

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA**

JOHN W. LICCIONE,
Plaintiff,

v.

RON DESANTIS, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 26-002751-CI
Section 20

VERIFIED EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff John W. Liccione, a declared candidate for the United States House of Representatives in Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District, moves under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(b) for a temporary injunction halting the further implementation of HB 1D, the congressional redistricting plan signed into law on May 4, 2026. This is a verified, noticed motion. It supersedes Plaintiff's prior Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction, withdraws the earlier request for relief without notice, and supersedes Plaintiff's Verified Supplement to that motion, so that a single, fully verified instrument is before the Court. Plaintiff's candidacy, standing, and injury are pleaded and verified in the Verified Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 14–17, 35–42. The threshold conditions identified in the Court's prior orders are addressed and satisfied in Section II below.
2. The motion asks this Court to do one thing: enjoin the implementing officials from putting HB 1D into effect for the 2026 congressional election, pending a final hearing on the merits, so that the districts under which Florida lawfully conducted its 2022 and 2024 elections remain operative in the interim. The relief is prohibitory. Plaintiff does not ask this Court to draw a map, to choose among maps, or to direct the Legislature to redraw one.

3. EOGPCRP2026 was drawn by Jason Poreda, the sole drawer, in the Executive Office of the Governor, who acknowledged on the legislative record that he was the only one who drew the map and that he used partisan data. The plan deports 103,359 registered voters from Pinellas County Districts 13 and 14 — a majority of them voters who do not align with Republican incumbent Anna Paulina Luna — across Tampa Bay and Boca Ciega Bay into Manatee-anchored District 16. Because there is a constitutional right to vote under a congressional map drawn in compliance with Article III, Section 20, this §20-violative deportation inflicts two distinct injuries at once: it denies these voters their right to vote Anna Luna out of office in District 13, the contest from which they are deported, and it wastes those same votes in District 16, where a 72,063-voter Republican supermajority leaves them unable to affect the outcome. It does so in the district where Plaintiff is the declared challenger to Republican incumbent Anna Luna, deporting the very electorate among whom Plaintiff has his greatest support. The plan thereby favors Anna Luna and a political party, in violation of Article III, Section 20(a) of the Florida Constitution, and it fractures Pinellas County across two bays in violation of the compactness and boundary commands of Section 20(b) while a legal alternative was ignored — the same kind of Tampa Bay water crossing the Florida Supreme Court has already ordered unwound under that provision.
4. This motion differs in three decisive respects from the consolidated Leon County challenge in which a coordinate circuit recently denied preliminary relief. First, Plaintiff's claim is race-independent: it rests on the partisan-and-incumbent-intent command of Section 20(a) and the geographic commands of Section 20(b), and does not require this Court to reinstate or evaluate any race-based district, so the strict-scrutiny analysis that drove the Leon County denial has no application here. Second, Plaintiff sues the office that drew the plan, and need not impute the

drawer's intent to a multi-member Legislature, so the evidentiary gap that defeated the Leon County plaintiffs is absent. Third, Plaintiff seeks prohibitory relief that halts implementation and leaves the prior plan in effect, rather than the affirmative, statewide installation of a particular map, so the remedial objection sustained in Leon County does not reach this request. Section III sets out each distinction.

5. This case raises a constitutional question under Article III, Section 20 — and to defeat the feasibility of a timely reversion on a question of this gravity, the State needed a sworn statement from a constitutional elections officer: the Secretary of State, or one of Florida's sixty-seven elected Supervisors of Elections, the officials who answer to the voters for the lawful conduct of their elections.
6. It could not produce one. Not the Secretary of State; not the Director of its own Division of Elections; not a single elected Supervisor. No constitutional officer would swear it.
7. The only sworn voice the State could find was a subordinate GIS manager at least two management levels below the elected Supervisor, some four hundred miles from Tallahassee. On a plain reading of what he actually swore, his declaration does not establish that a timely reversion is infeasible — it addresses only the build and deployment of the new map and says nothing about the effort to fall back to the prior plan. As Section V shows, the dates in his own declaration and the Director's, taken together, refute the conclusion the State induced from him: reverting to a plan that has existed in production since 2022 requires no new build and, at most, the same brief deployment — time the election calendar plainly allows.

II. VERIFIED FACTUAL BACKGROUND

8. **Threshold conditions met.** The threshold conditions the Court's prior orders placed on temporary injunctive relief are satisfied of record:

- a. **Rule 1.071 (notice to the Attorney General)** — Plaintiff filed his Notice of Constitutional Question on May 19, 2026 (DN 19) and served it, with the Complaint and the Emergency Motion, on the Attorney General, who received it on May 22, 2026, as shown by the USPS Proof of Delivery and the return receipt date-stamped received by the Department of Legal Affairs on May 26, 2026 (Exhibit 1; see also Plaintiff's Notice of Supplemental Service, DN 24);
- b. **Verification** — this motion is verified under penalty of perjury pursuant to section 92.525, Florida Statutes (Section VIII);
- c. **Service on Defendant Byrd** — personally served May 20, 2026, Affidavit of Service filed June 1, 2026 (DN 32); and
- d. **Service on Defendant DeSantis** — served June 4, 2026 by substitute service at the Executive Office of the Governor, return of service filed June 4, 2026 (Filing #249694615 – Exhibit 2). The motion is therefore ripe for decision under Rule 1.610(b).

9. EOGPCRP2026, enacted as HB 1D, is the congressional redistricting plan challenged in this action. It was drawn by the Executive Office of the Governor, transmitted to the Florida Legislature on April 27, 2026, enacted by both chambers as HB 1D on April 29, 2026, and signed into law by Defendant DeSantis on May 4, 2026, with immediate effect.

10. The plan was drawn by Jason Poreda, the sole drawer of the maps, in the Executive Office of the Governor. On the legislative record, Mr. Poreda testified, “I am the only one that drew the

map,” and acknowledged using partisan data. A coordinate circuit court has recorded, as the consensus of the parties before it, that “Mr. Jason Poreda was the sole drawer of the maps.” *Order, Equal Ground Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Byrd*, No. 2026 CA 000914 (Fla. 2d Cir. May 26, 2026), §II ¶4.

11. Under the congressional plan in effect for the 2022 and 2024 elections (Plan P000C0109), Pinellas County was divided between Congressional District 13 and Congressional District 14. Under EOGPCRP2026, Pinellas County is divided between Congressional District 13 and Congressional District 16, the latter anchored in Manatee County across Tampa Bay. The change reassigned thousands of Pinellas census blocks from Districts 13 and 14 into the Manatee-anchored District 16.¹ Compl. ¶¶ 78–82 & Ex. 2. The effect of that reassignment is the removal of South Pinellas voters from the District 13 electorate and their consolidation, across open water, into a Manatee-anchored district. Plaintiff identifies this as the second of two such operations.
12. The first operation, under the 2022 plan, moved a bloc of South Pinellas voters out of a Pinellas-based district and across Tampa Bay into Hillsborough-anchored District 14. That bloc — the current Pinellas portion of District 14 — contains 126,222 registered Pinellas voters: 55,108 Democratic, 34,869 Republican, 32,251 no-party-affiliation, 2,720 independent, and 1,274 minor-party voters. Under Plaintiff’s Coalition-voter measure (registered Democrats, no-party-affiliation, independent, and minor-party voters), the bloc contains 91,353 Coalition voters against 34,869 Republicans — a Coalition margin of 56,484, or 72.37 percent to 27.63 percent.

¹ Plaintiff’s Ballotir voter-count analysis is based on the April 2026 Florida Division of Elections voter-registration and voter-history files received by Plaintiff on DVD by United States mail in April 2026 in Plaintiff’s capacity as a declared congressional candidate. See Compl. ¶ 63.

13. Wave Two — EOGPCRP2026 — withdraws District 14 from Pinellas County entirely, leaving no Pinellas voter in District 14, and deports 103,359 Pinellas County District 13 and District 14 voters into Manatee-anchored District 16. Of those 103,359 voters, 63,448 are Coalition voters and 39,911 are Republican voters — 23,537 more Coalition voters than Republican voters. The removal reduces District 13's Coalition margin from 74,710 to 51,173 and shifts its two-party registration from 40.67 percent Democratic and 59.33 percent Republican to 38.98 percent Democratic and 61.02 percent Republican. Compl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 2.
14. The receiving district is not politically neutral. As of May 3, 2026, Manatee County — the anchor of Congressional District 16 — contained 138,346 registered Republicans and 66,283 registered Democrats, a Republican margin of 72,063 voters, before any deported Pinellas voter is added. The deportation inflicts two injuries at once: it denies the deported Coalition voters their right to vote Anna Paulina Luna out of office in District 13, from which they are removed, and it wastes that same vote in District 16, where the 72,063-voter Republican supermajority leaves them unable to affect the outcome.
15. The State's own sworn declarations describe how implementation works. In the consolidated Leon County litigation challenging EOGPCRP2026 — *Equal Ground Education Fund, Inc. v. Byrd*, No. 2026 CA 000914 (Fla. 2d Cir.), and related cases — the trial court denied preliminary relief on May 26, 2026, and the plaintiffs appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, No. 1D2026-1539. In its Appellees' Opposition to the Motion to Expedite that appeal (Filing #249430518, filed June 2, 2026), the State (Defendant Cord Byrd) submitted two sworn declarations in support of its position. The first is the declaration of Maria Matthews, Director of the Florida Division of Elections — the division within the Department of State headed by Defendant Byrd. Matthews declared that since HB 1D took effect on May 4, 2026, activity in

the Florida Voter Registration System "suggests" that Supervisors of Elections have been associating voters to the new districts. The second is the declaration of Xavier Pichs, GIS Development Manager for the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections, who declared that his team prepared, programmed, and quality-controlled the new district boundaries within the "Redistricting database" of the voting system, and that, after the trial court declined to enjoin implementation, his team "deployed the new boundary data from the Redistricting database to the live systems used to administer elections," a process "completed on May 30, 2026." Both declarations and the Response are together attached as Exhibit 3.

16. The voter-impact figures stated above are derived from the April 2026 Florida Division of Elections "Statewide Voter Registration and Voting History Extract File," which Plaintiff received by United States mail from the Division of Elections in his capacity as a declared congressional candidate. That source file, on the disc as received, is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Fla. Dep't of State, Division of Elections, "Statewide Voter Registration and Voting History Extract File," April 2026, on the disc and addressed mailing as received by Plaintiff.

17. Plaintiff is a declared candidate for Congress in District 13 in the August 18, 2026 primary, running to unseat the incumbent, Representative Anna Paulina Luna. The South Pinellas voters removed by EOGPCRP2026 are the electorate among whom Plaintiff has the greatest support and recognition. The plan removes Plaintiff's strongest voter base from the district in which he is a candidate. Compl. ¶¶ 14–17, 35–42.
18. The challenged plan is in effect and operative for the 2026 election. Since May 4, 2026, according to declarant Matthews, the Division of Elections has posted, and has emailed to every congressional candidate, notice that the districts in HB 1D are in effect and operative for qualifying for the United States House of Representatives, with the qualifying period running from June 8 to June 12, 2026. Defendant Marcus and other supervisors of elections have been implementing the plan by reassigning voters to the new districts.

ARGUMENT

III. THE LEON COUNTY ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY RELIEF DOES NOT REACH THIS ACTION

19. Defendant Marcus, through counsel, has brought to this Court's attention, by her Amended Notice of Related Cases, the order denying preliminary injunctive relief in the consolidated Leon County actions, Equal Ground Education Fund, Inc. v. Byrd, No. 2026 CA 914 (Fla. 2d Cir. May 26, 2026) (the "Leon Order"), and may be expected to urge this Court to deny relief here on the strength of that order. The Court should not follow it. The Leon Order is the decision of a coordinate trial court in another circuit; it carries persuasive weight only; and it rests on grounds that are absent from this action.

A. This action is race-independent; the strict-scrutiny chain that drove the Leon Order is absent.

20. The Leon court’s principal ground for denial turned entirely on race. The Equal Ground plaintiffs’ theory required restoring the 2022 congressional map, which contained a prior District 20 that the political branches had found to be a race-based district. The Leon court reasoned that it could not force the 2022 map onto the electorate without resolving whether District 20’s racial classifications could survive strict scrutiny, *see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007), and concluded that “the potential partisan intent in the 2026 map is the lesser of the two evils.” Leon Order §IV.A.
21. No part of that chain exists here. Plaintiff’s claim arises under the partisan-and-incumbent-intent command of Article III, Section 20(a) and the geographic commands of Section 20(b). The Pinellas and Tampa Bay districts were drawn in 2022 without reference to race. J. Alex Kelly, then Deputy Chief of Staff to Governor DeSantis and the drawer of the Governor’s Office’s 2022 congressional districts, stated before the Florida Senate Committee on Reapportionment that “[r]ace and political partisan data in no way related at all to my drawing of districts 13, 14, 15, 16, or any of the districts in the map.” Fla. S. Comm. on Reapportionment, 2022C Spec. Sess. (Apr. 19, 2022), at 1:13:35–1:13:46. Plaintiff does not allege a racial classification, does not seek relief that depends on any racial district, and does not ask this Court to weigh a state constitutional command against the federal Equal Protection Clause. The strict-scrutiny balancing that the Leon court found dispositive has no application to a Section 20 claim that does not involve race.
22. That Plaintiff’s requested relief, in halting implementation of HB 1D, has effect on the configuration of more than one district does not implicate the racial-classification concern that

drove the Leon Order. The districts reconfigured by EOGPCRP2026 in the region of Plaintiff's injury are the Tampa Bay districts across Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties. None is the South Florida district (District 20) whose race-based lines supplied the strict-scrutiny problem in the Leon case; District 20 lies on the southeast Atlantic coast, in the Broward and Palm Beach corridor, on the opposite side of the peninsula. Halting implementation of HB 1D reinstates no race-classified district: the prior lawful lines that remain in effect upon restraint of the challenged plan carry no racial classification that any party has identified. The strict-scrutiny chain of Leon Order §IV.A is therefore absent regardless of how many districts the restraint affects.

B. Intent is established at the executive source; no imputation of intent to the Legislature is required.

23. The Leon court's likelihood-of-success analysis denied relief because the partisan intent of the map drawer could not, on that record, be attributed to the enacting body. The court held that "[t]he intent of the map drawer is not as apparent as Plaintiffs argue, nor is the applicability of imputing Mr. Poreda's intent (if any) to the entire Legislature established on this record," and that "[o]nce an inference is required, evidence moves into the circumstantial category." Leon Order §IV.B.

24. That imputation problem is the Leon court's, not Plaintiff's. The Equal Ground plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State, the Florida Senate, and the Florida House, and were therefore required to impute the drawer's intent to a multi-member legislative body. Plaintiff sued the source. The defendants in this action include the Governor, whose office drew, transmitted, promoted, and signed EOGPCRP2026 into law, and the Secretary of State, an executive officer charged with its implementation. The Leon court found, as the consensus of the parties before it, that "Mr.

Jason Poreda was the sole drawer of the maps,” answering on the legislative record, “I am the only one that drew the map.” Leon Order §II ¶4. The intent of the sole executive drawer of an executive product is the intent of the executive office that produced it. Plaintiff need not aggregate, attribute, or impute that intent across the members of a 160-member legislative body, because Plaintiff does not sue a legislative chamber. The single evidentiary gap the Leon court identified as fatal is not present in a case pleaded against the drawer’s principal.

C. The plan favors an identified incumbent — an independent Section 20(a) violation the Leon court did not reach.

25. Section 20(a) forbids drawing a plan or district “with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.” Art. III, § 20(a), Fla. Const. The Equal Ground plaintiffs advanced a partisan-favoritism theory and did not plead a named-incumbent beneficiary. Plaintiff pleads the incumbent prong directly: EOGPCRP2026 protects Republican Representative Anna Paulina Luna in Congressional District 13 by removing from that district the voters most likely to support the identified challenger — 23,537 more Coalition voters than Republican voters — and reducing the Coalition registration advantage in Congressional District 13 from 74,710 to 51,173. This is a concrete, proof-amenable claim of intent to favor a specific, named incumbent. It does not depend on the circumstantial partisan-data inference the Leon court found insufficient, and the Leon court did not analyze it, because it was not before that court.

D. The plan crosses two bays in violation of a holding already binding in this State, when a compact alternative was available.

26. Plaintiff’s claim also rests on a violation of Article III, Section 20(b) the Leon court had no occasion to address. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 47, 49, 51. Section 20(b) requires that districts be compact and, where feasible, follow existing political and geographical boundaries. Applying that

command to this very geography, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a Tampa Bay crossing of Districts 13 and 14 unwound, holding that a crossing of the Bay drawn without a legitimate, tier-compliant justification cannot stand. *League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner*, 172 So. 3d 363, 408–09 (Fla. 2015) (Apportionment VII). EOGPCRP2026 carries South Pinellas across Tampa Bay into a Manatee-anchored district — the same Bay crossing the Court condemned, now drawn by the Governor's sole map-drawer using partisan data.

27. The crossing is in fact a double bay crossing. The contiguously situated South Pinellas communities — including St. Petersburg, Gulfport, South Pasadena, Pasadena, and southern Seminole — are joined to the Manatee-anchored district only across two separate bodies of open water: Boca Ciega Bay and Tampa Bay. A district that unites communities separated by two bays is, on its face, the antithesis of the compact, boundary-respecting configuration Section 20(b) commands, and compounds the very crossing Apportionment VII condemned.
28. That a compact alternative existed is established by the drawer's own words. J. Alex Kelly described drawing Districts 13 and 14 and the surrounding districts “solely based on trying to draw districts that are compact, aesthetically compact, statistically compact, that follow clearly definable political/geographical boundary lines that meet that Tier II test.” Fla. S. Comm. on Reapportionment, 2022C Spec. Sess. (Apr. 19, 2022), at 1:04:02–1:04:33. A constitutional alternative remains obvious on the same map: Pinellas's congressional population can be apportioned by moving the northern district boundary southward within the peninsula across land, rather than carrying southern communities across two bays into another county. That a more compact, boundary-respecting configuration was available and not chosen is itself probative of improper intent under *Apportionment VII*, 172 So. 3d at 401–03.

29. The Equal Ground plaintiffs did not deploy this holding, and the Leon Order does not mention *Apportionment VII* or any Tampa Bay crossing. The Section 20(b) geographic violation is therefore both directly supported by controlling Florida Supreme Court authority and entirely absent from the order Defendants would have this Court treat as persuasive. It is an independent basis for relief that the Leon Order does not reach.

E. The relief sought is prohibitory; the remedial concern in the Leon Order does not apply.

30. The Leon court’s remedial concern, drawn from *Byrd v. Black Voters Matter Capacity Bldg. Inst., Inc.*, 339 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (*Byrd I*), was that a temporary injunction in a declaratory action “could only reinstate the former congressional map,” Leon Order §IV.A, and that the proper remedy was to “order the Legislature to redraw the map.” That concern is a function of what the Equal Ground plaintiffs asked for: affirmative judicial imposition of a particular replacement map upon the entire State, against legislative defendants.

31. Plaintiff asks for neither. Plaintiff does not name the Legislature, does not ask this Court to order anyone to draw or adopt a map, and does not ask this Court to impose a replacement plan of any scope. Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin the further implementation of HB 1D, pending final hearing, so that the lawful districts in effect for the 2022 and 2024 congressional elections remain operative while this Court adjudicates the merits. That relief is prohibitory in substance: it restrains a continuing executive act and draws nothing. The prior, lawful district lines reassert not because this Court affirmatively imposes them, but because restraining the implementation of the challenged plan leaves the pre-existing lawful map undisturbed. That the restraint, like any change to a districting plan, has consequences for more than one district does not convert it into an affirmative remedy; the interlocking nature of districts is inherent in all redistricting, and *Byrd I* does not hold that interim relief is forbidden whenever it touches adjacent districts.

Byrd I withholds one thing — the provisional judicial installation of a particular replacement map, and the judicial direction to the Legislature to redraw. Plaintiff seeks neither. He seeks only to halt an unlawful executive act and preserve the status quo ante, which is the precise function Byrd I recognizes a temporary injunction may serve.

F. On the Leon court's own analysis, two of the four elements are resolved in Plaintiff's favor.

32. Even within the framework the Leon court applied, two elements favor Plaintiff. On irreparable harm, the Leon court expressly declined to decide the question. The Executive and Florida House defendants did not dispute irreparable harm; only the Florida Senate argued that, because the plaintiffs' right to vote was not itself at issue, their authority that a continuing constitutional violation is per se irreparable harm was less applicable in a map-drawing case. The court held it "need not decide that issue at this stage given the other points raised and decided." Leon Order §IV.C. Plaintiff's harm presents no such question: he is a declared candidate subjected to a quantified, district-specific disadvantage, as set out in Section IV. On adequate remedy at law, the Leon court recorded that the defendants did not dispute the absence of an adequate remedy, because a constitutional injury cannot be compensated through money damages. Leon Order §IV.D. Both elements are established here.

33. For these reasons, the Leon Order neither binds this Court nor supplies a reason to deny the relief Plaintiff seeks. It denied a statewide, race-dependent, legislature-directed demand to install a particular map. Plaintiff brings a race-independent, executive-directed motion to halt implementation of the plan and preserve the lawful status quo ante. The two actions are not the same, and the disposition of the one does not control the other.

IV. PLAINTIFF SATISFIES ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF RULE 1.610(b)

34. A party seeking a temporary injunction must establish four elements: a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, irreparable harm absent entry of the injunction, and that the injunction would serve the public interest. *Fla. Dep't of Health v. Florigrown, LLC*, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2021). Plaintiff establishes each. Because the verified factual averments set out above supply the evidentiary basis, the Court may make the “clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings” required to support injunctive relief. *Wade v. Brown*, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

(1) Plaintiff Has a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

35. Plaintiff challenges EOGPCRP2026 under both subsections of Article III, Section 20. The record set out in Section II, drawn from the enacted plans themselves and from Plaintiff's verified Ballotir analysis, establishes a substantial likelihood of success on each.

36. *Section 20(b) — compactness and geographic boundaries.* Plaintiff's Section 20(b) claim rests on two independent footings. First, the crossing was drawn with the same improper intent established under Section 20(a): the Governor's sole map-drawer used partisan data, and the crossing operates to favor the Republican incumbent. Apportionment VII condemned a Tampa Bay crossing of these very districts on just such a showing and held that once improper intent as to a district is shown, the burden shifts to the defense to justify the challenged lines in tier-compliant terms, without deference. *League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner*, 172 So. 3d 363, 401–03, 408–09 (Fla. 2015). Second, on the face of the map and independent of intent, EOGPCRP2026 is markedly less compact than the plan it replaced: It carries South Pinellas across two separate bodies of open water — Boca Ciega Bay and Tampa Bay — into a district anchored in a third county, Manatee, when a compact, Pinellas-based alternative crossing no

open water was available. A district uniting communities split by two bays into a neighboring county's district is the antithesis of the boundary-respecting configuration Section 20(b) commands. The enacted plan under which Pinellas voted in 2022 and 2024 carried neither defect — its drawer swore that partisan data played no role in drawing Districts 13 and 14, see Section III.D — so preserving that configuration pending final hearing neither installs a map nor certifies its geometry; it holds the lawful, enacted status quo while this Court adjudicates the validity of the new plan.

37. *Section 20(a) — intent to favor an incumbent. Section 20(a) prohibits drawing a plan or district with the intent to favor an incumbent.* EOGPCRP2026 deports 103,359 registered voters from Pinellas County Districts 13 and 14 — 63,448 of them Coalition voters, 23,537 more Coalition voters than Republicans — across two bays into Manatee-anchored District 16. Because there is a constitutional right to vote under a congressional map drawn in compliance with Article III, Section 20, the plan inflicts two distinct injuries at once: it denies these voters their right to vote Anna Luna out of office in District 13, the contest from which they are deported, and it wastes that same vote in District 16, where the 72,063-voter Republican supermajority leaves them unable to affect the outcome. The plan thereby reduces the District 13 Coalition margin from 74,710 to 51,173 and moves the district's two-party registration toward Anna Luna. The deported voters are the electorate among whom Plaintiff, the declared challenger to Anna Luna, has his greatest support. A plan that deports the challenger's strongest supporters out of the district where Anna Luna stands for election, and strands them in a safe Republican district where their votes are wasted, is direct circumstantial evidence of intent to favor Anna Luna. This is not the abstract, party-only theory the Leon County court found insufficient; it is a concrete, identified-incumbent favoritism claim, proven by the plan's own effects.

38. *Intent is established at the executive source.* Unlike the plaintiffs in the Leon County action, Plaintiff need not impute the drawer's intent to a multi-member legislative body. The plan was drawn by Jason Poreda, the sole drawer, in the Executive Office of the Governor — who acknowledged using partisan data — and Plaintiff has sued the Governor whose office drew, transmitted, promoted, and signed it. The intent of the sole executive drawer of an executive product is the intent of the executive that produced it. The evidentiary gap the Leon County court identified — the inability, on that record, to attribute the drawer's intent to the entire Legislature, Leon Order §IV.B — is therefore absent here, as set out in Section III.B.
39. *The claim is race-independent.* Plaintiff's claim invokes the partisan-and-incumbent-intent command of Section 20(a) and the geographic commands of Section 20(b). It does not allege a racial classification, does not depend on any race-based district, and does not require this Court to weigh the State constitutional command against the federal Equal Protection Clause. The strict-scrutiny analysis that drove the Leon County court's denial, Leon Order §IV.A, has no application here, as set out in Section III.A.
40. A substantial likelihood of success requires more than a contestable claim, but it does not require certainty. On the verified record — the plan's own block reassignments, the voter-impact figures, the facial double-bay crossing condemned by controlling authority, and the unchosen compact alternative — Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of prevailing on both Section 20(a) and Section 20(b).

(2) Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent an Injunction.

41. A continuing constitutional violation constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law. *Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, Santa Rosa Cnty. v. Home Builders Ass'n of W. Fla., Inc.*, 325 So. 3d 981, 985 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“[T]he law recognizes that a continuing constitutional violation, in and

of itself, constitutes irreparable harm.”). The implementation of a districting plan drawn in violation of Article III, Section 20 is such a violation, and it is ongoing: Defendant Marcus and other supervisors are reassigning voters to the unconstitutional districts now, and the qualifying period under the challenged map opens June 8, 2026.

42. Plaintiff’s injury is concrete, particularized, and measurable: a quantified disadvantage imposed on Plaintiff as the named challenger, not a generalized grievance shared with the electorate at large. A candidate has a distinct and cognizable interest in the legality of the process under which his election is conducted. *See Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections*, 607 U.S. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op., at 9–10) (candidates have “a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns”). If the 2026 primary and general elections proceed under EOGPCRP2026, they will be conducted in districts that deport Plaintiff’s voter base across two bays and leave the Coalition electorate unable to affect the outcome in the receiving district. An election held under an unconstitutional map cannot be re-run, and the seat, once filled under that map, cannot be restored by a later judgment. Compl. ¶¶ 155–157, 161–162.

43. Notably, in the Leon County action the Executive and House defendants did not dispute that a continuing constitutional violation of this kind constitutes irreparable harm. Leon Order §IV.C. The same executive interest is a defendant here.

(3) Plaintiff Has No Adequate Remedy at Law.

44. There is no adequate remedy at law for a constitutional injury of this character. Plaintiff does not seek, and could not be made whole by, money damages: the injury is the conduct of a congressional election in unconstitutional districts and the removal of Plaintiff’s electorate,


neither of which is compensable in damages. Declaratory and injunctive relief is the only remedy that can prevent the violation; a damages action cannot. In the Leon County action the defendants did not dispute the absence of an adequate remedy at law, recognizing that a constitutional injury cannot be compensated through money damages. Leon Order §IV.D.

(4) The Injunction Would Serve the Public Interest, and the Equities Favor Relief.

45. The Leon court's balance-of-hardships ground rested on *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006), and on *Haft v. Adams*, 238 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1970), and *Walker v. Best*, 163 So. 696 (Fla. 1935), for the principle that a court should not interfere with election machinery already in motion. That principle rests on an outdated conception of how elections are administered. The relevant machinery is not a fixed apparatus configured once per cycle; it is the VR Systems Voter Focus election-management system and the Supervisor's staff and contractors who operate it continuously, processing voter-registration transactions and administering a near-continuous calendar of municipal, special, primary, and general elections without pause between them.

46. In such a system, the configuration of each election is created by copying forward and overwriting the configuration of a prior one. That the machinery is "in motion" therefore says nothing about whether the EOGPCRP2026 configuration can be backed out: the machinery is always in motion, and is designed to load, clone, and overwrite election definitions as a matter of routine. The concern animating Walker and Haft — disruption of a settled electoral process on the eve of an election — is not presented by relief that uses the system's own ordinary function, well before the operative 2026 deadlines of June 8 and June 19. Plaintiff's relief is, moreover, prohibitory and preventive: it enjoins a change before it is carried into the election rather than unwinding a completed process.

47. The system’s ordinary function includes a documented operation for exactly this purpose. As shown in Figure 2 on the next page, the Voter Focus system supplied by VR Systems, Inc. includes a feature, “*Clone an Election*,” that copies “ballot styles, voting precincts, and related information from one election to another in a single operation.” The information copied expressly includes the election’s voting districts and precincts and the assignment of ballot styles to precincts — the districting configuration itself — and the vendor warns that “*Any existing information in the receiving election will be overwritten by the copy operation.*” The vendor describes the operation as “*a significant time-saver.*” Those quoted system statements are the VR Systems’ own description of the election-management function the Supervisor uses, and they foreclose any unsupported assumption that restoring the prior districting configuration is impossible or too disruptive to complete before the June 19, 2026 operational deadline. The feature was documented in VR Systems’ publicly accessible online help manual at <https://content.vrsys.co/Help/VF/> until VR Systems removed those pages from public access in mid-to-late December 2025. The Clone an Election page is shown below in Figure 2.



48. Defendants’ own implementation timeline supplies the practical benchmark for feasibility. The duty to implement HB 1D could not arise before it took effect on May 4, 2026. By on or about May 22, 2026, the new configuration was fielded in the Pinellas County Supervisor’s production system: on May 20 and again on May 22, the Supervisor’s public voter-lookup returned no record for Plaintiff — a registered voter and declared candidate — and displayed an alert that some voter-lookup services were temporarily down, and on the May 20 call a Supervisor representative stated that implementation was underway and would be completed “in the next two days.” The entire interval from HB 1D’s effective date to a fielded new map thus fell within roughly fifteen working days. Restoring the prior configuration through the documented “*Clone an Election*” function is plausibly bounded by the same order of magnitude, subject to testimony, and the operative deadlines of June 12 and June 19, 2026 leave time to accomplish it. The Pinellas implementation acts and the controlling election calendar are pleaded and verified in the Verified Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 25, 27, 158–160.
49. Reinstatement requires little work because the prior configuration has not been discarded — a fact established by the State’s own records. The April 2026 statewide voter-registration extract produced by the Division of Elections (Figure 1), reflecting data through the end of the prior month, carries every voter’s pre-EOGPCRP2026 congressional district assignment. Election records maintained by County Supervisors of Elections are retained under a state schedule. *See* Fla. Dep’t of State, General Records Schedule GS3 for Election Records (adopted by Fla. Admin. Code R. 1B-24.003); *see also* 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (federal 22-month retention floor). The configuration to be reinstated is therefore not a lost artifact to be reconstructed, but a record the State retains and recently produced.

50. The manner in which the Supervisor built the 2026 election definition is itself a matter for proof. Whether, in building the 2026 election definition, the Supervisor cloned forward a prior election definition — and from which election — is a fact within the Supervisor’s and her staff’s direct knowledge and subject to proof at an evidentiary hearing. The clone operation that builds each election definition is the same operation by which the prior configuration can be restored. To the extent Defendants dispute feasibility, that dispute is theirs to join with evidence; the operational facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the Supervisor and her staff, and Plaintiff is prepared to establish them at an evidentiary hearing through the testimony of the personnel with direct operational responsibility for the Voter Focus system and of the Supervisor herself, including those such as Marc Gillette, Chief Deputy Supervisor of Elections. The factual premise of the balance-of-hardships analysis is one this Court can resolve on testimony, not assumption.

51. The public interest favors enforcing the constitutional command, not entrenching its violation. The public has no legitimate interest in conducting a congressional election under a district plan drawn in violation of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution. That provision was placed in the Constitution by the people of Florida to govern exactly the conduct at issue here, and the public interest lies in giving it effect. The interest in electoral certainty is fully served by a prompt, calendar-administrable reversion to the districts under which Pinellas County voted in 2022 and 2024 — districts that are lawful, retained, and already familiar to the County’s voters. Certainty and constitutionality point the same direction: toward the plan that complies with Section 20, not the one challenged under it.

V. THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS PROHIBITORY, ADMINISTRABLE, AND MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST THE SERVED DEFENDANTS

52. Plaintiff seeks a single, narrow form of relief: an order enjoining the further implementation of HB 1D pending final hearing, so that the congressional districts lawfully in effect for the 2022 and 2024 elections (Plan P000C0109) remain operative while this Court adjudicates the merits. Plaintiff does not ask this Court to draw a map, to adopt a map, to select among competing maps, or to direct the Legislature to do any of those things. The relief restrains a continuing executive act; it imposes nothing.

A. The relief is prohibitory, and therefore within this Court's power under Byrd I.

53. Defendants may be expected to invoke *Byrd v. Black Voters Matter Capacity Bldg. Inst., Inc.*, 339 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (*Byrd I*), as the Leon court did, for the proposition that a temporary injunction in a declaratory action “could only reinstate the former congressional map,” *id.* at 1079, and that the proper remedy is “to order the Legislature to redraw the map,” *id.* at 1083. That principle does not defeat the relief sought here, because Plaintiff seeks neither an affirmative remedy nor the installation of a map.

54. Byrd I withholds the affirmative, provisional remedy of a court installing a chosen replacement plan; it does not forbid restraining an unlawful act and allowing the lawful status quo to remain. The First District was explicit that a temporary injunction’s proper office is “to preserve the status quo,” and that it “will not support [the trial court] going further to grant a remedy on a provisional basis.” *Id.* at 1076. That is precisely the line Plaintiff’s request respects. Enjoining implementation of HB 1D does not require this Court to draw or impose anything. The prior lawful districts remain operative not because the Court affirmatively installs them, but because restraining the implementation of the challenged plan leaves the previously enacted, lawful

plan undisturbed. That is the preservation of the status quo Byrd I authorizes, not the provisional grant of an affirmative remedy Byrd I withholds.

55. That the restraint, like any change to a districting plan, has consequences for more than one district does not convert prohibitory relief into mandatory relief. The interlocking character of districts is inherent in all redistricting; an injunction against implementing a plan necessarily leaves in place whatever lawful configuration preceded it. Byrd I does not hold that interim relief becomes forbidden whenever it has effects beyond a single district. It holds that a court may not, on a provisional basis, install a particular replacement map of the court's own choosing. Plaintiff asks for no such thing. The map that remains in effect upon restraint of EOGPCRP2026 is not a map of this Court's making; it is the plan the Legislature itself enacted and under which Florida conducted its 2022 and 2024 congressional elections.

B. Reversion is a single-digit days-scale deployment of a plan that already exists.

56. Section IV(4) establishes that reversion is operationally administrable well within the 2026 election calendar: the system's documented "***Clone an Election***" function performs exactly this operation, Plan P000C0109 already exists, was operative for the 2022 and 2024 cycles, and is retained in the State's records. ¶¶ 45–50, above. The State's only contrary evidence is its own declarations, which on a plain reading misrepresent the reversion question by both omission and commission and are entitled to no weight, as addressed next.

C. The State's sole sworn claim that a timely reversion is no longer possible in the First District Court of Appeal is entitled to no weight and is refuted by its own declarations.

57. The State's sole sworn assertion that a timely reversion is no longer possible does not withstand scrutiny, and as a bald, conclusory statement is entitled to no weight. That assertion appears in a single sentence of the Pichs declaration — that it is “now past the point” at which the county would need to begin implementation of any new plan “***or even revert to the previous***

congressional districts” while still adequately preparing for the primary. Ex. 3, Pichs Decl.

¶ 7. It fails at the threshold, and for the additional reasons set out below.

58. Before that assertion can carry any weight, it must be measured against the operational mechanism Plaintiff has identified. Miami-Dade County, like Pinellas County, administers its elections on VR Systems, Inc.'s Voter Focus software — the very software whose documented "Clone an Election" function is described above. See supra ¶¶ 45–50. Pichs never identifies VR Systems or Voter Focus by name, and the Court should consider that omission material. The State asks the Court to accept a bald assertion about operational impossibility while its declarant avoids naming both the vendor, VR Systems, and the software product, Voter Focus, whose own documentation describes a "Clone an Election" function for copying district, precinct, and ballot-style information into a receiving election as a “*significant time-saver*” feature. He refers only to a generic "Redistricting database" and unnamed "live systems used to administer elections," while avoiding the question that matters here: whether VR Systems' Voter Focus can rapidly restore or clone forward the prior Plan P000C0109 district, precinct, and ballot-style configuration.

59. Pichs does not address the documented "Clone an Election" function. He does not state that the Plan P000C0109 election definition is unavailable in VR Systems' Voter Focus in its test or production environments. He does not state whether the prior election definition has been discarded or preserved. And he does not explain how restoring an existing prior plan could require the same effort as building, programming, and quality-controlling a brand-new congressional plan. On that record, Pichs's declaration is not proof of infeasibility; it is evidence of a willful effort to suppress the vendor name, VR Systems, and the software-product

name, Voter Focus, while asking the Court to accept a conclusion that depends on the capabilities of that very software.

60. First, taken in the light most favorable to the relief sought, it is refuted by a reasonable inference from the arithmetic of the State’s (i.e., Appellee Cord Byrd’s) own attached declarations. Implementation began when HB 1D took effect on May 4, 2026. Ex. 3, Matthews Decl. The new district definition was built, programmed, and quality-controlled within the “Redistricting database” over the roughly twenty-two days from May 4 to the May 26 order declining to enjoin; only then was the finished definition deployed to the live systems, a deployment “completed on May 30, 2026” — four days. Ex. 3, Pichs Decl. ¶¶ 3–4. Reverting to the prior plan requires none of that build and testing, and at most the four-day deployment, because Plan P000C0109 already exists and was the configuration under which Pinellas County conducted its 2022 and 2024 elections. There is nothing to build; there is only the four-day deployment to perform. The Pichs declaration’s paragraph 7 treats reversion as though it required that same build-test-deploy effort, when reverting requires no new build at all — only the redeployment of a plan that already exists.

61. Second, the assertion exceeds the declarant’s competence. Mr. Pichs is a GIS Development Manager who supervises a team of GIS Specialists performing boundary and precinct work. Ex. 3, Pichs Decl. ¶¶ 1–2. Whether a county can adequately prepare for the primary if ordered to revert is a judgment about overall election administration that lies outside the scope of a GIS manager’s role and the personal knowledge his declaration establishes.

62. Third, the implementation declaration on which the State relies is not founded on first-hand knowledge. The Director of the Division of Elections Maria Matthews avers only that activity in the Florida Voter Registration System “suggests” that Supervisors have been implementing

the plan — an inference drawn by the Division from monitoring county activity in the statewide system, not a sworn account by any official of what a county actually did or can undo. Ex. 3, Matthews Decl.

63. Fourth, the conclusion is sworn to by no Constitutional official accountable for election administration. The State produced no sworn statement from any of Florida's sixty-seven Supervisors of Elections — the officials with first-hand knowledge of their counties' capacity to implement or revert. The Division of Elections sits in Tallahassee, in Leon County, whose elected Supervisor of Elections is Mark Earley; yet the State's reversion declaration came not from Supervisor Earley, in the Division's own county, nor from Alina Garcia, the elected Supervisor of Elections of Miami-Dade County and the officer accountable for the very county whose employee signed the declaration, nor from any of the other sixty-five Supervisors. It came from a GIS manager subordinate to Supervisor Garcia, four hundred miles from the Division. A reasonable inference from the State's resort to a county technologist, rather than to any Supervisor of Elections, is that the conclusion that a timely reversion is no longer possible was one to which no Supervisor was willing to swear.

64. Fifth, any lateness is the State's own creation. By the declarant's own account, the new plan was not deployed to the live systems until May 30, 2026, and only "after the trial court declined to enjoin" — the sole such ruling preceding the deployment being the May 26 order in the separate Leon County litigation. No ruling on the merits had been entered in this action; this Court's order on Plaintiff's ex parte request did not issue until June 1, 2026, and that order expressly limited itself "to an adjudication that the extraordinary remedy of an ex parte temporary injunction is unwarranted." That left Plaintiff's noticed motion for temporary injunction undecided on the merits, as it remains. The State thus completed fielding the

challenged map on the strength of a different plaintiff's adverse ruling in a different case in a different circuit, while a live challenge to that very implementation remained pending and undecided here — and while Defendant Byrd, the Secretary of State and chief election officer, had been personally served with this action on May 20, 2026, before that deployment had begun. A party may not initiate and complete a deployment with notice of a pending challenge to it and then invoke the completed deployment as the reason the challenge comes too late. In short, the State disregarded the live challenge pending here in the Sixth Judicial Circuit while using a coordinate circuit's denial in another plaintiff's Leon County case as the pretext to deploy.

65. To preserve the ability to administer that reversion, Plaintiff additionally requests that the Court direct Defendant Marcus to retain and preserve the Plan P000C0109 election definitions and associated configuration data pending final hearing. This is a preservation directive incident to the prohibitory injunction; it does not require Defendant Marcus to deploy or implement anything, only to refrain from discarding the lawful prior configuration that the requested relief leaves in effect.
66. Each Defendant is properly before the Court, as established in Section II: Defendant Marcus has appeared through counsel; Defendants Byrd and DeSantis have been served. The relief runs against all three in their official capacities — against Defendant Marcus, who administers elections in Pinellas County, and Defendant Byrd, who oversees elections statewide, as to the continued implementation of HB 1D; and against Defendant DeSantis, whose office drew, promoted, and signed EOGPCRP2026 into law, as to giving HB 1D further effect.

D. The qualifying deadlines the State invokes do not bar a timely reversion.

67. The qualifying deadlines the State features do not make a timely reversion untimely. The State leans on the Director’s statement that a “cascading set of election-related deadlines began to tumble” on May 25, 2026. But May 25 was the Division’s voluntary early acceptance of qualifying items — over the Memorial Day holiday — not a statutory deadline. Ex. 3, Matthews Decl. ¶ 4. The statutory congressional qualifying period does not open until noon on June 8 and closes at noon on June 12, 2026. § 99.061(9), Fla. Stat. That statutory window postdates any reversion order this Court would enter, and a reversion to the plan under which Pinellas County voted in 2022 and 2024 can be in place before it opens.
68. Nor does candidate qualifying lock the challenged map in place. Qualifying has not yet opened. Any candidate who qualifies under HB 1D can be afforded a brief opportunity to requalify in the district restored by reversion — in Miami-Dade County and in every other remapped county alike. Candidate reliance built during a qualifying period that has not yet begun is curable by a short requalification window and is no basis to deny relief.
69. And to the extent any additional time is needed to administer a timely reversion, this Court may briefly adjust the qualifying schedule set by section 99.061(9), Florida Statutes. Adjusting an election-calendar deadline draws no map, adopts no plan, and installs nothing; it is a scheduling order incident to prohibitory relief and therefore within the Court’s power under Byrd I. The State’s catalog of impending deadlines thus proves only that deadlines exist — not that they are immovable, and not that a court enjoining an unconstitutional plan cannot move them to make the lawful status quo administrable.

E. The equities and the election calendar favor prompt entry.

70. The window for meaningful relief remains open precisely because reversion is a single-digit days-scale operation. The qualifying period opens June 8 and closes June 12, 2026; the statewide vote-by-mail reporting obligations begin to run sixty days before the August 18 primary with the first operational deadline on June 19, 2026; and the primary itself is August 18. The timing is not deferrable to a later cycle: the primary and the November 3 general election are only 77 days apart, so deferral past the primary would collide almost immediately with general-election administration. Each step of implementation that proceeds under the challenged plan during the pendency of this motion narrows that window. Prompt entry of a prohibitory injunction preserves both the status quo and the Court’s ability to afford a complete remedy at final hearing, while a denial permits the continuing implementation of a plan that, on the verified record, was drawn in violation of Article III, Section 20.

VI. BOND SHOULD BE WAIVED OR SET IN A NOMINAL AMOUNT

71. Rule 1.610(b) provides that no temporary injunction shall issue unless the movant gives bond “conditioned for the payment of costs and damages sustained by the adverse party if the adverse party is wrongfully enjoined.” The amount of the bond, and whether to require one at all in a given case, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.

72. A nominal bond, or waiver of bond, is warranted here for two independent reasons.

73. First, this is public-interest litigation to enforce a provision of the Florida Constitution. Plaintiff seeks no private commercial advantage and no money; he seeks to prevent the conduct of a congressional election under a plan he has shown a substantial likelihood was drawn in violation of Article III, Section 20. The public interest in a constitutionally compliant election is not the kind of private stake for which a substantial damages bond exists to protect.

74. Second, the Defendants against whom relief is sought face no compensable monetary damage from being enjoined. The injunction asks the implementing officials to refrain from deploying EOGPCRP2026 and to leave in effect the prior plan — a plan that already exists, was operative for two election cycles, and is retained in VR Systems' Voter Focus election management system and is re-deployable in roughly four days. Maintaining the status quo under a plan the State itself enacted and administered through 2024 imposes no quantifiable financial loss on Defendant Marcus or Defendant Byrd or any Supervisor of Elections of the sort a bond is designed to secure. Where the enjoined party faces no monetary damages from the injunction, a substantial bond serves no purpose.
75. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court waive the bond requirement or set bond in a nominal amount.

VII. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff John W. Liccione respectfully requests that the Court:

- A.** Enter a temporary injunction, pending final hearing on the merits, on the verified record now before the Court and for the reasons set out in Sections IV and V, enjoining Defendant Ron DeSantis, in his official capacity as Governor, Defendant Cord Byrd, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State and chief elections officer, and Defendant Julie Marcus, in her official capacity as Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections, together with their respective officers, agents, and employees, from further implementing or giving effect to HB 1D for the 2026 congressional election;
- B.** Direct that, by operation of that injunction, the congressional districts lawfully enacted as Plan P000C0109 and operative for the 2022 and 2024 congressional elections remain in effect pending final hearing;

- C.** Direct Defendant Marcus to retain and preserve the Plan P000C0109 election definitions and associated configuration data pending final hearing;
- D.** Set an evidentiary hearing, on shortened notice and in advance of the June 12, 2026 noon qualifying deadline to the extent practicable, on whether the temporary injunction shall remain in effect pending final hearing, at which Plaintiff will present testimony, including that of Julie Marcus and Marc Gillette, Chief Deputy Supervisor of Elections, on the feasibility and scope of restoring the prior congressional plan;
- E.** Compel the appearance at that hearing of Xavier Pichs, GIS Development Manager, Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections, the declarant on whose statement the State relies, and of Alina Garcia, Supervisor of Elections of Miami-Dade County, the official accountable for that office, to testify on the feasibility of reverting to Plan P000C0109 and on the matters addressed in their office's declarations, and authorize Plaintiff to subpoena their attendance under Rule 1.410;
- F.** Provide that, should the State rely at that hearing on the declarations of Maria Matthews or Xavier Pichs (Exhibit 3), the declarant be produced for cross-examination, failing which the declaration be given no evidentiary weight;
- G.** In the event the Court determines that additional time is needed to administer a timely reversion to Plan P000C0109, extend or adjust the congressional candidate qualifying period set by section 99.061(9), Florida Statutes, by such brief period as the Court finds necessary, and afford any candidate who qualified under HB 1D a corresponding opportunity to requalify in the restored district — relief that adjusts the election calendar only and requires no map to be drawn, adopted, or selected;

H. Waive the bond requirement, or set bond in a nominal amount, for the reasons set out in Section VI; and

I. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

VIII. VERIFICATION

Under penalties of perjury, I declare as follows:

1. The factual averments in this motion are true. This declaration extends to the factual statements in the Verified Factual Background (Section II), including the threshold-conditions facts concerning the filings, orders, service, and notice in this case; to the voter-impact figures stated in this motion; and to the underlying facts on which the feasibility and administrability of the relief depend — namely, that Plan P000C0109 exists, was the congressional plan under which Pinellas County conducted its 2022 and 2024 elections, and that the election-management system in use includes a documented function for restoring a prior election definition.
2. The matters set out under the heading ARGUMENT (Sections III, IV, and V) — including the characterizations of the State's declarations and evidence, the inferences drawn from the dates and statements in those declarations, and the forms of relief requested — are presented as legal argument and analysis and are not offered as sworn statements of fact. Where those sections restate facts averred in the Verified Factual Background, those facts are true.
3. The voter-impact figures stated in this motion are true. They are derived from authoritative source data: the State of Florida's official voter-registration and voter-history files (the April 2026 Florida Division of Elections files received by Plaintiff on DVD), the United States Census Bureau's census-block data, and the enacted district-assignment data for Plan P000C0109 and Plan EOGPCRP2026 published by the Florida Legislature's Office of Economic and Demographic Research. The figures are the product of joining these official records, and they are true.

Dated this 5th day of June, 2026.

/s/ John W. Liccione
John W. Liccione,
Plaintiff, Pro Se
1497 Main St., Suite 196
Dunedin, Florida 34698
443-698-8156
jliccione@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of June, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction was filed on the date set forth above via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, which serves a copy by email on Jared D. Kahn, Esq., Pinellas County Attorney's Office, counsel for Defendant Julie Marcus (jkahn@pinellas.gov); and was served on Defendant Ron DeSantis (c/o Executive Office of the Governor, 400 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399) and Defendant Cord Byrd (c/o Florida Department of State, R.A. Gray Building, 500 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399) by United States certified mail.

/s/ John W. Liccione