs' counsel.

7. Second, I do not understand it to be my role to decide whether “race *predominated*” in the drawing of the maps, and never concluded in my Initial Report whether race did or did not “predominate.” I understand that determination will be made by the trier of fact and may include consideration of additional evidence that neither I nor Dr. Trende evaluated, such as statements by legislators. I concluded that the boundaries the Challenged congressional and State House districts have been drawn in a manner that significantly concentrates Hispanic population within the districts, resulting in clear and substantial racial disparities between these districts and their neighboring areas, consistent with the idea that race played a significant role in shaping the state legislature’s redistricting decisions in drawing the districts. While my analysis is consistent with and, I believe, would support a conclusion that race was the primary consideration of the legislature, I do not understand it to be the role of the political scientist to make legal determinations such as whether race “predominated.”

8. Finally, the use of statistical significance is the gold standard and most commonly used methodology by which to determine whether there is a relationship between two or more variables that cannot be otherwise explained by random chance or measurement error. Dr. Trende does not appear to support the use of statistical significance testing—as noted, he apparently prefers a vague and subjective “substantively interesting” standard. And in his discussion about the use of binomial tests in my Initial Report, he downplays the relevance of calculating p-values (Trende Report, pp. 12-15).

9. As an example of the pitfalls inherent in Dr. Trende’s subjective, standardless analysis, Dr. Trende’s discussion confusingly switches back and forth between the number of voters and the percentages of racial VAP without any clear indication as to why. For instance, Dr. Trende argues on page 72 that the difference between splits of VTD Miami-Dade 538 in district 26 (56.5% HVAP) and district 24 (53.4%) are not truly meaningful and suggests it should not be coded as a “yes.” But this difference in HVAP percentages – 3.1 percentage points – results in a difference

of 283 Hispanic voters, which is 4.6% of total Hispanic voters across both splits. In other parts of his report, Trende calculates the percentage difference between HVAP percentages between districts,<sup>1</sup> which here is 5.8%. Dr. Trende does not reference the number of voters, as he does at many other points throughout his report, as this might undercut his argument that a HVAP difference of 3.1% is not “substantive.”

10. Dr. Trende further offers that “of the 13 split precincts she identifies, seven involve differences of fewer than 10 percentage points, and six involve differences of fewer than five...this might suggest that the map drawers did not care much about achieving a racial split when splitting precincts” (Trende Report, p. 72). I disagree. By focusing on a perceived lack of meaningful difference between individual splits (which Dr. Trende determines are inconsequential without any indication as to why) he ignores the clear pattern in the data: my analysis shows that, given an opportunity to allocate a precinct or portion of a precinct with less or more HVAP to an HVAP-protected district, of all the possible contiguous precincts or split precincts, mapmakers chose time and again to put the precincts and portions of precincts with higher HVAPs into the majority- HVAP districts, strongly suggesting that race was a factor in the drawing of the Enacted Map. Dr. Trende’s narrow focus fails to see the forest through the trees.

11. Finally, Dr. Trende states that my “statistical analysis...does not take account of clustering.” (Trende Report, p. 76). It is not clear what Dr. Trende means by “clustering,” which may mean different things depending on the context. For example, clustering is a concern of political scientists who use econometrics when analyzing observational data that might be correlated to one another as a result of grouping (think, for example, of analyzing students who might be in the same classroom or school). This correlation violates standard assumptions used in regression analysis and is easily corrected through the use of clustered standard errors. I do not run any regressions in my Initial Report, however, so this is unlikely

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<sup>1</sup> For example, on page 72, Trende calculates the HVAP difference in split VTD Collier 012 (11.5% in district 19, 9.7% in district 26) as 1.8%, but this is incorrect. This is a 1.8 percentage *point* difference, but a 18.5% difference.

to be what Dr. Trende is referring to. Dr. Trende occasionally uses of the word “cluster” throughout his Report to refer to groups of ethnically or racially similar voters (e.g., Dr. Trende’s discussion of dot density maps on page 10). But it is not clear, and Dr. Trende does not explain, how I supposedly did not take into account racial “clusters” (or groups, in this context)—my Initial Report goes into intricate detail about how different electoral maps were drawn or not drawn to take into account the geographical location of different racial groups of voters.

## **2.2 I disagree with Dr. Trende’s opinion that my analysis is inadequate because it lacks a meaningful baseline**

12. Dr. Trende opines that “Dr. Abott lacks a meaningful baseline against which to measure the plans” (Trende Report, pp. 48, 95). I disagree that the absence of some hypothetical “neutral” comparator map would nullify my analysis and, in any event, I do use Dr. McCartan’s alternative maps as “neutral” comparators. I was asked to assess whether race could plausibly explain the shape and boundaries of specific congressional and State House districts in the Enacted Map, not whether the Enacted Map was the “best” map possible given some (undefined) set of constraints or in comparison to some other benchmark – other than Dr. McCartan’s alternative maps. Dr. McCartan’s maps, moreover, serve as a “neutral” comparison for this analysis because I was asked to assume that they were drawn without regard to race at all.

## **2.3 I disagree with Dr. Trende’s opinion that my analysis ignores protected districts**

13. Dr. Trende claims that I fail “to acknowledge...that District 24 is a heavily Black district that sends a Black representative to Congress” (Trende Report, p. 70). This is incorrect. I state in my Initial Report that “Counsel instructed me to assume that the following adjacent congressional and State House districts were drawn as protected districts for Black voters: Congressional districts 20 and 24 and

State House districts 102, 108, 109, and 117. For brevity, I refer to these as “Black protected districts” (Initial Report, ¶14). None of the analysis in my Initial Report is predicated on the idea that district 24 is not protected, and I explicitly acknowledge that it is.

14. Additionally, I see no reason to exclude or discount my analysis of the district 26 boundary with district 24. The simple fact that congressional district 24 is a Black-protected district does not mean that its boundary cannot or should not change. Dr. Trende does not explain why district 24's status as a Black-protected district should mean it should be excluded when examining the borders of district 26. Doing so would selectively remove portions of the district boundary from the analysis for no justifiable reason.

15. Dr. Trende claims that it is “unsurprising that areas included within District 24 have lower HVAPs than those contained within District 26.” (Trende Report, pp. 70, 75). But, once again, Dr. Trende fails to see the forest through the trees: even if District 24's protected status makes it more likely to have elevated Black VAP levels, my analysis shows that HVAPs are *consistently* higher on the District 26 side of splits, whether looking at counties, cities, or precincts. (Initial Report, pp. 11-13, Tables 3 & 4).

## **2.4 I disagree with Dr. Trende's opinion that my analysis ignores important political boundaries**

16. Dr. Trende asserts that my statistical analysis “fails to consider county boundaries” (Trende Report, p. 76). But, elsewhere, he argues that the divisions of counties I identify in my Initial Report (¶22) as being racially unbalanced in Collier County are irrelevant (Trende Report, pp. 55-56). In other words, Trende simultaneously asserts that I do not “consider” county boundaries and argues that I respect county boundaries *too much*.

17. Dr. Trende questions the significance of my analysis of precincts on the boundary of District 26 with their neighbors in other districts (Trende Report, pp. 74-

75). According to Trende, while my Initial Report Figure 2 “depict[s] differences between District 26 and the district to the north (District 25), the boundary between those two districts follows the county lines (Trende Report, p. 74). Similarly, with respect to my Initial Report Table 4, he notes that “19 of the precinct pairs that she compares involve precincts lying in different counties,” where the “county boundary can explain the decision to keep one precinct in District 26 while excluding the other precinct” (Trende Report, pg. 75). But, in general, the data is not consistent with the idea that the mapmakers were very concerned with respecting county boundaries—for example, the two counties in District 26, Collier County and Miami-Dade County, are split unnecessarily between three congressional districts, and have more congressional districts breach the county line than necessary, respectively. Notably, nearly all of the 19 precinct splits Trende relies upon involve double-digit differences in HVAP, suggesting the mapmakers may have followed county lines when doing so allowed them to place more Hispanic voters into District 26.<sup>2</sup>

18. Similarly, Dr. Trende argues that the Miami-Dade County splits in the Enacted Map that I identify as racially unbalanced are less racially unbalanced than those in the alternative maps (Trende Report, pp. 68-69); while this may or may not be true (discussed in detail section 2.8.2), the fact that I focus on these splits in the first place negates the claim that I ignore political boundaries like counties. Again, Dr. Trende switches back and forth between different methods when discussing county splits (e.g., visual inspection when discussing Collier County, bar plots and quantitative analysis in Miami-Dade County) while I maintain a single method of analysis in my Initial Report. This results in Dr. Trende ignoring the fact that the racial split of Collier County is in fact eliminated in Dr. McCartan’s maps, as well as the fact that the racial divide along the district 24 and district 26 border becomes substantially lessened.

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<sup>2</sup> Of the 19 precincts referenced, three have greater HVAP in the non-protected district. Only one precinct with greater HVAP on the district 26 side (Collier 139, total voting age population 932) has an HVAP difference of less than 10 percentage points. The remaining 15 have a difference of over 10 percentage points (total voting age population on the district 26 side 41,376), with 13 over 20 percentage points (total voting age population on the district 26 side 36,466), and 7 over 30 percentage points (total voting age population on the district 26 side 24,140).

**2.5 I disagree with Mr. Gonzalez’s opinion that State House districts 112-116 and 118-119 and congressional district 26 were drawn in order to follow essential political and geographical boundaries**

19. Additionally, Mr. Gonzalez identifies many geographical and political features and boundaries in his analysis of State House districts and congressional district 26. He identifies so many, in fact, that it is unclear what would *not* count as an essential or important feature or boundary. On the other hand, it could be argued that many important geographical and political features that Mr. Gonzalez does not identify were ignored by mapmakers while drawing the Enacted Map.

20. To illustrate this point, I was provided with two maps created by Dr. McCartan (**Appendix B**), showing the roadways and waterways which Mr. Gonzalez identified as “commonly understood and ascertainable” (Gonzalez Report, p. 6) boundaries that he favorably commented on as forming the district borders. Merely looking at the map demonstrates that a mapmaker would have no trouble designing districts for any purpose—including a race-based purpose—while tracking only Mr. Gonzalez's favored features.

**2.6 I disagree with Dr. Trende’s opinion that my analysis does not demonstrate that race played an important role in the drawing of the Enacted Map**

21. Dr. Trende makes the claim that my choice of comparison districts in the congressional district 26 analysis was arbitrary, writing that “It isn’t clear why we should choose to compare these districts [18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 26, and 28] but not, say, District 17...or Districts 23 and 22...” (Trende Report, p. 47). But my choice was not arbitrary. I chose to compare district 26 to other districts that were contiguous with it and were therefore would be immediately or necessarily affected if the boundary of district 26 were changed. This criterion did not include districts 17, 22, and 23 because they are not contiguous with district 26. Expanding the analysis to include areas not contiguous with district 26 would have had no natural endpoint.

If I were to expand the analysis to include every district in the state, the results would have marginal significance, if any, because it is unlikely other districts not touching district 26 would need to be changed significantly, if at all, if district 26 were redrawn. It would not be an appropriate “baseline”—to borrow Dr. Trende’s term—to compare the racial VAP of district 26 with districts in other far-flung parts of Florida. Including additional nearby districts that are not contiguous with district 26, as Dr. Trende suggests, would introduce arbitrariness to the methodology.

22. In any event, to address Dr. Trende’s methodological critiques, I have expanded the regional analysis to evaluate (1) the two counties including district 26 (Miami-Dade and Collier); (2) counties including district 26 and adjacent counties (Miami-Dade, Collier, Lee, Hendry, Broward, Monroe); and (3) districts including portions of those six counties (17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28). These are reported in the appendix. Regardless of which counties or districts near district 26 one analyzes, the racial disparities are similar.

23. Dr. Trende also appears to misunderstand my conclusions based upon my regional analysis (Trende Report, pp. 47-53). I point out both that there is a large discrepancy between average regional HVAP and average HVAP in the three protected congressional districts (26, 27, and 28) and also that there is very little variation in HVAP among the protected districts (Initial Report, ¶¶ 16-18). This is not a “heads-we-win-tails-you-lose” conclusion but rather part of an analysis that shows how Hispanic voters were placed in the protected districts in large volumes and predictable ways that ultimately resulted in uniform distributions of Hispanic voters across these districts that cannot be explained by overall regional demographics. The map could have been drawn in many other ways as to distribute Hispanic voters in ways that kept districts 26, 27, and 28 as majority-HVAP without artificially concentrating those voters in such a uniform way, as Plaintiffs’ alternative maps show. Ultimately, the three majority-HVAP districts were drawn in such a way as to be extremely similar to one another while still containing much greater HVAP than the overall subregion. In the Enacted Map, portions of South Florida have been

sectioned off to create HVAP-packed districts that are all very compositionally similar to one another. Dr. Trende ultimately does not rebut these dual observations: that (1) Hispanic voters are concentrated in the three protected Hispanic districts, and that (2) within those three districts, the Hispanic population is evenly distributed so as to be extremely balanced at a district-wide level—despite geographic variation in the distribution of Hispanic voters *within* each district.

24. Dr. Trende states it is “unclear how a mapmaker could possibly achieve a uniform distribution of Hispanic residents in the region overall.” (Trende Report, pp. 50-51). But this argument is a straw man: I do not opine that a mapmaker could or should attempt to achieve a uniform Hispanic distribution in the region overall.

25. Dr. Trende asserts that “Dr. McCartan’s Congressional maps are drawn with district HVAPs that seem similar to those found in the Enacted Maps” (Trende Report, p. 51). Except for B2, Dr. Trende is wrong—in each of Dr. McCartan’s other 6 alternative maps, the HVAP in districts 26, 27, and 28 include variation of at least a 10% difference (Initial Report, Table 2). And, obviously, in the one map (B2) in which Dr. McCartan chose to essentially continue the enacted configuration for districts 27 and 28, those districts’ demographics are nearly identical to those in the enacted plan. Dr. Trende also states that in my Initial Report I make an “...observation that Dr. McCartan’s districts 27 and 28 are similar in shape to the Enacted Plan [which] is simply the tail wagging the dog...” (Trende Report, p. 52). Rather than undermine my conclusions about the enacted plan, this highlights that the racial patterns I observe are a function of district 26’s border with districts 27 and 28, not just surrounding districts.

26. Dr. Trende states that I observe in my report that “...in the alternative maps, the adjacent districts see an increase in their HVAPs over those found in the Enacted Map” and goes on to opine that “...this is not because of the redraw of Districts 26, 27, and 28...[and instead is responsible for] bleaching the neighboring districts on balance” (Trende Report, p. 52). It is unclear to me how Dr. Trende can interpret an increase in HVAP of adjacent districts as “bleaching,” nor does he explain

how this increase in HVAP might occur in the alternative maps if not for the redrawing of the protected districts.

27. On page 68 of the Trende Report, Dr. Trende states that “If we look at the spread between the highest and lowest HVAP value [in congressional districts 19, 24, 26, 27, and 28], Maps A, C1, C2 and D all have higher HVAPs than the Enacted Map. Note that, elsewhere in her report, Dr. Abbott suggests that such high spreads indicate potential racial gerrymandering.” Dr. Trende is conflating my arguments, however, comparing apples to oranges. While he is talking about the spread of HVAP among all districts – both protected and non-protected – in the beginning of his claim, he is referencing my discussion of the variation in HVAP *within* protected districts (where a low spread would be indicative of spreading Hispanic voters uniformly throughout those districts, and a high spread would not) versus the difference in average HVAP between non-protected districts and protected districts (where a high spread would be indicative of packing Hispanic voters into the protected districts). There is little that can be inferred about a larger or smaller range of HVAP among individual districts without reference to their protected or non-protected status.

28. I disagree that using split precincts as a reference point is not useful or of “dubious value,” (Trende Report, p. 71) even if the Florida legislature does not explicitly consider them during redistricting. Precincts are a very commonly used unit of redistricting,<sup>3</sup> are a default geographic layer in the Florida Legislature's redistricting application, and the fact that the vast majority of precincts were not split during redistricting suggests that their cohesiveness is generally respected. Regardless, comparing splits of precincts with one another is the most justifiable way to determine whether two presumably otherwise similar social and geographical entities were included in one district or another for reasons primarily related to race. Furthermore, even if the enacted plans were drawn without regard to precincts, that makes the clear racial patterns I observe even more remarkable. Whatever the unit of geography used for the analysis – and Dr. Trende does not propose an alternative

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<sup>3</sup> Amos, Brian, Steven Gerontakis, and Michael McDonald. “United States Precinct Boundaries and Statewide Partisan Election Results.” *Scientific Data* 11, no. 1 (2024): 1173.

– the racial patterns are clear.

29. Dr. Trende offers as evidence for why my racialized conclusions are incorrect the fact that “two-thirds of the precincts easily available to map-drawers but excluded were majority HVAP or near-majority HVAP” (Trende Report, p. 75) but fails to recognize that map-makers still picked precincts that were *more* Hispanic than their pair; of course map-makers could not necessarily include all “majority HVAP or near-majority HVAP” (Trende Report, p. 75) precincts along with their pairs that had even greater HVAP for population equalization reasons.

## **2.7 I disagree with Dr. Trende’s opinion that my analysis does not demonstrate that politics predominated in the drawing of the maps**

30. Dr. Trende uses all three of the races I analyzed in my Initial Report (2020 president, 2018 governor, and 2016 president) to argue that Republicans underperformed in districts that I would have predicted that they perform better (Trende Report, pp. 76-77). But he ignores the fact that there is a clear improvement in Republican performance in these districts over time. Considering the most recent election results (2020 president), his argument that these areas did not perform as intended for the Republican candidate does not hold water. Further, Dr. Trende again tries to argue that the strong Republican performance in Hispanic-protected districts that I document in my Initial Report is not “substantive,” opining that “...the results over the three [protected] districts [26, 27, and 28] range over .88 and .7 points for 2020 and 2016 elections, respectively...suggest[ing] that this is not an ‘optimal’ configuration” (Trende Report, p. 77). But he neglects to acknowledge my larger point that – relative to the alternative maps – these spreads in the Enacted Map are much lower than they need to be in order to maintain HVAP-majorities in these districts.<sup>4</sup>

31. With respect to the State House map, Dr. Trende states that “[Republicans] lost every race in two districts (113 and 114)” as evidence that politics

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<sup>4</sup> My analysis is bolstered by actual election results under the enacted plan. In 2022, the Republican congressional candidates won districts 26, 27, and 28 with 70.9, 57.3, and 63.7% of the vote, respectively. In 2024, it was 70.9, 60.4, and 64.6%. <https://results.elections.myflorida.com/>.

could not have predominated in the drawing of the Enacted Map (Trende Report, p. 102). But this fails to recognize that State House districts 113 and 114 are drawn to be about as Republican as they could be given the political geography of the area; this is evident from reviewing the precinct maps, which show higher Democratic concentrations closer to the coasts. That these districts achieved the objective is supported by actual election results—the Republican candidates won districts 113 and 114 with 51.0 and 56.4% of the vote in 2022, and 54.7 and 58.4% in 2024, respectively.

## **2.8 I disagree with Dr. Trende’s opinion that my analyses would identify Dr. McCartan’s maps as racial gerrymanders**

32. First, in response to Dr. Trende’s claim on page 98 of the Trende Report that “...the range of HVAPs across challenged [State House] districts in Maps A1 and A2 is barely larger than in the Enacted Map,” I do not judge which of plaintiff’s alternative maps are preferable. I compared them to the enacted map and concluded whether the alternative maps were an improvement or not. For numerous reasons, I concluded that the alternative maps were an improvement. Dr. Trende’s comparison of the highest and lowest HVAP among the challenged districts in Maps A1 and A2 ignores that there is significantly more variation *within* the group of challenged districts than in the enacted map, even if the outer bounds were similar.

33. Second, Dr. Trende claims that if I were to use the same methods and standards I use in my consideration of the Enacted Plan I would be likely to also “flag Dr. McCartan’s maps as gerrymanders” (Trende Report, p. 78). I disagree with this assessment and stated in my Initial Report that the alternative maps provided by Dr. McCartan did not exhibit the same concerning characteristics as the Enacted Map. And notably, Dr. Trende does not use the same methodology that I did to arrive at his conclusions. I formalize this below by providing a more detailed analysis of a representative selection of the alternative maps employing the same methodology as in my analysis of the Enacted Map in the Initial Report. I have also included cities, precincts, and portions of precincts (in subsections 2.8.3, 2.8.4, and 2.8.5) that have

under 100 voters in response to Dr. Trende's incorrect assertion in note 15 that "Had [precincts and split precincts with less than 100 voters, which were excluded from the initial analysis for tractability reasons] been included, the p-value from a binomial test...would no longer be statistically significant" (Trende Report, p. 74).

### **2.8.1 Regional overview**

34. I go over all of the alternative maps and how they differ in their HVAP composition by district in Table 2 of my Initial Report. With the exception of map B2, there are greater spreads and more variation in HVAP within the three Hispanic-protected congressional districts (26, 27, and 28) in Dr. McCartan's maps compared to those within the Enacted Map.

### **2.8.2 Counties**

35. Table 1 below documents how Collier County is split in the Enacted Map across the challenged congressional district 26 and other non-challenged districts (it is worth noting that the portion of Collier County that is not included in district 26 is contained only in non-Hispanic protected districts – districts 18 and 19). This is reproduced from my Initial Report and shows that HVAP is 18.1 percentage points higher in the portion of Collier County that is contained in district 26. Dr. McCartan's maps do not split Collier County and thus there is no split to compare to the Enacted Map.

36. The next two sections of Table 1 are concerned with the split of Miami-Dade County across district 26 and other districts (middle section) and how Miami-Dade is split across all Hispanic-protected districts (26, 27, and 28). While HVAP remains uniformly higher in the portion of Miami-Dade that is contained in district 26 compared to all other districts across both the Enacted Map and the alternative maps – with the exception of B2 (Trende Report, p. 78, Table 9) – this is not the case when comparing HVAP in the portion of Miami-Dade that is contained in Hispanic-protected districts with the portion that is outside of the Hispanic-protected districts.

Here, Enacted Map's portion of Miami-Dade contained in the protected districts has HVAP that is 41 percentage points greater than the portion outside of the protected districts; this difference is greater than that in all of Dr. McCartan's alternative maps, which range from 3.2 percentage points larger (maps A, C1, C2, and D) to 11.9 percentage points larger (B1). While the portion of Miami-Dade contained in the protected districts is more Hispanic than that outside of the protected districts, this difference is less under the alternative maps, not greater.

Table 1: Demographic and Voting Age Population (VAP) Statistics by County and Plan

	Enacted Plan		A, C1, C2, and D		B1		B2	
	Total VAP	HVAP %	Total VAP	HVAP %	Total VAP	HVAP %	Total VAP	HVAP %
Portion of Collier County in Challenged CD 26	171,564	31.8%	—	—	—	—	—	—
Portion of Collier County Outside Challenged CD 26	141,605	13.7%	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Difference</i>		<i>18.1</i>		—		—		—
Portion of Miami-Dade County in Challenged CD 26	451,934	88.9%	630,600	91.1%	631,754	89.5%	625,615	71.6%
Portion of Miami-Dade County Outside Challenged CD 26	1,726,686	64.9%	1,548,020	61.3%	1,546,866	61.9%	1,553,005	69.2%
<i>Difference</i>		<i>24.0</i>		<i>29.8</i>		<i>27.0</i>		<i>2.4</i>
Portion of Miami-Dade County in “Hispanic Protected” CDs	1,626,450	80.3%	1,801,213	76.4%	1,800,757	74.9%	1,800,472	75.0%
Portion of Miami-Dade County Outside “Hispanic Protected” CDs	552,170	39.3%	377,407	38.6%	377,863	45.8%	378,148	45.6%
<i>Difference</i>		<i>41.0</i>		<i>37.8</i>		<i>29.1</i>		<i>29.4</i>

### **2.8.3 Municipalities and Census-Designated Places (CDPs)**

37. Table 2 puts the data I present in section B (§23) of my Initial Report into a table where I can compare splits of cities and CDPs in the Enacted Plan to those in Dr. McCartan's alternative plans. As I explain in my Initial Report, all of the split cities and CDPs in the Enacted Plan, with the exception of Immokalee, contain much greater HVAP in the protected district portions compared to the portions contained in the adjacent district.

38. This is not true in Dr. McCartan's alternative maps. While the Hispanic-protected district 27 gets a portion of Pinewood CDP that has a larger HVAP than the non-Hispanic protected district 24 in maps A1, C1, C2, and D, map B1 gives district 27 a portion of Pinewood that has a *lower* HVAP than the portion given to district 24. Westview CDP is also split in such a way in map B2 that Hispanic-protected district 26 gets a portion with greater HVAP than that given to district 24, but the portion given to district 24 contains no voters (0 total VAP).

39. Again, based on this analysis, Dr. Trende would be incorrect to claim that I would flag the alternative maps as equally problematic as the Enacted Map.

Table 2: Municipalities and CDPs Split Between “Hispanic Protected” and Other Districts

<u>Enacted Plan</u>						
City/CDP	“Hispanic Protected” CD	Total VAP in “Hispanic Protected” CD	“Hispanic Protected” CD HVAP	Adjacent CD HVAP	Total VAP in Adjacent CD	Adjacent CD
Immokalee CDP*	26	13,169	70.3%	84.6%	3,309	18
City of Miami*	26	53,878	79.6%	39.6%	69,609	24
	27	245,174	78.2%			
Brownsville CDP*	26	2,914	63.7%	43.6%	10,539	24
Gladeview CDP*	26	1,680	92.3%	37.7%	3,966	24
W. Little River CDP*	26	11,877	83.3%	40.4%	15,535	24
<u>Alternative Plans</u>						
City/CDP	“Hispanic Protected” CD	Total VAP in “Hispanic Protected”	“Hispanic Protected” CD HVAP	Adjacent CD HVAP	Total VAP in Adjacent CD	Adjacent CD
Pinewood CDP (A1, C1, C2, D)	27	3,188	39.7%	27.0%	10,025	24
Pinewood CDP (B1)	27	11,482	29.9%	31.1%	1,731	24
Westview CDP (B2)	26	7,736	40.4%	0.0%	0	24

\*Not split between “Hispanic Protected” and other districts in alternative plans.

Yellow shows which side of the split the HVAP is higher on. Pink shows the same thing for splits with less than 100 total VAP.

#### **2.8.4 Precinct splits**

40. Tables 3 and 4 display splits that were given to district 26 and to other, non-protected districts. Table 3 reproduces Table 3 of the Initial Report but responds to Dr. Trende's methodological critiques, for example by adding in precincts that contained splits with 100 or less total VAP. The original Table 3 had 9 out of 12 (75%) splits with a higher HVAP on the district 26 side; the Table 3 produced here (with the under 100 total VAP) pairs has 14 out of 22 (63.6%) splits with a higher HVAP on the district 26 side.

41. Notably, nearly all of McCartan's alternative maps—A, B1, C1, C2, and D—do not have any split precincts contained in district 26.

42. Table 4 repeats the above exercise for Dr. McCartan's alternative map B2. Only 1 out of 3 split precincts has a higher HVAP on the district 26 side, and this pair contains a split with only 89 total VAP.

Table 3: Hispanic Voting-Age Population in District 26 Precinct Split Across Different Congressional Districts, Enacted Plan

<b>VTD</b>	<b>District 26 Split Total VAP</b>	<b>District 26 Split HVAP %</b>	<b>Other District Split HVAP %</b>	<b>Other District Split Total VAP</b>	<b>Other District</b>
Collier 121	461	70.3%	48.7%	39	18
Collier 134	12852	70.2%	84.6%	3309	18
Collier 70	859	23.3%	23.4%	1158	19
Collier 71	6016	67.5%	67.1%	228	19
Collier 79	198	11.6%	7.7%	2241	19
Collier 92	518	88.2%	10.6%	1348	19
Collier 2	1037	12.7%	6.3%	1339	19
Collier 12	3481	9.7%	11.5%	235	19
Collier 72	6653	59.5%	87.2%	47	19
Collier 5	911	5.0%	35.7%	14	19
Collier 131	259	11.2%	0.0%	13	19
Miami-Dade 533	107	33.6%	24.8%	2879	24
Miami-Dade 536	11	18.2%	33.8%	201	24
Miami-Dade 534	28	53.6%	64.4%	4275	24
Miami-Dade 538	5676	56.5%	53.4%	5472	24
Miami-Dade 522	1121	67.7%	40.4%	2632	24
Miami-Dade 512	8	37.5%	41.6%	2219	24
Miami-Dade 264	34	94.1%	53.5%	1852	24
Miami-Dade 282	1275	52.6%	47.8%	2663	24
Miami-Dade 278	401	92.0%	58.3%	12	24
Miami-Dade 249	1340	60.4%	30.8%	1351	24
Miami-Dade 392	34	91.2%	25.2%	139	24

Yellow shows which side of the split the HVAP is higher on. Pink shows the same thing for splits with less than 100 total VAP. Discontiguous precincts are not shown.

Table 4: Hispanic Voting-Age Population in District 26 Precinct Split Across Different Congressional Districts, Map B2

<b>VTD</b>	<b>District 26 Split Total VAP</b>	<b>District 26 Split HVAP %</b>	<b>Other District Split HVAP %</b>	<b>Other District Split Total VAP</b>	<b>Other District Total VAP</b>
Miami-Dade 144	208	30.3%	18.0%	89	24
Miami-Dade 150	380	27.60%	34.70%	973	24
Miami-Dade 149	308	26.60%	36.50%	2725	24

Yellow shows which side of the split the HVAP is higher on. Pink shows the same thing for splits with less than 100 total VAP. Discontiguous precincts are not shown. In maps A, B1, C1, C2, and D, district 26 has no precincts split with non-Hispanic-Protected districts.

### **2.8.5 Neighboring precincts**

43. Tables 5, 6, and 7 repeat the analysis using neighboring, contiguous precincts (some of which are portions of precincts, but these tables do not compare portions of the same precinct, as in the previously discussed Tables 3 and 4). Table 5 reproduces the analysis done in my Initial Report but now includes precincts with total VAP under 100. Including these new segments, the Enacted Map has 69 out of 97 precincts (71.1%) with a higher HVAP on the district 26 side, whereas previously (excluding these low total VAP areas) 61 out of 78 precincts (78.2%) had a higher HVAP on the district 26 side.

44. Table 6 looks at contiguous precincts and portions of precincts in alternative map B1 for Hispanic-protected districts that adjoin non-Hispanic protected district (district 26 and 27). Excluding precinct segments with less than 100 total VAP, 14 out of 21 segments (66.7%) have a higher HVAP on the district 26 side while 20 out of 34 segments (58.8%) have a higher HVAP on the district 26 and 27 sides combined. Including segments with total VAP under 100, 14 out of 24 segments (58.3%) have a higher HVAP on the district 26 side and 23 out of 41 (56.1%) segments have a higher HVAP on the district 26 and 27 sides combined. As is clear, B1 has fewer segments with higher HVAP on the district 26 (or 27) side than the Enacted Map, no matter which way the calculation is constructed.

45. Finally, Table 7 looks at contiguous precincts and portions of precincts in alternative map B2. Here, the Hispanic-protected districts adjacent to non-Hispanic protected districts are districts 26 and 28. Excluding precinct segments with under 100 total VAP, districts 26 and 28 together have 19 out of 32 segments (59.4%) with a higher HVAP on the protected side. Including precinct segments with under 100 total VAP, districts 26 and 28 together have 26 out of 39 segments (66.7%) with a higher HVAP on the protected side. Again, map B2 has fewer segments with higher HVAP on the Hispanic-protected side of the district boundary compared to the Enacted Map.

Table 5: Hispanic Voting-Age Population in District 26 Precincts and Neighbors Across District Boundaries, Enacted Plan

CD 26 VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
Collier 122	147	40.10%	41.50%	200	Hendry 8	18
Collier 122	147	40.10%	70.80%	2888	Hendry 25	18
Collier 122	147	40.10%	48.7%	39	Collier 121*	18
Collier 134*	12852	70.2%	84.6%	3309	Collier 134*	18
Collier 121*	461	70.3%	48.7%	39	Collier 121*	18
Collier 121*	461	70.3%	51.60%	1825	Lee 53*	19
Collier 121*	461	70.3%	20.10%	768	Lee 19	19
Collier 120	11221	48.50%	20.10%	768	Lee 19	19
Collier 120	11221	48.50%	5.60%	6329	Lee 25	19
Collier 118	7658	26.70%	5.60%	6329	Lee 25	19
Collier 62	2340	17.60%	5.60%	6329	Lee 25	19
Collier 139	932	10%	5.60%	6329	Lee 25	19
Collier 57	611	5.10%	20.80%	4060	Lee 24	19
Collier 57	611	5.10%	2.80%	508	Collier 142	19
Collier 58	838	3.10%	6.70%	1428	Collier 30	19
Collier 59	338	5.30%	6.70%	1428	Collier 30	19
Collier 64	3298	13.60%	37.80%	2729	Collier 38	19
Collier 68	3664	4.10%	19.80%	3905	Collier 65	19
Collier 70*	859	23.3%	23.4%	1158	Collier 70*	19
Collier 71*	6016	67.5%	23.4%	1158	Collier 70*	19
Collier 71*	6016	67.5%	67.1%	228	Collier 71*	19
Collier 72*	6653	59.5%	7.7%	2241	Collier 79*	19
Collier 72*	6653	59.5%	87.2%	47	Collier 72*	19
Collier 331	2929	14.60%	7.7%	2241	Collier 79*	19
Collier 79*	198	11.6%	7.7%	2241	Collier 79*	19
Collier 79*	198	11.6%	9.80%	3456	Collier 89	19
Collier 79*	198	11.6%	10.60%	1348	Collier 92*	19
Collier 92*	518	88.2%	10.6%	1348	Collier 92*	19
Collier 69	2248	39.30%	1.70%	873	Collier 95	19
Collier 78	3459	10.70%	1.70%	873	Collier 95	19
Collier 2*	1037	12.7%	6.3%	1339	Collier 2*	19
Collier 3	1695	4.80%	22.60%	1664	Collier 10	19
Collier 12*	3481	9.7%	11.5%	235	Collier 12*	19
Collier 12*	3481	9.7%	18.20%	4759	Collier 4	19
Collier 13	4070	68.80%	18.20%	4759	Collier 4	19
Collier 136	2655	3.60%	18.20%	4759	Collier 4	19
Collier 112	6467	25.90%	18.20%	4759	Collier 4	19

Table 5, continued

CD 26 VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
Collier 15	1542	23%	35.7%	14	Collier 5*	19
Collier 128	1479	3.40%	35.7%	14	Collier 5*	19
Collier 16	161	50.90%	35.70%	14	Collier 5*	19
Collier 5*	911	5.0%	35.70%	14	Collier 5*	19
Collier 5*	911	5.0%	5.60%	868	Collier 6	19
Collier 5*	911	5.0%	4.20%	2377	Collier 21	19
Collier 131*	259	11.2%	3.40%	294	Collier 17	19
Collier 131*	259	11.2%	0.0%	13	Collier 131*	19
Miami-Dade 531A	327	39.10%	24.80%	2879	Miami-Dade 533*	24
Miami-Dade 976	634	56.00%	24.80%	2879	Miami-Dade 533*	24
Miami-Dade 533*	107	33.60%	24.80%	2879	Miami-Dade 533*	24
Miami-Dade 536*	11	18.2%	33.8%	201	Miami-Dade 536*	24
Miami-Dade 534*	28	53.6%	64.4%	4275	Miami-Dade 534*	24
Miami-Dade 534*	28	53.6%	42.80%	5722	Miami-Dade 544	24
Miami-Dade 538*	5676	56.5%	53.4%	5472	Miami-Dade 538*	24
Miami-Dade 999	1087	53.00%	43.10%	1853	Miami-Dade 516	24
Miami-Dade 599	2403	42.30%	53.80%	2375	Miami-Dade 517	24
Miami-Dade 599	2403	42.30%	48.10%	1992	Miami-Dade 518	24
Miami-Dade 535	2378	76.50%	48.10%	1992	Miami-Dade 518	24
Miami-Dade 522*	1121	67.7%	40.4%	2632	Miami-Dade 522*	24
Miami-Dade 512*	8	37.5%	41.6%	2219	Miami-Dade 512*	24
Miami-Dade 261 (pt)	94	28.70%	53.50%	1852	Miami-Dade 264*	24
Miami-Dade 264*	34	94.10%	53.50%	1852	Miami-Dade 264*	24
Miami-Dade 282*	1275	52.6%	53.50%	1852	Miami-Dade 264*	24
Miami-Dade 282*	1275	52.6%	47.8%	2663	Miami-Dade 282*	24
Miami-Dade 266	155	58.70%	47.8%	2663	Miami-Dade 282*	24
Miami-Dade 282*	1275	52.6%	47.8%	2663	Miami-Dade 282*	24
Miami-Dade 282*	1275	52.6%	58.30%	12	Miami-Dade 278*	24
Miami-Dade 400	4	50.0%	58.30%	12	Miami-Dade 278*	24
Miami-Dade 278*	401	92%	58.30%	12	Miami-Dade 278*	24
Miami-Dade 278*	401	92%	59.80%	2452	Miami-Dade 259	24
Miami-Dade 249*	1340	60.40%	59.80%	2452	Miami-Dade 259	24
Miami-Dade 249*	1340	60.40%	30.80%	1351	Miami-Dade 249*	24
Miami-Dade 248	3276	82.80%	53.40%	1439	Miami-Dade 248A	24
Miami-Dade 248	3276	82.80%	20 47.30%	2581	Miami-Dade 245	24
Miami-Dade 246	4986	91.20%	47.30%	2581	Miami-Dade 245	24
Miami-Dade 246	4986	91.20%	51.50%	3620	Miami-Dade 241	24

Table 5, continued

CD 26 VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
Miami-Dade 314	387	91.50%	51.50%	3620	Miami-Dade 241	24
Miami-Dade 314	387	91.50%	45.80%	3318	Miami-Dade 236	24
Miami-Dade 392*	34	91.20%	25.20%	139	Miami-Dade 392*	24
Miami-Dade 306	3424	80.50%	70.10%	3745	Miami-Dade 233	24
Miami-Dade 231	3180	83.80%	70.10%	3745	Miami-Dade 233	24
Miami-Dade 232	3127	77.40%	70.10%	3745	Miami-Dade 233	24
Miami-Dade 232	3127	77.40%	66.40%	1983	Miami-Dade 274	24
Miami-Dade 232	3127	77.40%	68.50%	3445	Miami-Dade 229	24
Miami-Dade 272	3054	84.60%	65.10%	3232	Miami-Dade 291	24
Miami-Dade 201	4273	89.30%	69.50%	3063	Miami-Dade 202	24
Miami-Dade 201	4273	89.30%	58.80%	1945	Miami-Dade 267	24
Miami-Dade 201	4273	89.30%	44.40%	9	Broward W012	25
Miami-Dade 201	4273	89.30%	57.10%	7313	Broward W021	25
Miami-Dade 350	1959	71.80%	57.10%	7313	Broward W021	25
Miami-Dade 303	4668	81.60%	55.80%	3139	Broward W020	25
Miami-Dade 364	4279	88.80%	56.30%	1905	Broward 22	25
Miami-Dade 365	4225	84.20%	56.30%	1905	Broward 22	25
Miami-Dade 365	4225	84.20%	57.10%	7313	Broward W021	25
Miami-Dade 365	4225	84.20%	48.90%	421	Broward 6	25
Miami-Dade 369.0	142	95.10%	58.00%	5328	Broward W014	25
Miami-Dade 369.0	142	95.10%	51.40%	5109	Broward W017	25
Miami-Dade 369.0	142	95.10%	50.50%	7862	Broward W016	25
Miami-Dade 369.0	142	95.10%	48.80%	1505	Broward W015	25

\*Split VTDs.

Yellow shows which side of the split the HVAP is higher on. Pink shows the same thing for splits with less than 100 total VAP. Discontiguous precincts are not shown.

Table 6: Hispanic Voting-Age Population in District 26 Precincts and Neighbors Across District Boundaries, Map B1

"Protected Hispanic" District	"Protected Hispanic" District VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
27	Miami-Dade 13	4537	71.50%	46.80%	4382	Miami-Dade 9	24
27	Miami-Dade 11	3154	67.20%	46.80%	4382	Miami-Dade 9	24
27	Miami-Dade 11	3154	67.20%	28.40%	74	Miami-Dade 10	24
27	Miami-Dade 157	1632	34.60%	28.40%	74	Miami-Dade 10	24
27	Miami-Dade 149	3033	35.50%	28.40%	74	Miami-Dade 10	24
27	Miami-Dade 149	3033	35.50%	54.80%	4009	Miami-Dade 148	24
27	Miami-Dade 150	1353	32.70%	54.80%	4009	Miami-Dade 148	24
27	Miami-Dade 150	1353	32.70%	42.20%	1054	Miami-Dade 169	24
27	Miami-Dade 151	563	41%	32.70%	5704	Miami-Dade 142	24
27	Miami-Dade 151	563	41%	25.40%	2127	Miami-Dade 139	24
27	Miami-Dade 177	1899	43%	25.40%	2127	Miami-Dade 139	24
27	Miami-Dade 152	2314	36%	26.80%	298	Miami-Dade 144	24
27	Miami-Dade 152	2314	36%	23.90%	522	Miami-Dade 137	24
27	Miami-Dade 160	1869	24.50%	28.80%	3551	Miami-Dade 136	24
27	Miami-Dade 160	1869	24.50%	28.80%	3551	Miami-Dade 136	24
27	Miami-Dade 160	1869	24.50%	26.80%	298	Miami-Dade 144	24
27	Miami-Dade 242*	2388	27%	31.10%	1731	Miami-Dade 242*	24
26	Miami-Dade 241	3620	51.50%	31.10%	1731	Miami-Dade 242*	24
26	Miami-Dade 178	1478	39.20%	29.80%	3033	Miami-Dade 135	24
26	Miami-Dade 172A	3	0%	29.80%	3033	Miami-Dade 135	24
26	Miami-Dade 172A	3	0%	25.60%	2464	Miami-Dade 134	24
26	Miami-Dade 240	3514	34.40%	25.60%	2464	Miami-Dade 134	24
26	Miami-Dade 265	122	41.80%	39.50%	2030	Miami-Dade 133	24
26	Miami-Dade 280	1567	22.10%	39.50%	2030	Miami-Dade 133	24
26	Miami-Dade 280	1567	22.10%	16.30%	4144	Miami-Dade 239	24
26	Miami-Dade 280	1567	22.10%	28.60%	1880	Miami-Dade 269	24

Table 6, continued

"Protected Hispanic" District	"Protected Hispanic" District VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
26	Miami-Dade 237	1959	37.70%	28.60%	1880	Miami-Dade 269	24
26	Miami-Dade 296	4091	61.90%	48.00%	1060	Miami-Dade 234	24
26	Miami-Dade 306	3424	80.50%	70.10%	3745	Miami-Dade 233	24
26	Miami-Dade 306	3424	80.50%	86.80%	68	Miami-Dade 303	24
26	Miami-Dade 305	4375	81.70%	89.20%	1551	Miami-Dade 372	24
26	Miami-Dade 352	3736	83.60%	89.20%	1551	Miami-Dade 372	24
26	Miami-Dade 352	3736	83.60%	85.70%	2161	Miami-Dade 302	24
26	Miami-Dade 390	4469	87.80%	85.70%	2161	Miami-Dade 302	24
26	Miami-Dade 390	4469	87.80%	89.20%	4056	Miami-Dade 389	24
26	Miami-Dade 369	142	95.10%	89.20%	4056	Miami-Dade 389	24
26	Miami-Dade 369	142	95.10%	84.20%	4225	Miami-Dade 365	24
26	Miami-Dade 369	142	95.10%	58.00%	5328	Broward W014	24
26	Miami-Dade 369	142	95.10%	51.40%	5109	Broward W017	24
26	Miami-Dade 369	142	95.10%	50.50%	7862	Broward W016	24
26	Miami-Dade 369	142	95.10%	48.80%	1505	Broward W015	24

*\*Split VTDs.*

Yellow shows which side of the split the HVAP is higher on. Pink shows the same thing for splits with less than 100 total VAP. Discontiguous precincts are not shown.

Table 7: Hispanic Voting-Age Population in District 26 Precincts and Neighbors Across District Boundaries, Map B2

"Protected Hispanic" District	"Protected Hispanic" District VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
26	Miami-Dade 13	4537	71.50%	46.80%	4382	Miami-Dade 9	24
26	Miami-Dade 11	3154	67.20%	46.80%	4382	Miami-Dade 9	24
26	Miami-Dade 11	3154	67.20%	28.40%	74	Miami-Dade 10	24
26	Miami-Dade 157	1632	34.60%	28.40%	74	Miami-Dade 10	24
26	Miami-Dade 157	1632	34.60%	36.50%	2725	Miami-Dade 149*	24
26	Miami-Dade 149	308	26.60%	36.50%	2725	Miami-Dade 149*	24
26	Miami-Dade 164	3010	38%	36.50%	2725	Miami-Dade 149*	24
26	Miami-Dade 164	3010	38%	34.70%	973	Miami-Dade 150*	24
26	Miami-Dade 150*	380	27.60%	34.70%	973	Miami-Dade 150*	24
26	Miami-Dade 150*	380	27.60%	42.20%	1054	Miami-Dade 169	24
26	Miami-Dade 151	563	41%	32.70%	5704	Miami-Dade 142	24
26	Miami-Dade 151	563	41%	25.40%	2127	Miami-Dade 139	24
26	Miami-Dade 177	1899	43%	25.40%	2127	Miami-Dade 139	24
26	Miami-Dade 152	2314	36%	18.90%	90	Miami-Dade 144*	24
26	Miami-Dade 152	2314	36%	23.90%	522	Miami-Dade 137	24
26	Miami-Dade 160	1869	24.50%	28.80%	3551	Miami-Dade 136	24
26	Miami-Dade 144*	208	30.30%	28.80%	3551	Miami-Dade 136	24
26	Miami-Dade 144*	208	30.30%	18.90%	90	Miami-Dade 144*	24
26	Miami-Dade 160	1869	24.50%	18.90%	90	Miami-Dade 144*	24
26	Miami-Dade 242*	4119	28.70%	29.80%	3033	Miami-Dade 135	24
26	Miami-Dade 178	1478	39.20%	29.80%	3033	Miami-Dade 135	24
26	Miami-Dade 240	3514	34.40%	0%	3	Miami-Dade 172A	24
26	Miami-Dade 240	3514	34.40%	25.60%	2464	Miami-Dade 134	24
26	Miami-Dade 265	122	41.80%	39.50%	2030	Miami-Dade 133	24
26	Miami-Dade 280	1567	22.10%	39.50%	2030	Miami-Dade 133	24
26	Miami-Dade 280	1567	22.10%	16.30%	4144	Miami-Dade 239	24
26	Miami-Dade 280	1567	22.10%	28.60%	1880	Miami-Dade 269	24

Table 7, continued

"Protected Hispanic" District	"Protected Hispanic" District VTD	Total VAP	HVAP %	Neighboring VTD HVAP %	Total VAP	Adjacent VTD	Adjacent District
26	Miami-Dade 237	1959	37.70%	28.60%	1880	Miami-Dade 269	24
26	Miami-Dade 296	4091	61.90%	48.00%	1060	Miami-Dade 234	24
26	Miami-Dade 306	3424	80.50%	70.10%	3745	Miami-Dade 233	24
26	Miami-Dade 303	68	86.80%	83.80%	3180	Miami-Dade 231	24
26	Miami-Dade 372	1551	89.20%	88.10%	2260	Miami-Dade 300A	24
26	Miami-Dade 372	1551	89.20%	92.50%	4421	Miami-Dade 300	24
26	Miami-Dade 352	3736	83.60%	85.70%	2161	Miami-Dade 302	24
26	Miami-Dade 390	4469	87.80%	85.70%	2161	Miami-Dade 302	24
26	Miami-Dade 390	4469	87.80%	89.20%	4056	Miami-Dade 389	24
26	Miami-Dade 363	10236	90.50%	95.10%	142	Miami-Dade 369.0	24
26	Miami-Dade 368	5086	95.40%	95.10%	142	Miami-Dade 369.0	24
28	Miami-Dade 453	1706	28.50%	95.10%	142	Miami-Dade 369.0	24

*\*Split VTDs.*

Yellow shows which side of the split the HVAP is higher on. Pink shows the same thing for splits with less than 100 total VAP. Discontiguous precincts are not shown.

**2.8.6 Binomial test including precincts and portions of precincts with less than 100 total VAP**

46. Altogether, in the Enacted Map there are 83 precinct pairs or precinct splits out of a total of 119 (69.7%) that contain greater HVAP on the protected side of a district boundary. This means that only 36 out of 119 pairs had greater HVAP on the non-protected side of the boundary. The statistical probability that at most 30.3% would have a lower HVAP on one side of the boundary is 1 in 50,990 or a .002% chance. Contrary to Dr. Trende's assertion, then, including even the smallest precinct segments (by total VAP) does not substantively change my findings or alter the statistical significance of my analysis.

47. Dr. Trende appears to criticize my use of binomial tests but he offers no reason to believe that the limitations of binomial tests he identifies (Trende Report, pp. 13-15) actually apply here.

**2.9 Contrary to Dr. Trende's conclusions, the "In/Out" analysis in the Trende Report provides additional evidence that race was a consideration in the drawing of the Enacted Map**

48. Dr. Trende's "In/Out" analysis (Trende Report, p. 89) actually provides additional evidence that race was a consideration in the drawing of the Enacted Map. Dr. Trende confines his analysis to the aggregate HVAP of the blocks moved into and out of benchmark congressional district 25, concluding that the similar HVAPs of swapped populations do not suggest racial segregation. However, this selective approach ignores the crucial fact that the specific districts involved in these transfers, and the direction of those moves, reveal a clear pattern of racial sorting.

49. A more granular examination of the data shows that the population swaps were not random or race-neutral. Instead, they were highly targeted: lower HVAP areas were systematically moved out of the benchmark Hispanic-protected districts (districts 25, 26, and 27), while higher HVAP areas were moved in, but only between the protected districts. For example, significant numbers of residents with

very high HVAPs (over 90%) were moved from benchmark district 25 into enacted districts 27 and 28, while lower HVAP areas were moved from benchmark district 25 into non-protected districts (18 and 19) which already had much lower Hispanic populations. Conversely, enacted district 26 gained high HVAP areas (particularly from benchmark districts 24 and 27), further concentrating Hispanic voters within the protected districts. These changes are summarized below in Table 8.

Table 8: Population Transfers and HVAP by District

<b>From District</b>	<b>To District</b>	<b>Total VAP Moved</b>	<b>HVAP (%)</b>
25	18	32,792	56.5
25	19	12,446	14.1
25	27	45,391	92.6
25	28	44,546	93.7
19	26	22,540	22.9
24	26	95,312	79.6
27	26	17,247	91.7

50. This pattern is underscored by the fact that no population from benchmark district 25 was moved into non-Hispanic protected districts in Miami-Dade County, indicating that the swaps were intentionally confined to the protected districts. The result of these moves was a tightening of the HVAP range among the three protected districts, decreasing from a 4-point range in the benchmark map to just a 1-point range in the enacted map. At the same time, these changes also increased the average HVAP within the three protected districts. Specifically, the HVAPs of the three benchmark protected districts were 74.4%, 72.4%, and 70.4%, while in the Enacted Map, the corresponding districts had HVAPs of 73.2%, 74.2%, and 73.4% (summarized in Table 9, below). The overall area moved out of the benchmark protected districts had an HVAP of just 66.1%, compared to the 72.4% HVAP of the area covered by the three benchmark protected districts and the 73.6% HVAP of the enacted protected districts. Thus, the areas moved out were disproportionately lower in HVAP, serving to further concentrate the Hispanic population within the three protected districts. All of this is even more remarkable given that the three benchmark Hispanic-protected districts collectively needed to

gain 216,580 total population to meet population targets. Rather than simply adding adjacent, less-Hispanic areas, the districts also shed lower HVAP areas and swapped territory internally, resulting in a higher concentration of Hispanic voters within the protected districts and a balancing of HVAP among them.

Table 9: HVAP Range and Average in Protected Districts

<b>District Set</b>	<b>Districts</b>	<b>HVAP Range</b>	<b>Average HVAP</b>
Benchmark Protected Districts	25, 26, 27	4 percentage pts.	72.4%
Enacted Protected Districts	26, 27, 28	1 percentage pt.	73.6%

### 3 Conclusion

51. The Trende Report and the Gonzalez Report do not provide compelling arguments or substantive analysis that would warrant a revision of the opinions expressed in my Initial Report. Dr. Trende's assessment of my analysis asserts incorrect claims, and attempts to discount standard political science and econometric methodologies in order to undercut my findings. Mr. Gonzalez's assertion that the Enacted Map is simply a result of respecting important political and geographical boundaries is similarly flawed and so broad as to be applicable to nearly any set of boundaries. Ultimately, both reports fail to adequately address the core issue: the choices made in the drawing of the Enacted Map were not racially neutral, but instead were made in a manner so consistent that they cannot be explained by random chance.

52. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed June 20, 2025.



Carolyn B. Abott, Ph.D.

## **Appendix A, Curriculum Vitae**

# Carolyn B. Abott

Baruch College - CUNY  
Department of Political  
Science One Bernard Baruch  
Way  
New York, NY 10010

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Phone: +1 (646) 312-4431  
Email: carolyn.abott@baruch.cuny.edu  
Website: <https://sites.google.com/view/carolynabott/>

## Academic Positions

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Baruch College - CUNY, 2021 —

Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Politics, St. John's University, 2018  
–21

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, John Glenn College of Public Affairs and Department of  
Political Science, The Ohio State University, 2016 – 18

## Education

Ph.D., Politics and Social Policy, Princeton University, 2016

Dissertation: *The Politics of Public Sector Pensions*

Committee: Nolan McCarty, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and Charles Cameron

M.A., Politics, Princeton University, 2013

Fields: American Politics, Formal and Quantitative Methods,  
Inequality and Public Policy

B.A. Economics and Political Science, with High Honors, Swarthmore College, 2008

## Research and teaching interests

American politics, elections, representation and accountability, state and local politics,  
public bud- geting and finance, interest groups and political parties, federalism.

## Publications

**Abott, Carolyn**, Matthew Incantalupo and Akheil Singla. Voter Responsiveness to  
Measures of Local Government Financial Health, *Urban Affairs Review*, forthcoming.

Rauscher, Emily, Greer Mellon, Susanna Loeb, and **Carolyn Abott**. When Money  
Matters Most: Unpacking the Effectiveness of School Spending, *Sociology of Education*,  
forthcoming.

**Abott, Carolyn**. (2025). **The Politics of Public Pensions: Parties, State Govern-  
ments, and Unions**, Columbia University Press.

**Abott, Carolyn**, Matthew Incantalupo and Akheil Singla. (2025). Informing Voters  
about Public Finance: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, *Public Finance Journal*, 2(1),  
pp. 7-20.

**Abott, Carolyn** and Akheil Singla. (2021). Helping or Hurting? The Financial Costs and Benefits of Municipal Bankruptcy, *Public Administration Review*, 81(3), pp. 428-445.

Carolyn B. Abbott

**Abbott, Carolyn** and Akheil Singla. (2021). Service Solvency and Quality of Life After Municipal Bankruptcy, *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy*, 2(2), pp. 249-280.

**Abbott, Carolyn** and Asya Magazinnik. (2020). At-Large Elections and Minority Representation in Local Government, *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(3), pp. 717-733.

**Abbott, Carolyn**, Vladimir Kogan, Stéphane Lavertu, and Zachary Peskowitz. (2020). School district operational spending and student outcomes: Evidence from tax elections in seven states. *Journal of Public Economics*, 183, 104142.

**Abbott, Carolyn**. (2018). Book review of Michael A. McCarthy, *Dismantling Solidarity: Capitalist Politics and American Pensions since the New Deal* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017). *Political Science Quarterly*, 133(2), pp. 371-372.

**Abbott, Carolyn**. (2010). Federal Reserve System. *Encyclopedia of United States Political History, Vol. 7: 1976-present*. Ed. Rick Valelly. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

## Available working papers

“The Bankruptcy of Special Districts in the United States: An Exploratory Analysis” (with Pengju Zhang and Jinah Yoo) **Under review**.

“The Impact of Local Electoral Rules on Government Spending: Evidence from School Districts in California” (with Pengju Zhang)

“The Political Consequences of Local Financial Emergencies” (with Matthew Incantalupo and Akheil Singla)

“Fiscal Federalism and Local Public Good Provision: Examining the Politics and Impact of the State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT) Cap” (with Rahul Pathak)

“A Distaste for Deficits: Voter Opinion and Balanced Budget Laws in the U.S. States”

## Research in progress

“Decoding the Role of Parent-Teacher Associations in New York City School Budgets”

“Analyzing the Impact of Community Boards on Local Governance in New York City”

## Invited talks, presentations, and workshops

“Decoding the Role of Parent-Teacher Associations in New York City School Budgets”  
*Brown Bag Lunch, New York City Independent Budget Office, 2025.*

“Decoding the Role of Parent-Teacher Associations in New York City School Budgets”  
*Public Finance and Budgeting Northeastern Workshop, Howard J. Samuels State and City Policy Center, Baruch College - CUNY, 2025.*

“The Politics of Public Pensions”  
*Keynote Speaker at the 10th Annual Political Science Reception, Baruch College - CUNY, 2025.*

“Analyzing the Impact of Community Boards on Local Governance in New York City”

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*Eugene M. Lang Junior Faculty Research Fellowships Luncheon, Baruch College - CUNY, 2025.*

“Informing Voters about Public Finance: Evidence from a Survey Experiment”

*Government Finance Officers Association Webinar, 2025.*

“Analyzing the Impact of Community Boards on Local Governance in New York City”

*Faculty Research Symposium, Baruch College - CUNY,*

*2025. “The 2024 Election and the State of American Politics,”*

*moderator*

*Baruch College and The Graduate Center - CUNY, 2024.*

“Analyzing the Impact of Community Boards on Local Governance in New York City”

*Eugene M. Lang New Faculty Fellows Luncheon, Baruch College - CUNY, 2024.*

“Fiscal Federalism and Local Public Good Provision: Examining the Politics and Impact of the State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT) Cap”

*Public Financial Management Northeastern Workshop, School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey-Newark, 2024.*

“Fiscal Federalism and Local Public Good Provision: Examining the Politics and Impact of the State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT) Cap”

*Research in Progress Faculty Seminar, Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College - CUNY, 2024.*

“Voter Responsiveness to Measures of Local Fiscal Performance”

*Spring Public Finance Conference, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland,*

*2023. “Voter Responsiveness to Measures of Local Fiscal Performance”*

*Political Science Research Colloquium, Baruch College - CUNY, 2023.*

“Fiscal Federalism and Local Public Good Provision: Examining the Politics and Impact of the State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT) Cap”

*Annual Faculty Research Symposium, Baruch College - CUNY, 2023.*

“A Distaste for Deficits: Voter Opinion and Balanced Budget Laws in the U.S. States”

*Research in Progress Faculty Seminar, Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College - CUNY, 2021.*

Roundtable on Capital Assets Reporting Standards

*Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), 2021.*

“A Distaste for Deficits: Voter Opinion and Balanced Budget Laws in the U.S. States”

*Public Finance Consortium, School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2021.*

“Service Solvency and Quality of Life After Municipal Bankruptcy”

*Local Political Economy Symposium, Bedrosian Center at Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California, 2021.*

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"Municipal Bankruptcy as Policy: Local Fiscal Stress and the Decision to File"<sup>‡</sup>

*Public Financial Management Northeastern Workshop, School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey-Newark, 2020.*

"Municipal Bankruptcy as Policy: Local Fiscal Stress and the Decision to File"

*Fiscal Policy Series, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2019.*

"At-Large Elections and Minority Representation in Local Government"

*Department of Government and Politics Fall Graduate Colloquium, St. John's University, 2018.*

"The Differential Impact of Single-Member and At-Large Voting Districts on Local Democracy: New Tests and Evidence"

*Yale Center for the Study of American Politics Annual Conference, Yale University, 2017.*

<sup>‡</sup>Canceled due to COVID-19 pandemic.

## Conference presentations

Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: 2016, 2017, 2022, 2024.

Annual State Politics and Policy Conference: 2015, 2020.<sup>‡</sup>

Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association: 2015, 2016, 2019, 2020,\*, 2021, 2024.

Urban Affairs Association Conference: 2019.<sup>‡</sup>

Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration: 2024.<sup>‡</sup>

Public Management Research Conference: 2017,<sup>‡</sup> 2023.<sup>‡</sup>

World Social Science Association Annual Conference: 2023.<sup>‡</sup>

Annual Conference of the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management: 2016, 2018,<sup>‡</sup> 2022,<sup>‡</sup> 2023.<sup>‡</sup>

Brookings Municipal Finance Conference: 2020.

Annual State Politics and Policy Conference: 2015, 2020.<sup>‡</sup>

Annual Conference of the Association for Education Finance and Policy: 2019.<sup>‡</sup>

Annual Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management: 2018,

2019.<sup>‡</sup> Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association: 2015, 2017.

<sup>‡</sup>Canceled due to COVID-19 pandemic; \*Canceled due to earthquake; <sup>‡</sup>Paper presented by coauthor.

## Grants, awards, & fellowships

Cycle 56 PSC-CUNY Traditional B Research Award, City University of New York, 2025

(\$6,000) Faculty Research Support Award, Dean's Office, Baruch College, 2025 (\$2,000)

GovFi Prize for Best Paper in *Public Finance Journal* (with Matthew Incantalupo and Akheil Singla), Government Finance Officers Association, 2025 (\$8,000)

*Carolyn B. Abbott*

Samuels Center Faculty Fellowship, Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College, 2024 (\$5,000)

Eugene M. Lang Junior Faculty Research Fellowship Award, Baruch College, 2024 (\$8,000) Cycle 55 PSC-CUNY Traditional B Research Award, City University of New York, 2024 (\$6,000)

GovFi Research Award (with Matthew Incantalupo and Akheil Singla), Government Finance Officers Association, 2024 (\$1,000)

Artinian Award, Southern Political Science Association, 2024 (\$500)

Faculty Fellowship Publication Program, City University of New York, 2024

Cycle 54 PSC-CUNY Traditional B Research Award, City University of New York, 2023 (\$6,000)

Faculty Innovation Seed Grant (with Rahul Pathak), Provost's Office, Baruch College, 2022 (\$12,000)

Cycle 53 PSC-CUNY Traditional B Research Award, City University of New York, 2022 (\$6,000) Travel Grant, APSA Annual Meeting, 2017

Prestage-Cook Travel Award, Southern Political Science Association, 2016

Grant, Graduate Student Travel, Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton, 2015 Grant, Dean's Fund for Scholarly Travel, Princeton, 2015

Grant (with Nolan McCarty), The Social and Economic Effects of the Great Recession, Russell Sage Foundation, 2012 (\$114,921)

Graduate School Centennial Fellowship in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Politics, Princeton, 2010 - 2015

Honorable Mention, National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowships Program, 2010

## Teaching experience

### *Graduate level*

Research Methodology and Quantitative Analysis State and Local Government and Administration Public Budgeting and Finance

### *Undergraduate level*

Public Policy

The Politics of Inequality in the U.S.

Introduction to Public Administration

Research Methods for Political Science and Public

Administration Introduction to American Government

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## Professional service

Senator, Baruch College Faculty Senate, 2025-present

Member, Jessica Plelpi Honors Thesis Committee, 2025

Organizer, Public Finance and Budgeting Northeastern Workshop, 2025

Referee, PSC-CUNY Awards, Economic and Political Science Panel, 2024-present

Member, Baruch Political Science Faculty Peer Observation Committee - 2021-

present Member, Baruch Political Science Student Awards Committee - 2022, 2024-

present Chair, Baruch Political Science Department Colloquium - 2022-present

Member, Committee to Design the Baruch Public Service Capstone Seminar - 2023

Member, Baruch Political Science Search Committee in Comparative Politics - 2021

Co-chair, SJU Government & Politics Committee to Redesign the Public Administration Major - 2019-2021

Member, SJU Government & Politics Graduate Education Policy Committee - 2018-2021

Member, SJU Government & Politics Undergraduate Education Policy Committee - 2018-2021

Referee, *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Economics & Politics*, *Economics Letters*, *European Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, & Politics*, *National Tax Journal*, *Political Analysis*, *Political Behavior*, *Politics & Policy*, *Public Budgeting & Finance*, *Public Finance & Management*, *Russell Sage Foundation*, *Sage Publications*, *Urban Affairs Review*

## Expert witness and/or consultant service

Serrato v. Town of Mount Pleasant. Case No. 55442/2024 (Supreme Court of the State of New York County of Westchester)

GRACE, Inc., et al. v. City of Miami. Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida)

## Appendix B, Additional Maps

Figure B.1:

Mr. Gonzalez's "Commonly Understood" Boundaries in South Florida




Figure B.2:  
Mr. Gonzalez's "Commonly Understood" Boundaries, Central Miami-Dade Inset



## Appendix C, Additional Tables

Table C.1:

Different Combinations of Counties and Districts and Voting Age Population by Race

<b>Region</b>	<b>WVAP</b>	<b>HVAP</b>	<b>BVAP</b>
Enacted 26 and Adjacent Districts (18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28)	32.9%	45.6%	18.9%
Counties Including Enacted 26 (Miami-Dade, Collier)	19.9%	64.1%	14.9%
Counties Including Enacted 26 and Adjacent Counties (Miami-Dade, Collier, Lee, Hendry, Broward, Monroe)	32.4%	46.6%	18.1%
Districts Including Portions of Those Six Counties (17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28)	40.4%	39.5%	16.9%

Table C.2:

District Racial Compositions in South Florida in Enacted Map and Plaintiffs' Maps

<b>District</b>	<b>Enacted HVAP</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>B1</b>	<b>B2</b>	<b>C1</b>	<b>C2</b>	<b>D</b>
26	73.2%	91.08%	89.48%	71.56%	91.08%	91.08%	91.08%
27	74.2%	66.74%	64%	74.17%	66.74%	66.74%	66.74%
28	73.4%	64.97%	64.97%	73.12%	64.97%	64.97%	64.97%
18	23.7%	22.92%	21.69%	21.69%	19.66%	20.37%	22.81%
19	16.2%	23.33%	23.28%	23.28%	23.31%	23.31%	23.28%
20	23.0%	23.61%	23.45%	23.61%	24.28%	24.28%	24.28%
24	38.5%	40.32%	44.50%	44.70%	40.32%	40.32%	40.32%
25	42.3%	33.26%	33.56%	33.26%	33.51%	33.51%	33.51%
17	11.5%	12.71%	12.74%	12.74%	16.08%	15.33%	12.76%
23	20.5%	17.79%	17.95%	17.79%	14.98%	14.98%	14.98%