

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
No. 21 CVS 015426
No. 21 CVS 500085

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION
VOTERS, INC., *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SENIOR CHAIR OF THE HOUSE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, *et al.*,

Defendants.

REBECCA HARPER, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SENIOR CHAIR OF THE HOUSE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, *et al.*,

Defendants.

COMMON CAUSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SENIOR CHAIR OF THE HOUSE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, *et al.*,

Defendants.

**EXPERT REPORT OF DR.
JOWEI CHEN**

Plaintiffs' Exhibit

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I, Dr. Jowei Chen, upon my oath, declare and say as follows:

1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and competent to testify as to the matters set forth herein.

2. I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I am also a Research Associate Professor at the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and a Research Associate at the Spatial Social Science Laboratory at Stanford University. In 2007, I received a M.S. in Statistics from Stanford University, and in 2009, I received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University.

3. I have published academic papers on legislative districting and political geography in several political science journals, including *The American Journal of Political Science* and *The American Political Science Review*, and *Election Law Journal*. My academic areas of expertise include legislative elections, spatial statistics, geographic information systems (GIS) data, redistricting, racial politics, legislatures, and political geography. I have expertise in the use of computer simulations of legislative districting and in analyzing political geography, elections, and redistricting.

4. I have authored expert reports in the following redistricting court cases: *The League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* (Fla. 2d Judicial Cir. Leon Cnty. 2012); *Romo v. Detzner* (Fla. 2d Judicial Cir. Leon Cnty. 2013); *Missouri National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Ferguson-Florissant School District & St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners* (E.D. Mo. 2014); *Raleigh Wake Citizens Association v. Wake County Board of Elections* (E.D.N.C. 2015); *Brown v. Detzner* (N.D. Fla. 2015); *City of Greensboro v. Guilford County Board of Elections* (M.D.N.C. 2015); *Common Cause v. Rucho*

(M.D.N.C 2016); *The League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (No. 261 M.D. 2017); *Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. The State of Georgia* (N.D. Ga. 2017); *The League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson* (E.D. Mich. 2017); *Whitford v. Gill* (W.D. Wis. 2018); *Common Cause v. Lewis* (N.C. Super. 2018); *Harper v. Lewis* (N.C. Super. 2019); *Baroody v. City of Quincy, Florida* (N.D. Fla. 2020); *McConchie v. Illinois State Board of Elections* (N.D. Ill. 2021). I have testified either at deposition or at trial in the following cases: *Romo v. Detzner* (Fla. 2d Judicial Cir. Leon Cnty. 2013); *Missouri National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Ferguson-Florissant School District & St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners* (E.D. Mo. 2014); *Raleigh Wake Citizens Association v. Wake County Board of Elections* (E.D.N.C. 2015); *City of Greensboro v. Guilford County Board of Elections* (M.D.N.C. 2015); *Common Cause v. Rucho* (M.D.N.C. 2016); *The League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (No. 261 M.D. 2017); *Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. The State of Georgia* (N.D. Ga. 2017); *The League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson* (E.D. Mich. 2017); *Whitford v. Gill* (W.D. Wis. 2018); *Common Cause v. Lewis* (N.C. Super. 2018); *Baroody v. City of Quincy, Florida* (N.D. Fla. 2020); *McConchie v. Illinois State Board of Elections* (N.D. Ill. 2021).

5. I have been retained by Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter. I am being compensated \$550 per hour for my work in this case.

6. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to analyze the SB 740 districting plan for North Carolina's congressional districts (the "Enacted Plan"), as passed on November 4, 2021. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to produce a set of computer-simulated plans for North Carolina's congressional districts by following the criteria adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly's Joint Redistricting Committee on August 12, 2021 (the "Adopted Criteria").

Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to compare the district-level partisan attributes of the Enacted Plan to those of the computer-simulated plans and to identify any districts in the Enacted Plan that are partisan outliers. Plaintiffs' counsel also asked me to compare the partisan composition of the individual Plaintiffs' congressional districts under the Enacted Plan to the partisan composition of Plaintiffs' districts under the computer-simulated plans and to identify any Plaintiffs whose Enacted Plan districts are partisan outliers.

7. The Use of Computer-Simulated Districting Plans: In conducting my academic research on legislative districting, partisan and racial gerrymandering, and electoral bias, I have developed various computer simulation programming techniques that allow me to produce a large number of nonpartisan districting plans that adhere to traditional districting criteria using US Census geographies as building blocks. This simulation process ignores all partisan and racial considerations when drawing districts. Instead, the computer simulations are programmed to draw districting plans following various traditional districting goals, such as equalizing population, avoiding county and Voting Tabulation District (VTD) splits, and pursuing geographic compactness. By randomly generating a large number of districting plans that closely adhere to these traditional districting criteria, I am able to assess an enacted plan drawn by a state legislature and determine whether partisan goals motivated the legislature to deviate from these traditional districting criteria. More specifically, by holding constant the application of nonpartisan, traditional districting criteria through the simulations, I am able to determine whether the enacted plan could have been the product of something other than partisan considerations. With respect to North Carolina's 2021 Congressional Enacted Plan, I determined that it could not.

8. I produced a set of 1,000 valid computer-simulated plans for North Carolina’s congressional districts using a computer algorithm programmed to strictly follow the required districting criteria enumerated in the August 12, 2021 Adopted Criteria of the General Assembly’s Joint Redistricting Committee. In following these Adopted Criteria, the computer algorithm uses the same general approach that I employed in creating the simulated state House and state Senate plans that I analyzed in *Common Cause v. Lewis* (2019) and the simulated congressional plans that I used in *Harper v. Lewis* (2019).

9. By randomly drawing districting plans with a process designed to strictly follow nonpartisan districting criteria, the computer simulation process gives us an indication of the range of districting plans that plausibly and likely emerge when map-drawers are not motivated primarily by partisan goals. By comparing the Enacted Plan against the distribution of simulated plans with respect to partisan measurements, I am able to determine the extent to which a map-drawer’s subordination of nonpartisan districting criteria, such as geographic compactness and preserving precinct boundaries, was motivated by partisan goals.

10. These computer simulation methods are widely used by academic scholars to analyze districting maps. For over a decade, political scientists have used such computer-simulated districting techniques to analyze the racial and partisan intent of legislative map-drawers.¹ In recent years, several courts have also relied upon computer simulations to assess partisan bias in enacted districting plans.²

¹ *E.g.*, Carmen Cirincione, Thomas A. Darling, Timothy G. O’Rourke. “Assessing South Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Districting,” *Political Geography* 19 (2000) 189–211; Jowei Chen, “The Impact of Political Geography on Wisconsin Redistricting: An Analysis of Wisconsin’s Act 43 Assembly Districting Plan.” *Election Law Journal*.

² *See, e.g.*, *League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth*, 178 A. 3d 737, 818-21 (Pa. 2018); *Raleigh Wake Citizens Association v. Wake County Board of Elections*, 827 F.3d 333, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2016); *City of Greensboro v. Guilford County Board of Elections*, No. 1:15-CV-599, 2017 WL 1229736 (M.D.N.C. Apr 3, 2017); *Common Cause v. Rucho*, No. 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. Jan 11, 2018); *The League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson* (E.D. Mich. 2017); *Common Cause v. David Lewis* (N.C. Super. 2018).

11. Redistricting Criteria: I programmed the computer algorithm to create 1,000 independent simulated plans adhering to the following seven districting criteria, as specified in the Adopted Criteria³:

a) Population Equality⁴: Because North Carolina's 2020 Census population was 10,439,388, districts in every 14-member congressional plan have an ideal population of 745,670.6. Accordingly, the computer simulation algorithm populated each districting plan such that precisely six districts have a population of 745,670, while the remaining eight districts have a population of 745,671.

b) Contiguity⁵: The simulation algorithm required districts to be geographically contiguous. Water contiguity is permissible. I also programmed the simulation algorithm to avoid double-traversals within a single county. In other words, for every simulated district, the portion of that district within any given county will be geographically contiguous.

c) Minimizing County Splits⁶: The simulation algorithm avoided splitting any of North Carolina's 100 counties, except when doing so is necessary to avoid violating one of the aforementioned criteria. When a county is divided into two districts, the county is considered to have one split. A county divided into three districts is considered to have two splits. A county divided into four districts is considered to have

³ Since my November 30 report, I made the following changes to the computer simulation algorithm. First, I added additional code at the conclusion of the algorithm that checks for the occurrence of double traversals. The computer is instructed to automatically reject any simulated plan that contains a double traversal. Second, the algorithm now contains several steps that further increase the preservation of municipal boundaries, discussed further below.

⁴ The Adopted Criteria state: "The number of persons in each congressional district shall be as nearly as equal as practicable, as determined under the most recent federal decennial census."

⁵ The Adopted Criteria state: "No point contiguity shall be permitted in any 2021 Congressional, House, and Senate plan. Congressional, House, and Senate districts shall be comprised of contiguous territory. Contiguity by water is sufficient."

⁶ The Adopted Criteria state: "Division of counties in the 2021 Congressional plan shall only be made for reasons of equalizing population and consideration of double bunking."

three splits, and so on. For the purpose of creating equally populated districts, each newly drawn congressional district requires only one county split. But the fourteenth and final district drawn in North Carolina does need not create an additional county split, since this final district should simply be the remaining area unassigned to the first thirteen districts. Therefore, an entire plan of 14 congressional districts requires only 13 county splits. Accordingly, I require that every simulated plan contain only 13 county splits. The 2021 Adopted Criteria do not prohibit splitting a county more than once, so I allow some of these 13 county splits to occur within the same county. As a result, the total number of counties containing one or more splits may be fewer than 13. The algorithm also follows the Adopted Criteria in that it draws a congressional district wholly within Mecklenburg and Wake counties, which each have sufficient population size to contain an entire congressional district within their boundaries.

d) Minimizing VTD Splits⁷: North Carolina is divided into 2,666 VTDs. The computer simulation algorithm attempted to keep these VTDs intact and not split them into multiple districts, except when doing so is necessary for creating equally populated districts. For the purpose of creating equally populated districts, each newly drawn congressional district requires one VTD split. But the fourteenth and final district drawn in North Carolina does need not create an additional VTD split, since this final district should simply be the remaining area unassigned to the first thirteen districts. Therefore, an entire plan of 14 congressional districts requires only 13 VTD splits. I therefore require that every simulated plan split only 13 VTDs in total.

⁷ The Adopted Criteria state: “Voting districts (‘VTDs’) should be split only when necessary.”

e) Geographic Compactness⁸: The simulation algorithm prioritized the drawing of geographically compact districts whenever doing so does not violate any of the aforementioned criteria.

f) Avoiding Incumbent Pairings: North Carolina's current congressional delegation includes two incumbents, Representatives Ted Budd and David Price, who announced before the Enacted Plan was adopted that they will not run for reelection in 2022. For the remaining eleven congressional incumbents, the simulation algorithm intentionally avoids pairing multiple incumbents in the same district. Hence, in every computer-simulated plan, each district contains no more than one incumbent's residence.

g) Municipal Boundaries⁹: The simulation algorithm generally favors not splitting municipalities. The algorithm contains several steps that favor the preservation of municipal boundaries, so long as other considerations required by the Adopted Criteria are not subordinated. To the extent that the algorithm avoids unnecessary splitting of counties, the municipalities within non-split counties are of course preserved. When the algorithm splits up a county by assigning the county's various VTDs to two different districts, the algorithm only allows one municipality to be split in this process of assigning the county's VTDs to different districts. Finally, as explained earlier, VTDs are only split when doing so is necessary for equalizing district populations. When a single VTD is split for this population equalization purpose, the algorithm attempts to split the VTD in such a way that minimizes the number of municipalities split within the VTD. In


⁸ The Adopted Criteria state: "The Committees shall make reasonable efforts to draw legislative districts in the 2021 Congressional, House and Senate plans that are compact."

⁹ The Adopted Criteria state: "The Committees may consider municipal boundaries when drawing districts in the 2021 Congressional, House, and Senate plans."

other words, the algorithm attempts to draw the district border within the VTD without crossing municipal boundaries.

12. On the following page of this report, Map 1 displays an example of one of the computer-simulated plans produced by the computer algorithm. The lower half of this Map also reports the population of each district, the compactness scores for each district, and the county splits and VTD splits created by the plan. As with every simulated plan, this plan contains exactly 13 VTD splits and 13 county splits, with 11 counties split into two or more districts.

**Map 1:
Example of a Computer-Simulated Congressional Plan Protecting all 11 Incumbents**



District:	Population:	Reock:	Popper-Polsby:
1	745,670	0.508	0.492
2	745,671	0.527	0.519
3	745,670	0.306	0.219
4	745,671	0.623	0.433
5	745,671	0.649	0.661
6	745,671	0.571	0.293
7	745,671	0.354	0.303
8	745,670	0.468	0.352
9	745,670	0.576	0.405
10	745,671	0.649	0.534
11	745,670	0.377	0.424
12	745,671	0.4	0.48
13	745,671	0.46	0.301
14	745,670	0.457	0.519
Plan Average:	745,670.6	0.495	0.424

13 Split Counties:
 Alamance (Districts 12, 13)
 Burke (Districts 10, 3)
 Davie (Districts 2, 8)
 Granville (Districts 1, 14)
 Hoke (Districts 13, 6)
 Mecklenburg (Districts 5, 9)
 Nash (Districts 1, 11)
 Orange (Districts 1, 13)
 Pitt (Districts 11, 7)
 Rockingham (Districts 12, 2)
 Rowan (Districts 10, 8)
 Rutherford (Districts 3, 9)
 Wake (Districts 14, 4)

13 Split VTD's:
 VTD 00008N in Alamance County (Districts 12 and 13)
 VTD 000053 in Burke County (Districts 10 and 3)
 VTD 000011 in Davie County (Districts 2 and 8)
 VTD 00TYHO in Granville County (Districts 1 and 14)
 VTD 000063 in Hoke County (Districts 13 and 6)
 VTD 000018 in Mecklenburg County (Districts 5 and 9)
 VTD 00P09A in Nash County (Districts 1 and 11)
 VTD 0000CX in Orange County (Districts 1 and 13)
 VTD 001301 in Pitt County (Districts 11 and 7)
 VTD 0000LI in Rockingham County (Districts 12 and 2)
 VTD 000033 in Rowan County (Districts 10 and 8)
 VTD 000018 in Rutherford County (Districts 3 and 9)
 VTD 008-03 in Wake County (Districts 14 and 4)

The Enacted Plan's Compliance with the Adopted Criteria

13. Although all seven of the criteria listed above are part of the General Assembly's Adopted Criteria, five of these criteria are ones that the Joint Redistricting Committee "shall" or "should" follow in the process of drawing its Congressional districting plan. These five mandated criteria are equal population, contiguity, minimizing county splits, minimizing VTD splits, and geographic compactness.¹⁰

14. I assessed whether the 2021 Enacted Plan complies with these five mandated criteria, and I describe my findings in this section. I found that the Enacted Plan does not violate the equal population requirement, nor do any of its districts violate contiguity.

15. However, by comparing the Enacted Plan to the 1,000 computer-simulated plans, I found that the Enacted Plan fails to minimize county splits, fails to minimize VTD splits, and is significantly less geographically compact than is reasonably possible. I describe these findings below in detail.

16. ***Minimizing County Splits:*** In comparing the total number of county splits in the Enacted Plan and in the computer-simulated plans, I counted the total number of times a county is split into more than one district. Specifically, a county fully contained within a single district counts as zero splits. A county split into two full or partial districts counts as one split. And a county split into three full or partial districts counts as two splits. And so on.

17. Using this standard method of accounting for total county splits, I found that the Enacted Plan contains 14 total county splits, which are detailed in Table 1. These 14 total county splits are spread across 11 counties. Eight of these 11 counties are split only once, but Guilford,

¹⁰ In listing these five mandated criteria, I am not including the Adopted Criteria's prohibitions on the use of racial data, partisan considerations, and election results data. I did not assess whether the Enacted Plan complies with the prohibition on racial considerations.

Mecklenburg, and Wake Counties are each split into three districts, thus accounting for two splits each. Thus, the Enacted Plan has 14 total county splits, as listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Total Number of County Splits in the 2021 Enacted Plan

	County:	Congressional Districts:	Total County Splits:
1	Davidson	7 and 10	1
2	Guilford	7, 10, and 11	2
3	Harnett	4 and 7	1
4	Iredell	10 and 12	1
5	Mecklenburg	8, 9, and 13	2
6	Onslow	1 and 3	1
7	Pitt	1 and 2	1
8	Robeson	3 and 8	1
9	Wake	5, 6, and 7	2
10	Watauga	11 and 14	1
11	Wayne	2 and 4	1
Total County Splits:			14

As explained in the previous section, a congressional plan in North Carolina needs to contain only 13 county splits if the map-drawer is attempting to minimize the splitting of counties. The Enacted Plan’s 14 county splits is therefore one more split than is necessary. This “extra” split is specifically found at the border between District 7 and District 10. In general, the border between any two congressional districts in North Carolina needs to split only one county, at most. But in the Enacted Plan, the border between Districts 7 and 10 creates two county splits: One split of Davidson County and one split of Guilford County. Creating two county splits of Davidson and Guilford Counties was not necessary for equalizing district populations. Nor was it necessary for protecting incumbents, as no incumbents reside in the portions of Davidson and Guilford Counties within District 7 and District 10. Hence, the “extra” county split in Davidson and Guilford Counties does not appear to be consistent with the 2021 Adopted Criteria, which


mandate that “Division of counties in the 2021 Congressional plan shall only be made for reasons of equalizing population and consideration of double bunking.”

18. Indeed, I found that the computer simulation algorithm was always able to draw districts complying with the Adopted Criteria without using an “extra” 14th county split. As the upper half of Figure 1 illustrates, all 1,000 computer-simulated plans contain exactly 13 county splits. The Enacted Plan clearly contains more county splits than one would expect from a map-drawing process complying with the Adopted Criteria. Therefore, I conclude that the Enacted Plan does not comply with the Adopted Criteria’s rule against unnecessary division of counties.


19. The Adopted Criteria do not explicitly limit the number of county splits within any single county. Nevertheless, it is notable that under the Enacted Plan, three different counties (Guilford, Mecklenburg, and Wake) are split multiple times. These three counties are each split into three districts under the Enacted Plan. This is an outcome that rarely occurs under the computer-simulated plans. As the lower half of Figure 1 illustrates, only 1.8% of the computer-simulated plans similarly split three or more counties multiple times. Thus, it is clear that the Enacted Plan’s level of concentrating multiple county splits within a single county is an outcome that generally does not occur in a vast majority of the simulated plans drawn according to the Adopted Criteria. Additionally, not once in the small number of simulated plans that split at least three counties three ways are Guilford, Mecklenburg, and Wake Counties all split multiple times.

Figure 1:

Comparison of Total County Splits in Enacted SB 740 Plan and 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans



**Number of Counties Split Multiple Times
in Enacted SB 740 Plan and 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans**



21. **Minimizing VTD Splits:** The Adopted Criteria mandates that “Voting districts (‘VTDs’) should be split only when necessary.” As explained earlier in this report, each newly drawn congressional district needs to create only one VTD split for the purpose of equalizing the district’s population. But the fourteenth and final district drawn in North Carolina does need not create an additional VTD split, since this final district should simply be the remaining area unassigned to the first 13 districts. Therefore, an entire plan of 14 congressional districts needs to create only 13 VTD splits.


22. However, the Enacted Plan creates far more VTD splits than is necessary. As the General Assembly’s “StatPack” Report¹¹ for the Enacted SB 740 Plan details, the Enacted Plan splits 24 VTDs into multiple districts. Among these 24 split VTDs, 23 VTDs are split into two districts, while one VTD (Wake County VTD 18-02) is split into three districts. Thus, using the same method of accounting for splits described earlier, the Enacted Plan contains 25 total VTD splits, and 24 VTDs are split into two or more districts.

23. The Enacted Plan’s 25 total VTD splits is far more than is necessary to comply with the Adopted Criteria’s equal population requirement. As explained earlier, only 13 VTD splits are necessary in order to produce an equally populated congressional plan in North Carolina. Thus, as Figure 2 illustrates, every one of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans contains exactly 13 VTD splits, and the Enacted Plan’s 25 total VTD splits is clearly not consistent with the Adopted Criteria’s requirement that “Voting districts (‘VTDs’) should be split only when necessary.”

¹¹ Available at:
<https://webservices.ncleg.gov/ViewBillDocument/2021/53447/0/SL%202021-174%20-%20StatPack%20Report>.

Figure 2:

Comparison of Total VTD Splits in Enacted SB 740 Plan and 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans



24. *Measuring Geographic Compactness*: The August 12, 2021 Adopted Criteria mandates that the Joint Redistricting Committee “shall” attempt to draw geographically compact congressional districts. The Adopted Criteria also specify two commonly used measures of district compactness: the Reock score and the Polsby-Popper score.

25. In evaluating whether the Enacted Plan follows the compactness requirement of the Adopted Criteria, it is useful to compare the compactness of the Enacted Plan and the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. The computer-simulated plans were produced by a computer algorithm adhering strictly to the traditional districting criteria mandated by the Adopted Criteria and ignoring any partisan or racial considerations. Thus, the compactness scores of these computer-simulated plans illustrate the statistical range of compactness scores that could be reasonably expected to emerge from a districting process that solely seeks to follow the Adopted Criteria while ignoring partisan and racial considerations. I therefore compare the compactness of the simulated plans and the Enacted Plan using the two measures of compactness specified by the 2021 Adopted Criteria.


26. First, I calculate the average Polsby-Popper score of each plan’s districts. The Polsby-Popper score for each individual district is calculated as the ratio of the district’s area to the area of a hypothetical circle whose circumference is identical to the length of the district’s perimeter; thus, higher Polsby-Popper scores indicate greater district compactness. The 2021 Enacted Plan has an average Polsby-Popper score of 0.3026 across its 14 congressional districts. As illustrated in Figure 3, every single one of the 1,000 computer-simulated House plans in this report exhibits a higher Polsby-Popper score than the Enacted Plan. In fact, the middle 50% of these 1,000 computer-simulated plans have an average Polsby-Popper score ranging from 0.37 to 0.39, and the most compact computer-simulated plan has a Polsby-Popper score of 0.42. Hence,

it is clear that the Enacted Plan is significantly less compact, as measured by its Polsby-Popper score, than what could reasonably have been expected from a districting process adhering to the Adopted Criteria.

27. Second, I calculate the average Reock score of the districts within each plan. The Reock score for each individual district is calculated as the ratio of the district's area to the area of the smallest bounding circle that can be drawn to completely contain the district; thus, higher Reock scores indicate more geographically compact districts. The 2021 Enacted Plan has an average Reock score of 0.4165 across its 14 congressional districts. As illustrated in Figure 3, 98.2% of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans exhibit a higher Reock score than the Enacted Plan. In fact, the middle 50% of these 1,000 computer-simulated plans have an average Reock score ranging from 0.45 to 0.46, and the most compact computer-simulated plan has an average Reock score of 0.52. Hence, it is clear that the Enacted Plan is significantly less compact, as measured by its Reock score, than what could reasonably have been expected from a districting process adhering to the Adopted Criteria.

Figure 3:

**Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
on Polsby-Popper and Reock Compactness Scores**



Measuring the Partisanship of Districting Plans

28. In general, I use actual election results from recent, statewide election races in North Carolina to assess the partisan performance of the Enacted Plan and the computer-simulated plans analyzed in this report. Overlaying these past election results onto a districting plan enables me to calculate the Republican (or Democratic) share of the votes cast from within each district in the Enacted Plan and in each simulated plan. I am also able to count the total number of Republican and Democratic-leaning districts within each simulated plan and within the Enacted Plan. All of these calculations thus allow me to directly compare the partisanship of the Enacted Plan and the simulated plans. These partisan comparisons allow me to determine whether or not the partisanship of individual districts and the partisan distribution of seats in the Enacted Plan could reasonably have arisen from a districting process adhering to the Adopted Criteria and its explicit prohibition on partisan considerations. Past voting history in federal and statewide elections is a strong predictor of future voting history. Mapmakers thus can and do use past voting history to identify the class of voters, at a precinct-by-precinct level, who are likely to vote for Republican or Democratic congressional candidates.

29. In the 2011, 2016, and 2017 rounds of state legislative and congressional redistricting last decade, the North Carolina General Assembly publicly disclosed that it was relying solely on recent statewide elections in measuring the partisanship of the districting plans being created. I therefore follow the General Assembly's past practice from last decade by using results from a similar set of recent statewide elections in order to measure the partisanship of districts in the Enacted Plan and in the computer-simulated plans.

30. ***The 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite:*** During the General Assembly's 2017 legislative redistricting process, Representative David Lewis announced at the Joint Redistricting Committee's August 10, 2017 meeting that the General Assembly would measure

the partisanship of legislative districts using the results from some of the most recent elections held in North Carolina for the following five offices: US President, US Senator, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General.

31. To measure the partisanship of all districts in the computer-simulated plans and the 2021 Enacted Plan, I used the two most-recent election contests held in North Carolina for these same five offices during 2016-2020. In other words, I used the results of the following ten elections: 2016 US President, 2016 US Senator, 2016 Governor, 2016 Lieutenant Governor, 2016 Attorney General, 2020 US President, 2020 US Senator, 2020 Governor, 2020 Lieutenant Governor, and 2020 Attorney General. I use these election results because these are the same state and federal offices whose election results were used by the General Assembly during its 2017 legislative redistricting process, and the 2017 redistricting process was the most recent one in which the leadership of the General Assembly's redistricting committees publicly announced how the General Assembly would evaluate the partisanship of its own districting plans.

32. I obtained precinct-level results for these ten elections, and I disaggregated these election results down to the census block level. I then aggregated these block-level election results to the district level within each computer-simulated plan and the Enacted Plan, and I calculated the number of districts within each plan that cast more votes for Republican than Democratic candidates. I use these calculations to measure the partisan performance of each simulated plan analyzed in this report and of the Enacted Plan. In other words, I look at the census blocks that would comprise a particular district in a given simulation and, using the actual election results from those census blocks, I calculate whether voters in that simulated district collectively cast more votes for Republican or Democratic candidates in the 2016-2020 statewide election contests. I performed such calculations for each district under each simulated plan to

measure the number of districts Democrats or Republicans would win under that particular simulated districting map.

33. I refer to the aggregated election results from these ten statewide elections as the “2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite.” For the Enacted Plan districts and for all districts in each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans, I calculate the percentage of total two-party votes across these ten elections that were cast in favor of Republican candidates in order to measure the average Republican vote share of the district. In the following section, I present district-level comparisons of the Enacted Plan and simulated plan districts in order to identify whether any individual districts in the Enacted Plan are partisan outliers. I also present plan-wide comparisons of the Enacted Plan and the simulated plans in order to identify the extent to which the Enacted Plan is a statistical outlier in terms of common measures of districting plan partisanship.

District-Level and Plan-Wide Partisan Comparisons of the Enacted Plan and Simulated Plans


34. In this section, I present partisan comparisons of the Enacted Plan to the computer-simulated plans at both a district-by-district level as well as a plan-wide level using several common measures of districting plan partisanship. First, I compare the district-level Republican vote share of the Enacted Plan's districts and the districts in the computer-simulated plans. Next, I compare the number of Republican-favoring districts in the Enacted Plan and in the computer-simulated plans. Finally, I use several common measures of partisan bias to compare the Enacted Plan to the computer-simulated plans. Overall, I find that the several individual districts in the Enacted Plan are statistical outliers, exhibiting extreme partisan characteristics that are rarely or never observed in the computer-simulated plan districts drawn with strict adherence to the Adopted Criteria. Moreover, I find that at the plan-wide level, the Enacted Plan creates a degree of partisan bias favoring Republicans that is more extreme than the vast majority of the computer-simulated plans. I describe these findings in detail below:

35. ***Partisan Outlier Districts in the Enacted Plan:*** In Figure 4, I directly compare the partisan distribution of districts in the Enacted Plan to the partisan distribution of districts in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. I first order the Enacted Plan's districts from the most to the least-Republican district, as measured by Republican vote share using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. The most-Republican district appears on the top row, and the least-Republican district appears on the bottom row of Figure 4. Next, I analyze each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans and similarly order each simulated plan's districts from the most- to the least-Republican district. I then directly compare the most-Republican Enacted Plan district (CD-10) to the most-Republican simulated district from each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. In other words, I compare one district from the Enacted Plan to 1,000 computer-simulated

districts, and I compare these districts based on their Republican vote share. I then directly compare the second-most-Republican district in the Enacted Plan to the second-most-Republican district from each of the 1,000 simulated plans. I conduct the same comparison for each district in the Enacted Plan, comparing the Enacted Plan district to its computer-simulated counterparts from each of the 1,000 simulated plans.

Figure 4:

Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan Districts to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans' Districts



36. Thus, the top row of Figure 4 directly compares the partisanship of the most-Republican Enacted Plan district (CD-10) to the partisanship of the most-Republican district from each of the 1,000 simulated plans. The two percentages (in parentheses) in the right margin of this Figure report the percentage of these 1,000 simulated districts that are less Republican than, and more Republican than, the Enacted Plan district. Similarly, the second row of this Figure compares the second-most-Republican district from each plan, the third row compares the third-most-Republican district from each plan, and so on. In each row of this Figure, the Enacted Plan's district is depicted with a red star and labeled in red with its district number; meanwhile, the 1,000 computer-simulated districts are depicted with 1,000 gray circles on each row.

37. As the bottom row of Figure 4 illustrates, the most-Democratic district in the Enacted Plan (CD-9) is more heavily Democratic than 100% of the most-Democratic districts in each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. This calculation is numerically reported in the right margin of the Figure. Every single one of the computer-simulated counterpart districts would have been more politically moderate than CD-9 in terms of partisanship: CD-9 exhibits a Republican vote share of 27.2%, while all 1,000 of the most-Democratic districts in the computer-simulated plans would have exhibited a higher Republican vote share and would therefore have been more politically moderate. It is thus clear that CD-9 packs together Democratic voters to a more extreme extent than the most-Democratic district in 100% of the computer-simulated plans. I therefore identify CD-9 as an extreme partisan outlier when compared to its 1,000 computer-simulated counterparts, using a standard threshold test of 95% for statistical significance.

38. The next-to-bottom row of Figure 4 reveals a similar finding regarding CD-6 in the Enacted Plan. This row illustrates that the second-most-Democratic district in the Enacted

Plan (CD-6) is more heavily Democratic than 100% of the second-most-Democratic districts in each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. Every single one of its computer-simulated counterpart districts would have been more politically moderate than CD-6 in terms of partisanship: CD-6 exhibits a Republican vote share of 27.5%, while 100% of the second-most-Democratic districts in the computer-simulated plans would have exhibited a higher Republican vote share and would therefore have been more politically moderate. In other words, CD-6 packs together Democratic voters to a more extreme extent than the second-most-Democratic district in 100% of the computer-simulated plans. I therefore identify CD-6 as an extreme partisan outlier when compared to its 1,000 computer-simulated counterparts, using a standard threshold test of 95% for statistical significance.

39. Meanwhile, the top two rows of Figure 4 reveal a similar finding: As the top row illustrates, the most-Republican district in the Enacted Plan (CD-10) is less heavily Republican than 100% of the most-Republican districts in each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. A similar pattern appears in the second-to-top row of Figure 4, which illustrates that the second-most-Republican district in the Enacted Plan (CD-13) is less heavily Republican than 99.7% of the second-most-Republican districts in each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans.

40. It is especially notable that these four aforementioned Enacted Plan districts – the two most Republican districts (CD-10 and CD-13) and the two most Democratic districts (CD-9 and CD-6) in the Enacted Plan – were drawn to include more Democratic voters than virtually all of their counterpart districts in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. These “extra” Democratic voters in the four most partisan-extreme districts in the Enacted Plan had to come from the remaining ten more moderate districts in the Enacted Plan. Having fewer Democratic voters in these more moderate districts enhances Republican candidate performance in these districts.

41. Indeed, the middle six rows in Figure 4 (i.e., rows 5 through 10) confirm this precise effect. The middle six rows in Figure 4 compare the partisanship of districts in the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth-most Republican districts within the Enacted Plan and the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. In all six of these rows, the Enacted Plan district is a partisan outlier. In each of these six rows, the Enacted Plan's district is more heavily Republican than over 95% of its counterpart districts in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. Three of these six rows illustrate Enacted Plan districts that are more heavily Republican than 100% of their counterpart districts in the computer-simulated plans. The six Enacted Plan districts in these six middle rows (CD-1, 3, 4, 11, 12, and 14) are more heavily Republican than nearly all of their counterpart computer-simulated plan districts because the four most partisan-extreme districts in the Enacted Plan (CD-6, 9, 10, and 13) are more heavily Democratic than nearly all of their counterpart districts in the computer-simulated plans.

42. I therefore identify the six Enacted Plan districts in the six middle rows (CD-1, 3, 4, 11, 12, and 14) of Figure 4 as partisan statistical outliers. Each of these six districts has a Republican vote share that is higher than over 95% of the computer-simulated districts in its respective row in Figure 4. I also identify the four Enacted Plan districts in the top rows and the bottom two rows (CD-6, 9, 10, and 13) of Figure 4 as partisan statistical outliers. Each of these four districts has a Republican vote share that is lower than at least 99.7% of the computer-simulated districts in its respective row in Figure 4.

43. In summary, Figure 4 illustrates that 10 of the 14 districts in the Enacted Plan are partisan outliers: Six districts (CD-1, 3, 4, 11, 12, and 14) in the Enacted Plan are more heavily Republican than over 95% of their counterpart computer-simulated plan districts, while four

districts (CD-6, 9, 10, and 13) are more heavily Democratic than at least 99.7% of their counterpart districts in the computer-simulated plans.

44. The Appendix of this report contains ten additional Figures (Figures A1 through A10) that each contain a similar analysis of the Enacted Plan districts and the computer-simulated plan districts. Each of these ten Figures in the Appendix measures the partisanship of districts using one of the individual ten elections included in the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. These ten Figures generally demonstrate that the same extreme partisan outlier patterns observed in Figure 4 are also present when district partisanship is measured using any one of the ten statewide elections held in North Carolina during 2016-2020.

45. ***“Mid-Range” Republican Districts:*** Collectively, the upper ten rows in Figure 4 illustrate that the Enacted Plan’s ten most-Republican districts exhibit a significantly narrower range of partisanship than is exhibited by the ten most-Republican districts in each of the computer-simulated plans. Specifically, the Enacted Plan’s ten most-Republican districts all have Republican vote shares within the narrow range of 52.9% to 61.2%. As explained earlier, this narrow range is the product of two distinct dynamics: In the top two rows of Figure 4, the Enacted Plan’s districts are significantly less Republican than nearly all of the simulated plans’ districts in these rows. But in the fifth to tenth rows of Figure 4, the Enacted Plan’s districts are more safely Republican-leaning than over 95% of the computer-simulated districts within each of these six rows. The overall result of these two distinct dynamics is that the Enacted Plan contains ten districts that all have Republican vote shares within the narrow range of 52.9% to 61.2%. I label any districts within this narrow range of partisanship as “mid-range” Republican-leaning districts, reflecting the fact that these districts have generally favored Republican candidates, but not by overwhelmingly large margins.

46. Is the Enacted Plan's creation of ten such "mid-range" Republican-leaning districts an outcome that ever occurs in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans? I analyzed the simulated plans and counted the number of districts within each plan that are similarly "mid-range" with a Republican vote share between 52.9% and 61.2%. As Figure 5 illustrates, the Enacted Plan's creation of ten "mid-range" Republican districts is an extreme statistical outlier. None of the 1,000 simulated plans comes close to creating ten such districts. Virtually all of the simulated plans contain from two to six "mid-range" Republican districts, and the most common outcome among the simulations is four such districts. Hence, the Enacted Plan is clearly an extreme partisan outlier in terms of its peculiar focus on maximizing the number of "mid-range" Republican districts, and the Enacted Plan did so to an extreme degree far beyond any of the 1,000 simulated plans created using a partisan-blind computer algorithm that follows the Adopted Criteria.

47. ***Competitive Districts:*** The Enacted Plan's maximization of "mid-range" Republican districts necessarily comes at the expense of creating more competitive districts. As Figure 4 illustrates, the Enacted Plan contains zero districts whose Republican vote share is higher than 47.0% and lower than 52.9%, as measured using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. In other words, there are zero districts in which the Republican vote share is within 5% of the Democratic vote share.

48. I label districts with a Republican vote share from 47.5% to 52.5% as "competitive" districts to reflect the fact that such districts have a nearly even share of Republican and Democratic voters, and election outcomes in the district could therefore swing in favor of either party. The Enacted Plan contains zero "competitive" districts, as measured using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite.

Figure 5:
Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
On Number of Mid-Range Republican Districts





Figure 6:
Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
On Number of Competitive Districts



49. Is the Enacted Plan's failure to create any "competitive" districts an outcome that ever occurs in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans? I analyzed the simulated plans and counted the number of districts within each plan that are "competitive" districts with a Republican vote share between 47.5% and 52.5%. As Figure 6 illustrates, the Enacted Plan's creation of zero "competitive" districts is almost a statistical outlier: Only 5.2% of the 1,000 simulated plans similarly fail to have a single "competitive" district. The vast majority of the computer-simulated plans contain two or more "competitive" districts. Almost 95% of the computer-simulated plans create more "competitive" districts than the Enacted Plan does.


50. *Number of Democratic and Republican Districts:* Figure 7 compares the partisan breakdown of the computer-simulated plans to the partisanship of the Enacted Plan. Specifically, Figure 7 uses the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite to measure the number of Republican-favoring districts created in each of the 1,000 simulated plans. Across the entire state, Republican candidates collectively won a 50.8% share of the votes in the ten elections in the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. But within the 14 districts in the Enacted Plan, Republicans have over a 50% vote share in 10 out of 14 districts. In other words, the Enacted Plan created 10 Republican-favoring districts, as measured using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. By contrast, only 3% of the computer-simulated plans create 10 Republican-favoring districts, and no computer-simulated plan ever creates more than 10 Republican districts.

51. Hence, in terms of the total number of Republican-favoring districts created by the plan, the 2021 Enacted Plan is a statistical outlier when compared to the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. The Enacted Plan creates the maximum number of Republican districts that ever occurs in any computer-simulated plan, and the Enacted Plan creates more Republican districts

than 97% of the computer-simulated plans, which were drawn using a non-partisan districting process adhering to the General Assembly’s 2021 Adopted Criteria. I characterize the Enacted Plan’s creation of 10 Republican districts as a statistical outlier among the computer-simulated plans because the Enacted Plan exhibits an outcome that is more favorable to Republicans than over 95% of the simulated plans.

Figure 7:

Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans



52. Notably, the ten elections included in the Statewide Election Composite all occurred in two election years and in electoral environments that were relatively favorable to Republicans across the country (November 2016 and November 2020). North Carolina did not hold any statewide elections for non-judicial offices in November 2018, which was an electoral environment more favorable to Democrats across the country.

53. Hence, the projected number of Republican seats would be even lower in the computer-simulated plans if one measured district partisanship using a statewide election whose outcome was more partisan-balanced or even favorable to Democrats. In the Appendix, I present ten histograms (labeled as Figures B1 to B10), each presenting the projected number of Republican seats across all of the simulated plans and the Enacted Plan using only one of the ten elections in the Statewide Election Composite.

54. The ten histograms in Figures B1 to B10 illustrate how the partisanship of the Enacted Plan compares to the partisanship of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans under a range of different electoral environments, as reflected by the ten elections in the Statewide Election Composite. Most notably, under all ten of these elections, the Enacted Plan always contains exactly 10 Republican-favoring districts and 4 Democrat-favoring districts. Hence, it is clear that the Enacted Plan creates a 10-to-4 distribution of seats in favor of Republican candidates that is durable across a range of different electoral conditions.

55. Moreover, the histograms in Figures B1 to B10 demonstrate that the Enacted Plan becomes a more extreme partisan outlier relative to the computer-simulated plans under electoral conditions that are slightly to moderately favorable to the Democratic candidate. For example, Figure B1 compares the Enacted Plan to the computer-simulated plan using the results of the 2016 Attorney General election, which was a near-tied statewide contest in which Democrat Josh

Stein defeated Republican Buck Newton by a very slim margin. Using the 2016 Attorney General election to measure district partisanship, the 2021 Enacted Plan contains 10 Republican-favoring districts out of 14. The Enacted Plan's creation of 10 districts favoring Republican Buck Newton over Democrat Josh Stein is an outcome that never occurs in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans, indicating that the Enacted Plan is a partisan statistical outlier under electoral conditions that are more favorable for Democrats (and thus relatively more unfavorable for Republicans) than is normal in North Carolina.

56. An even more favorable election for the Democratic candidate was the 2020 gubernatorial contest, in which Democrat Roy Cooper defeated Republican Dan Forest by a 4.5% margin. Figure B7 compares the Enacted Plan to the computer-simulated plans using the results of this 2020 gubernatorial election. Using the results from this election, the 2021 Enacted Plan contains 10 Republican-favoring districts out of 14. None of the 1,000 simulated plans ever contain 10 districts favoring the Republican candidate. The Enacted Plan's creation of 10 Republican-favoring districts is therefore an extreme partisan outlier that is durable even in Democratic-favorable electoral conditions. In fact, the 10-to-4 Republican partisan advantage under the Enacted Plan appears to become even more of an extreme partisan outlier under Democratic-favorable elections.

57. ***The Mean-Median Difference:*** I also calculate each districting plan's mean-median difference, which is another accepted method that redistricting scholars commonly use to compare the relative partisan bias of different districting plans. The mean-median difference for any given plan is calculated as the mean district-level Republican vote share, minus the median district-level Republican vote share. For any congressional districting plan, the mean is calculated as the average of the Republican vote shares in each of the 14 districts. The median, in

turn, is the Republican vote share in the district where Republican performed the middle-best, which is the district that Republican would need to win to secure a majority of the congressional delegation. For a congressional plan containing 14 districts, the median district is calculated as the average of the Republican vote share in the districts where Republican performed the 7th and 8th-best across the state.

58. Using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite to measure partisanship, the districts in the 2021 Enacted Plan have a mean Republican vote share of 50.8%, while the median district has a Republican vote share of 56.2%. Thus, the Enacted Plan has a mean-median difference of +5.4%, indicating that the median district is skewed significantly more Republican than the plan's average district. The mean-median difference thus indicates that the Enacted Plan distributes voters across districts in such a way that most districts are significantly more Republican-leaning than the average North Carolina congressional district, while Democratic voters are more heavily concentrated in a minority of the Enacted Plan's districts.


59. I perform this same mean-median difference calculation on all computer-simulated plans in order to determine whether this partisan skew in the median congressional districts could have resulted naturally from North Carolina's political geography and the application of the Adopted Criteria. Figure 8 compares the mean-median difference of the Enacted Plan to the mean-median difference for each the 1,000 computer-simulated plans.

60. Figure 8 contains 1,000 gray circles, representing the 1,000 computer-simulated plans, as well as a red star, representing the 2021 Enacted Plan. The horizontal axis in this Figure measures the mean-median difference of the 2021 Enacted Plan and each simulated plan using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite, while the vertical axis measures the average Polsby-Popper compactness score of the districts within each plan, with higher Polsby-Popper

scores indicating more compact districts. Figure 8 illustrates that the Enacted Plan's mean-median difference is +5.4%, indicating that the median district is skewed significantly more Republican than the plan's average district. Figure 8 further indicates that this difference is an extreme statistical outlier compared to the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. Indeed, the Enacted Plan's +5.4% mean-median difference is an outcome never observed across these 1,000 simulated plans. The 1,000 simulated plans all exhibit mean-median differences that range from -0.1% to +4.6%. In fact, the middle 50% of these computer-simulated plans have mean-median differences ranging from +2.1% to +3.1%, indicating a much smaller degree of skew in the median district than occurs under the 2021 Enacted Plan. These results confirm that the Enacted Plan creates an extreme partisan outcome that cannot be explained by North Carolina's voter geography or by strict adherence to the required districting criteria set forth in the General Assembly's Adopted Criteria.

Figure 8:

Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
on Mean-Median Difference and Compactness



61. Figure 8 illustrates that the Enacted Plan is less geographically compact than every single one of the computer-simulated plans, as measured by each plan's average Polsby-Popper score. The simulated plans have Polsby-Popper scores ranging from 0.31 to 0.42. In fact, the middle 50% of these computer-simulated plans have Polsby-Popper scores ranging from 0.37 to 0.39. Meanwhile, the Enacted Plan exhibits a Polsby-Popper score of only 0.30, which is lower than all 1,000 of the computer-simulated plans. Hence, it is clear that the Enacted Plan did not seek to draw districts that were as geographically compact as reasonably possible. Instead, the Enacted Plan subordinated geographic compactness, which enabled the Enacted Plan to create a partisan skew in North Carolina's congressional districts favoring Republican candidates.

62. ***The Efficiency Gap:*** Another commonly used measure of a districting plan's partisan bias is the efficiency gap.¹² To calculate the efficiency gap of the Enacted Plan and every computer-simulated plan, I first measure the number of Republican and Democratic votes within each Enacted Plan district and each computer-simulated district, as measured using the 2016- 2020 Statewide Election Composite. Using this measure of district-level partisanship, I then calculate each districting plan's efficiency gap using the method outlined in *Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap*.¹³ Districts are classified as Democratic victories if, using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite, the sum total of Democratic votes in the district during these elections exceeds the sum total of Republican votes; otherwise, the district is classified as Republican. For each party, I then calculate the total sum of surplus votes in districts the party won and lost votes in districts where the party lost. Specifically, in a district lost by a

¹² Eric McGhee, "Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* Vol. 39, No. 1: 55–85 (2014).

¹³ Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, *Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap*, 82 *University of Chicago Law Review* 831 (2015).

given party, all of the party's votes are considered lost votes; in a district won by a party, only the party's votes exceeding the 50% threshold necessary for victory are considered surplus votes. A party's total wasted votes for an entire districting plan is the sum of its surplus votes in districts won by the party and its lost votes in districts lost by the party. The efficiency gap is then calculated as total wasted Democratic votes minus total wasted Republican votes, divided by the total number of two-party votes cast statewide across all seven elections.

63. Thus, the theoretical importance of the efficiency gap is that it tells us the degree to which more Democratic or Republican votes are wasted across an entire districting plan. A significantly positive efficiency gap indicates far more Democratic wasted votes, while a significantly negative efficiency gap indicates far more Republican wasted votes.


64. I analyze whether the Enacted Plan's efficiency gap arises naturally from a map-drawing process strictly adhering to the mandated criteria in the General Assembly's Adopted Criteria, or rather, whether the skew in the Enacted Plan's efficiency gap is explainable only as the product of a map-drawing process that intentionally favored one party over the other. By comparing the efficiency gap of the Enacted Plan to that of the computer-simulated plans, I am able to evaluate whether or not such the Enacted Plan's efficiency gap could have realistically resulted from adherence to the Adopted Criteria.

65. Figure 9 compares the efficiency gaps of the Enacted Plan and of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. As before, the 1,000 circles in this Figure represent the 1,000 computer-simulated plans, while the red star in the upper right corner represents the Enacted Plan. Each plan is plotted along the vertical axis according to its efficiency gap, while each plan is plotted along the horizontal axis according to its mean-median difference.

66. The results in Figure 9 illustrate that the Enacted Plan exhibits an efficiency gap

of +19.5%, indicating that the plan results in far more wasted Democratic votes than wasted Republican votes. Specifically, the difference between the total number of wasted Democratic votes and wasted Republican votes amounts to 19.5% of the total number of votes statewide. The Enacted Plan's efficiency gap is larger than the efficiency gaps exhibited by 98.7% of the computer-simulated plans. This comparison reveals that the significant level of Republican bias exhibited by the Enacted Plan cannot be explained by North Carolina's political geography or the Adopted Criteria alone.

Figure 9:
Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
on Mean-Median Difference and Efficiency Gap



67. ***The Lopsided Margins Measure:*** Another measure of partisan bias in districting plans is the “lopsided margins” test. The basic premise captured by this measure is that a partisan-motivated map-drawer may attempt to pack the opposing party’s voters into a small number of extreme districts that are won by a lopsided margin. Thus, for example, a map-drawer attempting to favor Party A may pack Party B’s voters into a small number of districts that very heavily favor Party B. This packing would then allow Party A to win all the remaining districts with relatively smaller margins. This sort of partisan manipulation in districting would result in Party B winning its districts by extremely large margins, while Party A would win its districts by relatively small margins.

68. Hence, the lopsided margins test is performed by calculating the difference between the average margin of victory in Republican-favoring districts and the average margin of victory in Democratic-favoring districts. The 2021 Enacted Plan contains four Democratic-favoring districts (CD-2, 5, 6, and 9), and these four districts have an average Democratic vote share of 65.4%, as measured using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. By contrast, the Enacted Plan contains ten Republican-favoring districts (CD-1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14), and these ten districts have an average Republican vote share of 57.3%. Hence, the difference between the average Democratic margin of victory in Democratic-favoring districts and the average Republican margin of victory in Republican-favoring districts is +8.1%, which is calculated as 65.4% - 57.3%. I refer to this calculation of +8.1% as the Enacted Plan’s lopsided margins measure.

69. How does the 8.1% lopsided margins measure of the Enacted Plan compare to the same calculation for the 1,000 computer-simulated plans? Figure 10 reports the lopsided margins calculations for the Enacted Plan and for the simulated plans. In Figure 10, each plan is plotted


along the horizontal axis according to its lopsided margins measure and along the vertical axis according to its mean-median difference.

70. Figure 10 reveals that the Enacted Plan's +8.1% lopsided margins measure is an extreme outlier compared to the lopsided margins measures of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. All 1,000 of the simulated plans have a smaller lopsided margins measure than the Enacted Plan. In fact, a significant minority (37.3%) of the 1,000 simulated plans have a lopsided margins measure of between -2% to +2%, indicating a plan in which Democrats and Republicans win their respective districts by similar average margins.

71. By contrast, the Enacted Plan's lopsided margins measure of +8.1% indicates that the Enacted Plan creates districts in which Democrats are extremely packed into their districts, while the margin of victory in Republican districts is significantly smaller. The "lopsidedness" of the two parties' average margin of victory is extreme when compared to the computer-simulated plans. The finding that all 1,000 simulated plans have a smaller lopsided margins measure indicates that the Enacted Plan's extreme packing of Democrats into Democratic-favoring districts was not simply the result of North Carolina's political geography, combined with adherence to the Adopted Criteria.

Figure 10:

**Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
on Lopsided Margins Measure and Mean-Median Difference**



72. *Partisan Symmetry Based on Uniform Swing:* Another common measure of partisan bias is based on the concept of partisan symmetry and asks the following question: Under a given districting plan and given a particular election-based measure of district partisanship, what share of seats would each party win in a hypothetical tied election (i.e., 50% vote share for each of two parties). To approximate the district-level outcomes in a hypothetical tied election, one normally uses a uniform swing in order to simulate a tied statewide election. We then calculate whether each party would receive more than or less than 50% of the seats under this hypothetical tied election in a given districting plan. This particular measure is often referred to in the academic literature as “partisan bias.” In order to avoid confusion with other measures of partisan bias described in this report, I will refer to this measure as “Partisan Symmetry Based on Uniform Swing.”

73. Specifically, I use the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite to calculate the Partisan Symmetry measure for both the Enacted Plan and for the computer-simulated plans. The 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite produces a statewide Republican vote share of 50.8%. Therefore, I use a uniform swing of -0.8% in order to estimate the partisanship of districts under a hypothetical tied election in which each party wins exactly 50% of the statewide vote. In other words, this uniform swing subtracts 0.8% from the Republican vote share in every district, both in the Enacted Plan and in all simulated plans.

74. After applying this -0.8% uniform swing, I compare the number of Republican-favoring districts in the Enacted Plan and the simulated plans. In the Enacted Plan, 71.4% of the districts (10 out of 14) are Republican-favoring after applying the uniform swing. I then report the Republicans’ seat share (71.4%) under this hypothetical tied election in Figure 11 as the “Partisan


Symmetry Based on Uniform Swing” measure for the Enacted Plan. Figure 11 also reports the calculations for all 1,000 simulated plans using this identical method.

75. Figure 11 reveals 99.5% of the 1,000 simulated plans have a “Partisan Symmetry Based on Uniform Swing” measure that is closer to 50% than the Enacted Plan’s measure. In fact, 14% of the simulated plans have a measure that is exactly 50% (7 out of 14 districts), while over 60% of the simulated plans are between 40% and 60%.

76. By contrast, the Enacted Plan’s measure of 71.4% in Figure 11 would be a statistical outlier and is more favorable to Republicans than in 99.5% of the simulated plans. Substantively, this 71.4% measure reflects the Enacted Plan’s creation of a durable Republican majority for North Carolina’s congressional delegation, such that even when Democrats win 50% of the statewide vote, Republicans will still be favored in 10 out of 14 (71.4%) of the congressional districts, while Democrats will only be favored in only 4 out of the 14 (28.6%) districts.

Figure 11:

**Comparisons of SB 740 Enacted Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
On Partisan Symmetry Based on Uniform Swing**



Conclusions Regarding Partisanship and Traditional Districting Criteria

77. The analysis described thus far in this report lead me to reach two main findings: First, among the five traditional districting criteria mandated by the General Assembly's 2021 Adopted Criteria, the Enacted Plan fails to minimize county splits, fails to minimize VTD splits, and is significantly less geographically compact than is reasonably possible under a districting process that follows the Adopted Criteria. Second, I found that the Enacted Plan is an extreme partisan outlier when compared to computer-simulated plans produced by a process following the Adopted Criteria. The Enacted Plan contains 10 districts that are partisan outliers when compared to the simulated plans' districts, and using several different common measures of partisan bias, the Enacted Plan creates a level of pro-Republican bias more extreme than in over 95% of the computer-simulated plans. In particular, the Enacted Plan creates more "mid-range" Republican districts than is created in 100% of the computer-simulated plans (Paragraphs 45-46).

78. Based on these two main findings, I conclude that partisanship predominated in the drawing of the 2021 Enacted Plan and subordinated the traditional districting principles of avoiding county splits, avoiding VTD splits, and geographic compactness. Because the Enacted Plan fails to follow three of the Adopted Criteria's mandated districting principles while simultaneously creating an extreme level of partisan bias, I therefore conclude that the partisan bias of the Enacted Plan did not naturally arise by chance from a districting process adhering to the Adopted Criteria. Instead, I conclude that partisan goals predominated in the drawing of the Enacted Plan. By subordinating traditional districting criteria, the General Assembly's Enacted Plan was able to achieve partisan goals that could not otherwise have been achieved under a partisan-neutral districting process that follows the Adopted Criteria.

Regional Comparisons of Enacted Plan and Simulated Plan Districts

79. I have thus far compared the Enacted Plan to the simulated plans at a statewide level using several common measures of partisan bias and by identifying individual districts that are partisan outliers. However, I also analyzed the extent to which partisan bias affected the map-drawing process within specific cities and geographic regions of North Carolina. I found that the Enacted Plan's individual districts in certain regions exhibit extreme political bias when compared to the computer-simulated districts in the same regions. Below, I describe my findings regarding the partisan bias caused by the Enacted Plan's district boundaries in the Piedmont Triad area, in the Research Triangle, and in Mecklenburg County.

80. ***The Piedmont Triad Area:*** The Enacted Plan splits Guilford County into three different districts: CD-7, 10, and 11. These three fragments of Guilford County, which has voted solidly Democratic in recent statewide elections, are each combined with more Republican areas in surrounding counties across the Piedmont Triad area. This three-way splitting of Guilford County results in CD-7, 10, and 11 being safely Republican, each with a Republican vote share between 55.9% and 61.2%, as measured using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite.

81. Is this three-way splitting of Guilford County, and the resulting creation of three safe Republican districts, a districting outcome that could have resulted naturally from the region's political geography, combined with the districting principles required by the Adopted Criteria? A comparison of the Enacted Plan's districts to the simulated districts in the Piedmont Triad area reveals that the Enacted Plan managed to crack Democratic voters in the region to a more extreme extent than in virtually all of the computer-simulated plans. Moreover, the Enacted Plan achieved this extreme cracking of Democrats by creating districts that are significantly less compact than virtually all of the Guilford County districts in the computer-simulated plans.

82. Figure 12 directly compares the partisanship of the Enacted Plan's districts to the simulated plans' districts in the Piedmont Triad area at a local level. Specifically, the top row of Figure 12 describes the district within each plan that contains the most amount of Greensboro's population. In the Enacted Plan, this district is CD-11, and Figure 12 directly compares the Republican vote share of CD-11 to the Republican vote shares of all simulated districts that contain the largest portion of Greensboro residents among all districts in their respective simulated plans. The Figure reveals that the Enacted Plan's CD-11 is more safely Republican than 99.6% of the computer-simulated Greensboro districts. In fact, although CD-11 exhibits a 55.9% Republican vote share, 96.1% of the simulated districts containing Greensboro are Democratic-favoring districts. Hence, it is clear that the Enacted Plan created a safe Republican district for Greensboro, even though a partisan-neutral districting process following the Adopted Criteria would almost always have placed Greensboro in a Democratic-favoring district.


83. The second row of Figure 12 illustrates a similar finding regarding the city of High Point in Guilford County. The Enacted Plan places High Point into CD-10, which has a Republican vote share of 61.2%. CD-10 is more heavily Republican than 99.6% of the High Point-based district in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. Once again, nearly all of the simulated plans place High Point into a Democratic-favoring district, but the Enacted Plan managed to place High Point into an anomalously Republican district.

84. The third row of Figure 12 reveals a similar finding regarding CD-7, the third district containing a fragment of Guilford County. The city of Burlington (Alamance and Guilford Counties) is assigned to the Enacted Plan's CD-7, which exhibits a 58.2% Republican vote share. CD-7 is more heavily Republican than 99.7% of the Burlington-based districts in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. In fact, 95.5% of the Burlington districts in the simulated plans

favor the Democrats, often by an extremely wide margin. Thus, it is clear that the Enacted Plan created a far more Republican-favorable district for Burlington than could be reasonably expected from a partisan-blind districting process.

85. Of course, the creation of three safe Republican districts (CD-7, 10, and 11) in the Guilford County area required bringing in Republican voters from other, surrounding districts. One such district was CD-12, a safely Republican district covering areas in the Piedmont Triad region to the west of Guilford County. The fourth row of Figure 12 compares the partisanship of the Enacted Plan's district containing Winston-Salem (CD-12) to the simulated plans' districts containing Winston-Salem. The simulated plan results on this row illustrate that under a partisan-blind districting process, Winston-Salem would normally be placed into an even more heavily Republican district than the Enacted Plan's CD-12. The Enacted Plan's CD-12 is a safe Republican seat with a Republican vote share of 56.6%, but it is less heavily Republican than 91.4% of the computer-simulated districts containing the most of Winston-Salem's population. This finding suggests that CD-12 was drawn to be less extremely Republican than should be expected, given the political geography of the Piedmont Triad area. As a result, more Republican voters could be placed in the surrounding districts, particularly CD-10 and CD-11, that split up Guilford County.


**Figure 12: Piedmont Triad Area:
Comparison of Individual Districts' Republican Vote Shares
in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans**



86. Could the Enacted Plan's cracking of Guilford County Democrats into three districts (CD-7, 10, and 11) have resulted from a mapdrawing process attempting to follow the Adopted Criteria? The geographic characteristics of these three districts illustrate the opposite conclusion: The General Assembly managed to split Guilford County into three safe Republican districts by subordinating the districting principles required by the Adopted Criteria. Although the Adopted Criteria do not explicitly prohibit dividing Guilford County into three districts, doing so was not necessary to comply with the Adopted Criteria. Guilford County's population is well under that of an equally populated congressional district. In fact, the vast majority (75.6%) of the computer-simulated plans do not split Guilford County a single time. When Guilford County is split, the simulated plans usually split it only once.

87. Moreover, the compactness scores of the Enacted Plan's CD-7, 10, and 11 reveal that the General Assembly subordinated geographic compactness considerations in the process of cracking Democrats in Guilford County. The first row of Figure 13 illustrates that the Enacted Plan's CD-11 has a lower Polsby-Popper score than all 1,000 of the Greensboro-based districts in the computer-simulated plans. The second and third rows of Figure 13 reveal a nearly identical conclusion regarding the other two districts covering Guilford County (CD-7 and CD-10). In fact, there is a vast disparity between the compactness of the Enacted Plan's Guilford County districts and the simulated plans' districts in Guilford County. CD-7, 10, and 11 have Polsby-Popper scores of 0.197, 0.199, and 0.207. Meanwhile, over half of the simulated districts displayed in these upper three rows of Figure 13 have a Polsby-Popper score over 0.5. It is therefore clear that the Enacted Plan subordinated geographic compactness in the pursuit of Republican partisan advantage in the drawing of district boundaries in the Piedmont Triad area.

**Figure 13: Piedmont Triad Area:
Comparison of Individual Districts' Compactness Scores
in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans**



88. ***The Research Triangle:*** Figures 14 and 15 present a similar analysis of the districts in the Research Triangle. The top row of Figure 14 compares the Republican vote shares of the Enacted Plan's and each computer-simulated plan's district containing the most of Raleigh's population. The second row of Figure 14 is a similar comparison of the Enacted Plan's and each simulated plan's district containing the most of Durham's population. Overall, these two rows illustrate that the Enacted Plan's Raleigh-based district (CD-5) and Durham-based district (CD-6) are more heavily packed with Democrats than almost 100% of the computer-simulated districts containing Raleigh and Durham.

89. The top two rows of Figure 15 illustrate that extreme degree of Democratic voter packing in CD-5 and CD-6 is not the result of the Research Triangle's political geography or the Adopted Criteria. Instead, Figure 15 reveals that CD-5 and CD-6 are less geographically compact than nearly 100% of the computer-simulated districts containing Raleigh and Durham. Thus, the General Assembly managed to unnaturally pack Democrats in its Raleigh-based and Durham-based districts by subordinating geographic compactness in the drawing of these districts.

90. As a result of this packing of Democratic voters in CD-5 and CD-6, the surrounding districts in the Enacted Plan are more safely Republican than they would have been in the absence of such packing of Democrats. One example of these surrounding Republican districts in the Enacted Plan is CD-7, which combines Southern Wake County with various counties west of the Research Triangle. Southern Wake County is more politically moderate than the heavily Democratic cores of Raleigh and Durham. The third row of Figure 14 compares the partisanship of the Enacted Plan's district and each simulated plan's district containing the most of Holly Springs's and Fuquay-Varina's populations in Southern Wake County. The results on

this row illustrate that in the computer-simulated plans drawn according to the Adopted Criteria, Southern Wake County is generally placed into a heavily-Democratic district because it is generally placed into the same district with part of Raleigh. But the Enacted Plan packed Democrats into CD-5 (Raleigh) and CD-6 (Durham), so the General Assembly was able to create a safe Republican district by combining Southern Wake County with other Republican-favoring counties to the west of the Research Triangle. As the third row of Figure 14 illustrates, this outcome is an extreme statistical outlier compared to the computer-simulated districts in Southern Wake County. 99.2% of the simulated plans place Southern Wake County into a Democratic-favoring district, and 100% of the simulated districts containing Southern Wake County are less extremely Republican than CD-7. Hence, it is clear that CD-7 is a partisan outlier that was enabled by the packing of Democratic voters in CD-5 (Raleigh) and CD-6 (Durham).

**Figure 14: Research Triangle Area:
Comparison of Individual Districts' Republican Vote Shares
in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans**



**Figure 15: Research Triangle Area:
Comparison of Individual Districts' Compactness Scores
in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans**



91. ***Mecklenburg County Districts:*** Figure 16 illustrates a similar finding regarding Mecklenburg County. The top row of Figure 16 compares the partisanship of the Enacted Plan's district and each simulated plan's district containing the most of Charlotte's population. The results in this row illustrate that the Enacted Plan's CD-9 is more heavily Democratic than 100% of the simulated plans' primary Charlotte districts.


92. As a result, the second and third rows of Figure 16 reveal that the surrounding suburban districts in the Enacted Plan are more safely Republican than their geographic counterparts in all of the computer-simulated plans. Specifically, the second row of Figure 16 compares the partisanship of the Enacted Plan's district and each simulated plan's district containing the most of Huntersville's (Northern Mecklenburg County) population. In the simulated plans, Huntersville is either placed into the same district as most of Charlotte, resulting in a heavily Democratic district, or it is grouped with other counties outside of Mecklenburg, thus forming a politically competitive district with a Republican vote share close to 50%. But the Enacted Plan places Huntersville into a district (CD-13) that is much more strongly Republican than all 100% of the simulated districts containing Huntersville.

93. The third row of Figure 16 reveals a similar finding regarding Eastern Mecklenburg County. Specifically, this row compares the partisanship of the Enacted Plan's district and each simulated plan's district containing the most of Mint Hill's and Matthews' (Eastern Mecklenburg County) population. Once again, the results reveal that the Enacted Plan places Eastern Mecklenburg County into a district (CD-8) that is more strongly Republican than all 100% of the computer-simulated districts containing Mint Hill and Matthews.

94. Thus, it is clear that the Enacted Plan packed Democrats in Mecklenburg County to an extent greater than what naturally occurs as a result of the area's political geography.

Democratic voters are residentially concentrated in Charlotte, and this political geography tends to cause a clustering of Democratic voters in Mecklenburg County districts, as reflected in the simulation results in Figure 16. But the Enacted Plan's packing of Democratic voters in Mecklenburg goes beyond what is caused by political geography, resulting in a Charlotte district that is even more heavily Democratic than what could be expected from a partisan-blind map-drawing process.

**Figure 16: Mecklenburg County:
Comparison of Individual Districts' Republican Vote Shares
in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans**



***North Carolina's Political Geography Did Not Cause the Enacted Plan's
Extreme Partisan Bias***

95. How does North Carolina's political geography affect the partisan characteristics of the 2021 Enacted Plan? Democratic voters tend to be geographically concentrated in the urban cores of several of the state's largest cities, including Charlotte, Raleigh, and Greensboro. As I have explained in my prior academic research,¹⁴ these large urban clusters of Democratic voters, combined with the common districting principle of drawing geographically compact districts, can sometimes result in urban districts that "naturally" pack together Democratic voters, thus boosting the Republican vote share of other surrounding suburban and rural districts.

96. More importantly, my prior academic research explained how I can estimate the precise level of electoral bias in districting caused by a state's unique political geography: I programmed a computer algorithm that draws districting plans using North Carolina's unique political geography, including the state's census population data and political subdivision boundaries. In this report, I have also programmed the algorithm to follow North Carolina's Adopted Criteria. I then analyzed the partisan characteristics of the simulated districting plans using North Carolina's precinct-level voting data from past elections (past elections that were themselves skewed towards Republicans). Hence, the entire premise of conducting districting simulations is to fully account for North Carolina's unique political geography, its political subdivision boundaries, and its districting criteria, as mandated by the General Assembly's Adopted Criteria.

97. This districting simulation analysis allowed me to identify how much of the

¹⁴ Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, 2013. "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8(3): 239-269; Jowei Chen and David Cottrell, 2016. "Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S. House." *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 4: 329-430.

electoral bias in the 2021 Enacted Plan is caused by North Carolina's political geography and how much is caused by the map-drawer's intentional efforts to favor one political party over the other. North Carolina's natural political geography, combined with the Adopted Criteria, almost never resulted in simulated congressional plans containing 10 Republican-favoring districts out of 14 total districts.

98. The 2021 Enacted Plan's creation of 10 electorally safe Republican districts, which persists across a range of electoral outcomes, goes beyond any "natural" level of electoral bias caused by North Carolina's political geography or the political composition of the state's voters. The Enacted Plan is a statistical outlier in terms of its partisan characteristics when compared to the 1,000 computer-simulated plans and cannot be explained by North Carolina's natural political geography.

99. The two most Republican districts (CD-10 and CD-13) and the two most Democratic districts (CD-9 and CD-6) in the Enacted Plan were drawn to include more Democratic voters than virtually all of their counterpart districts in the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. Six other districts (CD-1, 3, 4, 11, 12, and 14) were drawn to be more heavily Republican than over 95% of their counterpart computer-simulated plan districts. Ten districts were drawn precisely to have Republican vote shares within the narrow range of 52.9% to 61.2%—an outcome that never arises in the computer-simulated plans.

100. This extreme, additional level of partisan bias in the 2021 Enacted Plan can be directly attributed to the map-drawer's clear efforts to favor the Republican Party. This level of partisan bias was not caused by North Carolina's political geography.

The Effect of the Enacted Plan Districts on Plaintiffs

101. I evaluated the congressional districts in which each Plaintiff would reside under the 1,000 computer-simulated maps using a list of geocoded residential addresses for the Plaintiffs that counsel for the Plaintiffs provided me. I used these geocoded addresses to identify the specific district in which each Plaintiff would be located under each computer-simulated plan, as well as under the Enacted Plan. I then compared the partisanship of each individual Plaintiff's Enacted Plan district to the partisanship of the Plaintiff's 1,000 districts from the 1,000 computer-simulated plans. Using this approach, I identify whether each Plaintiff's district is a partisan outlier when compared to the Plaintiff's 1,000 computer-simulated districts.

102. Figures 17a and 17b present the results of this analysis. These Figures list the individual Plaintiffs and describes the partisanship of each Plaintiff's district of residence in the Enacted Plan, as well as the partisanship of the district the Plaintiff would have resided in under each of the 1,000 simulated congressional plans. The first half of the plaintiffs are analyzed in Figure 17a, while the second half of the plaintiffs appear in Figure 17b.

103. To explain these analyses with an example, each row in Figure 17a corresponds to a particular individual Plaintiff. In the first row, describing Plaintiff Bobby Jones, the red star depicts the partisanship of the Plaintiff's Enacted Plan district (CD-2), as measured by its Republican vote share using the 2016-2020 Statewide Election Composite. The 1,000 gray circles on this row depict the Republican vote share of each of the 1,000 simulated districts in which the Plaintiff would reside in each of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans, based on that Plaintiff's residential address. In the margin to the right of each row, I list in parentheses how many of the 1,000 simulated plans would place the plaintiff in a more Democratic-leaning district (on the left) and how many of the 1,000 simulations would place the plaintiff in a more

Republican-leaning district (on the right) than the Plaintiff's Enacted Plan district. Thus, for example, the first row of Figure 17a reports that 99% of the 1,000 computer-simulated plans would place Plaintiff Bobby Jones in a more Republican-leaning district than his actual Enacted Plan district (CD-2). Therefore, I can conclude that Plaintiff Bobby Jones' Enacted Plan district is a partisan statistical outlier when compared to his district under the 1,000 simulated plans.

Figure 17a:
Plaintiffs' Districts in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans




Figure 17b:
Plaintiffs' Districts in the SB 740 Plan and in 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans



104. Figures 17a and 17b show that seven Plaintiffs residing in Republican-leaning districts under the Enacted Plan would be placed in a more Democratic-leaning district in over 95% of the computer-simulated plans: Donald M. MacKinnon (CD-10), Joshua Perry Brown (CD-10), Ronald Gray Osborne, Jr. (CD-7), Barbara Proffitt (CD-8), Mary Elizabeth Voss (CD-13); David Brown (CD-11) and Lily Nicole Quick (CD-7). Additionally, six Plaintiffs residing in Democratic-leaning districts under the Enacted Plan would be placed in a more Republican-leaning district in over 95% of the computer-simulated plans: Bobby Jones (CD-2), Kristiann Herring (CD-2), Sondra Stein (CD-6), Virginia Brien (CD-9), Jackson Dunn (CD-9), and Rebecca Harper (CD-6). Additionally, six Plaintiffs would be placed in a more Republican district in 99.9% or more of the simulated plans relative to their districts under the Enacted Plan: Ann Butzner (CD-14), Virginia Brien (CD-9), Jackson Dunn (CD-9), Mark Peters (CD-14), Kathleen Barnes (CD-14), Richard R. Crews (CD-14), and Rebecca Harper (CD-6).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

This 23rd day of December, 2021.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Chen', written over a horizontal line.

Dr. Jowei Chen

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Curriculum Vitae

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Associate Professor (2015-present), Assistant Professor (2009-2015), Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.
Research Associate Professor (2016-present), Faculty Associate (2009-2015), Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.
W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2013.
Principal Investigator and Senior Research Fellow, Center for Governance and Public Policy Research, Willamette University, 2013 – Present.

Education:

Ph.D., Political Science, Stanford University (June 2009)
M.S., Statistics, Stanford University (January 2007)
B.A., Ethics, Politics, and Economics, Yale University (May 2004)

Publications:

Chen, Jowei and Neil Malhotra. 2007. "The Law of k/n : The Effect of Chamber Size on Government Spending in Bicameral Legislatures."

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Chen, Jowei, 2010. "The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures."

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Chen, Jowei and Jonathan Rodden, 2013. "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures"

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Bradley, Katharine and Jowei Chen, 2014. "Participation Without Representation? Senior Opinion, Legislative Behavior, and Federal Health Reform."

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Chen, Jowei and David Cottrell, 2016. "Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S. House."

[*Electoral Studies*. Volume 44 \(December 2016\): 329-340.](#)

Chen, Jowei, 2017. "Analysis of Computer-Simulated Districting Maps for the Wisconsin State Assembly."

[*Election Law Journal*. Volume 16, Number 4 \(December 2017\): 417-442.](#)

Chen, Jowei and Nicholas Stephanopoulos, 2020. "The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights."

[*Yale Law Journal, Forthcoming*. Volume 130, Number 4: 778-1049.](#)

Kim, Yunsieg and Jowei Chen, 2021. "Gerrymandered by Definition: The Distortion of 'Traditional' Districting Principles and a Proposal for an Empirical Redefinition."

[*Wisconsin Law Review, Forthcoming*, Volume 2021, Number 1.](#)

Chen, Jowei and Nicholas Stephanopoulos, 2021. "Democracy's Denominator."

[*California Law Review, Accepted for Publication*, Volume 109.](#)

Non-Peer-Reviewed Publication:

Chen, Jowei and Tim Johnson. 2017. "Political Ideology in the Bureaucracy."

[*Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*.](#)

Research Grants:

"How Citizenship-Based Redistricting Systemically Disadvantages Voters of Color". 2020 (\$18,225). Combating and Confronting Racism Grant. University of Michigan Center for Social Solutions and Poverty Solutions.

Principal Investigator. [National Science Foundation Grant SES-1459459](#), September 2015 – August 2018 (\$165,008). "The Political Control of U.S. Federal Agencies and Bureaucratic Political Behavior."

"Economic Disparity and Federal Investments in Detroit," (with Brian Min) 2011. Graham Institute, University of Michigan (\$30,000).

"The Partisan Effect of OSHA Enforcement on Workplace Injuries," (with Connor Raso) 2009. John M. Olin Law and Economics Research Grant (\$4,410).

Invited Talks:

September, 2011. University of Virginia, American Politics Workshop.

October 2011. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, American Politics Conference.

January 2012. University of Chicago, Political Economy/American Politics Seminar.

February 2012. Harvard University, Positive Political Economy Seminar.

September 2012. Emory University, Political Institutions and Methodology Colloquium.

November 2012. University of Wisconsin, Madison, American Politics Workshop.

September 2013. Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, Political Economy Workshop.

February 2014. Princeton University, Center for the Study of Democratic Politics Workshop.

November 2014. Yale University, American Politics and Public Policy Workshop.

December 2014. American Constitution Society for Law & Policy Conference: Building the Evidence to Win Voting Rights Cases.

February 2015. University of Rochester, American Politics Working Group.

March 2015. Harvard University, Voting Rights Act Workshop.

May 2015. Harvard University, Conference on Political Geography.

October 2015. George Washington University School of Law, Conference on Redistricting Reform.

September 2016. Harvard University Center for Governmental and International Studies, Voting Rights Institute Conference.

March 2017. Duke University, Sanford School of Public Policy, Redistricting Reform Conference.

October 2017. Willamette University, Center for Governance and Public Policy Research

October 2017, University of Wisconsin, Madison. Geometry of Redistricting Conference.

February 2018: University of Georgia Law School

September 2018. Willamette University.

November 2018. Yale University, Redistricting Workshop.

November 2018. University of Washington, Severyns Ravenholt Seminar in Comparative Politics.
January 2019. Duke University, Reason, Reform & Redistricting Conference.
February 2019. Ohio State University, Department of Political Science. Departmental speaker series.
March 2019. Wayne State University Law School, Gerrymandering Symposium.
November 2019. Big Data Ignite Conference.
November 2019. Calvin College, Department of Mathematics and Statistics.
September 2020 (Virtual). Yale University, Yale Law Journal Scholarship Workshop

Conference Service:

Section Chair, 2017 APSA (San Francisco, CA), Political Methodology Section
Discussant, 2014 Political Methodology Conference (University of Georgia)
Section Chair, 2012 MPSA (Chicago, IL), Political Geography Section.
Discussant, 2011 MPSA (Chicago, IL) “Presidential-Congressional Interaction.”
Discussant, 2008 APSA (Boston, MA) “Congressional Appropriations.”
Chair and Discussant, 2008 MPSA (Chicago, IL) “Distributive Politics: Parties and Pork.”

Conference Presentations and Working Papers:

“Ideological Representation of Geographic Constituencies in the U.S. Bureaucracy,” (with Tim Johnson). 2017 APSA.

“Incentives for Political versus Technical Expertise in the Public Bureaucracy,” (with Tim Johnson). 2016 APSA.

“Black Electoral Geography and Congressional Districting: The Effect of Racial Redistricting on Partisan Gerrymandering”. 2016 Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology (Rice University)

“Racial Gerrymandering and Electoral Geography.” Working Paper, 2016.

“Does Deserved Spending Win More Votes? Evidence from Individual-Level Disaster Assistance,” (with Andrew Healy). 2014 APSA.

“The Geographic Link Between Votes and Seats: How the Geographic Distribution of Partisans Determines the Electoral Responsiveness and Bias of Legislative Elections,” (with David Cottrell). 2014 APSA.

“Gerrymandering for Money: Drawing districts with respect to donors rather than voters.” 2014 MPSA.

“Constituent Age and Legislator Responsiveness: The Effect of Constituent Opinion on the Vote for Federal Health Reform.” (with Katharine Bradley) 2012 MPSA.

“Voter Partisanship and the Mobilizing Effect of Presidential Advertising.” (with Kyle Dropp) 2012 MPSA.

“Recency Bias in Retrospective Voting: The Effect of Distributive Benefits on Voting Behavior.” (with Andrew Feher) 2012 MPSA.

“Estimating the Political Ideologies of Appointed Public Bureaucrats,” (with Adam Bonica and Tim Johnson) 2012 Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology (University of North Carolina)

“Tobler’s Law, Urbanization, and Electoral Bias in Florida.” (with Jonathan Rodden) 2010 Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology (University of Iowa)

“Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy” (with Tim Johnson) 2011 MPSA.

“Estimating Bureaucratic Ideal Points with Federal Campaign Contributions” 2010 APSA. (Washington, DC).

“The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Spending in Bicameral Legislatures,” Vanderbilt University Conference on Bicameralism, 2009.

“When Do Government Benefits Influence Voters’ Behavior? The Effect of FEMA Disaster Awards on US Presidential Votes,” 2009 APSA (Toronto, Canada).

“Are Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off?” 2009 APSA (Toronto, Canada).

“Credit Sharing Among Legislators: Electoral Geography’s Effect on Pork Barreling in Legislatures,” 2008 APSA (Boston, MA).

“Buying Votes with Public Funds in the US Presidential Election,” Poster Presentation at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology (University of Michigan).


“The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Spending in Bicameral Legislatures,” 2008 MPSA.

“Legislative Free-Riding and Spending on Pure Public Goods,” 2007 MPSA (Chicago, IL).


“Free Riding in Multi-Member Legislatures,” (with Neil Malhotra) 2007 MPSA (Chicago, IL).

“The Effect of Legislature Size, Bicameralism, and Geography on Government Spending: Evidence from the American States,” (with Neil Malhotra) 2006 APSA (Philadelphia, PA).


**Figure A1: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2016 Attorney General Election Results**




**Figure A2: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2016 Governor Election Results**




**Figure A3: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2016 Lieutenant Governor Election Results**




**Figure A4: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2016 US President Election Results**




**Figure A5: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2016 US Senator Election Results**




**Figure A6: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2020 Attorney General Election Results**




**Figure A7: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2020 Governor Election Results**



**Figure A8: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2020 Lieutenant Governor Election Results**



**Figure A9: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2020 US President Election Results**



**Figure A10: Comparison of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans:
Districts' Republican Vote Share Measured Using the 2020 US Senator Election Results**




Figure B1: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2016 Attorney General election
(49.7% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B2: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2016 Governor election
(49.9% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B3: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2016 Lieutenant Governor election
(53.3% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B4: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2016 US President election
(51.9% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B5: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2016 US Senator election
(53% Statewide Republican 2-Party Vote Share)




Figure B6: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2020 Attorney General election
(49.9% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B7: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2020 Governor election
(47.7% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B8: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2020 Lieutenant Governor election
(51.6% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)




Figure B9: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer-Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2020 US President election
(50.7% Statewide Republican 2-Party Vote Share)




Figure B10: Comparisons of Enacted SB 740 Plan to 1,000 Computer–Simulated Plans
Number of Districts With Over 50% Republican Vote Share in the 2020 US Senator election
(50.9% Statewide Republican 2–Party Vote Share)

