

EXHIBIT 18

REPORT OF MATTHEW BARRETO, Ph.D.

I. Introduction

1. I, Matthew A. Barreto, am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify.
2. I am a Professor of Political Science and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”). I was appointed to the position of Full Professor with tenure at UCLA in 2015. Prior to that, I was a tenured Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington (“UW”), and before that, tenured Associate Professor from 2009 to 2014 and started as Assistant Professor from 2005 to 2009 at UW. At UCLA, I am the faculty director of the Voting Rights Project in the Luskin School of Public Affairs and teach a year-long course on the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), focusing specifically on social science statistical analysis, demographics, and district mapping analysis that are relevant in redistricting expert reports. I have written expert reports and been qualified as an expert witness more than three-dozen times in federal and state voting rights and civil rights cases, including multiple times in the state of Florida. I have published peer-reviewed, social science articles specifically about minority representation, voting patterns and racially polarized voting and have co-authored a software package for use in understanding district performance and racial voting patterns in redistricting cases.
3. I have been retained as an expert consultant by counties and states across the country in many matters, advising them on redistricting as it relates to compliance with state and federal requirements. As an expert witness in VRA lawsuits, my testimony has been relied on by courts to find in favor of challenges to maps drawn by both Republicans and Democrats. In March 2022, a federal court relied on my analysis of district boundaries and voting patterns to strike down the defendants’ map that diluted the African American

vote, and order a new map in Baltimore, Maryland. In October 2023 a federal court relied on my analysis of district boundaries and voting patterns to strike down defendants' map that diluted the African American and Hispanic vote.

4. I hold a Ph.D. in Political Science from University of California at Irvine. I have attached my Curriculum Vitae as **Appendix B**.
5. I am being compensated for my work on this case at my standard rate of \$475 per hour for pre-trial work and \$600 for trial-related work. My compensation is not contingent upon any findings or on the result of this proceeding. I was assisted in this matter by a research assistant, Michael Rios,
6. References to documents and data I include in this report are meant to provide examples of supporting information but are not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive lists of all known support. The information in this report is based upon information that has been made available or known to me to date. My work in this matter is ongoing, and I reserve the right to modify or supplement any conclusions as additional information is made available or as I perform further analysis.

II. Scope of Work and Summary Findings

7. I was retained by Plaintiffs' attorneys to assess whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in several alternative configurations of Senate District 16 is diminished (retrogressed), as compared to Senate District 19 in the benchmark (2016–20) map. Specifically, I reviewed three map configurations offered by Plaintiffs' mapping expert and compared the Black voting age population, Black voter registration, Black voter turnout, and Black candidates of preferences across each alternative map as compared to the benchmark SD19. I also reviewed voting patterns by race and ethnicity to determine if Black and

other racial or ethnic groups were cohesive in support of preferred candidates as compared to white, non-Hispanic voters.

8. I was also asked to assess whether and the extent to which race explains the shapes and borders of State Senate districts 16 and 18 in the Tampa Bay region in the enacted map. I relied on map boundaries overlaid onto voting tabulation districts (VTDs) with race and ethnicity demographic information for voters to examine patterns where specific lines were drawn.
9. I conclude that the three maps offered by Plaintiffs all perform nearly identically to the benchmark SD19, and specifically that:
 - a. Plaintiffs' three maps maintain near-identical Black voting age population (VAP) as compared to the SD19 benchmark of 31.3% BVAP.
 - b. With respect to the share of all registered voters who are Black, the benchmark SD19 reports 30.1% at the 2020 election (the most recent pre-enactment election) and the Plaintiffs' three illustrative districts contain almost the exact same Black registered voter share. For example, Illustrative Map B contains an average Black registration of 30.6% across 2016 to 2020 compared to the benchmark average of 30.7% Black registration.
 - c. Black voters similarly maintain their strong position within the Democratic Party across all illustrative districts. In the benchmark SD19, Black voters represent 48.29% of all registered Democrats in 2020 as compared to 48.35% of all registered Democrats in Illustrative Map A in 2020. This trend is consistent across all years for all three Plaintiffs' maps.

- d. When I consider ballots cast and official voter turnout in November general elections, Black voters maintain the same share of all total voters in the benchmark map—30.2% on average in the benchmark, compared to 30.7% in Map A, 30.7% in Map B and 29.2% in Map C. Likewise, when I restrict the voter turnout data to only Democrats, Black voters retain their same share of all Democratic voters in the benchmark map (48.75%) as in illustrative maps (e.g., Map A, 48.92%)
- e. Restricting the analysis to primary elections, the same trend emerges whereby the three Plaintiffs' maps report nearly identical shares of all votes cast by Black voters as in the benchmark map. Most relevant, among all Democrats voting in primaries, the benchmark average is 49.7% compared to 51.0% in Illustrative A, 51.1% in Illustrative B, and 49.7% in Illustrative C.
- f. Election results are consistent across the benchmark SD19 and the three illustrative maps offered by Plaintiffs. Black candidates of choice, in this case Democrats, consistently win the SD19 benchmark by 20- to 30-point margins, and the same trend holds—almost to the identical percentage points—in the three illustrative maps. The performance analysis is clear that the illustrative maps match the benchmark map in maintaining a performing district for Black voters.
- g. In racially polarized Democratic primary elections, the outcomes are the same across all three Plaintiffs' illustrative maps as the benchmark SD19. For example, Black candidate of choice Andrew Gillum was the top vote-getter in benchmark SD19 with 49.5% of the primary vote and saw his support number

increase slightly in each of the three illustrative maps, to over 52.5%. The same trend is found for all primary elections analyzed.

- h. Black voters across the entire state of Florida, and specifically within Hillsborough County, are cohesive and vote together for candidates of choice. This trend has been well-documented in published reports and accepted by state and federal courts in Florida, for both primary and general elections.

10. As to the second question I was asked to answer, I find that the enacted map for State Senate districts 16 and 18 follow a clear pattern whereby the boundary edges, as well as the cores, can be explained by the race and ethnicity of voters/residents. Rather than respecting community or natural boundaries, there are numerous examples where the district borders follow racial populations, as revealed by comparing VTDs on the included versus excluded boundary of districts 16 and 18.

11. The above bullet points are meant as a summary of the data and findings in my report. The tables containing full results are available in **Appendix A**.

III. Data and Analytical Approach

12. For most of the analyses, I rely on the latest redistricting dataset available in downloadable format from Florida's official 2022 redistricting website, which was created by the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate (<https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/resources>). The data contains the population demographic, voter registration and turnout, and election data that is also found in the Legislature's Redistricting Portal available here: <https://web.floridaredistricting.esriemcs.com/redistricting/>. This data is made available to Florida Legislature members, staff, and the public, and has been relied

upon by the state of Florida to produce reports on population summary and statistics, as well as boundary, and functional/electoral performance analyses.¹ To obtain various election results, I sourced data from the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections website

(<https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/8/2022&DATAMODE=0>).

13. I downloaded map boundaries from Florida's redistricting website

(<https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/>).² This includes boundaries for the FLSD2016 map ("Benchmark"), and the enacted FLSD2022 map ("Adopted" or "Enacted").

14. To produce map boundary comparison figures, I used ArcGIS redistricting application developed by Esri (<https://www.esri.com/en-us/arcgis/about-arcgis/overview>) and imported block-level 2020 Decennial Census redistricting data (P.L. 94-171) as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau to depict population concentrations by race and ethnicity and matched to the voting precinct (VTD).

15. All other population demographic data was obtained from the 2020 Decennial Census redistricting data (P.L. 94-171).

16. To conduct functional/electoral performance analyses, I used Florida's Esri Redistricting Online Application and associated data made available here:

<https://web.floridaredistricting.esriemcs.com/redistricting/>.

17. To empirically examine racial and ethnic groups' candidates of choice, I conducted racially polarized voting ("RPV") analyses using Ecological Inference ("EI")³, which

¹ For example, see here: <https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans> and here: <https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Redistricting/MapsAndStats>.

² The benchmark and enacted Congressional map shapefiles can also be found here: <https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Redistricting/MapsAndStats>

³ "Ecological inference is the process of using aggregate (i.e., "ecological") data to infer discrete individual-level relationships of interest when individual-level data are not available." (page 2) King, G. and Roberts, M., 2012. EI: a (n R) program for ecological inference. *Harvard University*.

has been deemed the “...benchmark method courts rely upon to evaluate RPV patterns in voting rights lawsuits.”⁴ More specifically, I estimated candidate vote choice by race and ethnicity using King’s Iterative EI ⁵ and EI Rows by Columns (“RxC”)⁶ methods available in the “eiCompare” R software package⁷ available on GitHub (<https://github.com/RPVote/eiCompare>). For all the RPV analyses, I rely on election data and voter turnout by year and race/ethnicity made available on Florida’s official 2022 redistricting website.

IV. Results and Analysis

a. Comparison of Benchmark District to Plaintiffs Illustrative Districts

i. Population, Registration and Turnout by Race

18. The Black voting age population (BVAP) in the benchmark district 19 very closely approximates the BVAP in all three of Plaintiffs’ illustrative maps. Using Census data for the any-part Black population for 2020 reports the benchmark district was 31.3% BVAP as compared to a BVAP of 30.8% in Illustrative A, 30.8% in Illustrative B, and 30.0% in Illustrative C (Table 1, Appendix A).
19. When looking to the share of all registered voters who are Black, two of the three illustrative maps offered by Plaintiffs actually exceed the benchmark district for Black voter registration. The benchmark district was 30.09% Black among all

⁴ Barreto, M., Collingwood, L., Garcia-Rios, S. and Oskooii, K.A., 2022. Estimating candidate support in Voting Rights Act cases: Comparing iterative EI and EI-R×C methods. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 51(1), pp.271-304 (quote at p. 276).

⁵ King, G., 2013. A solution to the ecological inference problem. In *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*. Princeton University Press.

⁶ Rosen, O., Jiang, W., King, G. and Tanner, M.A., 2001. Bayesian and frequentist inference for ecological inference: The R×C case. *Statistica Neerlandica*, 55(2), pp.134-156.

⁷ Collingwood, L., Oskooii, K., Garcia-Rios, S. and Barreto, M., 2016. eiCompare: Comparing Ecological Inference Estimates across EI and EI: RxC. *R J.*, 8(2), p.92.

registered voters in 2020 (the most recent pre-enactment election), compared to Black registration of 30.37% in Illustrative A, 30.40% in Illustrative B, and 29.25% in illustrative C (Table 1, Appendix A). Whether I examine the 2016-2020 or 2012-2020 average for share of all registered voters who are Black, the benchmark map and illustrative maps are nearly identical.

20. In particular, the share of all registered Democrats who are Black is a key indicator to determine Black influence. Similar to the analysis for all registrants, when I restrict the analysis to just registered Democrats, I find nearly identical percentages across the benchmark district and illustrative districts (Table 1, Appendix A). In two of the three maps (A and B) the share of all Democrats who are Black is slightly higher than the benchmark while in the third (C) the Black share is slightly lower. Overall, there is no discernable difference in Black influence in Democratic registration from benchmark to illustrative maps.

21. Next I examine voter turnout and the share of all votes cast by Black voters in both general and primary elections, comparing benchmark district 19 to the Plaintiffs' three illustrative maps. Starting with November general elections, Table 2 in Appendix A reports the share of all votes cast by Black voters according to official vote history data from the State of Florida. In benchmark district 19, 28.65% of all voters were Black in November 2020, compared to a Black share of 29.48% in Illustrative A, 29.51% in Illustrative B, and 28.12% in Illustrative C. Using the 2016-2020 average, or the 2012-2020 average, reveals that in two illustrative maps (A and B) the Black share of all voters is slightly higher than the benchmark and in the third map (C) it is slightly lower.

22. Restricting the data to voter turnout among Democrats reveals a similar pattern to all voters in the preceding paragraph. In the benchmark district, 46.54% of all Democratic votes were cast by Black voters in 2020, with a slight increase to 47.32% Black in Illustrative A, 47.33% in Illustrative B, and 46.28% in Illustrative C.

Likewise, the 2016-2020 and 2012-2020 averages demonstrate no real difference between the share of all Democrats who are Black in the benchmark or any of the Plaintiffs' illustrative maps.

23. Table 3 in Appendix A reports the share of all voters who are Black in primary elections 2012 to 2020, comparing the benchmark district to Plaintiffs' illustrative maps. It is clear that across all turnout measures, Plaintiffs have two versions of the district in maps A and B which contain a slightly higher share of primary voters who are Black as compared to the benchmark, and in the third option (C) the Black share is only slightly lower. The same trend holds when looking just to voters in Democratic primaries—the critical elections in which Democrats pick their nominee for the general election. Here the Black share of Democrats is generally stronger in Plaintiffs' Illustrative A and B, while slightly lower in Illustrative C. Across all election vote history analyzed, Plaintiffs' illustrative maps demonstrate Black voter influence is retained, if not augmented, as compared to benchmark.

ii. Performance Analysis

24. Election results from 2012 to 2020 demonstrate that Plaintiffs' three illustrative maps all retain a State Senate district that will perform for Black voters' candidates of choice. Table 4 in Appendix A is arranged similarly to Tables 1-3 with data for the benchmark district and comparison columns for Illustrative A, B, and C. Rather than displaying population or voter statistics by race, the performance analysis in Table 4 contains election results, aggregated for just the precincts within each map for the comparable State Senate district. It is clear that the benchmark district, as well as all three Plaintiffs' illustrative districts, all match one another with respect to election results. Across all three of Plaintiffs' maps, Black voters would easily retain their ability to elect their candidate of choice. In most instances, there is a negligible difference in candidate results, less than one percentage point. In some elections,

Plaintiffs' maps A and B slightly outperform the benchmark (2018 Attorney General). Even in instances where a larger difference emerges (2014 Governor), there is no substantive difference in which candidate would prevail, with Black candidates of choice easily carrying the illustrative districts by margins of over 20 points.

25. Primary election performance analysis can be found in Table 5, Appendix A. Similar to the general election analysis in Table 4, results for primary elections demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern whereby Plaintiffs' illustrative maps closely match election results for the benchmark district. In some instances, Black candidates of choice in Democratic primaries fare better in all three illustrative maps, such as Andrew Gillum in the 2018 Governor's election, seeing his support increase by 3-4 percentage points as compared to the benchmark district. In general, the same electoral outcomes are maintained across the benchmark and illustrative districts in Democratic primary elections.

iii. Conclusion

26. Based on the above analysis, my overall conclusion as to whether, and the extent to which, the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice in Illustrative A, B, or C is diminished, as compared to Senate District 19 in the benchmark map, is that there is no diminishment whatsoever. Across all three Illustrative maps Black voters would be able to exert the same influence and be able to elect candidates of their choice. If anything, two of the three Illustrative maps (A and B) offer Black voters a slightly better opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.


b. Racially Polarized Voting

27. Extensive data analysis and court opinions have documented racially polarized voting in Florida elections, in particular between Black and white voters. Recently, I undertook a comprehensive analysis of voting patterns among Florida voters by race and ethnicity in my expert report in *Common Cause Florida v. Byrd*, in federal court in 2023. In this report I found clear evidence of Black cohesion often above 90% in

- support of their candidate of choice. In contrast, white voters in Florida consistently voted in opposition to Black candidates of choice. This prior report focused on voting patterns in different regions of Florida and specifically included data, analysis and results for Black and white voters in the Tampa Bay region, concluding that racially polarized voting exists. This report is attached as **Appendix C**.
28. Further, in a lawsuit in state court regarding the enacted district maps, attorneys for the State of Florida stipulated to plaintiffs' evidenced-based claims that Black voters were cohesive and that white voters bloc-voted against Black candidates of choice. Joint Stipulation to Narrow Issues for Resolution, *Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute v. Byrd*, No. 2022-CA-666 (Fla. 2nd Jud. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2023).
29. To further assess Black voting patterns in primary elections, I analyzed three primary elections for voters in Pinellas and Hillsborough County that featured Black candidates. This includes the 2018 election for Governor, the 2018 election for Attorney General and the 2014 election for Attorney General. The results of my ecological inference analysis can be found in Figures 5-8 in **Appendix A**. The data for voters in Pinellas and Hillsborough County paint a clear picture of Black cohesion in primary elections, with Blacks voting together in high rates for Gillum, Shaw and Thurston in their respective contests. In contrast, white voters in Hillsborough bloc vote against these Black-preferred primary candidates in each instance. The results are consistent in both versions of ecological inference accepted by the courts, including King's Iterative EI and EI rows x columns (RxC) as detailed in Figures 5-8 in Appendix A.
- c. Use of Race in Enacted Map**
30. Figure 1 depicts the current boundaries of State Senate district 16 (formerly 19) in the Tampa Bay region. The figure overlays the district boundary line (in red) on a map that contains Census data for the density of the Black VAP.

Figure 1

District 18 & 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among VAP




31. The map is shaded so that areas in green are majority white and areas in red are majority Black, and is provided a wide zoom level to be able to examine both Senate districts 16 and 18 on the same figure.
32. Overall, the shape of district 16 reflects the obvious connecting of two Black population centers of the region, across the bay. Tampa and St. Petersburg both have large Black populations, which are joined in SD16 almost to the exact VTD boundary of large Black populations. What's more, SD18 has moved lines so as to exclude Black populations and increase its White VAP.

33. It is clear that the boundary between districts 16 and 18 near St. Petersburg, and the boundary of district 16 near Tampa closely follow the racial demographics of the Black VAP so that the Black part of the region is kept in district 16.

34. Figure 2 allows for a closer view of the dividing lines between districts 16 and 18 near St. Petersburg.

Figure 2

District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among VAP




35. Looking at the eastern boundary of district 16 it is evident that the map closely tracks racial demographics to follow specific VTDs that are high-density Black VAP to include in district 16 and exclude from district 18. This trend is even more stark when compared to the former boundary of this same district under the 2016 benchmark map (formerly numbered as district 19).


36. Figure 3 contains the same map as Figure 2, with the addition of the 2016 benchmark boundary also overlaid in black. The movement of the boundary more closely hews to the Black VAP and excludes majority-white VTDs from district 16, even though they were formerly part of this same district. In total, the area that was excluded from district 16 had an overall BVAP of only 7%, and further evidence that racial factors explain the district boundaries.

Figure 3

District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among VAP



37. The same pattern of boundary lines being explainable based on race is also found in the northern portion of district 16 near Tampa. Here, district 16 closely follows a portion of Tampa that has a large Black VAP and specifically includes high-density Black VAP VTDs within the district, while excluding lower BVAP VTDs.

Figure 4**District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among VAP**


38. Next, I have replicated the above maps using the race of registered voters, a more politically relevant metric than VAP. Here, the same patterns are clear, and can be found in Figures 9 – 12 in Appendix A, at the same level of zoom as Figures 1 – 4 above. In addition, I replicated the maps for percent Black, among all registered Democrats which can be found in Figures 13 – 16 in Appendix A. In both instances, it is quite clear that the map followed VTDs with large Black voter populations to include in district 16, and excluded VTDs that were majority-white.
39. Beyond the visual depiction of race as a prominent factor in the map boundaries, I also downloaded the BVAP for each populated VTD (and portions of split VTDs) on

either side of the enacted district 16 boundary in both Pinellas and Hillsborough counties to assess what the census data reports, and to determine whether I could discern patterns in the racial patterns of adjacent VTDs. Table 6 in Appendix A displays the “adjacency graph” showing each pair of adjacent populated VTDs (or split VTDs) on the SD16 side of the boundary, and the adjacent VTD on the other side of the SD16 boundary, and reports the BVAP percentage for each VTD (or portion of a VTD split by the SD16 boundary). Each segment of the district border along the adjacency graph, contains adjacent VTDs, which are referred to as “adjacent segments.” Across 26 VTD adjacent segments in Pinellas County, 24 of 26 (92%) have a higher BVAP inside SD16. The average BVAP for VTDs on the SD16 side of the border was 27.8% and the average BVAP for VTDs on the SD18 side of the border was 6.9%.

40. The same pattern is clear in Hillsborough County VTDs. Across the 82 VTD adjacent segments for SD16, 60 of 82 (73%) report a higher BVAP inside SD16. The average BVAP for VTDs included on the inside of SD16 was 25.5% and the average BVAP for VTDs excluded was 17.8%.

41. We can rely on a probability analysis to determine the likelihood that the VTDs on one side of the district boundary line are consistently *higher* BVAP than on the other side. For example, if a map was drawn completely blind to race, a district boundary line would have an equal 50% chance of seeing higher or lower BVAP percentages on either side of the boundary. That is, if a map line was drawn through a neighborhood that was about 25% Black, some individual VTDs might be 20% Black while others might be 30% Black, and so on. Unless race was a factor in drawing the boundary, a district boundary should randomly have some VTDs that are higher in BVAP and some that are lower in BVAP on either side of the district boundary. Thus, any adjacent segments of VTDs should have a roughly 50/50 chance of being higher or lower BVAP on either side of a boundary line.

42. However, in the case of SD16 boundaries in Pinellas, only 2 of 26 VTD adjacent segments had a higher BVAP on the outside of SD16 as compared to inside. What is the statistical probability that at most 7.7% (2 of 26) would have a lower BVAP on one side? Assuming that any given adjacent pair has a 50/50 chance of being higher or lower, the statistical probability of such an outcome is 1 in 190,650 or a 0.0005% chance.
43. The same analysis can be applied to the Hillsborough County VTD adjacent segments where 22 out of 82 had a higher BVAP on the excluded side of the SD16 boundary. Again, if the lines were not drawn with respect to race, we would theoretically expect around 41 of the 82 to be lower BVAP on the outside. In this case, the probability of at most 22 being higher on the outside is 1 in 61,887, or chance of 0.0016%. Statistically, these two map boundaries in Pinellas and Hillsborough counties, are extremely unlikely to be random, and instead suggest that lines were purposefully placed so that higher BVAP VTDs were consistently on the inside of SD16.
44. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct according to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.



Matthew A. Barreto

Agoura Hills, CA

July 2, 2024

APPENDIX A:
DATA TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE 1

| <i>Variable Name</i> | FLSD16 D19 | Illustrative A D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative B D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative C D16 | (Diff) |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| 2020 NH Black VAP | 31.3% | 30.8% | -0.5% | 30.8% | -0.5% | 30.0% | -1.3% |
| Percent of all reg voters who are Black | | | | | | | |
| 2020G - percent Black | 30.09% | 30.37% | 0.28% | 30.40% | 0.31% | 29.25% | -0.84% |
| 2018G - percent Black | 30.49% | 30.30% | -0.19% | 30.33% | -0.16% | 29.15% | -1.34% |
| 2016G - percent Black | 31.63% | 31.05% | -0.58% | 31.08% | -0.55% | 29.96% | -1.67% |
| 2014G - percent Black | 32.42% | 31.43% | -0.19% | 31.47% | -0.95% | 30.29% | -2.13% |
| 2012G - percent Black | 32.91% | 31.60% | -1.31% | 31.64% | -1.27% | 30.49% | -2.42% |
| 2016 - 2020 Avg. Black | 30.74% | 30.57% | -0.16% | 30.60% | -0.13% | 29.45% | -1.28% |
| 2012 - 2020 Avg. Black | 31.51% | 30.95% | -0.56% | 30.98% | -0.52% | 29.83% | -1.68% |
| | | | | | | | |
| Percent of all reg Democrats who are Black | | | | | | | |
| 2020G - percent Black (Dem) | 48.29% | 48.35% | 0.06% | 48.37% | 0.08% | 47.51% | -0.78% |
| 2018G - percent Black (Dem) | 49.35% | 48.67% | -0.68% | 48.70% | -0.65% | 47.82% | -1.53% |
| 2016G - percent Black (Dem) | 51.01% | 49.81% | -1.20% | 49.84% | -1.17% | 48.97% | -2.04% |
| 2014G - percent Black (Dem) | 52.32% | 50.70% | -0.68% | 50.74% | -1.58% | 49.83% | -2.49% |
| 2012G - percent Black (Dem) | 52.44% | 50.55% | -1.89% | 50.60% | -1.84% | 49.72% | -2.72% |
| 2016 - 2020 Avg. Black | 49.55% | 48.94% | -0.61% | 48.97% | -0.58% | 48.10% | -1.45% |
| 2012 - 2020 Avg. Black | 50.68% | 49.62% | -1.07% | 49.65% | -1.03% | 48.77% | -1.91% |

TABLE 2

| <i>Variable Name</i> | FLSD16 D19 | Illustrative A D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative B D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative C D16 | (Diff) |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Percent of all turned out voters who are Black | | | | | | | |
| 2020G - percent Black | 28.65% | 29.48% | 0.83% | 29.51% | 0.86% | 28.12% | -0.53% |
| 2018G - percent Black | 31.35% | 32.13% | 0.78% | 32.17% | 0.82% | 30.52% | -0.83% |
| 2016G - percent Black | 30.59% | 30.40% | -0.19% | 30.46% | -0.13% | 29.06% | -1.53% |
| 2014G - percent Black | 31.49% | 31.02% | 0.78% | 31.07% | -0.42% | 29.41% | -2.08% |
| 2012G - percent Black | 34.82% | 33.94% | -0.88% | 33.98% | -0.84% | 32.54% | -2.28% |
| 2016 - 2020 Avg. Black | 30.20% | 30.67% | 0.47% | 30.71% | 0.52% | 29.23% | -0.96% |
| 2012 - 2020 Avg. Black | 31.38% | 31.39% | 0.01% | 31.44% | 0.06% | 29.93% | -1.45% |
| Percent of all turned out Democrats who are Black | | | | | | | |
| 2020G - percent Black (Dem) | 46.54% | 47.32% | 0.78% | 47.33% | 0.79% | 46.28% | -0.26% |
| 2018G - percent Black (Dem) | 49.60% | 50.10% | 0.50% | 50.15% | 0.55% | 48.94% | -0.66% |
| 2016G - percent Black (Dem) | 50.10% | 49.33% | -0.77% | 49.37% | -0.73% | 48.30% | -1.80% |
| 2014G - percent Black (Dem) | 51.94% | 51.32% | 0.50% | 51.38% | -0.56% | 50.02% | -1.92% |
| 2012G - percent Black (Dem) | 54.74% | 53.36% | -1.38% | 53.40% | -1.34% | 52.36% | -2.38% |
| 2016 - 2020 Avg. Black | 48.75% | 48.92% | 0.17% | 48.95% | 0.20% | 47.84% | -0.91% |
| 2012 - 2020 Avg. Black | 50.58% | 50.29% | -0.30% | 50.33% | -0.26% | 49.18% | -1.40% |

TABLE 3

| <i>Variable Name</i> | FLSD16 D19 | Illustrative A D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative B D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative C D16 | (Diff) |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Percent of all turned out primary voters who are Black | | | | | | | |
| 2020P - percent Black | 32.86% | 33.27% | 0.41% | 33.31% | 0.45% | 31.56% | -1.30% |
| 2018P - percent Black | 33.50% | 34.94% | 1.44% | 35.03% | 1.53% | 33.01% | -0.49% |
| 2016P - percent Black | 33.92% | 34.20% | 0.28% | 34.28% | 0.36% | 32.43% | -1.49% |
| 2014P - percent Black | 34.81% | 34.96% | 1.44% | 35.01% | 0.20% | 33.10% | -1.71% |
| 2012P - percent Black | 33.49% | 31.59% | -1.90% | 31.60% | -1.89% | 29.93% | -3.56% |
| 2016 - 2020 Avg. Black | 33.43% | 34.14% | 0.71% | 34.21% | 0.78% | 32.33% | -1.09% |
| 2012 - 2020 Avg. Black | 33.72% | 33.79% | 0.08% | 33.85% | 0.13% | 32.01% | -1.71% |
| | | | | | | | |
| Percent of all turned out primary Democrats who are Black | | | | | | | |
| 2020P - percent Black (Dem) | 48.12% | 49.15% | 1.03% | 49.19% | 1.07% | 47.78% | -0.34% |
| 2018P - percent Black (Dem) | 49.83% | 52.13% | 2.30% | 52.22% | 2.39% | 50.69% | 0.86% |
| 2016P - percent Black (Dem) | 51.15% | 51.76% | 0.61% | 51.84% | 0.69% | 50.57% | -0.58% |
| 2014P - percent Black (Dem) | 52.63% | 53.09% | 2.30% | 53.17% | 0.54% | 51.63% | -1.00% |
| 2012P - percent Black (Dem) | 55.34% | 53.24% | -2.10% | 53.27% | -2.07% | 51.96% | -3.38% |
| 2016 - 2020 Avg. Black | 49.70% | 51.01% | 1.31% | 51.08% | 1.38% | 49.68% | -0.02% |
| 2012 - 2020 Avg. Black | 51.41% | 51.87% | 0.46% | 51.94% | 0.52% | 50.53% | -0.89% |

TABLE 4

| <i>General Elections</i> | <i>Candidate Names</i> | FLSD16 D19 | Illustrative A D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative B D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative C D16 | (Diff) |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| 2020 President | Biden (D) | 64.55% | 64.25% | -0.30% | 64.32% | -0.23% | 62.89% | -1.66% |
| | Trump (R) | 34.20% | 34.42% | 0.22% | 34.34% | 0.14% | 35.79% | 1.59% |
| 2018 Governor | DeSantis (R) | 31.12% | 31.13% | 0.01% | 31.06% | -0.06% | 32.83% | 1.71% |
| | Gillum (D) | 67.69% | 67.64% | -0.05% | 67.72% | 0.03% | 65.96% | -1.73% |
| 2018 Attorney General | Moody (R) | 35.38% | 35.26% | -0.12% | 35.20% | -0.18% | 37.01% | 1.63% |
| | Shaw (D) | 62.87% | 62.99% | 0.12% | 63.05% | 0.18% | 61.24% | -1.63% |
| 2018 U.S. Senate | Scott (R) | 32.44% | 32.85% | 0.41% | 32.81% | 0.37% | 34.49% | 2.05% |
| | Nelson (D) | 67.55% | 67.14% | -0.41% | 67.18% | -0.37% | 65.50% | -2.05% |
| 2018 Commissioner of Agriculture | Caldwell (R) | 31.20% | 31.49% | 0.29% | 31.44% | 0.24% | 33.10% | 1.90% |
| | Fried (D) | 68.79% | 68.50% | -0.29% | 68.55% | -0.24% | 66.90% | -1.89% |
| 2018 Chief Financial Officer | Patronis (R) | 33.66% | 33.85% | 0.19% | 33.80% | 0.14% | 35.56% | 1.90% |
| | Ring (D) | 66.35% | 66.16% | -0.19% | 66.22% | -0.13% | 64.45% | -1.90% |
| 2016 President | Trump (R) | 32.24% | 32.31% | 0.07% | 32.24% | 0.00% | 33.75% | 1.51% |
| | Clinton (D) | 64.02% | 63.75% | -0.27% | 63.83% | -0.19% | 62.32% | -1.70% |
| 2016 U.S. Senate | Rubio (R) | 34.86% | 35.71% | 0.85% | 35.65% | 0.79% | 36.94% | 2.08% |
| | Murphy (D) | 60.66% | 59.70% | -0.96% | 59.76% | -0.90% | 58.46% | -2.20% |

| <i>General Elections</i> | <i>Candidate Names</i> | FLSD16 D19 | Illustrative A D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative B D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative C D16 | (Diff) |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| 2014 Governor | Scott (R) | 30.31% | 32.63% | 2.32% | 32.65% | 2.34% | 34.09% | 3.78% |
| | Crist (D) | 64.21% | 61.39% | -2.82% | 61.38% | -2.83% | 59.89% | -4.32% |
| 2014 Attorney General | Bondi (R) | 38.36% | 40.81% | 2.45% | 40.79% | 2.43% | 42.15% | 3.79% |
| | Sheldon (D) | 58.39% | 55.92% | -2.47% | 55.96% | -2.43% | 54.54% | -3.85% |
| 2014 Chief Financial Officer | Atwater (R) | 43.32% | 44.43% | 1.11% | 44.40% | 1.08% | 46.09% | 2.77% |
| | Rankin (D) | 56.67% | 55.56% | -1.11% | 55.60% | -1.07% | 53.91% | -2.76% |
| 2014 Commissioner of Agriculture | Putnam (R) | 44.22% | 46.22% | 2.00% | 46.16% | 1.94% | 47.76% | 3.54% |
| | Hamilton (D) | 55.78% | 53.77% | -2.01% | 53.83% | -1.95% | 52.22% | -3.56% |
| 2012 President | Romney (R) | 30.68% | 31.57% | 0.89% | 31.47% | 0.79% | 32.96% | 2.28% |
| | Obama (D) | 68.32% | 67.39% | -0.93% | 67.49% | -0.83% | 66.00% | -2.32% |
| 2012 U.S. Senate | Mack (R) | 25.75% | 26.59% | 0.84% | 26.55% | 0.80% | 27.84% | 2.09% |
| | Nelson (D) | 71.85% | 71.00% | -0.85% | 71.05% | -0.80% | 69.75% | -2.10% |

TABLE 5

| <i>Democratic Primary Elections</i> | <i>Candidate Names</i> | FLSD16 D19 | Illustrative A D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative B D16 | (Diff) | Illustrative C D16 | (Diff) |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| 2018 Governor | Gillum | 49.48% | 53.73% | 4.25% | 53.73% | 4.25% | 52.52% | 3.04% |
| | Graham | 26.30% | 24.23% | -2.07% | 24.22% | -2.08% | 25.10% | -1.20% |
| 2018 Attorney General | Torrens | 20.56% | 20.73% | 0.17% | 20.67% | 0.11% | 20.62% | 0.06% |
| | Shaw | 79.41% | 79.26% | -0.15% | 79.33% | -0.08% | 79.37% | -0.04% |
| 2018 Commissioner of Agriculture | Fried | 62.90% | 62.11% | -0.79% | 62.12% | -0.78% | 62.18% | -0.72% |
| | Walker | 21.00% | 20.72% | -0.28% | 20.71% | -0.29% | 20.84% | -0.16% |
| 2016 U.S. Senate | Keith | 17.33% | 20.01% | 2.68% | 19.98% | 2.65% | 19.94% | 2.61% |
| | Murphy | 65.18% | 60.07% | -5.11% | 60.09% | -5.09% | 60.48% | -4.70% |
| 2014 Governor | Crist | 83.98% | 81.70% | -2.28% | 81.70% | -2.28% | 81.46% | -2.52% |
| | Rich | 15.88% | 18.16% | 2.28% | 18.15% | 2.27% | 18.46% | 2.58% |
| 2014 Attorney General | Sheldon | 61.40% | 58.22% | -3.18% | 58.21% | -3.19% | 58.63% | -2.77% |
| | Thurston | 38.41% | 41.59% | 3.18% | 41.62% | 3.21% | 41.28% | 2.87% |
| 2012 U.S. Senate | Burkett | 14.99% | 15.85% | 0.86% | 15.77% | 0.78% | 16.03% | 1.04% |
| | Nelson | 84.69% | 83.85% | -0.84% | 83.92% | -0.77% | 83.71% | -0.98% |


Figure 5**Racially Polarized Voting Analysis Results***El Iterative Estimates*


Figure 6**Racially Polarized Voting Analysis Results***EI Iterative Estimates*


Figure 7**Racially Polarized Voting Analysis Results***RxC Estimates*

Figure 8
Racially Polarized Voting Analysis Results
RxC Estimates




Table 6A: Adjacent Precincts in Pinellas County, Senate District 16

| Outside | VAP | BVAP % | in SD16 | VAP | BVAP % |
|-------------------|------------|---------------|-------------------|------------|---------------|
| 155 | 2,805 | 1.2% | 142 | 4,144 | 3.9% |
| | | | 141 | 3,859 | 3.0% |
| 148 | 1,978 | 2.4% | 140 | 1,956 | 6.3% |
| 147 | 2,413 | 3.2% | 139 | 3,625 | 9.2% |
| 146 | 2,309 | 9.0% | | | |
| 163 | 2,189 | 8.6% | | | |
| 145 | 2,142 | 12.1% | 144 | 3,432 | 12.0% |
| 239 | 2,175 | 7.5% | 216 | 1,407 | 25.7% |
| | | | 238 | 1,322 | 9.5% |
| | | | 228 | 1,622 | 8.1% |
| 242 | 2,640 | 7.0% | | | |
| 231 (part) | 614 | 9.0% | 231 (part) | 2,084 | 11.7% |
| 222 (part) | 1,480 | 10.5% | 222 (part) | 67 | 9.0% |
| | | | 227 | 2,406 | 54.2% |
| 210 | 2,881 | 14.1% | 224 | 2,225 | 82.2% |
| | | | 205 | 2,321 | 72.7% |
| 206 | 1,183 | 6.6% | | | |
| 218 | 631 | 3.3% | 203 | 2,417 | 53.7% |
| 202 | 2,207 | 5.8% | 123 | 674 | 32.3% |
| 201 | 3,653 | 2.6% | 106 | 4,796 | 54.6% |
| | | | 101 | 2,221 | 24.3% |
| AVG | 2,087 | 6.9% | AVG | 2,387 | 27.8% |

Table 6B: Adjacent Precincts in Hillsborough County, Senate District 16

| Outside | VAP | BVAP % | in SD16 | VAP | BVAP % |
|---------------------|-------|--------|---------|---------------------|-------------|
| 125 | 1,157 | 2.1% | | 301.1 | 1,575 11.8% |
| 127 | 3,249 | 2.1% | | 159 | 4,345 3.7% |
| 157 | 1,079 | 3.8% | | 161 | 3,012 7.4% |
| 165 | 5,540 | 7.3% | | 160 | 2,875 4.9% |
| | | | | 169.2 | 3,956 36.7% |
| 151.1 | 2,076 | 5.8% | | | |
| 175 | 2,975 | 13.0% | | | |
| 205 | 5,190 | 12.4% | | 207 | 2,187 56.3% |
| | | | | 218 (part) | 57 17.5% |
| 218 (part) | 1,227 | 11.0% | | 207 | 2,187 56.3% |
| | | | | 217 | 2,981 12.0% |
| 227 | 3,559 | 13.2% | | | |
| 231 (part) | 2,454 | 11.9% | | 231 (part) | 1,037 13.1% |
| 237 (part) | 1,772 | 4.9% | | 237 (part) | 851 7.5% |
| 233.1 (part) | 1,632 | 17.8% | | 233.1 (part) | 1,580 32.9% |
| | | | | 355 | 1,802 14.5% |
| | | | | 344 | 4,751 55.3% |
| 245 | 2,887 | 13.1% | | 247 | 1,155 28.8% |
| 557 | 3,017 | 14.9% | | 565 | 711 25.2% |
| 569.1 | 3,169 | 8.4% | | 573 | 732 16.9% |
| 571.1 | 2,470 | 14.1% | | 563 | 6,122 32.5% |
| 581 (part) | 2,545 | 13.9% | | 581 (part) | 1,204 27.1% |

| | | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|-------|--|-------------------|--------------|
| 584 (part) | 2,136 | 24.3% | | | |
| | | | | 563 | 6,122 32.5% |
| | | | | 562 | 10,544 25.1% |
| | | | | 584 (part) | 682 28.2% |
| 583 | 2,951 | 13.1% | | | |
| 12 | 7,476 | 17.0% | | | |
| 356.1 | 19 | 47.4% | | 562 | 10,544 25.1% |
| | | | | 353 | 5,813 12.0% |
| | | | | 643 | 1,184 25.2% |
| | | | | 662 | 962 9.0% |
| | | | | 641 | 3,335 31.5% |
| 355.1 | 1,158 | 15.4% | | 658 | 2,507 25.0% |
| 635 (part) | 3,159 | 26.6% | | 635 (part) | 7 57% |
| | | | | 636 | 664 11.7% |
| | | | | 625 | 1,797 17.3% |
| | | | | 635 (part) | 7 57.1% |
| 629 | 4,238 | 22.0% | | 622.1 | 1,602 39.5% |
| 885 | 5,939 | 21.0% | | 883 | 5,653 24.9% |
| 851 | 4,049 | 17.7% | | 854 | 1,842 37.5% |
| 857 | 3,227 | 31.6% | | | |
| 853 | 2,452 | 32.4% | | 852.1 | 6,624 25.6% |
| 828 (part) | 5,403 | 23.9% | | 828 (part) | 5,681 23.1% |
| 955 | 6,051 | 16.3% | | 957.1 | 2,466 17.9% |
| | | | | 51 | 1,685 16.4% |
| | | | | 957.1 | 2,466 17.9% |
| 953 (part) | 3,472 | 12.2% | | 953 (part) | 1,272 14.8% |
| 949.1 | 6,724 | 16.8% | | 962 | 2,148 23.0% |
| 63 | 2,831 | 23.3% | | 946.2 | 6,001 27.1% |

| | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|--|--------------|-------------|
| 102 | 201 | 34.3% | | | |
| 63 | 2,831 | 23.3% | | | |
| 949.1 | 6,724 | 16.8% | | 145 | 1,072 29.8% |
| | | | | 946.2 | 6,001 27.1% |
| 67 | 1,712 | 24.8% | | 94 | 1,036 27.4% |
| 947 | 6,094 | 27.6% | | 946.2 | 6,001 27.1% |
| 944.1 | 2,849 | 28.2% | | | |
| 914 | 900 | 25.9% | | | |
| 137 | 892 | 42.3% | | | |
| 914 | 900 | 25.9% | | | |
| 77 | 3,539 | 37.8% | | 145 | 1,072 29.8% |
| | | | | 946.2 | 6,001 27.1% |
| 914 | 900 | 25.9% | | 97 | 3,358 34.8% |
| 913.2 | 9,073 | 4.9% | | | |
| 929.2 | 4,328 | 2.8% | | 149 | 496 37.9% |
| | | | | 932.3 | 4,567 22.0% |
| 905 | 948 | 3.9% | | 901 | 3,241 16.2% |
| | | | | 95 | 1,734 34.8% |
| | | | | 911 | 1,724 1.3% |
| 907 | 1,332 | 0.2% | | AVG | 2,928 25.5% |
| AVG | 3,136 | 17.8% | | | |

Figure 9

District 18 & 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Registered





Figure 10

District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Registered



7/2/2024






Figure 11**District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Registered**

Figure 12
District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Registered




Figure 13

District 18 & 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Democrats





Figure 14**District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Reg. Democrats**

7/2/2024





Figure 15

District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Reg. Democrats







Figure 16
District 16 (2022 Enacted) - % Black Among Reg. Democrats



7/2/2024



Appendix B
Barreto CV



MATT A. BARRETO – BARRETOM@UCLA.EDU

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, 3345 BUNCHE HALL, LOS ANGELES CA 90095 / 909.489.2955

EMPLOYMENT:

Professor, Political Science, University of California Los Angeles (2015 – present)
Professor, Chicana/o Studies, University of California Los Angeles (2015 – present)
Co-Founder & Faculty Director, Latino Policy & Politics Institute (LPPI)
Co-Founder & Faculty Director, UCLA Voting Rights Project (VRP)

Dept. Political Science, University of Washington

Professor (2014 – 2015)

Associate Professor (2009 – 2014)

Assistant Professor (2005 – 2009)

Co-Founder & Director, Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race

Founding Director, Center for Democracy and Voting Rights, UW School of Law

Affiliated Research Centers

Latino Policy & Politics Institute (LPPI), University of California, Los Angeles

Chicano Studies Research Center (CSRC), University of California, Los Angeles

Center for the Study of Los Angeles (CSLA), Loyola Marymount University

PERSONAL:

Born: June 6, 1976

San Juan, Puerto Rico

High School: 1994, Washburn Rural HS, Topeka, KS

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Political Science, June 2005

University of California – Irvine

Sub Fields: American Politics / Race, Ethnicity and Politics / Methodology

Thesis: Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation

Thesis Committee: Bernard Grofman (chair), Louis DeSipio, Katherine Tate, Carole Uhlaner

Thesis Awards: *Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship for Minorities, 04-05*

University of California President's Dissertation Fellowship, 04-05

University of California Institute for Mexico & the U.S. Dissertation Grant, 04-05

Master of Science, Social Science, March 2003

University of California – Irvine

Bachelor of Science, Political Science, May 1998

Eastern New Mexico University, Portales, NM

Minor: English. Cumulative GPA: 3.9, *Summa Cum Laude*

PUBLICATION RECORD

Google Scholar citation indices: Cites: 5,998 h-index: 38 i10-index: 68 i100-index: 15 Cites/year: 333

BOOK MANUSCRIPTS:

Barreto, Matt and Christopher Parker. nd. The Great White Hope: Donald Trump, Race, and the Crisis of American Politics. Under Contract, University of Chicago Press. *expected Fall 2024*

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Barreto, Matt and David Leal, editors. 2018. Race, Class, and Precinct Quality in American Cities. Springer Press.

Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto. 2013. Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America. Princeton University Press. *Winner: APSA Best Book Award for Race, Ethnicity, Politics, 2014*

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83. Barreto, Matt, Claudia Alegre, Isaiah Bailey, Alexandria Davis, Joshua Ferrer, Joyce Nguy, Christopher Palmisano, and Crystal Robertson. 2024. "Black Lives Matter and the Racialized Support for the January 6 Insurrection" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.

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81. Leslie, GJ, T Rush, J Collins, MA Barreto. 2023. "Perceived racial efficacy and voter engagement among African Americans." *Politics, Groups, and Identities*.

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65. Gutierrez, Angela, Angela Ocampo, Matt Barreto, and Gary Segura. 2019. "Somos Más : How Racial Threat and Anger Mobilized Latino Voters in the Trump Era" *Political Research Quarterly*. 72(4)
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41. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, and Sylvia Manzano. 2010. “Measuring Latino Political Influence in National Elections” *Political Research Quarterly*. 63:4 (Dec)
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38. Barreto, Matt, Sylvia Manzano, Ricardo Ramírez and Kathy Rim. 2009. “Immigrant Social Movement Participation: Understanding Involvement in the 2006 Immigration Protest Rallies.” *Urban Affairs Review*. 44: (5) 736-764
37. Grofman, Bernard and Matt Barreto. 2009. “A Reply to Zax’s (2002) Critique of Grofman and Migalski (1988): Double Equation Approaches to Ecological Inferences.” *Sociological Methods and Research*. 37 (May)
36. Barreto, Matt, Stephen Nuño and Gabriel Sanchez. 2009. “The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate – New Evidence from Indiana.” *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 42 (Jan)
35. Barreto, Matt, Luis Fraga, Sylvia Manzano, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Gary Segura. 2008. “Should they dance with the one who brung ‘em? Latinos and the 2008 Presidential election” *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 41 (Oct).

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32. Barreto, Matt and David Leal. 2007. "Latinos, Military Service, and Support for Bush and Kerry in 2004." *American Politics Research*. 35 (March): 224-251.
31. Barreto, Matt, Mara Marks and Nathan Woods. 2007. "Homeownership: Southern California's New Political Fault Line?" *Urban Affairs Review*. 42 (January). 315-341.
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29. Barreto, Matt, Fernando Guerra, Mara Marks, Stephen Nuño, and Nathan Woods. 2006. "Controversies in Exit Polling: Implementing a racially stratified homogenous precinct approach." *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 39 (July) 477-83.
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27. Barreto, Matt. 2005. "Latino Immigrants at the Polls: Foreign-born Voter Turnout in the 2002 Election." *Political Research Quarterly*. 58 (March): 79-86.
26. Barreto, Matt, Mario Villarreal and Nathan Woods. 2005. "Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior: Turnout and Candidate Preference in Los Angeles." *Journal of Urban Affairs*. 27(February): 71-91.
25. Leal, David, Matt Barreto, Jongho Lee and Rodolfo de la Garza. 2005. "The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election." *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 38 (January): 41-49.
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23. Barreto, Matt, Gary Segura and Nathan Woods. 2004. "The Effects of Overlapping Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review*. 98 (February): 65-75.
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21. Barreto, Matt and José Muñoz. 2003. "Reexamining the 'politics of in-between': political participation among Mexican immigrants in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*. 25 (November): 427-447.
20. Barreto, Matt. 2003. "National Origin (Mis)Identification Among Latinos in the 2000 Census: The Growth of the "Other Hispanic or Latino" Category." *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*. 15 (June): 39-63.

Edited Volume Book Chapters

19. Barreto, Matt and Gary Segura. 2020. "Latino Reaction and Resistance to Trump: Lessons learned from Pete Wilson and 1994." In Raul Hinojosa and Edward Telles (eds.) Equitable Globalization: Expanding Bridges, Overcoming Walls. Oakland: University of California Press.
18. Barreto, Matt, Albert Morales and Gary Segura. 2019. "The Brown Tide and the Blue Wave in 2018" In Larry Sabato, Kyle Kondik, Geoffrey Skelley (eds.) The Blue Wave. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
17. Gutierrez, Angela, Angela Ocampo and Matt Barreto. 2018. "Obama's Latino Legacy: From Unknown to Never Forgotten" In Andrew Rudalevige and Bert Rockman (eds.) The Obama Legacy. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
16. Barreto, Matt, Thomas Schaller and Gary Segura. 2017. "Latinos and the 2016 Election: How Trump Lost Latinos on Day 1"

- In Larry Sabato, Kyle Kondik, Geoffrey Skelley (eds.) Trumped: The 2016 Election that Broke All the Rules. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
15. Walker, Hannah, Gabriel Sanchez, Stephen Nuño, Matt Barreto 2017. "Race and the Right to Vote: The Modern Barrier of Voter ID Laws" In Todd Donovan (ed.) Election Rules and Reforms. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
 14. Barreto, Matt and Christopher Parker. 2015. "Public Opinion and Reactionary Movements: From the Klan to the Tea Party" In Adam Berinsky (ed.) New Directions in Public Opinion. 2nd edition. New York: Routledge Press.
 13. Barreto, Matt and Gabriel Sanchez. 2014. "A 'Southern Exception' in Black-Latino Attitudes?." In Anthony Affigne, Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Marion Orr (eds.) Latino Politics en Ciencia Política. New York: New York University Press.
 12. Barreto, Matt, Ben Gonzalez, and Gabriel Sanchez. 2014. "Rainbow Coalition in the Golden State? Exposing Myths, Uncovering New Realities in Latino Attitudes Towards Blacks." In Josh Kun and Laura Pulido (eds.) Black and Brown in Los Angeles: Beyond Conflict and Coalition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
 11. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Ben Gonzalez, and Christopher Parker. 2011. "Tea Party Politics in a Blue State: Dino Rossi and the 2010 Washington Senate Election" In William Miller and Jeremy Walling (eds.) Stuck in the Middle to Lose: Tea Party Effects on 2010 U.S. Senate Elections. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.
 10. Jason Morin, Gabriel Sanchez and Matt Barreto. 2011. "Perceptions of Competition Between Latinos and Blacks: The Development of a Relative Measure of Inter-Group Competition." In Edward Telles, Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Mark Sawyer (eds.) Just Neighbors? Research on African American and Latino Relations in the US. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
 9. Grofman, Bernard, Frank Wayman and Matt Barreto. 2009. "Rethinking partisanship: Some thoughts on a unified theory." In John Bartle and Paolo Bellucci (eds.) Political Parties and Partisanship: Social identity and individual attitudes. New York: Routledge Press.
 8. Barreto, Matt, Ricardo Ramírez, Luis Fraga and Fernando Guerra. 2009. "Why California Matters: How California Latinos Influence the Presidential Election." In Rodolfo de la Garza, Louis DeSipio and David Leal (eds.) Beyond the Barrio: Latinos in the 2004 Elections. South Bend, ID: University of Notre Dame Press.
 7. Francisco Pedraza and Matt Barreto. 2008. "Exit Polls and Ethnic Diversity: How to Improve Estimates and Reduce Bias Among Minority Voters." In Wendy Alvey and Fritz Scheuren (eds.) Elections and Exit Polling. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons.
 6. Adrian Pantoja, Matt Barreto and Richard Anderson. 2008. "Politics y la Iglesia: Attitudes Toward the Role of Religion in Politics Among Latino Catholics" In Michael Genovese, Kristin Hayer and Mark J. Rozell (eds.) Catholics and Politics. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press..
 5. Barreto, Matt. 2007. "The Role of Latino Candidates in Mobilizing Latino Voters: Revisiting Latino Vote Choice." In Rodolfo Espino, David Leal and Kenneth Meier (eds.) Latino Politics: Identity, Mobilization, and Representation. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
 4. Abosch, Yishaiya, Matt Barreto and Nathan Woods. 2007. "An Assessment of Racially Polarized Voting For and Against Latinos Candidates in California." In Ana Henderson (ed.) Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power. Berkeley, CA: UC Berkeley Public Policy Press.
 3. Barreto, Matt and Ricardo Ramírez. 2005. "The Race Card and California Politics: Minority Voters and Racial Cues in the 2003 Recall Election." In Shaun Bowler and Bruce Cain (eds.) Clicker Politics: Essays on the California Recall. Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
 2. Barreto, Matt and Nathan Woods. 2005. "The Anti-Latino Political Context and its Impact on GOP Detachment and Increasing Latino Voter Turnout in Los Angeles County." In Gary Segura and Shawn Bowler (eds.) Diversity in Democracy: Minority Representation in the United States. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
 1. Pachon, Harry, Matt Barreto and Frances Marquez. 2004. "Latino Politics Comes of Age in the Golden State." In Rodolfo de la Garza and Louis DeSipio (eds.) Muted Voices: Latino Politics in the 2000 Election. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

RESEARCH AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

| | | |
|------------|--|-------------------------|
| June 2020 | WK Kellogg Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz] | \$2,500,000 – 24 months |
| June 2020 | Casey Family Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz] | \$900,000 – 18 months |
| Aug 2018 | Provost Initiative for Voting Rights Research UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Chad Dunn] | \$90,000 – 24 months |
| April 2018 | Democracy Fund & Wellspring Philanthropic UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz] | \$200,000 – 18 months |
| March 2018 | AltaMed California UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz] | \$250,000 – 12 months |
| Dec 2017 | California Community Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz] | \$100,000 – 12 months |
| July 2013 | Ford Foundation UW Center for Democracy and Voting Rights | \$200,000 – 12 months |
| April 2012 | American Values Institute [With Ben Gonzalez] Racial Narratives and Public Response to Racialized Moments | \$40,000 – 3 months |
| Jan 2012 | American Civil Liberties Union Foundation [With Gabriel Sanchez] Voter Identification Laws in Wisconsin | \$60,000 – 6 months |
| June 2011 | State of California Citizens Redistricting Commission An Analysis of Racial Bloc Voting in California Elections | \$60,000 – 3 months |
| Apr 2011 | Social Science Research Council (SSRC) [With Karam Dana] Muslim and American? A national conference on the political and social incorporation of American Muslims | \$50,000 – 18 months |
| Jan 2011 | impreMedia [With Gary Segura] Latino public opinion tracking poll of voter attitudes in 2011 | \$30,000 – 6 months |
| Oct 2010 | National Council of La Raza (NCLR) [With Gary Segura] Measuring Latino Influence in the 2010 Elections | \$128,000 – 6 months |
| Oct 2010 | We Are America Alliance (WAAA) [With Gary Segura] Latino and Asian American Immigrant Community Voter Study | \$79,000 – 3 months |
| May 2010 | National Council of La Raza (NCLR) [With Gary Segura] A Study of Latino Views Towards Arizona SB1070 | \$25,000 – 3 months |
| Apr 2010 | Social Science Research Council (SSRC) [With Karam Dana] Muslim and American? The influence of religiosity in Muslim political incorporation | \$50,000 – 18 months |
| Oct 2009 | American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) [With Gary Segura] Health care reform and Latino public opinion | \$25,000 – 3 months |
| Nov 2008 | impreMedia & National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) [With Gary Segura] 2008 National Latino Post-Election Survey, Presidential Election | \$46,000 – 3 months |

RESEARCH GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS CONTINUED...

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|-------------|---|-----------------------|
| July 2008 | National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) [With Gary Segura] Latino voter outreach survey – an evaluation of Obama and McCain | \$72,000 – 3 months |
| June 2008 | The Pew Charitable Trusts, Make Voting Work Project [with Karin MacDonald and Bonnie Glaser] Evaluating Online Voter Registration (OVR) Systems in Arizona and Washington | \$220,000 – 10 months |
| April 2008 | National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) & National Council of La Raza (NCLR), 2008 Latino voter messaging survey | \$95,000 – 6 months |
| Dec. 2007 | Research Royalty Fund, University of Washington 2008 Latino national post-election survey | \$39,000 – 12 months |
| Oct. 2007 | Brenan Center for Justice, New York University [with Stephen Nuño and Gabriel Sanchez] Indiana Voter Identification Study | \$40,000 – 6 months |
| June 2007 | National Science Foundation, Political Science Division [with Gary Segura] American National Election Study – Spanish translation and Latino oversample | \$750,000 – 24 months |
| Oct. 2006 | University of Washington, Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education Absentee voter study during the November 2006 election in King County, WA | \$12,000 – 6 months |
| Mar. 2006 | Latino Policy Coalition Public Opinion Research Grant [with Gary Segura] Awarded to the Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race | \$40,000 – 18 months |
| 2005 – 2006 | University of Washington, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Research Grant | \$8,000 – 12 months |
| Mar. 2005 | Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Foundation Grant [with Fernando Guerra] Conduct Exit Poll during Los Angeles Mayoral Election, Mar. 8 & May 17, 2005 Awarded to the Center for the Study of Los Angeles | \$30,000 – 6 months |
| 2004 – 2005 | Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship for Minorities | \$21,000 – 12 months |
| 2004 – 2005 | University of California President's Dissertation Fellowship | \$14,700 – 9 months |
| 2004 – 2005 | University of California Mexico-US (UC MEXUS) Dissertation Grant | \$12,000 – 9 months |
| Apr – 2004 | UC Regents pre-dissertation fellowship, University of California, Irvine, | \$4,700 – 3 months |
| 2003 – 2004 | Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Foundation Grant [with Fernando Guerra] Awarded to the Center for the Study of Los Angeles | \$20,000 – 12 months |
| 2002 – 2003 | Ford Foundation Grant on Institutional Inequality [with Harry Pachon] Conducted longitudinal study of Prop 209 on Latino and Black college admittance Awarded to Tomás Rivera Policy Institute | \$150,000 – 12 months |
| 2002 – 2003 | Haynes Foundation Grant on Economic Development [with Louis Tornatzky] Knowledge Economy in the Inland Empire region of Southern California Awarded to Tomás Rivera Policy Institute | \$150,000 – 18 months |
| 2001 – 2002 | William F Podlich Graduate Fellowship, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine | \$24,000 – 9 months |

RESEARCH UNDER REVIEW/WORKING PAPERS:

Barreto, Matt, and Christopher Parker. The Great White Hope: Donald Trump, Race, and the Crisis of American Politics. Under Contract, University of Chicago Press, *expected 2020*

Barreto, Matt and Christopher Parker. "The Great White Hope: Existential Threat and Demographic Anxiety in the Age of Trump." Revise and Resubmit.

Barreto, Matt, Natalie Masuoka, Gabe Sanchez and Stephen El-Khatib. "Religiosity, Discrimination and Group Identity Among Muslim Americans" Revise and Resubmit

Barreto, Matt, Gabe Sanchez and Barbara Gomez. "Latinos, Blacks, and Black Latinos: Competition, Cooperation, or Indifference?" Revise and Resubmit

Walker, Hannah, Matt Barreto, Stephen Nuño, and Gabriel Sanchez. "A comprehensive review of access to valid photo ID and the right to vote in America" [Under review]

Gutierrez, Angela, Angela Ocampo, Matt Barreto and Gary Segura. "From Proposition 187 to Donald Trump: New Evidence that Anti-Immigrant Threat Mobilizes Latino Voters." [Under Review]

Oskooii, Kassra, Matt Barreto, and Karam Dana. "No Sharia, No Mosque: Orientalist Notions of Islam and Intolerance Toward Muslims in the United States" [Under Review]

EXPERT REPORTS:

- A North Carolina 2024, *North Carolina NAACP v. Hirsch*, SB 824 Voter ID law
- A North Carolina 2023, State Senate redistricting, *Democracy Project II*.
- A Dodge City, Kansas 2022-23, city redistricting, *Coca et al. vs. Dodge City, KS*.
- A Florida 2022-23, Statewide redistricting, *Common Cause et al. vs. Byrd*
- A Galveston County, Texas 2022-23, county redistricting, *Petteway et al. v. Galveston County, TX*.
- A Benton, Chelan, Yakima counties signature rejection, 2022-23, *Reyes et al. v. Chilton et al.*
- A San Juan County, New Mexico 2022-23, county redistricting, *Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, NM*
- A Texas Statewide redistricting, 2022, *LULAC v. Abbott* (on behalf of Mexican American Legislative Caucus)
- A Franklin County, WA, 2021-22, county redistricting, rebuttal expert for Plaintiffs, *Portugal et al. vs. Franklin County*
- A Texas Statewide redistricting, 2021-22, *Brooks v. Abbott* Senate District 10 (Tarrant County)
- A Baltimore County Council, 2021-22, *NAACP v. Baltimore County*, (on behalf of NAACP and ACLU-MD)
- A Maryland Office of Attorney General, 2021-22, racially polarized voting analysis as part of statewide redistricting
- A Pennsylvania House Democrats, 2021-22, racially polarized voting analysis as part of statewide redistricting
- A Washington State Senate Democrats, 2021-22, racially polarized voting analysis as part of statewide redistricting
- A City of San Jose, 2021, racially polarized voting analysis as part of city redistricting
- A Santa Clara County, 2021, racially polarized voting analysis as part of county redistricting
- A Pennsylvania, 2020, *Boockvar v. Trump*, Expert for Intervenors, (Perkins Coie) related to voter intimidation
- A Missouri, 2020, *Missouri NAACP vs. State of Missouri*, Expert for plaintiffs related to vote by mail
- A Georgia, 2020, *Black Voters Matter vs. Raffesnsperger*, Expert for plaintiffs related to vote by mail
- A New York, 2019, Expert for NYAG New York v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 1:19-cv-08876
- A North Carolina, 2019, Expert for Plaintiffs in North Carolina voter ID lawsuit, *NAACP v. Cooper*
- A East Ramapo CSD, 2019, Expert for Plaintiffs in Section 2 VRA lawsuit, assessed polarized voting
- A New York, 2018, Expert for Plaintiffs in Census Citizenship Lawsuit, New York v. U.S. Dept of Commerce (also an expert related cases: *California v. Ross* and *Kravitz v. Dept of Commerce*)
- A Dallas County, TX, 2017, Expert for Defense in Section 2 VRA lawsuit, *Harding v. Dallas County*
- A Kansas, 2016, Expert for Plaintiffs in Kansas voter registration lawsuit, *Fish v. Kobach* 2:16-cv-02105-JAR
- A North Dakota, 2015, Expert for Plaintiffs in North Dakota voter ID lawsuit, *Brakebill v. Jaeger* 1:16-cv-00008-CSM
- A Alabama, 2015, Expert for Plaintiffs in Alabama voter ID lawsuit, *Birmingham Ministries v. State of Alabama* 2:15-cv-02193-LSC
- A Texas, 2014, Testifying Expert for Plaintiffs in Texas voter ID lawsuit, *Veasey v. Perry* 2:13-cv-00193
- A Galveston County, TX Redistricting, 2013, Expert report for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, vote dilution analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit Galveston County JP/Constable districting
- A Pasadena, TX Redistricting, 2013, Expert report for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit within Pasadena School District
- A Harris County, TX Redistricting, 2011, Testifying Expert for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit within Harris County

- A Pennsylvania, 2012, Testifying Expert for ACLU Foundation of Pennsylvania in voter ID lawsuit, *Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* No. 330 MD 2012
- A Milwaukee County, WI, 2012, Testifying Expert for ACLU Foundation of Wisconsin in voter ID lawsuit, *Frank v. Walker* 2:11-cv-01128(LA)
- A Orange County, FL, 2012, Consulting Expert for Latino Justice/PRLDEF, Racially polarized voting analysis in Orange County, Florida
- A Anaheim, CA, 2012, Consulting Expert for Goldstein, Demchak & Baller Legal, Racially polarized voting analysis for CVRA redistricting case Anaheim, CA
- A Los Angeles County, CA, 2011, Consulting Expert for Goldstein, Demchak & Baller Legal, Racially polarized voting analysis for three redistricting cases in L.A.: Cerritos Community College Board; ABC Unified Schools; City of West Covina
- A Harris County, TX Redistricting, 2011, Consulting Expert for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, for Section 5 objection within Harris County
- A Monterey County, CA Redistricting, 2011, Consulting Expert for City of Salinas, Demographic analysis, creation of alternative maps, and racially polarized Voting analysis within Monterey County
- A Los Angeles County Redistricting Commission, 2011, Consulting Expert for Supervisor Gloria Molina, Racially Polarized voting analysis within L.A. County
- A State of California, Citizens Redistricting Commission, 2011, Consulting Expert, Racially Polarized Voting analysis throughout state of California
- A Asian Pacific American Legal Center, 2011, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Asian American candidates in Los Angeles for APALC redistricting brief
- A Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Arnold & Porter, LLP, 2010-12, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino and Asian candidates in San Mateo County, concerning San Mateo County Board of Supervisors
- A ACLU of Washington, 2010-11, preliminary analysis of Latino population patterns in Yakima, Washington, to assess ability to draw majority Latino council districts
- A State of Washington, 2010-11, provided expert analysis and research for *State of Washington v. MacLean* in case regarding election misconduct and voting patterns
- A Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association, 2008-10, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino candidates in L.A. County for VRA case, concerning L.A. County Board of Supervisors redistricting (6 reports issued 08-10)
- A Brennan Center for Justice and Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, 2009-10 Amicus Brief submitted to Indiana Supreme Court, *League of Women Voters v. Rokita*, regarding access to voter identification among minority and lower resource citizens
- A State of New Mexico, consulting expert for state in *AAPD v. New Mexico*, 2008,
- A District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), statistical consultant for survey methodology of opinion survey of parents in DCPS district (for pending suit), 2008,
- A Brennan Center for Justice, 2007-08, Amicus Brief submitted to U.S. Supreme Court, and cited in Supreme Court decision, *Crawford v. Marion County*, regarding access to voter identification among minority and lower-resource citizens
- A Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association, 2002-07, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino candidates in L.A. County for VRA case, concerning L.A. County Board of Supervisors redistricting (12 + reports issued during 5 years)
- A Monterrey County School Board, 2007, demographic and population analysis for VRA case
- A Sweetwater Union School District, 2007-08, Racially Polarized Voting analysis, and demographic and population analysis for VRA case
- A Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, 2007-08, Racially Polarized Voting analysis for Latino candidates, for City of Whittier city council races, for VRA case

- A** ACLU of Washington, 2008, preliminary analysis of voting patterns in Eastern Washington, related to electability of Latino candidates
- A** Nielsen Media Research, 2005-08, with Willie C. Velasquez Institute, assessed the methodology of Latino household recruitment in Nielsen sample

**TEACHING
EXPERIENCE:**

UCLA & UW

2005 – Present

- Minority Political Behavior (Grad Seminar)
- Politics of Immigration in the U.S. (Grad Seminar)
- Introduction to Empirical/Regression Analysis (Grad Seminar)
- Advanced Empirical/Regression Analysis (Grad Seminar)
- Qualitative Research Methods (Grad Seminar)
- Political Participation & Elections (Grad Seminar)
- The Voting Rights Act (Law School seminar)
- Research methodology II (Law School Ph.D. program seminar)
- U.S. Latino Politics
- Racial and Ethnic Politics in the U.S.
- Politics of Immigration in the U.S.
- Introduction to American Government
- Public Opinion Research
- Campaigns and Elections in the U.S.
- Presidential Primary Elections

Teaching Assistant

University of California, Irvine

2002 – 2005

- Intro to American Politics (K. Tate)
- Intro to Minority Politics (L. DeSipio)
- **Recognized as Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Winter 2002**
- Statistics and Research Methods (B. Grofman)
- **Recognized as Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Winter 2003**

**BOARD &
RESEARCH
APPOINTMENTS****Founding Partner**

Barreto Segura Partners (BSP) Research, LLC

2021 - Present**Founding Partner**

Latino Decisions

2007 – 2020**Board of Advisors**

American National Election Study, University of Michigan

2010 – 2017**Advisory Board**States of Change: Demographics & Democracy Project
*CAP, AEI, Brookings Collaborative Project*2014 – Present**Research Advisor**

American Values Institute / Perception Institute

2009 – 2014**Expert Consultant**

State of California, Citizens Redistricting Committee

2011 – 2012**Senior Scholar & Advisory Council**

Latino Policy Coalition, San Francisco, CA

2006 – 2008**Board of Directors**

CASA Latina, Seattle, WA

2006 – 2009**Faculty Research Scholar**

Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, University of Southern California

1999 – 2009

PHD STUDENTS

UCLA & UW

Committee Chair or Co-Chair

- Francisco I. Pedraza – University of California, Riverside (UW Ph.D. 2009)
- Loren Collingwood – University of California, Riverside (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Betsy Cooper – Public Religion Research Institute, Washington DC (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Sergio I. Garcia-Rios – Cornell University (UW Ph.D. 2015)
- Hannah Walker – Rutgers University (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Kassra Oskooii – University of Delaware (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Angela Ocampo – Arizona State University (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Ayobami Lanionu – University of Toronto (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Bryan Wilcox-Archuleta – Facebook Analytics (UCLA 2019)
- Tyler Reny – Claremont Graduate University (UCLA 2020)
- Adria Tinin – Environmental Policy Analyst (UCLA Ph.D. 2020)
- Angie Gutierrez – University of Texas (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Vivien Leung – Bucknell University (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Marcel Roman – Harvard University (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Ana Oaxaca – University of Texas (UCLA Ph.D. 2022)
- Estefania Castañeda-Perez – University of Pennsylvania (UCLA Ph.D. 2022)
- Tye Rush - University of California, Davis (UCLA Ph.D. 2023)
- Shakari Byerly-Nelson – *in progress* (UCLA)

Committee Member

- Erik Hanson – University of Southern California (UCLA 2022)
- Joy Wilke – Director of Polling, Blue Labs (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Christine Slaughter – Boston University (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Barbara Gomez-Aguinaga – University of Nebraska (UNM Ph.D. 2020)
- Bang Quan Zheng – Florida International University (UCLA Ph.D. 2020)
- Jessica Stewart – Emory University (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Jonathan Collins – Brown University (UCLA Ph.D., 2017)
- Lisa Sanchez – University of Arizona (UNM Ph.D., 2016)
- Nazita Lajevardi – Michigan State University (UC San Diego Ph.D., 2016)
- Kiku Huckle – Pace University (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Patrick Rock (Social Psychology) – (UCLA Ph.D. 2016)
- Raynee Gutting – Loyola Marymount University (Stony Brook Ph.D. 2015)
- Christopher Towler – Sacramento State University (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Benjamin F. Gonzalez – San Diego State University (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Marcela Garcia-Castañon – San Francisco State University (UW Ph.D. 2013)
- Justin Reedy (Communications) – University of Oklahoma (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Dino Bozonelos – Cal State San Marcos (UC Riverside Ph.D. 2012)
- Brandon Bosch – University of Nebraska (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Karam Dana (Middle East Studies) – UW Bothell (UW Ph.D. 2010)
- Lauren Goldstein (Social Psychology) – *in progress* (UCLA)

Appendix C

Barreto Report in *Common Cause*

DECLARATION OF MATTHEW BARRETO, PHD AND KASSRA A.R. OSKOOIL, PHD**I. Introduction**

1. I, Matthew A. Barreto, am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify.

2. I am a Professor of Political Science and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”). I was appointed to the position of Full Professor with tenure at UCLA in 2015. Prior to that, I was a tenured Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington (“UW”), and before that, tenured Associate Professor from 2009 to 2014 and started as Assistant Professor from 2005 to 2009 at UW. At UCLA, I am the faculty director of the Voting Rights Project in the Luskin School of Public Affairs and teach a year-long course on the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), focusing specifically on social science statistical analysis, demographics, and district mapping analysis that are relevant in redistricting expert reports. I have written expert reports and been qualified as an expert witness more than three-dozen times in federal and state voting rights and civil rights cases. I have published peer-reviewed, social science articles specifically about minority representation, voting patterns and racially polarized voting and have co-authored a software package for use in understanding district performance and racial voting patterns in redistricting cases.

3. I have been retained as an expert consultant by counties and states across the country in many matters, advising them on redistricting as it relates to compliance with state and federal requirements. As an expert witness in VRA lawsuits, my testimony has been relied on by courts to find in favor of challenges to maps drawn by both Republicans and Democrats. In March 2022, a federal court relied on my analysis of district boundaries and voting patterns to strike down the defendants’ maps that diluted the African American vote, and order a new map in Baltimore, Maryland.

4. I hold a Ph.D. in Political Science from University of California at Irvine. I have attached my Curriculum Vitae as **Exhibit 1**.

5. In this matter, I have been assisted by Dr. Kassra A. R. Oskooii, tenured Associate professor and Provost teaching fellow of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. Dr. Oskooii and I have worked on previous voting rights analyses together, including mapping and districting analyses, and we have co-authored peer-reviewed social science articles on racially polarized voting patterns. Dr. Oskooii's research and teaching focuses on American political behavior, political methodology, political psychology, political representation, voting rights, and redistricting. Dr. Oskooii has published numerous peer-reviewed, social science articles in leading journals, including Sociological Methods and Research, Political Behavior, Public Opinion Quarterly, Political Psychology, British Journal of Political Science, Electoral Studies, Perspectives on Politics, Urban Affairs Review, State Politics and Policy Quarterly, and Journal of Public Policy.

6. Of relevance to this report, Dr. Oskooii and I have co-authored a 2022 article in the journal Sociological Methods and Research titled "Estimating Candidate Support in Voting Rights Act Cases: Comparing Iterative EI & EI-RxC Methods." We have also co-developed a software package called "eiCompare," which enables social scientists to use aggregate-level election data to estimate individual-level voting behavior by racial or ethnic group affiliations and evaluate the performance of enacted, proposed, or illustrative electoral maps.

7. Dr. Oskooii has been retained as an expert witness in redistricting and voting rights cases such as *Dickenson Bay Area NAACP Branch v. Galveston County*, No. 22-cv-117-JVB (S.D. Tex.), *Baltimore County Branch of the NAACP v. Baltimore County*, No. 21-cv-03232-LKG (D. Md.), and *Reyes v. Chilton*, No. 4:21-cv-05075-MKD (E.D. Wash.). He has also been retained as an expert to advise jurisdictions on redistricting and voting rights compliance,

including by the State of Maryland. Dr. Oskooii holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington with specialization in American politics and political methodology, and his Curriculum Vitae is attached as **Exhibit 2**.

8. I am being compensated for my work on this case at my standard rate of 450 per hour. Dr. Oskooii is being compensated at a rate of 300 per hour. Our compensation is not contingent upon our findings or on the result of this proceeding.

9. References to documents and data we include in this Declaration are meant to provide examples of supporting information but are not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive lists of all known support. The information in this Declaration is based upon information that has been made available to us or known to us to date. Our work in this matter is ongoing, and we reserve the right to modify or supplement any conclusions as additional information is made available or as we perform further analysis.

A. Scope of Work and Summary Findings

10. We were retained by Plaintiffs' attorneys to assess the enacted Congressional District map passed by the Florida Legislature on April 19, 2022 and signed by Florida Governor Ronald DeSantis. In particular, we analyzed whether or not the adopted map diluted minority voting strength and diminished opportunities to elect their candidates of choice¹, as compared to (i) the benchmark map, as well as (ii) other unenacted maps proposed by the Florida Legislature. We also reviewed voting patterns by race and ethnicity to determine if Black and other racial or ethnic groups were cohesive in support of preferred candidates as compared to white, non-Hispanic voters. Finally, we examined statements by Governor DeSantis and other policy

¹ The preferred candidate of minority voters, regardless of that candidate's race or ethnicity, is called a "candidate of choice."

making officials to evaluate whether their public statements matched actual outcomes in the adopted map.

11. We conclude that the enacted map, “C0109,” dilutes and diminishes minority voting strength across the state of Florida and the following:

- a. Florida’s population growth over the last decade was driven by non-white populations, which are solely responsible for the population increase that resulted in one additional Congressional seat being apportioned to Florida in 2021.
- b. Despite minority population growth and white population share decline, the adopted Congressional map dismantles a Black-performing district and diminishes opportunities for minority voters to elect candidates of their choice as compared to the benchmark map and alternative options passed by the Florida Legislature.
- c. Across Northern Florida, Black voters are cohesive and vote together for their preferred candidates while white voters bloc vote against Black-preferred candidates. The adopted map cracks a Black community of interest and dilutes Black voting strength by eliminating a Black-performing district.
- d. In Central Florida, the adopted map cracks Black and Hispanic communities and diminishes opportunities for minority voters to elect candidates of choice. In the benchmark map, “FLCD2016,” minority voters were large enough in size to influence electoral outcomes and elect minority candidates of choice from Tampa to Orlando in four districts, however in the adopted map, despite gaining an extra seat in apportionment, minority voters have one fewer opportunity district than before.

- e. In South Florida, the adopted map closely adheres to racial neighborhood boundaries well beyond any supposed voting rights justification, including overly packing Black and Hispanic populations. The adopted map makes additional race-centered boundary changes beyond the benchmark or alternative maps with no other justification other than packing Black and Hispanic populations.
- f. Statements made by Florida Governor DeSantis and members of his administration about why the maps passed by the Legislature were vetoed and why the enacted map was preferred are inconsistent with the actual facts and data.

B. Data and Analytical Approach

12. For most of our analyses, we rely on the latest redistricting data available in downloadable format from Florida's official 2022 redistricting website, which was created by the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate

(<https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/resources>). The data contains the population demographic, voter registration and turnout, and election data that is also found in the Legislature's Redistricting Portal available here:

<https://web.floridaredistricting.esriemcs.com/redistricting/>. This data is made available to Florida Legislature members, staff, and the public, and has been relied upon by the state of Florida to produce reports on population summary and statistics, as well as boundary, district compactness, and functional/electoral performance analyses.²

13. We supplement this data by using Dave's Redistricting Application ("DRA") (https://davesredistricting.org/maps_home) to obtain 2020 5-Year American Community Survey ("ACS") Citizen Voting Age Population Data by race and ethnicity for all the Congressional

² For example, see here: <https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/pages/submitted-plans> and here: <https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Redistricting/MapsAndStats>.

districts (“CD”) across the different Congressional maps that we examine herein. Additionally, we rely on DRA to obtain statewide general elections data from 2016-2020 to produce election composites for the partisan scores³ that we report by Congressional districts and maps. In constructing the partisan lean composite scores, we used all the election results available on DRA for the state of Florida, which includes the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, 2016 and 2018 senatorial elections, 2018 gubernatorial election, and the 2018 election for attorney general. To obtain Congressional election results, we sourced data from the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections website

(https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate_11/8/2022&DATAMODE_0).

14. We downloaded map boundaries from Florida’s redistricting website (<https://www.floridaredistricting.gov/>).⁴ This includes boundaries for the FLCD2016 map (“Benchmark”), the enacted FLCD2022 map (“Adopted”, “C0109”), map S035C8060 passed by the Florida Senate on January 19, 2022 (“SC8060”), map H00C8019 passed by both Florida House and Senate on March 4, 2022 (“HC8019”), and map H00C8015 passed by both Florida House and Senate on March 4, 2022 as a secondary map that was intended to be enacted if the primary map (i.e., HC8019) was found to be invalid by the court (“HC8015”). We also downloaded map boundaries for the 2022 State House and Senate maps.

15. To produce map boundary comparison figures, we used ArcGIS redistricting application developed by Esri (<https://www.esri.com/en-us/arcgis/about-arcgis/overview>) and imported block group level 2020 Decennial Census redistricting data (P.L. 94-171) as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau to depict population concentrations by race and ethnicity.

³ For more information on DRA’s composite partisan scores, see: <https://medium.com/dra-2020/district-statistics-280ea441569b>

⁴ The benchmark and enacted Congressional map shapefiles can also be found here: <https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Redistricting/MapsAndStats>

16. Other population demographic data was obtained from the 2010 and 2020 Decennial Census redistricting data (P.L. 94-171). We also obtained data from the U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS) for 2021. When the ACS releases the 2022 data, we plan to analyze any changes in population demographics.

17. To conduct functional/electoral performance analyses, we used Florida's Esri Redistricting Online Application and associated data made available here: <https://web.floridaredistricting.esriemcs.com/redistricting/>. For ease of presentation, we produced functional/electoral performance plots by Congressional districts using the ggplot2 package (<https://ggplot2.tidyverse.org/reference/ggplot.html>) in R, which is a statistical computing and graphics software (<https://www.r-project.org>).

18. To empirically examine racial and ethnic groups' candidates of choice, we conducted racially polarized voting ("RPV") analyses using Ecological Inference ("EI")⁵, which has been deemed the "benchmark method courts rely upon to evaluate RPV patterns in voting rights lawsuits."⁶ More specifically, we estimated candidate vote choice by race and ethnicity using King's Iterative EI⁷ and EI Rows by Columns ("RxC")⁸ methods available in the "eiCompare" R software package⁹ available on GitHub (<https://github.com/RPVote/eiCompare>). For all the

⁵ "Ecological inference is the process of using aggregate (i.e., "ecological") data to infer discrete individual-level relationships of interest when individual-level data are not available." (page 2) King, G. and Roberts, M., 2012. EI: a (n R) program for ecological inference. *Harvard University*.

⁶ Barreto, M., Collingwood, L., Garcia-Rios, S. and Oskooii, K.A., 2022. Estimating candidate support in Voting Rights Act cases: Comparing iterative EI and EI-R C methods. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 51(1), pp.271-304 (quote at p.276).

⁷ King, G., 2013. A solution to the ecological inference problem. In *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*. Princeton University Press.

⁸ Rosen, O., Jiang, W., King, G. and Tanner, M.A., 2001. Bayesian and frequentist inference for ecological inference: The R C case. *Statistica Neerlandica*, 55(2), pp.134-156.

⁹ Collingwood, L., Oskooii, K., Garcia-Rios, S. and Barreto, M., 2016. eiCompare: Comparing Ecological Inference Estimates across EI and EI: RxC. *R J.*, 8(2), p.92.

RPV analyses, we rely on election data and voter turnout by year and race/ethnicity made available on Florida's official 2022 redistricting website.

19. We have reviewed the Fair Districts Amendments to the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const. Art. III, 20. We understand that Section 20 of the Florida Constitution regulates Congressional reapportionment. This provision includes "Tier 1" standards and "Tier 2" standards. Tier 1 standards require that: (1) no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; (2) districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and (3) districts shall consist of contiguous territory. Fla. Const. Art. III, 20(a). Tier 2 standards, which are subordinate to Tier 1 standards in the event of a conflict, require that: (1) districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; (2) districts shall be compact; and (3) where feasible, districts shall utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.¹⁰

20. We have also reviewed the April 3, 2023 Expert Report by Professor Morgan Kousser and have relied on the information he has presented.

¹⁰ Fla. Const. Art. III, 20 provides that: "(a) No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of contiguous territory;" "(b) Unless compliance with the standards in this subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a)1 or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries;" and "(c) The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and (b) of this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any priority of one standard over the other within that subsection."

II. Findings

A. Changing Demographics in Florida

21. Examining population changes reported in Table 1 across the 2010 to 2020 decennial Census reveals that Florida's total population grew by about 2.7 million during that decade. This growth resulted in the net gain of one additional Congressional seat for Florida under national apportionment, bringing Florida's total to 28 Congressional districts. However, the growth was not equal across racial and ethnic groups, with white, non-Hispanic population growing the slowest at only about a 2% growth rate. Indeed, Florida's population is considerably less white today than it was ten years ago. According to decennial Census data, Florida was 57.9% white in 2010 and fell to 51.5% white in 2020, a drop of 6.4 percentage points. In direct contrast, the non-white population in Florida grew at a rate 11.7 times more rapidly than the white population. Overall, Florida's white population grew by 215,822 while Florida's non-white population grew by 2,521,114 in ten years. According to the Florida Constitution, these racial and ethnic population changes must be reflected in the adopted redistricting map "districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice." Fla. Const. Art. III, § 20(a).

Table 1: Population Change State of Florida, 2010 – 2020 Decennial Census

| | 2010 Census | | | 2020 Census | | | Change | Diff |
|--------------------|-------------|-------|--|-------------|-------|--|-----------|--------|
| Total Population | 18,801,251 | | | 21,538,187 | | | 2,736,936 | 14.6% |
| Hispanic | 4,223,800 | 22.5% | | 5,697,240 | 26.5% | | 1,473,440 | 34.9% |
| Non-Hispanic | 14,577,451 | 77.5% | | 15,840,947 | 73.6% | | 1,263,496 | 8.7% |
| White | 10,884,681 | 57.9% | | 11,100,503 | 51.5% | | 215,822 | 2.0% |
| Black | 2,851,091 | 15.2% | | 3,127,052 | 14.5% | | 275,961 | 9.7% |
| American Indian | 47,265 | 0.3% | | 42,169 | 0.2% | | -5,096 | -10.8% |
| Asian | 445,216 | 2.4% | | 629,626 | 2.9% | | 184,410 | 41.4% |
| Native Hawaiian PI | 9,725 | 0.1% | | 11,521 | 0.1% | | 1,796 | 18.5% |
| Other | 48,462 | 0.3% | | 137,933 | 0.6% | | 89,471 | 184.6% |
| Two or More Races | 291,011 | 1.6% | | 792,143 | 3.7% | | 501,132 | 172.2% |

22. The population change trends are even more stark when considering the most recent data from the Census Bureau, the 1-year American Community Survey (“ACS”). According to the 2021 ACS data reported in Table 2, the white population’s share of the statewide population has continued to shrink, dropping from 51.5% to 51.1% in just one year. Despite the fact that whites only represent 51% of the state population, 20 of 28 Congressional districts (71%) are represented by white voters’ candidates of choice.

23. Looking closer at the population shifts across ten years of ACS data representing the two redistricting years (2011 to 2021) makes clear that among the four largest racial and ethnic groups in the state, the smallest raw growth, and the smallest growth rate was among white, non-Hispanics. From 2011 to 2021 Florida added 2,511,214 non-whites for a growth rate of 30.9% compared to white growth of only 212,372 for a growth rate of 1.9%.

Table 2: Population Change of the State of Florida, 2011 – 2021 Census 1-year ACS

| | 2011 ACS | | 2021 ACS | | Change | | Diff |
|-------------------------|------------|-------|------------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Total Population | 19,057,542 | | 21,781,128 | | 2,723,586 | 14.3% | |
| White NH alone | 10,927,459 | 57.3% | 11,139,831 | 51.1% | 212,372 | 1.9% | -6.2% |
| Hispanic | 4,355,051 | 22.9% | 5,830,915 | 26.8% | 1,475,864 | 33.9% | 3.9% |
| Black alone or in comb. | 3,245,366 | 17.0% | 3,848,174 | 17.7% | 602,808 | 18.6% | 0.6% |
| Asian alone or in comb. | 585,292 | 3.1% | 822,675 | 3.8% | 237,383 | 40.6% | 0.7% |
| Total non-White | 8,130,083 | 42.7% | 10,641,297 | 48.9% | 2,511,214 | 30.9% | 6.2% |

B. The Adopted Congressional Plan Cracks and Dilutes Black Voting Strength in Northern Florida

24. The benchmark map contains a district in Northern Florida that elects Black voters' preferred candidates of choice to Congress. In elections throughout the decade for 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 African American preferred candidates¹¹ have been able to win election to Congress in what had been numbered Florida's 5th Congressional District.

25. The enacted map signed by Governor DeSantis purposefully cracks and dilutes African American voting strength in Northern Florida and resulted in no Black-preferred candidates elected to office in the Northern Florida region under the new Congressional map, C0109. For the first time since 1992, the large and cohesive Black community in Northern Florida was not able to elect a candidate of choice to Congress in the 2022 election. African American incumbent Alfred Lawson was drawn out of his former district and into a new district

¹¹ Different versions of the minority district in Northern Florida; referred here as "the district." Corrine Brown won the district in 2012 and 2014. In 2016, 2018, 2020 Alfred Lawson won the district.

(CD2) and lost to Neal Dunn by nearly 20 percentage points. Dunn was heavily preferred by white voters, while Lawson was heavily preferred by Black voters.

26. As reported in Table A1 in **Appendix A**, Representative Lawson's former district (CD5) was a majority-minority voting age population ("VAP"), and citizen voting age population ("CVAP") district with the largest share of the eligible electorate being Black (46.7 %) and represented a clear and cohesive community of interest. Other maps proposed and passed by the Florida Legislature kept, to different degrees, this district intact. In stark contrast, the adopted map split apart and cracked the Black population, separating it within the city of Jacksonville as well as areas connected to Tallahassee.

27. We outline these changes in detail, beginning by visually depicting the cracking of the Black population in the benchmark CD5. Figure 1 shows Northern Florida's Congressional benchmark district boundaries in solid black lines with the adopted Congressional district boundaries overlayed on top of the benchmark boundaries with dashed red lines. This graphic, and all the other map Figures presented herein, were produced for illustrative purposes with ArcGIS redistricting application to visualize VAP racial and ethnic group concentration at the Census block group-level based on the 2020 Decennial Census redistricting data (P.L. 94-171). The map Figures are color-coded with dots to depict the VAP concentration of the three largest racial and ethnic groups in the state of Florida: the green dots represent the non-Hispanic Black or African American VAP, the pink dots represent the non-Hispanic white VAP, and the orange dots represent the Hispanic VAP. As this Figure 1 and the zoomed-in Figure 2 illustrate, the adopted map cracks the Black VAP in benchmark CD5, dispersing the population across the newly adopted CDs 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Figure 1: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map, Northern Florida






Figure 2: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map, Northern Florida (zoomed-in)



28. The cracking of the Black VAP is clearly visible in two areas of Northern Florida. Within the city of Jacksonville, the adopted boundaries cut through the high-density Black VAP Census block groups, placing the Eastern part of the city in the newly adopted CD5 and the Western part of the city in the adopted CD4 (*see* Figure 3). The division between CD4 and CD5 in Jacksonville is created exactly where the high-density Black VAP Census block groups are located, as illustrated by the heavy concentration of green dots on the map. To accomplish this sort of cracking, the map boundary lines run through the middle of the St. Johns River from

Mathews bridge all the way down to where the boundaries of the adopted CD6 begin, at which point no bridge or roadway connects CD4 to CD5.

Figure 3: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map, Jacksonville Region



29. The adopted boundaries also cuts off all the Black VAP areas outside of Jacksonville that connected the benchmark CD5 to Tallahassee, cracking this population into adopted CDs 2 and 3.

30. As illustrated in Figures B1 and B2 in **Appendix B**, maps SC8060 and HC8015 retain much of the CD5 benchmark boundaries. As shown in Figure B3, the HC8019 map boundaries

do not extend to Tallahassee, but the plan makes a reasonable attempt to create a visually compact district that keeps much of the city of Jacksonville intact. In contrast to the adopted map, HC8019 boundaries only cross the St. Johns River through the Henry H. Buchman Bridge so that Northern Florida residents can travel from the East to the West side of Jacksonville and remain in CD5. This cut-off point is also logical because it is where the Southwest boundary line of the city is located.

31. HC8019's CD5 boundaries closely resemble the shape and boundaries of the adopted State Senate Legislative District 5, which also keep much of the city of Jacksonville and the high-density Black population areas intact. While Governor DeSantis rejected HC8019, he did not object, interfere, or comment on the State Senate Legislative District 5 boundaries. Figures 4 and 5 show the similarities between the CD5 and state Senate District 5 boundaries.

Figure 4: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus HC8019 map, Jacksonville Region





Figure 5: Adopted State Senate District 5 boundaries, Jacksonville Region

32. Having visually depicted the patterns of cracking in Northern Florida, we next examine its effects on demographic changes—particularly changes in the Black voting age and citizen voting age population—Black voter registration and voter turnout, and the electoral performance of Black voters’ candidates of choice.

33. Starting with demographic changes, prior to the 2022 redistricting, benchmark CD5 covered Floridians that tended to be younger, more economically disadvantaged, and less educated than the median Floridian.¹² Floridians in benchmark CD5 had a median age of 35.1 years, compared to the state median of 42.8.¹³ The median household income in benchmark CD5

¹² <https://censusreporter.org/profiles/50000US1205-congressional-district-5-fl/> (summarizing American Community Survey 2021 1-year survey data).

¹³ *Id.*

was \$46,344—about three-quarters of the median income of \$63,062 statewide.¹⁴ 22.2% of all persons lived below the poverty line, including 30% of children (under 18 years old), compared to the statewide rate of 13.1% of all persons, and 18% of children.¹⁵ 87.3% of Floridians in benchmark CD5 had graduated high school or higher, compared to 89.8% statewide.¹⁶ 24.1% of Floridians in benchmark CD5 had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 33.2% statewide.¹⁷

34. The 2022 adopted plan cracked the population of benchmark CD5 into CDs 2, 3, 4, and 5. Each of the resulting districts is older, more affluent, and better educated than benchmark CD5, as summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Demographic Change between Benchmark CD5 and Adopted CDs 2-5, 2021 ACS 1-Year Estimates¹⁸

| | Benchmark CD5 | Adopted CD2 | Adopted CD3 | Adopted CD4 | Adopted CD5 |
|---|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Median Age | 35.1 | 38.6 | 40.1 | 39.1 | 39.2 |
| Median Household Income | \$46,344 | \$56,301 | \$52,054 | \$61,311 | \$77,698 |
| Persons Below the Poverty Line (%) | 22.2% | 15.8% | 17.6% | 15.8% | 8.7% |
| Children (under 18) Below the Poverty Line (%) | 30.0% | 21.1% | 19.2% | 22.4% | 10.5% |
| High School or Higher Education | 87.3% | 88.9% | 89.9% | 90.0% | 94.7% |
| Bachelor's Degree or Higher Education | 24.1% | 31.5% | 28.5% | 26.4% | 45.0% |

35. Table A1 in **Appendix A** also shows that the benchmark CD5 was a majority-minority VAP and CVAP district composed of 46.2% Black VAP and 46.7% Black CVAP. In CD5,

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ ACS data drawn from <https://censusreporter.org/profiles/50000US1205-congressional-district-5-fl/> and <https://www.census.gov/mycd/?st=12>

Alfred Lawson, the only African American Congressional representative in Northern Florida, won 65.1% of the votes in the 2020 Congressional election. Benchmark CD5 was also the only district in Northern Florida that elected a Black voters' candidate of choice; CDs 1-4 all elected white voters' candidates of choice.

36. Contrary to the benchmark map, the enacted 2022 map completely dismantles the only majority-minority district in Northern Florida by cracking the Black population across CDs 2, 3, 4, and 5. As Table A2 in **Appendix A** clearly demonstrates, all five Northern Florida CDs are now majority-white VAP and CVAP districts and elect white candidates of choice.

37. Relative to the benchmark CD5, the Black population is significantly reduced in size. In the adopted CD5, African Americans make up only 12.8% of the total VAP and 12.5% of the total CVAP. Analysis of race and voting further shows that the adopted CD5 is now a majority white district which elected John Rutherford, a white candidate of choice, to Congress in an uncontested 2022 contest. In the adopted CD4, African Americans now make up 31.7% of the total VAP and 30.5% of the total CVAP. This district, which is also now majority white, elected white voters' candidate of choice to Congress, Aaron Bean, who defeated Black voters' preferred candidate, LaShonda Holloway, by a wide margin of 21 percentage points. In CD3, where the Black VAP and CVAP are less than 17%, white voters' preferred candidate Kat Cammack easily defeated Danielle Hawk, who was preferred by minority voters, by about 26 percentage points. Finally, the only African American incumbent in Northern Florida lost to incumbent Neal Dunn in the adopted CD2 comprised of less than 24% Black VAP or CVAP by a wide margin of about 20 percentage points. Dunn was preferred by white voters while Lawson was preferred by Black and other minority voters.

38. In contrast to the enacted congressional districts, maps SC8060 and HC8015 retain most of the pre-existing Black population in benchmark CD5. Tables A3 and A4 in **Appendix A**

show that CD5 in both maps are majority-minority districts with about 44 Black VAP and CVAP, which is comparable to about 46 Black VAP and CVAP in the benchmark CD5, and overall over 50 non-white when Black and other minority voters are combined.

39. As previously noted, HC8019 makes more changes to the benchmark boundaries of CD5 but retains this district as majority-minority VAP jurisdiction. Since CD5 is retained within the city of Jacksonville, rather than also including Tallahassee, the Black VAP and CVAP population is reduced to 35.3 and 35.5, respectively, but this district is still over 50 non-white when Black and other minority voters are combined (*see* Table A5 in **Appendix A**).

40. In Table 4, we report 2020 general election registered voter statistics for the benchmark CDs. According to Florida's redistricting data, African Americans consist of an estimated 17 (473,653) of registered voters across Northern Florida's five CDs. Of this amount, 81.24 (384,808) are registered Democrats, 15 (71,025) have no party or minor party affiliation, and only 3.72 (17,598) are registered Republicans. The highest concentration of Black registrants is found in CD5, accounting for about 46 (227,599) of total registered voters (494,045).

Table 4: Northern Florida 2020 General Election Registered Voter Statistics by CDs (FLCD 2016 Benchmark Boundaries)

| CD | Total Registered | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|-------|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | 598,870 | 66,369 | 17,639 | 50,963 | 4,945 | 3,491 | 6,541 | 11,913 | 6,150 |
| 2 | 509,332 | 48,657 | 16,128 | 40,279 | 5,960 | 1,958 | 5,132 | 6,325 | 4,905 |
| 3 | 534,101 | 74,300 | 35,328 | 59,040 | 14,512 | 3,191 | 8,630 | 12,058 | 12,176 |
| 4 | 637,810 | 56,728 | 31,498 | 42,735 | 11,244 | 2,846 | 9,354 | 11,079 | 10,799 |
| 5 | 494,045 | 227,599 | 23,604 | 191,791 | 10,566 | 6,112 | 4,691 | 29,650 | 8,240 |
| Total | 2,774,158 | 473,653 | 124,197 | 384,808 | 47,227 | 17,598 | 34,348 | 71,025 | 42,270 |

41. In Table 5, we report 2018 general election registration statistics for the benchmark map to illustrate that the Black voter registration patterns detailed above are not unique to the 2020 presidential election year. The 2018 registration statistics show that 209,634 out of 432,034 Black registrants (or 48.5 %) in Northern Florida CDs resided in benchmark CD5, with the overwhelming majority (178,222) registered with the Democratic Party.

Table 5: Northern Florida 2018 General Election Registered Voter Statistics by CDs (FLCD 2016 Benchmark Boundaries)

| CD | Total Registered | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|-------|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | 539,926 | 59,290 | 14,029 | 46,092 | 3,870 | 3,266 | 5,252 | 9,928 | 4,905 |
| 2 | 482,856 | 45,940 | 14,286 | 38,504 | 5,444 | 1,845 | 4,250 | 5,477 | 4,469 |
| 3 | 499,011 | 67,442 | 31,086 | 54,088 | 12,766 | 2,719 | 7,407 | 10,605 | 10,906 |
| 4 | 578,428 | 49,728 | 25,778 | 37,731 | 8,974 | 2,505 | 7,582 | 9,434 | 9,123 |
| 5 | 457,693 | 209,634 | 20,083 | 178,222 | 9,006 | 5,457 | 3,842 | 25,883 | 7,128 |
| Total | 2,557,914 | 432,034 | 105,262 | 354,637 | 40,060 | 15,792 | 28,333 | 61,327 | 36,531 |

42. In Table 6, we detail changes in the 2020 general election Black voter registration between the enacted and the benchmark map. This analysis provides more nuanced evidence of cracking. The adopted map removed an estimated 168,382 (or about 74 %) of Black registrants

from Benchmark CD5, largely adding them to the adopted CD2 and CD4. Of the Black registrants removed from benchmark CD5, 147,240 (or 76.8 %) were Black Democrats and 3,168 Black Republicans. The 2018 general registration differences reported in Table 7 are consistent with the 2020 findings: 156,559 Black registrants were moved out of the benchmark CD5 and distributed to other Northern Florida CDs (primarily CD2 and CD4).

Table 6: 2022 Adopted v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|----------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -27,651 | -1,175 | -413 | -825 | -114 | -173 | -180 | -180 | -135 |
| 2 | 37,948 | 66,699 | 442 | 58,071 | 1,323 | 982 | -840 | 7,729 | 82 |
| 3 | -15,781 | -5,481 | -26 | -1,904 | 1,225 | -725 | -317 | -2,852 | -949 |
| 4 | -91,196 | 103,241 | -5,539 | 87,529 | -1,874 | 3,020 | -2,410 | 12,757 | -1,164 |
| 5 | 45,752 | -168,382 | 8,227 | -147,240 | 1,152 | -3,168 | 4,297 | -17,926 | 2,855 |

Table 7: 2022 Adopted v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|----------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -24,026 | -1,079 | -284 | -801 | -85 | -163 | -118 | -137 | -101 |
| 2 | 41,510 | 63,787 | 1,192 | 55,940 | 1,276 | 949 | -386 | 7,001 | 390 |
| 3 | -16,880 | -4,269 | -463 | -1,133 | 1,172 | -553 | -558 | -2,574 | -1,097 |
| 4 | -79,799 | 93,092 | -4,305 | 79,632 | -1,265 | 2,598 | -1,926 | 10,922 | -1,024 |
| 5 | 31,631 | -156,559 | 6,100 | -138,005 | 412 | -2,891 | 3,421 | -15,609 | 2,343 |

43. In Tables A6-A11 in **Appendix A**, we report 2020 and 2018 registration changes between the SC8060, HC8015, and HC819 maps versus the benchmark FLCD2016 map. Consistent with the VAP and CVAP population changes, maps SC8060 and HC8015 did not meaningfully alter the Black voter registration composition across the Northern Florida CDs.

For instance, both maps reduced Black registrants in CD5 by less than 8,700 registered voters. The HC8019 map reduced the 2020 and 2018 Black registrants more noticeably (by 53,060 and 52,962, respectively) by creating a CD contained within the city of Jacksonville which does not extend to Tallahassee.

44. A detailed look at voter turnout (i.e., those who voted) statistics further confirms that the adopted plan completely dismantled CD5 by significantly cracking Black voters. Table 8 provides 2020 general election turnout statistics for each of the five Northern Florida benchmark districts. As the turnout data shows, an estimated 154,247 out of 326,208 Black voters resided in benchmark CD5 (47.3 %), which is the highest concentration of African Americans who voted in Northern Florida during the 2020 general election. Of the total Black voter turnout across all five CDs, an estimated 278,390 (85.3 %) were registered Democrats, 10,811 (3.3 %) were registered Republicans, and the remainder had minor or no party affiliation. These trends are also present in 2018, as reported in Table 9.

Table 8: Northern Florida 2020 General Election Voter Turnout Statistics by CDs (FLCD 2016 Benchmark Boundaries)

| CD | Total Turnout | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|-------|------------------|---------|----------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 445,898 | 44,569 | 11,648 | 36,353 | 3,370 | 2,093 | 4,782 | 6,123 | 3,497 |
| 2 | 394,967 | 34,797 | 10,824 | 30,175 | 4,027 | 1,170 | 3,906 | 3,330 | 2,788 |
| 3 | 400,582 | 50,423 | 23,262 | 42,199 | 9,885 | 1,973 | 6,376 | 6,239 | 6,983 |
| 4 | 513,077 | 42,172 | 22,906 | 33,360 | 8,484 | 2,027 | 7,460 | 6,690 | 6,851 |
| 5 | 346,487 | 154,247 | 14,852 | 136,303 | 7,044 | 3,548 | 3,376 | 14,292 | 4,326 |
| Total | 2,101,011 | 326,208 | 83,492 | 278,390 | 32,810 | 10,811 | 25,900 | 36,674 | 24,445 |

Table 9: Northern Florida 2018 General Election Voter Turnout Statistics by CDs (FLCD 2016 Benchmark Boundaries)

| CD | Total Turnout | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|-------|------------------|---------|----------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 325,690 | 34,159 | 6,498 | 28,648 | 1,936 | 1,645 | 2,846 | 3,865 | 1,717 |
| 2 | 299,928 | 27,516 | 6,911 | 24,452 | 2,754 | 808 | 2,425 | 2,157 | 1,644 |
| 3 | 310,785 | 39,673 | 15,162 | 33,973 | 6,763 | 1,399 | 4,155 | 4,289 | 4,215 |
| 4 | 386,493 | 32,309 | 14,102 | 26,040 | 5,290 | 1,516 | 4,698 | 4,702 | 3,996 |
| 5 | 276,641 | 128,591 | 9,159 | 115,360 | 4,547 | 2,725 | 2,053 | 10,408 | 2,470 |
| Total | 1,599,537 | 262,248 | 51,832 | 228,473 | 21,290 | 8,093 | 16,177 | 25,421 | 14,042 |

45. In Table 10, we also report changes in the 2020 voter turnout by Northern Florida CDs, directly comparing the adopted map to the benchmark map. Benchmark CD5 experienced a significant reduction in African Americans who voted in the 2020 general election: 112,070 were taken out and distributed to other CDs, primarily CDs 2 and 4. Of these Black voters, 102,971 (or 91.8 %) were registered Democrats, and only 1,503 (or 1.5 %) were registered Republicans.

Table: 10: 2022 Adopted v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|---------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| 1 | -21,111 | -745 | -267 | -569 | -84 | -108 | -137 | -87 | -74 |
| 2 | 18,289 | 45,685 | 538 | 41,426 | 1,138 | 535 | -633 | 3,831 | 103 |
| 3 | -5,239 | -3,436 | 153 | -1,157 | 785 | -586 | -218 | -1,689 | -426 |
| 4 | -110,707 | 67,805 | -6,235 | 60,710 | -2,226 | 1,714 | -2,302 | 5,463 | -1,596 |
| 5 | 82,471 | -112,070 | 7,925 | -102,971 | 1,627 | -1,503 | 3,780 | -7,534 | 2,593 |

46. We find nearly identical results in terms of the percentage reduction in Black voters in benchmark CD5 when examining the 2018 midterm election general voter turnout, as reported in

Table 11. An estimated 95,489 Black voters were removed from benchmark CD5, of which 92.9% were registered Democrats.

Table 11: 2022 Adopted v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -14,862 | -581 | -135 | -468 | -43 | -86 | -71 | -34 | -37 |
| 2 | 23,939 | 40,376 | 993 | 36,961 | 1,023 | 471 | -257 | 3,026 | 296 |
| 3 | -3,583 | -2,238 | -116 | -649 | 485 | -399 | -317 | -1,184 | -297 |
| 4 | -79,747 | 55,451 | -4,175 | 50,501 | -1,466 | 1,285 | -1,436 | 3,713 | -1,168 |
| 5 | 46,629 | -95,489 | 4,727 | -88,704 | 834 | -1,206 | 2,381 | -5,488 | 1,572 |

47. Consistent with the registration statistics, we did not find that maps SC8060 or HC8015 meaningfully reduced benchmark CD5's Black voter turnout statistics in 2020 or 2018 (see Tables A12-A15 in **Appendix A**). For example, HC8015 reduced the number of Black registrants who voted in 2020 by only 5,809, which is significantly lower than the reduction of 112,070 under the adopted map. Under the HC8019 plan, 2020 Black voter turnout is reduced by 34,704, which is a significantly lower reduction in Black voter turnout compared to the adopted map (see Tables A16-A17 in **Appendix A**).

48. Thus far, we have found clear evidence of cracking in CD5 under the enacted map. We provided evidence of cracking with map visuals, VAP and CVAP statistics, and registration and turnout statistics. There is no question that the adopted map completely dismantled benchmark CD5. Next, we evaluate the extent to which the adopted map diminished Black voting strength in CD5 and other Northern Florida districts.

49. Vote "diminishment," sometimes referred to as "retrogression," refers to the elimination of majority-minority districts or the weakening of other historically performing

minority districts “where doing so would actually diminish a minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates.” *In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176*, 83 So.3d 597, 625 (Fla. 2012) (*Apportionment I*). This is assessed by determining “whether the ability to elect exists in the benchmark plan and whether it continues in the proposed plan.” *Id.* We understand that the Florida Supreme Court has also previously held that an evaluation of vote diminishment typically requires “an inquiry into whether a district is likely to perform for minority candidates of choice. This has been termed a ‘functional analysis,’ requiring consideration not only of the minority population in the districts, or even the minority voting-age population in those but of political data and how a minority population group has voted in the past.” *Id.* Courts and scholars sometimes describe this form of analysis as a “performance analysis.”

50. As explained above, the adopted map eliminated the only majority-minority Congressional district in Northern Florida. To examine diminishment, we conducted functional/performance analyses across all the general elections from 2012-2020 that were made available and could have easily been conducted by Governor DeSantis’ office through the state’s redistricting application (<https://web.floridaredistricting.esriemcs.com/redistricting/>).


51. Before reporting the functional/performance analysis results, we first report Black voters’ preferred candidates (“candidates of choice”) across all general elections in the Florida redistricting dataset. Specifically, we conducted racially polarized voting analysis (“RPV”) using the iterative and RxC ecological inference (“EI”) methods. For each election year, we used voter turnout by race and ethnicity for that election year.¹⁹ For instance, when examining

¹⁹ In constructing the percent non-Hispanic white voter variable, we first subtracted the total voter count from the Black and Hispanic voter count, and then divided it by the total voters in each unit of analysis. We made this analytical choice because the redistricting data does not provide a stand-alone white voter turnout category. We believe this strategy has merit and captures white vote choice since less than three percent of eligible voters in Northern Florida do not identify as non-Hispanic white, Black, or Hispanic. Additionally, we compared our results with models using VAP by race and ethnicity for which a standalone non-Hispanic white race category exists in the data and found substantively identical results. This further suggests that our analytical choice is sound and is indeed capturing white voter candidate preferences.


RPV patterns in the 2020 election, we used 2020 voter turnout data, and when examining the 2018 election, we used 2018 voter turnout data. This method accounts for any differences in voter turnout rates across different election years, particularly differences between midterm and presidential election years, and accounts for changes in the overall voter turnout from 2012 to 2020.

52. Figure 6 presents Northern Florida RPV results using the iterative EI method, comparing estimated Black voter and white voter candidate preferences with 95% confidence intervals from 2012 to 2020 election contests. The left side of the Figure lists the name of each contest, the year in which the elections were held, and the associated candidate names. The bars in the plot represent estimated vote percentages and the lines/bands attached to each bar represent 95% confidence intervals (“CIs”) around the point estimates. For ease of interpretation, estimated vote percentages are also provided at the tail ends of the CI bands.

53. The results clearly demonstrate that Northern Florida’s Black voters vote cohesively to support their candidates of choice, while white voters likewise vote as a bloc to disfavor the candidates of choice of Black voters and support their own (different) candidates of choice. For example, in the 2018 election for Governor, an estimated 90.5% of Black voters voted for Andrew Gillum, and only 9.6% voted for Ron DeSantis. In stark contrast, an estimated 69.6% of Northern Florida white voters voted for Ron DeSantis, and only 30.4% voted for the Black-preferred candidate, Andrew Gillum. This pattern of RPV is consistently present in every single election we examined going as far back as 2012.

Figure 6: Northern Florida iterative EI Estimates for Candidates by Race

54. The RxC EI estimates in Figure 7 also demonstrate that Black voters in Northern Florida are highly politically cohesive and have different candidate preferences than white voters. Across all the elections, over 87 of Black voters voted for candidates that a clear majority of white voters did not favor.

Figure 7: Northern Florida RxC EI Estimates for Candidates by Race

55. The RPV analyses demonstrated that Northern Florida Black voters are politically cohesive and revealed their specific candidate preferences across all the election contests. For instance, based on the RPV analyses, we can conclude that Joe Biden, Bill Nelson, and Andrew Gillum were Black voters' preferred candidates or "candidates of choice." Relying on this information we can examine the "Tier 1" considerations from Article III, Section 20(a): "the


extent to which the adopted map denies, abridges, or diminishes Black voters' ability to elect a representative of their choice."

56. To provide evidence of diminishment, we first report function/performance analyses²⁰ results of the benchmark map and then for each of the other maps, particularly the enacted map. This approach effectively demonstrates how alteration to CD boundaries can result in "denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice."

57. Functional/performance analyses results in Figure 8 show that benchmark CD5 consistently performed for Black voters' preferred candidates from election years 2012 to 2020. That is, every single candidate of choice for Black voters received more votes in CD5 than the candidates not preferred by Black voters. For example, according to Florida's redistricting data, Andrew Gillum won 64.9% of the total votes in the 2018 Gubernatorial general election, whereas Ron DeSantis received only 34.2% of the total votes. Outside of CD5, no Black voters' candidate of choice received a plurality or majority of votes in any of the election contests.

²⁰ A functional/performance analysis is a simple, yet effective approach to examining the success (or failure) of different candidates under different map or district boundaries. To conduct such analysis, one does not need to rely on estimation methods. All that is required is to identify the voting tabulated districts that fall inside the electoral jurisdictions of interest and then aggregating the candidate votes in each jurisdiction. The aggregated vote total for each candidate is then divided by the total votes cast in that given election in that jurisdiction to produce vote percentages. For this report, the analysis was performed using Florida's Esri Redistricting Online Application.


Figure 8: Electoral Performance Results of the Benchmark 2016 Northern Florida Congressional District Boundaries



58. Performance analysis of the adopted map reported in Figure 9 provides clear evidence of diminishment. The results show that none of the CDs perform for Black voter's candidates of choice in any election year or contest except for the 2012 Senatorial election. However, in that same presidential election year, President Obama, another Black candidate of choice, lost in

every single CD under the adopted map. Based on the accumulated evidence, we conclude that the adopted map is retrogressive and diminishes to the point of eliminating, Black voting strength in Northern Florida as a result of cracking the Black population.

Figure 9: Electoral Performance Results of the Adopted 2022 Northern Florida Congressional District Boundaries



59. Performance analysis results of the other maps reported in Figures B13-B15 in **Appendix B** show that these alternative plans maintained CD5 as a performing district for Black voters, particularly SC8060 and HC8015. HC8019 would also have performed in the 2018 and 2020 elections.

C. Minority Influence District is Diminished in St. Petersburg-Tampa Region and Orlando Region

60. In the Bay area region of Tampa-St. Petersburg, population growth resulted entirely due to increases in the Black, Hispanic and Asian communities. In Pinellas and Hillsborough counties combined, the overall population increased by 273,130 from 2010 to 2020. However, the white, non-Hispanic population *declined* from 13,082 while the non-white minority population increased by 286,212, as summarized in Table 12. The region is now 44% minority and 56% white, a significant shift from a region that had been 64% white ten years earlier.

Table 12: Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties combined 2010 – 2020 Population Change²¹


| | 2010 | | | 2020 | | Change | | Diff |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|--|-----------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| Total Population | 2,145,739 | | | 2,418,869 | | 273,130 | 12.7% | |
| Hispanic | 379,870 | 17.7% | | 529,820 | 21.9% | 149,950 | 39.5% | 4.2% |
| Non-Hispanic | 1,765,869 | 82.3% | | 1,889,049 | 78.1% | 123,180 | 7.0% | -4.2% |
| White | 1,365,336 | 63.6% | | 1,352,254 | 55.9% | -13,082 | -1.0% | -7.7% |
| Black | 283,174 | 13.2% | | 315,910 | 13.1% | 32,736 | 11.6% | -0.1% |
| American Indian | 5,014 | 0.2% | | 4,759 | 0.2% | -255 | -5.1% | 0.0% |
| Asian | 68,077 | 3.2% | | 103,628 | 4.3% | 35,551 | 52.2% | 1.1% |
| Native Hawaiian / PI | 1,427 | 0.1% | | 1,711 | 0.1% | 284 | 19.9% | 0.0% |
| Other | 4,794 | 0.2% | | 14,490 | 0.6% | 9,696 | 202.3% | 0.4% |
| Two or More Races | 38,047 | 1.8% | | 96,297 | 4.0% | 58,250 | 153.1% | 2.2% |

²¹ 2010 and 2020 Census PL94 Redistricting data.

61. In the benchmark Congressional map, minority voters in Tampa were able to elect candidates of choice in two districts, CD13 and CD14. CD13 was a minority influence district with a 27% minority VAP, and in the 2020 election, elected the minority voters' candidate of choice. CD14 was a 54.8% majority-minority VAP district in 2020 that already performed for minority voters' candidates of choice. The newly enacted map reduces the minority population to 22.8% in CD13, down from 28.2%, resulting in the minority voters' preferred candidate losing in the 2022 election. In particular, the Black population was cracked in St. Petersburg and reduced by almost 5 points.

62. As shown in Figure 10, in the benchmark map boundary shown in black lines, CD13 retained the entire southern portion of the Clearwater-St. Petersburg peninsula intact as a community of interest, including the large Black community in the southern portion of St. Petersburg. This configuration was honored in the map passed by the Florida State Legislature (8019), which kept the CD13 boundaries virtually unchanged from the benchmark as a minority influence district. In contrast, the adopted map boundary shown in red lines, cracks a community of interest in St. Petersburg, notably cracking the Black population, which had formerly been in CD13 and moving it into CD14. This creates a CD14 which is not geographically contiguous nor connected by land, connecting the city of Tampa across the bay to portions of St. Petersburg. The adopted map CD13 replaces the heavily Black population of St. Petersburg it discarded by extending its boundary north to Palm Harbor, which has a population that is 84.2% white and only 1.7% Black according to the 2020 Census.

Figure 10: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map, Tampa-St. Petersburg Region




63. Figure 11 shows a closer look at the cracking of the Black population in St. Petersburg in the enacted map. The enacted map splits the city of St. Petersburg and shifts it into a disconnected district with part of Tampa in CD14 without justification. The map passed by the Florida State Legislature (8019) demonstrated that it was possible to create a compact and contiguous district in Clearwater and St. Petersburg for CD13 and that the obvious cracking of the Black population was not necessary.

64. In addition to the cracking in St. Petersburg, the adopted map cracks the Black and Latino population in North Tampa, which had formerly been entirely contained as a community

of interest within CD14 as depicted by the red line (new boundary) dividing North Tampa in half along Busch Boulevard and shifting that population into CD15. Those Black and Latino residents in North Tampa used to be able to elect minority voters' preferred candidate in CD14 but now are located in CD15, which elects white voters' preferred candidates. This cracking of the minority population in North Tampa was not necessary and only the result of enacted map shifting the St. Petersburg population out of CD13 and into CD14.

Figure 11: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map, Tampa-St. Petersburg Region (zoomed-in)



65. Analysis of voting patterns reported in Figures B16-B17 in **Appendix B** makes clear there is strong and consistent evidence of racially polarized voting in the Tampa-St. Petersburg

region. Focusing on the region in CD12, CD13, CD14, and CD15, we find that Black voters are cohesive and vote consistently in support for their candidates of choice. Likewise, Hispanic voters in this region are cohesively voting in clear majority support for their candidates of choice, which are the same candidates of choice as Black voters. In direct contrast, white voters are also cohesive in bloc voting against minority-preferred candidates.

66. The same population growth trends of rapid minority growth were documented by the 2020 Census in the Central Florida region of the Orlando-Lakeland I-4 corridor. Examining the population change data from 2010 to 2020 for Orange, Osceola, and Polk counties combined reveals a total population growth of 526,877, of which 513,345 (97.4%) was the result of Hispanic, Black, Asian, and other non-white population growth in the region. In 2010, this three-county region's population was 50.8% white, non-Hispanic. By 2020 it dropped by 10 points to 40.8% white non-Hispanic, and currently, it is a clear majority-minority region in Florida (*see* Table 13).

Table 13: Orange, Osceola, and Polk Counties combined 2010 – 2020 Population Change²²

| | 2010 | | | 2020 | | | Change | Diff |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|--|-----------|-------|--|---------|--------|
| Total Population | 2,016,733 | | | 2,543,610 | | | 526,877 | 26.1% |
| Hispanic | 536,922 | 26.6% | | 871,809 | 34.3% | | 334,887 | 62.4% |
| Non-Hispanic | 1,479,812 | 73.4% | | 1,671,801 | 65.7% | | 191,989 | 13.0% |
| White | 1,023,813 | 50.8% | | 1,037,345 | 40.8% | | 13,532 | 1.3% |
| Black | 333,039 | 16.5% | | 399,719 | 15.7% | | 66,680 | 20.0% |
| American Indian | 4,703 | 0.2% | | 4,392 | 0.2% | | -311 | -6.6% |
| Asian | 72,228 | 3.6% | | 101,421 | 4.0% | | 29,193 | 40.4% |
| Native Hawaiian / PI | 1,505 | 0.1% | | 1,654 | 0.1% | | 149 | 9.9% |
| Other | 8,754 | 0.4% | | 23,917 | 0.9% | | 15,163 | 173.2% |
| Two or More Races | 35,770 | 1.8% | | 103,353 | 4.1% | | 67,583 | 188.9% |

²² 2010 and 2020 Census PL94 Redistricting data

67. Despite the entire Florida region from Tampa to Orlando experiencing considerable minority population growth, enough to account for a new and additional Congressional district, the enacted map reduces the number of districts in which minority candidates of choice can be elected. Combined, the region added 800,007 people from 2010 to 2020, with a total net gain of 450 in the white population, and a total net gain of 799,557 in the non-white population. Rather than increasing and adding a district in which minority communities had an opportunity to elect a candidate of choice, the enacted map diluted minority voting strength and resulted in *one fewer* district than the benchmark, when the population growth suggested it should have resulted in *one more* district than the benchmark.

68. In particular, both Black and Hispanic voters saw their communities cracked and diminished their opportunities to elect candidates of choice in and around Orlando. Congressional District 10, which encompassed large Black and Latino communities from Apopka to Ocoee to Orlando, was cracked along State Road 435/Apopka Vineland Road (*see* red, dashed line in Figure 12), and significant Black and Latino voting populations were shifted into Congressional District 11, a majority white district that votes against minority-preferred candidates. Congressional District 9 previously contained large Black and Hispanic populations in the southern portion of the district in Davenport, Haines City, Winter Haven, and Lake Wales, which once voted cohesively in support of minority-preferred candidates. The enacted map split these communities away from CD9 and into CD18 (*see* red, dashed line in Figure 13), a majority-white district where minority-preferred candidates have no chance of winning. Despite large population growth by Blacks and Latinos, these two minority communities in Central Florida were cracked from performing minority districts and find themselves in majority white districts that vote against their candidates of choice.

Figure 12: Congressional District 10 boundaries of 2016 benchmark vs. 2022 adopted map





Figure 13: Congressional District 9 boundaries of 2016 benchmark vs. 2022 adopted map



III. The State of Florida Provides Contradictory and Inconsistent Rationale for its Maps

A. The Adopted Map Relied on Racial Boundaries for Congressional Districts

69. The Governor and the Legislature have repeatedly used race in both State legislative and Congressional maps. First, the Legislature explicitly adhered to the non-diminishment standard of the Fair Districts Amendment in drafting State Legislative districts without any objection from the Governor, and the Secretary of State has implemented those maps after they were approved by the Florida Supreme Court. Second, the Congressional map Governor DeSantis's office submitted, and that the Legislature ultimately adopted as its own, reflects a number of race-based choices not required by the Fair Districts Amendment that can only be explained by a desire to influence – positively or negatively – the ability of different racial groups to elect candidates of their choosing.

70. On January 31, 2022, on the eve of final passage of the State legislative maps, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered the Attorney General to file the legislative apportionment plan, alongside “maps and statistical reports for the existing and new plans, and to specify the software used to create the new plans and the source of the data used in creating the new plans.” *In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 100*, No. SC22-131 (Jan. 31, 2022). The Florida House and Senate passed the state legislative maps on February 3, 2022, and the Attorney General submitted the requested petition the next day. Briefs and data in support of the maps from the House and Senate followed on February 9, 2022, in line with the Supreme Court's order.

71. At the same time that the state legislative maps were undergoing Supreme Court scrutiny, Governor DeSantis submitted a request to the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2022, for an advisory opinion that, notwithstanding the non-diminishment standard of the Fair Districts Amendment, CD5 in the Benchmark Congressional Plan violated the federal constitution

because it was elongated and based on race. He filed no comparable request for an advisory opinion with respect to the state legislative maps and has never suggested that the state legislative maps were unconstitutional because they are based on race and comply with the non-diminishment standard of the Fair Districts Amendment.

72. The submissions to the Supreme Court from the House and Senate with respect to the state legislative maps contained extensive data supporting the Legislature's compliance with the non-diminishment standard, suitable for the Court to rely on in judging the map. Although anyone opposing the map was permitted to challenge it pursuant to the Fair Districts Amendment, Governor DeSantis did not do so. *See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 100*, 334 So. 3d 1282, 1285 & 1289 n.7 (Fla. 2022) (noting that no party appeared to oppose the State Legislative apportionment and that the opinion expressed no view on the Governor's prior request for an advisory opinion).

73. On February 10, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the Governor's request for an advisory opinion on the congressional map because (unlike the submission with respect to the state legislative maps) there was "no record before us setting forth a functional analysis of statistical evidence, such as the voting age of minority populations and election results. A record will assist the judiciary in answering the complex federal and state constitutional issues implicated by the Governor's request." *Advisory Opinion to Governor re: Whether Article III, Section 20(a) of the Florida Constitution Requires the Retention of a District in Northern Florida, Etc.*, 333 So. 3d 1106, 1108 (Fla. 2022).

74. The non-diminishment issues the Governor sought to raise by advisory opinion were front and center in the State legislative apportionment decision. *See In re Senate Joint Resolution*, 334 So. 3d at 1289-90. Moreover, the Legislature filed the data in support of the legislative maps on Feb. 9, 2022 (precisely the data whose omission caused the Supreme Court

to deny the Governor's request for an advisory opinion on the congressional map the very next day). The Governor had ample time to file a challenge to the state-legislative maps if he believed that race-based line-drawing in redistricting, pursuant to the Fair Districts Amendment, violated the federal constitution. He did nothing. In approving the State legislative maps on March 3, 2022, the Florida Supreme Court again reaffirmed that Florida's Constitution prohibited retrogression. *Id.* Had the Governor wanted a judicial examination of the constitutional questions he claims prevented him from approving the Congressional map passed by the Legislature, he had the opportunity to present his case to the Florida Supreme Court at the time and to know the answer before the final maps – both legislative and congressional – were enacted into law.

75. In short, knowing the standards of the Fair District Amendment (as he stated in his request for an advisory opinion on Feb. 1) and having had those standards reaffirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in approving the legislative maps (on March 3), Governor DeSantis vetoed the Congressional maps submitted by the Legislature on March 29, 2022, because in his opinion – ratified by no court – they violated the federal constitution. But as he recognized when he was a congressman (as explained below), his duty to enforce the law did not extend to overriding clear expressions of the law because he disagreed with the law. His use of his personal opinion rather than a court ruling was all the more striking because he had the opportunity to obtain a court ruling when the Supreme Court considered the legislative maps.

76. While a congressman, DeSantis introduced a "Faithful Execution of the Law Act," which would have required the Attorney General to report to Congress about any federal policy not to enforce a law. He explained that federal officers must enforce the law, even when they believe it to be unconstitutional, saying that the U.S. Attorney General should be "required to report to Congress any time the Department of Justice stops enforcement of a law on the grounds that it is unconstitutional. . . . My hope is that this sunlight will prove to be a disinfectant that

will serve to hinder the President from usurping the authority of Congress. The President is not a king.” Testimony of Representative Ron DeSantis, Serial No. 113-63 (House Hearing), “Enforcing the President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws,” (February 26, 2014).²³

77. The Governor is also not a king, yet he ignored what he knew to be the requirements of the Florida constitution in vetoing the congressional maps solely because he said he believed it was unconstitutional. And at the same time, both he and Legislature used inappropriate race-based line-drawing to disadvantage minority voters throughout the congressional map.

78. The state of Florida is picking and choosing different and inconsistent standards when deciding which district boundaries to oppose or support. In South Florida, a Congressional map produced by the Florida legislature and supported by Governor DeSantis relied on the Florida non-retrogression standard to keep non-contiguous Black communities together in West Palm Beach and Fort Lauderdale, and then connected to distant and rural Black communities near Lake Okeechobee, resulting in an oddly shaped CD20 (*see* Figure B4 in **Appendix B**). Likewise, CD26 stretches the entire span of the Florida peninsula from the Gulf of Mexico to the Biscayne Bay, connecting Immokalee to downtown Miami 115 miles away (*see* Figure B5 in **Appendix B**). Map drawers traced explicit racial population boundaries in multiple Cuban-Hispanic districts in South Florida and joined together different Hispanic communities. For example, the majority-Hispanic community in Immokalee voted against the Hispanic Republican congressional candidate by over a 30-point margin, and the majority-Hispanic community in downtown Miami likewise voted against the Hispanic Republican candidate by a 30-point margin. These portions of the district could not have been included to comply with non-retrogression standards due to the different voting patterns of the Cuban-American portion of CD26 in Hialeah. Nearby CD24 shifted boundaries by following census population on Black

²³ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86841/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg86841.pdf>

and Hispanic populations to further increase (pack) the Black population in CD24 while shifting different segments of Hispanic voters into CD26 who are not cohesive with the Hispanic voters in the core part of CD26, taking them out of a district in which they had a clear candidate of choice (in CD24), and moving them in to a district where they voted in contrast to the rest of CD26 (*see* Figure B6 in **Appendix B**). With respect to CD28 (formerly CD26) the adopted map cracks a Black community in West Perrine (*see* Figure B7 in **Appendix B**) that the State Legislative map identifies as a Black community of interest connected to Florida City. In the 2016 benchmark map, and in the adopted 2022 State House map, the Black community is kept whole and was entirely contained in CD26. However, the large Black community in West Perrine is shifted out of CD28 (formerly CD26) and into CD27 (*see* Figure B7 in **Appendix B**), diminishing their opportunity to elect a candidate of choice.

79. The state legislature and Governor DeSantis recognize CD20 as a protected district where Black voters can elect a candidate of choice as laid out by the Voting Rights Act and Florida state law on non-diminishment. Governor DeSantis did not object to CD20 or to the packing of Black voters in CD24, or the obvious racial boundary changes to CD26, CD27, CD28. Yet the state legislature made the exact same argument in favor of protecting CD5 in Northern Florida, but the Governor objected.

80. The office of the Governor of Florida makes a *Gingles* 1 argument in criticizing both congressional maps passed by the State Legislature with respect to CD5, a previously African American performing district.²⁴ While the state legislature cited the same non-retrogression standards in passing two different versions of CD5 that maintained Black voters ability to elect candidates of choice, the office of the Governor argued that it is unconstitutional to propose a district that cannot meet the *Gingles* 1 threshold of 50.1 Black VAP. However, the Governor's

²⁴ In Section 2 VRA cases, in order to decide whether a redistricting plan has the effect of discrimination, Courts utilize the "Gingles" three factor test from the case *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The first factor, *Gingles* 1, requires the minority group in question "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute the majority of a district." *Id.* at 50.

argument is misleading because he did not apply this same *Gingles* 1 standard to multiple other districts that elect Black candidates of choice in maps adopted by the State Legislature. Rather, the Governor accepted, without comment or interference, the application of the non-regression standard of the Fair Districts Amendment in the legislative maps.

81. The most egregious example is the fact that the Governor did not object to the State Senate map in Jacksonville, which relied on the non-retrogression standard to draw Senate District 5 in Duval County, keeping Jacksonville whole on both sides of the river in creating a 41 Black VAP district that performed to elect Black candidates of choice. This map was submitted to the Florida Supreme Court, and any interested parties were allowed to file comments in support or opposition to the State Senate map. The Governor did not oppose the State Senate map, and ultimately the Secretary of State of Florida implemented this map without objection in the 2022 elections. Senate District 5 also creates the appearance of a so-called “donut district” in that Senate District 4 wraps around SD5 (*see* Figure B8 in **Appendix B**). This district was expressly approved by the State Supreme Court as complying with the non-diminishment standard. In contrast, Governor DeSantis rejected the HC8019 because he first claimed it was below 50.1 Black VAP and second, the surrounding donut district was oddly shaped. The State Senate map to which Governor DeSantis did not object to and implemented in the 2022 election, creates essentially the same Black district in Duval County that he rejected at the Congressional level. The Congressional District that was vetoed had a BVAP of 35 , which is greater than other State Legislative districts implementing the non-diminishment standard to which the Governor did not object, and that was approved by the Florida Supreme Court, e.g., SD 16, and HDs 21, 117. Inconsistently, the Governor’s veto message rejected CD5 in HC8019 because it “appears to have diminished the ability of [B]lack voters to elect a candidate of their choice” [veto message] compared with CD5 in HC8015 which he rejected because it more clearly assures Black voters of their ability to elect a candidate of choice and is therefore – in the Governor’s personal opinion – unconstitutional.

82. Likewise, State Senate District 16 was accepted and implemented by the state of Florida for the express purpose of not retrogressing Black voters' ability to elect a candidate of choice. Yet, SD16 has only 33 Black VAP and creates a district that connects non-contiguous Black communities in St. Petersburg and Tampa. In fact, the district is not contiguous or driveable at all as it is separated by Tampa Bay with no bridges (*see* Figure B9 in **Appendix B**). This district does not meet *Gingles I* but was still advanced as a Black voting rights district that was not opposed by Governor DeSantis. Precisely, such districts are lawful in Florida in order to not retrogress minority voting strength and should be maintained.

83. Examining the map enacted for Florida State House reveals similar districts drawn to maintain Black voting strength that fall below the 50.1 *Gingles 1* threshold, and traces racial boundaries to ensure the districts perform for Black candidates of choice. For example, State House District 21 has only 29 Black VAP, splits counties and cities, and follows racial boundaries in Gainesville and Ocala (*see* Figure B10 in **Appendix B**). Governor DeSantis did not object to this district, which was implemented in 2022.

84. State House District 62 was described as a Black non-retrogression district but is only 39 Black VAP and splits cities (*see* Figure B11 in **Appendix B**). Similar to Senate district 16, House District 62 splits St. Petersburg and Tampa to join geographically disconnected Black communities across Tampa Bay from each other and is non-contiguous. Governor DeSantis did not object to this district, which was implemented in 2022.

85. In South Florida, State House District 117 is only 29 Black VAP and connects two non-adjacent Black communities in West Perrine and Florida City in a long and non-compact district that also traces racial boundaries for the purpose of maintaining an existing Black performing district (*see* Figure B12 in **Appendix B**). Governor DeSantis did not object to this district, which was implemented in 2022.

86. It is clear that the Office of the Governor for the state of Florida is inconsistent and hypocritical in its supposed reasoning for vetoing the adopted Congressional maps. The exact same standards that they opposed in the Congressional map were in plain sight on the State Senate and State House maps, which Governor DeSantis did not object to and implemented. Moreover, in South Florida, the Congressional maps use similar race-based line drawing standards to maintain Black and Hispanic congressional districts, yet they were not scrutinized by the Governor, instead he welcomed the use of racial boundaries for Congressional districts.

87. The findings and conclusions in this report are based upon information that has been made available to us or known by us to date. We reserve the right to modify, update or supplement the report and analysis as additional information is made available to us.

88. We declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct according to the best of our knowledge, information, and belief.



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April 3, 2023



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Appendix A

Table A1: FLCD2016 Benchmark Demographic and Political Data Statistics by Congressional Districts

| 2016 Benchmark Districts | Total Pop | Partisan Lean (Composite Score) | | | 2020 Congressional Election | | 2020 Voting Age Population | | | | | | | | 2020 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|------------|-------|------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------|----------|----------|-------|-------|--------|---------|---|-------|----------|----------|-------|-------|--------|---------|
| | | Democrat | Republican | Other | Winner | % Votes | Total VAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific | Total CVAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific |
| 1 | 807881 | 29.6% | 68.1% | 2.3% | (R) Gaetz | 64.6% | 636380 | 72.7% | 27.3% | 6.6% | 13.2% | 4.1% | 3.2% | 0.4% | 599997 | 76.5% | 23.5% | 5.2% | 13.4% | 2.9% | 1.5% | 0.10% |
| 2 | 727856 | 31.8% | 66.7% | 1.6% | (R) Dunn | 97.9% | 588566 | 75.9% | 24.2% | 6.7% | 12.4% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 0.2% | 566961 | 79.4% | 20.6% | 4.9% | 12.9% | 1.5% | 1.1% | 0.08% |
| 3 | 766133 | 41.5% | 56.7% | 1.8% | (R) Cammack | 57.1% | 609560 | 66.9% | 33.1% | 10.3% | 16.1% | 4.7% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 570100 | 71.4% | 28.6% | 8.4% | 16.3% | 2.9% | 0.9% | 0.04% |
| 4 | 871884 | 35.2% | 62.8% | 1.9% | (R) Rutherford | 61.1% | 691279 | 72.7% | 27.3% | 8.8% | 10.4% | 6.0% | 1.9% | 0.3% | 616171 | 78.0% | 22.0% | 7.2% | 9.7% | 4.2% | 0.7% | 0.06% |
| 5 | 748910 | 61.7% | 36.7% | 1.6% | (D) Lawson | 65.1% | 580527 | 40.2% | 59.8% | 9.1% | 46.2% | 3.5% | 1.8% | 0.2% | 547437 | 43.8% | 56.2% | 6.2% | 46.7% | 2.3% | 0.8% | 0.06% |
| 6 | 796254 | 40.5% | 57.6% | 1.9% | (R) Waltz | 60.6% | 658454 | 73.5% | 26.5% | 12.1% | 10.1% | 2.4% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 623290 | 76.9% | 23.1% | 10.9% | 9.8% | 1.6% | 0.7% | 0.06% |
| 7 | 788518 | 51.8% | 45.4% | 2.7% | (D) Murphy | 55.3% | 634763 | 56.1% | 43.9% | 24.7% | 12.2% | 6.4% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 583879 | 61.9% | 38.1% | 22.8% | 10.4% | 4.1% | 0.6% | 0.05% |
| 8 | 783753 | 39.1% | 58.7% | 2.2% | (R) Posey | 61.4% | 645163 | 74.6% | 25.4% | 10.4% | 9.7% | 3.2% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 606244 | 78.9% | 21.1% | 8.9% | 9.1% | 2.2% | 0.7% | 0.07% |
| 9 | 955602 | 52.9% | 45.2% | 1.9% | (D) Soto | 56.0% | 737088 | 40.4% | 59.6% | 41.5% | 14.3% | 4.2% | 2.0% | 0.3% | 619261 | 46.5% | 53.5% | 37.8% | 12.1% | 2.8% | 0.6% | 0.09% |
| 10 | 873804 | 60.9% | 37.3% | 1.8% | (D) Demings | 63.6% | 669945 | 36.0% | 64.0% | 29.0% | 26.7% | 6.5% | 1.7% | 0.3% | 549892 | 41.7% | 58.3% | 25.1% | 27.0% | 5.3% | 0.6% | 0.06% |
| 11 | 820835 | 33.1% | 65.3% | 1.8% | (R) Webster | 66.7% | 694239 | 78.8% | 21.2% | 10.1% | 7.2% | 1.9% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 651828 | 82.4% | 17.6% | 8.8% | 6.6% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 0.03% |
| 12 | 807137 | 40.2% | 57.5% | 2.4% | (R) Bilirakis | 62.9% | 653760 | 76.2% | 23.8% | 12.5% | 5.8% | 3.6% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 608036 | 80.9% | 19.1% | 10.9% | 5.0% | 2.4% | 0.7% | 0.08% |
| 13 | 727465 | 50.7% | 47.0% | 2.4% | (D) Crist | 53.0% | 614181 | 71.8% | 28.2% | 9.8% | 11.9% | 4.5% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 584268 | 76.2% | 23.8% | 7.9% | 11.8% | 3.3% | 0.7% | 0.07% |
| 14 | 787447 | 56.3% | 41.7% | 2.0% | (D) Castor | 60.3% | 626311 | 45.2% | 54.8% | 30.2% | 17.9% | 6.6% | 1.6% | 0.2% | 558264 | 51.2% | 48.8% | 26.5% | 17.5% | 4.0% | 0.6% | 0.07% |
| 15 | 819853 | 43.8% | 54.0% | 2.2% | (R) Franklin | 55.4% | 639081 | 56.8% | 43.3% | 22.7% | 15.4% | 4.0% | 2.2% | 0.2% | 582807 | 63.4% | 36.6% | 18.9% | 14.2% | 2.6% | 0.7% | 0.05% |
| 16 | 884047 | 43.7% | 54.4% | 2.0% | (R) Buchanan | 55.5% | 715022 | 70.2% | 29.8% | 15.9% | 9.3% | 3.0% | 1.7% | 0.2% | 639840 | 77.3% | 22.7% | 11.4% | 8.6% | 2.0% | 0.5% | 0.04% |
| 17 | 779955 | 35.4% | 63.0% | 1.6% | (R) Steube | 64.6% | 650151 | 76.2% | 23.8% | 13.3% | 7.2% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 0.1% | 619836 | 80.1% | 20.0% | 10.9% | 6.8% | 1.3% | 0.7% | 0.07% |
| 18 | 794724 | 45.5% | 53.2% | 1.3% | (R) Mast | 56.3% | 649064 | 67.1% | 32.9% | 15.6% | 13.0% | 2.9% | 1.6% | 0.2% | 593378 | 73.8% | 26.2% | 12.3% | 11.4% | 1.8% | 0.5% | 0.04% |
| 19 | 835012 | 36.6% | 62.0% | 1.3% | (R) Donalds | 61.3% | 700605 | 71.6% | 28.4% | 18.1% | 6.8% | 2.1% | 1.3% | 0.1% | 630885 | 78.4% | 21.6% | 12.9% | 6.5% | 1.7% | 0.4% | 0.02% |
| 20 | 776283 | 79.8% | 19.3% | 0.9% | (D) Hastings | 78.7% | 593894 | 18.0% | 82.0% | 26.8% | 52.4% | 3.7% | 1.2% | 0.2% | 502281 | 22.8% | 77.2% | 20.5% | 53.0% | 2.8% | 0.4% | 0.04% |
| 21 | 788007 | 58.6% | 40.2% | 1.2% | (D) Frankel | 59.0% | 643275 | 57.5% | 42.6% | 22.6% | 15.0% | 3.5% | 1.4% | 0.2% | 547387 | 65.6% | 34.4% | 17.4% | 13.5% | 2.8% | 0.5% | 0.07% |
| 22 | 785756 | 57.4% | 41.5% | 1.2% | (D) Deutch | 58.6% | 645611 | 56.1% | 43.9% | 21.4% | 15.2% | 4.3% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 540907 | 64.9% | 35.1% | 17.9% | 13.7% | 2.9% | 0.4% | 0.04% |
| 23 | 769356 | 60.7% | 38.1% | 1.3% | (D) W. Schultz | 58.2% | 613268 | 39.1% | 60.9% | 39.7% | 15.2% | 5.5% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 517171 | 44.5% | 55.5% | 36.4% | 14.2% | 4.1% | 0.5% | 0.07% |
| 24 | 742542 | 80.7% | 18.4% | 0.8% | (D) Wilson | 75.6% | 587681 | 11.7% | 88.3% | 44.9% | 43.6% | 2.1% | 1.1% | 0.1% | 453993 | 12.9% | 87.1% | 36.4% | 48.9% | 1.3% | 0.3% | 0.07% |
| 25 | 771434 | 40.9% | 57.8% | 1.3% | (R) Diaz-Balart | Uncontested | 623579 | 19.9% | 80.1% | 74.4% | 4.9% | 1.6% | 0.9% | 0.1% | 451478 | 25.6% | 74.4% | 69.3% | 3.7% | 1.0% | 0.2% | 0.01% |
| 26 | 787914 | 51.5% | 47.2% | 1.3% | (R) Gimenez | 51.7% | 623565 | 15.2% | 84.9% | 72.4% | 11.3% | 2.2% | 1.1% | 0.1% | 476268 | 20.3% | 79.7% | 66.3% | 11.2% | 1.8% | 0.2% | 0.02% |
| 27 | 739825 | 53.8% | 45.0% | 1.2% | (R) Salazar | 51.4% | 614220 | 21.4% | 78.6% | 70.4% | 6.0% | 2.7% | 0.9% | 0.1% | 455019 | 24.2% | 75.8% | 68.3% | 5.1% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 0.01% |
| Summary | 797709 | 47.5% | 50.7% | 1.7% | 16 Republicans, 11 Democrats | | 642194 | 54.7% | 45.4% | 25.0% | 15.5% | 3.7% | 1.7% | 0.2% | 566511 | 61.2% | 38.8% | 20.4% | 15.0% | 2.6% | 0.6% | 0.1% |

Table A2: FLCD2022 Adopted Demographic and Political Data Statistics by Congressional Districts

| 2022 Enacted Districts | Total Pop | Partisan Lean (Composite Score) | | | 2022 Congressional Election | | 2020 Voting Age Population | | | | | | | | 2020 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------|----------|----------|-------|-------|--------|---------|---|-------|----------|----------|-------|-------|--------|---------|
| | | Democrat | Republican | Other | Winner | % Votes | Total VAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific | Total CVAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific |
| 1 | 769221 | 30.0% | 67.6% | 2.4% | (R) Gaetz | 67.9% | 605557 | 72.2% | 27.8% | 6.7% | 13.5% | 4.2% | 3.2% | 0.4% | 570531 | 76.0% | 24.0% | 5.3% | 13.7% | 3.0% | 1.4% | 0.10% |
| 2 | 769221 | 43.8% | 54.3% | 1.6% | (R) Dunn | 59.8% | 619356 | 65.5% | 34.5% | 6.4% | 23.1% | 2.8% | 2.3% | 0.2% | 605145 | 68.4% | 31.6% | 4.7% | 23.8% | 1.7% | 1.2% | 0.07% |
| 3 | 769221 | 42.1% | 56.3% | 1.6% | (R) Cammack | 62.5% | 624295 | 67.7% | 32.3% | 10.6% | 15.9% | 3.9% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 581403 | 71.8% | 28.2% | 8.3% | 16.7% | 2.2% | 0.9% | 0.04% |
| 4 | 769221 | 44.0% | 54.3% | 1.7% | (R) Bean | 60.5% | 590934 | 55.3% | 44.7% | 7.8% | 31.7% | 3.6% | 2.2% | 0.3% | 550308 | 59.4% | 40.6% | 6.2% | 30.5% | 2.8% | 0.9% | 0.05% |
| 5 | 769221 | 37.7% | 60.5% | 2.0% | (R) Rutherford | Uncontested | 606741 | 67.5% | 32.5% | 10.9% | 12.8% | 7.0% | 1.8% | 0.3% | 534015 | 73.5% | 26.5% | 8.4% | 12.5% | 4.6% | 0.6% | 0.07% |
| 6 | 769221 | 37.4% | 60.9% | 1.7% | (R) Waltz | 75.3% | 634516 | 74.8% | 25.2% | 9.8% | 11.2% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 595646 | 78.3% | 21.7% | 8.0% | 11.5% | 1.4% | 0.8% | 0.06% |
| 7 | 769221 | 44.8% | 52.6% | 2.5% | (R) Mills | 58.5% | 616306 | 64.6% | 35.4% | 19.0% | 10.5% | 4.7% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 584081 | 69.4% | 30.6% | 17.7% | 9.1% | 3.0% | 0.6% | 0.04% |
| 8 | 769221 | 39.0% | 58.8% | 2.2% | (R) Posey | 64.9% | 633719 | 74.9% | 25.1% | 10.1% | 9.7% | 3.2% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 595913 | 79.2% | 20.8% | 8.7% | 9.0% | 2.2% | 0.7% | 0.08% |
| 9 | 769221 | 58.8% | 39.2% | 2.0% | (D) Soto | 56.0% | 593636 | 32.3% | 67.7% | 50.0% | 13.0% | 5.2% | 1.9% | 0.3% | 477735 | 37.5% | 62.5% | 47.9% | 9.9% | 3.8% | 0.5% | 0.12% |
| 10 | 769221 | 63.9% | 33.9% | 2.2% | (D) Frost | 59.0% | 610303 | 38.5% | 61.5% | 28.6% | 26.0% | 6.1% | 1.8% | 0.3% | 532149 | 44.5% | 55.5% | 25.3% | 24.8% | 4.5% | 0.6% | 0.08% |
| 11 | 769221 | 41.5% | 56.9% | 1.6% | (R) Webster | 63.1% | 618709 | 63.3% | 36.7% | 17.1% | 12.8% | 4.6% | 1.8% | 0.2% | 539036 | 69.3% | 30.8% | 14.5% | 11.8% | 3.6% | 0.7% | 0.02% |
| 12 | 769221 | 35.3% | 62.3% | 2.4% | (R) Bilirakis | 70.4% | 626932 | 78.3% | 21.7% | 11.7% | 5.3% | 2.5% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 583070 | 82.5% | 17.5% | 10.4% | 4.5% | 1.6% | 0.8% | 0.08% |
| 13 | 769221 | 45.2% | 52.5% | 2.4% | (R) Luna | 53.1% | 650487 | 77.2% | 22.8% | 9.6% | 7.1% | 4.1% | 1.8% | 0.2% | 617937 | 81.8% | 18.2% | 7.5% | 6.8% | 3.1% | 0.6% | 0.07% |
| 14 | 769221 | 58.4% | 39.6% | 2.1% | (D) Castor | 56.9% | 620281 | 49.4% | 50.6% | 26.0% | 19.1% | 5.0% | 1.6% | 0.2% | 562338 | 54.8% | 45.2% | 22.1% | 19.1% | 3.2% | 0.6% | 0.07% |
| 15 | 769221 | 46.6% | 51.2% | 2.2% | (R) Lee | 58.5% | 599800 | 54.9% | 45.1% | 22.7% | 15.4% | 6.0% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 547761 | 61.9% | 38.1% | 19.6% | 14.1% | 3.7% | 0.6% | 0.04% |
| 16 | 769221 | 42.7% | 55.2% | 2.1% | (R) Buchanan | 62.1% | 607353 | 64.5% | 35.5% | 18.7% | 12.0% | 3.6% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 545528 | 71.2% | 28.8% | 14.4% | 11.4% | 2.2% | 0.6% | 0.06% |
| 17 | 769221 | 40.8% | 57.8% | 1.7% | (R) Steube | 63.8% | 654821 | 79.1% | 20.9% | 11.5% | 5.6% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 0.1% | 613887 | 83.8% | 16.2% | 8.8% | 5.4% | 1.4% | 0.6% | 0.04% |
| 18 | 769221 | 37.7% | 60.6% | 1.7% | (R) Franklin | 74.7% | 603562 | 59.8% | 40.2% | 23.7% | 13.2% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 0.2% | 555723 | 66.5% | 33.5% | 18.5% | 12.6% | 1.4% | 0.8% | 0.05% |
| 19 | 769221 | 36.1% | 62.5% | 1.4% | (R) Donalds | 68.0% | 650465 | 74.1% | 25.9% | 16.2% | 6.1% | 2.2% | 1.3% | 0.1% | 587637 | 80.7% | 19.3% | 11.5% | 5.7% | 1.7% | 0.4% | 0.02% |
| 20 | 769221 | 77.9% | 21.2% | 1.0% | (D) McCormick | 72.3% | 595408 | 23.5% | 76.5% | 23.0% | 50.1% | 3.4% | 1.2% | 0.2% | 490821 | 27.9% | 72.1% | 18.3% | 50.3% | 2.6% | 0.5% | 0.03% |
| 21 | 769221 | 45.0% | 53.8% | 1.3% | (D) Mast | 63.5% | 629736 | 68.1% | 31.9% | 15.1% | 12.5% | 2.8% | 1.6% | 0.2% | 578128 | 74.7% | 25.3% | 11.9% | 11.1% | 1.8% | 0.5% | 0.04% |
| 22 | 769220 | 58.9% | 39.9% | 1.2% | (D) Frankel | 55.1% | 625981 | 55.3% | 44.7% | 24.7% | 15.9% | 3.4% | 1.5% | 0.2% | 532278 | 63.9% | 36.1% | 18.5% | 14.3% | 2.6% | 0.5% | 0.07% |
| 23 | 769221 | 56.5% | 42.3% | 1.2% | (D) Moskowitz | 51.6% | 632647 | 58.4% | 41.6% | 20.5% | 13.2% | 4.4% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 536316 | 67.0% | 33.0% | 17.5% | 11.7% | 3.2% | 0.4% | 0.04% |
| 24 | 769221 | 79.0% | 20.2% | 0.9% | (D) Wilson | 71.8% | 611792 | 18.2% | 81.8% | 38.5% | 42.2% | 2.2% | 0.9% | 0.1% | 483698 | 18.5% | 81.5% | 32.3% | 47.2% | 1.4% | 0.3% | 0.06% |
| 25 | 769221 | 62.0% | 36.8% | 1.3% | (D) W Schultz | 55.1% | 607264 | 34.4% | 65.7% | 42.3% | 17.5% | 6.0% | 1.3% | 0.2% | 517166 | 40.5% | 59.5% | 37.2% | 16.9% | 4.4% | 0.4% | 0.08% |
| 26 | 769221 | 43.9% | 54.9% | 1.3% | (R) Diaz-Balart | 70.9% | 623498 | 19.7% | 80.3% | 73.2% | 6.9% | 1.5% | 0.9% | 0.1% | 446784 | 24.6% | 75.4% | 68.1% | 6.0% | 1.1% | 0.2% | 0.01% |
| 27 | 769221 | 52.4% | 46.5% | 1.2% | (R) Salazar | 57.3% | 636002 | 16.9% | 83.1% | 74.2% | 7.1% | 2.6% | 0.9% | 0.1% | 467146 | 20.1% | 79.9% | 71.0% | 6.6% | 2.0% | 0.2% | 0.01% |
| 28 | 769221 | 51.0% | 47.6% | 1.4% | (R) Gimenez | 63.7% | 609131 | 15.2% | 84.8% | 73.4% | 10.3% | 2.2% | 1.2% | 0.1% | 464696 | 20.3% | 79.7% | 67.8% | 9.8% | 1.7% | 0.2% | 0.02% |
| Summary | 769219 | 47.5% | 50.7% | 1.7% | 19 Republicans, 9 Democrats | | 619258 | 54.7% | 45.4% | 25.0% | 15.5% | 3.7% | 1.7% | 0.2% | 546317 | 61.2% | 38.8% | 20.4% | 15.0% | 2.6% | 0.6% | 0.1% |

Table A3: SC8060 Plan Demographic and Political Data Statistics by Congressional Districts

| SC8060 Districts | Total Pop | Partisan Lean (Composite Score) | | | Total VAP | 2020 Voting Age Population | | | | | | | 2020 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|------------|-------|-----------|----------------------------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--------|---------|---|--------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--------|---------|
| | | Democrat | Republican | Other | | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific | Total CVAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific |
| 1 | 769221 | 30.0% | 67.6% | 2.4% | 605559 | 72.15% | 27.85% | 6.69% | 13.55% | 4.24% | 3.18% | 0.38% | 570935 | 76.04% | 23.96% | 5.29% | 13.70% | 3.03% | 1.44% | 0.10% |
| 2 | 769221 | 32.3% | 66.1% | 1.5% | 618732 | 75.47% | 24.53% | 6.21% | 13.32% | 2.28% | 2.55% | 0.19% | 599283 | 78.95% | 21.05% | 4.54% | 13.56% | 1.47% | 1.27% | 0.07% |
| 3 | 769221 | 41.6% | 56.6% | 1.8% | 612746 | 66.76% | 33.24% | 10.45% | 16.08% | 4.72% | 2.13% | 0.21% | 571026 | 71.47% | 28.53% | 8.40% | 16.21% | 2.87% | 0.85% | 0.04% |
| 4 | 769221 | 35.3% | 62.7% | 2.0% | 608885 | 71.32% | 28.68% | 9.27% | 10.79% | 6.65% | 1.84% | 0.27% | 534576 | 77.10% | 22.90% | 7.48% | 9.96% | 4.39% | 0.68% | 0.06% |
| 5 | 769221 | 59.3% | 39.2% | 1.5% | 599323 | 42.86% | 57.14% | 9.04% | 43.73% | 3.41% | 1.84% | 0.21% | 562776 | 45.95% | 54.05% | 6.15% | 44.61% | 2.33% | 0.77% | 0.06% |
| 6 | 769221 | 40.3% | 57.8% | 1.9% | 636146 | 74.86% | 25.14% | 11.04% | 9.70% | 2.41% | 1.98% | 0.16% | 608743 | 78.27% | 21.73% | 9.91% | 9.35% | 1.71% | 0.64% | 0.02% |
| 7 | 769221 | 50.9% | 46.4% | 2.7% | 616250 | 55.44% | 44.56% | 25.39% | 12.32% | 6.26% | 1.89% | 0.23% | 566792 | 60.97% | 39.03% | 23.65% | 10.56% | 3.99% | 0.54% | 0.09% |
| 8 | 769221 | 39.1% | 59.7% | 2.3% | 633688 | 74.71% | 25.29% | 10.30% | 9.58% | 3.24% | 2.02% | 0.22% | 596301 | 79.14% | 20.86% | 8.74% | 8.95% | 2.24% | 0.66% | 0.08% |
| 9 | 769221 | 59.3% | 38.7% | 2.1% | 590784 | 31.66% | 68.34% | 50.24% | 12.81% | 5.92% | 1.87% | 0.31% | 476006 | 37.26% | 62.74% | 47.64% | 9.81% | 4.34% | 0.43% | 0.12% |
| 10 | 769221 | 59.9% | 38.2% | 1.9% | 592086 | 40.11% | 59.89% | 23.38% | 28.33% | 6.06% | 1.71% | 0.27% | 501148 | 45.69% | 54.31% | 20.14% | 28.45% | 4.79% | 0.62% | 0.01% |
| 11 | 769221 | 34.0% | 64.4% | 1.7% | 650206 | 76.62% | 23.38% | 10.59% | 8.61% | 2.17% | 1.87% | 0.16% | 597229 | 80.61% | 19.39% | 8.90% | 7.97% | 1.58% | 0.75% | 0.06% |
| 12 | 769221 | 38.0% | 59.7% | 2.4% | 617279 | 74.34% | 25.66% | 14.04% | 6.55% | 3.09% | 2.11% | 0.17% | 572148 | 79.10% | 20.90% | 12.62% | 5.42% | 1.93% | 0.70% | 0.09% |
| 13 | 769221 | 49.6% | 48.1% | 2.4% | 650583 | 74.09% | 25.91% | 9.05% | 10.72% | 4.11% | 1.80% | 0.18% | 620587 | 78.31% | 21.69% | 7.15% | 10.69% | 3.07% | 0.62% | 0.06% |
| 14 | 769220 | 50.4% | 47.5% | 2.1% | 623401 | 55.90% | 44.10% | 26.93% | 11.13% | 5.36% | 1.63% | 0.18% | 567203 | 62.02% | 37.98% | 23.23% | 10.44% | 3.55% | 0.56% | 0.07% |
| 15 | 769221 | 51.9% | 45.9% | 2.2% | 585717 | 46.71% | 53.29% | 24.65% | 21.98% | 6.30% | 2.10% | 0.24% | 523369 | 53.34% | 46.66% | 21.07% | 21.02% | 3.58% | 0.69% | 0.05% |
| 16 | 769221 | 42.9% | 55.3% | 1.9% | 639143 | 74.68% | 25.32% | 13.73% | 7.23% | 2.63% | 1.58% | 0.13% | 581580 | 81.06% | 18.94% | 9.49% | 7.11% | 1.70% | 0.51% | 0.04% |
| 17 | 769221 | 36.9% | 61.6% | 1.5% | 633379 | 71.06% | 28.94% | 16.71% | 9.02% | 1.59% | 1.70% | 0.12% | 598495 | 75.85% | 24.15% | 13.40% | 8.62% | 1.21% | 0.73% | 0.05% |
| 18 | 769221 | 44.7% | 54.0% | 1.3% | 628718 | 68.59% | 31.41% | 14.87% | 12.22% | 2.78% | 1.57% | 0.16% | 577366 | 74.87% | 25.13% | 11.76% | 10.98% | 1.76% | 0.49% | 0.05% |
| 19 | 769221 | 35.1% | 63.5% | 1.4% | 658909 | 76.93% | 23.07% | 15.06% | 4.37% | 2.20% | 1.19% | 0.11% | 593290 | 83.52% | 16.48% | 10.44% | 3.90% | 1.68% | 0.40% | 0.01% |
| 20 | 769221 | 77.6% | 21.5% | 1.0% | 599373 | 24.47% | 75.53% | 22.15% | 50.04% | 3.31% | 1.15% | 0.21% | 496747 | 29.05% | 70.95% | 17.85% | 49.73% | 2.48% | 0.48% | 0.03% |
| 21 | 769221 | 59.3% | 39.5% | 1.2% | 623193 | 54.04% | 45.96% | 25.39% | 16.53% | 3.30% | 1.56% | 0.16% | 526014 | 62.80% | 37.20% | 18.84% | 15.04% | 2.54% | 0.47% | 0.07% |
| 22 | 769221 | 56.3% | 42.5% | 1.2% | 632682 | 58.86% | 41.14% | 20.40% | 12.74% | 4.49% | 1.06% | 0.15% | 538003 | 67.34% | 32.66% | 17.42% | 11.35% | 3.21% | 0.37% | 0.04% |
| 23 | 769221 | 61.7% | 37.0% | 1.3% | 607373 | 34.97% | 65.03% | 42.18% | 16.90% | 6.08% | 1.25% | 0.18% | 516167 | 41.23% | 58.77% | 37.26% | 16.12% | 4.41% | 0.44% | 0.08% |
| 24 | 769221 | 78.8% | 20.3% | 0.9% | 613497 | 18.86% | 81.14% | 38.31% | 41.47% | 2.30% | 0.92% | 0.13% | 484894 | 19.08% | 80.92% | 32.51% | 46.38% | 1.43% | 0.32% | 0.06% |
| 25 | 769221 | 45.6% | 53.2% | 1.2% | 615294 | 15.34% | 84.66% | 76.34% | 8.45% | 1.41% | 0.97% | 0.08% | 441536 | 19.65% | 80.35% | 70.81% | 8.15% | 0.97% | 0.28% | 0.01% |
| 26 | 769221 | 51.0% | 47.6% | 1.4% | 609129 | 15.23% | 84.77% | 73.35% | 10.32% | 2.23% | 1.15% | 0.10% | 464680 | 20.29% | 79.71% | 67.81% | 9.83% | 1.73% | 0.17% | 0.02% |
| 27 | 769221 | 52.4% | 46.5% | 1.2% | 636004 | 16.88% | 83.12% | 74.18% | 7.07% | 2.62% | 0.86% | 0.09% | 467161 | 20.09% | 79.91% | 70.96% | 6.56% | 2.01% | 0.19% | 0.01% |
| 28 | 769221 | 41.7% | 56.4% | 1.9% | 601153 | 58.49% | 41.51% | 23.18% | 14.78% | 2.43% | 2.15% | 0.18% | 542821 | 65.22% | 34.78% | 18.48% | 13.71% | 1.76% | 0.69% | 0.06% |
| Summary | 769219 | 47.5% | 50.7% | 1.7% | 619258 | 54.65% | 45.35% | 24.99% | 15.54% | 3.68% | 1.70% | 0.18% | 546317 | 61.20% | 38.80% | 20.41% | 14.98% | 2.55% | 0.61% | 0.05% |

Table A4: HC8015 Plan Demographic and Political Data Statistics by Congressional Districts

| Partisan Lean (Composite Score) | | | | | 2020 Voting Age Population | | | | | | | | 2020 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------|----------|------------|-------|----------------------------|--------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--------|---------|---|--------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--------|---------|--|--|
| HC8015 Districts | Total Pop | Democrat | Republican | Other | Total VAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific | Total CVAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific | | |
| 1 | 769221 | 30.0% | 67.6% | 2.4% | 605557 | 72.16% | 27.84% | 6.69% | 13.54% | 4.24% | 3.18% | 0.38% | 570531 | 76.01% | 23.99% | 5.31% | 13.72% | 3.04% | 1.44% | 0.10% | | |
| 2 | 769221 | 33.4% | 65.0% | 1.6% | 618534 | 74.06% | 25.94% | 6.32% | 14.53% | 2.43% | 2.53% | 0.19% | 598339 | 77.61% | 22.39% | 4.65% | 14.82% | 1.45% | 1.28% | 0.07% | | |
| 3 | 769221 | 41.6% | 56.6% | 1.8% | 612356 | 66.71% | 33.29% | 10.49% | 16.11% | 4.72% | 2.12% | 0.22% | 571553 | 71.34% | 28.66% | 8.46% | 16.25% | 2.89% | 0.85% | 0.04% | | |
| 4 | 769221 | 35.1% | 63.0% | 1.9% | 607965 | 72.53% | 27.47% | 8.94% | 10.24% | 6.26% | 1.85% | 0.27% | 540918 | 78.06% | 21.94% | 7.32% | 9.29% | 4.27% | 0.67% | 0.07% | | |
| 5 | 769221 | 58.6% | 39.9% | 1.6% | 596074 | 42.54% | 57.46% | 9.24% | 43.48% | 3.76% | 1.86% | 0.22% | 557560 | 46.00% | 54.00% | 6.24% | 44.28% | 2.53% | 0.76% | 0.06% | | |
| 6 | 769221 | 38.8% | 59.3% | 1.9% | 638003 | 75.48% | 24.52% | 9.76% | 10.23% | 2.37% | 2.00% | 0.15% | 601724 | 78.93% | 21.07% | 8.23% | 10.36% | 1.58% | 0.76% | 0.06% | | |
| 7 | 769221 | 46.9% | 50.5% | 2.6% | 618936 | 61.03% | 38.97% | 21.14% | 11.42% | 5.40% | 1.94% | 0.21% | 577417 | 66.76% | 33.24% | 19.73% | 9.42% | 3.32% | 0.51% | 0.04% | | |
| 8 | 769221 | 39.0% | 58.7% | 2.2% | 633917 | 74.95% | 25.05% | 10.00% | 9.69% | 3.17% | 2.01% | 0.21% | 596683 | 79.22% | 20.78% | 8.64% | 9.03% | 2.15% | 0.70% | 0.08% | | |
| 9 | 769221 | 59.1% | 38.8% | 2.1% | 589255 | 31.28% | 68.72% | 50.84% | 13.13% | 5.68% | 1.93% | 0.30% | 487924 | 36.58% | 63.42% | 48.11% | 10.30% | 4.07% | 0.43% | 0.13% | | |
| 10 | 769221 | 60.9% | 37.2% | 1.9% | 598880 | 40.26% | 59.74% | 24.60% | 28.80% | 5.06% | 1.80% | 0.27% | 520723 | 45.71% | 54.29% | 21.25% | 28.07% | 4.03% | 0.70% | 0.02% | | |
| 11 | 769221 | 38.5% | 59.9% | 1.6% | 640420 | 69.14% | 30.86% | 15.88% | 8.35% | 4.22% | 1.67% | 0.19% | 553185 | 75.06% | 24.94% | 13.29% | 7.61% | 3.18% | 0.60% | 0.06% | | |
| 12 | 769221 | 37.7% | 59.9% | 2.4% | 632295 | 80.07% | 19.93% | 10.60% | 4.53% | 2.63% | 2.02% | 0.16% | 589464 | 84.17% | 15.83% | 9.21% | 3.97% | 1.75% | 0.68% | 0.08% | | |
| 13 | 769221 | 50.3% | 47.3% | 2.4% | 649755 | 72.35% | 27.65% | 9.77% | 11.46% | 4.43% | 1.83% | 0.18% | 617828 | 76.61% | 23.39% | 7.88% | 11.44% | 3.26% | 0.65% | 0.07% | | |
| 14 | 769221 | 53.1% | 44.7% | 2.1% | 595724 | 48.56% | 51.44% | 26.06% | 20.26% | 4.84% | 1.99% | 0.22% | 543077 | 54.19% | 45.81% | 22.56% | 19.38% | 2.93% | 0.68% | 0.07% | | |
| 15 | 769221 | 48.2% | 49.6% | 2.2% | 605567 | 52.67% | 47.33% | 26.65% | 13.09% | 6.90% | 1.77% | 0.21% | 542446 | 60.01% | 39.99% | 23.49% | 11.53% | 4.16% | 0.60% | 0.05% | | |
| 16 | 769221 | 41.2% | 56.9% | 1.9% | 599690 | 58.38% | 41.62% | 23.21% | 14.94% | 2.34% | 2.17% | 0.18% | 543657 | 65.25% | 34.75% | 18.10% | 14.15% | 1.71% | 0.65% | 0.06% | | |
| 17 | 769221 | 43.0% | 55.2% | 1.9% | 636680 | 73.79% | 26.21% | 14.29% | 7.55% | 2.66% | 1.60% | 0.13% | 577703 | 80.47% | 19.53% | 9.86% | 7.33% | 1.70% | 0.51% | 0.04% | | |
| 18 | 769221 | 36.1% | 62.3% | 1.5% | 637796 | 73.31% | 26.69% | 15.79% | 7.69% | 1.56% | 1.66% | 0.12% | 603290 | 77.84% | 22.16% | 12.81% | 7.20% | 1.25% | 0.71% | 0.05% | | |
| 19 | 769221 | 35.9% | 62.7% | 1.4% | 655897 | 74.99% | 25.01% | 15.79% | 5.58% | 2.21% | 1.23% | 0.12% | 589781 | 81.70% | 18.30% | 10.83% | 5.32% | 1.66% | 0.42% | 0.01% | | |
| 20 | 769221 | 77.9% | 21.2% | 1.0% | 595408 | 23.54% | 76.46% | 22.98% | 50.11% | 3.37% | 1.19% | 0.21% | 490821 | 27.93% | 72.07% | 18.30% | 50.30% | 2.56% | 0.46% | 0.03% | | |
| 21 | 769221 | 45.0% | 53.8% | 1.3% | 629736 | 68.09% | 31.91% | 15.14% | 12.48% | 2.80% | 1.55% | 0.16% | 578128 | 74.67% | 25.33% | 11.92% | 11.05% | 1.76% | 0.45% | 0.04% | | |
| 22 | 769220 | 58.9% | 39.9% | 1.2% | 625981 | 55.32% | 44.68% | 24.65% | 15.88% | 3.35% | 1.52% | 0.15% | 532278 | 63.87% | 36.13% | 18.47% | 14.30% | 2.56% | 0.47% | 0.07% | | |
| 23 | 769221 | 56.5% | 42.3% | 1.2% | 632647 | 58.41% | 41.59% | 20.51% | 13.17% | 4.43% | 1.06% | 0.15% | 536316 | 66.96% | 33.04% | 17.49% | 11.68% | 3.19% | 0.38% | 0.04% | | |
| 24 | 769221 | 79.0% | 20.2% | 0.9% | 611792 | 18.23% | 81.77% | 38.46% | 42.17% | 2.22% | 0.92% | 0.13% | 483698 | 18.54% | 81.46% | 32.30% | 47.18% | 1.40% | 0.32% | 0.06% | | |
| 25 | 769221 | 62.0% | 36.8% | 1.3% | 607264 | 34.35% | 65.65% | 42.26% | 17.52% | 6.02% | 1.26% | 0.18% | 517166 | 40.50% | 59.50% | 37.23% | 16.94% | 4.38% | 0.43% | 0.08% | | |
| 26 | 769221 | 44.3% | 54.5% | 1.2% | 617970 | 17.34% | 82.66% | 75.41% | 7.11% | 1.50% | 0.97% | 0.08% | 442825 | 21.88% | 78.12% | 70.39% | 6.30% | 0.98% | 0.28% | 0.01% | | |
| 27 | 769221 | 52.4% | 46.5% | 1.2% | 636002 | 16.88% | 83.12% | 74.18% | 7.07% | 2.62% | 0.86% | 0.09% | 467146 | 20.09% | 79.91% | 70.96% | 6.56% | 2.01% | 0.19% | 0.01% | | |
| 28 | 769221 | 51.0% | 47.6% | 1.4% | 609131 | 15.23% | 84.77% | 73.35% | 10.32% | 2.23% | 1.15% | 0.10% | 464696 | 20.29% | 79.71% | 67.81% | 9.83% | 1.73% | 0.17% | 0.02% | | |
| Summary | 769219 | 47.5% | 50.7% | 1.7% | 619258 | 54.65% | 45.35% | 24.99% | 15.54% | 3.68% | 1.70% | 0.18% | 546317 | 61.20% | 38.80% | 20.41% | 14.98% | 2.55% | 0.61% | 0.05% | | |

Table A5: HC8019 Plan Demographic and Political Data Statistics by Congressional Districts

| HC8019 Districts | Total Pop | Partisan Lean (Composite Score) | | | Total VAP | 2020 Voting Age Population | | | | | | | 2020 (ACS 5-Year) Citizen Voting Age Population Estimates | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|------------|-------|-----------|----------------------------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--------|---------|---|--------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--------|---------|
| | | Democrat | Republican | Other | | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific | Total CVAP | White | Minority | Hispanic | Black | Asian | Native | Pacific |
| 1 | 769221 | 30.0% | 67.6% | 2.4% | 605557 | 72.16% | 27.84% | 6.69% | 13.54% | 4.24% | 3.18% | 0.38% | 570531 | 76.01% | 23.99% | 5.31% | 13.72% | 3.04% | 1.44% | 0.10% |
| 2 | 769221 | 43.8% | 54.9% | 1.6% | 619356 | 65.48% | 34.52% | 6.42% | 23.09% | 2.78% | 2.34% | 0.18% | 605145 | 68.43% | 31.57% | 4.66% | 23.82% | 1.68% | 1.18% | 0.07% |
| 3 | 769221 | 41.4% | 57.0% | 1.6% | 623606 | 68.61% | 31.39% | 9.97% | 15.61% | 3.88% | 1.95% | 0.16% | 581272 | 72.70% | 27.30% | 7.65% | 16.50% | 2.19% | 0.86% | 0.04% |
| 4 | 769221 | 31.1% | 67.0% | 1.9% | 599181 | 75.97% | 24.03% | 7.96% | 8.91% | 4.92% | 2.05% | 0.27% | 553913 | 80.47% | 19.53% | 6.88% | 8.35% | 3.26% | 0.72% | 0.05% |
| 5 | 769221 | 52.9% | 45.3% | 1.8% | 598494 | 46.99% | 53.01% | 10.75% | 35.32% | 5.75% | 1.93% | 0.27% | 530410 | 51.60% | 48.40% | 7.74% | 35.46% | 4.13% | 0.75% | 0.08% |
| 6 | 769221 | 38.3% | 59.9% | 1.8% | 634932 | 75.00% | 25.00% | 9.69% | 10.89% | 2.20% | 2.08% | 0.16% | 598551 | 78.48% | 21.52% | 8.05% | 11.07% | 1.49% | 0.78% | 0.06% |
| 7 | 769221 | 46.9% | 50.5% | 2.6% | 618936 | 61.03% | 38.97% | 21.14% | 11.42% | 5.40% | 1.94% | 0.21% | 577417 | 66.76% | 33.24% | 19.73% | 9.42% | 3.32% | 0.51% | 0.04% |
| 8 | 769221 | 39.0% | 58.7% | 2.2% | 633917 | 74.95% | 25.05% | 10.00% | 9.69% | 3.17% | 2.01% | 0.21% | 596683 | 79.22% | 20.78% | 8.64% | 9.03% | 2.15% | 0.70% | 0.08% |
| 9 | 769221 | 59.1% | 38.8% | 2.1% | 589255 | 31.28% | 68.72% | 50.84% | 13.13% | 5.68% | 1.93% | 0.30% | 487924 | 36.58% | 63.42% | 48.11% | 10.30% | 4.07% | 0.43% | 0.13% |
| 10 | 769221 | 60.9% | 37.2% | 1.9% | 598880 | 40.26% | 59.74% | 24.60% | 28.80% | 5.06% | 1.80% | 0.27% | 520723 | 45.71% | 54.29% | 21.25% | 28.07% | 4.03% | 0.70% | 0.02% |
| 11 | 769221 | 38.4% | 60.0% | 1.7% | 637783 | 68.90% | 31.10% | 15.87% | 8.53% | 4.29% | 1.69% | 0.20% | 553987 | 74.94% | 25.06% | 13.29% | 7.67% | 3.19% | 0.64% | 0.05% |
| 12 | 769221 | 37.7% | 58.8% | 2.4% | 632295 | 80.07% | 19.93% | 10.60% | 4.53% | 2.63% | 2.02% | 0.16% | 589464 | 84.17% | 15.83% | 9.21% | 3.97% | 1.75% | 0.68% | 0.08% |
| 13 | 769221 | 50.3% | 47.3% | 2.4% | 649755 | 72.35% | 27.65% | 9.77% | 11.46% | 4.43% | 1.83% | 0.18% | 617828 | 76.61% | 23.39% | 7.88% | 11.44% | 3.26% | 0.65% | 0.07% |
| 14 | 769221 | 53.1% | 44.7% | 2.1% | 595724 | 48.56% | 51.44% | 26.06% | 20.26% | 4.84% | 1.99% | 0.22% | 543077 | 54.19% | 45.81% | 22.56% | 19.38% | 2.93% | 0.68% | 0.07% |
| 15 | 769221 | 48.2% | 49.6% | 2.2% | 605567 | 52.67% | 47.33% | 26.65% | 13.09% | 6.90% | 1.77% | 0.21% | 542446 | 60.01% | 39.99% | 23.49% | 11.53% | 4.16% | 0.60% | 0.05% |
| 16 | 769221 | 41.2% | 56.5% | 1.9% | 599690 | 58.38% | 41.62% | 23.21% | 14.94% | 2.34% | 2.17% | 0.18% | 543657 | 65.25% | 34.75% | 18.10% | 14.15% | 1.71% | 0.65% | 0.06% |
| 17 | 769221 | 43.0% | 55.2% | 1.9% | 636680 | 73.79% | 26.21% | 14.29% | 7.55% | 2.66% | 1.60% | 0.13% | 577703 | 80.47% | 19.53% | 9.86% | 7.33% | 1.70% | 0.51% | 0.04% |
| 18 | 769221 | 36.1% | 62.3% | 1.5% | 637796 | 73.31% | 26.69% | 15.79% | 7.69% | 1.56% | 1.66% | 0.12% | 603290 | 77.84% | 22.16% | 12.81% | 7.20% | 1.25% | 0.71% | 0.05% |
| 19 | 769221 | 35.9% | 62.7% | 1.4% | 655897 | 74.99% | 25.01% | 15.79% | 5.58% | 2.21% | 1.23% | 0.12% | 589781 | 81.70% | 18.30% | 10.83% | 5.32% | 1.66% | 0.42% | 0.01% |
| 20 | 769221 | 77.9% | 21.2% | 1.0% | 595408 | 23.54% | 76.46% | 22.98% | 50.11% | 3.37% | 1.19% | 0.21% | 490821 | 27.93% | 72.07% | 18.30% | 50.30% | 2.56% | 0.46% | 0.03% |
| 21 | 769221 | 45.0% | 53.8% | 1.3% | 629736 | 68.09% | 31.91% | 15.14% | 12.48% | 2.80% | 1.55% | 0.16% | 578128 | 74.67% | 25.33% | 11.92% | 11.05% | 1.76% | 0.45% | 0.04% |
| 22 | 769220 | 58.9% | 39.9% | 1.2% | 625981 | 55.32% | 44.68% | 24.65% | 15.88% | 3.35% | 1.52% | 0.15% | 532278 | 63.87% | 36.13% | 18.47% | 14.30% | 2.56% | 0.47% | 0.07% |
| 23 | 769221 | 56.5% | 42.3% | 1.2% | 632647 | 58.41% | 41.59% | 20.51% | 13.17% | 4.43% | 1.06% | 0.15% | 536316 | 66.96% | 33.04% | 17.49% | 11.68% | 3.19% | 0.38% | 0.04% |
| 24 | 769221 | 79.0% | 20.2% | 0.9% | 611792 | 18.23% | 81.77% | 38.46% | 42.17% | 2.22% | 0.92% | 0.13% | 483698 | 18.54% | 81.46% | 32.30% | 47.18% | 1.40% | 0.32% | 0.06% |
| 25 | 769221 | 62.0% | 36.8% | 1.3% | 607264 | 34.35% | 65.65% | 42.26% | 17.52% | 6.02% | 1.26% | 0.18% | 517166 | 40.50% | 59.50% | 37.23% | 16.94% | 4.38% | 0.43% | 0.08% |
| 26 | 769221 | 44.3% | 54.5% | 1.2% | 617970 | 17.34% | 82.66% | 75.41% | 7.11% | 1.50% | 0.97% | 0.08% | 442825 | 21.88% | 78.12% | 70.39% | 6.30% | 0.98% | 0.28% | 0.01% |
| 27 | 769221 | 52.4% | 46.5% | 1.2% | 636002 | 16.88% | 83.12% | 74.18% | 7.07% | 2.62% | 0.86% | 0.09% | 467146 | 20.09% | 79.91% | 70.96% | 6.56% | 2.01% | 0.19% | 0.01% |
| 28 | 769221 | 51.0% | 47.6% | 1.4% | 609131 | 15.23% | 84.77% | 73.35% | 10.32% | 2.23% | 1.15% | 0.10% | 464696 | 20.29% | 79.71% | 67.81% | 9.83% | 1.73% | 0.17% | 0.02% |
| Summary | 769219 | 47.53% | 50.7% | 1.7% | 619258 | 54.65% | 45.35% | 24.99% | 15.54% | 3.68% | 1.70% | 0.18% | 546317 | 61.20% | 38.80% | 20.41% | 14.98% | 2.55% | 0.61% | 0.05% |

Table A6: SC8060 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -27,681 | -1,159 | -417 | -822 | -110 | -170 | -180 | -172 | -131 |
| 2 | 35,017 | 9,836 | -1,089 | 8,566 | -490 | 316 | -258 | 1,005 | -264 |
| 3 | 1,092 | 250 | 443 | 231 | 192 | 4 | 90 | 12 | 171 |
| 4 | -80,075 | -5,511 | -2,349 | -4,441 | -848 | -283 | -813 | -764 | -682 |
| 5 | 12,411 | -7,146 | 846 | -6,382 | 328 | -45 | 454 | -691 | 121 |

Table A7: SC8060 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -24,005 | -1,076 | -278 | -782 | -80 | -162 | -115 | -132 | -93 |
| 2 | 27,636 | 8,731 | -1,552 | 7,784 | -676 | 281 | -369 | 737 | -440 |
| 3 | 983 | 262 | 333 | 222 | 165 | 10 | 54 | 29 | 110 |
| 4 | -72,626 | -4,490 | -1,796 | -3,686 | -610 | -221 | -604 | -584 | -549 |
| 5 | 13,946 | -6,877 | 1,187 | -6,280 | 467 | -17 | 496 | -554 | 283 |

Table A8: HC8015 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -27,651 | -1,175 | -413 | -825 | -114 | -173 | -180 | -180 | -135 |
| 2 | 25,406 | 14,350 | -1,158 | 12,307 | -404 | 403 | -371 | 1,703 | -296 |
| 3 | 951 | 279 | 519 | 261 | 227 | 4 | 114 | 17 | 186 |
| 4 | -73,400 | -7,543 | -2,792 | -5,952 | -1,043 | -320 | -801 | -1,236 | -910 |
| 5 | 12,804 | -8,511 | 743 | -7,785 | 133 | -27 | 381 | -699 | 288 |

Table A9: HC8015 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -24,026 | -1,079 | -284 | -801 | -85 | -163 | -118 | -137 | -101 |
| 2 | 22,808 | 13,422 | -949 | 11,670 | -383 | 367 | -302 | 1,468 | -206 |
| 3 | 1,247 | 304 | 417 | 272 | 198 | 12 | 81 | 37 | 135 |
| 4 | -67,318 | -6,255 | -2,215 | -5,004 | -813 | -276 | -604 | -970 | -780 |
| 5 | 11,040 | -8,697 | 485 | -7,996 | 37 | -15 | 299 | -679 | 198 |

Table A10: HC8019 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -27,651 | -1,175 | -413 | -825 | -114 | -173 | -180 | -180 | -135 |
| 2 | 37,948 | 66,699 | 442 | 58,071 | 1,323 | 982 | -840 | 7,729 | 82 |
| 3 | -16,728 | -6,954 | -3,722 | -3,092 | -795 | -779 | -940 | -3,090 | -1,998 |
| 4 | -52,788 | -12,080 | -3,141 | -10,321 | -1,939 | 43 | -233 | -1,748 | -905 |
| 5 | 7,351 | -53,060 | 5,832 | -49,392 | 1,219 | -199 | 2,118 | -3,425 | 2,600 |

Table A11: HC8019 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Registration Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -24,026 | -1,079 | -284 | -801 | -85 | -163 | -118 | -137 | -101 |
| 2 | 41,510 | 63,787 | 1,192 | 55,940 | 1,276 | 949 | -386 | 7,001 | 390 |
| 3 | -17,190 | -5,577 | -3,519 | -2,176 | -654 | -612 | -1,027 | -2,785 | -1,868 |
| 4 | -45,486 | -10,500 | -2,248 | -8,982 | -1,480 | -109 | -80 | -1,367 | -620 |
| 5 | -2,684 | -52,962 | 4,044 | -49,394 | 628 | -189 | 1,574 | -3,326 | 1,939 |

Table A12: SC8060 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -21,146 | -740 | -267 | -565 | -80 | -105 | -135 | -84 | -70 |
| 2 | 27,712 | 7,360 | -694 | 6,596 | -328 | 213 | -184 | 604 | -166 |
| 3 | 792 | 204 | 210 | 192 | 94 | 3 | 48 | 13 | 62 |
| 4 | -65,150 | -4,302 | -1,861 | -3,603 | -679 | -199 | -681 | -489 | -456 |
| 5 | 9,669 | -5,092 | 738 | -4,697 | 261 | -24 | 379 | -329 | 129 |

Table A13: SC8060 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -14,841 | -580 | -127 | -470 | -38 | -83 | -66 | -32 | -32 |
| 2 | 19,604 | 6,085 | -728 | 5,607 | -394 | 161 | -151 | 355 | -179 |
| 3 | 646 | 177 | 89 | 154 | 32 | 7 | 22 | 14 | 26 |
| 4 | -49,835 | -3,153 | -1,115 | -2,745 | -430 | -114 | -395 | -301 | -279 |
| 5 | 7,898 | -4,606 | 790 | -4,328 | 367 | 3 | 293 | -205 | 182 |

Table A14: HC8015 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -21,111 | -745 | -267 | -569 | -84 | -108 | -137 | -87 | -74 |
| 2 | 15,749 | 10,133 | -661 | 9,050 | -189 | 244 | -268 | 904 | -183 |
| 3 | 820 | 240 | 276 | 219 | 127 | 9 | 74 | 21 | 75 |
| 4 | -57,288 | -5,627 | -1,983 | -4,669 | -770 | -222 | -648 | -710 | -519 |
| 5 | 11,178 | -5,809 | 553 | -5,494 | 92 | 22 | 313 | -274 | 196 |

Table A15: HC8015 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -14,862 | -581 | -135 | -468 | -43 | -86 | -71 | -34 | -37 |
| 2 | 11,583 | 8,686 | -318 | 7,924 | -81 | 185 | -150 | 627 | -46 |
| 3 | 1,078 | 208 | 124 | 177 | 46 | 11 | 44 | 25 | 42 |
| 4 | -44,276 | -4,184 | -1,193 | -3,548 | -478 | -160 | -389 | -463 | -292 |
| 5 | 7,572 | -5,505 | 235 | -5,261 | 31 | 37 | 199 | -216 | 62 |

Table A16: HC8019 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2020 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -21,111 | -745 | -267 | -569 | -84 | -108 | -137 | -87 | -74 |
| 2 | 18,289 | 45,685 | 538 | 41,426 | 1,138 | 535 | -633 | 3,831 | 103 |
| 3 | -5,490 | -4,640 | -2,119 | -2,188 | -483 | -634 | -642 | -1,835 | -1,008 |
| 4 | -42,818 | -9,557 | -2,536 | -8,507 | -1,604 | 64 | -212 | -1,066 | -638 |
| 5 | 14,578 | -34,704 | 4,217 | -33,753 | 1,000 | 141 | 1,691 | -1,006 | 1,629 |

Table A17: HC8019 v. 2016 Benchmark Map 2018 General Election Turnout Differences by Northern Florida CDs

| CD | Total Difference | Black | Hispanic | Black Democrats | Hispanic Democrats | Black Republicans | Hispanic Republicans | Black NPA | Hispanic NPA |
|----|------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1 | -14,862 | -581 | -135 | -468 | -43 | -86 | -71 | -34 | -37 |
| 2 | 23,939 | 40,376 | 993 | 36,961 | 1,023 | 471 | -257 | 3,026 | 296 |
| 3 | -3,531 | -3,158 | -1,426 | -1,443 | -315 | -440 | -555 | -1,287 | -568 |
| 4 | -34,002 | -7,638 | -1,616 | -6,715 | -1,042 | -60 | -83 | -829 | -400 |
| 5 | 882 | -32,397 | 2,164 | -31,487 | 409 | 136 | 1,030 | -952 | 811 |

Appendix B

Figure B1: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus SC8060 map, Northern Florida




Figure B2: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus HC8015 map, Northern Florida




Figure B3: Congressional District boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus HC8019 map, Northern Florida




Figure B4: Congressional District 20 boundaries of the 2022 adopted map




Figure B5: Congressional District 26 boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map




Figure B6: Congressional District 24 boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map




Figure B7: Congressional Districts 27 and 28 boundaries of the 2016 benchmark versus 2022 adopted map




Figure B8: State Senate District 5 boundaries of the 2022 adopted map




Figure B9: State Senate District 16 boundaries of the 2022 adopted map




Figure B10: State House District 21 boundaries of the 2022 adopted map




Figure B11: State House District 62 boundaries of the 2022 adopted map





Figure B12: State House District 117 boundaries of the 2022 adopted map



**Figure B13: Electoral Performance Results of the SC8060 Map, Northern Florida
Congressional District Boundaries**





Figure B14: Electoral Performance Results of the HC8015 Map, Northern Florida Congressional District Boundaries



**Figure B15: Electoral Performance Results of the HC8019 Map, Northern Florida
Congressional District Boundaries**





Figure B16: Tampa-St. Petersburg Region Iterative EI Estimates for Candidates by Race

Figure B17: Tampa-St. Petersburg Region RxC Estimates for Candidates by Race