UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PRESS ROBINSON, EDGAR CAGE, DOROTHY NAIRNE, EDWIN RENE SOULE, ALICE WASHINGTON, CLEE EARNEST LOWE, DAVANTE LEWIS, MARTHA DAVIS, AMBROSE SIMS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE ("NAACP") LOUISIANA STATE CONFERENCE, AND POWER COALITION FOR EQUITY AND JUSTICE, *Plaintiffs*, v. KYLE ARDOIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for Louisiana. *Defendant*.	Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-RLB
EDWARD GALMON, SR., CIARA HART, NORRIS HENDERSON, TRAMELLE HOWARD, *Plaintiffs*, v. KYLE ARDOIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for Louisiana. *Defendant*.	Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00214-SDD-RLB

Supplemental Expert Report of Dr. Traci Burch

Hearing Exhibit
PR-89
3:22-cv-00211-SDD-RLB

In his report, Dr. Alford concludes that the clear correlations between race and voting in Louisiana are caused by party cohesion rather than race. I was asked to assess the role of race and racial attitudes in partisanship and vote choice. I do so by briefly reviewing the relevant literature in political science. The literature is clear: racial identity and racial attitudes shape partisanship and party cohesion, and have become increasingly linked since 2008.

Today, "political observers take for granted" the distinction of the Democratic Party as the party of civil rights and racial liberalism, while the Republican Party is associated with "greater resistance to government programs to redress problems of racial inequality" (Schickler 2016: 1). Carmines and Stimson locate the origins of this distinction in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when party elites such as Barry Goldwater clearly aligned themselves as anti-civil rights and party activists and masses gradually followed suit (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schickler 2016: 2). In fact, Lyndon Johnson, when signing the Civil Rights Act into law, said that by passing the law, "we have delivered the South to the Republican Party for your lifetime and mine" (Schickler 2016: 2). Schickler, however, offers an important corrective to this narrative, pointing out that partisan realignment occurred much earlier than the 1960s and was the result of movement of African American constituents toward the Democratic Party as a result of the New Deal (Schickler 2016). These new voters put pressure on Democrats at the local and state levels to liberalize on issues of civil rights (Schickler 2016).

Despite disagreement over the timing and mechanisms, the literature provides strong support for the notion that the contemporary partisan alignment stems from the positioning of the two parties on the issue of civil rights. Schickler characterizes this system as "the post-New Deal party system in which Democrats were identified with African Americans and racial liberalism, while Republicans were associated with racial conservatism" (Schickler 2016: 2). The roots of partisan ideological polarization at the elite level can be traced to the realignment of the parties in this period: in a task force report of the American Political Science Association on "Negotiating Agreement in Politics," Barber and McCarty argue that the realignment in the South accounts for some of the ideological shifts of the parties. In particular, they argue that for Democrats, left-ward ideological movement in the party as a whole is a function of the election of African American and Latino representatives in southern majority-minority districts (Barber et al. 2015: 27). With respect to partisan sorting of the masses, research shows that the exodus of southern white voters from the Democratic Party from 1958 to 1980 was a reflection of racial attitudes rather than income or other non-race related policy preferences (Kuziemko and Washington 2018). Some observers argue that the importance of race to mass partisanship had faded after this point (Abramowitz 1994; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997); however, Valentino and Sears find that in the South, racial attitudes, more than ideological shifts or other policy preferences, explained an increasingly large part of candidate choice and partisanship among white voters between 1972 and 2000.

This pattern also affected Louisiana voters. Writing in 1999, Arp et al. characterize the changes in Louisiana:

> The most important trend in voter registration in the South during the last 25 years has been the defection of White voters from the Democratic party. Louisiana seems to be no

exception. From 1975 to 1996, the number of Whites registering to vote increased by 26.2%, but the White Democratic party registrants decreased by 21.7%. These Whites have increasingly registered as Republicans or Independents (Arp III, Simmons, and Cottrell 1999: 762-763).

Arp et al. further note that "In 1975, 76.7% of Democrats were white, but by 1996, this number had decreased to 61.6%. The Republican party has not changed as drastically; the percentage of whites in the Republican party has stayed near 93%" (Arp III, Simmons, and Cottrell 1999: 763-764). Giles and Hertz attribute the racial shift in partisanship to racial threat, while Arp et al. attribute the change to the increasing presence of Black voters within the Louisiana Democratic Party (Arp III, Simmons, and Cottrell 1999; Giles and Hertz 1994). Still other studies note that racial attitudes, specifically symbolic racism, was an important predictor of vote choice in Louisiana's 1995 Gubernatorial election (Knuckey and Orey 2000).

Research that examines mass and elite partisanship from 2008 onward finds strong evidence of both partisan sorting and issue polarization along the lines of race in the electorate.[1] In particular, the election of President Obama was consequential: although Obama's candidacy and election did not seem to affect the level of racial prejudice or resentment among white Americans overall, that election did shape the importance of those attitudes to partisanship and vote choice (Tesler 2016). Race-related attitudes were an important predictor of support for President Obama, and the relationship between vote choice and racial attitudes was stronger in the 2008 presidential election than in those prior (Tesler 2013). Similarly, Abramowitz and McCoy find that the relationship between racial attitudes and candidate preferences changed beginning with the 2008 election, finding that "the presence of an African American presidential candidate on the ballot led to a sharp increase in the correlation between racial resentment and feeling thermometer ratings among white working-class voters" (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019:

[1] In contrast, studies of the rise of partisan polarization in the period prior to 2008 document the fact that ideological differences between Republican and Democratic legislators increased dramatically in both the House and the Senate (Barber et al. 2015). However, studies of mass polarization focused on that time period generated much weaker evidence of polarization among the national electorate. Barber and McCarty point out that polarization in the electorate can manifest as partisan sorting and greater attachment to parties and as polarization in policy positions. Many observers found increasing partisan sorting in the electorate during the period prior to 2008 (Barber et al. 2015; Layman and Carsey 2002; Levendusky 2009), but disagreed as to whether there was greater polarization in policy positions (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Barber et al. 2015; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal and others attribute this rise of partisan sorting to the rise of economic inequality (Barber et al. 2015; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2003; Voorheis, McCarty, and Shor 2015). Barber and McCarty also note that the literature rules out many structural factors such as changes in primary elections, gerrymandering, and changes to congressional rules and norms for explaining elite and mass polarization (Barber et al. 2015). Barber and McCarty also acknowledge the realignment of the South as important to partisan sorting in this period (Barber et al. 2015).

142). Several studies show this phenomenon specifically for Louisiana, finding that support for Obama would have been higher in the state were it not for racial prejudice, which caused Obama to underperform relative to other Democrats in Louisiana (Bullock III 2010; Highton 2011; Stephens-Davidowitz 2014).

Abramowitz and McCoy further argue that with respect to voting and racial resentment, "Donald Trump's heavy emphasis on racial issues led to a further increase in the strength of this relationship, especially among white voters without college degrees" (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019: 142). By 2016, racial resentment was strongly associated with how a voter evaluated candidates: the correlation between the gap in evaluations of the two major party presidential candidates and racial resentment was .636 among white voters (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019 :142).[2] Abramowitz and McCoy argue that partisan sorting based on racial attitudes increased dramatically among white voters since 2004; they find "the relationship between racial resentment and candidate feeling thermometer ratings was about 2.6 times stronger in 2016 than in 2004 among all white voters, but it was more than four times stronger among white working-class voters" (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019: 143).

Alternative explanations for polarization also became tied more strongly to racial attitudes. Negative partisan affect, economic anxiety, and antidemocratic sentiments, also are increasingly explained by racial attitudes and anxieties (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Bartels 2020; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019; Stewart, McCarty, and Bryson 2020). The relationship between economic inequality and partisan polarization has been shown to be a function of racial context (Hersh and Nall 2016). Voters' positions on non-racial policy issues more generally have become more correlated with racial resentment (Enders and Scott 2019).

Racial threat and racial anxiety also became more salient to partisanship and vote choice in the years since 2008. The strength of white identity politics--defined as "White Americans' feelings of marginalization in an increasingly diverse America" (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019: 87)--is becoming increasingly salient to vote choice (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; 2019: 89-90) and is more important than economic anxiety in explaining vote choice (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019: 91-92). Bartels finds that Republicans and Democrats are sharply polarized with respect to holding attitudes of ethnic antagonism (Bartels 2020: 22757).[3] Bonikowski et al. argue that these 'outgroup antipathies' are part of broader nationalist ideologies on which partisans are increasingly sorting (Bonikowski, Feinstein, and Bock 2021).

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[2] Pearson's R, a measure of correlation, can range from -1 to 1, with 0 meaning no association, and +1 meaning perfectly positive association. A correlation over .6 is considered strong.

[3] Bartels defines ethnic antagonism using responses to survey items such as "discrimination against Whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities." Not far behind are items positing that "things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country," that immigrants get more than their fair share of government resources, that people on welfare often have it better than those who work for a living, that speaking English is "essential for being a true American" and that African-Americans "need to stop using racism as an excuse" (Bartels 2020: 22756).

Partisan sorting by racial group also increased more strongly beginning in 2008. Beginning with the 2008 presidential election, African American, Latino, and Asian support for Democratic presidential candidates increased (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019: 25). Meanwhile, support for Democratic candidates among white voters decreased (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019:26). Figure 1 shows that partisan sorting by race continued in Louisiana after 2000, and most of that movement involved white voters shifting out of the Democratic Party in the state.

Figure 1: Percent of Louisiana Voters Registered as Democrats, by Race. Source: Louisiana Secretary of State.[4]



Black voters consistently identify strongly with the Democratic Party; as shown in Figure 1, this pattern is true for Louisiana. White and Laird describe this fact, "That black Americans are remarkably unified in their support for the Democratic Party, and have been since the mid--twentieth century," as "a rather straightforward fact of American politics" (White and Laird 2020: 3). Neither socioeconomic status, policy preferences, nor ideology can explain this trend (White and Laird 2020). Instead, scholars locate this high rate of Democratic support in primarily in the sense of racial linked fate, or the degree to which a Black person believes that their fate is tied to the fate of the race, and in the social pressure to conform to group ideas of Black uplift (Dawson 1994., 2001; White and Laird 2020).

[4] https://www.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/Pages/RegistrationStatisticsStatewide.aspx.

Recent studies have shown that party and race are linked in the American mind. Partisan sorting has caused parties to be explicitly identified with particular racial groups in the minds of some Americans; in particular, 97.2 percent of Americans think that the typical Republican is white (Zhirkov and Valentino 2022). Racial and partisan affect are increasingly linked, such that it is possible to activate one by activating the other (Westwood and Peterson 2020). Likewise, "White respondents who perceive the Democratic Party as African American are less favorable toward Democrats, more favorable toward Republicans, and take more conservative positions on political issues" (Zhirkov and Valentino 2022: 17).

In conclusion, the literature clearly supports the point that party and candidate choice is shaped by racial identity and racial attitudes in the electorate. This relationship has been strengthening in recent years. To say that party cohesion rather than racial considerations explain the voting patterns along racial dimensions in Louisiana ignores the rather strong evidence in the literature that race and racial attitudes increasingly drive partisanship and vote choice.

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Per the U.S. Code § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 2, 2022.

Traci Burch, Ph.D.