

# **EXHIBIT C**

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION**

DAN MCCONCHIE, in his official capacity as Minority Leader of the Illinois Senate and individually as a registered voter, JIM DURKIN, in his official capacity as Minority Leader of the Illinois House of Representatives and individually as a registered voter, JAMES RIVERA, ANNA DE LA TORRE, DOLORES DIAZ, FELIPE LUNA JR., SALVADOR TREMILLO, CHRISTOPHER ROMERO, the REPUBLICAN CAUCUS OF THE ILLINOIS SENATE, the REPUBLICAN CAUCUS OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, and the ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN PARTY,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

IAN K. LINNABARY, CASANDRA B. WATSON, WILLIAM J. CADIGAN, LAURA K. DONAHUE, CATHERINE S. MCCRORY, WILLIAM M. MCGUFFAGE, and RICK S. TERVEN, SR., in their official capacities as members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, EMANUEL CHRISTOPHER WELCH, in his official capacity as Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, the OFFICE OF SPEAKER OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DON HARMON, in his official capacity as President of the Illinois Senate, and the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE ILLINOIS SENATE,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-03091

Circuit Judge Michael B. Brennan  
Chief District Judge Jon E. DeGuilio  
District Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.

Three-Judge Court  
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)

**EXPERT REPORT OF ANTHONY FOWLER**

**A. Introduction**

1. I am submitting this expert report regarding the extent of racially polarized voting in Illinois, the extent to which minority groups in Illinois have been able to choose candidates who will respond to their needs, and how district demographics relate to the chances that a minority

legislator will represent a district. As discussed fully below, I conclude that (1) there is significant racially polarized voting in Illinois; (2) voters in minority districts have little opportunity to elect their preferred officials or incentivize their officials to work hard on their behalf; and (3) Latino legislators are unlikely to emerge in districts that are not predominantly Latino. I have based these opinions on the information I know now and reserve the right to supplement this report or revise my opinions if new or additional information becomes available. I have been compensated a \$500.00 hourly rate for my work; my compensation doesn't depend on the nature of my opinions or the outcome of underlying lawsuit.

## **B. Education and Professional History**

2. I am a professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, a faculty associate of the Department of Political Science and a founding member of the Committee on Quantitative Methods in Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences at the University of Chicago. I have a bachelor's degree in biology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2009) and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University (2013).

3. My research applies econometric methods for causal inference to questions in political science, with particular emphasis on elections and political representation. Some specific interests include the causes and consequences of unequal voter turnout, explanations for incumbent success in elections, the politics of policymaking in legislatures, the health of democracy, and the credibility of empirical research.

4. I have published 28 peer-reviewed articles in academic journals including the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *Political Science Research and Methods*, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *Election Law Journal*, and *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*. I have also written for Bloomberg, The Washington Post, and Boston Review, and co-authored an amicus brief for *Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett*, a U.S. Supreme Court case on campaign finance.

5. At the University of Chicago, I have taught courses for undergraduate, professional, and doctoral students on elections, campaigns, public opinion, political economy, and quantitative methods. I have co-authored a textbook entitled *Thinking Clearly with Data: A Guide to Quantitative Reasoning and Analysis*, which is published by Princeton University Press.

## **C. The Extent of Racially Polarized Voting in Illinois is Significant**

6. To what extent do racial groups vote differently in Illinois? Political and legal scholars often attempt to answer this question by analyzing precinct-level election data and comparing precincts with different racial compositions. This kind of analysis often requires strong assumptions. For example, if the white voters living in predominantly minority precincts are different from the white voters living in predominantly white precincts, the standard ecological

regression will produce biased estimates of the share of white and minority voters who supported each candidate in an election.<sup>1</sup>

7. Therefore, to better assess racially polarized voting in Illinois and as cross-check on other assessment methods, I analyze surveys in which individual voters reported their vote choices in a recent election.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, I utilize data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES, formerly the Cooperative Congressional Election Study). The CES surveyed tens of thousands of voting-eligible Americans each year between 2006 and 2020. It utilized a panel of respondents recruited by YouGov that, after re-weighting, was intended to be nationally representative. These data have been utilized in numerous academic studies and are generally viewed to be reliable and high quality. All subsequent analyses of these data in this report utilize the survey weights provided by YouGov and the CES.

8. The CES asks respondents how they voted in recent U.S. presidential, U.S. senatorial, or gubernatorial elections, and it also asks respondents to self-identify their race and ethnicity. Limiting my analyses to respondents who reside in Illinois and self-identify as white, Black, Latino, or Asian, I have data from between 1,135 and 2,546 respondents in each even year between 2006 and 2020.

9. Table 1 shows how different racial and ethnic groups voted in these high-salience statewide elections. Specifically, for each election and racial group, the table reports the proportion of respondents who supported the Democratic candidate. Those who report abstaining or voting for a third-party candidate are excluded, so the table indicates how many people voted for the Democrat among those who voted for either the Democratic or Republican candidates. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, reflecting the sampling uncertainty associated with each estimate. As expected, the standard errors are smallest for white voters (approximately three-fourths of the sample), slightly larger for Black voters (approximately 15 percent), and larger still for Latino voters (approximately 7 percent) and Asian voters (approximately 2 percent). Table 1 also reports, for each election, the difference in the voting behavior of Black and white voters, Latino and white voters, and Asian and white voters, along with the corresponding standard error associated with each difference.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Greiner, D. James. 2007. Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, and Where Do We Want to Be? *Jurimetrics* 47(2):115-167 for a discussion of these challenges. Several different methods are commonly used to infer individual voting behavior from aggregate election returns. If analysts want to do more than simply bound the extent of racially polarized voting, strong assumptions are necessary. By directly analyzing individual-level data, I am able to assess racially polarized voting without having to make any kind of ecological inference.

<sup>2</sup> Other scholars have utilized survey data to assess racially polarized voting. For example, see Elmendorf, Christopher S., Kevin M. Quinn, and Marisa A. Abrajano. 2016. Racially Polarized Voting. *University of Chicago Law Review* 83:587-692., which discusses the benefits of this approach relative to alternative approaches that rely on aggregate data.

10. The results in Table 1 show that there is significant racially polarized voting in Illinois. The majority of Black and Latino voters preferred the Democratic candidate in every election analyzed, the majority of Asian voters preferred the Democratic candidate in 10 out of 13 elections, and the majority of white voters preferred the Democratic candidate in only 7 out of 13 elections. Averaging across the 13 elections and putting equal weight on each election, the rate of Democratic support is 48.5 percent among white voters, 58.9 percent among Asian voters, 74.1 percent among Latino voters, and 95.4 percent among Black voters.

11. Social scientists typically report that an observed difference is statistically significant if the p-value is less than .05, which means that if the true difference were zero, the chances of obtaining a result as extreme as the one we observed is less than 5 percent. The observed differences between Black and white voters are highly statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) in every election examined. The observed differences between Latino and white voters are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ) in 11 out of 13 elections examined. And the observed differences between Asian and white voters are statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ) in 3 out of 13 cases.

12. To better utilize the available data and summarize the differences in voting behavior between racial groups, I pool data from each of these elections in a single regression. Each observation is a voter by election. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the voter supported the Democratic candidate (as opposed to the Republican) in that election. The independent variables of interest are indicators for Black, Latino, and Asian respondents. I also include election fixed effects to account for the fact that rates of support differed across elections, and as before, I utilize survey weights in the analysis.

13. The results of this analysis are in Table 2. The first column shows results for the entire state of Illinois, and the coefficients indicate that, on average, Black voters are 47.3 percentage points more likely to vote for a Democrat relative to a white voter in the state, Latino voters are 25.4 percentage points more likely to vote for a Democrat than a white voter, and Asian voters are 13.1 percentage points more likely to vote for a Democrat. All of these differences are substantively meaningfully and highly statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ).

14. The remaining columns of Table 2 show the same analyses but for particular regions of interest. The CES provides a zip code and a county of residence for each respondent. I match respondents to the cities of Chicago and Aurora using zip codes, and I match respondents to Metro East according to their county of residence. Following the Wikipedia entry for the region,<sup>3</sup> I classify Bond, Calhoun, Clinton, Jersey, Macoupin, Madison, Monroe, and St. Clair counties as Metro East.

15. Even focusing within these particular regions, there remain large gaps in the voting behavior of different racial groups. In Chicago, the gaps between groups are smaller than they are statewide, largely because white voters in Chicago are more Democratic than white voters elsewhere in Illinois. But in Aurora and Metro East, the differences in voting behavior between

---

<sup>3</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metro\\_East#List\\_of\\_counties](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metro_East#List_of_counties)

minority and white voters are even larger than the statewide differences. For example, in Aurora and Metro East, respectively, Black voters are 58.9 and 53.2 percentage points more Democratic than white voters, and Latino voters are 43.2 and 34.2 percentage points more Democratic than white voters.

16. The bottom row of Table 2 shows the average voting behavior of white voters in these places. Aside from Chicago, we see that white voters in these places lean Republican. Therefore, the preferred candidate of minority voters is typically different from the preferred candidate of white voters.

**D. Racially Polarized Voting Likely Understates the Extent to Which Minority Groups Have Divergent Interests**

17. Although Tables 1 and 2 show significant racially polarized voting in Illinois, we would theoretically expect racially polarized voting to understate the extent to which the interests of minority voters diverge from those of white voters. The reason is that the extent of polarized voting depends on the electoral choices available to voters. If there are no candidates who differentially appeal to the interests of a minority group, the lack of polarized voting would not constitute evidence that the minority group does not have important or unique interests.

18. To see this, consider two candidates running for statewide office in Illinois. More than seven in ten Illinois residents are white, so no candidate can win statewide office without receiving the support of a significant share of white voters. As an example, in 2014, Democratic incumbent governor Pat Quinn received just below 40 percent of the two-party vote among white voters,<sup>4</sup> and he lost office. So candidates who appeal primarily to minority voters are not likely to win statewide office. Because of these demographics, if there are issue positions that primarily appeal to minority voters but not white voters, statewide candidates are not likely to espouse those positions. If one candidate did espouse these positions, we might expect racially polarized voting to be even greater. But if both candidates are trying to appeal to the median voter, the observed level of polarized voting will not reflect the extent to which groups have divergent interests.

19. Now consider a local or legislative election with a majority-minority electorate. By the same logic, two office-motivated candidates competing for a majority of votes will espouse the positions that appeal to the interests that are prevalent in this particular electorate, which happen to be the interests of the minority group.<sup>5</sup> So again, we would expect polarized voting to

---

<sup>4</sup> According to the CES data previously, Quinn received 39 percent of the two-party vote among white voters. According to an exit poll, <[cbsnews.com/elections/2014/governor/illinois/exit/](https://www.cbsnews.com/elections/2014/governor/illinois/exit/)>, Quinn received 36 percent of the two-party vote among whites.

<sup>5</sup> See Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row for a canonical model of two office-motivated candidates who converge to the preferences of the median voter. See Hall, Andrew B. 2015. What Happens when Extremists Win Primaries? *American Political Science Review* 109(1):18-42 for evidence that ideological moderation is electorally beneficial.

understate the extent to which the interests of groups diverge. For voting behavior to reflect the interests of groups, there must be high-quality candidates available who appeal to those divergent interests.

20. The preceding discussion assumes there are two viable candidates competing for office, but this is not the typical scenario in Illinois elections. The next section shows that candidates in Illinois often run unopposed, meaning that voters have no choice whatsoever. The voters have no opportunity to select a better candidate or incentive their elected officials to work harder on their behalf if a candidate runs unopposed or if the only challengers to an incumbent are not serious, viable alternatives. In this grim scenario, racially polarized voting will be an especially uninformative indicator of voter interests.

21. Despite these theoretical issues, racially polarized voting in Illinois is nevertheless quite stark. This suggests that minority groups indeed have unique and divergent interests. But their ability to translate those interests into outcomes depends upon the electoral institutions and the choices available to them.

22. I understand that other experts have or will be analyzing racially polarized voting in specific state legislative races. I would recommend considering the issues described above when focusing on those specific races. Many state legislative races are uncompetitive, many candidates are not viable, and many candidates don't put forth the kind of campaign effort necessary to appeal to voters and make their positions known. As previously discussed, a lack of racially polarized voting in such an election would not constitute convincing evidence that minority groups don't have divergent interests.

23. Table 3 shows data on votes and campaign spending for several elections of particular interest that I believe other experts plan to analyze. All of these elections are general elections or Democratic primaries between 2012 and 2020. In many of these elections, the runner-up did not spend a meaningful amount of money on their campaign. In 15 out of 32 races, the winner spent more than 80 percent of the money spent by the top-two candidates, and in 11 cases, the winner spent more than 90 percent. We wouldn't expect the divergent interests of minority voters to be reflected in their voting behavior if candidates don't campaign enough for voters to learn about them, or if they don't offer meaningfully different policy positions than their opponent.

**E. Voters in Minority Districts Have Fewer Choices and Less Opportunity for Electoral Selection and Accountability**

24. Minority voters in Illinois typically have little opportunity to choose their own elected officials or to incentivize them to work hard on their behalf even though they have interests and preferences that often differ from those of white voters. As explained in more detail below, elections in Illinois are often uncompetitive or even uncontested, and party leaders use various tactics to reduce competition, thereby mitigating opportunities for electoral selection and accountability.



25. To assess the extent of electoral competition, I analyze data from the Illinois House of Representatives. I focus on the most recent redistricting cycle, which includes election years 2012-2020 and General Assemblies 98 through 102. Primary election data is not available for 2018 so analyses that rely on this data exclude that particular election and corresponding General Assembly.

26. Table 4 shows for each General Assembly, the share of districts for which the elected legislator ran uncontested in the primary election, general election, and both the primary and the general election. Many citizens have essentially no choice when it comes to selecting their state legislator. Elected legislators to the House of Representatives were uncontested 79 percent of the time in their primary election, 49 percent of the time in their general election, and 40 percent of the time in both their primary and general elections. This last result bears repeating. In four out of ten cases, the person elected to represent their voters in the Illinois House of Representatives ran unopposed in both the primary and the general election.

27. Why is there so little competition in Illinois elections? At least part of the answer is that party leaders use various tactics to prevent voters from having more choices. One of those tactics is that incumbents who would like to retire from the legislature often resign in the middle of their term, giving their party the opportunity to appoint a replacement. A large literature in political science finds that incumbents are electorally advantaged because of the increased resources and exposure that come with holding office.<sup>6</sup> So instead of allowing voters to select a new leader in an open-seat race following a retirement, party leaders in Illinois appear to encourage retiring members resign in the middle of their term, allowing the party leaders to appoint a new legislator who can run for reelection as an incumbent.

28. The far-right column of Table 4 shows how often this occurs in the Illinois House of Representatives. In a typical General Assembly, nine to 13 percent of the elected legislators will resign in the middle of their term and be replaced by an appointee of the party. The 102nd General Assembly is still ongoing so we don't yet know how many legislators will resign, but at the time of this data collection, two elected legislators have already resigned and been replaced by appointees. Based on the results from previous General Assemblies, more are likely to follow.

29. Many of these appointed legislators go on to face little competition when they stand for election for the first time. During this period of analysis, 40 percent of these appointed legislators ran uncontested in their first primary, 49 percent ran uncontested in their first general, and 17 percent run uncontested in both their first primary and their first general election.

---

<sup>6</sup> See Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2002. The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000. *Election Law Journal* 1(3):315-338 and Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2014. Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9(4):501-531 for evidence that incumbent state legislators benefit electorally from having held office.



30. Table 5 shows the same measures of competition but for different subsets of cases. The first row shows results for districts for which more than 40 percent of the voting-age population in 2010 was Black. The second row shows results for districts for which more than 40 percent of the voting-age population in 2010 was Latino. During the period of study, the representatives of these districts are all Democrats. The third row shows all other cases where a Democrat won the election, and the fourth row shows cases where a Republican won the election.

31. We see that uncompetitive races are common across all of these cases, but they are especially common in minority districts. The primary and the general election were both uncontested 32 percent of the time when a Democrat won in a non-minority district, but in Black and Latino districts, these rates increase to 53 and 45 percent, respectively. We also see that appointments are more common in minority districts relative to non-minority districts. Therefore, the residents of minority districts are especially unlikely to have an electoral choice to make. The representatives of minority districts are often selected by the Democratic Party, and citizens of these districts have little opportunity to select a better representative or to incentivize their representative to work harder on their behalf.<sup>7</sup>

32. A potential explanation for the results in Table 5 is that Black and Latino districts see less competitive because they are especially partisan districts. We saw in Tables 1 and 2 that Black and Latino voters are much more likely to support Democrats. If more Democratic or more partisan districts tend to have less competitive elections, that might mean that minority districts see less competition because they are especially partisan, not because they are minority districts per se. Table 4 assesses this possibility through regressions that control for the partisan leanings of each district. Specifically, analyzing each General Assembly by district with a Democratic representative, I regress the outcomes from Table 5 on indicators for Black and Latino districts and control for the partisanship of the district. Specifically, I control for the average two-party vote share of Democratic candidates in statewide elections in each district. I also include fixed effects for each General Assembly to account for the fact that these measures of competition may change over time idiosyncratically.

33. The results in Table 6 suggest that more partisan Democratic districts are less likely to see uncontested primary elections, much more likely to see uncontested general elections, and more likely to see both elections go uncontested. After controlling for district partisanship, we see that minority districts are less likely to see uncontested primary elections, much more likely to see uncontested general elections, and slightly more likely to see both elections go uncontested. They are also notably more likely to experience a partisan appointment in the middle of a term. Overall, the results suggest that voters in minority districts have fewer choices at the ballot box, and they're much more likely to have their choices made for them by party leaders. This remains true if we compare them to similarly partisan but non-minority districts.

---

<sup>7</sup> For more on the importance of electoral competition for representation, policy outcomes, and the health of democracy, see Ashworth, Scott. Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work. *Annual Review of Political Science* 15:183-201.

**F. Latino Representatives Are Unlikely to Emerge in Districts That Are Not Predominantly Latino**

34. Do minority voters at least have representatives from their minority group even though minority districts have little opportunity to select their representatives or incentivize them to work hard on their behalf? To address this question, I analyze data on the race of electoral winners in Illinois state legislative elections between 2012 and 2020. I focus on all districts for which at least 15 percent of the citizen voting-age population (or CVAP) is Black, 15 percent is Latino, or 15 percent is Asian.<sup>8</sup> I pool data from both chambers, and approximately three out of four races in this analyses are from the Illinois House of Representatives.

35. Figure 1 shows how the share of a district's CVAP comprised of a minority group corresponds with the probability that a general election winner is a member of that minority group. Specifically, the figure shows kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = .1). Only the ranges of demographics observed in the data are shown. As expected, the probability that the electoral winner is from a minority group increases as the share of the district composed of that minority group increases.

36. Also as expected, the relationship between a group's share of a district and the probability that a group member wins the election is nonlinear. There is typically a weak relationship between demographics and descriptive representation when a group is a small minority of a district, but as the size of a group increases, the relationship becomes steeper. And it flattens out again at a certain point.

37. This result suggests that the way in which districts are drawn can have large effects on minority representation. For example, a district that is 40 percent Black is predicted to have a 78 percent chance of electing a Black legislator. But a district that is 20 percent Black is predicted to have a 15 percent chance of having a Black legislator. Therefore, if a region is 20 percent Black and has the population for two districts, a map that places all Black citizens in one district will produce a black legislator 78 percent of the time, but a map that equally distributes black citizens between the two districts will produce at least one Black legislator only 28 percent of the time ( $1 - \{1 - .15\}^2 \approx .28$ ).

38. Figure 1 shows that Latino districts are much less likely than a comparably Black district to elect a member of their group. A district that is 20 percent Latino is predicted to have a Latino winner just 6 percent of the time, and a district that is 40 percent Latino is predicted to have a Latino winner 45 percent of the time. The nonlinear relationship between demographics and descriptive representation are such that districts that do not have a large share of Latino voters are very unlikely to see a Latino representative.

---

<sup>8</sup> Data on the race of candidates was collected only for districts with at least 15 percent population from one of these minority groups. This information was provided by counsel for the *McConchie* plaintiffs, and I believe it to be accurate.


39. When an Illinois legislative map includes several districts with large Latino populations but with white incumbents, are minority candidates likely to be elected in these cases?

40. To answer this question, Figure 2 repeats the same analyses from Figure 1 but conditions on cases where a white candidate previously won the general election. Specifically, the three panels of the figure show the probability of a minority winner emerging in the next election after a white candidate won, two elections downstream, and three elections downstream. Comparing the results to those in Figure 1, we see that minority candidate victories are much less likely in scenarios where a white candidate won a recent election.

41. The descriptive representation of minority districts with a white incumbent does increase over time. For example, if a white candidate wins in a 50 percent Latino district, there is only a six percent chance that a Latino candidate will win in the next election, a 13 percent chance they will win two elections downstream, and a 20 percent chance three elections downstream. However, the extent to which minority representation increases over time depends strongly and nonlinearly on the districts demographics. If a white candidate wins in a 40 percent Latino district, there is a four percent chance that a Latino candidate will win in the next election, a seven percent chance they will win two elections downstream, and a ten percent chance three elections downstream. So a district with a white incumbent is twice as likely to later elect a Latino legislator if it is 50 versus 40 percent Latino.

42. My current curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit A, which includes a list of all the publications that I have authored in the past ten years. In forming my opinion, I reviewed survey data on vote choices and racial identification, election results, data on the demographics of state legislative districts, campaign finance data from elections of interest, and data on the race of electoral candidates. I also drew from theory and evidence in political science, and the most influential sources are cited in the footnotes of the report. I have submitted expert reports but have not testified as an expert at trial or been deposed in the last four years.

Dated this 10th day of November 2021 at Chicago, Illinois.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Anthony Fowler", is written over a horizontal line.

Anthony Fowler

**Table 1. Racially Polarized Voting in Illinois**

Election	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Black – White	Hisp – White	Asian – White
Governor 2006	.488 (.021)	.902 (.028)	.714 (.062)	.791 (.140)	.413 (.035)	.226 (.066)	.302 (.142)
Governor 2010	.417 (.021)	.957 (.017)	.581 (.106)	.262 (.136)	.540 (.027)	.165 (.108)	-.154 (.137)
Governor 2014	.392 (.020)	.889 (.027)	.658 (.094)	.342 (.136)	.497 (.033)	.266 (.096)	-.050 (.138)
Governor 2018	.486 (.017)	.967 (.016)	.801 (.052)	.642 (.098)	.481 (.023)	.315 (.054)	.156 (.099)
U.S. President 2008	.518 (.022)	.977 (.016)	.835 (.066)	.707 (.126)	.460 (.027)	.317 (.070)	.189 (.128)
U.S. President 2012	.502 (.021)	.975 (.018)	.794 (.061)	.658 (.152)	.473 (.028)	.292 (.065)	.155 (.154)
U.S. President 2016	.502 (.017)	.931 (.032)	.896 (.027)	.787 (.064)	.429 (.036)	.395 (.032)	.285 (.066)
U.S. President 2020	.516 (.017)	.939 (.028)	.743 (.061)	.727 (.099)	.423 (.032)	.227 (.063)	.211 (.101)
U.S. Senate 2008	.559 (.021)	.977 (.017)	.823 (.072)	.670 (.142)	.418 (.027)	.264 (.075)	.111 (.144)
U.S. Senate 2010	.390 (.020)	.957 (.016)	.491 (.102)	.268 (.141)	.567 (.026)	.100 (.104)	-.122 (.142)
U.S. Senate 2014	.476 (.021)	.962 (.017)	.785 (.070)	.505 (.142)	.486 (.027)	.309 (.073)	.028 (.144)
U.S. Senate 2016	.540 (.017)	.985 (.006)	.767 (.074)	.594 (.091)	.445 (.018)	.227 (.076)	.054 (.093)
U.S. Senate 2020	.521 (.016)	.979 (.011)	.739 (.063)	.707 (.102)	.458 (.020)	.218 (.065)	.186 (.104)

*The table reports the share of Illinois voters from each racial group who supported the Democratic candidate in each election. The final three columns show the difference between minority and white voters. Standard errors are in parentheses.*

**Table 2. Racially Polarized Voting in Different Regions of Interest**

	DV = Democratic Vote			
	Illinois	Chicago	Aurora	Metro East
Black	.473 (.008)	.285 (.016)	.589 (.048)	.532 (.036)
Latino	.254 (.022)	.161 (.029)	.432 (.118)	.342 (.077)
Asian	.131 (.034)	.048 (.054)	.217 (.115)	-.451 (.058)
Election Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Survey Weights	X	X	X	X
Observations	17,618	3,948	439	830
Mean DV for white voters	.480	.674	.376	.445

*Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.*

Table 3. Competition in Elections of Interest

Election	Winner			Runner-up			Winner		
	Name	Votes	Spending	Name	Votes	Spending	Vote Share	Spending Share	Winner
H4 2018 P	DELIA RAMIREZ	7,120	\$0.00	IRIS MILLAN	3,076	\$144,746.60	.698		.000
CMP 2016 G	SUSANA MENDOZA	2,676,244	\$3,533,134.00	LESLIE MUNGER (I)	2,404,723	\$9,977,165.00	.527		.262
H114 2016 G	LATOYA GREENWOOD	26,029	\$47,655.28	BOB ROMANIK	19,492	\$120,386.62	.572		.284
H1 2018 P	AARON ORTIZ	5,636	\$127,045.70	DAN BURKE (I)	4,974	\$221,122.80	.531		.365
H10 2020 P	AMAR WILLIAMS (I)	8,334	\$69,896.49	GERARD C. MOORER	5,872	\$94,106.12	.587		.426
H39 2014 P	WILL GUZZARDI	5,316	\$273,165.70	TONI BERRIOS (I)	3,484	\$352,523.30	.604		.437
H25 2018 P	CURTIS TARVER	4,737	\$117,600.30	FLYNN RUSH	3,071	\$125,780.50	.607		.483
S22 2016 P	CRISTINA CASTRO	13,887	\$122,683.10	STEVE CARAMELLI	6,906	\$126,802.90	.668		.492
CCA 2018 P	FRITZ KAEGI	327,769	\$2,274,312.00	JOSEPH BERRIOS (I)	243,425	\$2,200,793.00	.574		.508
H40 2014 P	JAIME M. ANDRADE, JR. (I)	2,917	\$171,344.70	NANCY SCHIAVONE	1,585	\$161,535.10	.648		.515
AUR 2017 G	RICHARD IRVIN	7,574	\$211,384.43	RICK GUZMAN	7,404	\$198,718.72	.506		.515
H83 2020 P	BARBARA HERNANDEZ (I)	5,340	\$114,371.90	JUAN THOMAS	2,053	\$83,062.96	.722		.579
S5 2016 P	PATRICIA VAN PELT (I)	33,123	\$329,459.80	BOB FIORETTI	15,696	\$229,090.20	.678		.590
H2 2016 P	THERESA MAH	10,732	\$175,462.70	ALEX ACEVEDO	10,217	\$117,515.10	.512		.599
AG 2018 P	KWAME RAUL	390,472	\$2,923,824.00	PAT QUINN	352,425	\$1,779,583.00	.526		.622
H40 2016 P	JAIME M. ANDRADE, JR. (I)	12,886	\$225,219.00	HARISH I. PATEL	8,812	\$120,419.00	.594		.652
H5 2016 P	JULIANA STRATTON	19,790	\$1,982,591.00	KEN DUNKIN (I)	9,300	\$965,530.80	.680		.672
S20 2018 P	IRIS MARTINEZ (I)	19,414	\$198,487.20	BART GOLDBERG	7,050	\$90,182.42	.734		.688
H39 2012 P	TONI BERRIOS (I)	4,021	\$240,160.10	WILL GUZZARDI	3,896	\$98,015.51	.508		.710
H5 2018 P	LAMONT ROBINSON	7,230	\$842,266.68	DILARA SAYEED	4,844	\$234,593.40	.599		.782
H49 2018 G	KARINA VILLA	22,133	\$1,215,408.00	TONIA JANE KHOURI	18,997	\$279,198.80	.538		.813
H22 2016 P	MICHAEL MADIGAN (I)	17,155	\$1,434,018.83	JASON GONZALES	7,124	\$253,638.99	.707		.850
H77 2014 P	KATHLEEN WILLIS (I)	3,272	\$32,288.57	ANTONIO FAVELA	946	\$5,412.50	.776		.856
S22 2016 G	CRISTINA CASTRO	39,835	\$211,483.10	TRACY SMOODILLA	21,991	\$32,767.66	.644		.866
S11 2020 G	CELINA VILLANUEVA (I)	46,700	\$56,540.52	MARI BROWN	11,916	\$7,959.00	.797		.877
S25 2020 G	KARINA VILLA	60,238	\$1,565,337.00	JEANETTE WARD	57,976	\$216,875.70	.510		.878
H114 2020 G	LATOYA GREENWOOD (I)	26,682	\$94,598.21	DAVE BARNES	20,015	\$12,394.71	.571		.884
S22 2020 P	CRISTINA CASTRO (I)	13,838	\$502,285.90	RAE YAWER	3,136	\$52,326.46	.815		.906
H83 2020 G	BARBARA HERNANDEZ (I)	19,300	\$54,375.90	DONALD R. WALTER	7,607	\$5,173.95	.717		.913
S40 2020 P	PATRICK J. JOYCE (I)	11,387	\$459,661.00	LORI WILCOX	6,474	\$29,275.94	.638		.940
H4 2016 P	CYNTHIA SOTO (I)	18,326	\$76,531.93	ROBERT ZWOLINSKI	4,705	\$4,408.11	.796		.946
H24 2016 G	LISA HERNANDEZ (I)	23,079	\$79,957.85	ANDY KIRCHOFF	5,969	\$4,152.09	.795		.951
S40 2020 G	PATRICK J. JOYCE (I)	57,901	\$224,180.80	ERIC M. WALLACE	41,128	\$5,610.97	.585		.976
H40 2020 P	JAIME M. ANDRADE, JR. (I)	11,687	\$330,987.50	SYAMALA KRISHNAMSETTY	6,287	\$4,925.41	.650		.985
S57 2018 G	CHRISTOPHER BELT	44,254	\$175,193.63	TANYA HILDENBRAND	30,496	\$2,213.57	.592		.988
S6 2014 G	JOHN J. CULLERTON (I)	39,851	\$1,621,943.00	STEFANIE LINARES	20,291	\$18,640.63	.663		.989
CCC2 2018 P	DENNIS DEER (I)	11,522	\$106,897.60	EDDIE JOHNSON	7,482	\$0.00	.606		1.000
S12 2012 P	STEVEN LANDEK (I)	7,121	\$88,816.19	RAUL MONTES, JR.	3,583	\$0.00	.665		1.000
H35 2012 G	FRAN HURLEY	34,590	\$51,189.32	RICARDO FERNANDEZ	16,022	\$0.00	.683		1.000
H40 2012 G	DEBORAH MELL (I)	21,744	\$3,187.36	TONI PUCCIO-JOHNSON	4,909	\$0.00	.816		1.000
H10 2016 G	MELISSA CONYEARS	35,858	\$7,228.97	MARK SPOGNARDI	6,911	\$0.00	.838		1.000

The top two performing candidates from each race are shown. Elections are sorted by the winner's spending share. Some races are general elections (G) and others are Democratic primaries (P). State legislative races indicate the chamber (H or S) and the district number. AG stands for Attorney General, CMP stands for Comptroller, CCA stands for Cook County Assessor, CCC2 stands for Cook County Commissioner District 2, and AUR stands for Aurora mayor. (I) indicates an incumbent at time of election.

**Table 4. Electoral Competition in the Illinois House of Representatives**

Assembly	Primary Uncontested	General Uncontested	Both Uncontested	Appointment
98	.720	.500	.356	.085
99	.805	.559	.475	.093
100	.831	.568	.475	.127
101		.424		.119
102	.797	.398	.280	.017
Pooled	.788	.490	.396	.088




**Table 5. Electoral Competition in Different Settings**

	Primary Unc.	General Unc.	Both Unc.	Appointment
Black Districts	.694	.800	.528	.111
Latino Districts	.661	.729	.446	.114
Democrats in Non-Minority Districts	.877	.337	.318	.061
Republicans	.789	.427	.395	.094


**Table 6. Assessing Competitiveness While Controlling for Partisanship**

	Primary Unc.	General Unc.	Both Unc.	Appointment
Black District	-.115 (.072)	.201 (.095)	.066 (.103)	.084 (.044)
Latino District	-.164 (.067)	.189 (.101)	.017 (.115)	.079 (.042)
District Partisanship	-.350 (.202)	1.324 (.333)	.715 (.345)	-.180 (.143)
Assembly Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Observations	282	356	282	356

*District-clustered standard errors in parentheses*

**Figure 1. Minority Winners and District Demographics**

*The curves are kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = .1) showing how the probability that the general election winner is from a minority group relates to the share of the district's CVAP comprised of that group. The sample includes all state legislative general elections (from both chambers) between 2012 and 2020 in districts where at least 15 percent of the citizen voting-age population (CVAP) is Black, 15 percent is Latino, or 15 percent is Asian.*

**Figure 2. Minority Winners Following White Winners**

*The figure replicates the analysis in Figure 1 but focuses on cases where a white candidate previously won. The left panel shows the probability of a minority winner in the next election after a white candidate's victory, the middle panel shows the same thing two elections downstream, and the right panel shows three elections downstream.*

# **EXHIBIT A**

## Anthony Fowler

1307 East 60<sup>th</sup> Street, 2031  
Chicago, IL 60637

[anthony.fowler@uchicago.edu](mailto:anthony.fowler@uchicago.edu)  
[voices.uchicago.edu/fowler](https://voices.uchicago.edu/fowler)

### Employment

University of Chicago

Harris School of Public Policy

Professor, August 2020-present

Associate Professor (with tenure), July 2017-July 2020

Assistant Professor, July 2013-June 2017

Department of Political Science

Faculty Associate, November 2017-present

Committee on Quantitative Methods in Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences

Faculty Member, July 2018-present

### Education

Ph.D., Government, Harvard University, 2013

S.B., Biology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009

### Book

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Anthony Fowler. Forthcoming. [\*Thinking Clearly with Data: A Guide to Quantitative Reasoning and Analysis\*](#). Princeton University Press.

### Publications

Berry, Christopher R., Anthony Fowler, Tamara Glazer, Samantha Handel-Meyer, and Alec MacMillen. 2021. [Evaluating the Effects of Shelter-in-Place Policies during the COVID-19 Pandemic](#). *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118(15):e2019706118.

Fouirnaies, Alexander and Anthony Fowler. 2021. [Do Campaign Contributions Buy Favorable Policies? Evidence from the Insurance Industry](#). *Political Science Research and Methods* 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2020.59>.

Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2021. [Leadership or Luck? Randomization Inference for Leader Effects in Politics, Business, and Sports](#). *Science Advances* 7:eabe3404.

Fowler, Anthony, Haritz Garro, and Jorg L. Spenkuch. 2020. [Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions](#). *Journal of Politics* 82(3):844-858.

Fowler, Anthony. 2020. [Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting?](#) *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 15(2):141-179.

Ashworth, Scott and Anthony Fowler. 2020. [Electoralates vs. Voters](#). *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy* 1(3):477-505.

Fowler, Anthony. 2020. [Promises and Perils of Mobile Voting](#). *Election Law Journal* 19(3):418-431.

Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. [Do Shark Attacks Influence Presidential Elections? Reassessing a Prominent Finding on Voter Competence](#). *Journal of Politics* 80(4):1423-1437.

Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2018. [Congressional Committees, Legislative Influence, and the Hegemony of Chairs](#). *Journal of Public Economics* 158:1-11.

Fowler, Anthony. 2018. [A Bayesian Explanation for the Effect of Incumbency](#). *Electoral Studies* 53:66-78.

Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler. 2018. [Aggregate Effects of Large-Scale GOTV Campaigns on Voter Turnout](#). *Political Science Research and Methods* 6(4):733-751.

- Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2017. [Long-Term Consequences of Election Results](#). *British Journal of Political Science* 47(2):351-372.
- Fowler, Anthony. 2017. [Does Voter Preregistration Increase Youth Participation?](#) *Election Law Journal* 16(4):485-494.
- Enos, Ryan D., Anthony Fowler, and Chris Havasy. 2017. [The Negative Effect Fallacy: A Case Study of Incorrect Statistical Reasoning by Federal Courts](#). *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 14(3):618-647.
- Fowler, Anthony. 2016. [What Explains Incumbent Success? Disentangling Selection on Party, Selection on Candidate Characteristics, and Office-Holding Benefits](#). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(3):313-338.
- Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2016. [Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork](#). *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3):692-708.
- Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2016. [The Elusive Quest for Convergence](#). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(1):131-149.
- Fowler, Anthony and B. Pablo Montagnes. 2015. [College Football, Elections, and False-Positive Results in Observational Research](#). *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112(45):13800-13804.
- Eggers, Andrew C., Anthony Fowler, Jens Hainmueller, Andrew B. Hall, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2015. [On the Validity of Regression Discontinuity Designs for Estimating Electoral Effects: Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races](#). *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):259-274.
- Fowler, Anthony. 2015. [Regular Voters, Marginal Voters, and the Electoral Effects of Turnout](#). *Political Science Research and Methods* 3(2):205-219.
- Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2015. [Congressional Seniority and Pork: A Pig Fat Myth?](#) *European Journal of Political Economy* 40:42-56.
- Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2014. [Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits](#). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9(4):501-531.
- Enos, Ryan D., Anthony Fowler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2014. [Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate](#). *Journal of Politics* 76(1):273-288.
- Atkinson, Matthew D. and Anthony Fowler. 2014. [Social Capital and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Saint's Day Fiestas in Mexico](#). *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1):41-59.
- Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler. 2014. [Pivotality and Turnout: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Aftermath of a Tied Election](#). *Political Science Research and Methods* 2(2):309-319.
- Fowler, Anthony and Michele Margolis. 2014. [The Political Consequences of Uninformed Voters](#). *Electoral Studies* 34:100-110.
- Fowler, Anthony. 2013. [Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia](#). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8(2):159-182.
- Dowling, Conor M., Ryan D. Enos, Anthony Fowler, and Costas Panagopoulos. 2012. [Does Public Financing Chill Political Speech? Exploiting a Court Injunction as a Natural Experiment](#). *Election Law Journal* 11(3):302-315.

#### **Working Papers and Papers under Review**

- Fowler, Anthony, Seth Hill, Jeff Lewis, Chris Tausanovitch, Lynn Vavreck, and Christopher Warshaw. [Moderates](#).
- Fowler, Anthony and Kisoo Kim. [An Information-Based Explanation for Partisan Media Sorting](#).



Fowler, Anthony and William G. Howell. [Updating amidst Disagreement: New Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cues](#).  
Fowler, Anthony. [Correcting Point Estimates for Publication Bias](#).  
Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. [Conservative Vote Probabilities: An Easier Method for Summarizing Roll Call Data](#).

### Other Writings

Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2021. [Does Leadership Matter?](#) *Natural History*, March pp. 12-15.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2020. [America Needs Compulsory Voting](#). *Foreign Affairs*.  
Working Group on Universal Voting. 2020. [Lift Every Voice: The Urgency of Universal Civic Duty Voting](#). Brookings Institution Report.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2020. [Curing coronavirus isn't a job for social scientists](#). *Bloomberg*.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2020. [Defending Sober Voters against Sensationalist Scholars: A Reply to Rogers](#). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 15(2):213-219.  
Fowler, Anthony, Haritz Garro, and Jorg Spenkuch. 2020. [Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions](#). CATO Research Briefs in Economic Policy No. 217.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2019. [But Shouldn't That Work Against Me?](#) *The Political Methodologist*.  
Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. [Politics as if Evidence Mattered: A Reply to Achen and Bartels](#).  
Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2018. [Erratum to "Cardinals or Clerics: Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork"](#). *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4):1014-1016.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2018. [Better Representation through Replacement](#). Conference on Political Polarization, University of Chicago.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2017. [The Negative Effect Fallacy, Gobbledygook, and the Use of Quantitative Evidence in the Supreme Court](#). *Election Law Blog*.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2017. [Chief Justice Roberts and other judges have a hard time statistics. That's a real problem](#). *The Monkey Cage*.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2017. [A Case for More Incumbents](#). Conference on Electoral Reform, University of Chicago.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2016. [Football games, shark attacks, and why voters may not be so incompetent after all](#). *University of Chicago News*.  
Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2016. [Congressional Committee Membership is Less Important than Previously Thought, but Chairs Are Really Influential](#). *American Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science*.  
Fowler, Anthony and B. Pablo Montagnes. 2015. [Reply to Healy et al.: Value of Ex Ante Predictions and Independent Tests for Assessing False-Positive Results](#). *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* doi:10.1073/pnas.1520253112.  
Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2015. [Elections Have Big Consequences that Last for Decades](#). *American Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science*.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2014. [Is Get-Out-the-Vote Bad for Democracy?](#) *Boston Review*.  
Fowler, Anthony. 2014. [Marginal Voters Are Much More Likely to Vote Democratic](#). *American Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science*.  
Fowler, Anthony and Michele Margolis. 2014. [A More Informed Electorate Would Benefit the Democratic Party](#). *American Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science*.

- Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler. 2014. [Get Out the Vote Interventions Increase Inequality in Voter Turnout](#). *American Politics and Policy Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science*.
- Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler 2014. [The Surprising Parity of the 2012 Ground Game](#). *The Monkey Cage*.
- Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler. 2013. [Obama's Voters Mobilization Was Barely More Effective than Romney's](#). *The Monkey Cage*.
- Fowler, Anthony and Michele Margolis. 2012. [Know Where You Stand: How Informing the Voters Helps the Democrats](#). *Boston Review*.
- Panagopoulos, Costas, Conor M. Dowling, Ryan D. Enos, and Anthony Fowler. 2011. [Amicus Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett](#).
- Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler. 2010. [Do Americans Care about Politics?](#) *YouGov Model Politics Blog*.
- Enos, Ryan D. and Anthony Fowler. 2010. [Does YOUR Vote Count?](#) *YouGov Model Politics Blog*.

## **Teaching**

[Quantitative Methods for Public Policy](#)

[Political Economy III: Testing Theories of Political Institutions](#)

[The Science of Political Campaigns](#)

[Electoral Politics](#)

[Public Opinion and Public Policy](#)

## **Awards and Fellowships**

Finalist, MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Research Competition, 2019

*Political Analysis* Outstanding Reviewer Award, 2017

*Pacific Standard's* ["Top 30 Thinkers Under 30,"](#) 2016

Inductee, [The QJPS Referee Hall of Fame](#), 2005-2014

Research Grant, Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard, 2012

Deakin-Royce Graduate Research Fellowship in Australian Studies, Harvard, 2011 & 2012

Honorary Visiting Research Fellow in Social Science, La Trobe University, 2011

Research Grant, Center for American Political Studies, Harvard, 2010

James A. Lash Presidential Graduate Fellowship, MIT, 2009

## **Conferences and Presentations**

American Politics Graduate Workshop, UCSD, November 2021

American Politics Colloquium, Princeton, September 2021

UT Austin COVID-19 Modeling Consortium, April 2021

Harvard, Working Group in Political Psychology and Behavior, March 2021

Chicago, American Politics Workshop, January 2020, January 2019, October 2017, October 2013

Oak Park Temple, December 2020

Chicago, Diversity Day, November 2020, November 2019

Chicago, Political Economy Workshop, October 2020

Norwegian School of Business, Virtual Seminar, October 2020

Chicago, Model Class for Family Weekend, October 2020, October 2019, October 2018

Stanford GSB, APSA Pre-Conference on Money in Politics, September 2020

Stemnova, August 2020  
Chicago, COVID-19 Research Discussion, May 2020  
Chicago, Political Economy Lunch, Jan 2020, Jan 2018, Apr 2017, May 2016, Mar 2015, Feb 2014  
UCSD, American Politics Speaker Series, November 2019  
Chicago, Public Policy Leaders Program Seminar, November 2019  
UPenn, Election Sciences, Reform, and Administration Conference, July 2019  
Columbia, American Politics/Political Economy Seminar, March 2019  
MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, March 2019  
MIT Club of Chicago, December 2018  
Maryland; Trade, Institutions, and Political Economy Seminar, December 2018  
Notre Dame, American Democracy Seminar, November 2018  
Texas, American Politics Workshop, October 2018  
Chicago, Quantitative Methods Committee Workshop, October 2018  
ANU, Australian Political Economy Network Workshop, July 2018  
UNSW Business School, School of Economics, July 2018  
Chicago-Northwestern American Politics Meeting, May 2018  
Chicago, Conference on Political Polarization, May 2018  
Emory/Asheville Political Economy Conference, May 2018  
USC, Political Institutions and Political Economy Conference, March 2018  
Emory, Institute for Quantitative Theory and Methods, December 2017  
Chicago, BFI Research Experience for Undergraduates, July 2017  
Chicago, Conference on Electoral Reform, June 2017  
Washington Area Political Economy Conference, May 2017  
Chicago, Harris School, Faculty in Focus, April 2017  
Political Economy in the Chicago Area, Dec 2016, March 2016, Oct 2014, Dec 2013  
Chicago, Booth Econometrics and Statistics Workshop, October 2016  
German Academic Scholarship Foundation, Annual North American Conference, October 2016  
ASA-Significance Media Luncheon, Joint Statistical Meetings, August 2016  
Stanford, Political Science Methods Workshop, April 2016  
ASU, Conference on Campaigns, Elections, and Representation, April 2016  
Chilean Public Policy Summit, April 2016  
NYU, Political Economy Workshop, November 2015  
Chicago, 69th Annual Latke-Hamantash Debate, November 2015  
UCLA, American Politics Workshop, February 2015  
MIT, American Politics Conference, September 2014  
Georgetown, American Government Speaker Series, September 2014  
Yale, Center for the Study of American Politics Summer Workshop, June 2014  
Oxford, Nuffield CESS Conference on Field Experiments and Election Campaigns, May 2014  
Chicago, Microeconomics Workshop, April 2014  
UC Berkeley, American Politics Workshop, April 2014  
UCSD, American Politics Speaker Series, February 2014  
LSE, Government Research Seminar, October 2013  
University of Warwick, Political Economy Seminar, October 2013  
Berkeley Conference on Political Economy and Governance, September 2013  
CCES Sundance Conference, May 2013  
Harvard, The Westminster Model of Democracy in Crisis? May 2013  
Harvard, Applied Statistics Workshop, March 2013  
University of Melbourne, Australian Society for Quantitative Political Science, December 2012

MIT, Political Economy Breakfast; Oct 2012, May 2011, March 2010  
Harvard, American Politics Research Workshop; Sept 2012, April 2102, Oct 2011, Feb 2011  
Harvard, Political Psychology and Behavior Workshop; Sept 2011, Feb 2011  
La Trobe University, Invited Presentation, July 2011  
American Political Science Association; 2020, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012  
Midwest Political Science Association; 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011  
Southern Political Science Association; 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013  
European Political Science Association, 2014

### Service

Associate Editor, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2019-present  
Co-host, *Not Another Politics Podcast*, 2020-present  
Governing Board, Joint Ph.D. Program in Political Economy, University of Chicago, 2021-present  
Remote Ballot Return Standards Working Group, UC Berkeley, 2021-present  
Quantitative Methods Workshop Committee, University of Chicago, 2019-present  
Hiring Committee in Development, Harris School, 2021-22  
Guest Editor, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2021  
College Council, University of Chicago, 2018-2021  
Advisory Committee, Cyber Policy Initiative, Harris School, 2018-2021  
Pi Sigma Alpha Award Committee, Southern Political Science Association, 2021  
Director of Undergraduate Studies, Harris School, 2018-2020  
Editorial Board Member, *Journal of Politics*, 2017-2020  
Truman Scholarship Nomination Committee, University of Chicago, 2019-2020  
Working Group on Universal Voting, Harvard and Brookings, 2019-2020  
Ad Hoc Committee on Preregistration, *Journal of Politics*, 2018  
Curriculum Committee on Quantitative Methods, University of Chicago, 2018-19  
Committee on International Development and Policy Curriculum, Harris School, 2017-2018  
Committee on Part-Time Degree Curriculum, Harris School, 2016-2017  
Committee on Undergraduate Public Policy Curriculum, University of Chicago, 2015-2018  
Hiring Committee in Analytical Politics, Harris School, 2014-15, 2017-18, 2018-19  
Hiring Committee in Quantitative Methods and Formal Theory, Dept. of Political Science, 2018-19  
Committee on Faculty Voting Procedures, Harris School, 2017  
Coordinator, Political Economy Workshop, Harris School, 2015-2017  
Co-organizer, Chicago Harris-Emory Analytical Politics (CHEAP) Conference, 2015 and 2016  
Committee on Undergraduate Public Policy Program, University of Chicago, 2014  
Coordinator, Harris School Module of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2014  
Coordinator, Harvard Working Group in Political Psychology and Behavior, 2011-2013  
Referee:

*American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*  
*American Economic Review* (6)  
*American Journal of Political Science* (15)  
*American Political Science Review* (24)  
*American Politics Research*  
*Australian Journal of Political Science* (2)  
*British Journal of Political Science* (16)  
*Canadian Journal of Political Science* (2)  
*Comparative Political Studies* (4)  
*Congress & the Presidency*

*Demography*  
*Economics & Politics*  
*Electoral Studies* (9)  
*European Economic Review* (2)  
*European Journal of Political Economy*  
*Games and Economic Behavior*  
*Governance* (2)  
*Government and Opposition*  
*Harvard Undergraduate Research Journal*  
*International Journal of Infectious Disease*  
*Journal of the American Statistical Association*  
*Journal of Development Economics*  
*Journal of the European Economic Association* (2)  
*Journal of Experimental Political Science* (4)  
*Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* (2)  
*Journal of Legislative Studies*  
*Journal of Political Economy* (7)  
*Journal of Political Marketing*  
*Journal of Politics* (36)  
*Journal of Public Economics* (5)  
*Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports*  
*Journal of Theoretical Politics*  
*Legislative Studies Quarterly* (12)  
*National Science Foundation*  
*Nature Human Behavior*  
*Party Politics* (2)  
*PLOS One*  
*Political Analysis* (6)  
*Political Behavior* (9)  
*Political Research Quarterly* (6)  
*Political Science Research and Methods* (8)  
*Politics, Groups, and Identities*  
*Proceedings of the National Academic of Sciences*  
*Public Choice* (5)  
*Public Opinion Quarterly* (2)  
*Quarterly Journal of Economics*  
*Quarterly Journal of Political Science* (10)  
*Review of Economic Studies* (2)  
*Review of Economics and Statistics* (2)  
*Scandinavian Journal of Economics* (3)  
*Science* (3)  
*Social Science Quarterly*  
*Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences* (2)