

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA**

CUBANOS PA'LANTE, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FLORIDA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-21983-JB

Hon. Judge Britt C. Grant

Hon. Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz II

Hon. Judge Jacqueline Becerra

Expert Report of Hannah Walker, Ph.D.

March 21, 2025

CONFIDENTIAL

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I. Executive Summary

1. In this report, I conduct two primary analyses.

2. *First*, I examine past election data from the state of Florida to evaluate voting patterns among Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida, and the voting patterns of white voters statewide. I do this in order to answer the following two questions: 1) whether, and to what extent, Hispanic voters in South Florida typically vote cohesively; and 2) whether, and to what extent, white voters statewide vote as a bloc, and sufficiently such that they are enabled to defeat the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida. I examine Hispanic voting patterns in the following 17 jurisdictions:

- (a) Adopted under the House plan in use from 2012 - 2022, Florida House Districts 103, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118 and 119;
- (b) Adopted under the Congressional plan in use from 2016 - 2020, Congressional Districts 25, 26, and 27;
- (c) Miami-Dade County;
- (d) Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, and Collier County as a group; and
- (e) Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, Collier County, Broward County and Hendry County as a group.

3. To determine whether Hispanic voters in South Florida vote cohesively, I evaluate between 14 and 17 elections in each jurisdiction between 2012 and 2020. In all jurisdictions under study I evaluate 14 statewide elections that occurred during this time period. Statewide elections are of primary importance to this inquiry because they facilitate an evaluation of whether white voters statewide vote as a bloc, and do so sufficiently to defeat the election of the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida. I include an evaluation of endogenous elections in jurisdictions where appropriate between 2016 - 2020, following the 2016 adoption of

Florida's benchmark congressional plan. I do this in order to assess whether patterns of cohesive voting among Hispanic voters in South Florida observed in statewide elections persist in more localized contexts.

4. Overall, I analyze 293 electoral contexts to evaluate the voting patterns of Hispanic voters in South Florida and white voters statewide. I conclude the following:

(a) Evidence that Hispanic voters in South Florida vote cohesively is very weak. A simple majority of Hispanic voters support one candidate over another in the majority of election contexts in all jurisdictions under study, but the party affiliations of the candidate preferred by the simple majority of Hispanic voters vary, and estimates as to who they support and to what degree vary widely. In each of the jurisdictions studied, Hispanic voters' support for a candidate is usually at a level under 60%. Only rarely, in a select few of the jurisdictions, do Hispanic voters consolidate to support a candidate at a level over 70% support.

(b) I evaluate the data both by examining simple scatter plots with fitted lines displaying the association between percent of Hispanic voters in a given precinct and the vote share received by each candidate in a given election. I also evaluate the data using methods of ecological inference to derive estimated levels of support for a given candidate among Hispanic voters in South Florida and among white voters statewide, with 95 percent confidence intervals. I use two methods of ecological inference: iterative

ecological inference and rows by columns. Valence and cohesion of vote patterns among Hispanic voters is not consistently validated across methods.

(c) White voters statewide display patterns of bloc voting in every single election contest evaluated for this report.

(d) To the extent that Hispanic voters in South Florida do vote cohesively, even at the threshold of a bare majority, the preferences of white voters statewide most often align with the preferences of Hispanic voters in South Florida. In other words, when Hispanic voters in South Florida vote cohesively, the majority of white voters statewide usually vote in coalition with them.

(e) In the majority of elections, white voters statewide did not vote such that the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida was defeated. The preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida succeeded statewide in all 14 contests evaluated for this report.

5. *Second*, I assess whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in several alternative configurations of Congressional District 20, Congressional District 24, House District 108 and House District 109 is diminished (retrogressed), as compared to the configurations adopted in the benchmark maps (2016 -20 in the case of CD 20 and CD 24, and 2012-20 in the case of HD 108 and HD 109). In CD 20 I reviewed three alternative configurations; in CD 24 I reviewed three alternative configurations; in HD 108 I reviewed seven alternative configurations; and in HD 109 I reviewed seven alternative configurations offered by Plaintiffs' mapping expert. To do this, I compared the Black voting age population, Black voter registration, Black voter turnout, the Black share of Democratic registration and turnout, the Black share of turnout in Democratic primary elections,

and general and primary election returns across each alternative map as compared to the relevant benchmark districts. I also compared each alternative map to the 2022 adopted maps.

6. I conclude that the alternative maps offered by Plaintiffs perform in ways that are substantially similar to both the benchmark maps and the 2022 adopted maps, and that Black voters' ability to elect preferred candidates is maintained in each of the alternative configurations as compared to the benchmark districts. Specifically:

(a) With respect to CD 20, all but one proposed alternative map falls within one percentage point of the 2022 adopted map in terms of BVAP. In terms of percent of registered voters, all but one alternative map falls within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted map. This trend persists across all measures of turnout. One alternative map (Map CD) proposes more dramatic changes to the racial composition of the district. Even so, all four maps yield election results in both general and primary elections that are substantially similar to those generated by the benchmark and the 2022 adopted maps.

(b) Plaintiffs propose three alternative maps to CD 24. While all three maps propose drops in the share of registered voters, registered Democrats, turned-out voters, and turned-out Democrats who are Black, all three alternative plans yield election outcomes that are substantially similar to those generated under the benchmark and 2022 adopted plans. The average estimated drop in percent of registered voters who are Black ranges from eight to 11 percentage points across the three plans. Even so, an evaluation of general and primary election outcomes finds that election outcomes do not differ from

those observed under the benchmark and adopted 2022 plans. Black voters retain their ability to exert electoral influence under the proposed plans.

(c) I evaluated seven alternative plans for HD 108. The BVAP in all seven plans falls within three percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. In five out of seven proposed plans, the share of registered voters, registered Democratic voters, turned-out voters, and turned-out Democrats in both the primary and general elections falls within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. The two remaining plans fall within 2.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. Accordingly, election returns in both the general and primary elections generated under the proposed plans are not substantially different from those generated under either the benchmark or the 2022 adopted plan.

(d) Plaintiffs propose seven alternative plans for HD 109. In three of proposed maps for HD 109 the share of the electorate who is Black increased across all relevant metrics. In the remaining four, the proposed maps are virtually indistinguishable from the 2022 adopted plan. Likewise, across both general and primary elections each of the seven proposed maps yields election outcomes that are substantively similar to those generated under both the benchmark and the 2022 adopted plan. In the general election, all seven proposed maps return election outcomes that diverge from the benchmark plan by less than two percentage points.

II. Background and Qualifications

7. I am an Associate Professor of Government and Director of Research with the Law Society and Justice Initiative at the University of Texas, at Austin. I received my Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington in 2016. Previous appointments include as a post-doctoral fellow with the Prisons and Justice Initiative at Georgetown University (2016-

2017), as an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Criminal Justice at Rutgers University (2017-2020), and as a visiting scholar with the Russell Sage Foundation (2023-2024).

8. My area of expertise concerns institutional barriers to civic participation including voting, with an emphasis on barriers to participation faced by people impacted by the criminal justice system. I have 25 peer-reviewed articles published or forthcoming, including an award-winning book with Oxford University Press titled “Mobilized by Injustice: Criminal Justice Contact, Political Participation and Race.” My research has been published in the discipline’s leading journals, including *The Journal of Politics*, *Perspectives on Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly* and *Political Behavior*. My research has been recognized for its excellence by my colleagues in Political Science, including multiple best paper awards and the best book in Racial and Ethnic Politics published in 2020 from the American Political Science Association. My research has likewise received recognition for its merit through the award of over a million dollars in funding, cumulatively, from such organizations as Arnold Ventures, the Houston Endowment, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT.

9. My curriculum vitae, including all publications authored in the last ten years, is provided in the Appendix to this report. Previously, I served as a testifying expert for the plaintiffs in *Jones et al. v. DeSantis et al.*, No. 4:19-cv-300 (N.D. Fla.). I additionally developed a report in conjunction with the Harvard Election Project evaluating patterns of racially polarized voting in Jacksonville, Florida, which was submitted to the City Council in consideration of

redistricting matters.¹ In this instance, I am being compensated at a rate of \$275/hour. My compensation is not contingent on any findings or on the result of this proceeding.

III. Part 1: Hispanic Block Voting and Electoral Success in South Florida

A. Racially Cohesive Voting

10. Cohesive voting among racial minorities is understood to be present in a given electoral context when a plurality of a minoritized racial group votes for a given candidate (or initiative/ballot measure). Racially polarized voting is understood to be present when a plurality of the dominant racial group votes for the opposing candidate (or against the relevant initiative/ballot measure). I have been tasked with assessing the extent to which Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida vote cohesively in support of a given candidate across several electoral contexts. I have further been tasked with assessing the extent to which white voters statewide vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable them to defeat preferred candidates of Hispanic voters in South Florida. Thus, the analysis that follows first evaluates the degree to which voting among Hispanic voters can be characterized as cohesive in select jurisdictions; and bloc voting among white voters in the state of Florida.

11. Political scientists evaluate multiple elections to assess whether cohesive voting characterizes the vote choices of different racial subgroups in a relevant geographic unit. In the case of the several jurisdictions in South Florida under consideration in this report, I evaluate every statewide general election between 2012 and 2020. In jurisdictions where appropriate, I also evaluate endogenous elections between 2016 - 2020, following the 2016 adoption of Florida's benchmark congressional plan. If racially cohesive voting is present among Hispanic voters in South Florida, in a two-candidate contest I would expect to see a majority of Hispanic

¹ <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21202913-hannah-walker-racially-polarized-voting-in-jacksonville>

voters to vote to support one candidate (referred to as the Hispanic-preferred candidate) across the majority of elections under evaluation.

12. There is no precise threshold employed by Political Scientists to determine whether a group votes cohesively. Instead, scholars describe cohesion as existing on a spectrum, where bloc voting patterns that fall below 60 – 65 percent or that is inconsistent across elections is typically described as relatively weak evidence of cohesive voting; and bloc voting patterns that fall above 80 – 85 percent and does so consistently across elections is described as relatively strong evidence of cohesive voting (Kurawaki et al. 2023, Ansolabehere et al. 2010). I present estimates of cohesive voting patterns at several thresholds. When estimated vote choice is at or near a simple majority (i.e. Hispanic voters are estimated to support one candidate at or slightly above the level of 50 percent, and estimated to support the alternative candidate at or slightly below the level of 50 percent), we would characterize this as completely non-cohesive. In contrast, when estimated vote choice is at or near 100 percent (i.e. Hispanic voters are estimated to support one candidate at or near the level of 100 percent and estimated to support the alternative candidate at or near the level of zero percent) we could characterize this as completely cohesive. The use of thresholds, which I employ here, can help us evaluate not just whether, but also the extent to which, Hispanic voters in South Florida vote cohesively. I further note that scholars often leverage multiple pieces of evidence to establish whether a group can be said to display patterns of bloc voting. We evaluate the data using different methods in order to validate conclusions derived from each method.

13. Whether racially cohesive voting occurs does not necessarily mean that racially polarized voting occurs. It may be the case that the majority of Hispanic voters support the same candidate as the majority of non-Hispanic voters in the same jurisdiction. The primary questions

of interest here are whether Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida vote cohesively; and whether white voters statewide vote sufficiently as a bloc to defeat Hispanic voters of South Florida's candidate of choice.

14. Details about the elections chosen for analysis are included below. I assess patterns of racially cohesive voting among Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida at the precinct level.² I elaborate further on the empirical choices made for this report below.

B. Ecological Inference

15. To determine if patterns of racially cohesive voting occur, analysts must infer individual-level voting behavior from aggregate data. They do this in the absence of individual-level information about voters who are registered; voters who cast a ballot; and crucially, for whom they vote. Inferring individual-level vote choice based on patterns observed aggregated to some relevant geographic unit (in this case, precincts) is a problem called ecological inference. Often, experts will leverage precinct vote returns (where they very often do not know the breakdown of turnout by race). They will estimate the racial composition of eligible voters in a

² Voter data for statewide elections were retrieved here: <https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/resources>; voter data for endogenous elections were retrieved here: <https://dos.fl.gov/elections/data-statistics/elections-data/precinct-level-election-results/>. The state of Florida's redistricting data make vote returns available at various census geographies, and provide information on voters' race, but do not include turnout estimates among white voters. In order to evaluate the election data at the level of precinct, and to generate estimates of white citizen voting age population necessary to evaluate white voting patterns statewide, I employed methods of areal interpolation. To develop the estimate of white citizen voting population for all election cycle years under study, I drew on American Community Survey 5-year citizen voting age population estimates. These data are made available by the Census and can be retrieved here: <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.html>; and the associated shapefiles can be found here: <https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/time-series/geo/carto-boundary-file.html>. Relevant precinct shapefiles were obtained from the Harvard Voting Election and Science Team: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/electionscience>.

given precinct using methods of spatial interpolation to convert voting age population/citizen voting age population estimates made available via the Census into estimates for the appropriate geographic unit. In this instance, the state of Florida makes counts of total votes and votes cast by Black and Hispanic voters, and counts of total eligible voters and eligible Black and Hispanic voters at various census geographies publicly available for purposes of analysis related to redistricting. This allows for a more precise estimation of the candidate preferences of Hispanic voters than might otherwise be possible were we to employ methods of spatial interpolation that use citizen voting age population – instead of actual voters – as the denominator to estimate vote choice. Statewide vote returns were collected by the state of Florida at the precinct level and then estimated to the Census block level using methods of spatial interpolation; it is therefore necessary to re-aggregate statewide vote returns from the state of Florida’s redistricting data back to the precinct level. In the absence of counts of votes cast by white voters in the state of Florida’s redistricting data, I use citizen voting age population to estimate white voters’ preferences statewide.

16. Even given the provision of estimated vote counts among Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida, I still must estimate individual-level vote choice from aggregated information, and I still do not know exactly how many ballots were cast by Hispanic voters for a specific candidate. To estimate this, experts leverage various methods of ecological inference, including iterative ecological regression, homogeneous precinct analysis, and ecological inference. The R software package, eiCompare (Collingwood et al. 2020), builds upon packages eiPack (Lau, Moore, and Kellermann 2020) and ei (King and Roberts 2016) to streamline analysis of racial bloc voting, and includes several kinds of statistical methods. In this report, I first examine each election at the bivariate level, presenting simple scatter plots with

fitted lines displaying the relationship between percent of voters who are Hispanic in a given precinct and the percent of votes cast for each candidate. I then subject the observed relationships to more rigorous analysis, relying on iterative ecological inference as implemented via eiCompare. I validate these findings using alternative methods of ecological inference where possible. Finally, for each analysis I provide 95 percent confidence bands to demonstrate the range of statistical uncertainty contained in the estimates.

C. List of Elections Analyzed

17. Fourteen statewide elections were selected for evaluation of racially cohesive voting among Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida and for comparison to the voting behavior of white individuals statewide. This amounts to every statewide general election contest held between 2012 – 2020. In addition, where appropriate, endogenous elections were evaluated between 2016 – 2020, following the adoption of Florida’s benchmark congressional plan. Endogenous elections were evaluated for all jurisdictions but Miami-Dade, Collier, and Monroe Counties as a group; and Miami-Dade, Collier, Monroe, Broward, and Hendry as a group. In State House and Congressional elections, elections featured a partisan contest between two candidates. In Miami-Dade County alone, the appropriate contests for evaluation were non-partisan contests for County Mayor. Elections considered for analysis included those in which all voters in each jurisdiction could participate, regardless of party registration. Judicial retention contests that functioned as a referendum on the candidate were omitted for the sake of parsimony. Table 1 displays the elections that met the specifications above and were evaluated for this report; the jurisdictions for which they were evaluated; the candidates featured in each contest; and on balance, the preferred candidate among Hispanic voters.

Table 1. List of Elections Analyzed.

Contest	Cand 1	Cand 2	Pref'd Cand	Jurisdiction
President 2020	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*	All
Governor 2018	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*	All
Atty. General 2018	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*	All
CFO 2018	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*	All
Com. of Ag. 2018	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell	All
US Senate 2018	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*	All
President 2016	Trump*	Clinton	R-Trump*	All
US Senate 2016	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*	All
Governor 2014	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*	All
Atty. General 2014	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*	All
CFO 2014	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*	All
Com. of Ag. 2014	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*	All
President 2012	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney	All
US Senate 2012	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack	All
State House 2020	Fabricio*	Polo	D-Polo	HD 103
State House 2018	Mingo	Polo*	D-Polo*	HD 103
State House 2016	Diaz Jr.*	Petkovitch	R-Diaz Jr.*	HD 103
State House 2020	Barrero*	Porras	R-Barrero*	HD 105
State House 2018	Rodriguez*	Estevez	R-Rodriguez*	HD 105
State House 2016	Trujillo*	Moreno	D-Moreno	HD 105
State House 2020	Rizo*	Collazo	R-Rizo*	HD 110
State House 2016	Olivia*	Puentes	R-Olivia*	HD 110
State House 2020	Avila*	Hancock	R-Avila*	HD 111
State House 2018	Avila*	Ahmed	R-Avila*	HD 111
State House 2016	Avila*	Miyar	R-Avila*	HD 111
State House 2020	Barreiro	Duran*	R-Barreiro	HD 112
State House 2018	Palomino	Duran*	R-Palomino	HD 112
State House 2016	Palomino	Duran*	R-Palomino	HD 112
State House 2018	Parker	Greico*	D-Greico*	HD 113
State House 2016	Parker*	Richardson	D-Richardson	HD 113
State House 2020	Cabrera*	Bado	R-Cabrera*	HD 114
State House 2018	Enriquez	Fernandez*	R-Enriquez	HD 114
State House 2016	Couriel	Baez*	R-Couriel	HD 114
State House 2020	Aloupis*	Browne	R-Aloupis*	HD 115
State House 2018	Aloupis*	Solomon	R-Aloupis*	HD 115
State House 2016	Bileca*	Solomon	R-Bileca*	HD 115
State House 2020	Perez*	Lynch	R-Perez*	HD 116
State House 2018	Perez*	Harden	R-Perez*	HD 116
State House 2016	Diaz*	Rassner	R-Diaz*	HD 116
State House 2020	Rodriguez*	Junquera	R-Rodriguez*	HD 118

Contest	Cand 1	Cand 2	Pref'd Cand	Jurisdiction
State House 2018	Rodriguez*	Asencio	R-Rodriguez*	HD 118
State House 2016	Rivera	Asencio*	R-Rivera	HD 118
State House 2020	Fernandez-Barquin*	Mohammad	R-Fernandez-Barquin*	HD 119
State House 2018	Fernandez-Barquin*	Rassner	R-Fernandez-Barquin*	HD 119
State House 2016	Nunez*	Villanueva	R-Nunez*	HD 119
Congress 2018	Diaz-Balart*	Flores	R-Diaz-Balart*	CD 25
Congress 2016	Diaz-Balart*	Valdes	R-Diaz-Balart*	CD 25
Congress 2020	Gimenez*	Mucarsel-Powell	R-Gimenez*	CD 26
Congress 2018	Curbelo	Mucarsel-Powell*	R-Curbelo	CD 26
Congress 2016	Curbelo*	Garcia	R-Curbelo*	CD 26
Congress 2020	Salazar*	Shalala	R-Salazar*	CD 27
Congress 2018	Salazar	Shalala	R-Salazar	CD 27
Congress 2016	Ros-Lehtinen*	Fuhrman	R-Ros-Lehtinen*	CD 27
County Mayor 2020	Cava*	Bovo	R-Bovo	Miami-Dade
County Mayor 2016	Gimenez* [†]	Regalado [†]	R-Gimenez* [†]	Miami-Dade

Note for all charts: *Denotes winning candidate statewide or, for endogenous elections, in the district or county. [†] Both County Mayor 2016 candidates Gimenez and Regalado were Republicans.

D. Cohesive Voting among Hispanic Voters Across Select Jurisdictions in South Florida

18. I was tasked with evaluating the degree of cohesion among Hispanic voters in the following 17 jurisdictions:

- (a) Adopted under the House plan in use from 2012 - 2022, Florida House Districts 103, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118 and 119;
- (b) Adopted under the Congressional plan in use from 2016 - 2020, Congressional Districts 25, 26, and 27;
- (c) Miami-Dade County;
- (d) Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, and Collier County as a group; and
- (e) Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, Collier County, Broward County and Hendry County as a group.

19. For each jurisdiction, I present scatterplots displaying the bivariate association between percent of those casting a ballot who are Hispanic and candidate choice. This allows me to assess whether patterns of cohesion among Hispanic voters are present in the raw data, prior to any kind of estimation. If Hispanic voters vote cohesively, this should be apparent in the raw data. To more precisely estimate the degree to which Hispanic individuals vote cohesively, and the majority support one candidate over another, I also present estimates derived using methods of ecological inference. Specifically, I evaluate the data using iterative ecological inference (EI) and rows by columns (RxC) as implemented by the R software package eiCompare.

i. *House District 103*

20. Table 2 summarizes the races evaluated for Hispanic bloc voting in House District 103. Table 2 notes whether Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported one candidate over another at levels that meet or exceed three thresholds: 50 percent, 60 percent and 70 percent.

Using methods of ecological inference, if Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported one candidate over another at levels that meet or exceed the threshold in a given contest, this is noted with “Yes” in the respective column. If Hispanic voters are not estimated to meet or exceed a given threshold of support, this is noted with a “No” in the respective column. If there is conflict between the estimates derived from the two methods of ecological inference such that I cannot conclude that they had a preferred candidate, then this is noted with a “No” in the table. Conflict between estimates would arise if estimates suggest that the majority of Hispanic voters supported one candidate over another using one method of inference, but the second method indicates they were split in their support for the candidate. In instances where the second method indicates a majority supported one candidate over another, but the confidence bands around the estimates overlap and estimates for which candidate they supported are not statistically distinguishable from one another, then this suggests that they were split in their support. Finally, I interpret the estimates as conflicted if bloc voting is evident across both methods of inference but the estimated preferred candidate flips. However, if estimates derived from both methods of inference indicate that Hispanic voters supported a given candidate over another and did so at rates that fall at or above the respective bandwidth, I interpret these as consistent even if the estimates themselves are not exactly the same. Of primary importance is consistency in the valence of the estimates and that the estimates are statistically distinguishable from one another such that we can confidently identify a candidate who received the majority of support from Hispanic voters. The column identifying the preferred candidate indicates the candidate who is estimated to have received a majority of votes across methods of inference at or exceeding the threshold of a bare majority. If the estimated preferred candidate flips across methods or

estimates derived from one method are not statistically distinguishable from one another, then the preferred candidate is listed as undetermined.

21. At the threshold of a simple majority, Hispanic voters appear to vote cohesively in 11 out of 17 contests (65%). At the more stringent threshold of 60 percent voting in favor of a given candidate, only five of 17 contests (29%) indicate cohesive voting. In none of the contests evaluated here were Hispanic voters estimated to support a given candidate at the threshold of 70 percent.

22. Figure 1 displays the bivariate association between the percent of votes cast by Hispanic voters and the vote share received by each candidate across the 17 elections under study. Each pair of graphs in each column display the share of votes received by the candidates in a given race. For example, the two panels in the top row and the two left-side columns display the share of votes cast in favor of Democrat Joe Biden (outside left column) and Republican Donald Trump (inside left column) in the 2020 Presidential contest. The left axis of each panel displays the percent of votes each candidate received conditional on the percent of votes cast by Hispanic voters (measured on the bottom axis). As the percentage of voters who are Hispanic increases, so does the share of votes received by Republican candidates, on balance. Hispanic voters appear to vote as a bloc to a lesser degree in endogenous elections (State House 2020, State House 2018 and State House 2016), where they are just as likely to vote for the Democratic candidate as they are the Republican candidate.

23. I subject these bivariate relationships to more precise analysis, using two methods of ecological inference: iterative ecological inference and rows by columns (RxC) as implemented by the R software package eiCompare. I do this in order to validate the estimates derived from each method, and I am looking for estimates that are similar in direction, even if

the size of the estimates are not identical (i.e. if estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest that a majority of Hispanic voters supported the Republican candidate in a given context, I am evaluating whether estimates derived from RxC likewise suggest that a majority of Hispanic voters supported that same candidate in that context). Figure 2 displays the results of this analysis in the context of House District 103. Estimates derived from iterative ecological inference are displayed in the top panel. Those derived from RxC are displayed in the bottom panel. Each race is listed on the left-hand axis. The bars colored in green display estimated levels of Hispanic support for the Republican candidate. The bars colored in blue display estimated levels of Hispanic support for the Democratic candidate. Estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals in black. Candidate names are included next to the bars for ease of interpretation. Stars indicate the candidate that won statewide or, for endogenous elections, in the district or county.

Table 2. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 103.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	No	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	Undetermined
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	No	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	Undetermined
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	No	No	No	Fabricio*	Polo	Undetermined
State House 2018	Yes	No	No	Mingo	Polo*	D-Polo*
State House 2016	No	No	No	Diaz Jr.*	Petkovitch	Undetermined




Figure 1. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 103.




Figure 2. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 103.

24. In 11 out of 17 elections under study, a simple majority of Hispanic voters in House District 103 are estimated to have voted in favor of the Republican candidate. There is a great deal of variation in the estimates generated across the two methods of ecological inference. In particular, while estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest that Hispanic voters voted cohesively in 15 out of 17 elections, estimates from RxC suggest many fewer contests where Hispanic support for one candidate can be statistically differentiated from support for the other. For example, iterative ecological inference estimates suggest that a clear majority of Hispanic voters supported Romney in the 2012 presidential contest. However, estimates derived from RxC indicate that the majority of Hispanic voters supported Obama, but that estimate is not distinguishable from estimated support for Romney. As such, I cannot conclude which candidate Hispanic voters favored in the 2012 presidential contest. I can only confidently conclude that they did so in nine out of 17 contests under evaluation here. Moreover, in only five of 17 contests (29%) did estimated votes exceed the 60 percent threshold. Together with wide variation in estimates across electoral contexts, this provides weak evidence of Hispanic bloc voting in House District 103.

ii. *House District 105*

25. Table 3 summarizes the findings from an analysis of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 105. Hispanic voters are observed to have favored one candidate over another at the threshold of a simple majority in 12 out of 17 elections (70%). At the threshold of 60 percent estimated support for one candidate over another, however, Hispanic voters only voted cohesively in a single election: the 2016 presidential contest, when they voted in support for

Democrat Hillary Clinton. This provides very weak evidence that Hispanic voters voted cohesively in House District 105.

26. Figure 3 displays the bivariate association between percent of voters in precinct who are Hispanic and the vote share for each candidate. Whether Hispanic voters support one candidate over another is unclear from the raw distribution. Lines fitted to the distribution of the raw data suggest that there is no difference between how Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters vote, that on average voters support Republican candidates at only a little over 50%, and there are many homogeneous Hispanic precincts where Republican candidates receive a high percentage of votes, but also many homogeneous Hispanic precincts where Republican candidates receive a lower percentage of votes. It is thus not clear from the raw data whether Hispanic voters in House District 105 vote as a group.

27. When subjecting the relationship between percent of voters in a precinct who are Hispanic and vote share for a given candidate are subjected to more precise analysis using ecological inference, estimates suggest that while a simple majority of Hispanic voters do cohere around a given candidate in the majority of elections evaluated, they do not clearly favor one party over another (estimates displayed in Figure 4). The majority of Hispanic voters supported Republican candidates in nine out of 17 (53%) elections under study, but in only one election does support exceed 60% and in that election Hispanic voters supported the Democratic candidate (2016 presidential contest), not the Republican. The offers very weak and inconsistent evidence for Hispanic bloc voting in House District 105.

Table 3. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 105.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	D-Gillum

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
Attorney General 2018	No	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	Undetermined
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	D-Ring
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	D-Fried*
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	D-Nelson
President 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Clinton	D-Clinton
US Senate 2016	No	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	Undetermined
Governor 2014	No	No	No	Scott*	Crist	Undetermined
Attorney General 2014	Yes	No	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	D-Obama*
US Senate 2012	Yes	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	D-Nelson*
State House 2020	Yes	No	No	Barreiro*	Porras	R-Barreiro*
State House 2018	No	No	No	Rodriguez*	Estevez	Undetermined
State House 2016	No	No	No	Trujillo*	Moreno	Undetermined




Figure 3. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 105.




Figure 4. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 105.

iii. *House District 110*

28. The results of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 110 are displayed in Table 4. A simple majority of Hispanic voters supported one candidate over another in 14 of 16 elections under study (88%). At a stricter threshold of 60 percent or more estimated support for a given candidate, Hispanic votes cohere in eight of 16 elections (50%), but estimated support only exceeds 70% in one election.

Table 4. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 110.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Rizo*	Collazo	R-Rizo*
State House 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Oliva*	Puentes	R-Oliva*




Figure 5. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 110.




Figure 6. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 110.

29. Figure 5 displays the bivariate association between percent of voters who are Hispanic in a given precinct and candidate vote share. As precincts become more heavily Hispanic, the estimated vote share for the Republican candidate increases. Thus, Hispanic voters not only appear to vote coherently, but they do so in ways that contrast with the voting behavior of non-Hispanic voters in House District 110. Figure 6 displays estimated support for a given candidate among Hispanic voters derived from methods of ecological inference. Irrespective of method used, in all but two elections a simple majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported the Republican candidate in a given context. Hispanic support for the Republican candidate exceeds the stricter 60 threshold for bloc voting in 50 percent of elections under study. However, only in the 2014 Attorney General contest does Hispanic support for a given candidate exceed 70 percent. The direction of the estimates displayed is consistent across two methods of ecological inference, even as the estimated size of Hispanics' support varies.

iv. *House District 111*

30. Table 5 displays the results of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 111. Coherent voting patterns among Hispanic voters at the threshold of a simple majority was observed in 14 out of 17 elections (82%). At the threshold of 60 percent estimated vote for a given candidate or greater, Hispanic voters voted coherently in nine of 17 elections (53%). Most often, Hispanic voters supported the Republican candidate. Estimated support for a candidate only exceeded the 70 percent threshold in one electoral contest.

31. Figure 7 displays the bivariate association between percent of votes cast in a precinct by Hispanic voters and the percent of total votes received by a given candidate. Among

the most heavily Hispanic precincts, the Republican candidate's vote share is slightly higher than among those precincts that are more heavily non-Hispanic.

32. Figure 8 displays estimates of Hispanic vote choice derived from methods of ecological inference. Across both methods of ecological inference employed, a majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported the Republican candidate in a given electoral context. In three contests, a clear majority is not consistently estimated to have supported either candidate: the 2016 Presidential contest, the 2012 Presidential contest and 2012 contest for US Senate. In sum, Hispanic voters in House District 111 appear to vote coherently in 14 of 17 (86%) of contests under study, do so at over 60 percent in over half, and do so at over 70 percent in only one contest.

Table 5. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 111.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Avila*	Hancock	R-Avila*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Avila*	Ahmed	R-Avila*
State House 2016	Yes	No	No	Avila*	Miyar	R-Avila*




Figure 7. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 111.




Figure 8. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 111.

v. *House District 112*

33. A summary of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns across 17 elections in House District 112 is displayed in Table 6. Coherent voting patterns at the level of a simple majority is observed in 13 of the 17 elections under study (76%). However, only in four electoral contexts are Hispanic voters estimated to support a given candidate at greater than 60 percent (only 25% of elections under study). In no contest are Hispanic voters estimated to consistently offer 70 percent or greater support for any candidate.

34. Figure 9 displays the bivariate relationship between percent of voters who are Hispanic in a precinct and the share of votes received by a given candidate. As the percent of voters who are Hispanic increases, so too does the share of votes received by (most often) the Republican candidate. However, it is worth noting that in the raw data, even as a simple majority of voters in heavily Hispanic are estimated to support the Republican candidate, they often only just cross 50 percent estimated support for said candidate.

35. I subject these relationships to more precise analysis using two different methods of ecological inference. The estimates derived from these methods are displayed in Figure 10. The estimates derived from iterative ecological inference (top panel) suggest that Hispanic voters vote coherently in support of the Republican candidate in 15 of 17 electoral contexts, at the threshold of a simple majority. However, there is variation across methods of ecological inference. Estimates derived from RxC similarly suggest that Hispanic voters vote as a bloc in 15 of 17 electoral contexts, but in several contexts the candidate they are estimated to support flips, such as in the 2018 contest for US Senate, where ecological inference estimates suggest Hispanic voters supported the Republican candidate Rick Scott, but RxC estimates suggest that they supported his Democratic opponent, Bill Nelson. Reflecting that the closeness of these elections in House District 112, in only four contests did 60 percent or more of Hispanic voters support

one candidate over the other, and in zero contests was that support estimated to exceed 70 percent.

Table 6. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 112.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	No	No	No	Trump*	Biden	Undetermined
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Barreiro	Duran*	R-Barreiro
State House 2018	Yes	No	No	Palomino	Duran*	R-Palomino
State House 2016	Yes	No	No	Palomino	Duran*	R-Palomino




Figure 9. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 112.




Figure 10. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 112.

vi. *House District 113*

36. A summary of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 113 is displayed in Table 7. Bloc voting among Hispanic voters at the threshold of a simple majority was observed in 12 out of 16 elections evaluated for this report (75%). Figure 11 displays the association between the percent of voters in a precinct who are Hispanic and the share of votes each candidate in each election received. The patterns here are somewhat different than those observed in previous jurisdictions. In House District 113, on average Hispanic voters are slightly more supportive of Democratic candidates than of Republican ones in a majority of electoral contexts.

37. Figure 12 displays estimates of Hispanic support for each candidate across 16 elections, derived from iterative ecological inference (top panel) and RxC (bottom panel). Across both methods, in 12 of 16 elections a simple majority Hispanic voters are estimated to support the Democratic candidate. However, in all four contests evaluated that took place in 2014, Hispanic voters are split in who they support: the 2014 contests for Commissioner of Agriculture, Chief Financial Officer, Attorney General and Governor. Moreover, in only four of 16 contests (25%) evaluated here is support estimated to meet or exceed 60 percent across both methods of ecological inference, and in zero contests does support for any candidate exceed 70 percent.

Table 7. Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 113.

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	No	No	No	Trump*	Biden	Undetermined
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	D-Gillum
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	D-Shaw
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	D-Ring
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	D-Fried*
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	D-Nelson

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Clinton	D-Clinton
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	D-Murphy
Governor 2014	No	No	No	Scott*	Crist	Undetermined
Attorney General 2014	No	No	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	Undetermined
CFO 2014	No	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	Undetermined
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	D-Hamilton
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	D-Obama*
US Senate 2012	Yes	Yes	No	Mack	Nelson*	D-Nelson*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Parker	Greico*	D-Greico*
State House 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Parker*	Richardson	D-Richardson




Figure 11. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 113.




Figure 12. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 113.

vii. *House District 114*

38. Table 8 summarizes the results of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 114. A simple majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported the same candidate in 11 out of 17 (65%) of elections analyzed for this report. Estimated support for a given candidate met or exceeded 60 percent in seven out of 17 elections (41%) and in no elections was support estimated to exceed 70 percent.

39. Figure 13 displays the bivariate association between percent Hispanic in a precinct and the share of votes each candidate in a given electoral context received. As the percent of voters who are Hispanic increases, so too does the share of votes received by Republican candidates.

40. Estimates derived from methods of ecological inference are displayed in Figure 14. Estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest that Hispanic voters coherently (16 out of 17 elections, they support the Republican candidate, and do so at levels that exceed 60% in 13 of 17 contests). However, there is variation across methods of inference. Only in 11 of 17 contests (65%) are Hispanic voters consistently estimated to support a given candidate over another at levels that exceed 50 percent. In less than half (seven of 17, or 41%) does support meet or exceed 60 percent.

Table 8. Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 114.

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	No	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	Undetermined
Com. of Agriculture 2018	No	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	Undetermined
US Senate 2018	No	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	Undetermined
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Cabrera*	Bado	R-Cabrera*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Enriquez	Fernandez*	R-Enriquez
State House 2016	No	No	No	Couriel	Baez*	Undetermined




Figure 13. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 114.




Figure 14. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 114.

viii. *House District 115*

41. A summary of the results of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 115 is displayed in Table 9. Patterns of Hispanic bloc voting at the threshold of a simple majority are observed in 13 of 17 (76%) elections under study. At the threshold of 60 percent, bloc voting is observed in 10 of 17 elections (59%). In no elections is Hispanic support for a given candidate estimated to exceed 70%.

42. The distribution of the raw data is displayed in Figure 15. As a precinct becomes more heavily Hispanic, the vote share afforded to the Republican candidate in a given context also increases. Figure 16 displays estimates derived from ecological inference. Across both methods of ecological inference, the majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported the Republican candidate in a given contest. There are three contests where estimates across iterative ecological inference and RxC are conflicted. That includes the 2018 contest for US Senate, the 2018 contest for Commissioner of Agriculture, and the 2018 contest for Chief Financial Officer. Iterative ecological inference yields estimates that suggest the Hispanic population strongly supported the Republican candidate, but estimates derived from RxC suggest instead that Hispanic voters were either divided or supported the Democratic candidate.

Table 9. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 115.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	Yes	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	No	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	Undetermined
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	Yes	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Aloupis*	Browne	R-Aloupis*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Aloupis*	Solomon	R-Aloupis*
State House 2016	Yes	No	No	Bileca*	Solomon	R-Bileca*




Figure 15. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 115.




Figure 16. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 115.

ix. *House District 116*

43. Table 10 summarizes the results of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 116. Bloc voting at the threshold of a simple majority is observed in 16 of 17 elections evaluated (94%). The only election in which I cannot conclude who Hispanic voters supported was the 2016 Presidential contest, where estimates across methods of inference employed are conflicted. Moreover, Hispanic support for one candidate over another exceeds the 60 percent threshold in 10 of 17 elections under study (59%). Where in several jurisdictions, Hispanic support for a given candidate is never estimated to exceed 70 percent, it is estimated to do so in three elections of 17 (18%) in House District 116.

44. The bivariate association between percent Hispanic in a precinct and the share of votes each candidate received in an election is displayed in Figure 17. Precincts in House District 116 are on balance Republican leaning, where even units that are heavily non-Hispanic yield a greater than 50 percent vote share for the Republican candidate in several elections. As the percent of voters who are Hispanic increases, so does Republican vote share.

45. Estimates of Hispanic support for each candidate in a given contest are displayed in Figure 18. Across all contests save for the 2016 Presidential contest, a simple majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported the Republican candidate. Estimated support exceeds 60 percent across two methods of estimation in 10 of 17 contests (59%). In three of 17 contests (28%) does Hispanic support consistently exceed the 70 percent threshold.

Table 10. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 116.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	No	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	Undetermined
President 2016	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	R-Trump*
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	Yes	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	Yes	Perez*	Lynch	R-Perez*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Perez*	Harden	R-Perez*
State House 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Diaz*	Rassner	R-Diaz*




Figure 17. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 116.




Figure 18. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 116.

x. *House District 118*

46. Table 11 summarizes the results of an evaluation of Hispanic voting patterns in House District 118. Hispanic voters were observed to have voted in favor of one candidate over another at the threshold of a simple majority in 11 out of 17 (65%) elections evaluated. They were estimated to have supported one candidate over another at the threshold of 60 percent in five out of 17 elections evaluated (30%), and in two of 17 (12%) they were estimated to have supported one candidate over another at the level of 70 percent.

47. Figure 19 displays the bivariate association between percent of voters in a precinct who are Hispanic and the share of overall votes received by a candidate in an election. In precincts that are heavily Hispanic, Republican candidates receive the majority of votes.

48. Figure 20 displays estimated Hispanic support for each candidate in a given election derived from methods of ecological inference. Estimates derived using iterative ecological inference suggest that the majority of Hispanic voters cast ballots in favor of the Republican candidate in all elections under study, and in all but one election support is estimated to have exceeded 60 percent. However, estimates derived using RxC do not validate these estimates in six contests, where instead Hispanic voters appear to be split.

Table 11. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 118.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	No	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	Undetermined
Com. of Agriculture 2018	No	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	Undetermined
US Senate 2018	No	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	Undetermined
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rodriguez*	Junquera	R-Rodriguez*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Rodriguez*	Asencio	R-Rodriguez*
State House 2016	Yes	No	No	Rivera	Asencio*	R-Rivera




Figure 19. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 118.




Figure 20. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 118.

xi. *House District 119*

49. An evaluation of the voting patterns of Hispanic voters in House District 119 is summarized in Table 12. Hispanic voters were observed to support one candidate over another at the threshold of a simple majority in 14 out of 17 elections (82%). In only four of 17 elections (24%) did estimated support for one candidate over another exceed the 60 percent threshold, and in only one did it exceed 70 percent. Moreover there is a high degree of variation across the two methods of ecological inference employed here in terms of the degree to which Hispanic voters vote as a bloc.

50. Figure 21 displays the bivariate association between the percent of voters in a precinct who are Hispanic and the share of votes received by each candidate in a given election. The more heavily Hispanic a precinct, the greater the share of votes received by Republican candidates.

51. Estimates of Hispanic support for each candidate in a given election derived from methods of ecological inference are displayed in Figure 22. Estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest that the majority of Hispanic voters supported the Republican in all 17 elections evaluated. In 12 out of 17 elections evaluated, estimated support exceeded 60 percent. However, estimates derived from RxC do not validate these patterns. In 14 elections, that a simple majority of Hispanic voters supported the same candidate is validated, but estimated support only exceeded a stricter threshold of 60 percent in four of 17 elections (24%), and estimated vote choice in the 2016 Presidential contest flipped, where the majority of Hispanic voters were estimated to have supported Democrat Hillary Clinton. Thus, there is a wide variation in estimates between the two methods of ecological inference employed here.

Table 12. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in House District 119.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
State House 2020	Yes	Yes	Yes	Fernandez-Barquin*	Mohammad	R-Fernandez-Barquin*
State House 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Fernandez-Barquin*	Rassner	R-Fernandez-Barquin*
State House 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Nunez*	Villanueva	R-Nunez*




Figure 21. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in House District 119.




Figure 22. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in House District 119.

xii. *Congressional District 25*

52. Table 13 summarizes the races evaluated for Hispanic voting patterns in Congressional District 25. Hispanic voters supported one candidate over another at the threshold of simple majority in 14 out of 16 elections evaluated for this report (88%). In four out of 16 elections (24%), Hispanic voters were estimated to have supported one candidate over another at the threshold of 60 percent. In zero elections were they estimated to have supported a given candidate at or above the threshold of 70 percent.

53. Figure 23 displays the bivariate association between percent of ballots cast by Hispanic voters and candidate choice across the 16 elections under study. The bivariate distribution indicates that Hispanic voters are more often favoring the Republican candidate for office.

54. Across two methods of ecological inference, Hispanic voters were estimated to support a single candidate in 14 of 16 elections (88%, displayed in Figure 24). In four of 16 elections (25%), both methods of inference yield estimates of Hispanic support for the preferred candidate that exceed the 60 percent threshold. There is not a high degree of variation across the two methods of inference. Evidence therefore suggests that levels of support rarely meet or exceed the 60 percent threshold.

Table 13. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in Congressional District 25.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	D-Clinton
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined
Congress 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Diaz-Balart*	Flores	R-Diaz-Balart*
Congress 2016	Yes	No	No	Diaz-Balart*	Valdes	R-Diaz-Balart*




Figure 23. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in Congressional District 25.




Figure 24. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in Congressional District 25.

xiii. *Congressional District 26*

55. Races evaluated for Hispanic bloc voting in Congressional District 26 are displayed in Table 14. Bloc voting at the level of simple majority was observed in 15 of 17 elections (88%) under study. Estimated levels of support meet or exceed the 60 percent threshold in six of 17 elections (35%), and meet or exceed the 70 percent threshold in two of 17 electoral contexts (12%).

56. Figure 25 displays the bivariate association between percent of ballots cast by Hispanic voters and candidate preference. The distribution of the raw data points suggests precincts that are predominately Hispanic yield higher vote returns for Republican candidates.

57. Figure 26 displays the estimated vote choice of Hispanic voters using methods of ecological inference. The top panel displays these estimates using iterative ecological inference. The bottom panel displays these estimates using RxC. There is some variation in the estimates generated by each method, where Hispanic voters are estimated to have offered more support for Democratic candidates in particularly close races using RxC. Across both methods of inference, in 15 out of 17 elections Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported one candidate over another at the threshold of a simple majority. However, the candidate whom they are estimated to have supported flips, where estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest support for the Republican candidate and those derived from RxC suggest support for the Democratic candidate. Moreover, estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest that in 14 of 17 contests (82%) Hispanic voters were estimated to support the Republican candidate at levels that meet or exceed 60 percent, but this was only validated in six electoral

contexts using RxC. Such a high degree of variation in the substance of the estimates undercuts evidence of Hispanic bloc voting in Congressional District 26.

Table 14. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in Congressional District 26.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	Yes	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack
Congress 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Gimenez*	Mucarsel-Powell	R-Gimenez*
Congress 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Curbelo	Mucarsel-Powell*	R-Curbelo
Congress 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Curbelo*	Garcia	R-Curbelo*




Figure 25. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in Congressional District 26.




Figure 26. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in Congressional District 26.

xiv. *Congressional District 27*

58. Table 15 summarizes the races evaluated for coherence in the Hispanic vote in Congressional District 27. Racial bloc voting is observed in 13 out of 17 races (76%) under study at the threshold of a simple majority. At a higher threshold of 60 percent, Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported one candidate over another in only six of 17 elections (35%). Hispanic voters are never consistently estimated to have supported a candidate at levels that meet or exceed 70 percent. There is therefore weak evidence that Hispanic voters vote as a bloc in Congressional District 27.

59. Figure 27 displays the distribution of the raw estimates of percent Hispanic in a given precinct and the percent of votes cast for a given candidate. In precincts that are heavily Hispanic, the majority of voters most often supported Republican candidates.

60. The estimated vote choices of Hispanic voters using methods of ecological inference are displayed in Figure 28. As in Congressional District 26, there is some variation in the estimates generated using iterative Ecological Inference (top panel) and those estimated using RxC (bottom panel). Using iterative ecological inference, Hispanic voters are estimated to have voted as a bloc in 16 out of 17 elections, with the 2016 Presidential contest being the one exception. Using RxC, a majority of Hispanic voters were estimated to have supported the Democratic candidate in the 2018 US Senate, and voters were divided in the contests for Commissioner of Agriculture and Chief Financial Officer. Across both methods of inference, Hispanic voters were estimated to have voted for one candidate over another at the level of simple majority in 13 of 17 elections (76%), but estimated support only consistently exceeds 60 percent in six of 17 elections (35%).

Table 15. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in Congressional District 27.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	No	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	Undetermined
Com. of Agriculture 2018	No	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	Undetermined
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	No	No	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	Yes	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack
Congress 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Salazar*	Shalala	R-Salazar*
Congress 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Salazar*	Shalala	R-Salazar*
Congress 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Ros-Lehtinen*	Fuhrman	R-Ros-Lehtinen*




Figure 27. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in Congressional District 27.




Figure 28. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in Congressional District 27.

xv. *Miami-Dade County*

61. Table 16 summarizes the races evaluated for coherent voting patterns among Hispanic voters in Miami-Dade County. Hispanic voters are observed to have voted in support of one candidate over another at the threshold of a simple majority in 14 out of 16 races (88%) under study. In only five of 16 contests (31%) does the estimated level of Hispanic support for one candidate over another exceed the 60 percent threshold, and in no contests is it consistently estimated to meet or exceed the 70 percent threshold. There is weak evidence of Hispanic bloc voting in Miami-Dade County.

62. The bivariate association between percent of voters who are Hispanic and the percent of votes cast for a given candidate are displayed in Figure 29. Precincts that are heavily Hispanic are characterized by relatively high degrees of support for Republican candidates. But in heavily Hispanic precincts, vote shares in favor of the Republican candidate rarely exceed 75%, suggesting greater heterogeneity in vote preferences among Hispanic voters than among non-Hispanic voters.

63. The estimated vote choices of Hispanic voters using methods of ecological inference are displayed in Figure 30. As in previous jurisdictions, there is some variation across methods of estimation in who Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported. This variation occurs with respect to the 2018 US Senate, Commissioner of Agriculture, and Chief Financial Officer contests, reflecting that the overall outcomes of these contests statewide were extremely close. Using iterative ecological inference, Hispanic voters are estimated to have voted as a bloc in 15 of 16 contests evaluated for this report, with the exception of the 2016 Presidential contest, when voters were exactly evenly divided. In all other contests, the majority of Hispanic voters were estimated to have supported the Republican candidate, with the exception of the 2016 contest for County Mayor. Contests for County Mayor are non-partisan. Daniella Cava is a

Democrat, and Hispanic voters voted as a bloc in favor of her opponent, Esteban Bovo, who is a Republican. In 2016, both candidates were Republican. Hispanic voters voted as a bloc for Carlos Gimenez.

64. However, using RxC, a majority of Hispanic voters were estimated to have supported the Democratic candidate in the 2018 US Senate, Commissioner of Agriculture and Chief Financial Officer contests. While estimated support by Hispanic voters for these candidates exceeded 51%, estimates nevertheless highlight the closeness of the races overall. The most conservative estimate, then, is that Hispanic voters consistently voted as a bloc that exceeds 60 percent in only five of 16 elections (31%) evaluated for this report.

Table 16. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in Miami-Dade County.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	Desantis*	Gillum	R-Desantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	Yes	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack
County Mayor 2020	Yes	Yes	No	Bovo	Cava*	R-Bovo
County Mayor 2016	Yes	No	No	Gimenez*†	Regalado†	R-Gimenez*†

Note: † Both candidates in the nonpartisan County Mayor 2016 race were Republicans.




Figure 29. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in Miami-Dade County.




Figure 30. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in Miami-Dade County.

xvi. *Miami-Dade, Monroe and Collier Counties (as a group)*

65. I was further tasked with evaluating Hispanic voting patterns in a cluster of three counties that comprise the southwestern tip of the state of Florida: Miami-Dade, Monroe and Collier Counties. There is limited evidence that Hispanic voters vote coherently in this cluster. Table 17 summarizes the elections evaluated for this report. At the threshold of a simple majority, Hispanic bloc voting is observed in 11 out of 14 elections under study. Only in one election is Hispanic support for a given candidate consistently estimated to exceed 60 percent, and that is the 2014 contest for Attorney General.

66. Figure 31 displays the bivariate association between percent Hispanic in a precinct and the vote shares for a candidate in that unit. As the percent of voters who are Hispanic in a precinct increases, the estimated vote share for Democratic candidates decreases. Among those units that are very heavily Hispanic, the estimated vote share for the Republican candidate consistently exceeds 50%, even as there several units that are heavily non-Hispanic that support Republican candidates at even higher rates. This suggests that Hispanic voters in Florida's southern three counties vote most often in favor of Republican candidates.

67. Figure 32 displays the estimated vote choices of Hispanic voters in Miami-Dade, Monroe and Collier Counties. Once again, there is some variation across methods of estimation as to who Hispanic voters supported, and this variation specifically occurs with reference to the 2018 US Senate, Commissioner of Agriculture, and Chief Financial Officer contests. The majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported the Republican candidate in these elections using iterative ecological inference, but the Democratic candidate when using RxC. Given that the races statewide were extremely close and that there is discrepancy across the two methods of ecological inference, in these three contexts it is not clear which candidate Hispanic voters favored. Thus, Hispanic voters voted coherently at the simple-majority threshold and

clearly favored one candidate over another in 11 out of 14 contests (79%) under evaluation. Moreover, Hispanic voters are consistently estimated to have supported one candidate over another in only one of 14 elections evaluated for this report. There is thus weak evidence that Hispanic voters vote as a bloc in the Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Collier County cluster in South Florida.

Table 17. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in Miami-Dade, Monroe and Collier Counties.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	R-DeSantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	No	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	Undetermined
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined




Figure 31. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in Miami-Dade, Monroe and Collier Counties (grouped).




Figure 32. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in Miami-Dade, Monroe and Collier Counties (grouped).

xvii. *Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward and Hendry Counties (as a group)*

68. Finally, I was tasked with evaluating whether Hispanic voters vote coherently in a cluster of five counties that cover the southern portion of the state of Florida, and include the three counties analyzed above: Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward and Hendry Counties. In this cluster of five counties, Hispanic bloc voting at the threshold of a simple majority is observed in eight of 14 elections (57%). Estimated support for one candidate over another is only consistently estimated to meet or exceed the 60 percent threshold in one election (the 2014 contest for Attorney General). There is thus only weak evidence that Hispanic voters vote as a bloc in this cluster of five counties in South Florida.

69. Figure 33 displays the bivariate association between percent Hispanic in a given geographic unit and the vote shares for a candidate in that unit. Patterns in this cluster of five counties are similar to those observed above when omitting Hendry and Broward Counties, insofar as, on balance, higher concentrations of Hispanic voters are associated with greater support for Republican candidates.

70. The estimated vote choices of Hispanic voters in Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Hendry and Broward Counties are displayed in Figure 34. Estimates derived from iterative Ecological Inference are displayed in the top panel and those derived from RxC are displayed in the bottom panel. As in the previous evaluation of three counties, there is a high degree of variation in the estimates derived from these two methods. We consistently observe that Hispanic voters fail to vote as a bloc in the 2012 Presidential contest and the 2012 contest for US Senate. Hispanic voters consistently vote as a bloc at the threshold of a simple majority and in support of the Republican candidate in the following six contests: 2014 Attorney General, 2014 Governor, 2016 US Senate, 2018 Attorney General, 2018 Governor and 2020 Presidential. In the 2016

Presidential contest, the majority of Hispanic voters are estimated to have supported Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. In the following three electoral contests, while Hispanic voters are estimated to have voted in support of one candidate over another, it is unclear which candidate they favored because the estimated preferred candidate flipped across the two methods of inference: 2018 US Senate, 2018 Commissioner of Agriculture, and 2018 Chief Financial Officer. In the 2014 contests for Commissioner of Agriculture and Chief Financial Officer, estimates derived from RxC suggest that Hispanic voters were exactly evenly divided, while estimates derived from iterative ecological inference suggest that Hispanics voted as a bloc for the Republican candidate. There is not much evidence that Hispanic voters vote coherently in the Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward, Hendry County cluster in South Florida.

Table 18. *Summary of Hispanic Bloc Voting in Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward and Hendry Counties.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	No	No	No	DeSantis*	Gillum	Undetermined
Attorney General 2018	Yes	No	No	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	No	No	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	No	No	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	No	No	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	Yes	No	No	Trump*	Clinton	D-Clinton
US Senate 2016	Yes	No	No	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	No	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	No	No	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	No	No	No	Putnam*	Hamilton	Undetermined
President 2012	No	No	No	Romney	Obama*	Undetermined
US Senate 2012	No	No	No	Mack	Nelson*	Undetermined




Figure 33. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are Hispanic in Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward and Hendry Counties (grouped).




Figure 34. Estimated Hispanic support for a given candidate in Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward and Hendry Counties (grouped).

xviii. *Summary of Hispanic Voting Cohesion Findings*

71. Table 19, below, summarizes the above findings of how frequently in each jurisdiction Hispanic voters vote for the Republican candidate at the 50%+, 60%+, and 70%+ thresholds in the studied elections.

Table 19. *Summary of Hispanic Support for Republican Candidates in All Jurisdictions Studied.*

	R 50%+	R 60%+	R 70%+
HD 103	10/17 (59%)	5/17 (29%)	0/17 (0%)
HD 105	5/17 (29%)	0/17 (0%)	0/17 (0%)
HD 110	14/16 (88%)	8/16 (50%)	1/16 (6%)
HD 111	14/17 (82%)	8/17 (47%)	1/17 (6%)
HD 112	14/17 (82%)	4/17 (24%)	0/17 (0%)
HD 113	0/16 (0%)	0/16 (0%)	0/16 (0%)
HD 114	11/17 (65%)	7/17 (41%)	0/17 (0%)
HD 115	15/17 (88%)	10/17 (59%)	0/17 (0%)
HD 116	16/17 (94%)	11/17 (65%)	3/17 (18%)
HD 118	11/17 (65%)	5/17 (29%)	2/17 (12%)
HD 119	14/17 (82%)	4/17 (24%)	1/17 (6%)
CD 25	13/16 (81%)	6/16 (38%)	0/16 (0%)
CD 26	15/17 (88%)	7/17 (41%)	2/17 (12%)
CD 27	14/17 (82%)	7/17 (41%)	0/17 (0%)
Miami-Dade	14/16 (88%)	6/16 (38%)	1/16 (6%)
Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier	11/14 (79%)	3/14 (21%)	0/14 (0%)
Miami-Dade, Monroe, Collier, Broward, Hendry	9/14 (64%)	2/14 (14%)	0/14 (0%)

72. In two of the jurisdictions studied, a majority of Hispanic voters preferred Democratic candidates more frequently than they preferred Republican candidates (HD 105 and HD 113). Table 20, below, summarizes how frequently in these two jurisdictions Hispanic voters vote for the Democratic candidate at each threshold in the studied elections.

Table 20. *Summary of Hispanic Support for Democratic Candidates in HD 105 and 113.*

	D 50%+	D 60%+	D 70%+
HD 105	7/17 (41%)	1/17 (6%)	0/17 (0%)
HD 113	12/16 (75%)	4/16 (25%)	0/16 (0%)

E. White Bloc Voting Statewide, and Success of Hispanic Preferred Candidates

73. I was further tasked with evaluating whether, and the extent to which, white voters in Florida vote as a bloc, and sufficiently as to defeat those candidates preferred by Hispanic voters in South Florida. To begin, I present scatter plots displaying the bivariate association between percent of those casting a ballot who are white and candidate choice. In order to more precisely estimate the degree to which white individuals vote as a bloc, and the majority support one candidate over another, I also present estimates derived using methods of ecological inference. However, the question at hand is whether white voters vote as a bloc sufficiently to defeat the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters of South Florida. I therefore present these estimates alongside those of Hispanic voter preferences for each jurisdiction evaluated above. For the sake of parsimony, I present those estimates derived from iterative ecological inference.

74. Table 21 summarizes the findings from an evaluation of the voting patterns of white voters across the state of Florida. White voters were observed to vote as a bloc at the threshold of simple majority in all 14 elections under study. In 12 of 14 elections (86%), estimated support for their candidate of choice exceeded the 60 percent threshold, and in two it is estimated to exceed the 70 percent threshold. The consistency with which they vote as a bloc, most often for the Republican candidate, is reflected in Figure 35, which displays the bivariate association between percent white in a precinct and the vote share received by each candidate in an electoral contest. While there is a great deal of variation in white voting patterns, the general trend emerges that as the percent white in a precinct goes up, so too does the estimated vote share for the Republican candidate.

75. Figure 36 displays estimates of white voting patterns derived from methods of ecological inference. These estimates are displayed alongside those of Hispanic voting patterns

in select jurisdictions in South Florida. Each panel displays a different contest. The white bars at the top of each panel indicate white voters' estimated support for each candidate. White voters display clear preferences for one candidate in every single election under study.

76. In all 14 contests, white voters' preferred candidate is the same candidate as that preferred by Hispanic voters in select jurisdictions in South Florida. Accordingly, the candidate preferred by Hispanic voters in South Florida – to the extent that Hispanics display patterns of bloc voting – succeeded in the contest overall. In sum, white voters statewide do appear to vote as a bloc in the majority of elections under study. However, most often their preferred candidate aligns with the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida. Bloc voting by white voters statewide does not yield the defeat of South Florida's Hispanic voters' preferred candidates.

Table 21. *Summary of White Bloc Voting Statewide.*

Contest	Bloc > 50%	Bloc > 60%	Bloc > 70%	Rep Cand	Dem Cand	Pref'd Cand
President 2020	Yes	Yes	Yes	Trump*	Biden	R-Trump*
Governor 2018	Yes	Yes	Yes	Desantis*	Gillum	R-Desantis*
Attorney General 2018	Yes	Yes	Yes	Moody*	Shaw	R-Moody*
CFO 2018	Yes	Yes	Yes	Patronis*	Ring	R-Patronis*
Com. of Agriculture 2018	Yes	Yes	Yes	Caldwell	Fried*	R-Caldwell
US Senate 2018	Yes	Yes	Yes	Scott*	Nelson	R-Scott*
President 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Trump*	Clinton	R-Trump*
US Senate 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rubio*	Murphy	R-Rubio*
Governor 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Scott*	Crist	R-Scott*
Attorney General 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Bondi*	Sheldon	R-Bondi*
CFO 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Atwater*	Rankin	R-Atwater*
Com. of Agriculture 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Putnam*	Hamilton	R-Putnam*
President 2012	Yes	Yes	Yes	Romney	Obama*	R-Romney
US Senate 2012	Yes	Yes	Yes	Mack	Nelson*	R-Mack




Figure 35. Bivariate association between candidate support and percent of voters who are white, statewide.




Figure 36. Estimated support for a given candidate by Hispanic voters in South Florida and white voters statewide.

F. Conclusion

77. The purpose of Part 1 of this report is to evaluate whether Hispanic voters in South Florida display patterns of bloc voting; and whether white voters statewide also display patterns of bloc voting, and vote as a bloc sufficiently to defeat the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida. To answer this question, I evaluated 14 statewide elections across 18 jurisdictions (17 in South Florida and white voting statewide); and an additional 41 endogenous elections in jurisdictions where appropriate. I conclude that the evidence that Hispanic voters in South Florida vote as a bloc is relatively weak. In every jurisdiction under study, Hispanic voters voted as a bloc at the level of simple majority in the majority of elections evaluated for this report. However, estimated support for a given candidate rarely exceeds a stricter threshold of 60 percent, and there is a great deal of variation in the valence and level of estimated support across methods of evaluation. Most often, Hispanic voters favor the Republican candidate. I further conclude that white voters statewide display patterns of bloc voting, and their preferences most often align with the preferences of Hispanic voters in South Florida, to the extent that Hispanic voters vote as a bloc. Thus, bloc voting by white voters does not yield the defeat of the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters in South Florida in the majority of elections under study.

IV. Part 2: Analysis of Black Voters' Ability-to-Elect in Certain Illustrative Districts

A. Scope of Work and Summary of Findings

78. I was also retained by Plaintiffs' attorneys to assess whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in several alternative configurations of Congressional District 20, Congressional District 24, House District 108 and House District 109 is diminished (retrogressed), as compared to the configurations adopted in the benchmark maps (2016-20 in the case of CD 20 and CD 24, and 2012-20 in the case of HD 108

and HD 109). In CD 20 I reviewed three alternative configurations; in CD 24 I reviewed three alternative configurations; in HD 108 I reviewed seven alternative configurations; and in HD 109 I reviewed seven alternative configurations offered by Plaintiffs' mapping expert. To do this, I compared the Black voting age population, Black voter registration, Black voter turnout, the Black share of Democratic registration and turnout, the Black share of turnout in Democratic primary elections, and general and primary election returns across each alternative map as compared to the relevant benchmark districts. I also compared each alternative map to the 2022 adopted maps.

79. I conclude that the alternative maps offered by Plaintiffs perform in ways that are substantially similar to both the benchmark maps and the 2022 adopted maps, and that Black voters' ability to elect preferred candidates is maintained in each of the alternative configurations as compared to the benchmark districts. Specifically:

- (a) With respect to CD 20, all but one proposed alternative map falls within one percentage point of the 2022 adopted map in terms of BVAP. In terms of percent of registered voters, all but one alternative map falls within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted map. This trend persists across all measures of turnout. One alternative map (Map CD) proposes more dramatic changes to the racial composition of the district. Even so, all four maps yield election results in both general and primary elections that are substantially similar to those generated by the benchmark and the 2022 adopted maps.
- (b) Plaintiffs propose three alternative maps to CD 24. While all three maps propose drops in the share of registered voters, registered Democrats, turned-out voters, and turned-out Democrats who are Black, all three alternative plans yield election outcomes that are substantially similar to those generated under the benchmark and 2022 adopted

plans. The average estimated drop in percent of registered voters who are Black ranges from eight to 11 percentage points across the three plans. Even so, an evaluation of general and primary election outcomes finds that election outcomes do not differ from those observed under the benchmark and adopted 2022 plans. Black voters retain their ability to exert electoral influence under the proposed plans.

(c) I evaluated seven alternative plans for HD 108. The BVAP in all seven plans falls within three percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. In five out of seven proposed plans, the share of registered voters, registered Democratic voters, turned-out voters, and turned-out Democrats in both the primary and general elections falls within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. The two remaining plans fall within 2.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. Accordingly, election returns in both the general and primary elections generated under the proposed plans are not substantially different from those generated under either the benchmark or the 2022 adopted plan.

(d) Plaintiffs propose seven alternative plans for HD 109. In three of proposed maps for HD 109 the share of the electorate who is Black increased across all relevant metrics. In the remaining four, the proposed maps are virtually indistinguishable from the 2022 adopted plan. Likewise, across both general and primary elections each of the seven proposed maps yields election outcomes that are substantively similar to those generated under both the benchmark and the 2022 adopted plan. In the general election, all seven

proposed maps return election outcomes that diverge from the benchmark plan by less than two percentage points.

(e) The above sub-points are meant as a summary of the data and findings presented in this report. The tables containing the full results are found in Appendix A.

B. Data and Analytic Approach

80. I rely on the latest redistricting dataset available in downloadable format from Florida's official 2022 redistricting website, which was created by the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate.³ The data contains the population demographic, voter registration and election data necessary to assess Black voting power across maps. Plaintiffs' counsel provided me with block to district crosswalk files for the proposed maps, the benchmark plans in place prior to 2020 and the 2022 adopted plans.

81. Previous analyses have established that Black voters vote cohesively in South Florida and do so in support of Democratic candidates. Where appropriate, I note the level of Black support for a given candidate present in Florida's redistricting data.

C. Results and Analysis

i. Congressional District 20

(a) Population, registration and turnout by race

82. Plaintiffs propose three alternative maps, which I evaluated relative to both the benchmark map and the 2022 adopted map. The Black voting age population (BVAP) was 52.37% in the benchmark district. The 2022 adopted district drops to 50.11% BVAP (loss of 2.26 percentage points). In two of the three proposed plans the BVAP is within one percentage point of that of the 2022 adopted district. In Illustrative Map B1 the BVAP is 49.04%, in AB2 it

³ <https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/resources>.

is 48.56%. Only in Illustrative Map CD does the BVAP substantially differ and is estimated to be 42.44% (-9.93% relative to the benchmark map) (Table 1, Appendix A).

83. I next evaluate changes in registered voters who are Black. The percent of registered voters who were Black in 2020 in the benchmark plan is 49.68%. In the 2022 adopted plan they were estimated to comprise 46.83% of registered voters in 2020, a loss of 2.85 percentage points. In two of four of Plaintiffs' proposed plans (B1 and AB2) the percent of registered voters who are black fall within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. Only in Illustrative Map CD does the proposed share of registered voters who are Black drop by a larger 11.71 percentage points (Table 1, Appendix A).

84. The share of registered Democratic voters who are Black is a key indicator to determine Black influence. The average share of registered Democrats who are Black across the 2012 – 2020 elections in the benchmark plan was 64.58%. In the 2022 adopted plan, that dropped to 60.93%. In Illustrative plans B1 and AB2, the share of registered Democrats who are Black fall within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. In Illustrative Map CD, the average drops to 50.6% (Table 1, Appendix A).

85. As is the case with voter registration in Illustrative Maps B1 and AB2, while the share of turned-out voters who are Black drops by between 4.6 and 4.99 percentage points from the benchmark plan, the level of Black turnout is commensurate with that in the 2022 adopted plan. In the 2022 adopted plan, Black voters account for 47.88% of turned-out voters, while in the Illustrative Map B1 (for example) the Black share of the electorate is 46.46% (averaged across election years, Table 1, Appendix A).

86. In the benchmark plan the average share of turned-out Democrats who were Black was 66.94%. This dropped to 62.38% in the 2022 adopted plan (a loss of 4.56 percentage points).

In all but Illustrative Map CD, estimated average Black share of Democrats who turned out fall within 1.5 percentage points of the adopted plan. In Illustrative Map CD, this drops to 51.95% (Table 1, Appendix A).

87. With respect to the percent of primary voters who are Black and Democratic primary voters who are Black, the patterns are very similar. On average, in the 2022 adopted plan the share of primary voters who are Black drops by 6.47 percentage points relative to the benchmark plan, and the share of Democratic primary voters who are Black drops by 6.25 percentage points. In all cases but Illustrative Map CD, the Plaintiffs' alternative maps fall within two percentage points of the adopted 2022 plan. In Illustrative Map CD, Black voters share of turnout in the primaries, and turnout in the Democratic primaries drops more substantially, by about 17% relative to the benchmark plan and 11% relative to the 2022 adopted plan (Table 1, Appendix A).

(b) Performance Analysis

88. Election results from 2012 to 2020 demonstrate that Plaintiffs' three illustrative maps all retain a congressional district that will perform for Black voters' candidates of choice. Table 2 in Appendix A displays the estimated support a candidate would receive under a given districting plan, and the difference in support relative to the benchmark plan, inclusive of estimates for the 2022 adopted plan. It is clear that the benchmark district, all four illustrative plans, and the 2022 adopted plan yield similar election results. Across all four of Plaintiffs' proposed maps, Black voters would easily retain their ability to elect their candidate of choice. This is particularly notable in the case of Illustrative Map CD, where larger drops in Black registered voters and turnout were observed. Even given these drops, estimated election returns are very similar to those generated under the benchmark plan and the 2022 adopted plan. For

example, in 2020 presidential election under Map CD, Biden earned an estimated 72.38% of the vote, relative to 27.04% of the vote earned by Trump. This departs from the benchmark plan by 4.92 percentage points, but still yields a substantive outcome reflective of Black preferences. In the other three proposed maps, election returns diverge from the benchmark plan by only a few percentage points, and never such that the preferences of Black voters are undercut.

89. Primary election performance analysis can be found in Table 3 in Appendix A. Similar to the general election analysis in Table 2, results for primary elections demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern whereby Plaintiffs' illustrative maps perform similarly to both the benchmark plan and the 2022 adopted plan.

(c) Conclusion

90. Based on the above analysis, my overall conclusion as to whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in Illustrative B1, AB2, or CD is diminished as compared to Congressional District 20 in the benchmark map, as well as the 2022 adopted map, is that the capacity to do so is not diminished. Across all three maps – even despite some notable drops in registration and turnout in Map CD – Black voters would be able to exert the same influence and be able to elect candidates of their choice in District 20.

ii. *Congressional District 24*

(a) Population, registration and turnout by race

91. Plaintiffs propose three alternative maps, which I evaluated relative to both the benchmark map and the 2022 adopted map. The Black voting age population (BVAP) was 43.62% in the benchmark district. The 2022 adopted district drops to 42.17% BVAP (loss of 1.45 percentage points). In Illustrative Map B1 the BVAP is 36.67% and in B2 it is 36.33% (both

less than six percentage points lower than the 2022 adopted plan). In Illustrative Map ACD the BVAP is two percentage points lower than the adopted plan (40.17%, Table 4, Appendix A).

92. I next evaluate changes in registered voters who are Black. The percent of registered voters who were Black in 2020 in the benchmark plan is 46.17%. In the 2022 adopted plan they made up 44.03% of registered voters in 2020, a loss of 2.14 percentage points. In Illustrative Map B1 and B2 the percent of registered voters who are Black drop by less than 10 percentage points relative to the benchmark district, and by less than eight percentage points relative to the 2022 adopted district. In Illustrative Map ACD the percent of registered voters who are Black drops by a little more than four percentage points relative to the 2022 adopted district (39.83%, Table 4, Appendix A).

93. The share of registered Democratic voters who are Black is a key indicator to determine Black influence. The average share of registered Democrats who are Black across the 2012 – 2020 elections in the benchmark plan was 63.80%. In the 2022 adopted plan, that dropped to 61.93%. The share of registered Democrats who are Black never drops below a majority of voters, decreasing to 54.54%, 54.12%, and 57.23% in Illustrative Maps B1, B2 and ACD respectively (Table 4, Appendix A).

94. In the benchmarks plan the share of turned-out voters who are Black is slightly above 50% (51.88%). In the 2022 adopted plan the share drops to 48.16%. Similar to the 2022 adopted plan, in Illustrative Maps B1, B2 and ACD the average share of turned-out voters who are Black drops to 41.02%, 40.59% and 44.05%, respectively (Table 4, Appendix A).

95. In the benchmark plan the average share of turned-out Democrats who were Black was 66.16%. This dropped to 63.24% in the 2022 adopted plan (a loss of 2.92 percentage points). The estimated average Black share of Democrats who turned out falls below the 2022 adopted

plan in all three illustrative plans – but under all three plans, the average share of turned-out Democrats who were Black remains well above 50% (57.74% in plan B1, 57.28% in plan B2, and 59.91% in plan ACD, Table 4, Appendix A).

96. With respect to the percent of primary voters who are Black and Democratic primary voters who are Black, the patterns are very similar. On average, in the 2022 adopted plan the share of primary voters who are Black drops by 4.99 percentage points relative to the benchmark plan, and the share of Democratic primary voters who are Black drops by 4.58 percentage points. In all three illustrative plans, the share of turned-out primary voters who are Black fall within about five percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan. Under the benchmark plan, the average share of turned-out Democratic primary voters who are Black is 72.46%, and 67.88% under the 2022 adopted plan. Each of the three illustrative plans fall within five percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan, and above 60% in all cases (Table 4, Appendix A).

(b) Performance Analysis

97. Election results from 2012 to 2020 demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ three illustrative maps all retain a congressional district that will perform for Black voters’ candidates of choice. Table 5 in Appendix A displays the estimated support a candidate would receive under a given districting plan, and the difference in support relative to the benchmark plan, inclusive of estimates for the 2022 adopted plan. It is clear that the benchmark district, all three illustrative plans, and the 2022 adopted plan yield similar election results. Across all three of Plaintiffs’ proposed maps, Black voters would easily retain their ability to elect their candidate of choice. Across numerous elections the expected support for the Black preferred candidate diverges from

that under the benchmark plan by seven to eight percentage points. However, the valence of the divergence varies, and in nearly all cases support for the exceeds 70%.

98. Primary election performance analysis can be found in Table 6 in Appendix A. Similar to the general election analysis in Table 5, results for primary elections demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern whereby Plaintiffs' illustrative maps perform such that the Black preferred candidate continues to succeed by healthy margins. Estimated support for the Black preferred candidate never deviates from that observed under the benchmark plan by more than five percentage points, and in most cases estimated support is within 2.5 percentage points.

(c) Conclusion

99. Based on the above analysis, my overall conclusion as to whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in Illustrative Maps B1, B2, or ACD is diminished as compared to Congressional District 24 in the benchmark map, as well as the 2022 adopted map, is that the capacity to do so is not diminished. Across all three maps Black voters would be able to exert the same influence and be able to elect candidates of their choice in District 24.

iii. *House District 108*

(a) Population, registration and turnout by race

100. Plaintiffs propose seven alternative maps, which I evaluated relative to both the benchmark map and the 2022 adopted map. The Black voting age population (BVAP) was 54.89% in the benchmark district. The 2022 adopted district drops to 50.69% BVAP (loss of 4.2 percentage points). In the seven proposed plans the BVAP is within three percentage points of that of the 2022 adopted district. In Illustrative Map A1 the BVAP is 49.21%; in A2 it is 47.98%; in B it is 49.04%; in C1 it is 49.08%; in C2 it is 49.98%; in C3 it is 49.95%; and in C4 it is

49.72% (Maps A1 – C1 are displayed in Table 7, Appendix A; Maps C2 – C4 are displayed in Table 8, Appendix A).

101. I next evaluate changes in registered voters who are Black. The percent of registered voters who were Black in 2020 in the benchmark plan is 54.63%. In the 2022 adopted plan they were made up 49.71% of registered voters in 2020, a loss of 4.92 percentage points. In all seven of Plaintiffs' proposed plans the percent of registered voters who are black drop by between two and three percentage points relative to the 2022 adopted plan. (Table 7 and Table 8, Appendix A).

102. The share of registered Democratic voters who are Black is a key indicator to determine Black influence. The average share of registered Democrats who are Black across the 2012 – 2020 elections in the benchmark plan was 69.29%. In the 2022 adopted plan, that dropped to 64.82%. In Illustrative Map A2, the share of registered Democrats who are Black drops below the enacted plan by just over two percentage points; in all other plans, the share of registered Democrats who are Black fall within 1.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan (Table 7 and Table 8, Appendix A).

103. As is the case with voter registration, while the average percent of turned-out voters who are Black drop in every illustrative map evaluated here, in all but one they fall within two percentage points of the 2022 adopted map. In Illustrative Map A2, the percent of turned-out voters who are Black fall within 2.5 percentage points of the 2022 adopted plan (Table 7 and Table 8, Appendix A).

104. In the benchmark plan the average share of turned-out Democrats who were Black was 69.60%. This dropped to 65.63% in the 2022 adopted plan (a loss of 3.97 percentage points).

In all seven illustrative maps, estimated average Black share of Democrats who turned out fall within 2.5 percentage points of the adopted plan (Table 7 and Table 8, Appendix A).

105. With respect to the percent of primary voters who are Black and Democratic primary voters who are Black, the patterns are very similar. On average, in the 2022 adopted plan the share of primary voters who are Black drops by 4.35 percentage points relative to the benchmark plan, and the share of Democratic primary voters who are Black drops by 3.93 percentage points. In all seven illustrative plans, the Plaintiffs' alternative maps fall within 2.5 percentage points of the adopted 2022 plan (Table 7 and Table 8, Appendix A).

(b) Performance Analysis

106. General election results from 2012 to 2020 demonstrate that Plaintiffs' seven illustrative maps all retain a State House District 108 that will perform for Black voters' candidates of choice. Table 9 and Table 10 in Appendix A displays the estimated support a candidate would receive under a given districting plan, and the difference in support relative to the benchmark plan, inclusive of estimates for the 2022 adopted plan. It is clear that the benchmark district, all seven illustrative plans, and the 2022 adopted plan yield similar election results. Across all seven of Plaintiffs' proposed maps, Black voters would easily retain their ability to elect their candidate of choice. In all seven proposed maps, election returns diverge from the benchmark plan by only a few percentage points.

107. Primary election performance analysis can be found in Table 11 and Table 12 in Appendix A. Similar to the general election analysis in Tables 9 and 10, results for primary elections demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern whereby Plaintiffs' illustrative maps perform such that the Black preferred candidate continues to succeed. In only one instance is this not the case, and this is in the 2014 primary election for Attorney General. In this instance the majority

candidate was Thurston, who achieved 51.65% of the vote relative to Sheldon who achieved 48.22% of the vote. Under schemes proposed by the Plaintiffs Sheldon receives a slight majority of the estimated vote. However, this is also true in the 2022 adopted plan. In the 2022 adopted plan, Sheldon achieves 52.19 percent of the vote and Thurston achieves 47.39 percent of the vote. In every single plan proposed by the Plaintiffs, Thurston's share of the election returns falls within one percentage point of the share garnered under the 2022 adopted plan. This single election, which reflects a less racially polarized result, does not change my overall conclusion as to this district.

(c) Conclusion

108. Based on the above analysis, my overall conclusion as to whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1, C2, C3, and C4, is diminished as compared to State House District 108 in the benchmark map, as well as the 2022 adopted map, is that the capacity to do so is not diminished. Across all seven maps Black voters would be able to exert the same influence as that exerted under the 2022 adopted plan and be able to elect candidates of their choice in District 108.

iv. *House District 109*

(a) Population, registration and turnout by race

109. Plaintiffs propose seven alternative maps, which I evaluated relative to both the benchmark map and the 2022 adopted map. The Black voting age population (BVAP) was 38.39% in the benchmark district. The 2022 adopted district increases to 40.06% BVAP (increase of 1.67 percentage points). In two of Plaintiffs' seven proposed plans the BVAP exceeds the adopted plan by one to two percentage points (A1 and A2). In five of the proposed plans (B, C1, C2, C3 and C4) the BVAP is nearly indistinguishable from the 2022 adopted plan

(Maps A1 – C1 are displayed in Table 13, Appendix A; Maps C2 – C4 are displayed in Table 14, Appendix A).

110. I next evaluate changes in registered voters who are Black. The percent of registered voters who were Black in 2020 in the benchmark plan is 48.12%. In the 2022 adopted plan they were made up 49.82% of registered voters in 2020. In all seven of Plaintiffs' proposed plans the percent of registered voters who are Black increase by one percentage points relative to the benchmark plan. (Table 13 and Table 14, Appendix A).

111. The share of registered Democratic voters who are Black is a key indicator to determine Black influence. The average share of registered Democrats who are Black across the 2012 – 2020 elections in the benchmark plan was 69.73%. In the 2022 adopted plan, that increased slightly to 70.70%. In all seven illustrative plans, the share of registered Democrats who are Black is very similar to that under the 2022 adopted plan (Table 13 and Table 14, Appendix A).

112. As is the case with voter registration, in every alternative map proposed by the Plaintiffs the share of turnout voters who are Black increases. In Illustrative Map A1 it increases by 2.59 percentage points relative to the adopted map. In every other map, it falls within two percentage points of both the benchmark plan and the 2022 adopted map (Table 13 and Table 14, Appendix A).

113. In the benchmark plan the average share of turned-out Democrats who were Black was 72.37%. This increases to 73.99% in the 2022 adopted plan (an increase of 1.62 percentage points). In all seven illustrative maps, estimated average Black share of Democrats who turned

out increases above the benchmark plan and the difference from the 2022 adopted plan is negligible (Table 7 and Table 13 and Table 14, Appendix A).

114. With respect to the percent of primary voters who are Black and Democratic primary voters who are Black, the patterns are very similar. On average, in the 2022 adopted plan the share of primary voters who are Black increases by 3.01 percentage points relative to the benchmark plan, and the share of Democratic primary voters who are Black increases by 1.53 percentage points. In six of seven illustrative plans, the Plaintiffs' alternative maps fall within one percentage point of the adopted 2022 plan. In Illustrative Plan A2, the Black share of Democratic primary voters increases by 1.04 percentage points (Table 13 and Table 14, Appendix A).

(b) Performance Analysis

115. General election results from 2012 to 2020 demonstrate that Plaintiffs' seven illustrative maps all retain a State House district that will perform for Black voters' candidates of choice. Table 15 and Table 16 in Appendix A displays the estimated support a candidate would receive under a given districting plan, and the difference in support relative to the benchmark plan, inclusive of estimates for the 2022 adopted plan. It is clear that the benchmark district, all seven illustrative plans, and the 2022 adopted plan yield similar election results. Across all seven of Plaintiffs' proposed maps, Black voters would easily retain their ability to elect their candidate of choice. In all seven proposed maps, election returns diverge from the benchmark plan by less than two percentage points. In most cases, election returns diverge by less than one percentage point.

116. Primary election performance analysis can be found in Table 17 and Table 18 in Appendix A. Similar to the general election analysis in Tables 9 and 10, results for primary

elections demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern whereby Plaintiffs' illustrative maps perform such that the Black preferred candidate continues to succeed. In only four instances do estimates depart from the benchmark plan by more than two percent. In all other primary contests and map combinations, estimates depart by less than two percent.

(c) Conclusion

117. Based on the above analysis, my overall conclusion as to whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1, C2, C3, and C4, is diminished as compared to State House District 109 in the benchmark map, as well as the 2022 adopted map, is that the capacity to do so is not diminished. Across all seven maps Black voters would be able to exert the same influence as that exerted under both the benchmark plan and the 2022 adopted plan and be able to elect candidates of their choice.

V. References

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct according to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. My work in this matter is ongoing, and I reserve the right to supplement this analysis in the future.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Hannah Walker', is written above a horizontal line.

Hannah Walker
March 21, 2025

APPENDIX A

Table 1. Turnout Statistics for CD20

	FLCD20	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. AB2	AB2 Diff	Illus. CD	CD Diff	CD20 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 Black VAP	52.37	49.04	-3.33	48.56	-3.81	42.44	-9.93	50.11	-2.26
<i>Percent of registered voters who are Black</i>									
Reg Voters 2020	49.68	45.65	-4.03	45.43	-4.25	37.97	-11.71	46.83	-2.85
Reg Voters 2018	49.53	45.16	-4.37	44.99	-4.54	36.70	-12.83	46.38	-3.15
Reg Voters 2016	49.55	44.93	-4.62	44.79	-4.76	35.92	-13.63	46.17	-3.38
Reg Voters 2014	49.47	44.62	-4.85	44.50	-4.97	34.97	-14.50	45.87	-3.60
Reg Voters 2012	48.73	43.72	-5.01	43.61	-5.12	33.91	-14.82	44.90	-3.83
Average	49.39	44.82	-4.58	44.66	-4.73	35.89	-13.50	46.03	-3.36
<i>Percent of registered Democrats who are Black</i>									
Reg Dem 2020	65.27	61.13	-4.14	60.96	-4.31	53.05	-12.22	62.19	-3.08
Reg Dem 2018	64.84	60.41	-4.43	60.27	-4.57	51.67	-13.17	61.50	-3.34
Reg Dem 2016	64.66	59.99	-4.67	59.87	-4.79	50.79	-13.87	61.11	-3.55
Reg Dem 2014	64.64	59.47	-5.17	59.37	-5.27	49.58	-15.06	60.62	-4.02
Reg Dem 2012	63.49	58.11	-5.38	58.01	-5.48	47.91	-15.58	59.23	-4.26
Average	64.58	59.82	-4.76	59.70	-4.88	50.60	-13.98	60.93	-3.65
<i>Percent of turned-out voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020	49.81	45.06	-4.75	44.82	-4.99	37.36	-12.45	46.41	-3.40
Voter Turnout 2018	53.26	47.31	-5.95	47.13	-6.13	38.78	-14.48	48.76	-4.50
Voter Turnout 2016	50.50	45.10	-5.40	44.95	-5.55	36.13	-14.37	46.49	-4.01
Voter Turnout 2014	55.03	47.77	-7.26	47.64	-7.39	37.97	-17.06	49.25	-5.78
Voter Turnout 2012	53.00	47.06	-5.94	46.95	-6.05	36.86	-16.14	48.50	-4.50
Average	52.32	46.46	-5.86	46.30	-6.02	37.42	-14.90	47.88	-4.44
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020	65.40	60.50	-4.90	60.31	-5.09	52.33	-13.07	61.71	-3.69
Dem Turnout 2018	67.54	61.82	-5.72	61.67	-5.87	53.17	-14.37	63.07	-4.47
Dem Turnout 2016	65.39	60.02	-5.37	59.91	-5.48	50.83	-14.56	61.27	-4.12

	FLCD20	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. AB2	AB2 Diff	Illus. CD	CD Diff	CD20 Enacted	Enact Diff
Dem Turnout 2014	69.22	62.09	-7.13	62.00	-7.22	52.45	-16.77	63.41	-5.81
Dem Turnout 2012	67.15	61.12	-6.03	61.03	-6.12	50.96	-16.19	62.42	-4.73
Average	66.94	61.11	-5.83	60.98	-5.96	51.95	-14.99	62.38	-4.56
<i>Percent of turned-out primary voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020 (Prim)	60.17	53.05	-7.12	52.86	-7.31	44.92	-15.25	54.44	-5.73
Voter Turnout 2018 (Prim)	59.61	51.49	-8.12	51.37	-8.24	41.39	-18.22	53.01	-6.60
Voter Turnout 2016 (Prim)	60.84	53.02	-7.82	52.95	-7.89	44.55	-16.29	54.60	-6.24
Voter Turnout 2014 (Prim)	62.58	54.43	-8.15	54.32	-8.26	43.30	-19.28	55.79	-6.79
Voter Turnout 2012 (Prim)	59.52	50.94	-8.58	50.91	-8.61	39.62	-19.90	52.55	-6.97
Average	60.54	52.59	-7.96	52.48	-8.06	42.76	-17.79	54.08	-6.47
<i>Percent of turned-out Democratic primary voters who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020 (Prim)	69.46	62.67	-6.79	62.51	-6.95	54.59	-14.87	64.01	-5.45
Dem Turnout 2018 (Prim)	70.37	62.78	-7.59	62.68	-7.69	52.81	-17.56	64.14	-6.23
Dem Turnout 2016 (Prim)	71.67	63.61	-8.06	63.56	-8.11	54.95	-16.72	65.15	-6.52
Dem Turnout 2014 (Prim)	72.12	64.50	-7.62	64.41	-7.71	53.22	-18.90	65.68	-6.44
Dem Turnout 2012 (Prim)	71.59	63.43	-8.16	63.43	-8.16	51.89	-19.70	64.98	-6.61
Average	71.04	63.40	-7.64	63.32	-7.72	53.49	-17.55	64.79	-6.25

Table 2. General Election Returns for CD20

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLCD20	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. AB2	AB2 Diff	Illus. CD	CD Diff	CD20 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 President	Biden (D)	77.30	75.28	-2.02	75.16	-2.14	72.38	-4.92	75.88	-1.42
	Trump (R)	22.10	24.10	2.00	24.21	2.11	27.04	4.94	23.49	1.39
2018 Governor	DeSantis (R)	17.19	20.09	2.90	20.17	2.98	23.49	6.30	19.39	2.20
	Gillum (D)	82.17	79.23	-2.94	79.15	-3.02	75.83	-6.34	79.93	-2.24
2018 Atty. Gen	Moody (R)	18.17	20.87	2.70	20.94	2.77	23.91	5.74	20.23	2.06
	Shaw (D)	80.59	77.80	-2.79	77.73	-2.86	74.72	-5.87	78.43	-2.16
2018 CFO	Patronis (R)	18.10	20.86	2.76	20.93	2.83	24.02	5.92	20.16	2.06
	Ring (D)	81.86	79.09	-2.77	79.02	-2.84	75.96	-5.90	79.78	-2.08
2018 Comm. Ag.	Caldwell (R)	17.83	20.48	2.65	20.55	2.72	23.42	5.59	19.85	2.02
	Fried (D)	82.14	79.47	-2.67	79.40	-2.74	76.56	-5.58	80.09	-2.05
2018 US Senate	Scott (R)	18.05	20.60	2.55	20.67	2.62	23.54	5.49	19.98	1.93
	Nelson (D)	81.92	79.38	-2.54	79.31	-2.61	76.44	-5.48	79.99	-1.93
2016 President	Trump (R)	18.08	21.00	2.92	21.07	2.99	24.61	6.53	20.38	2.30
	Clinton (D)	80.19	77.21	-2.98	77.13	-3.06	73.53	-6.66	77.84	-2.35
2016 US Senate	Rubio (R)	20.97	23.02	2.05	23.07	2.10	26.50	5.53	22.40	1.43
	Murphy (D)	77.23	75.02	-2.21	74.97	-2.26	71.51	-5.72	75.65	-1.58
2014 Governor	Scott (R)	16.50	18.53	2.03	18.56	2.06	22.19	5.69	17.88	1.38
	Crist (D)	81.51	79.26	-2.25	79.22	-2.29	75.52	-5.99	79.92	-1.59
2014 Atty. Gen.	Bondi (R)	20.63	23.01	2.38	23.07	2.44	26.78	6.15	22.39	1.76
	Sheldon (D)	78.02	75.49	-2.53	75.44	-2.58	71.61	-6.41	76.12	-1.90
2014 CFO	Atwater (R)	22.29	25.22	2.93	25.29	3.00	29.32	7.03	24.47	2.18
	Rankin (D)	77.64	74.71	-2.93	74.64	-3.00	70.68	-6.96	75.47	-2.17
2014 Comm. Ag.	Putnam (R)	20.70	23.75	3.05	23.80	3.10	28.06	7.36	22.93	2.23
	Hamilton (D)	79.23	76.22	-3.01	76.16	-3.07	71.92	-7.31	77.03	-2.20
2012 President	Romney (R)	17.08	19.81	2.73	19.86	2.78	24.42	7.34	19.02	1.94
	Obama (D)	82.51	79.72	-2.79	79.66	-2.85	75.08	-7.43	80.52	-1.99
2012	Mack (R)	15.25	17.52	2.27	17.56	2.31	21.83	6.58	16.81	1.56

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLCD20	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. AB2	AB2 Diff	Illus. CD	CD Diff	CD20 Enacted	Enact Diff
US Senate	Nelson (D)	83.61	81.25	-2.36	81.21	-2.40	76.83	-6.78	81.96	-1.65

Table 3. Primary Election Returns for CD20

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLCD20	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. AB2	AB2 Diff	Illus. CD	CD Diff	CD20 Enacted	Enact Diff
2018 Governor	Gillum	57.40	52.61	-4.79	52.62	-4.78	47.19	-10.21	53.40	-4.00
	Graham	11.80	13.35	1.55	13.37	1.57	14.09	2.29	13.13	1.33
2018 Atty Gen.	Torrens	17.49	18.52	1.03	18.51	1.02	19.59	2.10	18.52	1.03
	Shaw	82.43	81.35	-1.08	81.36	-1.07	80.40	-2.03	81.38	-1.05
2018 Comm. Ag.	Fried	62.93	64.24	1.31	64.30	1.37	66.59	3.66	63.96	1.03
	Walker	20.71	19.83	-0.88	19.79	-0.92	19.15	-1.56	19.87	-0.84
2016 US Senate	Keith	14.47	14.30	-0.17	14.32	-0.15	14.39	-0.08	14.23	-0.24
	Murphy	69.42	69.40	-0.02	69.34	-0.08	68.80	-0.62	69.53	0.11
2014 Governor	Crist	84.59	82.39	-2.20	82.31	-2.28	79.89	-4.70	82.86	-1.73
	Rich	14.37	16.67	2.30	16.75	2.38	19.29	4.92	16.18	1.81
2014 Atty. Gen.	Sheldon	37.06	37.83	0.77	37.86	0.80	38.12	1.06	38.12	1.06
	Thurston	62.36	61.77	-0.59	61.74	-0.62	61.61	-0.75	61.44	-0.92
2012 US Senate	Burkett	12.49	12.62	0.13	12.64	0.15	12.04	-0.45	12.67	0.18
	Nelson	86.01	85.89	-0.12	85.89	-0.12	86.15	0.14	85.87	-0.14

Table 4. Turnout Statistics for CD24

	FLCD24	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. B2	B2 Diff	Illus. ACD	ACD Diff	ACD24 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 Black VAP	43.62	36.67	-6.95	36.33	-7.29	40.17	-3.45	42.17	-1.45
<i>Percent of registered voters who are Black</i>									
Reg Voters 2020	46.17	36.60	-9.57	36.24	-9.93	39.83	-6.34	44.03	-2.14
Reg Voters 2018	47.60	37.50	-10.10	37.10	-10.50	40.74	-6.86	45.57	-2.03
Reg Voters 2016	48.53	37.79	-10.74	37.38	-11.15	41.07	-7.46	46.39	-2.14
Reg Voters 2014	50.75	38.73	-12.02	38.29	-12.46	42.12	-8.63	47.83	-2.92
Reg Voters 2012	51.04	38.51	-12.53	38.08	-12.96	41.79	-9.25	48.20	-2.84
Average	48.82	37.83	-10.99	37.42	-11.40	41.11	-7.71	46.40	-2.41
<i>Percent of registered Democrats who are Black</i>									
Reg Dem 2020	62.15	54.54	-7.61	54.14	-8.01	57.05	-5.10	60.56	-1.59
Reg Dem 2018	62.71	54.44	-8.27	54.03	-8.68	57.10	-5.61	61.28	-1.43
Reg Dem 2016	63.34	54.42	-8.92	54.00	-9.34	57.15	-6.19	61.85	-1.49
Reg Dem 2014	65.44	55.12	-10.32	54.68	-10.76	57.93	-7.51	63.05	-2.39
Reg Dem 2012	65.35	54.20	-11.15	53.77	-11.58	56.93	-8.42	62.93	-2.42
Average	63.80	54.54	-9.25	54.12	-9.67	57.23	-6.57	61.93	-1.86
<i>Percent of turned-out voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020	45.56	36.40	-9.16	36.03	-9.53	39.51	-6.05	42.88	-2.68
Voter Turnout 2018	51.67	41.53	-10.14	41.09	-10.58	44.44	-7.23	47.81	-3.86
Voter Turnout 2016	49.02	38.36	-10.66	37.95	-11.07	41.58	-7.44	45.86	-3.16
Voter Turnout 2014	58.35	46.55	-11.80	46.05	-12.30	49.27	-9.08	53.65	-4.70
Voter Turnout 2012	54.80	42.28	-12.52	41.81	-12.99	45.43	-9.37	50.60	-4.20
Average	51.88	41.02	-10.86	40.59	-11.29	44.05	-7.83	48.16	-3.72
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020	61.87	54.86	-7.01	54.42	-7.45	57.11	-4.76	59.69	-2.18
Dem Turnout 2018	65.68	58.22	-7.46	57.77	-7.91	60.25	-5.43	62.70	-2.98
Dem Turnout 2016	63.49	55.06	-8.43	54.63	-8.86	57.60	-5.89	61.26	-2.23
Dem Turnout 2014	71.52	62.52	-9.00	62.02	-9.50	64.19	-7.33	67.68	-3.84

	FLCD24	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. B2	B2 Diff	Illus. ACD	ACD Diff	ACD24 Enacted	Enact Diff
Dem Turnout 2012	68.26	58.02	-10.24	57.55	-10.71	60.39	-7.87	64.89	-3.37
Average	66.16	57.74	-8.43	57.28	-8.89	59.91	-6.26	63.24	-2.92
<i>Percent of turned-out primary voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020 (Prim)	54.93	47.25	-7.68	46.86	-8.07	49.90	-5.03	50.97	-3.96
Voter Turnout 2018 (Prim)	60.52	51.13	-9.39	50.67	-9.85	53.23	-7.29	54.92	-5.60
Voter Turnout 2016 (Prim)	59.06	48.31	-10.75	47.78	-11.28	50.92	-8.14	53.95	-5.11
Voter Turnout 2014 (Prim)	65.66	55.26	-10.40	54.93	-10.73	57.85	-7.81	61.10	-4.56
Voter Turnout 2012 (Prim)	65.55	52.67	-12.88	52.24	-13.31	56.09	-9.46	59.82	-5.73
Average	61.14	50.92	-10.22	50.50	-10.65	53.60	-7.55	56.15	-4.99
<i>Percent of turned-out Democratic primary voters who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020 (Prim)	66.49	60.69	-5.80	60.18	-6.31	61.80	-4.69	62.61	-3.88
Dem Turnout 2018 (Prim)	70.64	63.90	-6.74	63.40	-7.24	64.84	-5.80	65.55	-5.09
Dem Turnout 2016 (Prim)	70.96	62.23	-8.73	61.53	-9.43	63.19	-7.77	66.15	-4.81
Dem Turnout 2014 (Prim)	76.53	67.49	-9.04	67.19	-9.34	68.90	-7.63	72.42	-4.11
Dem Turnout 2012 (Prim)	77.67	67.48	-10.19	67.09	-10.58	69.08	-8.59	72.68	-4.99
Average	72.46	64.36	-8.10	63.88	-8.58	65.56	-6.90	67.88	-4.58

Table 5. General Election Returns for CD24

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLCD24	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. B2	B2 Diff	Illus. ACD	ACD Diff	CD24 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 President	Biden (D)	75.42	68.53	-6.89	68.41	-7.01	71.11	-4.31	74.17	-1.25
	Trump (R)	23.99	30.97	6.98	31.09	7.10	28.39	4.40	25.27	1.28
2018 Governor	DeSantis (R)	15.62	23.05	7.43	23.22	7.60	20.94	5.32	17.81	2.19
	Gillum (D)	83.56	76.19	-7.37	76.02	-7.54	78.33	-5.23	81.45	-2.11
2018 Atty. Gen	Moody (R)	16.57	23.51	6.94	23.67	7.10	21.48	4.91	18.39	1.82
	Shaw (D)	81.90	74.94	-6.96	74.78	-7.12	77.00	-4.90	80.07	-1.83
2018 CFO	Patronis (R)	16.63	23.66	7.03	23.83	7.20	21.59	4.96	18.45	1.82
	Ring (D)	83.36	76.33	-7.03	76.17	-7.19	78.40	-4.96	81.54	-1.82
2018 Comm. Ag.	Caldwell (R)	16.37	23.18	6.81	23.34	6.97	21.15	4.78	18.00	1.63
	Fried (D)	83.62	76.81	-6.81	76.66	-6.96	78.86	-4.76	82.01	-1.61
2018 US Senate	Scott (R)	16.72	23.65	6.93	23.78	7.06	21.55	4.83	18.62	1.90
	Nelson (D)	83.28	76.32	-6.96	76.18	-7.10	78.42	-4.86	81.35	-1.93
2016 President	Trump (R)	15.40	22.29	6.89	22.45	7.05	20.55	5.15	17.28	1.88
	Clinton (D)	82.87	75.98	-6.89	75.81	-7.06	77.76	-5.11	81.04	-1.83
2016 US Senate	Rubio (R)	20.17	27.46	7.29	27.63	7.46	25.26	5.09	21.98	1.81
	Murphy (D)	77.66	70.64	-7.02	70.46	-7.20	72.80	-4.86	75.92	-1.74
2014 Governor	Scott (R)	14.18	21.10	6.92	21.27	7.09	19.21	5.03	16.16	1.98
	Crist (D)	84.04	77.17	-6.87	77.00	-7.04	79.13	-4.91	82.21	-1.83
2014 Atty. Gen.	Bondi (R)	17.05	24.33	7.28	24.57	7.52	22.30	5.25	18.73	1.68
	Sheldon (D)	81.40	74.25	-7.15	74.01	-7.39	76.30	-5.10	79.77	-1.63
2014 CFO	Atwater (R)	18.43	25.83	7.40	26.11	7.68	23.95	5.52	20.90	2.47
	Rankin (D)	81.52	74.19	-7.33	73.91	-7.61	76.05	-5.47	79.05	-2.47
2014 Comm. Ag.	Putnam (R)	18.01	25.35	7.34	25.59	7.58	23.41	5.40	20.16	2.15
	Hamilton (D)	81.89	74.63	-7.26	74.40	-7.49	76.56	-5.33	79.76	-2.13
2012 President	Romney (R)	13.81	22.23	8.42	22.46	8.65	20.29	6.48	16.78	2.97
	Obama (D)	85.77	77.41	-8.36	77.18	-8.59	79.35	-6.42	82.81	-2.96
2012	Mack (R)	13.23	20.14	6.91	20.35	7.12	18.43	5.20	15.49	2.26

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLCD24	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. B2	B2 Diff	Illus. ACD	ACD Diff	CD24 Enacted	Enact Diff
US Senate										
	Nelson (D)	85.62	78.67	-6.95	78.47	-7.15	80.44	-5.18	83.46	-2.16

Table 6. Primary Election Returns for CD24

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLCD24	Illus. B1	B1 Diff	Illus. B2	B2 Diff	Illus. ACD	ACD Diff	CD24 Enacted	Enact Diff
2018 Governor	Gillum	53.10	50.90	-2.20	50.79	-2.31	51.27	-1.83	50.59	-2.51
	Graham	10.62	11.54	0.92	11.65	1.03	11.37	0.75	10.92	0.30
2018 Atty Gen.	Torrens	17.80	18.12	0.32	18.08	0.28	17.77	-0.03	17.75	-0.05
	Shaw	82.06	81.83	-0.23	81.85	-0.21	82.19	0.13	82.10	0.04
2018 Comm. Ag.	Fried	57.45	61.96	4.51	62.12	4.67	61.65	4.20	59.09	1.64
	Walker	23.58	21.62	-1.96	21.63	-1.95	21.90	-1.68	23.46	-0.12
2016 US Senate	Keith	13.07	12.05	-1.02	12.10	-0.97	12.32	-0.75	13.33	0.26
	Murphy	66.72	67.77	1.05	67.83	1.11	68.20	1.48	66.95	0.23
2014 Governor	Crist	84.81	84.07	-0.74	83.81	-1.00	84.04	-0.77	84.25	-0.56
	Rich	14.33	15.01	0.68	15.28	0.95	15.16	0.83	15.11	0.78
2014 Atty. Gen.	Sheldon	44.04	47.45	3.41	47.55	3.51	47.19	3.15	46.51	2.47
	Thurston	55.75	52.17	-3.58	52.07	-3.68	52.66	-3.09	53.19	-2.56
2012 US Senate	Burkett	14.19	13.57	-0.62	13.49	-0.70	13.46	-0.73	13.71	-0.48
	Nelson	85.13	85.56	0.43	85.68	0.55	85.78	0.65	85.70	0.57

Table 7. Turnout Statistic for HD108, Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1

	FLHD108	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 Black VAP	54.89	49.21	-5.68	47.98	-6.91	49.04	-5.85	49.08	-5.81	50.69	-4.20
<i>Percent of registered voters who are Black</i>											
Reg Voters 2020	54.63	48.26	-6.37	47.13	-7.50	48.10	-6.53	48.16	-6.47	49.71	-4.92
Reg Voters 2018	55.75	49.69	-6.06	48.80	-6.95	49.61	-6.14	49.60	-6.15	51.13	-4.62
Reg Voters 2016	56.91	50.80	-6.11	50.04	-6.87	50.77	-6.14	50.72	-6.19	52.33	-4.58
Reg Voters 2014	59.02	53.03	-5.99	52.36	-6.66	53.00	-6.02	52.97	-6.05	54.40	-4.62
Reg Voters 2012	59.26	52.64	-6.62	51.74	-7.52	52.58	-6.68	52.53	-6.73	53.93	-5.33
Average	57.11	50.88	-6.23	50.01	-7.10	50.81	-6.30	50.80	-6.32	52.30	-4.81
<i>Percent of registered Democrats who are Black</i>											
Reg Dem 2020	67.11	61.24	-5.87	60.12	-6.99	61.09	-6.02	61.14	-5.97	62.37	-4.74
Reg Dem 2018	68.04	62.60	-5.44	61.72	-6.32	62.53	-5.51	62.52	-5.52	63.70	-4.34
Reg Dem 2016	69.16	63.82	-5.34	63.09	-6.07	63.81	-5.35	63.75	-5.41	64.96	-4.20
Reg Dem 2014	71.05	65.81	-5.24	65.16	-5.89	65.79	-5.26	65.76	-5.29	66.87	-4.18
Reg Dem 2012	71.07	65.18	-5.89	64.31	-6.76	65.14	-5.93	65.08	-5.99	66.18	-4.89
Average	69.29	63.73	-5.56	62.88	-6.41	63.67	-5.61	63.65	-5.64	64.82	-4.47
<i>Percent of turned-out voters who are Black</i>											
Voter Turnout 2020	52.89	46.79	-6.10	45.66	-7.23	46.62	-6.27	46.69	-6.20	48.44	-4.45
Voter Turnout 2018	56.44	50.72	-5.72	49.85	-6.59	50.62	-5.82	50.65	-5.79	52.49	-3.95
Voter Turnout 2016	56.21	50.10	-6.11	49.33	-6.88	50.06	-6.15	50.02	-6.19	51.88	-4.33
Voter Turnout 2014	62.77	57.49	-5.28	56.99	-5.78	57.49	-5.28	57.45	-5.32	59.13	-3.64
Voter Turnout 2012	61.62	55.27	-6.35	54.40	-7.22	55.22	-6.40	55.18	-6.44	56.81	-4.81
Average	57.99	52.07	-5.91	51.25	-6.74	52.00	-5.98	52.00	-5.99	53.75	-4.24
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>											
Dem Turnout 2020	65.55	59.83	-5.72	58.69	-6.86	59.67	-5.88	59.73	-5.82	61.17	-4.38
Dem Turnout 2018	67.98	62.70	-5.28	61.84	-6.14	62.62	-5.36	62.63	-5.35	64.16	-3.82
Dem Turnout 2016	68.24	62.87	-5.37	62.11	-6.13	62.85	-5.39	62.80	-5.44	64.17	-4.07

	FLHD108	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
Dem Turnout 2014	73.65	69.09	-4.56	68.61	-5.04	69.09	-4.56	69.05	-4.60	70.40	-3.25
Dem Turnout 2012	72.58	67.09	-5.49	66.26	-6.32	67.06	-5.52	67.00	-5.58	68.26	-4.32
Average	69.60	64.32	-5.28	63.50	-6.10	64.26	-5.34	64.24	-5.36	65.63	-3.97
<i>Percent of turned-out primary voters who are Black</i>											
Voter Turnout 2020 (Prim)	55.35	47.93	-7.42	46.94	-8.41	47.89	-7.46	47.87	-7.48	50.09	-5.26
Voter Turnout 2018 (Prim)	60.97	54.81	-6.16	54.15	-6.82	54.77	-6.20	54.76	-6.21	56.72	-4.25
Voter Turnout 2016 (Prim)	61.69	55.92	-5.77	55.33	-6.36	55.94	-5.75	55.86	-5.83	57.51	-4.18
Voter Turnout 2014 (Prim)	70.20	65.55	-4.65	65.21	-4.99	65.59	-4.61	65.52	-4.68	66.85	-3.35
Voter Turnout 2012 (Prim)	68.67	62.65	-6.02	61.98	-6.69	62.67	-6.00	62.58	-6.09	63.98	-4.69
Average	63.38	57.37	-6.00	56.72	-6.65	57.37	-6.00	57.32	-6.06	59.03	-4.35
<i>Percent of turned-out Democratic primary voters who are Black</i>											
Dem Turnout 2020 (Prim)	63.76	56.44	-7.32	55.38	-8.38	56.39	-7.37	56.38	-7.38	58.47	-5.29
Dem Turnout 2018 (Prim)	68.70	62.96	-5.74	62.25	-6.45	62.91	-5.79	62.92	-5.78	64.69	-4.01
Dem Turnout 2016 (Prim)	70.48	65.26	-5.22	64.64	-5.84	65.28	-5.20	65.21	-5.27	66.68	-3.80
Dem Turnout 2014 (Prim)	77.89	74.10	-3.79	73.79	-4.10	74.14	-3.75	74.07	-3.82	75.14	-2.75
Dem Turnout 2012 (Prim)	77.49	72.63	-4.86	72.04	-5.45	72.65	-4.84	72.57	-4.92	73.69	-3.80
Average	71.66	66.28	-5.39	65.62	-6.04	66.27	-5.39	66.23	-5.43	67.73	-3.93

Table 8. Turnout Statistic for HD108, Illustrative Maps C2, C3, C4

	FLHD108	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 Black VAP	54.89	49.98	-4.91	49.95	-4.94	49.72	-5.17	50.69	-4.20
<i>Percent of registered voters who are Black</i>									
Reg Voters 2020	54.63	49.24	-5.39	49.20	-5.43	48.94	-5.69	49.71	-4.92
Reg Voters 2018	55.75	50.75	-5.00	50.72	-5.03	50.37	-5.38	51.13	-4.62
Reg Voters 2016	56.91	51.98	-4.93	51.96	-4.95	51.49	-5.42	52.33	-4.58
Reg Voters 2014	59.02	54.12	-4.90	54.09	-4.93	53.73	-5.29	54.40	-4.62
Reg Voters 2012	59.26	53.73	-5.53	53.67	-5.59	53.26	-6.00	53.93	-5.33
Average	57.11	51.96	-5.15	51.93	-5.19	51.56	-5.56	52.30	-4.81
<i>Percent of registered Democrats who are Black</i>									
Reg Dem 2020	67.11	61.96	-5.15	61.93	-5.18	61.88	-5.23	62.37	-4.74
Reg Dem 2018	68.04	63.35	-4.69	63.33	-4.71	63.22	-4.82	63.70	-4.34
Reg Dem 2016	69.16	64.65	-4.51	64.63	-4.53	64.45	-4.71	64.96	-4.20
Reg Dem 2014	71.05	66.61	-4.44	66.59	-4.46	66.42	-4.63	66.87	-4.18
Reg Dem 2012	71.07	65.97	-5.10	65.93	-5.14	65.77	-5.30	66.18	-4.89
Average	69.29	64.51	-4.78	64.48	-4.80	64.35	-4.94	64.82	-4.47
<i>Percent of turned-out voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020	52.89	47.88	-5.01	47.83	-5.06	47.50	-5.39	48.44	-4.45
Voter Turnout 2018	56.44	52.07	-4.37	52.02	-4.42	51.45	-4.99	52.49	-3.95
Voter Turnout 2016	56.21	51.47	-4.74	51.43	-4.78	50.83	-5.38	51.88	-4.33
Voter Turnout 2014	62.77	58.85	-3.92	58.82	-3.95	58.27	-4.50	59.13	-3.64
Voter Turnout 2012	61.62	56.52	-5.10	56.46	-5.16	55.91	-5.71	56.81	-4.81
Average	57.99	53.36	-4.63	53.31	-4.67	52.79	-5.19	53.75	-4.24
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020	65.55	60.69	-4.86	60.64	-4.91	60.51	-5.04	61.17	-4.38
Dem Turnout 2018	67.98	63.74	-4.24	63.71	-4.27	63.40	-4.58	64.16	-3.82
Dem Turnout 2016	68.24	63.80	-4.44	63.78	-4.46	63.53	-4.71	64.17	-4.07
Dem Turnout 2014	73.65	70.14	-3.51	70.12	-3.53	69.76	-3.89	70.40	-3.25

	FLHD108	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
Dem Turnout 2012	72.58	67.99	-4.59	67.94	-4.64	67.66	-4.92	68.26	-4.32
Average	69.60	65.27	-4.33	65.24	-4.36	64.97	-4.63	65.63	-3.97
<i>Percent of turned-out primary voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020 (Prim)	55.35	49.56	-5.79	49.50	-5.85	48.85	-6.50	50.09	-5.26
Voter Turnout 2018 (Prim)	60.97	56.38	-4.59	56.33	-4.64	55.72	-5.25	56.72	-4.25
Voter Turnout 2016 (Prim)	61.69	57.20	-4.49	57.20	-4.49	56.79	-4.90	57.51	-4.18
Voter Turnout 2014 (Prim)	70.20	66.65	-3.55	66.64	-3.56	66.33	-3.87	66.85	-3.35
Voter Turnout 2012 (Prim)	68.67	63.83	-4.84	63.80	-4.87	63.28	-5.39	63.98	-4.69
Average	63.38	58.72	-4.65	58.69	-4.68	58.19	-5.18	59.03	-4.35
<i>Percent of turned-out Democratic primary voters who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020 (Prim)	63.76	57.96	-5.80	57.89	-5.87	57.39	-6.37	58.47	-5.29
Dem Turnout 2018 (Prim)	68.70	64.34	-4.36	64.30	-4.40	63.82	-4.88	64.69	-4.01
Dem Turnout 2016 (Prim)	70.48	66.39	-4.09	66.36	-4.12	66.06	-4.42	66.68	-3.80
Dem Turnout 2014 (Prim)	77.89	74.95	-2.94	74.96	-2.93	74.72	-3.17	75.14	-2.75
Dem Turnout 2012 (Prim)	77.49	73.55	-3.94	73.53	-3.96	73.15	-4.34	73.69	-3.80
Average	71.66	67.44	-4.23	67.41	-4.26	67.03	-4.64	67.73	-3.93

Table 9. General Election Returns for HD108, Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD108	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 President	Biden (D)	82.44	80.22	-2.22	80.32	-2.12	80.47	-1.97	80.53	-1.91	81.09	-1.35
	Trump (R)	16.99	19.20	2.21	19.10	2.11	18.94	1.95	18.89	1.90	18.34	1.35
2018 Governor	DeSantis (R)	10.97	12.61	1.64	12.56	1.59	12.47	1.50	12.43	1.46	11.93	0.96
	Gillum (D)	88.36	86.69	-1.67	86.76	-1.60	86.84	-1.52	86.88	-1.48	87.37	-0.99
2018 Atty. Gen	Moody (R)	12.15	13.68	1.53	13.60	1.45	13.54	1.39	13.50	1.35	13.04	0.89
	Shaw (D)	86.38	84.75	-1.63	84.85	-1.53	84.92	-1.46	84.95	-1.43	85.41	-0.97
2018	Patronis (R)	12.39	14.10	1.71	14.03	1.64	13.95	1.56	13.91	1.52	13.39	1.00

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD108	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
CFO	Ring (D)	87.57	85.85	-1.72	85.92	-1.65	86.00	-1.57	86.04	-1.53	86.56	-1.01
2018 Comm. Ag.	Caldwell (R)	12.09	13.57	1.48	13.48	1.39	13.42	1.33	13.41	1.32	13.01	0.92
	Fried (D)	87.93	86.45	-1.48	86.54	-1.39	86.59	-1.34	86.61	-1.32	87.02	-0.91
2018 US Senate	Scott (R)	12.21	13.67	1.46	13.58	1.37	13.51	1.30	13.48	1.27	13.06	0.85
	Nelson (D)	87.73	86.27	-1.46	86.36	-1.37	86.42	-1.31	86.45	-1.28	86.89	-0.84
2016 President	Trump (R)	11.25	12.88	1.63	12.85	1.60	12.80	1.55	12.77	1.52	12.27	1.02
	Clinton (D)	87.12	85.32	-1.80	85.35	-1.77	85.43	-1.69	85.46	-1.66	85.98	-1.14
2016 US Senate	Rubio (R)	15.73	17.65	1.92	17.53	1.80	17.44	1.71	17.42	1.69	16.88	1.15
	Murphy (D)	81.90	79.93	-1.97	80.05	-1.85	80.14	-1.76	80.17	-1.73	80.75	-1.15
2014 Governor	Scott (R)	10.37	12.11	1.74	11.97	1.60	11.94	1.57	11.93	1.56	11.45	1.08
	Crist (D)	88.14	86.42	-1.72	86.54	-1.60	86.60	-1.54	86.61	-1.53	87.10	-1.04
2014 Atty. Gen.	Bondi (R)	13.33	15.04	1.71	14.88	1.55	14.88	1.55	14.88	1.55	14.36	1.03
	Sheldon (D)	85.09	83.23	-1.86	83.34	-1.75	83.38	-1.71	83.39	-1.70	83.94	-1.15
2014 CFO	Atwater (R)	15.48	17.68	2.20	17.59	2.11	17.54	2.06	17.54	2.06	16.75	1.27
	Rankin (D)	84.30	82.20	-2.10	82.27	-2.03	82.34	-1.96	82.34	-1.96	83.12	-1.18
2014 Comm. Ag.	Putnam (R)	15.00	17.08	2.08	17.01	2.01	16.93	1.93	16.93	1.93	16.28	1.28
	Hamilton (D)	84.79	82.76	-2.03	82.83	-1.96	82.90	-1.89	82.89	-1.90	83.55	-1.24
2012 President	Romney (R)	10.03	12.03	2.00	12.13	2.10	11.99	1.96	11.94	1.91	11.26	1.23
	Obama (D)	89.58	87.54	-2.04	87.45	-2.13	87.60	-1.98	87.66	-1.92	88.34	-1.24
2012 US Senate	Mack (R)	9.96	11.51	1.55	11.59	1.63	11.48	1.52	11.44	1.48	10.82	0.86
	Nelson (D)	89.09	87.44	-1.65	87.37	-1.72	87.49	-1.60	87.53	-1.56	88.14	-0.95

Table 10. General Election Returns for HD108, Illustrative Maps C2, C3, C4

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD108	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 President	Biden (D)	82.44	80.95	-1.49	80.95	-1.49	80.78	-1.66	81.09	-1.35
	Trump (R)	16.99	18.47	1.48	18.47	1.48	18.63	1.64	18.34	1.35
2018 Governor	DeSantis (R)	10.97	11.99	1.02	11.98	1.01	12.21	1.24	11.93	0.96
	Gillum (D)	88.36	87.32	-1.04	87.33	-1.03	87.10	-1.26	87.37	-0.99
2018 Atty. Gen	Moody (R)	12.15	13.08	0.93	13.07	0.92	13.30	1.15	13.04	0.89
	Shaw (D)	86.38	85.37	-1.01	85.39	-0.99	85.16	-1.22	85.41	-0.97
2018 CFO	Patronis (R)	12.39	13.45	1.06	13.45	1.06	13.69	1.30	13.39	1.00
	Ring (D)	87.57	86.51	-1.06	86.51	-1.06	86.27	-1.30	86.56	-1.01
2018 Comm. Ag.	Caldwell (R)	12.09	13.05	0.96	13.04	0.95	13.21	1.12	13.01	0.92
	Fried (D)	87.93	86.99	-0.94	87.00	-0.93	86.82	-1.11	87.02	-0.91
2018 US Senate	Scott (R)	12.21	13.10	0.89	13.09	0.88	13.28	1.07	13.06	0.85
	Nelson (D)	87.73	86.85	-0.88	86.86	-0.87	86.66	-1.07	86.89	-0.84
2016 President	Trump (R)	11.25	12.30	1.05	12.31	1.06	12.56	1.31	12.27	1.02
	Clinton (D)	87.12	85.94	-1.18	85.93	-1.19	85.68	-1.44	85.98	-1.14
2016 US Senate	Rubio (R)	15.73	16.93	1.20	16.92	1.19	17.18	1.45	16.88	1.15
	Murphy (D)	81.90	80.70	-1.20	80.70	-1.20	80.43	-1.47	80.75	-1.15
2014 Governor	Scott (R)	10.37	11.48	1.11	11.47	1.10	11.68	1.31	11.45	1.08
	Crist (D)	88.14	87.07	-1.07	87.07	-1.07	86.86	-1.28	87.10	-1.04
2014 Atty. Gen.	Bondi (R)	13.33	14.37	1.04	14.38	1.05	14.62	1.29	14.36	1.03
	Sheldon (D)	85.09	83.92	-1.17	83.90	-1.19	83.66	-1.43	83.94	-1.15
2014 CFO	Atwater (R)	15.48	16.81	1.33	16.81	1.33	17.21	1.73	16.75	1.27
	Rankin (D)	84.30	83.07	-1.23	83.06	-1.24	82.68	-1.62	83.12	-1.18
2014 Comm. Ag.	Putnam (R)	15.00	16.33	1.33	16.31	1.31	16.62	1.62	16.28	1.28
	Hamilton (D)	84.79	83.51	-1.28	83.51	-1.28	83.22	-1.57	83.55	-1.24
2012 President	Romney (R)	10.03	11.29	1.26	11.32	1.29	11.77	1.74	11.26	1.23
	Obama (D)	89.58	88.30	-1.28	88.27	-1.31	87.83	-1.75	88.34	-1.24
2012	Mack (R)	9.96	10.85	0.89	10.86	0.90	11.31	1.35	10.82	0.86

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD108	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
US Senate	Nelson (D)	89.09	88.12	-0.97	88.11	-0.98	87.68	-1.41	88.14	-0.95

Table 11. Primary Election Returns for HD108, Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD108	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
2018 Governor	Gillum	48.82	45.18	-3.64	45.15	-3.67	45.32	-3.50	45.36	-3.46	45.97	-2.85
	Graham	11.28	12.75	1.47	12.76	1.48	12.67	1.39	12.64	1.36	12.32	1.04
2018 Atty Gen.	Torrens	20.65	22.47	1.82	22.61	1.96	22.48	1.83	22.47	1.82	22.3	1.65
	Shaw	79.1	77.04	-2.06	76.95	-2.15	77.09	-2.01	77.08	-2.02	77.23	-1.87
2018 Comm. Ag.	Fried	52.16	53.48	1.32	53.64	1.48	53.54	1.38	53.44	1.28	52.9	0.74
	Walker	26.67	26.63	-0.04	26.72	0.05	26.70	0.03	26.7	0.03	26.72	0.05
2016 US Senate	Keith	14.61	13.75	-0.86	13.71	-0.9	13.73	-0.88	13.71	-0.9	13.68	-0.93
	Murphy	66.26	65.77	-0.49	65.92	-0.34	66.02	-0.24	66.03	-0.23	65.85	-0.41
2014 Governor	Crist	85.85	86.20	0.35	86.31	0.46	86.34	0.49	86.33	0.48	86.44	0.59
	Rich	13.41	12.99	-0.42	12.91	-0.5	12.92	-0.49	12.91	-0.5	12.8	-0.61
2014 Atty. Gen.	Sheldon	48.22	53.06	4.84	53.15	4.93	52.93	4.71	52.97	4.75	52.19	3.97
	Thurston	51.65	46.52	-5.13	46.54	-5.11	46.71	-4.94	46.64	-5.01	47.39	-4.26
2012 US Senate	Burkett	12.38	11.69	-0.69	11.52	-0.86	11.60	-0.78	11.62	-0.76	11.79	-0.59
	Nelson	87.1	87.54	0.44	87.73	0.63	87.66	0.56	87.63	0.53	87.48	0.38

Table 12. Primary Election Returns for HD108, Illustrative Maps C2, C3, C4

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD108	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD108 Enacted	Enact Diff
2018 Governor	Gillum	48.82	45.93	-2.89	45.91	-2.91	45.83	-2.99	45.97	-2.85
	Graham	11.28	12.38	1.1	12.37	1.09	12.48	1.2	12.32	1.04
2018 Atty Gen.	Torrens	20.65	22.31	1.66	22.31	1.66	22.29	1.64	22.3	1.65
	Shaw	79.1	77.23	-1.87	77.23	-1.87	77.3	-1.8	77.23	-1.87
2018 Comm. Ag.	Fried	52.16	53.03	0.87	53.03	0.87	53.25	1.09	52.9	0.74
	Walker	26.67	26.71	0.04	26.71	0.04	26.71	0.04	26.72	0.05
2016 US Senate	Keith	14.61	13.71	-0.9	13.72	-0.89	13.78	-0.83	13.68	-0.93
	Murphy	66.26	65.88	-0.38	65.91	-0.35	66.11	-0.15	65.85	-0.41
2014 Governor	Crist	85.85	86.44	0.59	86.45	0.6	86.44	0.59	86.44	0.59
	Rich	13.41	12.82	-0.59	12.84	-0.57	12.88	-0.53	12.8	-0.61
2014 Atty. Gen.	Sheldon	48.22	52.23	4.01	52.25	4.03	52.35	4.13	52.19	3.97
	Thurston	51.65	47.35	-4.3	47.35	-4.3	47.32	-4.33	47.39	-4.26
2012 US Senate	Burkett	12.38	11.77	-0.61	11.76	-0.62	11.71	-0.67	11.79	-0.59
	Nelson	87.1	87.51	0.41	87.54	0.44	87.6	0.5	87.48	0.38

Table 13. Turnout Statistics for HD109, Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1

	FLHD109	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 Black VAP	38.39	40.64	2.25	41.71	3.32	40.78	2.39	40.72	2.33	40.06	1.67
<i>Percent of registered voters who are Black</i>											
Reg Voters 2020	48.12	50.37	2.25	51.51	3.39	50.56	2.44	50.45	2.33	49.83	1.71
Reg Voters 2018	51.38	52.64	1.26	53.54	2.16	52.74	1.36	52.71	1.33	52.10	0.72
Reg Voters 2016	53.38	54.38	1.00	55.11	1.73	54.41	1.03	54.44	1.06	53.84	0.46
Reg Voters 2014	57.85	58.19	0.34	58.82	0.97	58.23	0.38	58.21	0.36	57.91	0.06
Reg Voters 2012	59.00	59.53	0.53	60.24	1.24	59.60	0.60	59.63	0.63	59.10	0.10
Average	53.95	55.02	1.08	55.84	1.90	55.11	1.16	55.09	1.14	54.56	0.61
<i>Percent of registered Democrats who are Black</i>											
Reg Dem 2020	65.44	67.48	2.04	68.48	3.04	67.66	2.22	67.58	2.14	67.27	1.83
Reg Dem 2018	67.48	68.61	1.13	69.39	1.91	68.69	1.21	68.68	1.20	68.35	0.87
Reg Dem 2016	69.00	69.90	0.90	70.51	1.51	69.92	0.92	69.97	0.97	69.64	0.64
Reg Dem 2014	73.04	73.71	0.67	74.17	1.13	73.72	0.68	73.75	0.71	73.66	0.62
Reg Dem 2012	73.67	74.61	0.94	75.17	1.50	74.66	0.99	74.72	1.05	74.58	0.91
Average	69.73	70.86	1.14	71.54	1.82	70.93	1.20	70.94	1.21	70.70	0.97
<i>Percent of turned-out voters who are Black</i>											
Voter Turnout 2020	46.74	49.71	2.97	51.06	4.32	49.93	3.19	49.80	3.06	48.97	2.23
Voter Turnout 2018	56.83	59.40	2.57	60.48	3.65	59.55	2.72	59.46	2.63	58.55	1.72
Voter Turnout 2016	53.64	55.35	1.71	56.21	2.57	55.39	1.75	55.42	1.78	54.56	0.92
Voter Turnout 2014	67.85	68.93	1.08	69.52	1.67	68.93	1.08	68.94	1.09	68.34	0.49
Voter Turnout 2012	62.83	63.82	0.99	64.64	1.81	63.89	1.06	63.90	1.07	63.19	0.36
Average	57.58	59.44	1.86	60.38	2.80	59.54	1.96	59.50	1.93	58.72	1.14
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>											
Dem Turnout 2020	64.73	67.53	2.80	68.77	4.04	67.75	3.02	67.66	2.93	67.20	2.47
Dem Turnout 2018	71.59	74.00	2.41	74.91	3.32	74.13	2.54	74.10	2.51	73.43	1.84
Dem Turnout 2016	68.79	70.27	1.48	70.98	2.19	70.29	1.50	70.36	1.57	69.85	1.06

	FLHD109	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
Dem Turnout 2014	80.53	82.27	1.74	82.63	2.10	82.27	1.74	82.30	1.77	82.01	1.48
Dem Turnout 2012	76.22	77.55	1.33	78.20	1.98	77.60	1.38	77.66	1.44	77.48	1.26
Average	72.37	74.32	1.95	75.10	2.73	74.41	2.04	74.42	2.04	73.99	1.62
<i>Percent of turned-out primary voters who are Black</i>											
Voter Turnout 2020 (Prim)	58.84	61.70	2.86	62.82	3.98	61.77	2.93	61.73	2.89	60.54	1.70
Voter Turnout 2018 (Prim)	68.88	71.45	2.57	72.24	3.36	71.53	2.65	71.50	2.62	70.50	1.62
Voter Turnout 2016 (Prim)	65.69	65.77	0.08	66.40	0.71	65.74	0.05	65.80	0.11	64.75	-0.94
Voter Turnout 2014 (Prim)	74.90	74.69	-0.21	75.16	0.26	74.63	-0.27	74.70	-0.20	73.50	-1.40
Voter Turnout 2012 (Prim)	73.94	73.38	-0.56	73.91	-0.03	73.35	-0.59	73.39	-0.55	72.61	-1.33
Average	68.45	69.40	0.95	70.11	1.66	69.40	0.95	69.42	0.97	68.38	-0.07
<i>Percent of turned-out Democratic primary voters who are Black</i>											
Dem Turnout 2020 (Prim)	72.28	75.93	3.65	76.96	4.68	76.03	3.75	76.02	3.74	75.29	3.01
Dem Turnout 2018 (Prim)	79.51	82.66	3.15	83.37	3.86	82.76	3.25	82.75	3.24	82.18	2.67
Dem Turnout 2016 (Prim)	79.33	80.72	1.39	81.25	1.92	80.69	1.36	80.77	1.44	80.24	0.91
Dem Turnout 2014 (Prim)	86.44	87.62	1.18	87.80	1.36	87.56	1.12	87.66	1.22	87.01	0.57
Dem Turnout 2012 (Prim)	86.37	87.11	0.74	87.42	1.05	87.09	0.72	87.18	0.81	86.86	0.49
Average	80.79	82.81	2.02	83.36	2.57	82.83	2.04	82.88	2.09	82.32	1.53

Table 14. Turnout Statistics for for HD109, Illustrative Maps C2, C3, C4

	FLHD109	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 Black VAP	38.39	40.15	1.76	40.18	1.79	40.05	1.66	40.06	1.67
<i>Percent of registered voters who are Black</i>									
Reg Voters 2020	48.12	49.88	1.76	49.93	1.81	49.60	1.48	49.83	1.71
Reg Voters 2018	51.38	52.16	0.78	52.19	0.81	51.87	0.49	52.10	0.72
Reg Voters 2016	53.38	53.87	0.49	53.90	0.52	53.60	0.22	53.84	0.46
Reg Voters 2014	57.85	57.87	0.02	57.90	0.05	57.50	-0.35	57.91	0.06
Reg Voters 2012	59.00	59.08	0.08	59.14	0.14	58.89	-0.11	59.10	0.10
Average	53.95	54.57	0.63	54.61	0.67	54.29	0.35	54.56	0.61
<i>Percent of registered Democrats who are Black</i>									
Reg Dem 2020	65.44	67.29	1.85	67.32	1.88	66.82	1.38	67.27	1.83
Reg Dem 2018	67.48	68.37	0.89	68.39	0.91	67.94	0.46	68.35	0.87
Reg Dem 2016	69.00	69.63	0.63	69.65	0.65	69.24	0.24	69.64	0.64
Reg Dem 2014	73.04	73.60	0.56	73.62	0.58	73.16	0.12	73.66	0.62
Reg Dem 2012	73.67	74.49	0.82	74.54	0.87	74.10	0.43	74.58	0.91
Average	69.73	70.68	0.95	70.70	0.98	70.25	0.53	70.70	0.97
<i>Percent of turned-out voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020	46.74	49.08	2.34	49.15	2.41	48.82	2.08	48.97	2.23
Voter Turnout 2018	56.83	58.70	1.87	58.77	1.94	58.45	1.62	58.55	1.72
Voter Turnout 2016	53.64	54.65	1.01	54.71	1.07	54.44	0.80	54.56	0.92
Voter Turnout 2014	67.85	68.35	0.50	68.40	0.55	68.09	0.24	68.34	0.49
Voter Turnout 2012	62.83	63.23	0.40	63.31	0.48	63.05	0.22	63.19	0.36
Average	57.58	58.80	1.22	58.87	1.29	58.57	0.99	58.72	1.14
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020	64.73	67.25	2.52	67.32	2.59	66.77	2.04	67.20	2.47
Dem Turnout 2018	71.59	73.55	1.96	73.59	2.00	73.21	1.62	73.43	1.84
Dem Turnout 2016	68.79	69.88	1.09	69.91	1.12	69.51	0.72	69.85	1.06
Dem Turnout 2014	80.53	81.99	1.46	82.02	1.49	81.73	1.20	82.01	1.48

	FLHD109	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
Dem Turnout 2012	76.22	77.42	1.20	77.48	1.26	77.00	0.78	77.48	1.26
Average	72.37	74.02	1.65	74.06	1.69	73.64	1.27	73.99	1.62
<i>Percent of turned-out primary voters who are Black</i>									
Voter Turnout 2020 (Prim)	58.84	60.75	1.91	60.83	1.99	60.56	1.72	60.54	1.70
Voter Turnout 2018 (Prim)	68.88	70.65	1.77	70.71	1.83	70.41	1.53	70.50	1.62
Voter Turnout 2016 (Prim)	65.69	64.91	-0.78	64.91	-0.78	64.69	-1.00	64.75	-0.94
Voter Turnout 2014 (Prim)	74.90	73.70	-1.20	73.72	-1.18	73.72	-1.18	73.50	-1.40
Voter Turnout 2012 (Prim)	73.94	72.69	-1.25	72.73	-1.21	72.58	-1.36	72.61	-1.33
Average	68.45	68.54	0.09	68.58	0.13	68.39	-0.06	68.38	-0.07
<i>Percent of turned-out Democrats who are Black</i>									
Dem Turnout 2020 (Prim)	72.28	75.40	3.12	75.49	3.21	75.11	2.83	75.29	3.01
Dem Turnout 2018 (Prim)	79.51	82.32	2.81	82.37	2.86	81.95	2.44	82.18	2.67
Dem Turnout 2016 (Prim)	79.33	80.32	0.99	80.35	1.02	80.02	0.69	80.24	0.91
Dem Turnout 2014 (Prim)	86.44	87.08	0.64	87.07	0.63	87.13	0.69	87.01	0.57
Dem Turnout 2012 (Prim)	86.37	86.88	0.51	86.89	0.52	86.72	0.35	86.86	0.49
Average	80.79	82.40	1.61	82.43	1.65	82.19	1.40	82.32	1.53

Table 15. General Election Returns for HD109, Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD109	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 President	Biden (D)	76.13	76.32	0.19	76.42	0.29	76.15	0.02	76.09	-0.04	75.68	-0.45
	Trump (R)	23.27	23.07	-0.20	22.96	-0.31	23.24	-0.03	23.30	0.03	23.70	0.43
2018 Governor	DeSantis (R)	12.56	12.45	-0.11	12.43	-0.13	12.65	0.09	12.74	0.18	13.05	0.49
	Gillum (D)	86.43	86.42	-0.01	86.42	-0.01	86.22	-0.21	86.14	-0.29	85.79	-0.64
2018 Atty. Gen	Moody (R)	14.03	14.16	0.13	14.18	0.15	14.34	0.31	14.43	0.40	14.74	0.71
	Shaw (D)	84.35	84.22	-0.13	84.18	-0.17	84.01	-0.34	83.93	-0.42	83.58	-0.77
2018 CFO	Patronis (R)	14.42	14.35	-0.07	14.36	-0.06	14.55	0.13	14.64	0.22	15.03	0.61
	Ring (D)	85.52	85.59	0.07	85.57	0.05	85.40	-0.12	85.30	-0.22	84.89	-0.63
2018 Comm. Ag.	Caldwell (R)	13.93	14.24	0.31	14.26	0.33	14.42	0.49	14.47	0.54	14.81	0.88
	Fried (D)	86.05	85.73	-0.32	85.72	-0.33	85.57	-0.48	85.51	-0.54	85.14	-0.91
2018 US Senate	Scott (R)	14.62	14.99	0.37	14.99	0.37	15.17	0.55	15.23	0.61	15.56	0.94
	Nelson (D)	85.38	85.03	-0.35	85.04	-0.34	84.87	-0.51	84.79	-0.59	84.44	-0.94
2016 President	Trump (R)	12.12	11.93	-0.19	11.95	-0.17	12.08	-0.04	12.13	0.01	12.42	0.30
	Clinton (D)	86.37	86.70	0.33	86.65	0.28	86.51	0.14	86.45	0.08	86.15	-0.22
2016 US Senate	Rubio (R)	18.04	18.12	0.08	18.19	0.15	18.35	0.31	18.41	0.37	18.79	0.75
	Murphy (D)	79.74	79.72	-0.02	79.62	-0.12	79.47	-0.27	79.41	-0.33	79.00	-0.74
2014 Governor	Scott (R)	11.00	11.78	0.78	11.82	0.82	12.02	1.02	12.05	1.05	12.31	1.31
	Crist (D)	87.05	86.22	-0.83	86.19	-0.86	85.99	-1.06	85.95	-1.10	85.62	-1.43
2014 Atty. Gen.	Bondi (R)	13.21	14.18	0.97	14.24	1.03	14.41	1.20	14.45	1.24	14.73	1.52
	Sheldon (D)	85.23	84.25	-0.98	84.22	-1.01	84.02	-1.21	83.99	-1.24	83.63	-1.60
2014 CFO	Atwater (R)	13.74	13.82	0.08	13.92	0.18	14.10	0.36	14.14	0.40	14.45	0.71
	Rankin (D)	86.15	85.96	-0.19	85.88	-0.27	85.69	-0.46	85.65	-0.50	85.33	-0.82
2014 Comm. Ag.	Putnam (R)	13.44	13.99	0.55	14.05	0.61	14.25	0.81	14.29	0.85	14.57	1.13
	Hamilton (D)	86.37	85.71	-0.66	85.65	-0.72	85.45	-0.92	85.42	-0.95	85.11	-1.26
2012 President	Romney (R)	9.48	9.30	-0.18	9.26	-0.22	9.45	-0.03	9.54	0.06	10.11	0.63
	Obama (D)	90.02	90.26	0.24	90.29	0.27	90.10	0.08	90.00	-0.02	89.43	-0.59

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD109	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2012 US Senate	Mack (R)	10.17	10.17	0.00	10.09	-0.08	10.25	0.08	10.33	0.16	10.85	0.68
	Nelson (D)	88.64	88.66	0.02	88.73	0.09	88.56	-0.08	88.47	-0.17	87.94	-0.70

Table 16. General Election Returns for HD109, Illustrative Maps C2, C3, C4

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD109	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2020 President	Biden (D)	76.13	75.69	-0.44	75.68	-0.45	75.77	-0.36	75.68	-0.45
	Trump (R)	23.27	23.69	0.42	23.70	0.43	23.63	0.36	23.70	0.43
2018 Governor	DeSantis (R)	12.56	12.99	0.43	13.00	0.44	13.02	0.46	13.05	0.49
	Gillum (D)	86.43	85.86	-0.57	85.85	-0.58	85.85	-0.58	85.79	-0.64
2018 Atty. Gen	Moody (R)	14.03	14.69	0.66	14.69	0.66	14.68	0.65	14.74	0.71
	Shaw (D)	84.35	83.65	-0.70	83.62	-0.73	83.64	-0.71	83.58	-0.77
2018 CFO	Patronis (R)	14.42	14.94	0.52	14.95	0.53	14.92	0.50	15.03	0.61
	Ring (D)	85.52	84.98	-0.54	84.97	-0.55	85.02	-0.50	84.89	-0.63
2018 Comm. Ag.	Caldwell (R)	13.93	14.75	0.82	14.76	0.83	14.74	0.81	14.81	0.88
	Fried (D)	86.05	85.21	-0.84	85.20	-0.85	85.23	-0.82	85.14	-0.91
2018 US Senate	Scott (R)	14.62	15.50	0.88	15.52	0.90	15.52	0.90	15.56	0.94
	Nelson (D)	85.38	84.50	-0.88	84.49	-0.89	84.51	-0.87	84.44	-0.94
2016 President	Trump (R)	12.12	12.39	0.27	12.38	0.26	12.31	0.19	12.42	0.30
	Clinton (D)	86.37	86.18	-0.19	86.20	-0.17	86.25	-0.12	86.15	-0.22
2016 US Senate	Rubio (R)	18.04	18.72	0.68	18.72	0.68	18.68	0.64	18.79	0.75
	Murphy (D)	79.74	79.07	-0.67	79.06	-0.68	79.12	-0.62	79.00	-0.74
2014 Governor	Scott (R)	11.00	12.29	1.29	12.30	1.30	12.35	1.35	12.31	1.31
	Crist (D)	87.05	85.65	-1.40	85.66	-1.39	85.63	-1.42	85.62	-1.43
2014 Atty. Gen.	Bondi (R)	13.21	14.70	1.49	14.69	1.48	14.75	1.54	14.73	1.52
	Sheldon (D)	85.23	83.67	-1.56	83.70	-1.53	83.66	-1.57	83.63	-1.60
2014	Atwater (R)	13.74	14.41	0.67	14.41	0.67	14.43	0.69	14.45	0.71

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD109	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
CFO	Rankin (D)	86.15	85.35	-0.80	85.37	-0.78	85.35	-0.80	85.33	-0.82
2014 Comm. Ag.	Putnam (R)	13.44	14.55	1.11	14.56	1.12	14.59	1.15	14.57	1.13
	Hamilton (D)	86.37	85.14	-1.23	85.14	-1.23	85.11	-1.26	85.11	-1.26
2012 President	Romney (R)	9.48	9.98	0.50	9.96	0.48	9.74	0.26	10.11	0.63
	Obama (D)	90.02	89.56	-0.46	89.59	-0.43	89.80	-0.22	89.43	-0.59
2012 US Senate	Mack (R)	10.17	10.73	0.56	10.71	0.54	10.47	0.30	10.85	0.68
	Nelson (D)	88.64	88.05	-0.59	88.07	-0.57	88.31	-0.33	87.94	-0.70

Table 17. Primary Election Returns for HD109, Illustrative Maps A1, A2, B, C1

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD109	Illus. A1	A1 Diff	Illus. A2	A2 Diff	Illus. B	B Diff	Illus. C1	C1 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2018 Governor	Gillum	59.27	60.12	0.85	59.7	0.43	59.64	0.37	59.54	0.27	59.37	0.1
	Graham	8.15	6.69	-1.46	6.84	-1.31	6.91	-1.24	6.97	-1.18	6.92	-1.23
2018 Atty Gen.	Torrens	14.86	15.47	0.61	15.58	0.72	15.60	0.74	15.64	0.78	15.89	1.03
	Shaw	85.03	84.51	-0.52	84.33	-0.7	84.32	-0.71	84.3	-0.73	84.04	-0.99
2018 Comm. Ag.	Fried	52.04	49.04	-3.00	49.01	-3.03	49.07	-2.97	49.19	-2.85	49.31	-2.73
	Walker	25.61	26.81	1.20	26.73	1.12	26.73	1.12	26.72	1.11	26.8	1.19
2016 US Senate	Keith	13.69	13.39	-0.30	13.52	-0.17	13.42	-0.27	13.45	-0.24	13.39	-0.3
	Murphy	65.12	64.27	-0.85	64.11	-1.01	64.02	-1.10	64.01	-1.11	63.96	-1.16
2014 Governor	Crist	83.71	84.28	0.57	84.22	0.51	84.12	0.41	84.13	0.42	83.99	0.28
	Rich	15.24	14.75	-0.49	14.8	-0.44	14.82	-0.42	14.83	-0.41	14.95	-0.29
2014 Atty. Gen.	Sheldon	36.08	35.67	-0.41	36.12	0.04	36.02	-0.06	35.97	-0.11	36.16	0.08
	Thurston	63.81	64.36	0.55	63.82	0.01	63.94	0.13	64.02	0.21	63.91	0.1
2012 US Senate	Burkett	15.3	15.30	0.00	15.31	0.01	15.33	0.03	15.32	0.02	15.27	-0.03
	Nelson	83.94	83.88	-0.06	83.86	-0.08	83.82	-0.12	83.84	-0.1	83.87	-0.07

Table 18. Primary Election Returns for HD109, Illustrative Maps C2, C3, C4

Year/Contest	Candidate	FLHD109	Illus. C2	C2 Diff	Illus. C3	C3 Diff	Illus. C4	C4 Diff	HD109 Enacted	Enact Diff
2018 Governor	Gillum	59.27	59.4	0.13	59.42	0.15	59.2	-0.07	59.37	0.1
	Graham	8.15	6.89	-1.26	6.89	-1.26	7	-1.15	6.92	-1.23
2018 Atty Gen.	Torrens	14.86	15.84	0.98	15.84	0.98	15.85	0.99	15.89	1.03
	Shaw	85.03	84.08	-0.95	84.08	-0.95	84.05	-0.98	84.04	-0.99
2018 Comm. Ag.	Fried	52.04	49.22	-2.82	49.22	-2.82	49.34	-2.7	49.31	-2.73
	Walker	25.61	26.79	1.18	26.79	1.18	26.72	1.11	26.8	1.19
2016 US Senate	Keith	13.69	13.39	-0.3	13.38	-0.31	13.41	-0.28	13.39	-0.3
	Murphy	65.12	63.94	-1.18	63.91	-1.21	63.77	-1.35	63.96	-1.16
2014 Governor	Crist	83.71	83.99	0.28	83.99	0.28	84.01	0.3	83.99	0.28
	Rich	15.24	14.94	-0.3	14.92	-0.32	14.88	-0.36	14.95	-0.29
2014 Atty. Gen.	Sheldon	36.08	36.16	0.08	36.15	0.07	36.27	0.19	36.16	0.08
	Thurston	63.81	63.89	0.08	63.9	0.09	63.72	-0.09	63.91	0.1
2012 US Senate	Burkett	15.3	15.27	-0.03	15.28	-0.02	15.31	0.01	15.27	-0.03
	Nelson	83.94	83.86	-0.08	83.83	-0.11	83.81	-0.13	83.87	-0.07

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Academic Positions

Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar, 2023 - 2024

Associate Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 2023 - Present

Director of Research, Initiative for Law, Society and Justice
Faculty Affiliate, Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies
Research Affiliate, Population Research Center
Faculty Fellow, Politics of Race and Ethnicity Lab

Assistant Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 2020 - 2023

Assistant Professor of Political Science and Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, 2017 - 2020

Postdoctoral Fellow, Prisons and Justice Initiative, Georgetown University, 2016-2017

Education

University of Washington

Ph.D. Political Science, June 2016
Research Fields: American Politics, Race and Ethnic Politics, Political Methodology
Center for Statistics in the Social Sciences Political Methodology Field Certificate, May 2014
Master of Arts, Political Science, December 2013

Rutgers University

Masters of Public Policy, May 2011

Washington State University-Vancouver

Bachelor of Arts, Public Affairs, May 2009

Book Manuscripts

Walker, Hannah L. 2020. *Mobilized by Injustice: Criminal Justice Contact, Political Participation and Race*. Oxford University Press.

**Winner of the American Political Science Association Racial and Ethnic Politics Section best book award, 2020*

Journal Publications

26. Lopez Bunyasi, Tehama, Watts Smith, Candis and Walker, Hannah L. Forthcoming. "Are These My People? The Geography of Black Politics." *Politics, Groups and Identities*.
25. Verrilli, Allison, Roman, Marcel, **Walker, Hannah L.**, Epp, Derek, Finley, Mike and Liu, Amy. Forthcoming. "Policing at the Margins: Boundary Maintenance in U.S. Municipalities." *Perspectives on Politics*.
24. Roman, Marcel, Fredrikkson, Klara, **Walker, Hannah L.**, Cassella, Chris and Epp, Derek. Forthcoming. "The George Floyd Effect: How Protests and Public Scrutiny Changed Police Behavior." *Perspectives on Politics*.
23. Dias, Megan, Epp, Derek, Roman, Marcel and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2024. "Consent searches: Evaluating the usefulness of a common and highly discretionary police practice." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 21(1), 35-91.
22. Garcia-Rios, Sergio, Lajevardi, Nazita, Oskooii, Kassra, and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2022. "The Participatory Implications of Racialized Policy Feedbacks." *Perspectives on Politics*, 21(3), 932-950.
21. Lajevardi, Nazita, Oskooii, Kassra, and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2022. "Unmediated Digital News Consumption and Support for Anti-Muslim American Policy Proposals." *Journal of Public Policy*, 42(4), 656-683.
20. Barreto, Matt, Sanchez, Gabriel, and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2022. "Battling the Hydra: Voter ID Laws and Native Americans in North Dakota." *Journal of Racial and Ethnic Politics*, 7(1), 119-140.
19. Roman, Marcel, **Walker, Hannah L.** and Barreto, Matt. 2022. "Overcoming the limits of illegality: How social ties with undocumented immigrants motivate Latinx political participation." *Political Research Quarterly*, 75(3), 661-675.
18. Walker, Hannah L., McCabe, Katherine and Matos, Yalidy. 2022. "Proximal contact with Latino Immigrants, Perceptions of Immigrants, and Policy Attitudes among non-Hispanic Whites." *Politics, Groups and Identities*, 10(4): 653-673.
17. McCabe, Katherine, Matos, Yalidy and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2021. "Priming legality: Perceptions of Latino and undocumented Latino immigrants." *American Politics Research*, 49(1), 106-113.
16. Walker, Hannah L., Roman, Marcel and Barreto, Matt. 2020. "The Direct and Indirect Effects of Immigration Enforcement on Latino Political Engagement." *UCLA Law Review*. 67.
15. Walker, Hannah L., Collingwood, Loren, and Lopez Bunyasi, Tehama. 2020. "White Response to Black Death: A Racialized Theory of White Attitudes Towards Gun Control." *Du Bois Review*, 17(1):165-188.
14. Walker, Hannah L., Roman Marcel, and Barreto Matt. 2020. "The Ripple Effect: The Political Consequences of Proximal Contact with Immigration Enforcement." *The Journal of Racial and Ethnic Politics*, doi: 10.1017/rep.2020.9. Online first.
13. Walker, Hannah L. 2020. "Targeted: The mobilizing effect of perceptions of unfair policing practices." *The Journal of Politics*, 82(1): 119-134.
12. Lajevardi, Nazita, Oskooii, Kassra, and **Walker, Hannah L.** and Westfall, Aubrey. 2020. "The Paradox Between Integration and Perceived Discrimination Among American Muslims." *Political Psychology*, 41(3): 587-606.

11. Barreto, Matt, Nuño, Stephen, Sanchez, Gabriel, and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2019. "The Racial Implications of Voter ID Laws in America." *American Politics Research*, 47(2), 238-249.
10. García-Castañón, Marcela, Huckle, Kiku, **Walker, Hannah L.** and Chong, Chinbo. 2019. "Democracy's Deficit: The role of institutional contact in non-white political behavior." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics*, 4(1): 1-31.
9. Owens, Michael Leo and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2018. "Civic Voluntarism of 'Custodial Citizens': Involuntary Criminal Justice Contact, Associational Life and Political Participation." *Perspectives on Politics*, 16(4), 990-1013.
8. Walker, Hannah L., Herron, Michael C., and Smith, Daniel A. 2018. "Early voting changes and voter turnout: North Carolina in the 2016 General Election." *Political Behavior*, doi:10.1007/s11109-018-9473-5. *Online first*.
7. Dana, Karam, Lajevardi, Nazita, Oskooii, Kassra, and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2018. "Veiled politics: Experiences with discrimination among American Muslims." *Religion and Politics*, doi:10.1017/S1755048318000287. *Online first*.
6. Walker, Hannah L. and García-Castañón, Marcela. 2017. "For Love and Justice: The Mobilizing Impacts of Race, Gender and Proximal Contact." *Politics and Gender*, 13(4): 541-568.
5. Walker, Hannah L., Thorpe, Rebecca, Christensen, Emily and Anderson, JP. 2016. "The Hidden Subsidies of Rural Prisons: Race, Space and Cumulative Disadvantage." *Punishment and Society*, online first, Sage. August 8, 2016.
4. Sanchez, Gabriel R., Vargas, Eduard D., **Walker, Hannah L.**, and Ybarra, Vickie D. 2015. "Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Relationship Between Latino/a's Personal Connections to Immigrants and Issue Salience and Presidential Approval." *Politics, Groups and Identities*, 3(3).
3. Walker, Hannah L. and Bennett, Dylan. 2015. "The Wages of Wisconsin's Whiteness: Black Milwaukee, White Waukesha, and the Destruction of Public Sector Labor Unions." *New Political Science: A Journal of Politics and Culture*, 37(2): 181-203.
2. Dana, Karam and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2015. "Invisible Disasters: The Effects of Israeli Occupation on Palestinian Gender Roles." *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 8(4): 488-504.
1. Walker, Hannah L. 2014. "Extending the Effects of the Carceral State: Proximal Contact, Political Participation and Race." *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(4): 809-822.

Book Chapters, Reviews, and other Academic Works

1. Walker, Hannah L. Review of "*Neighborhood Watch: Policing White Spaces in America*. Shawn E. Fields. New York: Cambridge University Press (2022)" *Perspectives on Politics*, 21(1): 375-376.
2. Harris, Allison, **Walker, Hannah L.**, and Eckhouse, Laurel. 2020. "No Justice, No Peace: Political Science Perspectives on the American Carceral State. *The Journal of Racial and Ethnic Politics*, 5: 427-449. Introduction to special issue on the politics of criminal justice.
3. Bennet, Dylan and **Walker, Hannah L.** 2019. "Cracking the Racial Code: Black Threat, White Rights and the Lexicon of American Politics." Invited submission. *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 77(3-4): 689-727.

4. Sanchez, Gabe, **Walker, Hannah L.**, Nuño, Stephen, and Barreto, Matt. 2019. Encyclopedia Entry for "The Impact of Voter ID Laws." in Jessica Lavariega-Monforti (ed.) *Latinos in the American Political System: An Encyclopedia of Latinos as Voters, Candidates, and Office Holders*.
5. Walker, Hannah L., Sanchez, Gabe, Nuño, Stephen, and Barreto, Matt. 2017. "Race and the Right to Vote: The Modern Barrier of Voter ID Laws." in Todd Donovan (ed.) *Election Rules and Reforms*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
6. Walker, Hannah L. Review of "Incarceration Nation: How the United States Became the Most Punitive Democracy in the World. Peter K. Enns. New York: Cambridge University Press (2017) 192, ISBN 978-1-107-13288-7, 178-1-316-50061-3," *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 56(2): 269-271.

Select Working Papers

Doleac, Jennifer, Eckhouse, Laurel, Harris, Allison, Walker, Hannah L. and White, Ariel. "Registering Returning Citizens to Vote: Field Experiments in North Carolina." Revise & Resubmit.

White, Ariel, Walker, Hannah L., Michelson, Melissa, and Roth, Sam. "No Longer a Number: Finding New Ways to Contact and Mobilize Newly Enfranchised Citizens in New Jersey." Revise & Resubmit.

Walker, Hannah L. "Collaborative Injustice: Linking Federal Immigration Policy to Local Law Enforcement Practices." Working paper.

Doleac, Jennifer, Harris, Allison, Walker, Hannah L. and White, Ariel. "Reaching returning voters through individual outreach and social ties." Working paper.

Funding

Arnold Ventures, "Registering Returning Citizens to Vote through Relational Organizing in Texas," 2024 - 2025, \$158,318.00 (with Allison Harris and Ariel White).

Arnold Ventures, Convening on Implementing Rights Restoration for People with Felony Convictions, May 2024, \$21,000.00 (with Rob Stewart).

Public Agenda, Democracy Renewal Project, "Registering Returning Citizens to Vote through Relational Organizing in Texas," 2024 - 2025, \$50,000.00 (with Allison Harris and Ariel White).

Russell Sage Trustee Grant in Social, Political and Economic Inequality, "Policing socio-geographic change and displacement," 2023 - 2025, \$187,136.00 (with Marcel Roman, Derek Epp, Mike Findley and Amy Liu).

Houston Endowment Fund, "Registering Re-Entering Citizens to Vote," 2022 - 2025, \$420,000.00 (with Jennifer Doleac, Allison Harris and Ariel White).

OneOne Ventures. "Registering Re-Entering Citizens to Vote," 2022 - 2023, \$60,000.00 (with Jennifer Doleac, Allison Harris and Ariel White).

Russell Sage Trustee Grant in Social, Political and Economic Inequality, "Registering Re-Entering Citizens to Vote," 2021-2023, \$166,865.00 (with Jennifer Doleac, Laurel Eckhouse, Eric Foster-Moore, Allison Harris, and Ariel White).

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J-PAL North America Pilot Grant, "Registering Re-entering Citizens to Vote," 2019-2022, \$174,636 (with Jennifer Doleac, Laurel Eckhouse, Eric Foster-Moore, Allison Harris, and Ariel White).

Russell Sage Foundation Pipeline Grant, "Intersecting (In)Justice: The Causes and Consequences of the Criminalization of Immigration," 2020-2021, \$26,428.00

J-PAL North America Pilot Grant, "Pilot: Registering Re-entering Citizens to Vote," 2019, \$49,126.30 (with Jennifer Doleac, Laurel Eckhouse, Eric Foster-Moore, Allison Harris, and Ariel White).

Rutgers University Research Council Award, 2019-2020, \$2,880.00

MIT Election Lab New Initiatives Grant, 2019-2020, \$9,992.13 (with Laurel Eckhouse, Allison Harris and Ariel White)

Brian and Diane Jones Graduate Research Grant, University of Washington, Department of Political Science, 2015, \$1,500.00

Center for Statistics and Social Science Graduate Student Research Presentation and Training Grant, Spring 2014, \$1,000.00

WISER Survey Research Fellowship, Fall 2011-Fall 2014, \$2,000.00

WISER Summer Research Fellowship, Summer 2012, \$2,500.00

Christopherson Fellowship, 2011-2012 Academic Year

Bloustein Fellowship in Public Policy, 2009-2010 Academic Year.

Awards

Racial and Ethnic Politics Section Best Book Award, APSA, 2020, *Mobilized by Injustice: Criminal Justice Contact, Political Participation and Race*.

Latino Caucus Best Paper in Latino Politics, WPSA, 2019, "The Ripple Effect: The Political Consequences of Proximal Contact with Immigration Enforcement," (with Marcel Roman and Matt Barreto).

Racial and Ethnic Politics Section Best Conference Paper Award, APSA, 2019, "Acculturation and Perceived Discrimination among Muslim Americans," (with Nazita Lajevardi, Kassra Oskooii and Aubrey Westfall).

Best Graduate Paper in Political Science, 2014, "Executive Discretion: A Mixed-Method Study of the Pardon and Clemency Process in Washington State," (with Kassra Oskooii)

Western Political Science Association Paper Award 2012, Best Paper in Black Politics. "The Effects of Indirect Contact With the Criminal Justice System on Political Participation."

Teaching

Introduction to American Politics

The Politics of Immigration

Race, Criminal Justice and Civil Rights

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Law and Society
Public Policy Formation
Political Behavior (graduate)
American Politics Pro-Seminar (graduate)
Citizenship, Violence and Political Exclusion (graduate)

Research and Consulting Experience

Florida, 2020, expert report on racially polarized voting submitted to the Jacksonville City Council.

Florida, 2020, expert witness, Jones v. Desantis

North Dakota, 2016, 2018, provided research support for expert report with Dr. Matt Barreto, Dr. Gabe Sanchez and Janelle Johnson submitted to federal court in the case Brakebill at al. v Jaeger

Texas, 2014, provided research support for expert report with Dr. Matt Barreto and Dr. Gabe Sanchez submitted to federal court in the case Veasey v. Perry

City of Seattle, Office for Civil Rights, Research and Evaluation Assistant, 2013 - 2014

Pennsylvania, 2012, provided research support for expert report with Dr. Matt Barreto and Dr. Gabe Sanchez submitted to federal court in the case Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Milwaukee County, WI, 2012, provided research support for expert report Dr. Matt Barreto and Dr. Gabe Sanchez submitted to federal court the case Frank v. Walker

Invited Talks and Conference Presentations

Center for the Study of Democratic Politics conference on Racialized Policy Feedbacks, Princeton, 2024

Immigration Seminar Series, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, 2024

Institute for Social Science Research, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, 2024

Department of Political Science American Politics Workshop, University of Chicago, Chicago, 2024

The Sentencing Project convening on "50 Years of Mass Incarceration: Building Civic Power", 2023
Brennan Center for Justice Convening on Current Research in Voting Rights, NYU School of Law, 2023

Department of Political Science Mini-conference on the Politics of Gender, Diversity and Representation, University of Houston, 2023

Department of Political Science American Politics Workshop, Rice University, 2023

Department of Political Science American Politics Workshop, Emory University, Atlanta, 2022

Conversations on Race and Policing, CSU San Bernardino, 2022

SNF Paideia Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2021

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Citrin Center on Public Opinion, University of California, Berkeley, 2020
Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, Austin, 2020
Race, Inequality and Policy Initiative, Wake Forest University, 2020
Department of Political Science Research in American Politics Workshop, University of California, Berkeley, 2019
Department of Political Science Race, Ethnicity and Politics Workshop, University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
University of Denver, 2019
Columbia University, 2018
Yale University, 2018
Seminar in Racial and Ethnic Politics, Pace University, 2017
Winant Symposium on Democratic Deficits and American Politics, Rothermere American Institute at the University of Oxford, 2016

Professional Service

Discipline

Journal and Book Reviewer

Journal of Politics, American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Perspectives on Politics, Political Behavior, Religion and Politics, Politics, Groups and Identities, the Journal of Racial and Ethnic Politics, Oxford University Press, University of Chicago Press

Professional Leadership

American Political Science Association, section on Race, Ethnicity and Politics Co-Chair, 2022-2024
American Political Science Association, section on Race, Ethnicity and Politics best paper award committee, 2021
Journal of Racial and Ethnic Politics, special issue in criminal justice, 2020 (guest editor with Allison Harris and Laurel Eckhouse)
American Political Science Association, section on Race, Ethnicity and Politics program chair, 2020
American Political Science Association, section on Race, Ethnicity and Politics Newsletter editor, 2017 - 2019

Conferences Organized

Founding organizer, conference on "Justice and Injustice: Political Science Perspectives on Crime and Punishment", 2018 - present
Convening on Implementing Rights Restoration for People with Felony Convictions, University of Minnesota, May 2024
Politics of Race, Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium, University of Texas at Austin, 2022 & 2024
Women in REP Writing Retreat, Michigan State University, June 2019

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University

Dissertation committee chair:

Allison Verrilli (UT Austin)

Peter Dunphy (UT Austin)

Dissertation committee member:

Bailey Socha (Rutgers University)

Katie Krumholz (Rutgers University)

Chris Cassella (UT Austin)

Megan Dias (UT Austin)

Ben White (UT Austin)

Klara Fredriksson (UT Austin)

Miranda Sullivan (UT Austin)

Katherine McCardle (UT Austin)

Strategic planning committee, 2022 - 2023

Initiative on Law Society and Justice, advisory committee member, 2020 - present; director of research, 2023 - present

Racial and Ethnic Politics Search Committee, 2021

Provost's Early Career Fellowship Program Search Committee, 2020

Diversity and Inclusion in Government Graduate Studies (DIGGS) recruitment participant, 2021, 2022

Admissions Committee, 2019

Advisory Committee, 2017 - 2018

Last updated: March 20, 2025