No. 413PA21 ${ }^{\text {Rule }}$ (d) Copies of Exhibits \& Other Items
No. 413PA21

## SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF ) CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC., et al., ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, )

REBECCA HARPER, et al., )
Plaintiffs-Appellants, and )
COMMON CAUSE,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, )
v. )

REPRESENTATIVE DESTINHALL in )
REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in ) his official capacity as Chair of the House ) Standing Committee on Redistricting, et )

From Wake
County
21 CVS 015426
21 CVS 500058 al.,

Defendants-Appellees. )

## RULE 9(d) COPIES OF EXHIBITS AND OTHER ITEMS

VOLUME 4 OF 6

## INDEX

## VOLUME 1

Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit List (served 8 January 2022) ..... Ex. 1
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit List (served 6 January 2022) ..... Ex. 29
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX1 ..... Ex. 37
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX2 ..... Ex. 38
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX3 ..... Ex. 39
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX4 ..... Ex. 40
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX5 ..... Ex. 56
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX6 ..... Ex. 58
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX7 ..... Ex. 59
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX8 ..... Ex. 60
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX9 ..... Ex. 74
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX10 ..... Ex. 76
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX11 ..... Ex. 77
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX12 ..... Ex. 78
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX13 ..... Ex. 91
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX14 ..... Ex. 93
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX15 ..... Ex. 94
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX16 ..... Ex. 95
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX17 ..... Ex. 96
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX18 ..... Ex. 97
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX19 ..... Ex. 98
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX20 ..... Ex. 99
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX21 ..... Ex. 100
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX22 ..... Ex. 109
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX23 ..... Ex. 126
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX24 ..... Ex. 160
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX25 ..... Ex. 161
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX26 ..... Ex. 163
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX27 ..... Ex. 165
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX28 ..... Ex. 179
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX29 ..... Ex. 184
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX30 ..... Ex. 208
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX31 ..... Ex. 210
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX32 ..... Ex. 212
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX33 ..... Ex. 214
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX34 ..... Ex. 216
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX35 ..... Ex. 218
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX36 ..... Ex. 282
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX37 ..... Ex. 353
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX38 ..... Ex. 437
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX39 ..... Ex. 486
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX40 ..... Ex. 517
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX41 ..... Ex. 564
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX42 ..... Ex. 606
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX43 ..... Ex. 653
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX44 ..... Ex. 703
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX46 ..... Ex. 704
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX47 ..... Ex. 710
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX48 ..... Ex. 713
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX49 ..... Ex. 718
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX52 ..... Ex. 728
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX53 ..... Ex. 730
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX55 ..... Ex. 731
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX56 ..... Ex. 732
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX57 ..... Ex. 733
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX59 ..... Ex. 734
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX60 ..... Ex. 735
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX61 ..... Ex. 736
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX62 ..... Ex. 737
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX63 ..... Ex. 738
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX64 ..... Ex. 739
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX65 ..... Ex. 740
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX66 ..... Ex. 741
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX68 ..... Ex. 742
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX69 ..... Ex. 743
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX70 ..... Ex. 744
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX71 ..... Ex. 759
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX72 ..... Ex. 777
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX73 ..... Ex. 787
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX74 ..... Ex. 788
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX75 ..... Ex. 827
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX76 ..... Ex. 857
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX77 ..... Ex. 869
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX78 ..... Ex. 979
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX79 ..... Ex. 1012
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX80 ..... Ex. 1099
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX81 ..... Ex. 1151
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX82 ..... Ex. 1296
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX83 ..... Ex. 1409
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX84 ..... Ex. 1568
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX85 ..... Ex. 1632
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX86 ..... Ex. 1640
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX87 ..... Ex. 1641
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX88 ..... Ex. 1650
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX89 ..... Ex. 1663
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX90 ..... Ex. 1690
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX91 ..... Ex. 1725
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX92 ..... Ex. 1742
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX93 ..... Ex. 1759
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX94 ..... Ex. 1779
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX95 ..... Ex. 1809
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX96 ..... Ex. 1843
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX97 ..... Ex. 1860
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX98 ..... Ex. 1868
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX99 ..... Ex. 1897
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX100 ..... Ex. 1930
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX101 ..... Ex. 1950
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX102 ..... Ex. 1967
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX103 ..... Ex. 1996
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX109 ..... Ex. 2009
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX110 ..... Ex. 2011
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX114 ..... Ex. 2056
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX115 ..... Ex. 2087
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX116 ..... Ex. 2162
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX117 ..... Ex. 2357
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX118 ..... Ex. 2442
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX119 ..... Ex. 2517
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX120 ..... Ex. 2522
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX121 ..... Ex. 2527
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX122 ..... Ex. 2546
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX123 ..... Ex. 2593
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX124 ..... Ex. 2725
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX125 ..... Ex. 2882
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX126. ..... Ex. 3011
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX127 ..... Ex. 3012
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX129 ..... Ex. 3024
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX130 ..... Ex. 3026
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX131 ..... Ex. 3032
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX132 ..... Ex. 3033
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX133 ..... Ex. 3035
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX134 ..... Ex. 3037
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX135 ..... Ex. 3044
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX136 ..... Ex. 3047
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX137 ..... Ex. 3053
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX138 ..... Ex. 3055
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX139 ..... Ex. 3056
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX140 ..... Ex. 3067
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX141 ..... Ex. 3074
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX142 ..... Ex. 3080
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX143 ..... Ex. 3229
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX144 ..... Ex. 3234
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX145 ..... Ex. 3235
Plaintiffs' Joint Trial Exhibit PX146 ..... Ex. 3556
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX150 ..... Ex. 3901
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX151 ..... Ex. 3929
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX152 ..... Ex. 3936
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX153 ..... Ex. 3937
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX154 ..... Ex. 3938
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX155 ..... Ex. 3939
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX156 ..... Ex. 3940
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX157 ..... Ex. 3941
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX158 ..... Ex. 3942
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX159 ..... Ex. 3943
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX160 ..... Ex. 3944
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX161 ..... Ex. 3945
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX162 ..... Ex. 3946
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX163 ..... Ex. 3947
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX164 ..... Ex. 3948
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX165 ..... Ex. 3949
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX166 ..... Ex. 3950
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX167 ..... Ex. 3951
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX168 ..... Ex. 3952
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX169 ..... Ex. 3953
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX170 ..... Ex. 3954
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX171 ..... Ex. 3955
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX172 ..... Ex. 3956
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX173 ..... Ex. 3957
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX174 ..... Ex. 3958
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX175 ..... Ex. 3959
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX176 ..... Ex. 3960
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX177 ..... Ex. 3961
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX178 ..... Ex. 3963
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX179 ..... Ex. 3965
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX180 ..... Ex. 3967
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX181 ..... Ex. 3969
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX182 ..... Ex. 3971
VOLUME 2
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX183 ..... Ex. 3973
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX184 ..... Ex. 3975
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX185 ..... Ex. 3977
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX186 ..... Ex. 3979
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX187 ..... Ex. 3981
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX188 ..... Ex. 3983
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX189 ..... Ex. 3985
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX190 ..... Ex. 3987
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX191 ..... Ex. 3989
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX192 ..... Ex. 3991
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX193 ..... Ex. 3993
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX194 ..... Ex. 3995
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX195 ..... Ex. 3997
NCLCV Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit PX196 ..... Ex. 3999
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX197 ..... Ex. 4001
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX198 ..... Ex. 4003
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX199 ..... Ex. 4005
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX200 ..... Ex. 4007
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX201 ..... Ex. 4009
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX202 ..... Ex. 4010
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX203 ..... Ex. 4103
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX204 ..... Ex. 4110
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX205 ..... Ex. 4116
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX206 ..... Ex. 4121
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX207 ..... Ex. 4123
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX208 ..... Ex. 4125

NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX209 ...................Ex. 4127
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX210 ...................Ex. 4129
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX211 ...................Ex. 4131
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX214 ................... Ex. 4133
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX215 ...................Ex. 4134
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX216 ...................Ex. 4140
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX217 ...................Ex. 4155
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX234 ................... Ex. 4156
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX235 ...................Ex. 4166
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX236 ...................Ex. 4168
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX237 ...................Ex. 4169
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX238 ................... Ex. 4170
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX239 ...................Ex. 4171
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX240 ...................Ex. 4172
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX241 ...................Ex. 4173
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX247 ................... Ex. 4174
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX248 ...................Ex. 4175
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX249 ...................Ex. 4176
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX250 ................... Ex. 4177
NCLCV Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX251 ...................Ex. 4178
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX400 ....................Ex. 4179
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX401 ....................Ex. 4180
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX402 ..... Ex. 4181
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX403 ..... Ex. 4182
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX404 ..... Ex. 4183
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX405 ..... Ex. 4184
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX406 ..... Ex. 4185
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX407 ..... Ex. 4186
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX408 ..... Ex. 4187
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX409 ..... Ex. 4188
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX410 ..... Ex. 4189
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX411 ..... Ex. 4190
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX412 ..... Ex. 4191
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX413 ..... Ex. 4192
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX414 ..... Ex. 4193
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX415 ..... Ex. 4194
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX416 ..... Ex. 4195
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX417 ..... Ex. 4196
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX418 ..... Ex. 4197
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX419 ..... Ex. 4198
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX420 ..... Ex. 4199
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX421 ..... Ex. 4200
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX422 ..... Ex. 4201
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX423 ..... Ex. 4202
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX424 ..... Ex. 4203
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX425 ..... Ex. 4204
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX426 ..... Ex. 4335
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX427 ..... Ex. 4336
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX428 ..... Ex. 4337
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX429 ..... Ex. 4338
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX430 ..... Ex. 4339
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX431 ..... Ex. 4340
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX432 ..... Ex. 4341
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX433 ..... Ex. 4342
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX434 ..... Ex. 4343
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX435 ..... Ex. 4344
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX436 ..... Ex. 4345
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX437 ..... Ex. 4346
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX438 ..... Ex. 4347
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX439 ..... Ex. 4348
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX440 ..... Ex. 4349
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX441 ..... Ex. 4350
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX442 ..... Ex. 4351
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX443 ..... Ex. 4352
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX444 ..... Ex. 4353
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX445 ..... Ex. 4354
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX446 ..... Ex. 4355
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX447 ..... Ex. 4356
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX448 ..... Ex. 4357
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX449 ..... Ex. 4358
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX450 ..... Ex. 4359
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX451 ..... Ex. 4360
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX452 ..... Ex. 4361
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX453 ..... Ex. 4362
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX454 ..... Ex. 4363
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX455 ..... Ex. 4364
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX456 ..... Ex. 4365
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX457 ..... Ex. 4366
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX458 ..... Ex. 4367
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX459 ..... Ex. 4368
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX460 ..... Ex. 4369
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX461 ..... Ex. 4370
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX462 ..... Ex. 4371
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX463 ..... Ex. 4372
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX464 ..... Ex. 4373
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX465 ..... Ex. 4374
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX466 ..... Ex. 4375
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX467 ..... Ex. 4376
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX468 ..... Ex. 4377
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX469 ..... Ex. 4378
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX470 ..... Ex. 4379
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX471 ..... Ex. 4380
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX472 ..... Ex. 4381
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX473 ..... Ex. 4382
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX474 ..... Ex. 4383
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX475 ..... Ex. 4384
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX476 ..... Ex. 4385
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX477 ..... Ex. 4386
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX478 ..... Ex. 4387
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX479 ..... Ex. 4388
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX480 ..... Ex. 4389
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX481 ..... Ex. 4390
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX482 ..... Ex. 4391
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX483 ..... Ex. 4486
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX484 ..... Ex. 4487
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX485 ..... Ex. 4488
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX486 ..... Ex. 4489
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX487 ..... Ex. 4490
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX488 ..... Ex. 4491
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX489 ..... Ex. 4492
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX490 ..... Ex. 4493
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX491 ..... Ex. 4494
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX492 ..... Ex. 4495
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX493 ..... Ex. 4496
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX494 ..... Ex. 4497
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX495 ..... Ex. 4498
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX496 ..... Ex. 4499
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX497 ..... Ex. 4500
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX498 ..... Ex. 4501
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX499 ..... Ex. 4502
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX500 ..... Ex. 4503
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX501 ..... Ex. 4504
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX502 ..... Ex. 4505
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX503 ..... Ex. 4506
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX504 ..... Ex. 4507
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX505 ..... Ex. 4508
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX506 ..... Ex. 4509
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX507 ..... Ex. 4510
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX508 ..... Ex. 4511
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX509 ..... Ex. 4512
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX510 ..... Ex. 4513
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX511 ..... Ex. 4514
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX512 ..... Ex. 4515
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX513 ..... Ex. 4516
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX514 ..... Ex. 4517
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX515 ..... Ex. 4518
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX516 ..... Ex. 4519
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX517 ..... Ex. 4520
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX518 ..... Ex. 4521
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX519 ..... Ex. 4522
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX520 ..... Ex. 4523
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX521 ..... Ex. 4524
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX522 ..... Ex. 4525
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX523 ..... Ex. 4526
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX524 ..... Ex. 4585
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX525 ..... Ex. 4590
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX526 ..... Ex. 4591
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX527 ..... Ex. 4592
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX528 ..... Ex. 4593
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX529 ..... Ex. 4594
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX530 ..... Ex. 4595
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX531 ..... Ex. 4596
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX532 ..... Ex. 4597
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX533 ..... Ex. 4598

## xvii

Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX534 ..... Ex. 4599
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX535 ..... Ex. 4600
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX538 ..... Ex. 4601
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX539 ..... Ex. 4602
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX540 ..... Ex. 4603
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX541 ..... Ex. 4604
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX542 ..... Ex. 4605
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX543 ..... Ex. 4606
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX544 ..... Ex. 4607
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX545 ..... Ex. 4608
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX546 ..... Ex. 4609
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX547 ..... Ex. 4610
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX548 ..... Ex. 4611
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX549 ..... Ex. 4612
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX550 ..... Ex. 4613
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX551 ..... Ex. 4614
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX552 ..... Ex. 4615
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX553 ..... Ex. 4616
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX554 ..... Ex. 4617
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX555 ..... Ex. 4618
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX556 ..... Ex. 4619
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX557 ..... Ex. 4620

## xviii

Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX558 ..... Ex. 4621
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX559 ..... Ex. 4622
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX560 ..... Ex. 4623
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX561 ..... Ex. 4624
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX562 ..... Ex. 4625
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX563 ..... Ex. 4626
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX564 ..... Ex. 4627
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX565 ..... Ex. 4628
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX566 ..... Ex. 4629
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX567 ..... Ex. 4630
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX568 ..... Ex. 4631
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX569 ..... Ex. 4632
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX570 ..... Ex. 4633
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX571 ..... Ex. 4634
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX572 ..... Ex. 4635
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX573 ..... Ex. 4636
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX574 ..... Ex. 4637
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX575 ..... Ex. 4638
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX576 ..... Ex. 4639
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX577 ..... Ex. 4640
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX578 ..... Ex. 4641
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX579 ..... Ex. 4642
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX580 ..... Ex. 4643
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX581 ..... Ex. 4644
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX582 ..... Ex. 4645
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX583 ..... Ex. 4646
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX584 ..... Ex. 4647
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX585 ..... Ex. 4648
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX586 ..... Ex. 4649
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX587 ..... Ex. 4650
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX588 ..... Ex. 4651
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX589 ..... Ex. 4652
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX590 ..... Ex. 4653
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX591 ..... Ex. 4654
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX592 ..... Ex. 4655
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX593 ..... Ex. 4656
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX594 ..... Ex. 4657
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX595 ..... Ex. 4658
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX596 ..... Ex. 4659
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX597 ..... Ex. 4660
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX598 ..... Ex. 4661
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX602 ..... Ex. 4662
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX603 ..... Ex. 4676
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX604 ..... Ex. 4677
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX605 ..... Ex. 4678
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX606 ..... Ex. 4679
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX607 ..... Ex. 4680
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX608 ..... Ex. 4681
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX609 ..... Ex. 4682
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX610 ..... Ex. 4683
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX611 ..... Ex. 4684
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX612 ..... Ex. 4685
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX613 ..... Ex. 4686
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX614 ..... Ex. 4687
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX615 ..... Ex. 4688
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX616 ..... Ex. 4689
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX617 ..... Ex. 4690
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX618 ..... Ex. 4691
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX619 ..... Ex. 4692
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX620 ..... Ex. 4693
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX621 ..... Ex. 4694
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX622 ..... Ex. 4695
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX623 ..... Ex. 4696
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX624 ..... Ex. 4697
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX625 ..... Ex. 4698
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX626 ..... Ex. 4699
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX627 ..... Ex. 4700
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX628 ..... Ex. 4715
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX629 ..... Ex. 4720
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX630 ..... Ex. 4826
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX631 ..... Ex. 4834
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX632 ..... Ex. 4835
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX633 ..... Ex. 4836
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX634 ..... Ex. 4837
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX635 ..... Ex. 4838
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX636 ..... Ex. 4839
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX637 ..... Ex. 4840
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX638 ..... Ex. 4841
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX639 ..... Ex. 4842
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX640 ..... Ex. 4843
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX641 ..... Ex. 4844

## xxii

Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX642 ..... Ex. 4845
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX643 ..... Ex. 4846
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX644 ..... Ex. 4847
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX645 ..... Ex. 4848
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX646 ..... Ex. 4849
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX647 ..... Ex. 4850
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX648 ..... Ex. 4851
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX649 ..... Ex. 4852
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX650 ..... Ex. 4853
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX651 ..... Ex. 4854
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX652 ..... Ex. 4855
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX653 ..... Ex. 4856
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX654 ..... Ex. 4857
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX655 ..... Ex. 4858
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX656 ..... Ex. 4859
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX657 ..... Ex. 4860
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX658. ..... Ex. 4861
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX659. ..... Ex. 4862
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX660 ..... Ex. 4863
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX661 ..... Ex. 4864
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX662 ..... Ex. 4865
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX663 ..... Ex. 4866
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX664 ..... Ex. 4867
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX665. ..... Ex. 4868
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX666 ..... Ex. 4869
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX667. ..... Ex. 4870
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX668. ..... Ex. 4871
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX669. ..... Ex. 4872
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX670 ..... Ex. 4873
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX671 ..... Ex. 4874
VOLUME 3
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX672 ..... Ex. 4893
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX673 ..... Ex. 4894
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX674 ..... Ex. 4895
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX675 ..... Ex. 4896
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX676 ..... Ex. 4897
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX677 ..... Ex. 4898
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX678 ..... Ex. 4899
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX679 ..... Ex. 4912
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX680 ..... Ex. 4919
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX681 ..... Ex. 4927
Common Cause \& Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX682 ..... Ex. 4935
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX683 ..... Ex. 4936
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX684 ..... Ex. 4937

## xxv

Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX685 ..... Ex. 4938
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX686 ..... Ex. 4939
Harper Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit PX687 ..... Ex. 5217
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1400 ..... Ex. 5270
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1401 ..... Ex. 5271
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1402 ..... Ex. 5272
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1403 ..... Ex. 5287
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1404 ..... Ex. 5288
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1405 ..... Ex. 5302
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1406 ..... Ex. 5303
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1407 ..... Ex. 5305
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1408. ..... Ex. 5306
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1409 ..... Ex. 5455
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1410 ..... Ex. 5473
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1411 ..... Ex. 5474
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1412. ..... Ex. 5541
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1413. ..... Ex. 5549
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1415. ..... Ex. 5551
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1416. ..... Ex. 5552
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1417. ..... Ex. 5565
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1418. ..... Ex. 5566
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1419 ..... Ex. 5642
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1420 ..... Ex. 5644
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1421 ..... Ex. 5720
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1422 ..... Ex. 5721
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1423. ..... Ex. 5831
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1424. ..... Ex. 5832
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1425. ..... Ex. 5833
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1426. ..... Ex. 5834
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1427. ..... Ex. 5834
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1428. ..... Ex. 5849
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1429. ..... Ex. 5863
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1430 ..... Ex. 5864
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1431 ..... Ex. 5865
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1432. ..... Ex. 5867
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1433. ..... Ex. 5870
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1434 ..... Ex. 5871
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1435. ..... Ex. 5873
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1436. ..... Ex. 5875
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1437. ..... Ex. 5877
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1438 ..... Ex. 5878
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1439. ..... Ex. 5879
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1440 ..... Ex. 5880
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1441 ..... Ex. 5896
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1442 ..... Ex. 5897
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1443 ..... Ex. 5898
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1444 ..... Ex. 5899
VOLUME 5
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1445 ..... Ex. 5978
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1446 ..... Ex. 6057
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1447. ..... Ex. 6058
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1448. ..... Ex. 6087
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1458. ..... Ex. 6091
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1459. ..... Ex. 6092
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1460. ..... Ex. 6093
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1461 ..... Ex. 6116
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1462 ..... Ex. 6148
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1463 ..... Ex. 6205
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1464 ..... Ex. 6209
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1465. ..... Ex. 6226
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1467. ..... Ex. 6227
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1468. ..... Ex. 6289
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1469. ..... Ex. 6311
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1470 ..... Ex. 6313
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1471 ..... Ex. 6321

## xxviii

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1472 ..... Ex. 6391
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1473. ..... Ex. 6405
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1474. ..... Ex. 6406
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1475. ..... Ex. 6407
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1476. ..... Ex. 6408
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1477 ..... Ex. 6409
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1478. ..... Ex. 6410
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1479. ..... Ex. 6411
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1480 ..... Ex. 6412
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1481 ..... Ex. 6422
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1482 ..... Ex. 6425
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1483. ..... Ex. 6444
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1484 ..... Ex. 6473
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1485. ..... Ex. 6579
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1486. ..... Ex. 6581
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1487. ..... Ex. 6680
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1488. ..... Ex. 6681
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1489. ..... Ex. 6682
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1490. ..... Ex. 6683
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1491 ..... Ex. 6684
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1492 ..... Ex. 6685
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1493. ..... Ex. 6686
xxix
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1494 ..... Ex. 6687
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1495 ..... Ex. 6688
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1496. ..... Ex. 6689
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1497. ..... Ex. 6690
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1498. ..... Ex. 6691
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1499. ..... Ex. 6692
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1500 ..... Ex. 6693
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1501 ..... Ex. 6694
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1502. ..... Ex. 6695
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1503. ..... Ex. 6696
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1504 ..... Ex. 6697
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1505. ..... Ex. 6698
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1506. ..... Ex. 6699
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1507. ..... Ex. 6700
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1508. ..... Ex. 6701
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1509 ..... Ex. 6702
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1510 ..... Ex. 6703
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1511 ..... Ex. 6704
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1512. ..... Ex. 6705
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1513 ..... Ex. 6706
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1514 ..... Ex. 6707
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1515 ..... Ex. 6708

## xxx

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1516 ..... Ex. 6709
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1517 ..... Ex. 6710
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1518. ..... Ex. 6711
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1519. ..... Ex. 6712
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1520. ..... Ex. 6713
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1521 ..... Ex. 6714
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1522 ..... Ex. 6715
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1523. ..... Ex. 6716
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1524 ..... Ex. 6717
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1525. ..... Ex. 6718
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1526. ..... Ex. 6719
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1527. ..... Ex. 6720
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1528. ..... Ex. 6721
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1529 ..... Ex. 6722
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1530. ..... Ex. 6723
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1531 ..... Ex. 6724
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1532 ..... Ex. 6728
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1533. ..... Ex. 6729
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1534. ..... Ex. 6730
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1535 ..... Ex. 6731
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1536. ..... Ex. 6732
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1537 ..... Ex. 6733
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1538 ..... Ex. 6734
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1539 ..... Ex. 6735
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1540 ..... Ex. 6736
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1541 ..... Ex. 6737
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1542. ..... Ex. 6738
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1543. ..... Ex. 6739
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1544. ..... Ex. 6740
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1545. ..... Ex. 6741
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1546. ..... Ex. 6742
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1547 ..... Ex. 6743
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1548 ..... Ex. 6744
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1549. ..... Ex. 6745
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1550 ..... Ex. 6746
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1551 ..... Ex. 6747
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1552 ..... Ex. 6748
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1553. ..... Ex. 6749
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1554. ..... Ex. 6750
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1555. ..... Ex. 6751
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1556. ..... Ex. 6752
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1557. ..... Ex. 6753
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1558. ..... Ex. 6754
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1559. ..... Ex. 6755
xxxii
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1561 ..... Ex. 6756
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1562 ..... Ex. 6840
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1563 ..... Ex. 6841
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1564 ..... Ex. 6842
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1565 ..... Ex. 6844
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1566. ..... Ex. 6846
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1567 ..... Ex. 6849
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1568. ..... Ex. 6853
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1569. ..... Ex. 6854
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1570 ..... Ex. 6862
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1571 ..... Ex. 6865
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1572 ..... Ex. 6866
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1573 ..... Ex. 6867
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1574 ..... Ex. 6868
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1575 ..... Ex. 6869
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1576. ..... Ex. 6870
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1577. ..... Ex. 6871
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1578. ..... Ex. 6872
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1579. ..... Ex. 6873
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1580 ..... Ex. 6874
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1581 ..... Ex. 6875
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1582 ..... Ex. 6877
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1583 ..... Ex. 6885
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1585. ..... Ex. 6886
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1586 ..... Ex. 6887
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1587. ..... Ex. 6888
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1589 ..... Ex. 6889
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1590 ..... Ex. 6890
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1591 ..... Ex. 6891
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1592. ..... Ex. 6892
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1593 ..... Ex. 6893
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1594 ..... Ex. 6894
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1595 ..... Ex. 6895
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1596. ..... Ex. 6896
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1597 ..... Ex. 6897
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1598. ..... Ex. 6898
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1599. ..... Ex. 6899
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1600. ..... Ex. 6900
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1601 ..... Ex. 6901
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1602 ..... Ex. 6902
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1603. ..... Ex. 6903
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1604. ..... Ex. 6904
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1605. ..... Ex. 6905
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1606. ..... Ex. 6906
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1607 ..... Ex. 6907
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1608 ..... Ex. 6908
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1609 ..... Ex. 6909
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1610. ..... Ex. 6910
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1611 ..... Ex. 6911
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1612 ..... Ex. 6912
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1613 ..... Ex. 6913
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1614. ..... Ex. 6914
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1615 ..... Ex. 6915
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1616 ..... Ex. 6916
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1617 ..... Ex. 6917
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1618. ..... Ex. 6921
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1619 ..... Ex. 6935
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1620 ..... Ex. 6941
Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1621 ..... Ex. 6942
VOLUME 5
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX1 ..... Ex. 6943
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX2 ..... Ex. 6956
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX3 ..... Ex. 6957
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX4 ..... Ex. 7041
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX5 ..... Ex. 7051

## xxxv

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX6 .........Ex. 7065
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX7 .........Ex. 7066
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX8 .........Ex. 7137
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX9 ......... Ex. 7142
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX10 ....... Ex. 7150
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX11 .......Ex. 7160
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX12 ....... Ex. 7176
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX13 ....... Ex. 7177
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX14 ....... Ex. 7241
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX15 .......Ex. 7244
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX16 .......Ex. 7246
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX17 ....... Ex. 7250
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX18 ....... Ex. 7251
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX19 .......Ex. 7301
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX20 .......Ex. 7307
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX21 .......Ex. 7308
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX22 ....... Ex. 7355
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX23 .......Ex. 7356
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX24 ....... Ex. 7398
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX25 ....... Ex. 7399
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX26 .......Ex. 7400
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX27 .......Ex. 7401

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX28 ....... Ex. 7475
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX29 .......Ex. 7588
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX30 .......Ex. 7589
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX31 ....... Ex. 7590
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX32 ....... Ex. 7591
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX33 .......Ex. 7592
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX34 ....... Ex. 7603
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX35 ....... Ex. 7605
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX36 ....... Ex. 7611
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX37 .......Ex. 7641
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX38 .......Ex. 7643
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX39 ....... Ex. 7644
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX40 ....... Ex. 7667
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX41 .......Ex. 7708
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX42 .......Ex. 7718
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX43 ....... Ex. 7756
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX44 ....... Ex. 7757
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX45 .......Ex. 7767
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX46 ....... Ex. 7793
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX47 ....... Ex. 7800
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX48 .......Ex. 7832
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX49 .......Ex. 7833

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX50 ....... Ex. 7842
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX51 .......Ex. 7850
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX52 .......Ex. 7858
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX53 ....... Ex. 7890
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX54 .......Ex. 7960
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX55 .......Ex. 7961
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX56 .......Ex. 7977
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX57 ....... Ex. 7986
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX58 ....... Ex. 7996
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX59 .......Ex. 8019
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX60 ....... Ex. 8020
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX61 ....... Ex. 8036
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX62 ....... Ex. 8045
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX63 .......Ex. 8055
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX64 .......Ex. 8078
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX65 ....... Ex. 8079
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX66 .......Ex. 8085
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX67 .......Ex. 8088
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX68 ....... Ex. 8095
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX69 ....... Ex. 8115
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX70 .......Ex. 8116
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX71 .......Ex. 8127

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX72 ....... Ex. 8129
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX73 .......Ex. 8137
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX74 .......Ex. 8164
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX75 ....... Ex. 8228
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX76 .......Ex. 8229
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX77 .......Ex. 8342
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX78 .......Ex. 8343
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX79 ....... Ex. 8488
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX80 .......Ex. 8489
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX81 .......Ex. 8648
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX82 .......Ex. 8649
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX83 ....... Ex. 8701
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX84 .......Ex. 8702
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX85 .......Ex. 8812
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX89 ....... Ex. 8813
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX90 ....... Ex. 8919
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX94 ....... Ex. 9169
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX95 .......Ex. 9173
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX96 ....... Ex. 9176
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX97 ....... Ex. 9185
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX98 .......Ex. 9204
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX99 .......Ex. 9206

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX100 ..... Ex. 9208 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX101 .....Ex. 9210 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX102 ..... Ex. 9212 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX103 ..... Ex. 9214 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX104 ..... Ex. 9216 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX105 ..... Ex. 9218 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX106 .....Ex. 9220 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX107 ..... Ex. 9236

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX108 ..... Ex. 9514
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX109 .....Ex. 9583
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX110 ..... Ex. 9650
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX111 ..... Ex. 9703
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX112 ..... Ex. 9726
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX113 .....Ex. 9728
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX114 ..... Ex. 9729
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX115 ..... Ex. 9731
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX116 .....Ex. 9732
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX117 .....Ex. 9733
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX118 ..... Ex. 9734
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX119 ..... Ex. 9735
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX120 .....Ex. 9736
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX121 .....Ex. 9737

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX122 ..... Ex. 9738
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX123 ..... Ex. 9739
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX124 .....Ex. 9740
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX125 ..... Ex. 9742

## VOLUME 6

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX126 ..... Ex. 9829
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX127 ..... Ex. 9928
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX130 ..... Ex. 9976
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX131 .....Ex. 9978
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX132 ..... Ex. 9980
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX133 ..... Ex. 9982
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX134 .....Ex. 9983
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX135 .....Ex. 9984
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX136 ..... Ex. 9985
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX137 ..... Ex. 9986
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX138 .....Ex. 9987
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX139 ...Ex. 10005
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX140 ...Ex. 10013
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX141 ...Ex. 10016
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX142 ...Ex. 10019
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX143 ...Ex. 10020

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX144 ...Ex. 10021 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX145 ...Ex. 10022 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX146 ... Ex. 10023 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX147 ...Ex. 10024 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX148 ... Ex. 10025 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX149 ...Ex. 10026 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX150 .... Ex. 10027 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX151 .... Ex. 10057 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX152 ...Ex. 10071 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX153 ...Ex. 10147 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX154 ...Ex. 10242 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX156 ...Ex. 10244 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX157 ... Ex. 10255 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX158 ...Ex. 10278

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX159 ... Ex. 10313
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX160 ... Ex. 10332
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX163 ... Ex. 10367
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX164 ...Ex. 10645
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX165 ...Ex. 10659
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX166 ... Ex. 10678
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX167 ...Ex. 10731
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX168 ...Ex. 10750

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX169 ... Ex. 10770 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX170 ...Ex. 10778 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX171 ...Ex. 10782 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX172 ... Ex. 10783 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX173 ... Ex. 10852 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX174 ...Ex. 10889 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX176 ...Ex. 11020 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX179 ...Ex. 11023 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX180 ... Ex. 11046 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX181 ...Ex. 11053 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX182 ... Ex. 11112 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX183 ... Ex. 11126 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX184 ... Ex. 11210 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX185 ...Ex. 11212 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX186 ...Ex. 11213 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX187 ... Ex. 11214 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX188 ...Ex. 11218 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX189 ...Ex. 11230 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX190 ... Ex. 11234 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX191 ...Ex. 11269 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX192 ... Ex. 11270 Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX195 ... Ex. 11274

Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX196 ... Ex. 11380
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX197 ...Ex. 11382
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX198 ... Ex. 11466
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX199 ... Ex. 11468
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX200 ...Ex. 11487
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX201 ...Ex. 11554
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX202 ...Ex. 11555
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX203 ... Ex. 11556
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX204 ...Ex. 11557
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX205 ...Ex. 11558
Legislative Defendants' Trial Exhibit LDTX206 ... Ex. 11571
Joint Stipulation of Facts $\qquad$ .Ex. 11606

# NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY AMENDMENT <br> Senate Bill 740 

S740-AST-73 [v.1]

$\underset{\substack{\text { AMENDMENT NO. A1 } \\ \text { (to be filled in by } \\ \text { Principal Clerk) }}}{ }$
Page 1 of 12

Amends Title [NO] First Edition

Date . 2021

## Representative Reives

moves to amend the bill on page 1 , line 9 , through page 15 , line 43 , by rewriting those lines to read:
"District 1: Bertie County, Chowan County, Edgecombe County, Franklin County, Gates County, Granville County, Greene County, Halifax County, Hertford County, Martin County, Nash County, Northampton County, Pasquotank County, Perquimans County, Pitt County: VTD 101, VTD 1201, VTD 1501, VTD 1503, VTD 1504A, VTD 1504B, VTD 1505B, VTD 1506, VTD 1507, VTD 1507B, VTD 1508A, VTD 1508B, VTD 1509, VTD 1512A: Block(s) 1470006072012, 1470006072013, 1470006073000, 1470006073001, 1470016011001; VTD 301, VTD 401, VTD 501, VTD 701, VTD 800A, VTD 800B, VTD 901; Vance County, Warren County, Washington County, Wayne County: VTD 002: Block(s) 1910002001008, 1910002003000, 1910002003001, 1910002003002, 1910002003003, 1910002003004, 1910002003005, 1910002003006, 1910002003007, 1910002003008, 1910002003009, 1910002003010, 1910002003011, 1910002003012, 1910002003013, 1910002003014, 1910002003015, 1910002003016, 1910002003017, 1910002003018, 1910002003019, 1910002003020, 1910002003021, 1910002003022, 1910002003023, 1910002003025, 1910002003028, 1910002003029, 1910002003030, 1910002003031, 1910002003032, 1910002003033, 1910002003035, 1910002003036, 1910002003037, 1910002003038, 1910002003039, 1910002003040, 1910002003041, 1910002003042, 1910002003043, 1910002003044, 1910002003045, 1910003031000, 1910003031001, 1910003031021, 1910003031022, 1910003032000, 1910003041000, 1910003041033, 1910003041034, 1910003041036, 1910003041037, 1910003041038, 1910003041039, 1910003043000; VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 012; Wilson County.
District 2: Wake County: VTD 01-01, VTD 01-02, VTD 01-03, VTD 01-04, VTD 01-05, VTD 01-06, VTD 01-07, VTD 01-09, VTD 01-10, VTD 01-11, VTD 01-12, VTD 01-13, VTD $01-14$, VTD 01-15, VTD 01-16, VTD 01-17, VTD 01-18, VTD 01-19, VTD 01-20, VTD 01-21, VTD 01-22, VTD 01-23, VTD 01-25, VTD 01-26, VTD 01-27, VTD 01-28, VTD $01-29$, VTD 01-30, VTD 01-31, VTD 01-32, VTD 01-33, VTD 01-34, VTD 01-35, VTD 01-36, VTD 01-37, VTD 01-38, VTD 01-39, VTD 01-40, VTD 01-41, VTD 01-42, VTD 01-43, VTD 01-44, VTD 01-45, VTD 01-46, VTD 01-47, VTD 01-48, VTD 01-50, VTD $01-51$, VTD $02-01$, VTD $02-02$, VTD $02-03$, VTD $02-04$, VTD $02-05$, VTD $02-06$, VTD 04-05, VTD 05-05, VTD 07-01, VTD 07-02, VTD 07-03, VTD 07-04, VTD 07-05, VTD


AMENDMENT NO.
(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)

07-06, VTD 07-07, VTD 07-09, VTD 07-10, VTD 07-11, VTD 07-12, VTD 07-13, VTD $08-02$, VTD 08-03, VTD 08-04, VTD 08-05, VTD 08-06, VTD 08-07, VTD 08-08, VTD $08-09$, VTD $08-10$, VTD $08-11$, VTD $09-01$, VTD $09-02$, VTD 09-03, VTD 10-01, VTD $10-02$, VTD 10-03, VTD 10-04, VTD 11-01, VTD 11-02, VTD 12-05: Block(s) 1830531111000, 1830531111001, 1830531111002, 1830531111003, 1830531111004, 1830531111005, 1830531111006, 1830531111007, 1830531111008, 1830531111010, 1830531111015, 1830531111020, 1830531111025, 1830531113003, 1830531113008, 1830531113013, 1830531113018, 1830531113023, 1830531113028, 1830531113035, 1830532111000, 1830532111005, 1830532111011, 1830532111016, 1830532111022, 1830532111027, 1830532111032, 1830531111011, 1830531111012, 1830531111016, 1830531111017, 1830531111021, 1830531111022, 1830531111013, 1830531111009, 1830531111014, 1830531111018, 1830531111019, 1830531111023, 1830531111024, 1830531111026, 1830531113000, 1830531113001, 1830531113004, 1830531113005, 1830531113009, 1830531113010, 1830531113014, 1830531113015, 1830531113006, 1830531113002, 1830531113007, 1830531113011, 1830531113012, 1830531113016, 1830531113017, 1830531113019, 1830531113020, 1830531113021, 1830531113022, 1830531113024, 1830531113025, 1830531113026, 1830531113027, 1830531113030, 1830531113031, 1830531113036, 1830531113037, 1830532111001, 1830532111002, 1830531113032, 1830531113034, 1830531113038, 1830531113039, , 1830532111006, 1830532111007, 1830532111008, 1830532111012, 1830532111013, 1830532111014, 1830532111017, 1830532111018, 1830532111020, 1830532111010, 1830532111015, 1830532111021, 1830532111023, 1830532111024, 1830532111025, 1830532111026, 1830532111033, 183053211034, 1830532111035, 183053211036, 1830532111037, 1830532111038, 1830532111051, 1830532111052, 1830532111053, 1830532111054, 1830532111055, 1830532111056, 1830532111057, 1830532112023; VTD 13-01, VTD 13-02, VTD 13-05, VTD 13-06, VTD 13-07, VTD 13-08, VTD 13-09, VTD 13-10, VTD 13-11, VTD 14-01, VTD 14-02, VTD 15-01, VTD 15-02, VTD 15-04, VTD 16-01, VTD 16-02, VTD 16-03, VTD 16-04, VTD 16-05, VTD 16-06, VTD 16-07, VTD 16-09, VTD 16-10, VTD 16-11, VTD 17-01, VTD 17-02, VTD 17-03, VTD 17-04, VTD 17-05, VTD 17-06, VTD 17-07, VTD 17-09, VTD 17-10, VTD 17-11, VTD 17-12, VTD 17-13, VTD 18-01, VTD 18-02, VTD 18-04, VTD 18-06, VTD 18-07, VTD 19-03, VTD 19-05, VTD 19-07, VTD 19-09, VTD 19-11, VTD 19-12, VTD 19-13, VTD 19-14, VTD 19-15, VTD 19-16, VTD 19-17, VTD 19-18, VTD 19-19, VTD 19-20, VTD 19-21.
District 3: Beaufort County, Camden County, Carteret County, Craven County, Currituck County, Dare County, Duplin County, Hyde County, Jones County, Lenoir County, Onslow County, Pamlico County, Pender County: VTD LT18: Block(s) 1419201061094, 1419201061095, 1419201061096, 1419201061097, 1419201061100, 1419201061102, 1419201061103, 1419201061104, 1419201061105, 1419201061106, 1 1419201061108, 1419201061113, 1419202022012, 1419202022017, 1419202022018, 1419202022019, 1419202022020, 1419202022021,

AMENDMENT NO. $\boldsymbol{A 1}$
(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)
Page 3 of 12

> 1419202022022,
> 1419202022027, 1419202022032, 1419202022037, 1419202031015, 1419202031038,

1419202022023, 1419202022024, 1419202022025, 1419202022028, 1419202022029, 1419202022033, 1419202022034, 1419202022039, 1419202031008, 1419202031023, 1419202031024, 1419202031025, 1419202032020, 1419202032021, 1419202032022,

1419202022026, 1419202022031, 1419202022036, 1419202031013, 1419202031030, 1419202032033, $1419202032049,1419901000002,1419901000003 ;$ VTD MH07, VTD MT19, VTD SC13,
VTD SP15, VTD UH08, VTD UT14; Pitt County: VTD 1001, VTD 1101, VTD 1102A, VTD 1102B, VTD 1301, VTD 1403A1, VTD 1403A2, VTD 1403B, VTD 1505A, VTD 1510A, VTD 1510B, VTD 1511A, VTD 1511B, VTD 1512A: Block(s) 1470006071000, 1470006071001, 1470006071002, 1470006071003, 1470006071004, 1470006071005, 1470006071006 1470006071011, 1470006071016, 1470006072002, 1470006072007, 1470006072014, 1470006072019 , 1470006072024 , 1470006073002, 1470006073007, 1470006073012, 1470006073017, 1470006073022, 1470006073027, 1470006073032, 1470006073037, 1470006073042, 1470006074001, 1470006074006, 1470006074011, 1470016011015, 1470016011020, 1470016011021, 1470016011054, 1470016011055, 1470016011056, 1470016011057, 1470016011058, 1470016011060; VTD 1512B, VTD 1513A, VTD 1513B, VTD 200A, VTD 200B, VTD 601; Tyrrell County.
District 4: Alamance County, Caswell County, Durham County: VTD 001, VTD 002, VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 008, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 016, VTD 017, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 031, VTD 032, VTD 033, VTD 036, VTD 037, VTD 038, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 044, VTD 045, VTD 046, VTD 047, VTD 048, VTD 050, VTD 051, VTD 052, VTD 054, VTD 055-11, VTD 055-49, VTD 30-1, VTD 30-2, VTD 34-1, VTD 34-2, VTD 35.3: Block(s) 0630020131000, 0630020131001, 0630020131002,

AMENDMENT NO.

(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)
Page 4 of 12

|  | 0630020131004, | 0630020131005 , | 0630020131006, |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0630020132000 , | 0630020132001, | 063 | , |  |
| 2005 | 0630020132006, | 0630020132007 | 0630020133000, | 0630 |
| 02, | 630020133003, | 630020133004 | 20133005, | 6, |
| 33007, | 630020133008, | 063002013300 | 10, | 66300 |
| 20133012, | 0630020202000, | 0630020202001 | 0630020202002, | 0630020202 |
| 063002020200 | 63002020200 | 0630020202006 | 0630020202007, | 0630020203000 , |
| 0630020203001 | 66300202030 | 06300202 | 63002020 | 5, |
| 30020203006 | 0630020203007 , | 0630020203008 | 0630020204000 , | 063002 |
| 30020204002 | 630020204003, | 0630020204004 | 0630020204005, | 0630020204006, |
| 0630020204007 , | 630020 | 0630020204009 | 630020204010, | 0630020204011, |
| 630020204012 | 0630020204013 | 0630020204014 | 0630020204015, | 063 |
| 30020204017 | 0630020204018, | 0630020204019 | 0630020204020, | 06300202 |
| 300202040 | 630020204023 | 063002020402 | 630020 | 7, |
| 63002 | 63002020402 | 063002020403 | 6300202 | 0630020204032, |
| 30020204038 | 630020204039, | 0630020204040 | 0630020204041, | 0630020204042, |
| 300202040 | 6300202040 | 06300202040 | 0630020204046, | 063 |
| 300202040 | 6300202 | 06300202040 | 630020204053, |  |
| 630020211002 | 0630020 | 06300 | 06300 | 0630020211006, |
| 300202 | 630020211008 | 06300202110 | 630020211010 | 630020211011, |
| 630 | 3002 | 630 | 6300202 | 6, |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 硣 | y. | IR, VID Li, | MC, VID MS | R |
| 570401013003 | 157040101300 | 1570401013006 | 157040101300 |  |
| 020 | 570411002001, | 2002, | 1570411002003, |  |
| 70411002005 | 1570411002006, | 1570411002007, | 1570411002008, | 157 |
| 70411002010, | 1570411002011, | 1570411002012 | 1570411002013, | 1570 |
| 70411002015 | 1570411002019, | 1570411002020 | 1570411002021, | 1570 |
| 70411002023 | 157041100202 | 1570411002025 | 1570411002026, | 1570 |
| 70411002028 | 1570411003000, | 1570411003001 | 1570411003002, | 157 |
| 7041100300 | 1570411003012, | 1570411003014, | 1570411003015, | , |
| 704110030 | 1570411003 | 1570411003 | 1570411003 | 57 |
| 110040 | 1570411004015, | 1570411004016 | 1570411005000, | 1570411005 |
| 570411005002, | 1570411005003, | 1570411005007 | 1570411005008, | 1570411005009 |
| 1570411005011, | 15704110050 | 1570411005 | 15704 |  |
| 704110050 | 1570411005017, | 1570411005018 | 1570411005019, | 157041100502 |
| 570411005021, | 1570411005022, | 1570411005023 | 1570411005024, | 570411005 |
| 1570411005028, | 1570411005029, | 1570411005030 | 1570411005031, | 1570411005032, |
| 570411005033 | 15704110050 | 1570411005035 , | 1570411005036, | 15704110050 |
| 10050 | 570411005043, | 1570411005044, | 1570411005045, | 157041100504 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

District 5: Alexander County, Alleghany County, Ashe County, Avery County, Burke County: VTD 001, VTD 003, VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 018, VTD

AMENDMENT NO.
A1
(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)

019, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 024, VTD 031, VTD 034, VTD 035, VTD 036, VTD 038, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 048, VTD 051: Block(s) 0230203013010, 0230203013011, 0230203013012, 0230203013014, 0230203014000, 0230203014001, $0230203014002, ~ 0230203014003, ~ 0230203014004, ~ 0230203014005, ~ 0230203014006$, 0230203014007, 0230203014008, 0230203014009, 0230203014010, 0230203014011, $0230203014012, ~ 0230203014013, ~ 0230203014014, ~ 0230203014015, ~ 0230203014016$, 0230203014017, 0230203014018, 0230203014019, 0230203014020, 0230203014021, $0230203014022, ~ 0230203014023, ~ 0230203014024, ~ 0230203014025, ~ 0230203014026$, $0230203014027,0230203014028, ~ 0230203014029, ~ 0230203014030, ~ 0230203014031$, 0230203014032, 0230203014033, 0230203014034, 0230203014035, 0230203014036, 0230203014037, 0230203014043, 0230214003011, 0230214003012 ; VTD 062, VTD 066, VTD 070, VTD 47-A, VTD 47-B; Caldwell County, Forsyth County: VTD 031, VTD 032, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 051, VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 054, VTD 055, VTD 071, VTD 072, VTD 073, VTD 074, VTD 075, VTD 091, VTD 092, VTD 101, VTD 122, VTD 123, VTD 131, VTD 132, VTD 133, VTD 201, VTD 206: Block(s) 0670014001015, 0670014001016, 0670027021001, 0670027021002, 0670027021003, 0670027021004, $0670027021005, ~ 0670027021006, ~ 0670027021007, ~ 0670027021008, ~ 0670027021011$, 0670027021012, 0670027021013, 0670027021014, 0670027021018, 0670027021019, 0670027021020 ; VTD 207, VTD 602, VTD 607, VTD 705, VTD 706, VTD 708, VTD 709, VTD 804, VTD 805, VTD 806, VTD 807, VTD 808, VTD 809, VTD 904, VTD 905, VTD 906, VTD 907, VTD 908, VTD 909; Rockingham County: VTD EC, VTD EDEN-1, VTD HO, VTD HU, VTD LK-2, VTD MA, VTD NB, VTD RC: Block(s) 1570411001000, 1570411001001, 1570411001002, 1570411001003, 1570411001004, 1570411001005, 1570411001006, 1570411001007, 1570411001008, 1570411001009, 1570411001010, 1570411001013, 1570411001019, 1570411003005, 1570411003006, 1570411003007, 1570411003008, 1570411003009, 1570411003010, 1570411003011, 1570411003013, $1570411003019,1570411003020,1570411003021,1570411003022$, 1570411003023 , $1570411003024,1570411003025,1570411003026,1570411003027,1570411003028$, 1570411003029, 1570411004008, 1570411004017, 1570411006009, 1570411006014, 1570411006019, 1570416011027, 1570416011035, 1570416012003, 1570416012008, 1570416012013, 1570416012018, 1570411003032, 1570411003033, 1 1570411004009, 1570411004010, 1570411006005, 1570411006006, 1570411004011, 1570411006010, 1570411006011, 1570411006007, 1570411006012, 1570411006015, 1570411006016, 1570411006017, 1570416011022, 1570416011024, 1570416011025, 1570416011029, 1570416011030, 1570416011031, 1570416011039, 1570416012000, 1570416012001, 1570416012004, 1570416012005, 1570416012006, 1570416012009, 1570416012010, 1570416012011, 1570416012014, 1570416012015, 1570416012016, 1570416012023, 1570416012024, 1570416012035, 1570416012037, 1570416012038, 1570416012039, 1570416012040, 1570416012041, 1570416012042; VTD WS; Stokes County, Surry County, Watauga County, Wilkes County, Yadkin County.

AMENDMENT NO. A1
(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)
Page 6 of 12

District 6: Forsyth County: VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 021, VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 061, VTD 062, VTD 063, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD 066, VTD 067, VTD 068, VTD 081, VTD 082, VTD 083, VTD 111, VTD 112, VTD 203, VTD 204, VTD 205, VTD 206: Block(s) 0670014001000, 0670014001001, 0670014001002, 0670014001003, 0670014001004, 0670014001005, 0670014001006, 0670014001007, 0670014001008, 0670014001009, 0670014001010, 0670014001011, 0670014001012, 0670014001013, 0670014001014, 0670014001017, 0670014001018, 0670014001019, $0670014001020, ~ 0670014001021, ~ 0670014001022, ~ 0670014001023, ~ 0670014001024$, $0670014001025,0670014001026,0670014001027,0670014001028,0670014001031$, 0670027021015,0670027021016 ; VTD 301, VTD 302, VTD 303, VTD 304, VTD 305, VTD 306, VTD 401, VTD 402, VTD 403, VTD 404, VTD 405, VTD 501, VTD 502, VTD 503, VTD 504, VTD 505, VTD 506, VTD 507, VTD 601, VTD 603, VTD 604, VTD 605, VTD 606, VTD 701, VTD 702, VTD 703, VTD 704, VTD 707, VTD 801, VTD 802, VTD 803, VTD 901, VTD 902, VTD 903; Guilford County.
District 7: Bladen County: VTD P10: Block(s) 0179505012025, 0179505012026, 0179505012032, 0179505012033, 0179505012034, 0179505022048, 0179505022049, $0179505023000, ~ 0179505023008, ~ 0179505023009, ~ 0179505023010, ~ 0179505023011$, $0179505023021,0179505023022,0179505023023,0179505023024,0179505023025$, $0179505023026,0179505023028,0179505023029,0179505023030,0179505023031$, 0179505023032, 0179506014001, 0179506014002, 0179506014003, 0179506014004, $0179506014005, ~ 0179506014010, ~ 0179506014011, ~ 0179506014012, ~ 0179506014013$, $0179506014014, ~ 0179506014015, ~ 0179506014016, ~ 0179506014017, ~ 0179506014018$, $0179506014019,0179506014020,0179506014021,0179506014022,0179506014023$, 0179506014024, 0179506014025, 0179506014026, 0179506014027, 0179506014028, 0179506014029, 0179506014030, 0179506014031, 0179506014036, 0179506014037, 0179506014038, 0179506014039, 0179506014043, 0179506014044, 0179506014045, 0179506014046, 0179506014047, 0179506014048, 0179506014061, 0179506014062, 0179506014068 ; VTD P25, VTD P30, VTD P40, VTD P45, VTD P502, VTD P55, VTD P65, VTD P75; Brunswick County, Columbus County, Johnston County: VTD PR04, VTD PR07, VTD PR08, VTD PR09: Block(s) 1010409033008, 1010409033009, 1010409033010, 1010409033011, 1010409033012, 1010409033013, 1010409033014, 1010409033015, 1010409033016, 1010409043008, 1010409043009, 1010409043010, 1010409043011, 1010409043012, 1010409043013, 1010409055000, 1010409055001, 1010409055002, 1010409055003, 1010409055004, 1010409055005, 1010409055006, 1010409055007, 1010409055010, 1010409055011, 1010409055013, 1010409055014, 1010409055019, 1010409055020, 1010409061005, 1010409061006, 1010409061007, 1010409061008, 1010409061009, 1010409061012, 1010409061013, 1010409061014, 1010409061015, 1010409061016, 1010409061018, 1010409061019, 1010409061020, 1010409061021, 1010409061022, 1010409061025; VTD PR13, VTD PR14, VTD PR19, VTD PR20, VTD PR21, VTD PR22, VTD PR24, VTD PR25, VTD PR26, VTD PR27A, VTD PR27B, VTD PR28, VTD PR29A, VTD PR29B, VTD PR30, VTD PR32, VTD PR35, VTD PR36, VTD PR37, VTD PR38; New Hanover County, Pender County: VTD CF11, VTD CL05, VTD CS04, VTD CT03, VTD GR06, VTD LC09, VTD LT18: Block(s) 1419202031026,

AMENDMENT NO.

(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)

1419202031027, 1419202031028, 1419202031029, 1419202031033, 1419202031037, 1419202032019, 1419202032034, 1419202032035, 1419202032036, 1419202032037, 1419202032038, 1419202032039, 1419202032040, 1419202032041, 1419202032043, 1419202032044, 1419202032045, 1419202032048; VTD LU16, VTD NB01, VTD PL10, VTD RP20, VTD SB02, VTD SH12, VTD UU17; Sampson County, Wayne County: VTD 001, VTD 002: Block(s) 1910002001000, 1910002001001, 1910002001002, 1910002001003, 1910002001004, 1910002001005, 1910002001006, 1910002001007, 1910002001009 , 1910002001014, 1910002001025, 1910002003026, 1910003041003, 1910003041022, 1910003042002, 1910002001010, 1910002001011, 1910002001012, 1910002001013, 1910002001015, 1910002001016, 1910002001017, 1910002001018, 1910002001045, 1910002002000, 1910002002001, 1910002003024, 1910002003027, 1910002003034, 1910003041001, 1910003041002, 1910003041018, 1910003041019, 1910003041020, 1910003041021, 1910003043003 , 1910003043004, 1910003043005, 1910003043006, 1910003043007, 1910003043008, 1910003043009,1910003043010 ; VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 008, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 011, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 016, VTD 017, VTD 018, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 1920, VTD 2530.

District 8: Cabarrus County: VTD 02-01, VTD 02-02, VTD 02-05, VTD 02-06, VTD 02-07, VTD 02-08, VTD 02-09, VTD 03-00, VTD 04-01, VTD 04-03, VTD 04-08, VTD 04-09, VTD 04-11, VTD 04-12, VTD 04-13, VTD 05-00, VTD 06-00, VTD 07-00, VTD 08-00, VTD 09-00: Block(s) 0250416022010, 0250417013028, 0250417013031, 0250417013033, $0250417013034,0250417013049,0250417013050$; VTD 11-02, VTD 12-03, VTD 12-04, VTD 12-05, VTD 12-06, VTD 12-08, VTD 12-10, VTD 12-11, VTD 12-13; Davidson County, Davie County, Iredell County: VTD BA: Block(s) 0970612022026, 0970612022027, 0970612022028, 0970612022029, 0970612022033, 0970612022034, 0970612022035, 0970612022036, 0970612022037, 0970612022038, 0970612022039, 0970612022040, $0970612022041, ~ 0970612022042, ~ 0970612022059, ~ 0970612023012, ~ 0970612023013$, 0970612023022, 0970612023024, 0970612023025, 0970612023026, 0970612023027, 0970612023028, 0970612023029, 0970612023030, 0970612023031, 0970612023032, $0970612023033, ~ 0970612023034, ~ 0970612023046, ~ 0970612031000, ~ 0970612031001$, 0970612031003, 0970612031004, 0970612031014, 0970613012010, 0970613012011, 0970613012012, 0970613012013, 0970613021000, 0970613021001, 0970613021002, 0970613021003 , 0970613021008 , 0970613021013 0970613021018 , 0970613021023 , 0970613021028 , 0970613021038 , 0970613022006 0970613022011 , 0970613021004, 0970613021005, 0970613021009,0970613021010 0970613021014, 0970613021015, 0970613021006, 0970613021007 , 0970613021012 , 0970613021017, 0970613021019, 0970613021020, 0970613021021, 0970613021024, 0970613021025, 0970613021026, 0970613021029, 0970613021030, 0970613021036, 0970613022002, 0970613022003, 0970613022004, 0970613021022 , 0970613021027, 0970613021037 , 0970613022005, 0970613022007, 0970613022008, 0970613022009, 0970613022010, 0970613022012, 0970613022013, 0970613022014, 0970613022015,

AMENDMENT NO.

(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)

0970613022016, 0970613022017, 0970613023009, 0970613023010, 0970613023011, 0970613023012 , 0970613023013, 0970613023020 , 0970613023025 , 0970613023030 , 0970613023035 , 0970613023040 , 0970613023045 , 0970613031015 , 0970613031021 , 0970613031038 , 0970613031057 , 0970613032004 , 0970613032009 , 0970613032014, 0970613032019 , 0970613032024, 0970613023021, 0970613023026, 0970613023031, 0970613023032, 0970613023036, 0970613023037, 0970613023041, 0970613023042, 0970613031000, 0970613031001, 0970613023015, 0970613023023 , 0970613023028 , 0970613023033 , 0970613023038 , 0970613023043 , 0970613031016, 0970613031018, 0970613031019, 0970613031022, 0970613031035, 0970613031036, 0970613031039, 0970613031040, 0970613031041, 0970613032000, 0970613032001, 0970613032002, 0970613032005, 0970613032006, 0970613032007, 0970613023019 , 0970613023024, 0970613023029 , 0970613023034 , 0970613023039 , 0970613023044, 0970613031003 , 0970613031020 , 0970613031037, 0970613031043 , 0970613032003 , 0970613032010, 0970613032011, 0970613032012, 0970613032008 , 0970613032015, 0970613032016, 0970613032017, 0970613032013 , 0970613032018, 097061303 $0970613032025,0970613032027,0970613032028,0970613032048$, $0970613032049,0970613032066,0970613042000,0970613042002$; VTD CC1, VTD CC2, VTD CC3, VTD CC4, VTD DV1-A, VTD DV1-B, VTD DV2-A, VTD DV2-B; Randolph County, Rowan County.
District 9: Cabarrus County: VTD 01-02, VTD 01-04, VTD 01-07, VTD 01-08, VTD 01-10, VTD 01-11, VTD 02-03, VTD 09-00: Block(s) 0250416021000, 0250416021001, $0250416021002, ~ 0250416021003, ~ 0250416021004, ~ 0250416021005, ~ 0250416021006$, 0250416021007, 0250416021008, 0250416021010, 0250416021011, 0250416021012, 0250416021013, 0250416021014, 0250416021015, 0250416021016, 0250416021017, $0250416021018,0250416022000,0250416022001, ~ 0250416022002, ~ 0250416022003$, $0250416022005, \quad 0250416022006, ~ 0250416022007$, $0250416022008, ~ 0250416022009$, $0250416022011, ~ 0250416022013, ~ 0250416022014, ~ 0250416022015, ~ 0250416022016$, $0250416022017,0250416022018,0250416022019,0250416022020,0250416022021$, 0250416022022, 0250416022023, 0250416022024, 0250416022025, 0250416022026, 0250416022027, 0250416022028, 0250416022029, 0250416022030, 0250416022031, $0250416022032,0250416022033, ~ 0250416022034, ~ 0250416022035, ~ 0250416022036$, 0250416022037, 0250416022038, 0250416022039, 0250416022040, 0250416022041, $0250416022042, ~ 0250416022043, ~ 0250416022044, ~ 0250416022045, ~ 0250416022046$, 0250416022047, 0250416041000, 0250416041001, 0250416041003, 0250416041004, $0250416041005, ~ 0250416041008, ~ 0250416041009, ~ 0250416041010, ~ 0250416041011$, $0250416041012, ~ 0250416041013, ~ 0250416041014, ~ 0250416041031, ~ 0250417013016$, 0250417013035, 0250417013037, 0250417013038, 0250417013046, 0250417013047, $0250417013048 ;$ VTD 10-00, VTD 11-01, VTD 12-09, VTD 12-12; Mecklenburg County: VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 008, VTD 019, VTD 032, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 036, VTD 045, VTD 048, VTD 049, VTD 060: Block(s) 1190015091002, 1190015091007, 1190015091008, 1190015091009, 1190015091010, 1190015092009,1190015092012 ; VTD 061, VTD 062, VTD 063, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD

AMENDMENT NO.
A1 (to be filled in by Principal Clerk)

066, VTD 067, VTD 068, VTD 069, VTD 070, VTD 071, VTD 072, VTD 073, VTD 074, VTD 083, VTD 084, VTD 085, VTD 086, VTD 090, VTD 091, VTD 094, VTD 095, VTD 096, VTD 099, VTD 100, VTD 102, VTD 103, VTD 104, VTD 106, VTD 108, VTD 110, VTD 111, VTD 112, VTD 113, VTD 115, VTD 116, VTD 117, VTD 118, VTD 119, VTD 121, VTD 123, VTD 124, VTD 125, VTD 130, VTD 131, VTD 136, VTD 137, VTD 149, VTD 201, VTD 203, VTD 204.1, VTD 205, VTD 215, VTD 216, VTD 217, VTD 218, VTD 219, VTD 220, VTD 221, VTD 227, VTD 232, VTD 233, VTD 234, VTD 235, VTD 236, VTD 237; Stanly County, Union County.
District 10: Burke County: VTD 051: Block(s) 0230203012000, 0230203012001, 0230203012002, 0230203013000, 0230203013001, 0230203013002, 0230203013003, 0230203013004, 0230203013005, 0230203013006, 0230203013007, 0230203013008, 0230203013009, 0230203013013, 0230203013015, 0230203013016, 0230203013017, $0230203013018, ~ 0230203013019, ~ 0230203013020, ~ 0230203013021, ~ 0230203013022$, 0230203013023, 0230203013024, 0230203013025, 0230203013026, 0230203013027, $0230203013028, ~ 0230203013029, ~ 0230203013030, ~ 0230203013031, ~ 0230203013032$, 0230203013033, 0230203013034, 0230203013035, 0230203013036, 0230203014038, $0230203014039, ~ 0230203014040, ~ 0230203014041, ~ 0230203014042, ~ 0230203014044$, 0230203014045, 0230203014046, 0230203014047, 0230203014048, 0230203014051, 0230203014052, 0230203014053, 0230203014054, 0230203014055, 0230203014056, 0230203014057, 0230203014058, 0230203014059, 0230203014060, 0230203014061, 0230203031022, 0230203031023, 0230203031024, 0230203031025, 0230203031026, 0230203031027, 0230203031028, 0230203031029, 0230203032000, 0230203032001, $0230203032002, ~ 0230203032003, ~ 0230203032004, ~ 0230203032005, ~ 0230203032006$, 0230203032007, 0230203032008, 0230203032009, 0230203032010, 0230203032011, 0230203032012, 0230214003035, 0230214003036; VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD 29-A, VTD 29-B; Catawba County, Cleveland County, Gaston County, Iredell County: VTD BA: Block(s) 0970612013035, 0970612013036, 0970612013037, 0970612013040, 0970612013041, 0970612013048, 0970612013049, 0970612022000, 0970612022001, 0970612022002, 0970612022003, 0970612022004, 0970612022005, 0970612022006, 0970612022013, 0970612022022, 0970612022023, 0970612022024, $0970612022025, ~ 0970612022030, ~ 0970612022031, ~ 0970612022032, ~ 0970612022047$, $0970612022048, ~ 0970612022049, ~ 0970612022053, ~ 0970612022058, ~ 0970612023023$, 0970613011001, 0970613011007, 0970613011020, 0970613011021, 0970613011022, 0970613011023, 0970613011024, 0970613011025, 0970613011028, 0970613011029, 0970613011030, 0970613011031, 0970613011032, 0970613011033, 0970613011034, 0970613011035, 0970613011036, 0970613011037, 0970613023016, 0970613023017; VTD BE, VTD CD, VTD CH-A, VTD CH-B, VTD CS, VTD EM, VTD FT, VTD NH, VTD OL, VTD SB, VTD SH-A, VTD SH-B, VTD ST1, VTD ST2, VTD ST3, VTD ST4, VTD ST5, VTD ST6, VTD TB, VTD UG; Lincoln County, Rutherford County: VTD 011, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 030, VTD 034, VTD 03A, VTD 04A, VTD 05A, VTD 09A, VTD 10A, VTD 16A: Block(s) 1619601032012, 1619601032013, 1619601032014, 1619601032020, 1619601032021, 1619602011003, 1619602011004, 1619602011005, 1619602011006, 1619602011008, 1619602011009,

# NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

## IMENDMENT

## Senate Bill 740

S740-AST-73 [v.1]

AMENDMENT NO.

(to be filled in by
Principal Clerk)

1619602011010, 1619602011015 , 1619602011020, 1619602011025, 1619602011030, 1619602011037, 1619602011042 , 1619602011056, 1619602012046, 1619602012057, 1619602013020, 1619602022004

1619602011011, 1619602011016, 1619602011021, 1619602011026, 1619602011031, 1619602011038, 1619602011043 , 1619602012024, 1619602012048, 1619602012058, 1619602022000,

1619602011012, 1619602011017, 1619602011022, 1619602011027, 1619602011032, 1619602011039, 1619602011044, 1619602012043, 1619602012049, 1619602013011, 1619602022001,

1619602011013, 1619602011018 , 1619602011023 , 1619602011028, 1619602011033 1619602011040, 1619602011045 1619602012044, 1619602012050 1619602013014 1619602022002 1619602022007

1619602011014, 1619602011019, 1619602011024, 1619602011029, 1619602011036, 1619602011041, 1619602011055, 1619602012045 , 1619602012051, 1619602013015, 1619602022003, 1619602022011, 1619602022012, 1619602022016, 1619605021000.
District 11: Buncombe County, Cherokee County, Clay County, Graham County, Haywood County, Henderson County, Jackson County, Macon County, Madison County, McDowell County, Mitchell County, Polk County, Rutherford County: VTD 06A, VTD 16A: Block(s) 1619602011000, 1619602011001, 1619602011002, 1619602012000, 1619602012001, 1619602012002, 1619602012014, 1619602012015, 1619602012053, 1619602012054, 1619602012055, 1619602012056, 1619602012059, 1619602012060, 1619602012061, 1619602012063, 1619602012064, 1619602013000, 1619602013001, 1619602013002, 1619602013003, 1619602013004, 1619602013005, 1619602013006, 1619602013007, 1619602013010, 1619602013012, 1619602013013, 1619602013016, 1619602013017, 1619602013018, 1619602013019, 1619602013021, 1619602013023; Swain County, Transylvania County, Yancey County.
District 12: Mecklenburg County: VTD 001, VTD 002, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 016, VTD 017, VTD 018, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 030, VTD 031, VTD 035, VTD 037, VTD 038, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 044, VTD 046, VTD 047, VTD 050, VTD 051, VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 054, VTD 055, VTD 056, VTD 057, VTD 058, VTD 059, VTD 060: Block(s) 1190015051006, 1190015052026, 1190015091000, 1190015091001, 1190015091003, 1190015091004, 1190015091005, 1190015091006, 1190015091011, 1190015091012, 1190015092000, 1190015092002, 1190015092003, 1190015092004, 1190015092005, 1190015092006, 1190015092007, 1190015092008, 1190015092010, 1190015092011, 1190015092013, 1190015092014, 1190015092015, 1190015092016, 1190053062001, 1190053062008,1190053062009 ; VTD 075, VTD 076, VTD 077, VTD 079, VTD 080, VTD 081, VTD 082, VTD 087, VTD 088, VTD 089, VTD 092, VTD 093, VTD 097, VTD 098, VTD 101, VTD 105, VTD 107.1, VTD 109, VTD 114, VTD 120, VTD 122, VTD 126, VTD 127, VTD 128, VTD 129, VTD 132, VTD 133, VTD 134, VTD 135, VTD 138, VTD 139.1, VTD 140, VTD 141, VTD 142, VTD 143, VTD 144, VTD 145, VTD 146, VTD 147, VTD 148, VTD 150, VTD 151, VTD 200, VTD 202, VTD 206, VTD 207, VTD 208, VTD 209, VTD 210, VTD 211, VTD 212, VTD 213, VTD 214, VTD 222, VTD 223.1, VTD 224, VTD

S740-AST-73 [v.1]

AMENDMENT NO. A1 (to be filled in by Principal Clerk)

225, VTD 226, VTD 228, VTD 229, VTD 230, VTD 231, VTD 238.1, VTD 239, VTD 240, VTD 241, VTD 242, VTD 243, VTD 78.1.
District 13: Chatham County, Durham County: VTD 35.3: Block(s) 0630020134000, 0630020134001, 0630020134002, 0630020134003, 0630020134004, 0630020134005, 0630020134006, 0630020134007, 0630020134008, 0630020134009, 0630020134010, 0630020204025, 0630020204033, 0630020204034, 0630020204035, 0630020204036, 0630020204037, 0630020204050, 0630020204052, 0630020361007, 0630020361008, 0630020361015, 0630020361016, 0630020361037; Harnett County, Johnston County: VTD PR09: Block(s) 1010409032000, 1010409032001, 1010409032002, 1010409032003, 1010409032004, 1010409032005, 1010409032006, 1010409032007, 1010409032008, 1010409032010, 1010409033000, 1010409033001, 1010409033002, 1010409033003, 1010409033004, 1010409033005, 1010409033006, 1010409033007, 1010409034000, 1010409034001, 1010409034002, 1010409034003, 1010409034004, 1010409034005, 1010409034006, 1010409034007, 1010409034008, 1010409034009, 1010409034010, 1010409034011, 1010409035000, 1010409035001, 1010409035002, 1010409035003, 1010409035004, 1010409035005, 1010409035006, 1010409035007, 1010409061000, 1010409061001, 1010409061002, 1010409061003, 1010409061004, 1010409061010, 1010409061011, 1010409061017, 1010410012036, 1010410013000, 1010410013001, 1010410013002, 1010410013003, 1010410013004, 1010410013005, 1010410013006, 1010410013007, 1010410013008, 1010410013009, 1010410013010, 1010410013011, 1010410013012, 1010410013013, 1010410013016, 1010410014000, 1010410014001, 1010410014002, 1010410014003, 1010410014004, 1010410014005, 1010410014006, 1010410014007, 1010410014008, 1010410014009, 1010410014010, 1010410014011, 1010410014012, 1010410014013, 1010410014014, 1010410014015, 1010410014016, 1010410014017, 1010410014018; VTD PR10A, VTD PR10B, VTD PR11A, VTD PR11B, VTD PR12A, VTD PR12B, VTD PR23A, VTD PR23B, VTD PR31A, VTD PR31B, VTD PR33, VTD PR34; Lee County, Wake County: VTD 01-49, VTD 03-00, VTD 04-01, VTD 04-02, VTD 04-03, VTD 04-04, VTD 04-06, VTD 04-07, VTD 04-08, VTD 04-09, VTD 04-10, VTD 04-11, VTD 04-12, VTD 04-13, VTD 04-14, VTD 04-15, VTD 04-16, VTD 04-17, VTD 04-18, VTD 04-19, VTD 04-20, VTD 04-21, VTD 05-01, VTD 05-03, VTD $05-06$, VTD 05-07, VTD 05-08, VTD 06-04, VTD 06-05, VTD 06-06, VTD 06-07, VTD $06-08$, VTD 06-09, VTD 06-10, VTD 12-01, VTD 12-02, VTD 12-04, VTD 12-05: Block(s) 1830531113029, 1830531113033, 1830531113040, 1830532111009, 1830532111019, 1830532111039, 1830532111040, 1830532111041, 1830532111042, 1830532111043, 1830532111044, 1830532111045, 1830532111046, 1830532111047, 1830532111048, 1830532111049, 1830532111050, 1830532112000, 1830532112001, 1830532112002, 1830532112003, 1830532112004, 1830532112005, 1830532112006, 1830532112007, 1830532112008, 1830532112009, 1830532112010, 1830532112011, 1830532112012, 1830532112013, 1830532112014, 1830532112015, 1830532112016, 1830532112017, 1830532112018, 1830532112019, 1830532112020, 1830532112021, 1830532112022, 1830532112024, 1830532112025; VTD 12-06, VTD 12-07, VTD 12-08, VTD 12-09, VTD 15-03, VTD 18-03, VTD 18-05, VTD 18-08, VTD 20-01, VTD 20-03, VTD 20-04, VTD

# NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY <br> IMENDMENT <br> Senate Bill 740 <br> S740-AST-73 [v.1] <br> AMENDMENT NO. A1 <br> (to be filled in by <br> Principal Clerk) <br> Page 12 of 12 <br> 20-05, VTD 20-06A, VTD 20-06B, VTD 20-08, VTD 20-09, VTD 20-10, VTD 20-11, VTD 20-12, VTD 20-14, VTD 20-15, VTD 20-16, VTD 20-17. <br> District 14: Anson County, Bladen County: VTD P10: Block(s) 0179505012024, 0179505012036, 0179505022007, 0179505022008, 0179505023001, 0179505023002, 0179505023003, 0179505023004, 0179505023005, 0179505023006, 0179505023007, 0179505023027 ; VTD P15, VTD P201, VTD P202, VTD P35, VTD P501, VTD P60, VTD P70, VTD P80; Cumberland County, Hoke County, Montgomery County, Moore County, Richmond County, Robeson County, Scotland County.". 

SIGNED $\qquad$
Amendment Sponsor
SIGNED
Committee Chair if Senate Committee Amendment
ADOPTED $\qquad$ FAILED $\qquad$ TABLED $\qquad$

The official copy of this document, with signatures and vote information, is available in the House Principal Clerk's Office

## CST-8



User:
Plan Name: CST-8
Plan Type: Congressional

## Measures of Compactness Report

Monday, October 25, 2021

|  | Reock | Polsby- <br> Popper |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sum | N/A | N/A |
| Min | 0.34 | 0.22 |
| Max | 0.59 | 0.54 |
| Mean | 0.45 | 0.36 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.08 | 0.09 |
| District | Reock | Polsby- <br> Popper |
|  |  | 0.43 |
| 1 | 0.56 | 0.39 |
| 2 | 0.39 | 0.43 |
| 3 | 0.59 | 0.29 |
| 4 | 0.34 | 0.51 |
| 5 | 0.50 | 0.32 |
| 6 | 0.34 | 0.54 |
| 7 | 0.35 | 0.22 |
| 10 | 0.39 | 0.43 |
| 11 | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| 9 |  | 0.31 |


| Reock | Polsby- <br> Popper |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sum | N/A | N/A |
| Min | 0.34 | 0.22 |
| Max | 0.59 | 0.54 |
| Mean | 0.45 | 0.36 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.08 | 0.09 |
| District | Reock | Polsby- <br> Popper |
|  |  | 0.30 |
| 12 | 0.39 | 0.33 |
| 13 | 0.53 | 0.35 |

Measures of Compactness Summary

| Reock | The measure is always between 0 and 1 , with 1 being the most compact. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Polsby-Popper | The measure is always between 0 and 1 , with 1 being the most compact. |

Population Deviation Report
District Plan: CST-8

| District | Seats | Ideal Pop | Actual Pop | Deviation | Deviation \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,670 | -1 | 0.00\% |
| 2 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,670 | -1 | 0.00\% |
| 3 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 4 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 5 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,670 | -1 | 0.00\% |
| 6 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,670 | -1 | 0.00\% |
| 7 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 8 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 9 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,670 | -1 | 0.00\% |
| 10 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,670 | -1 | 0.00\% |
| 11 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 12 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 13 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| 14 | 1 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Totals: | 14 |  | 10,439,388 |  |  |

## County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | District | Total County Population | Total District Population | County Pop in District | Percent of County Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alamance | 4 | 171,415 | 745,671 | 171,415 | 100.00 \% | 22.99 \% |
| Alexander | 5 | 36,444 | 745,670 | 36,444 | 100.00 \% | 4.89 \% |
| Alleghany | 5 | 10,888 | 745,670 | 10,888 | 100.00 \% | 1.46 \% |
| Anson | 14 | 22,055 | 745,671 | 22,055 | 100.00 \% | 2.96 \% |
| Ashe | 5 | 26,577 | 745,670 | 26,577 | 100.00 \% | 3.56 \% |
| Avery | 5 | 17,806 | 745,670 | 17,806 | 100.00 \% | 2.39 \% |
| Beaufort | 3 | 44,652 | 745,671 | 44,652 | 100.00 \% | 5.99 \% |
| Bertie | 1 | 17,934 | 745,670 | 17,934 | 100.00 \% | 2.41 \% |
| Bladen | 7 | 29,606 | 745,671 | 11,928 | 40.29 \% | 1.60 \% |
|  | 14 | 29,606 | 745,671 | 17,678 | 59.71 \% | 2.37 \% |
| Brunswick | 7 | 136,693 | 745,671 | 136,693 | 100.00 \% | 18.33 \% |
| Buncombe | 11 | 269,452 | 745,671 | 269,452 | 100.00 \% | 36.14 \% |
| Burke | 5 | 87,570 | 745,670 | 71,394 | 81.53 \% | 9.57 \% |
|  | 10 | 87,570 | 745,670 | 16,176 | 18.47 \% | 2.17 \% |
| Cabarrus | 8 | 225,804 | 745,671 | 150,716 | 66.75 \% | 20.21 \% |
|  | 9 | 225,804 | 745,670 | 75,088 | 33.25 \% | 10.07 \% |
| Caldwell | 5 | 80,652 | 745,670 | 80,652 | 100.00 \% | 10.82 \% |
| Camden | 3 | 10,355 | 745,671 | 10,355 | 100.00 \% | 1.39 \% |
| Carteret | 3 | 67,686 | 745,671 | 67,686 | 100.00 \% | 9.08 \% |
| Caswell | 4 | 22,736 | 745,671 | 22,736 | 100.00 \% | 3.05 \% |
| Catawba | 10 | 160,610 | 745,670 | 160,610 | 100.00 \% | 21.54 \% |
| Chatham | 13 | 76,285 | 745,671 | 76,285 | 100.00 \% | 10.23 \% |
| Cherokee | 11 | 28,774 | 745,671 | 28,774 | 100.00 \% | 3.86 \% |
| Chowan | 1 | 13,708 | 745,670 | 13,708 | 100.00 \% | 1.84 \% |
| Clay | 11 | 11,089 | 745,671 | 11,089 | 100.00 \% | 1.49 \% |
| Cleveland | 10 | 99,519 | 745,670 | 99,519 | 100.00 \% | 13.35 \% |
| Columbus | 7 | 50,623 | 745,671 | 50,623 | 100.00 \% | 6.79 \% |
| Craven | 3 | 100,720 | 745,671 | 100,720 | 100.00 \% | 13.51 \% |
| Cumberland | 14 | 334,728 | 745,671 | 334,728 | 100.00 \% | 44.89 \% |
| Currituck | 3 | 28,100 | 745,671 | 28,100 | 100.00 \% | 3.77 \% |
| Dare | 3 | 36,915 | 745,671 | 36,915 | 100.00 \% | 4.95 \% |
| Davidson | 8 | 168,930 | 745,671 | 168,930 | 100.00 \% | 22.65 \% |
| Davie | 8 | 42,712 | 745,671 | 42,712 | 100.00 \% | 5.73 \% |
| Duplin | 3 | 48,715 | 745,671 | 48,715 | 100.00 \% | 6.53 \% |
| Durham | 4 | 324,833 | 745,671 | 323,173 | 99.49 \% | 43.34 \% |
|  | 13 | 324,833 | 745,671 | 1,660 | 0.51 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Edgecombe | 1 | 48,900 | 745,670 | 48,900 | 100.00 \% | 6.56 \% |
| Forsyth | 5 | 382,590 | 745,670 | 178,219 | 46.58 \% | 23.90 \% |
|  | 6 | 382,590 | 745,670 | 204,371 | 53.42 \% | 27.41 \% |
| Franklin | 1 | 68,573 | 745,670 | 68,573 | 100.00 \% | 9.20 \% |
| Gaston | 10 | 227,943 | 745,670 | 227,943 | 100.00 \% | 30.57 \% |
| Gates | 1 | 10,478 | 745,670 | 10,478 | 100.00 \% | 1.41 \% |

[^0]
## County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | District | Total County Population | Total District Population | County Pop in District | Percent of County Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Graham | 11 | 8,030 | 745,671 | 8,030 | 100.00 \% | 1.08 \% |
| Granville | 1 | 60,992 | 745,670 | 60,992 | 100.00 \% | 8.18 \% |
| Greene | 1 | 20,451 | 745,670 | 20,451 | 100.00 \% | 2.74 \% |
| Guilford | 6 | 541,299 | 745,670 | 541,299 | 100.00 \% | 72.59 \% |
| Halifax | 1 | 48,622 | 745,670 | 48,622 | 100.00 \% | 6.52 \% |
| Harnett | 13 | 133,568 | 745,671 | 133,568 | 100.00 \% | 17.91 \% |
| Haywood | 11 | 62,089 | 745,671 | 62,089 | 100.00 \% | 8.33 \% |
| Henderson | 11 | 116,281 | 745,671 | 116,281 | 100.00 \% | 15.59 \% |
| Hertford | 1 | 21,552 | 745,670 | 21,552 | 100.00 \% | 2.89 \% |
| Hoke | 14 | 52,082 | 745,671 | 52,082 | 100.00 \% | 6.98 \% |
| Hyde | 3 | 4,589 | 745,671 | 4,589 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Iredell | 8 | 186,693 | 745,671 | 92,267 | 49.42 \% | 12.37 \% |
|  | 10 | 186,693 | 745,670 | 94,426 | 50.58 \% | 12.66 \% |
| Jackson | 11 | 43,109 | 745,671 | 43,109 | 100.00 \% | 5.78 \% |
| Johnston | 7 | 215,999 | 745,671 | 128,866 | 59.66 \% | 17.28 \% |
|  | 13 | 215,999 | 745,671 | 87,133 | 40.34 \% | 11.69 \% |
| Jones | 3 | 9,172 | 745,671 | 9,172 | 100.00 \% | 1.23 \% |
| Lee | 13 | 63,285 | 745,671 | 63,285 | 100.00 \% | 8.49 \% |
| Lenoir | 3 | 55,122 | 745,671 | 55,122 | 100.00 \% | 7.39 \% |
| Lincoln | 10 | 86,810 | 745,670 | 86,810 | 100.00 \% | 11.64 \% |
| Macon | 11 | 37,014 | 745,671 | 37,014 | 100.00 \% | 4.96 \% |
| Madison | 11 | 21,193 | 745,671 | 21,193 | 100.00 \% | 2.84 \% |
| Martin | 1 | 22,031 | 745,670 | 22,031 | 100.00 \% | 2.95 \% |
| McDowell | 11 | 44,578 | 745,671 | 44,578 | 100.00 \% | 5.98 \% |
| Mecklenburg | 9 | 1,115,482 | 745,670 | 369,811 | $33.15 \%$ | 49.59 \% |
|  | 12 | 1,115,482 | 745,671 | 745,671 | 66.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Mitchell | 11 | 14,903 | 745,671 | 14,903 | 100.00 \% | 2.00 \% |
| Montgomery | 14 | 25,751 | 745,671 | 25,751 | 100.00 \% | 3.45 \% |
| Moore | 14 | 99,727 | 745,671 | 99,727 | 100.00 \% | 13.37 \% |
| Nash | 1 | 94,970 | 745,670 | 94,970 | 100.00 \% | 12.74 \% |
| New Hanover | 7 | 225,702 | 745,671 | 225,702 | 100.00 \% | 30.27 \% |
| Northampton | 1 | 17,471 | 745,670 | 17,471 | 100.00 \% | 2.34 \% |
| Onslow | 3 | 204,576 | 745,671 | 204,576 | 100.00 \% | 27.44 \% |
| Orange | 4 | 148,696 | 745,671 | 148,696 | 100.00 \% | 19.94 \% |
| Pamlico | 3 | 12,276 | 745,671 | 12,276 | 100.00 \% | 1.65 \% |
| Pasquotank | 1 | 40,568 | 745,670 | 40,568 | 100.00 \% | 5.44 \% |
| Pender | 3 | 60,203 | 745,671 | 27,018 | 44.88 \% | 3.62 \% |
|  | 7 | 60,203 | 745,671 | 33,185 | 55.12 \% | 4.45 \% |
| Perquimans | 1 | 13,005 | 745,670 | 13,005 | 100.00 \% | 1.74 \% |
| Person | 4 | 39,097 | 745,671 | 39,097 | 100.00 \% | 5.24 \% |
| Pitt | 1 | 170,243 | 745,670 | 77,713 | 45.65 \% | 10.42 \% |
|  | 3 | 170,243 | 745,671 | 92,530 | 54.35 \% | 12.41 \% |

[^1]
## County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | District | Total County Population | Total District Population | County Pop in District | Percent of County Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Polk | 11 | 19,328 | 745,671 | 19,328 | 100.00 \% | 2.59 \% |
| Randolph | 8 | 144,171 | 745,671 | 144,171 | 100.00 \% | 19.33 \% |
| Richmond | 14 | 42,946 | 745,671 | 42,946 | 100.00 \% | 5.76 \% |
| Robeson | 14 | 116,530 | 745,671 | 116,530 | 100.00 \% | 15.63 \% |
| Rockingham | 4 | 91,096 | 745,671 | 40,554 | 44.52 \% | 5.44 \% |
|  | 5 | 91,096 | 745,670 | 50,542 | 55.48 \% | 6.78 \% |
| Rowan | 8 | 146,875 | 745,671 | 146,875 | 100.00 \% | 19.70 \% |
| Rutherford | 10 | 64,444 | 745,670 | 60,186 | 93.39 \% | 8.07 \% |
|  | 11 | 64,444 | 745,671 | 4,258 | 6.61 \% | 0.57 \% |
| Sampson | 7 | 59,036 | 745,671 | 59,036 | 100.00 \% | 7.92 \% |
| Scotland | 14 | 34,174 | 745,671 | 34,174 | 100.00 \% | 4.58 \% |
| Stanly | 9 | 62,504 | 745,670 | 62,504 | 100.00 \% | 8.38 \% |
| Stokes | 5 | 44,520 | 745,670 | 44,520 | 100.00 \% | 5.97 \% |
| Surry | 5 | 71,359 | 745,670 | 71,359 | $100.00 \%$ | 9.57 \% |
| Swain | 11 | 14,117 | 745,671 | 14,117 | 100.00 \% | 1.89 \% |
| Transylvania | 11 | 32,986 | 745,671 | 32,986 | 100.00 \% | 4.42 \% |
| Tyrrell | 3 | 3,245 | 745,671 | 3,245 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Union | 9 | 238,267 | 745,670 | 238,267 | 100.00 \% | 31.95 \% |
| Vance | 1 | 42,578 | 745,670 | 42,578 | 100.00 \% | 5.71 \% |
| Wake | 2 | 1,129,410 | 745,670 | 745,670 | 66.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 13 | 1,129,410 | 745,671 | 383,740 | 33.98 \% | 51.46 \% |
| Warren | 1 | 18,642 | 745,670 | 18,642 | 100.00 \% | 2.50 \% |
| Washington | 1 | 11,003 | 745,670 | 11,003 | 100.00 \% | 1.48 \% |
| Watauga | 5 | 54,086 | 745,670 | 54,086 | 100.00 \% | 7.25 \% |
| Wayne | 1 | 117,333 | 745,670 | 17,695 | 15.08 \% | 2.37 \% |
|  | 7 | 117,333 | 745,671 | 99,638 | 84.92 \% | 13.36 \% |
| Wilkes | 5 | 65,969 | 745,670 | 65,969 | 100.00 \% | 8.85 \% |
| Wilson | 1 | 78,784 | 745,670 | 78,784 | $100.00 \%$ | 10.57 \% |
| Yadkin | 5 | 37,214 | 745,670 | 37,214 | 100.00 \% | 4.99 \% |
| Yancey | 11 | 18,470 | 745,671 | 18,470 | 100.00 \% | 2.48 \% |
| Total: $\quad 10,439,388$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Number of split counties: 14
Display: all counties

District - County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | County | Total District Population | Total County Population | District Pop in County | Percent of District Pop in County | Percent of County Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bertie | 745,670 | 17,934 | 17,934 | 2.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chowan | 745,670 | 13,708 | 13,708 | 1.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Edgecombe | 745,670 | 48,900 | 48,900 | 6.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Franklin | 745,670 | 68,573 | 68,573 | 9.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gates | 745,670 | 10,478 | 10,478 | $1.41 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Granville | 745,670 | 60,992 | 60,992 | 8.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greene | 745,670 | 20,451 | 20,451 | 2.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Halifax | 745,670 | 48,622 | 48,622 | 6.52 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hertford | 745,670 | 21,552 | 21,552 | 2.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Martin | 745,670 | 22,031 | 22,031 | 2.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Nash | 745,670 | 94,970 | 94,970 | 12.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Northampton | 745,670 | 17,471 | 17,471 | 2.34 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pasquotank | 745,670 | 40,568 | 40,568 | 5.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Perquimans | 745,670 | 13,005 | 13,005 | 1.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pitt | 745,670 | 170,243 | 77,713 | 10.42 \% | 45.65 \% |
|  | Vance | 745,670 | 42,578 | 42,578 | 5.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Warren | 745,670 | 18,642 | 18,642 | 2.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Washington | 745,670 | 11,003 | 11,003 | 1.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wayne | 745,670 | 117,333 | 17,695 | 2.37 \% | $15.08 \%$ |
|  | Wilson | 745,670 | 78,784 | 78,784 | 10.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 2 | Wake | 745,670 | 1,129,410 | 745,670 | 100.00 \% | 66.02 \% |
| 3 | Beaufort | 745,671 | 44,652 | 44,652 | 5.99 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Camden | 745,671 | 10,355 | 10,355 | 1.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Carteret | 745,671 | 67,686 | 67,686 | 9.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Craven | 745,671 | 100,720 | 100,720 | 13.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Currituck | 745,671 | 28,100 | 28,100 | 3.77 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dare | 745,671 | 36,915 | 36,915 | 4.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Duplin | 745,671 | 48,715 | 48,715 | 6.53 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hyde | 745,671 | 4,589 | 4,589 | 0.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jones | 745,671 | 9,172 | 9,172 | 1.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lenoir | 745,671 | 55,122 | 55,122 | 7.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Onslow | 745,671 | 204,576 | 204,576 | 27.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pamlico | 745,671 | 12,276 | 12,276 | 1.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pender | 745,671 | 60,203 | 27,018 | 3.62 \% | 44.88 \% |
|  | Pitt | 745,671 | 170,243 | 92,530 | 12.41 \% | 54.35 \% |
|  | Tyrrell | 745,671 | 3,245 | 3,245 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 4 | Alamance | 745,671 | 171,415 | 171,415 | 22.99 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Caswell | 745,671 | 22,736 | 22,736 | 3.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Durham | 745,671 | 324,833 | 323,173 | 43.34 \% | 99.49 \% |
|  | Orange | 745,671 | 148,696 | 148,696 | 19.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Person | 745,671 | 39,097 | 39,097 | 5.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rockingham | 745,671 | 91,096 | 40,554 | 5.44 \% | 44.52 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina
[G20-DistCnty] - Generated 10/25/2021

District - County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | County | Total District Population | Total County Population | District Pop in County | Percent of District Pop in County | Percent of County Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5 | Alexander | 745,670 | 36,444 | 36,444 | 4.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Alleghany | 745,670 | 10,888 | 10,888 | 1.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ashe | 745,670 | 26,577 | 26,577 | 3.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Avery | 745,670 | 17,806 | 17,806 | 2.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burke | 745,670 | 87,570 | 71,394 | 9.57 \% | 81.53 \% |
|  | Caldwell | 745,670 | 80,652 | 80,652 | 10.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Forsyth | 745,670 | 382,590 | 178,219 | 23.90 \% | 46.58 \% |
|  | Rockingham | 745,670 | 91,096 | 50,542 | 6.78 \% | 55.48 \% |
|  | Stokes | 745,670 | 44,520 | 44,520 | 5.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Surry | 745,670 | 71,359 | 71,359 | 9.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Watauga | 745,670 | 54,086 | 54,086 | 7.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilkes | 745,670 | 65,969 | 65,969 | 8.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Yadkin | 745,670 | 37,214 | 37,214 | 4.99 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 6 | Forsyth | 745,670 | 382,590 | 204,371 | 27.41 \% | 53.42 \% |
|  | Guilford | 745,670 | 541,299 | 541,299 | 72.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 7 | Bladen | 745,671 | 29,606 | 11,928 | 1.60 \% | 40.29 \% |
|  | Brunswick | 745,671 | 136,693 | 136,693 | 18.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Columbus | 745,671 | 50,623 | 50,623 | 6.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Johnston | 745,671 | 215,999 | 128,866 | 17.28 \% | 59.66 \% |
|  | New Hanover | 745,671 | 225,702 | 225,702 | 30.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pender | 745,671 | 60,203 | 33,185 | 4.45 \% | 55.12 \% |
|  | Sampson | 745,671 | 59,036 | 59,036 | 7.92 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wayne | 745,671 | 117,333 | 99,638 | 13.36 \% | 84.92 \% |
| 8 | Cabarrus | 745,671 | 225,804 | 150,716 | 20.21 \% | 66.75 \% |
|  | Davidson | 745,671 | 168,930 | 168,930 | 22.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Davie | 745,671 | 42,712 | 42,712 | 5.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Iredell | 745,671 | 186,693 | 92,267 | 12.37 \% | 49.42 \% |
|  | Randolph | 745,671 | 144,171 | 144,171 | 19.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rowan | 745,671 | 146,875 | 146,875 | 19.70 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 9 | Cabarrus | 745,670 | 225,804 | 75,088 | 10.07 \% | 33.25 \% |
|  | Mecklenburg | 745,670 | 1,115,482 | 369,811 | 49.59 \% | 33.15 \% |
|  | Stanly | 745,670 | 62,504 | 62,504 | 8.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Union | 745,670 | 238,267 | 238,267 | 31.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 10 | Burke | 745,670 | 87,570 | 16,176 | 2.17 \% | 18.47 \% |
|  | Catawba | 745,670 | 160,610 | 160,610 | 21.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cleveland | 745,670 | 99,519 | 99,519 | 13.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gaston | 745,670 | 227,943 | 227,943 | 30.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Iredell | 745,670 | 186,693 | 94,426 | 12.66 \% | 50.58 \% |
|  | Lincoln | 745,670 | 86,810 | 86,810 | 11.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford | 745,670 | 64,444 | 60,186 | 8.07 \% | 93.39 \% |

District - County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | County | Total District Population | Total County Population | District Pop in County | Percent of District Pop in County | Percent of County Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | Buncombe | 745,671 | 269,452 | 269,452 | 36.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cherokee | 745,671 | 28,774 | 28,774 | 3.86 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clay | 745,671 | 11,089 | 11,089 | 1.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Graham | 745,671 | 8,030 | 8,030 | 1.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Haywood | 745,671 | 62,089 | 62,089 | 8.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Henderson | 745,671 | 116,281 | 116,281 | 15.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jackson | 745,671 | 43,109 | 43,109 | 5.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Macon | 745,671 | 37,014 | 37,014 | 4.96 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Madison | 745,671 | 21,193 | 21,193 | 2.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McDowell | 745,671 | 44,578 | 44,578 | 5.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mitchell | 745,671 | 14,903 | 14,903 | 2.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Polk | 745,671 | 19,328 | 19,328 | 2.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford | 745,671 | 64,444 | 4,258 | 0.57 \% | 6.61 \% |
|  | Swain | 745,671 | 14,117 | 14,117 | 1.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Transylvania | 745,671 | 32,986 | 32,986 | 4.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Yancey | 745,671 | 18,470 | 18,470 | 2.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 12 | Mecklenburg | 745,671 | 1,115,482 | 745,671 | 100.00 \% | 66.85 \% |
| 13 | Chatham | 745,671 | 76,285 | 76,285 | 10.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Durham | 745,671 | 324,833 | 1,660 | 0.22 \% | 0.51 \% |
|  | Harnett | 745,671 | 133,568 | 133,568 | 17.91 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Johnston | 745,671 | 215,999 | 87,133 | 11.69 \% | 40.34 \% |
|  | Lee | 745,671 | 63,285 | 63,285 | 8.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wake | 745,671 | 1,129,410 | 383,740 | 51.46 \% | 33.98 \% |
| 14 | Anson | 745,671 | 22,055 | 22,055 | 2.96 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bladen | 745,671 | 29,606 | 17,678 | 2.37 \% | 59.71 \% |
|  | Cumberland | 745,671 | 334,728 | 334,728 | 44.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hoke | 745,671 | 52,082 | 52,082 | 6.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Montgomery | 745,671 | 25,751 | 25,751 | 3.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Moore | 745,671 | 99,727 | 99,727 | 13.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Richmond | 745,671 | 42,946 | 42,946 | 5.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Robeson | 745,671 | 116,530 | 116,530 | 15.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Scotland | 745,671 | 34,174 | 34,174 | 4.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  |  |  | Total: | 10,439,388 |  |  |

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aberdeen | 14 | 8,516 | 745,671 | 8,516 | 100.00 \% | 1.14 \% |
| Ahoskie | 1 | 4,891 | 745,670 | 4,891 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.66 \% |
| Alamance | 4 | 988 | 745,671 | 988 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Albemarle | 9 | 16,432 | 745,670 | 16,432 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.20 \% |
| Alliance | 3 | 733 | 745,671 | 733 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Andrews | 11 | 1,667 | 745,671 | 1,667 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Angier | 13 | 5,265 | 745,671 | 5,265 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.71 \% |
| Ansonville | 14 | 440 | 745,671 | 440 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Apex | 13 | 58,780 | 745,671 | 58,780 | $100.00 \%$ | 7.88 \% |
| Arapahoe | 3 | 416 | 745,671 | 416 | 100.00 \% | $0.06 \%$ |
| Archdale | 6 | 11,907 | 745,670 | 380 | 3.19 \% | 0.05 \% |
|  | 8 | 11,907 | 745,671 | 11,527 | 96.81 \% | 1.55 \% |
| Archer Lodge | 7 | 4,797 | 745,671 | 4,797 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.64 \% |
| Asheboro | 8 | 27,156 | 745,671 | 27,156 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.64 \% |
| Asheville | 11 | 94,589 | 745,671 | 94,589 | $100.00 \%$ | 12.69 \% |
| Askewville | 1 | 184 | 745,670 | 184 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Atkinson | 7 | 296 | 745,671 | 296 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Atlantic Beach | 3 | 1,364 | 745,671 | 1,364 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.18 \% |
| Aulander | 1 | 763 | 745,670 | 763 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Aurora | 3 | 455 | 745,671 | 455 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Autryville | 7 | 167 | 745,671 | 167 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Ayden | 3 | 4,977 | 745,671 | 4,977 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.67 \% |
| Badin | 9 | 2,024 | 745,670 | 2,024 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.27 \% |
| Bailey | 1 | 568 | 745,670 | 568 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Bakersville | 11 | 450 | 745,671 | 450 | 100.00 \% | $0.06 \%$ |
| Bald Head Island | 7 | 268 | 745,671 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Banner Elk | 5 | 1,049 | 745,670 | 1,049 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.14 \% |
| Bath | 3 | 245 | 745,671 | 245 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Bayboro | 3 | 1,161 | 745,671 | 1,161 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Bear Grass | 1 | 89 | 745,670 | 89 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Beaufort | 3 | 4,464 | 745,671 | 4,464 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.60 \% |
| Beech Mountain | 5 | 675 | 745,670 | 675 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Belhaven | 3 | 1,410 | 745,671 | 1,410 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Belmont | 10 | 15,010 | 745,670 | 15,010 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.01 \% |
| Belville | 7 | 2,406 | 745,671 | 2,406 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Belwood | 10 | 857 | 745,670 | 857 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Benson | 7 | 3,967 | 745,671 | 3,967 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
|  | 13 | 3,967 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Bermuda Run | 8 | 3,120 | 745,671 | 3,120 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Bessemer City | 10 | 5,428 | 745,670 | 5,428 | 100.00 \% | 0.73 \% |
| Bethania | 5 | 344 | 745,670 | 344 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Bethel | 1 | 1,373 | 745,670 | 1,373 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.18\% |

Municipality - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Beulaville | 3 | 1,116 | 745,671 | 1,116 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Biltmore Forest | 11 | 1,409 | 745,671 | 1,409 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Biscoe | 14 | 1,848 | 745,671 | 1,848 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Black Creek | 1 | 692 | 745,670 | 692 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Black Mountain | 11 | 8,426 | 745,671 | 8,426 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Bladenboro | 14 | 1,648 | 745,671 | 1,648 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Blowing Rock | 5 | 1,376 | 745,670 | 1,376 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Boardman | 7 | 166 | 745,671 | 166 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Bogue | 3 | 695 | 745,671 | 695 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Boiling Spring Lakes | 7 | 5,943 | 745,671 | 5,943 | 100.00 \% | 0.80 \% |
| Boiling Springs | 10 | 4,615 | 745,670 | 4,615 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Bolivia | 7 | 149 | 745,671 | 149 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Bolton | 7 | 519 | 745,671 | 519 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Boone | 5 | 19,092 | 745,670 | 19,092 | 100.00 \% | 2.56 \% |
| Boonville | 5 | 1,185 | 745,670 | 1,185 | 100.00 \% | $0.16 \%$ |
| Bostic | 10 | 355 | 745,670 | 355 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Brevard | 11 | 7,744 | 745,671 | 7,744 | 100.00 \% | 1.04 \% |
| Bridgeton | 3 | 349 | 745,671 | 349 | 100.00 \% | $0.05 \%$ |
| Broadway | 13 | 1,267 | 745,671 | 1,267 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Brookford | 10 | 442 | 745,670 | 442 | 100.00 \% | $0.06 \%$ |
| Brunswick | 7 | 973 | 745,671 | 973 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Bryson City | 11 | 1,558 | 745,671 | 1,558 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Bunn | 1 | 327 | 745,670 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Burgaw | 7 | 3,088 | 745,671 | 3,088 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Burlington | 4 | 57,303 | 745,671 | 55,481 | 96.82 \% | 7.44 \% |
|  | 6 | 57,303 | 745,670 | 1,822 | $3.18 \%$ | 0.24 \% |
| Burnsville | 11 | 1,614 | 745,671 | 1,614 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Butner | 1 | 8,397 | 745,670 | 8,397 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Cajah's Mountain | 5 | 2,722 | 745,670 | 2,722 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Calabash | 7 | 2,011 | 745,671 | 2,011 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Calypso | 3 | 327 | 745,671 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Cameron | 14 | 244 | 745,671 | 244 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Candor | 14 | 813 | 745,671 | 813 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Canton | 11 | 4,422 | 745,671 | 4,422 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Cape Carteret | 3 | 2,224 | 745,671 | 2,224 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Carolina Beach | 7 | 6,564 | 745,671 | 6,564 | 100.00 \% | 0.88 \% |
| Carolina Shores | 7 | 4,588 | 745,671 | 4,588 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Carrboro | 4 | 21,295 | 745,671 | 21,295 | 100.00 \% | $2.86 \%$ |
| Carthage | 14 | 2,775 | 745,671 | 2,775 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Cary | 2 | 174,721 | 745,670 | 6,689 | 3.83 \% | 0.90 \% |
|  | 13 | 174,721 | 745,671 | 168,032 | 96.17 \% | 22.53 \% |
| Casar | 10 | 305 | 745,670 | 305 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Castalia | 1 | 264 | 745,670 | 264 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Caswell Beach | 7 | 395 | 745,671 | 395 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Catawba | 10 | 702 | 745,670 | 702 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Cedar Point | 3 | 1,764 | 745,671 | 1,764 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.24 \% |
| Cedar Rock | 5 | 301 | 745,670 | 301 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Cerro Gordo | 7 | 131 | 745,671 | 131 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Chadbourn | 7 | 1,574 | 745,671 | 1,574 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Chapel Hill | 4 | 61,960 | 745,671 | 61,960 | $100.00 \%$ | 8.31 \% |
| Charlotte | 9 | 874,579 | 745,670 | 297,095 | 33.97 \% | 39.84 \% |
|  | 12 | 874,579 | 745,671 | 577,484 | 66.03 \% | 77.44 \% |
| Cherryville | 10 | 6,078 | 745,670 | 6,078 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.82 \% |
| Chimney Rock Village | 11 | 140 | 745,671 | 140 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| China Grove | 8 | 4,434 | 745,671 | 4,434 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.59 \% |
| Chocowinity | 3 | 722 | 745,671 | 722 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Claremont | 10 | 1,692 | 745,670 | 1,692 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.23 \% |
| Clarkton | 7 | 614 | 745,671 | 614 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Clayton | 2 | 26,307 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 7 | 26,307 | 745,671 | 4,268 | 16.22 \% | 0.57 \% |
|  | 13 | 26,307 | 745,671 | 22,039 | 83.78 \% | 2.96 \% |
| Clemmons | 5 | 21,163 | 745,670 | 21,163 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.84 \% |
| Cleveland | 8 | 846 | 745,671 | 846 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Clinton | 7 | 8,383 | 745,671 | 8,383 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.12 \% |
| Clyde | 11 | 1,368 | 745,671 | 1,368 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.18 \% |
| Coats | 13 | 2,155 | 745,671 | 2,155 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| Cofield | 1 | 267 | 745,670 | 267 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Colerain | 1 | 217 | 745,670 | 217 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Columbia | 3 | 610 | 745,671 | 610 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Columbus | 11 | 1,060 | 745,671 | 1,060 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.14 \% |
| Como | 1 | 67 | 745,670 | 67 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Concord | 8 | 105,240 | 745,671 | 80,520 | 76.51 \% | 10.80 \% |
|  | 9 | 105,240 | 745,670 | 24,720 | 23.49 \% | 3.32 \% |
| Conetoe | 1 | 198 | 745,670 | 198 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Connelly Springs | 5 | 1,529 | 745,670 | 1,529 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Conover | 10 | 8,421 | 745,670 | 8,421 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.13 \% |
| Conway | 1 | 752 | 745,670 | 752 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Cooleemee | 8 | 940 | 745,671 | 940 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Cornelius | 12 | 31,412 | 745,671 | 31,412 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.21 \% |
| Cove City | 3 | 378 | 745,671 | 378 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.05 \%$ |
| Cramerton | 10 | 5,296 | 745,670 | 5,296 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.71 \% |
| Creedmoor | 1 | 4,866 | 745,670 | 4,866 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.65 \% |
| Creswell | 1 | 207 | 745,670 | 207 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Crossnore | 5 | 143 | 745,670 | 143 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |

[^2]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dallas | 10 | 5,927 | 745,670 | 5,927 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Danbury | 5 | 189 | 745,670 | 189 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Davidson | 8 | 15,106 | 745,671 | 378 | 2.50 \% | 0.05 \% |
|  | 12 | 15,106 | 745,671 | 14,728 | 97.50 \% | 1.98 \% |
| Dellview | 10 | 6 | 745,670 | 6 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Denton | 8 | 1,494 | 745,671 | 1,494 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Dillsboro | 11 | 213 | 745,671 | 213 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Dobbins Heights | 14 | 687 | 745,671 | 687 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Dobson | 5 | 1,462 | 745,670 | 1,462 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.20 \% |
| Dortches | 1 | 1,082 | 745,670 | 1,082 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Dover | 3 | 349 | 745,671 | 349 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Drexel | 5 | 1,760 | 745,670 | 1,760 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.24 \% |
| Dublin | 14 | 267 | 745,671 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Duck | 3 | 742 | 745,671 | 742 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Dunn | 13 | 8,446 | 745,671 | 8,446 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.13 \% |
| Durham | 2 | 283,506 | 745,670 | 269 | 0.09 \% | 0.04 \% |
|  | 4 | 283,506 | 745,671 | 281,683 | 99.36 \% | 37.78 \% |
|  | 13 | 283,506 | 745,671 | 1,554 | 0.55 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Earl | 10 | 198 | 745,670 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| East Arcadia | 7 | 418 | 745,671 | 418 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.06 \%$ |
| East Bend | 5 | 634 | 745,670 | 634 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| East Laurinburg | 14 | 234 | 745,671 | 234 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Eastover | 14 | 3,656 | 745,671 | 3,656 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| East Spencer | 8 | 1,567 | 745,671 | 1,567 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Eden | 4 | 15,421 | 745,671 | 3,158 | 20.48 \% | 0.42 \% |
|  | 5 | 15,421 | 745,670 | 12,263 | 79.52 \% | 1.64 \% |
| Edenton | 1 | 4,460 | 745,670 | 4,460 | 100.00 \% | 0.60 \% |
| Elizabeth City | 1 | 18,631 | 745,670 | 18,593 | 99.80 \% | 2.49 \% |
|  | 3 | 18,631 | 745,671 | 38 | 0.20 \% | $0.01 \%$ |
| Elizabethtown | 7 | 3,296 | 745,671 | 1,481 | 44.93 \% | 0.20 \% |
|  | 14 | 3,296 | 745,671 | 1,815 | 55.07 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Elkin | 5 | 4,122 | 745,670 | 4,122 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Elk Park | 5 | 542 | 745,670 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Ellenboro | 10 | 723 | 745,670 | 723 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Ellerbe | 14 | 864 | 745,671 | 864 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Elm City | 1 | 1,218 | 745,670 | 1,218 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Elon | 4 | 11,336 | 745,671 | 11,336 | 100.00 \% | 1.52 \% |
| Emerald Isle | 3 | 3,847 | 745,671 | 3,847 | 100.00 \% | 0.52 \% |
| Enfield | 1 | 1,865 | 745,670 | 1,865 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Erwin | 13 | 4,542 | 745,671 | 4,542 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Eureka | 1 | 214 | 745,670 | 175 | 81.78 \% | 0.02 \% |
|  | 7 | 214 | 745,671 | 39 | 18.22 \% | 0.01 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Everetts | 1 | 150 | 745,670 | 150 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Fair Bluff | 7 | 709 | 745,671 | 709 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Fairmont | 14 | 2,191 | 745,671 | 2,191 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| Fairview | 9 | 3,456 | 745,670 | 3,456 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.46 \% |
| Faison | 3 | 784 | 745,671 | 784 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
|  | 7 | 784 | 745,671 | 0 | $0.00 \%$ | 0.00 \% |
| Faith | 8 | 819 | 745,671 | 819 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Falcon | 7 | 324 | 745,671 | 0 | $0.00 \%$ | 0.00 \% |
|  | 14 | 324 | 745,671 | 324 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Falkland | 1 | 47 | 745,670 | 47 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Fallston | 10 | 627 | 745,670 | 627 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.08 \%$ |
| Farmville | 1 | 4,461 | 745,670 | 4,461 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.60 \% |
| Fayetteville | 14 | 208,501 | 745,671 | 208,501 | $100.00 \%$ | 27.96 \% |
| Flat Rock | 11 | 3,486 | 745,671 | 3,486 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.47 \% |
| Fletcher | 11 | 7,987 | 745,671 | 7,987 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.07 \% |
| Fontana Dam | 11 | 13 | 745,671 | 13 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.00 \% |
| Forest City | 10 | 7,377 | 745,670 | 7,377 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.99 \% |
| Forest Hills | 11 | 303 | 745,671 | 303 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Fountain | 1 | 385 | 745,670 | 385 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Four Oaks | 7 | 2,158 | 745,671 | 2,158 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| Foxfire | 14 | 1,288 | 745,671 | 1,288 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.17 \% |
| Franklin | 11 | 4,175 | 745,671 | 4,175 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.56 \% |
| Franklinton | 1 | 2,456 | 745,670 | 2,456 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.33 \% |
| Franklinville | 8 | 1,197 | 745,671 | 1,197 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.16\% |
| Fremont | 7 | 1,196 | 745,671 | 1,196 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.16 \% |
| Fuquay-Varina | 2 | 34,152 | 745,670 | 1,373 | 4.02 \% | 0.18 \% |
|  | 13 | 34,152 | 745,671 | 32,779 | $95.98 \%$ | 4.40 \% |
| Gamewell | 5 | 3,702 | 745,670 | 3,702 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.50 \% |
| Garland | 7 | 595 | 745,671 | 595 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Garner | 2 | 31,159 | 745,670 | 31,159 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.18 \% |
| Garysburg | 1 | 904 | 745,670 | 904 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Gaston | 1 | 1,008 | 745,670 | 1,008 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.14 \% |
| Gastonia | 10 | 80,411 | 745,670 | 80,411 | $100.00 \%$ | 10.78 \% |
| Gatesville | 1 | 267 | 745,670 | 267 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Gibson | 14 | 449 | 745,671 | 449 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Gibsonville | 4 | 8,920 | 745,671 | 4,278 | 47.96 \% | 0.57 \% |
|  | 6 | 8,920 | 745,670 | 4,642 | 52.04 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Glen Alpine | 5 | 1,529 | 745,670 | 1,152 | 75.34 \% | 0.15 \% |
|  | 10 | 1,529 | 745,670 | 377 | 24.66 \% | $0.05 \%$ |
| Godwin | 14 | 128 | 745,671 | 128 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Goldsboro | 1 | 33,657 | 745,670 | 6,282 | 18.66 \% | 0.84 \% |
|  | 7 | 33,657 | 745,671 | 27,375 | 81.34 \% | 3.67 \% |

[^3]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Goldston | 13 | 234 | 745,671 | 234 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Graham | 4 | 17,157 | 745,671 | 17,157 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.30 \% |
| Grandfather Village | 5 | 95 | 745,670 | 95 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Granite Falls | 5 | 4,965 | 745,670 | 4,965 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.67 \% |
| Granite Quarry | 8 | 2,984 | 745,671 | 2,984 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.40 \% |
| Grantsboro | 3 | 692 | 745,671 | 692 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Greenevers | 3 | 567 | 745,671 | 567 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Green Level | 4 | 3,152 | 745,671 | 3,152 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.42 \% |
| Greensboro | 6 | 299,035 | 745,670 | 299,035 | $100.00 \%$ | 40.10 \% |
| Greenville | 1 | 87,521 | 745,670 | 45,905 | 52.45 \% | $6.16 \%$ |
|  | 3 | 87,521 | 745,671 | 41,616 | 47.55 \% | 5.58 \% |
| Grifton | 3 | 2,448 | 745,671 | 2,448 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.33 \% |
| Grimesland | 3 | 386 | 745,671 | 386 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Grover | 10 | 802 | 745,670 | 802 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Halifax | 1 | 170 | 745,670 | 170 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Hamilton | 1 | 306 | 745,670 | 306 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Hamlet | 14 | 6,025 | 745,671 | 6,025 | 100.00 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Harmony | 10 | 543 | 745,670 | 543 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Harrells | 3 | 160 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 7 | 160 | 745,671 | 160 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Harrellsville | 1 | 85 | 745,670 | 85 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Harrisburg | 9 | 18,967 | 745,670 | 18,967 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.54 \% |
| Hassell | 1 | 49 | 745,670 | 49 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Havelock | 3 | 16,621 | 745,671 | 16,621 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.23 \% |
| Haw River | 4 | 2,252 | 745,671 | 2,252 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Hayesville | 11 | 461 | 745,671 | 461 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Hemby Bridge | 9 | 1,614 | 745,670 | 1,614 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.22 \% |
| Henderson | 1 | 15,060 | 745,670 | 15,060 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.02 \% |
| Hendersonville | 11 | 15,137 | 745,671 | 15,137 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.03 \% |
| Hertford | 1 | 1,934 | 745,670 | 1,934 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Hickory | 5 | 43,490 | 745,670 | 111 | 0.26 \% | 0.01 \% |
|  | 10 | 43,490 | 745,670 | 43,379 | 99.74 \% | 5.82 \% |
| Highlands | 11 | 1,072 | 745,671 | 1,072 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| High Point | 6 | 114,059 | 745,670 | 107,405 | 94.17 \% | 14.40 \% |
|  | 8 | 114,059 | 745,671 | 6,654 | $5.83 \%$ | 0.89 \% |
| High Shoals | 10 | 595 | 745,670 | 595 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Hildebran | 5 | 1,679 | 745,670 | 1,679 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Hillsborough | 4 | 9,660 | 745,671 | 9,660 | 100.00 \% | 1.30 \% |
| Hobgood | 1 | 268 | 745,670 | 268 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Hoffman | 14 | 418 | 745,671 | 418 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Holden Beach | 7 | 921 | 745,671 | 921 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Holly Ridge | 3 | 4,171 | 745,671 | 4,171 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.56 \% |

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Holly Springs | 2 | 41,239 | 745,670 | 1,675 | 4.06 \% | 0.22 \% |
|  | 13 | 41,239 | 745,671 | 39,564 | 95.94 \% | $5.31 \%$ |
| Hookerton | 1 | 413 | 745,670 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Hope Mills | 14 | 17,808 | 745,671 | 17,808 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.39 \% |
| Hot Springs | 11 | 520 | 745,671 | 520 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Hudson | 5 | 3,780 | 745,670 | 3,780 | 100.00 \% | 0.51 \% |
| Huntersville | 12 | 61,376 | 745,671 | 61,376 | $100.00 \%$ | 8.23 \% |
| Indian Beach | 3 | 223 | 745,671 | 223 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Indian Trail | 9 | 39,997 | 745,670 | 39,997 | $100.00 \%$ | 5.36 \% |
| Jackson | 1 | 430 | 745,670 | 430 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Jacksonville | 3 | 72,723 | 745,671 | 72,723 | $100.00 \%$ | 9.75 \% |
| Jamestown | 6 | 3,668 | 745,670 | 3,668 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.49 \% |
| Jamesville | 1 | 424 | 745,670 | 424 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Jefferson | 5 | 1,622 | 745,670 | 1,622 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.22 \% |
| Jonesville | 5 | 2,308 | 745,670 | 2,308 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.31 \% |
| Kannapolis | 8 | 53,114 | 745,671 | 53,114 | $100.00 \%$ | 7.12 \% |
| Kelford | 1 | 203 | 745,670 | 203 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Kenansville | 3 | 770 | 745,671 | 770 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Kenly | 1 | 1,491 | 745,670 | 198 | 13.28 \% | 0.03 \% |
|  | 7 | 1,491 | 745,671 | 1,293 | 86.72 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Kernersville | 6 | 26,449 | 745,670 | 26,449 | 100.00 \% | 3.55 \% |
| Kill Devil Hills | 3 | 7,656 | 745,671 | 7,656 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.03 \% |
| King | 5 | 7,197 | 745,670 | 7,197 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.97 \% |
| Kings Mountain | 10 | 11,142 | 745,670 | 11,142 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.49 \% |
| Kingstown | 10 | 656 | 745,670 | 656 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Kinston | 3 | 19,900 | 745,671 | 19,900 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.67 \% |
| Kittrell | 1 | 132 | 745,670 | 132 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Kitty Hawk | 3 | 3,689 | 745,671 | 3,689 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.49 \% |
| Knightdale | 2 | 19,435 | 745,670 | 19,435 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.61 \% |
| Kure Beach | 7 | 2,191 | 745,671 | 2,191 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| La Grange | 3 | 2,595 | 745,671 | 2,595 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.35 \% |
| Lake Lure | 11 | 1,365 | 745,671 | 1,365 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.18 \% |
| Lake Park | 9 | 3,269 | 745,670 | 3,269 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.44 \% |
| Lake Santeetlah | 11 | 38 | 745,671 | 38 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Lake Waccamaw | 7 | 1,296 | 745,671 | 1,296 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.17 \% |
| Landis | 8 | 3,690 | 745,671 | 3,690 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.49 \% |
| Lansing | 5 | 126 | 745,670 | 126 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Lasker | 1 | 64 | 745,670 | 64 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Lattimore | 10 | 406 | 745,670 | 406 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.05 \%$ |
| Laurel Park | 11 | 2,250 | 745,671 | 2,250 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.30 \% |
| Laurinburg | 14 | 14,978 | 745,671 | 14,978 | $100.00 \%$ | $2.01 \%$ |
| Lawndale | 10 | 570 | 745,670 | 570 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08\% |

[^4]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Leggett | 1 | 37 | 745,670 | 37 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Leland | 7 | 22,908 | 745,671 | 22,908 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.07 \% |
| Lenoir | 5 | 18,352 | 745,670 | 18,352 | 100.00 \% | 2.46 \% |
| Lewiston Woodville | 1 | 426 | 745,670 | 426 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Lewisville | 5 | 13,381 | 745,670 | 13,381 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.79 \% |
| Lexington | 8 | 19,632 | 745,671 | 19,632 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.63 \% |
| Liberty | 8 | 2,655 | 745,671 | 2,655 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.36 \% |
| Lilesville | 14 | 395 | 745,671 | 395 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Lillington | 13 | 4,735 | 745,671 | 4,735 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.63 \% |
| Lincolnton | 10 | 11,091 | 745,670 | 11,091 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.49 \% |
| Linden | 14 | 136 | 745,671 | 136 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Littleton | 1 | 559 | 745,670 | 559 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Locust | 9 | 4,537 | 745,670 | 4,537 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.61 \% |
| Long View | 5 | 5,088 | 745,670 | 735 | 14.45 \% | 0.10 \% |
|  | 10 | 5,088 | 745,670 | 4,353 | 85.55 \% | 0.58 \% |
| Louisburg | 1 | 3,064 | 745,670 | 3,064 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.41 \%$ |
| Love Valley | 10 | 154 | 745,670 | 154 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Lowell | 10 | 3,654 | 745,670 | 3,654 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.49 \% |
| Lucama | 1 | 1,036 | 745,670 | 1,036 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.14 \% |
| Lumber Bridge | 14 | 82 | 745,671 | 82 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Lumberton | 14 | 19,025 | 745,671 | 19,025 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.55 \% |
| McAdenville | 10 | 890 | 745,670 | 890 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Macclesfield | 1 | 413 | 745,670 | 413 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| McDonald | 14 | 94 | 745,671 | 94 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| McFarlan | 14 | 94 | 745,671 | 94 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Macon | 1 | 110 | 745,670 | 110 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Madison | 5 | 2,129 | 745,670 | 2,129 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| Maggie Valley | 11 | 1,687 | 745,671 | 1,687 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.23 \% |
| Magnolia | 3 | 831 | 745,671 | 831 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Maiden | 10 | 3,736 | 745,670 | 3,736 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.50 \% |
| Manteo | 3 | 1,600 | 745,671 | 1,600 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Marietta | 14 | 111 | 745,671 | 111 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Marion | 11 | 7,717 | 745,671 | 7,717 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.03 \% |
| Marshall | 11 | 777 | 745,671 | 777 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Mars Hill | 11 | 2,007 | 745,671 | 2,007 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.27 \% |
| Marshville | 9 | 2,522 | 745,670 | 2,522 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.34 \% |
| Marvin | 9 | 6,358 | 745,670 | 6,358 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.85 \% |
| Matthews | 9 | 29,435 | 745,670 | 29,435 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.95 \% |
| Maxton | 14 | 2,110 | 745,671 | 2,110 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.28 \% |
| Mayodan | 5 | 2,418 | 745,670 | 2,418 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.32 \% |
| Maysville | 3 | 818 | 745,671 | 818 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Mebane | 4 | 17,797 | 745,671 | 17,797 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.39 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mesic | 3 | 144 | 745,671 | 144 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Micro | 7 | 458 | 745,671 | 458 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Middleburg | 1 | 101 | 745,670 | 101 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Middlesex | 1 | 912 | 745,670 | 912 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Midland | 9 | 4,684 | 745,670 | 4,684 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.63 \% |
| Midway | 8 | 4,742 | 745,671 | 4,742 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.64 \% |
| Mills River | 11 | 7,078 | 745,671 | 7,078 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.95 \% |
| Milton | 4 | 155 | 745,671 | 155 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Mineral Springs | 9 | 3,159 | 745,670 | 3,159 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.42 \% |
| Minnesott Beach | 3 | 530 | 745,671 | 530 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Mint Hill | 9 | 26,450 | 745,670 | 26,450 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.55 \% |
| Misenheimer | 9 | 650 | 745,670 | 650 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Mocksville | 8 | 5,900 | 745,671 | 5,900 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.79 \% |
| Momeyer | 1 | 277 | 745,670 | 277 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Monroe | 9 | 34,562 | 745,670 | 34,562 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.64 \% |
| Montreat | 11 | 901 | 745,671 | 901 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Mooresboro | 10 | 293 | 745,670 | 293 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Mooresville | 8 | 50,193 | 745,671 | 50,193 | $100.00 \%$ | 6.73 \% |
| Morehead City | 3 | 9,556 | 745,671 | 9,556 | 100.00 \% | 1.28 \% |
| Morganton | 5 | 17,474 | 745,670 | 16,963 | 97.08 \% | 2.27 \% |
|  | 10 | 17,474 | 745,670 | 511 | 2.92 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Morrisville | 4 | 29,630 | 745,671 | 207 | 0.70 \% | 0.03 \% |
|  | 13 | 29,630 | 745,671 | 29,423 | 99.30 \% | 3.95 \% |
| Morven | 14 | 329 | 745,671 | 329 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Mount Airy | 5 | 10,676 | 745,670 | 10,676 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.43 \% |
| Mount Gilead | 14 | 1,171 | 745,671 | 1,171 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.16 \% |
| Mount Holly | 10 | 17,703 | 745,670 | 17,703 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.37 \% |
| Mount Olive | 3 | 4,198 | 745,671 | 5 | 0.12 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 7 | 4,198 | 745,671 | 4,193 | 99.88 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Mount Pleasant | 8 | 1,671 | 745,671 | 1,666 | 99.70 \% | 0.22 \% |
|  | 9 | 1,671 | 745,670 | 5 | 0.30 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Murfreesboro | 1 | 2,619 | 745,670 | 2,619 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.35 \% |
| Murphy | 11 | 1,608 | 745,671 | 1,608 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.22 \% |
| Nags Head | 3 | 3,168 | 745,671 | 3,168 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.42 \% |
| Nashville | 1 | 5,632 | 745,670 | 5,632 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.76 \% |
| Navassa | 7 | 1,367 | 745,671 | 1,367 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.18\% |
| New Bern | 3 | 31,291 | 745,671 | 31,291 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.20 \% |
| Newland | 5 | 715 | 745,670 | 715 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| New London | 9 | 607 | 745,670 | 607 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08\% |
| Newport | 3 | 4,364 | 745,671 | 4,364 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.59 \% |
| Newton | 10 | 13,148 | 745,670 | 13,148 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.76 \% |
| Newton Grove | 7 | 585 | 745,671 | 585 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08\% |

[^5]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Norlina | 1 | 920 | 745,670 | 920 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Norman | 14 | 100 | 745,671 | 100 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| North Topsail Beach | 3 | 1,005 | 745,671 | 1,005 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Northwest | 7 | 703 | 745,671 | 703 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| North Wilkesboro | 5 | 4,382 | 745,670 | 4,382 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Norwood | 9 | 2,367 | 745,670 | 2,367 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Oakboro | 9 | 2,128 | 745,670 | 2,128 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Oak City | 1 | 266 | 745,670 | 266 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Oak Island | 7 | 8,396 | 745,671 | 8,396 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Oak Ridge | 6 | 7,474 | 745,670 | 7,474 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Ocean Isle Beach | 7 | 867 | 745,671 | 867 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Old Fort | 11 | 811 | 745,671 | 811 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Oriental | 3 | 880 | 745,671 | 880 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Orrum | 14 | 59 | 745,671 | 59 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Ossipee | 4 | 536 | 745,671 | 536 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Oxford | 1 | 8,628 | 745,670 | 8,628 | 100.00 \% | $1.16 \%$ |
| Pantego | 3 | 164 | 745,671 | 164 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Parkton | 14 | 504 | 745,671 | 504 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Parmele | 1 | 243 | 745,670 | 243 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Patterson Springs | 10 | 571 | 745,670 | 571 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Peachland | 14 | 390 | 745,671 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Peletier | 3 | 769 | 745,671 | 769 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Pembroke | 14 | 2,823 | 745,671 | 2,823 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Pikeville | 7 | 712 | 745,671 | 712 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Pilot Mountain | 5 | 1,440 | 745,670 | 1,440 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Pinebluff | 14 | 1,473 | 745,671 | 1,473 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Pinehurst | 14 | 17,581 | 745,671 | 17,581 | 100.00 \% | $2.36 \%$ |
| Pine Knoll Shores | 3 | 1,388 | 745,671 | 1,388 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Pine Level | 7 | 2,046 | 745,671 | 2,046 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Pinetops | 1 | 1,200 | 745,670 | 1,200 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Pineville | 12 | 10,602 | 745,671 | 10,602 | 100.00 \% | 1.42 \% |
| Pink Hill | 3 | 451 | 745,671 | 451 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Pittsboro | 13 | 4,537 | 745,671 | 4,537 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Pleasant Garden | 6 | 5,000 | 745,670 | 5,000 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Plymouth | 1 | 3,320 | 745,670 | 3,320 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Polkton | 14 | 2,250 | 745,671 | 2,250 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Polkville | 10 | 516 | 745,670 | 516 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Pollocksville | 3 | 268 | 745,671 | 268 | 100.00 \% | $0.04 \%$ |
| Powellsville | 1 | 189 | 745,670 | 189 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Princeton | 7 | 1,315 | 745,671 | 1,315 | 100.00 \% | 0.18\% |
| Princeville | 1 | 1,254 | 745,670 | 1,254 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Proctorville | 14 | 121 | 745,671 | 121 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Raeford | 14 | 4,559 | 745,671 | 4,559 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Raleigh | 2 | 467,665 | 745,670 | 460,066 | 98.38 \% | 61.70 \% |
|  | 4 | 467,665 | 745,671 | 1,559 | 0.33 \% | 0.21 \% |
|  | 13 | 467,665 | 745,671 | 6,040 | $1.29 \%$ | 0.81 \% |
| Ramseur | 8 | 1,774 | 745,671 | 1,774 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.24 \% |
| Randleman | 8 | 4,595 | 745,671 | 4,595 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Ranlo | 10 | 4,511 | 745,670 | 4,511 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.60 \% |
| Raynham | 14 | 60 | 745,671 | 60 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Red Cross | 9 | 762 | 745,670 | 762 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Red Oak | 1 | 3,342 | 745,670 | 3,342 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Red Springs | 14 | 3,087 | 745,671 | 3,087 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Reidsville | 4 | 14,583 | 745,671 | 14,583 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.96 \% |
| Rennert | 14 | 275 | 745,671 | 275 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Rhodhiss | 5 | 997 | 745,670 | 997 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Richfield | 9 | 582 | 745,670 | 582 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Richlands | 3 | 2,287 | 745,671 | 2,287 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Rich Square | 1 | 894 | 745,670 | 894 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| River Bend | 3 | 2,902 | 745,671 | 2,902 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.39 \% |
| Roanoke Rapids | 1 | 15,229 | 745,670 | 15,229 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.04 \% |
| Robbins | 14 | 1,168 | 745,671 | 1,168 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Robbinsville | 11 | 597 | 745,671 | 597 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Robersonville | 1 | 1,269 | 745,670 | 1,269 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Rockingham | 14 | 9,243 | 745,671 | 9,243 | 100.00 \% | 1.24 \% |
| Rockwell | 8 | 2,302 | 745,671 | 2,302 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Rocky Mount | 1 | 54,341 | 745,670 | 54,341 | 100.00 \% | 7.29 \% |
| Rolesville | 2 | 9,475 | 745,670 | 9,475 | 100.00 \% | 1.27 \% |
| Ronda | 5 | 438 | 745,670 | 438 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Roper | 1 | 485 | 745,670 | 485 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Roseboro | 7 | 1,163 | 745,671 | 1,163 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Rose Hill | 3 | 1,371 | 745,671 | 1,371 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Rosman | 11 | 701 | 745,671 | 701 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Rowland | 14 | 885 | 745,671 | 885 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Roxboro | 4 | 8,134 | 745,671 | 8,134 | 100.00 \% | 1.09 \% |
| Roxobel | 1 | 187 | 745,670 | 187 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Rural Hall | 5 | 3,351 | 745,670 | 3,351 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Ruth | 10 | 347 | 745,670 | 347 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Rutherford College | 5 | 1,226 | 745,670 | 1,226 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Rutherfordton | 10 | 3,640 | 745,670 | 3,640 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| St. Helena | 7 | 417 | 745,671 | 417 | 100.00 \% | $0.06 \%$ |
| St. James | 7 | 6,529 | 745,671 | 6,529 | 100.00 \% | 0.88 \% |
| St. Pauls | 14 | 2,045 | 745,671 | 2,045 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Salemburg | 7 | 457 | 745,671 | 457 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |

[^6]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

Municipality - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salisbury | 8 | 35,540 | 745,671 | 35,540 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.77 \% |
| Saluda | 11 | 631 | 745,671 | 631 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Sandy Creek | 7 | 248 | 745,671 | 248 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Sandyfield | 7 | 430 | 745,671 | 430 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.06 \%$ |
| Sanford | 13 | 30,261 | 745,671 | 30,261 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.06 \% |
| Saratoga | 1 | 353 | 745,670 | 353 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Sawmills | 5 | 5,020 | 745,670 | 5,020 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.67 \% |
| Scotland Neck | 1 | 1,640 | 745,670 | 1,640 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.22 \% |
| Seaboard | 1 | 542 | 745,670 | 542 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Seagrove | 8 | 235 | 745,671 | 235 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Sedalia | 6 | 676 | 745,670 | 676 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Selma | 7 | 6,317 | 745,671 | 6,317 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.85 \% |
| Seven Devils | 5 | 313 | 745,670 | 313 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Seven Springs | 7 | 55 | 745,671 | 55 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.01 \%$ |
| Severn | 1 | 191 | 745,670 | 191 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Shallotte | 7 | 4,185 | 745,671 | 4,185 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.56 \% |
| Sharpsburg | 1 | 1,697 | 745,670 | 1,697 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.23 \% |
| Shelby | 10 | 21,918 | 745,670 | 21,918 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.94 \% |
| Siler City | 13 | 7,702 | 745,671 | 7,702 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.03 \% |
| Simpson | 3 | 390 | 745,671 | 390 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.05 \%$ |
| Sims | 1 | 275 | 745,670 | 275 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Smithfield | 7 | 11,292 | 745,671 | 11,292 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.51 \% |
| Snow Hill | 1 | 1,481 | 745,670 | 1,481 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.20 \% |
| Southern Pines | 14 | 15,545 | 745,671 | 15,545 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.08 \% |
| Southern Shores | 3 | 3,090 | 745,671 | 3,090 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.41 \% |
| Southport | 7 | 3,971 | 745,671 | 3,971 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.53 \% |
| Sparta | 5 | 1,834 | 745,670 | 1,834 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.25 \% |
| Speed | 1 | 63 | 745,670 | 63 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Spencer | 8 | 3,308 | 745,671 | 3,308 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.44 \% |
| Spencer Mountain | 10 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | $0.00 \%$ | 0.00 \% |
| Spindale | 10 | 4,225 | 745,670 | 4,225 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.57 \% |
| Spring Hope | 1 | 1,309 | 745,670 | 1,309 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Spring Lake | 14 | 11,660 | 745,671 | 11,660 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.56 \% |
| Spruce Pine | 11 | 2,194 | 745,671 | 2,194 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| Staley | 8 | 397 | 745,671 | 397 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Stallings | 9 | 16,112 | 745,670 | 16,112 | $100.00 \%$ | $2.16 \%$ |
| Stanfield | 9 | 1,585 | 745,670 | 1,585 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Stanley | 10 | 3,963 | 745,670 | 3,963 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.53 \% |
| Stantonsburg | 1 | 762 | 745,670 | 762 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Star | 14 | 806 | 745,671 | 806 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.11 \%$ |
| Statesville | 10 | 28,419 | 745,670 | 28,419 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.81 \% |
| Stedman | 14 | 1,277 | 745,671 | 1,277 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.17 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Stem | 1 | 960 | 745,670 | 960 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Stokesdale | 6 | 5,924 | 745,670 | 5,924 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.79 \% |
| Stoneville | 5 | 1,308 | 745,670 | 1,308 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Stonewall | 3 | 214 | 745,671 | 214 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Stovall | 1 | 324 | 745,670 | 324 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Sugar Mountain | 5 | 371 | 745,670 | 371 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Summerfield | 6 | 10,951 | 745,670 | 10,951 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.47 \% |
| Sunset Beach | 7 | 4,175 | 745,671 | 4,175 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.56 \% |
| Surf City | 3 | 3,867 | 745,671 | 3,867 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.52 \% |
| Swansboro | 3 | 3,744 | 745,671 | 3,744 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.50 \% |
| Swepsonville | 4 | 2,445 | 745,671 | 2,445 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.33 \% |
| Sylva | 11 | 2,578 | 745,671 | 2,578 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.35 \% |
| Tabor City | 7 | 3,781 | 745,671 | 3,781 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.51 \% |
| Tarboro | 1 | 10,721 | 745,670 | 10,721 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.44 \% |
| Tar Heel | 14 | 90 | 745,671 | 90 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Taylorsville | 5 | 2,320 | 745,670 | 2,320 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.31 \% |
| Taylortown | 14 | 634 | 745,671 | 634 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Teachey | 3 | 448 | 745,671 | 448 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Thomasville | 8 | 27,183 | 745,671 | 27,183 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.65 \% |
| Tobaccoville | 5 | 2,578 | 745,670 | 2,578 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.35 \% |
| Topsail Beach | 3 | 461 | 745,671 | 461 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Trenton | 3 | 238 | 745,671 | 238 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Trent Woods | 3 | 4,074 | 745,671 | 4,074 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.55 \% |
| Trinity | 8 | 7,006 | 745,671 | 7,006 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.94 \% |
| Troutman | 8 | 3,698 | 745,671 | 807 | 21.82 \% | 0.11 \% |
|  | 10 | 3,698 | 745,670 | 2,891 | 78.18 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Troy | 14 | 2,850 | 745,671 | 2,850 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.38 \% |
| Tryon | 11 | 1,562 | 745,671 | 1,562 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Turkey | 7 | 213 | 745,671 | 213 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Unionville | 9 | 6,643 | 745,670 | 6,643 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.89 \% |
| Valdese | 5 | 4,689 | 745,670 | 4,689 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.63 \% |
| Vanceboro | 3 | 869 | 745,671 | 869 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Vandemere | 3 | 246 | 745,671 | 246 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Varnamtown | 7 | 525 | 745,671 | 525 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Vass | 14 | 952 | 745,671 | 952 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Waco | 10 | 310 | 745,670 | 310 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Wade | 14 | 638 | 745,671 | 638 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Wadesboro | 14 | 5,008 | 745,671 | 5,008 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.67 \% |
| Wagram | 14 | 615 | 745,671 | 615 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08\% |
| Wake Forest | 1 | 47,601 | 745,670 | 1,504 | $3.16 \%$ | 0.20 \% |
|  | 2 | 47,601 | 745,670 | 46,097 | 96.84 \% | 6.18 \% |
| Walkertown | 6 | 5,692 | 745,670 | 5,692 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.76 \% |

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Wallace | 3 | 3,413 | 745,671 | 3,413 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.46 \% |
|  | 7 | 3,413 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Wallburg | 8 | 3,051 | 745,671 | 3,051 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.41 \% |
| Walnut Cove | 5 | 1,586 | 745,670 | 1,586 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Walnut Creek | 7 | 1,084 | 745,671 | 1,084 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.15 \% |
| Walstonburg | 1 | 193 | 745,670 | 193 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Warrenton | 1 | 851 | 745,670 | 851 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Warsaw | 3 | 2,733 | 745,671 | 2,733 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.37 \% |
| Washington | 3 | 9,875 | 745,671 | 9,875 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.32 \% |
| Washington Park | 3 | 392 | 745,671 | 392 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.05 \%$ |
| Watha | 7 | 181 | 745,671 | 181 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Waxhaw | 9 | 20,534 | 745,670 | 20,534 | 100.00 \% | 2.75 \% |
| Waynesville | 11 | 10,140 | 745,671 | 10,140 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.36 \%$ |
| Weaverville | 11 | 4,567 | 745,671 | 4,567 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.61 \% |
| Webster | 11 | 372 | 745,671 | 372 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.05 \% |
| Weddington | 9 | 13,181 | 745,670 | 13,181 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.77 \% |
| Weldon | 1 | 1,444 | 745,670 | 1,444 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Wendell | 2 | 9,793 | 745,670 | 9,793 | 100.00 \% | 1.31 \% |
| Wentworth | 4 | 2,662 | 745,671 | 921 | 34.60 \% | 0.12 \% |
|  | 5 | 2,662 | 745,670 | 1,741 | 65.40 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Wesley Chapel | 9 | 8,681 | 745,670 | 8,681 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.16 \%$ |
| West Jefferson | 5 | 1,279 | 745,670 | 1,279 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Whispering Pines | 14 | 4,987 | 745,671 | 4,987 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.67 \% |
| Whitakers | 1 | 627 | 745,670 | 627 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| White Lake | 7 | 843 | 745,671 | 843 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.11 \% |
| Whiteville | 7 | 4,766 | 745,671 | 4,766 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.64 \% |
| Whitsett | 6 | 584 | 745,670 | 584 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Wilkesboro | 5 | 3,687 | 745,670 | 3,687 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.49 \% |
| Williamston | 1 | 5,248 | 745,670 | 5,248 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.70 \% |
| Wilmington | 7 | 115,451 | 745,671 | 115,451 | $100.00 \%$ | 15.48 \% |
| Wilson | 1 | 47,851 | 745,670 | 47,851 | $100.00 \%$ | 6.42 \% |
| Wilson's Mills | 7 | 2,534 | 745,671 | 2,534 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.34 \% |
| Windsor | 1 | 3,582 | 745,670 | 3,582 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Winfall | 1 | 555 | 745,670 | 555 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Wingate | 9 | 4,055 | 745,670 | 4,055 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Winston-Salem | 5 | 249,545 | 745,670 | 111,539 | 44.70 \% | 14.96 \% |
|  | 6 | 249,545 | 745,670 | 138,006 | 55.30 \% | 18.51 \% |
| Winterville | 3 | 10,462 | 745,671 | 10,462 | 100.00 \% | 1.40 \% |
| Winton | 1 | 629 | 745,670 | 629 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Woodfin | 11 | 7,936 | 745,671 | 7,936 | 100.00 \% | 1.06 \% |
| Woodland | 1 | 557 | 745,670 | 557 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Wrightsville Beach | 7 | 2,473 | 745,671 | 2,473 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |

[^7]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yadkinville | 5 | 2,995 | 745,670 | 2,995 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Yanceyville | 4 | 1,937 | 745,671 | 1,937 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Youngsville | 1 | 2,016 | 745,670 | 2,016 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Zebulon | 2 | 6,903 | 745,670 | 6,903 | 100.00 \% | 0.93 \% |
|  | 7 | 6,903 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Total: |  |  |  | 6,017,605 |  |  |

Number of split municipalities: 37
Display: all municipalities

- Ex. 6016 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aberdeen | 14 | 8,516 | 745,671 | 8,516 | 100.00 \% | 1.14 \% |
| Ahoskie | 1 | 4,891 | 745,670 | 4,891 | 100.00 \% | 0.66 \% |
| Alamance | 4 | 988 | 745,671 | 988 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Albemarle | 9 | 16,432 | 745,670 | 16,432 | 100.00 \% | 2.20 \% |
| Alliance | 3 | 733 | 745,671 | 733 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Andrews | 11 | 1,667 | 745,671 | 1,667 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Angier (Harnett) | 13 | 4,709 | 745,671 | 4,709 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |
| Angier (Wake) | 13 | 556 | 745,671 | 556 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Ansonville | 14 | 440 | 745,671 | 440 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Apex | 13 | 58,780 | 745,671 | 58,780 | 100.00 \% | 7.88 \% |
| Arapahoe | 3 | 416 | 745,671 | 416 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Archdale (Guilford) | 6 | 380 | 745,670 | 380 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Archdale (Randolph) | 8 | 11,527 | 745,671 | 11,527 | 100.00 \% | 1.55 \% |
| Archer Lodge | 7 | 4,797 | 745,671 | 4,797 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Asheboro | 8 | 27,156 | 745,671 | 27,156 | 100.00 \% | 3.64 \% |
| Asheville | 11 | 94,589 | 745,671 | 94,589 | 100.00 \% | 12.69 \% |
| Askewville | 1 | 184 | 745,670 | 184 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Atkinson | 7 | 296 | 745,671 | 296 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Atlantic Beach | 3 | 1,364 | 745,671 | 1,364 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Aulander | 1 | 763 | 745,670 | 763 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Aurora | 3 | 455 | 745,671 | 455 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Autryville | 7 | 167 | 745,671 | 167 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Ayden | 3 | 4,977 | 745,671 | 4,977 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Badin | 9 | 2,024 | 745,670 | 2,024 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Bailey | 1 | 568 | 745,670 | 568 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Bakersville | 11 | 450 | 745,671 | 450 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Bald Head Island | 7 | 268 | 745,671 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Banner Elk | 5 | 1,049 | 745,670 | 1,049 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Bath | 3 | 245 | 745,671 | 245 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Bayboro | 3 | 1,161 | 745,671 | 1,161 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Bear Grass | 1 | 89 | 745,670 | 89 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Beaufort | 3 | 4,464 | 745,671 | 4,464 | 100.00 \% | 0.60 \% |
| Beech Mountain (Avery) | 5 | 62 | 745,670 | 62 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Beech Mountain (Watauga) | 5 | 613 | 745,670 | 613 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Belhaven | 3 | 1,410 | 745,671 | 1,410 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Belmont | 10 | 15,010 | 745,670 | 15,010 | 100.00 \% | 2.01 \% |
| Belville | 7 | 2,406 | 745,671 | 2,406 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Belwood | 10 | 857 | 745,670 | 857 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Benson (Harnett) | 13 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Benson (Johnston) | 7 | 3,967 | 745,671 | 3,967 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Bermuda Run | 8 | 3,120 | 745,671 | 3,120 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/25/2021

- Ex. 6017 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bessemer City | 10 | 5,428 | 745,670 | 5,428 | 100.00 \% | 0.73 \% |
| Bethania | 5 | 344 | 745,670 | 344 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Bethel | 1 | 1,373 | 745,670 | 1,373 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Beulaville | 3 | 1,116 | 745,671 | 1,116 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Biltmore Forest | 11 | 1,409 | 745,671 | 1,409 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Biscoe | 14 | 1,848 | 745,671 | 1,848 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Black Creek | 1 | 692 | 745,670 | 692 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Black Mountain | 11 | 8,426 | 745,671 | 8,426 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Bladenboro | 14 | 1,648 | 745,671 | 1,648 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Blowing Rock (Caldwell) | 5 | 91 | 745,670 | 91 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Blowing Rock (Watauga) | 5 | 1,285 | 745,670 | 1,285 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Boardman | 7 | 166 | 745,671 | 166 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Bogue | 3 | 695 | 745,671 | 695 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Boiling Spring Lakes | 7 | 5,943 | 745,671 | 5,943 | 100.00 \% | 0.80 \% |
| Boiling Springs | 10 | 4,615 | 745,670 | 4,615 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Bolivia | 7 | 149 | 745,671 | 149 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Bolton | 7 | 519 | 745,671 | 519 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Boone | 5 | 19,092 | 745,670 | 19,092 | 100.00 \% | 2.56 \% |
| Boonville | 5 | 1,185 | 745,670 | 1,185 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Bostic | 10 | 355 | 745,670 | 355 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Brevard | 11 | 7,744 | 745,671 | 7,744 | 100.00 \% | 1.04 \% |
| Bridgeton | 3 | 349 | 745,671 | 349 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Broadway (Harnett) | 13 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Broadway (Lee) | 13 | 1,267 | 745,671 | 1,267 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Brookford | 10 | 442 | 745,670 | 442 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Brunswick | 7 | 973 | 745,671 | 973 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Bryson City | 11 | 1,558 | 745,671 | 1,558 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Bunn | 1 | 327 | 745,670 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Burgaw | 7 | 3,088 | 745,671 | 3,088 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Burlington (Alamance) | 4 | 55,481 | 745,671 | 55,481 | 100.00 \% | 7.44 \% |
| Burlington (Guilford) | 6 | 1,822 | 745,670 | 1,822 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Burnsville | 11 | 1,614 | 745,671 | 1,614 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Butner | 1 | 8,397 | 745,670 | 8,397 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Cajah's Mountain | 5 | 2,722 | 745,670 | 2,722 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Calabash | 7 | 2,011 | 745,671 | 2,011 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Calypso | 3 | 327 | 745,671 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Cameron | 14 | 244 | 745,671 | 244 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Candor (Montgomery) | 14 | 813 | 745,671 | 813 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Candor (Moore) | 14 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Canton | 11 | 4,422 | 745,671 | 4,422 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Cape Carteret | 3 | 2,224 | 745,671 | 2,224 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/25/2021

- Ex. 6018 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Carolina Beach | 7 | 6,564 | 745,671 | 6,564 | 100.00 \% | 0.88 \% |
| Carolina Shores | 7 | 4,588 | 745,671 | 4,588 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Carrboro | 4 | 21,295 | 745,671 | 21,295 | 100.00 \% | 2.86 \% |
| Carthage | 14 | 2,775 | 745,671 | 2,775 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Cary (Chatham) | 13 | 3,709 | 745,671 | 3,709 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Cary (Wake) | 2 | 171,012 | 745,670 | 6,689 | 3.91 \% | 0.90 \% |
|  | 13 | 171,012 | 745,671 | 164,323 | 96.09 \% | 22.04 \% |
| Casar | 10 | 305 | 745,670 | 305 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Castalia | 1 | 264 | 745,670 | 264 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Caswell Beach | 7 | 395 | 745,671 | 395 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Catawba | 10 | 702 | 745,670 | 702 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Cedar Point | 3 | 1,764 | 745,671 | 1,764 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Cedar Rock | 5 | 301 | 745,670 | 301 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Cerro Gordo | 7 | 131 | 745,671 | 131 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Chadbourn | 7 | 1,574 | 745,671 | 1,574 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Chapel Hill (Durham) | 4 | 2,906 | 745,671 | 2,906 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Chapel Hill (Orange) | 4 | 59,054 | 745,671 | 59,054 | 100.00 \% | 7.92 \% |
| Charlotte | 9 | 874,579 | 745,670 | 297,095 | 33.97 \% | 39.84 \% |
|  | 12 | 874,579 | 745,671 | 577,484 | 66.03 \% | 77.44 \% |
| Cherryville | 10 | 6,078 | 745,670 | 6,078 | 100.00 \% | 0.82 \% |
| Chimney Rock Village | 11 | 140 | 745,671 | 140 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| China Grove | 8 | 4,434 | 745,671 | 4,434 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Chocowinity | 3 | 722 | 745,671 | 722 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Claremont | 10 | 1,692 | 745,670 | 1,692 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Clarkton | 7 | 614 | 745,671 | 614 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Clayton (Johnston) | 7 | 26,307 | 745,671 | 4,268 | 16.22 \% | 0.57 \% |
|  | 13 | 26,307 | 745,671 | 22,039 | 83.78 \% | 2.96 \% |
| Clayton (Wake) | 2 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Clemmons | 5 | 21,163 | 745,670 | 21,163 | 100.00 \% | 2.84 \% |
| Cleveland | 8 | 846 | 745,671 | 846 | 100.00 \% | 0.11\% |
| Clinton | 7 | 8,383 | 745,671 | 8,383 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |
| Clyde | 11 | 1,368 | 745,671 | 1,368 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Coats | 13 | 2,155 | 745,671 | 2,155 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Cofield | 1 | 267 | 745,670 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Colerain | 1 | 217 | 745,670 | 217 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Columbia | 3 | 610 | 745,671 | 610 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Columbus | 11 | 1,060 | 745,671 | 1,060 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Como | 1 | 67 | 745,670 | 67 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Concord | 8 | 105,240 | 745,671 | 80,520 | 76.51 \% | 10.80 \% |
|  | 9 | 105,240 | 745,670 | 24,720 | 23.49 \% | 3.32 \% |
| Conetoe | 1 | 198 | 745,670 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Connelly Springs | 5 | 1,529 | 745,670 | 1,529 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Conover | 10 | 8,421 | 745,670 | 8,421 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Conway | 1 | 752 | 745,670 | 752 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Cooleemee | 8 | 940 | 745,671 | 940 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Cornelius | 12 | 31,412 | 745,671 | 31,412 | 100.00 \% | 4.21 \% |
| Cove City | 3 | 378 | 745,671 | 378 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Cramerton | 10 | 5,296 | 745,670 | 5,296 | 100.00 \% | 0.71 \% |
| Creedmoor | 1 | 4,866 | 745,670 | 4,866 | 100.00 \% | 0.65 \% |
| Creswell | 1 | 207 | 745,670 | 207 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Crossnore | 5 | 143 | 745,670 | 143 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Dallas | 10 | 5,927 | 745,670 | 5,927 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Danbury | 5 | 189 | 745,670 | 189 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Davidson (Iredell) | 8 | 378 | 745,671 | 378 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Davidson (Mecklenburg) | 12 | 14,728 | 745,671 | 14,728 | 100.00 \% | 1.98 \% |
| Dellview | 10 | 6 | 745,670 | 6 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Denton | 8 | 1,494 | 745,671 | 1,494 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Dillsboro | 11 | 213 | 745,671 | 213 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Dobbins Heights | 14 | 687 | 745,671 | 687 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Dobson | 5 | 1,462 | 745,670 | 1,462 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Dortches | 1 | 1,082 | 745,670 | 1,082 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Dover | 3 | 349 | 745,671 | 349 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Drexel | 5 | 1,760 | 745,670 | 1,760 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Dublin | 14 | 267 | 745,671 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Duck | 3 | 742 | 745,671 | 742 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Dunn | 13 | 8,446 | 745,671 | 8,446 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Durham (Durham) | 4 | 283,093 | 745,671 | 281,539 | 99.45 \% | 37.76 \% |
|  | 13 | 283,093 | 745,671 | 1,554 | 0.55 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Durham (Orange) | 4 | 144 | 745,671 | 144 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Durham (Wake) | 2 | 269 | 745,670 | 269 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
|  | 13 | 269 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Earl | 10 | 198 | 745,670 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| East Arcadia | 7 | 418 | 745,671 | 418 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| East Bend | 5 | 634 | 745,670 | 634 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| East Laurinburg | 14 | 234 | 745,671 | 234 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| East Spencer | 8 | 1,567 | 745,671 | 1,567 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Eastover | 14 | 3,656 | 745,671 | 3,656 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Eden | 4 | 15,421 | 745,671 | 3,158 | 20.48 \% | 0.42 \% |
|  | 5 | 15,421 | 745,670 | 12,263 | 79.52 \% | 1.64 \% |
| Edenton | 1 | 4,460 | 745,670 | 4,460 | 100.00 \% | 0.60 \% |
| Elizabeth City (Camden) | 3 | 38 | 745,671 | 38 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Elizabeth City (Pasquotank) | 1 | 18,593 | 745,670 | 18,593 | 100.00 \% | 2.49 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Elizabethtown | 7 | 3,296 | 745,671 | 1,481 | 44.93 \% | 0.20 \% |
|  | 14 | 3,296 | 745,671 | 1,815 | 55.07 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Elk Park | 5 | 542 | 745,670 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Elkin (Surry) | 5 | 4,049 | 745,670 | 4,049 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Elkin (Wilkes) | 5 | 73 | 745,670 | 73 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Ellenboro | 10 | 723 | 745,670 | 723 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Ellerbe | 14 | 864 | 745,671 | 864 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Elm City (Nash) | 1 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Elm City (Wilson) | 1 | 1,218 | 745,670 | 1,218 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Elon | 4 | 11,336 | 745,671 | 11,336 | 100.00 \% | 1.52 \% |
| Emerald Isle | 3 | 3,847 | 745,671 | 3,847 | 100.00 \% | 0.52 \% |
| Enfield | 1 | 1,865 | 745,670 | 1,865 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Erwin | 13 | 4,542 | 745,671 | 4,542 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Eureka | 1 | 214 | 745,670 | 175 | 81.78 \% | 0.02 \% |
|  | 7 | 214 | 745,671 | 39 | 18.22 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Everetts | 1 | 150 | 745,670 | 150 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Fair Bluff | 7 | 709 | 745,671 | 709 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Fairmont | 14 | 2,191 | 745,671 | 2,191 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Fairview | 9 | 3,456 | 745,670 | 3,456 | 100.00 \% | 0.46 \% |
| Faison (Duplin) | 3 | 784 | 745,671 | 784 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Faison (Sampson) | 7 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Faith | 8 | 819 | 745,671 | 819 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Falcon (Cumberland) | 14 | 324 | 745,671 | 324 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Falcon (Sampson) | 7 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Falkland | 1 | 47 | 745,670 | 47 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.01 \% |
| Fallston | 10 | 627 | 745,670 | 627 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Farmville | 1 | 4,461 | 745,670 | 4,461 | 100.00 \% | 0.60 \% |
| Fayetteville | 14 | 208,501 | 745,671 | 208,501 | 100.00 \% | 27.96 \% |
| Flat Rock | 11 | 3,486 | 745,671 | 3,486 | 100.00 \% | 0.47 \% |
| Fletcher | 11 | 7,987 | 745,671 | 7,987 | 100.00 \% | 1.07 \% |
| Fontana Dam | 11 | 13 | 745,671 | 13 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Forest City | 10 | 7,377 | 745,670 | 7,377 | 100.00 \% | 0.99 \% |
| Forest Hills | 11 | 303 | 745,671 | 303 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Fountain | 1 | 385 | 745,670 | 385 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Four Oaks | 7 | 2,158 | 745,671 | 2,158 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Foxfire | 14 | 1,288 | 745,671 | 1,288 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Franklin | 11 | 4,175 | 745,671 | 4,175 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.56 \% |
| Franklinton | 1 | 2,456 | 745,670 | 2,456 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Franklinville | 8 | 1,197 | 745,671 | 1,197 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Fremont | 7 | 1,196 | 745,671 | 1,196 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Fuquay-Varina (Harnett) | 13 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

- Ex. 6021 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fuquay-Varina (Wake) | 2 | 34,152 | 745,670 | 1,373 | 4.02 \% | 0.18 \% |
|  | 13 | 34,152 | 745,671 | 32,779 | 95.98 \% | 4.40 \% |
| Gamewell | 5 | 3,702 | 745,670 | 3,702 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Garland | 7 | 595 | 745,671 | 595 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Garner | 2 | 31,159 | 745,670 | 31,159 | 100.00 \% | 4.18 \% |
| Garysburg | 1 | 904 | 745,670 | 904 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Gaston | 1 | 1,008 | 745,670 | 1,008 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Gastonia | 10 | 80,411 | 745,670 | 80,411 | 100.00 \% | 10.78 \% |
| Gatesville | 1 | 267 | 745,670 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Gibson | 14 | 449 | 745,671 | 449 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Gibsonville (Alamance) | 4 | 4,278 | 745,671 | 4,278 | 100.00 \% | 0.57 \% |
| Gibsonville (Guilford) | 6 | 4,642 | 745,670 | 4,642 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Glen Alpine | 5 | 1,529 | 745,670 | 1,152 | 75.34 \% | 0.15 \% |
|  | 10 | 1,529 | 745,670 | 377 | 24.66 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Godwin | 14 | 128 | 745,671 | 128 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Goldsboro | 1 | 33,657 | 745,670 | 6,282 | 18.66 \% | 0.84 \% |
|  | 7 | 33,657 | 745,671 | 27,375 | 81.34 \% | 3.67 \% |
| Goldston | 13 | 234 | 745,671 | 234 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Graham | 4 | 17,157 | 745,671 | 17,157 | 100.00 \% | 2.30 \% |
| Grandfather Village | 5 | 95 | 745,670 | 95 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Granite Falls | 5 | 4,965 | 745,670 | 4,965 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Granite Quarry | 8 | 2,984 | 745,671 | 2,984 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Grantsboro | 3 | 692 | 745,671 | 692 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Green Level | 4 | 3,152 | 745,671 | 3,152 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Greenevers | 3 | 567 | 745,671 | 567 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Greensboro | 6 | 299,035 | 745,670 | 299,035 | 100.00 \% | 40.10 \% |
| Greenville | 1 | 87,521 | 745,670 | 45,905 | 52.45 \% | $6.16 \%$ |
|  | 3 | 87,521 | 745,671 | 41,616 | 47.55 \% | 5.58 \% |
| Grifton (Lenoir) | 3 | 147 | 745,671 | 147 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Grifton (Pitt) | 3 | 2,301 | 745,671 | 2,301 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Grimesland | 3 | 386 | 745,671 | 386 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Grover | 10 | 802 | 745,670 | 802 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Halifax | 1 | 170 | 745,670 | 170 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Hamilton | 1 | 306 | 745,670 | 306 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Hamlet | 14 | 6,025 | 745,671 | 6,025 | 100.00 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Harmony | 10 | 543 | 745,670 | 543 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Harrells (Duplin) | 3 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Harrells (Sampson) | 7 | 160 | 745,671 | 160 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Harrellsville | 1 | 85 | 745,670 | 85 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Harrisburg | 9 | 18,967 | 745,670 | 18,967 | 100.00 \% | 2.54 \% |
| Hassell | 1 | 49 | 745,670 | 49 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

- Ex. 6022 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Havelock | 3 | 16,621 | 745,671 | 16,621 | 100.00 \% | 2.23 \% |
| Haw River | 4 | 2,252 | 745,671 | 2,252 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Hayesville | 11 | 461 | 745,671 | 461 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Hemby Bridge | 9 | 1,614 | 745,670 | 1,614 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Henderson | 1 | 15,060 | 745,670 | 15,060 | 100.00 \% | 2.02 \% |
| Hendersonville | 11 | 15,137 | 745,671 | 15,137 | 100.00 \% | 2.03 \% |
| Hertford | 1 | 1,934 | 745,670 | 1,934 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Hickory (Burke) | 5 | 79 | 745,670 | 79 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Hickory (Caldwell) | 5 | 32 | 745,670 | 32 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Hickory (Catawba) | 10 | 43,379 | 745,670 | 43,379 | 100.00 \% | 5.82 \% |
| High Point (Davidson) | 8 | 6,646 | 745,671 | 6,646 | 100.00 \% | 0.89 \% |
| High Point (Forsyth) | 6 | 84 | 745,670 | 84 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| High Point (Guilford) | 6 | 107,321 | 745,670 | 107,321 | 100.00 \% | 14.39 \% |
| High Point (Randolph) | 8 | 8 | 745,671 | 8 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| High Shoals | 10 | 595 | 745,670 | 595 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Highlands (Jackson) | 11 | 12 | 745,671 | 12 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Highlands (Macon) | 11 | 1,060 | 745,671 | 1,060 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Hildebran | 5 | 1,679 | 745,670 | 1,679 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Hillsborough | 4 | 9,660 | 745,671 | 9,660 | 100.00 \% | 1.30 \% |
| Hobgood | 1 | 268 | 745,670 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Hoffman | 14 | 418 | 745,671 | 418 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Holden Beach | 7 | 921 | 745,671 | 921 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Holly Ridge | 3 | 4,171 | 745,671 | 4,171 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Holly Springs | 2 | 41,239 | 745,670 | 1,675 | 4.06 \% | 0.22 \% |
|  | 13 | 41,239 | 745,671 | 39,564 | 95.94 \% | 5.31 \% |
| Hookerton | 1 | 413 | 745,670 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Hope Mills | 14 | 17,808 | 745,671 | 17,808 | 100.00 \% | 2.39 \% |
| Hot Springs | 11 | 520 | 745,671 | 520 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Hudson | 5 | 3,780 | 745,670 | 3,780 | 100.00 \% | 0.51 \% |
| Huntersville | 12 | 61,376 | 745,671 | 61,376 | 100.00 \% | 8.23 \% |
| Indian Beach | 3 | 223 | 745,671 | 223 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Indian Trail | 9 | 39,997 | 745,670 | 39,997 | 100.00 \% | 5.36 \% |
| Jackson | 1 | 430 | 745,670 | 430 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Jacksonville | 3 | 72,723 | 745,671 | 72,723 | 100.00 \% | 9.75 \% |
| Jamestown | 6 | 3,668 | 745,670 | 3,668 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Jamesville | 1 | 424 | 745,670 | 424 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Jefferson | 5 | 1,622 | 745,670 | 1,622 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Jonesville | 5 | 2,308 | 745,670 | 2,308 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Kannapolis (Cabarrus) | 8 | 42,846 | 745,671 | 42,846 | 100.00 \% | 5.75 \% |
| Kannapolis (Rowan) | 8 | 10,268 | 745,671 | 10,268 | 100.00 \% | 1.38 \% |
| Kelford | 1 | 203 | 745,670 | 203 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

- Ex. 6023 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kenansville | 3 | 770 | 745,671 | 770 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Kenly (Johnston) | 7 | 1,293 | 745,671 | 1,293 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Kenly (Wilson) | 1 | 198 | 745,670 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Kernersville (Forsyth) | 6 | 25,947 | 745,670 | 25,947 | 100.00 \% | 3.48 \% |
| Kernersville (Guilford) | 6 | 502 | 745,670 | 502 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Kill Devil Hills | 3 | 7,656 | 745,671 | 7,656 | 100.00 \% | 1.03 \% |
| King (Forsyth) | 5 | 591 | 745,670 | 591 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| King (Stokes) | 5 | 6,606 | 745,670 | 6,606 | 100.00 \% | 0.89 \% |
| Kings Mountain (Cleveland) | 10 | 10,032 | 745,670 | 10,032 | 100.00 \% | 1.35 \% |
| Kings Mountain (Gaston) | 10 | 1,110 | 745,670 | 1,110 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Kingstown | 10 | 656 | 745,670 | 656 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Kinston | 3 | 19,900 | 745,671 | 19,900 | 100.00 \% | 2.67 \% |
| Kittrell | 1 | 132 | 745,670 | 132 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Kitty Hawk | 3 | 3,689 | 745,671 | 3,689 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Knightdale | 2 | 19,435 | 745,670 | 19,435 | 100.00 \% | 2.61 \% |
| Kure Beach | 7 | 2,191 | 745,671 | 2,191 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| La Grange | 3 | 2,595 | 745,671 | 2,595 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Lake Lure | 11 | 1,365 | 745,671 | 1,365 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Lake Park | 9 | 3,269 | 745,670 | 3,269 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Lake Santeetlah | 11 | 38 | 745,671 | 38 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Lake Waccamaw | 7 | 1,296 | 745,671 | 1,296 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Landis | 8 | 3,690 | 745,671 | 3,690 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Lansing | 5 | 126 | 745,670 | 126 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Lasker | 1 | 64 | 745,670 | 64 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Lattimore | 10 | 406 | 745,670 | 406 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Laurel Park | 11 | 2,250 | 745,671 | 2,250 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Laurinburg | 14 | 14,978 | 745,671 | 14,978 | 100.00 \% | 2.01 \% |
| Lawndale | 10 | 570 | 745,670 | 570 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Leggett | 1 | 37 | 745,670 | 37 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Leland | 7 | 22,908 | 745,671 | 22,908 | 100.00 \% | 3.07 \% |
| Lenoir | 5 | 18,352 | 745,670 | 18,352 | 100.00 \% | 2.46 \% |
| Lewiston Woodville | 1 | 426 | 745,670 | 426 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Lewisville | 5 | 13,381 | 745,670 | 13,381 | 100.00 \% | 1.79 \% |
| Lexington | 8 | 19,632 | 745,671 | 19,632 | 100.00 \% | 2.63 \% |
| Liberty | 8 | 2,655 | 745,671 | 2,655 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Lilesville | 14 | 395 | 745,671 | 395 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Lillington | 13 | 4,735 | 745,671 | 4,735 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |
| Lincolnton | 10 | 11,091 | 745,670 | 11,091 | 100.00 \% | 1.49 \% |
| Linden | 14 | 136 | 745,671 | 136 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Littleton | 1 | 559 | 745,670 | 559 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Locust (Cabarrus) | 9 | 541 | 745,670 | 541 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

- Ex. 6024 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Locust (Stanly) | 9 | 3,996 | 745,670 | 3,996 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Long View (Burke) | 5 | 735 | 745,670 | 735 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Long View (Catawba) | 10 | 4,353 | 745,670 | 4,353 | 100.00 \% | 0.58 \% |
| Louisburg | 1 | 3,064 | 745,670 | 3,064 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Love Valley | 10 | 154 | 745,670 | 154 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Lowell | 10 | 3,654 | 745,670 | 3,654 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Lucama | 1 | 1,036 | 745,670 | 1,036 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Lumber Bridge | 14 | 82 | 745,671 | 82 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Lumberton | 14 | 19,025 | 745,671 | 19,025 | 100.00 \% | 2.55 \% |
| Macclesfield | 1 | 413 | 745,670 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Macon | 1 | 110 | 745,670 | 110 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Madison | 5 | 2,129 | 745,670 | 2,129 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Maggie Valley | 11 | 1,687 | 745,671 | 1,687 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Magnolia | 3 | 831 | 745,671 | 831 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Maiden (Catawba) | 10 | 3,736 | 745,670 | 3,736 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Maiden (Lincoln) | 10 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Manteo | 3 | 1,600 | 745,671 | 1,600 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Marietta | 14 | 111 | 745,671 | 111 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Marion | 11 | 7,717 | 745,671 | 7,717 | 100.00 \% | 1.03 \% |
| Mars Hill | 11 | 2,007 | 745,671 | 2,007 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Marshall | 11 | 777 | 745,671 | 777 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Marshville | 9 | 2,522 | 745,670 | 2,522 | 100.00 \% | 0.34 \% |
| Marvin | 9 | 6,358 | 745,670 | 6,358 | 100.00 \% | 0.85 \% |
| Matthews | 9 | 29,435 | 745,670 | 29,435 | 100.00 \% | 3.95 \% |
| Maxton (Robeson) | 14 | 1,902 | 745,671 | 1,902 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Maxton (Scotland) | 14 | 208 | 745,671 | 208 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Mayodan | 5 | 2,418 | 745,670 | 2,418 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Maysville | 3 | 818 | 745,671 | 818 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| McAdenville | 10 | 890 | 745,670 | 890 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| McDonald | 14 | 94 | 745,671 | 94 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| McFarlan | 14 | 94 | 745,671 | 94 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Mebane (Alamance) | 4 | 14,626 | 745,671 | 14,626 | 100.00 \% | 1.96 \% |
| Mebane (Orange) | 4 | 3,171 | 745,671 | 3,171 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Mesic | 3 | 144 | 745,671 | 144 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Micro | 7 | 458 | 745,671 | 458 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Middleburg | 1 | 101 | 745,670 | 101 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Middlesex | 1 | 912 | 745,670 | 912 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Midland (Cabarrus) | 9 | 4,684 | 745,670 | 4,684 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |
| Midland (Mecklenburg) | 9 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Midway | 8 | 4,742 | 745,671 | 4,742 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Mills River | 11 | 7,078 | 745,671 | 7,078 | 100.00 \% | 0.95 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Milton | 4 | 155 | 745,671 | 155 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Mineral Springs | 9 | 3,159 | 745,670 | 3,159 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Minnesott Beach | 3 | 530 | 745,671 | 530 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Mint Hill (Mecklenburg) | 9 | 26,444 | 745,670 | 26,444 | 100.00 \% | 3.55 \% |
| Mint Hill (Union) | 9 | 6 | 745,670 | 6 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Misenheimer | 9 | 650 | 745,670 | 650 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Mocksville | 8 | 5,900 | 745,671 | 5,900 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Momeyer | 1 | 277 | 745,670 | 277 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Monroe | 9 | 34,562 | 745,670 | 34,562 | 100.00 \% | 4.64 \% |
| Montreat | 11 | 901 | 745,671 | 901 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Mooresboro | 10 | 293 | 745,670 | 293 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Mooresville | 8 | 50,193 | 745,671 | 50,193 | 100.00 \% | 6.73 \% |
| Morehead City | 3 | 9,556 | 745,671 | 9,556 | 100.00 \% | 1.28 \% |
| Morganton | 5 | 17,474 | 745,670 | 16,963 | 97.08 \% | 2.27 \% |
|  | 10 | 17,474 | 745,670 | 511 | 2.92 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Morrisville (Durham) | 4 | 207 | 745,671 | 207 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Morrisville (Wake) | 13 | 29,423 | 745,671 | 29,423 | 100.00 \% | 3.95 \% |
| Morven | 14 | 329 | 745,671 | 329 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Mount Airy | 5 | 10,676 | 745,670 | 10,676 | 100.00 \% | 1.43 \% |
| Mount Gilead | 14 | 1,171 | 745,671 | 1,171 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Mount Holly | 10 | 17,703 | 745,670 | 17,703 | 100.00 \% | 2.37 \% |
| Mount Olive (Duplin) | 3 | 5 | 745,671 | 5 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Mount Olive (Wayne) | 7 | 4,193 | 745,671 | 4,193 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Mount Pleasant | 8 | 1,671 | 745,671 | 1,666 | 99.70 \% | 0.22 \% |
|  | 9 | 1,671 | 745,670 | 5 | 0.30 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Murfreesboro | 1 | 2,619 | 745,670 | 2,619 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Murphy | 11 | 1,608 | 745,671 | 1,608 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Nags Head | 3 | 3,168 | 745,671 | 3,168 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Nashville | 1 | 5,632 | 745,670 | 5,632 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Navassa | 7 | 1,367 | 745,671 | 1,367 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| New Bern | 3 | 31,291 | 745,671 | 31,291 | 100.00 \% | 4.20 \% |
| New London | 9 | 607 | 745,670 | 607 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Newland | 5 | 715 | 745,670 | 715 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Newport | 3 | 4,364 | 745,671 | 4,364 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Newton | 10 | 13,148 | 745,670 | 13,148 | 100.00 \% | 1.76 \% |
| Newton Grove | 7 | 585 | 745,671 | 585 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Norlina | 1 | 920 | 745,670 | 920 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Norman | 14 | 100 | 745,671 | 100 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| North Topsail Beach | 3 | 1,005 | 745,671 | 1,005 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| North Wilkesboro | 5 | 4,382 | 745,670 | 4,382 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Northwest | 7 | 703 | 745,671 | 703 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

- Ex. 6026 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Norwood | 9 | 2,367 | 745,670 | 2,367 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Oak City | 1 | 266 | 745,670 | 266 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Oak Island | 7 | 8,396 | 745,671 | 8,396 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Oak Ridge | 6 | 7,474 | 745,670 | 7,474 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Oakboro | 9 | 2,128 | 745,670 | 2,128 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Ocean Isle Beach | 7 | 867 | 745,671 | 867 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Old Fort | 11 | 811 | 745,671 | 811 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Oriental | 3 | 880 | 745,671 | 880 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Orrum | 14 | 59 | 745,671 | 59 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Ossipee | 4 | 536 | 745,671 | 536 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Oxford | 1 | 8,628 | 745,670 | 8,628 | 100.00 \% | 1.16 \% |
| Pantego | 3 | 164 | 745,671 | 164 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Parkton | 14 | 504 | 745,671 | 504 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Parmele | 1 | 243 | 745,670 | 243 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Patterson Springs | 10 | 571 | 745,670 | 571 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Peachland | 14 | 390 | 745,671 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Peletier | 3 | 769 | 745,671 | 769 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Pembroke | 14 | 2,823 | 745,671 | 2,823 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Pikeville | 7 | 712 | 745,671 | 712 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Pilot Mountain | 5 | 1,440 | 745,670 | 1,440 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Pine Knoll Shores | 3 | 1,388 | 745,671 | 1,388 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Pine Level | 7 | 2,046 | 745,671 | 2,046 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Pinebluff | 14 | 1,473 | 745,671 | 1,473 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Pinehurst | 14 | 17,581 | 745,671 | 17,581 | 100.00 \% | 2.36 \% |
| Pinetops | 1 | 1,200 | 745,670 | 1,200 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Pineville | 12 | 10,602 | 745,671 | 10,602 | 100.00 \% | 1.42 \% |
| Pink Hill | 3 | 451 | 745,671 | 451 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Pittsboro | 13 | 4,537 | 745,671 | 4,537 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Pleasant Garden | 6 | 5,000 | 745,670 | 5,000 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Plymouth | 1 | 3,320 | 745,670 | 3,320 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Polkton | 14 | 2,250 | 745,671 | 2,250 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Polkville | 10 | 516 | 745,670 | 516 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Pollocksville | 3 | 268 | 745,671 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Powellsville | 1 | 189 | 745,670 | 189 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Princeton | 7 | 1,315 | 745,671 | 1,315 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Princeville | 1 | 1,254 | 745,670 | 1,254 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Proctorville | 14 | 121 | 745,671 | 121 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Raeford | 14 | 4,559 | 745,671 | 4,559 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Raleigh (Durham) | 4 | 1,559 | 745,671 | 1,559 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Raleigh (Wake) | 2 | 466,106 | 745,670 | 460,066 | 98.70 \% | 61.70 \% |
|  | 13 | 466,106 | 745,671 | 6,040 | 1.30 \% | 0.81 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

- Ex. 6027 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ramseur | 8 | 1,774 | 745,671 | 1,774 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Randleman | 8 | 4,595 | 745,671 | 4,595 | 100.00 \% | 0.62 \% |
| Ranlo | 10 | 4,511 | 745,670 | 4,511 | 100.00 \% | 0.60 \% |
| Raynham | 14 | 60 | 745,671 | 60 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Red Cross | 9 | 762 | 745,670 | 762 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Red Oak | 1 | 3,342 | 745,670 | 3,342 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Red Springs (Hoke) | 14 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Red Springs (Robeson) | 14 | 3,087 | 745,671 | 3,087 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Reidsville | 4 | 14,583 | 745,671 | 14,583 | 100.00 \% | 1.96 \% |
| Rennert | 14 | 275 | 745,671 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Rhodhiss (Burke) | 5 | 639 | 745,670 | 639 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Rhodhiss (Caldwell) | 5 | 358 | 745,670 | 358 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Rich Square | 1 | 894 | 745,670 | 894 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Richfield | 9 | 582 | 745,670 | 582 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Richlands | 3 | 2,287 | 745,671 | 2,287 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| River Bend | 3 | 2,902 | 745,671 | 2,902 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Roanoke Rapids | 1 | 15,229 | 745,670 | 15,229 | 100.00 \% | 2.04 \% |
| Robbins | 14 | 1,168 | 745,671 | 1,168 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Robbinsville | 11 | 597 | 745,671 | 597 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Robersonville | 1 | 1,269 | 745,670 | 1,269 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Rockingham | 14 | 9,243 | 745,671 | 9,243 | 100.00 \% | 1.24 \% |
| Rockwell | 8 | 2,302 | 745,671 | 2,302 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Rocky Mount (Edgecombe) | 1 | 15,414 | 745,670 | 15,414 | 100.00 \% | 2.07 \% |
| Rocky Mount (Nash) | 1 | 38,927 | 745,670 | 38,927 | 100.00 \% | 5.22 \% |
| Rolesville | 2 | 9,475 | 745,670 | 9,475 | 100.00 \% | 1.27 \% |
| Ronda | 5 | 438 | 745,670 | 438 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Roper | 1 | 485 | 745,670 | 485 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Rose Hill | 3 | 1,371 | 745,671 | 1,371 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Roseboro | 7 | 1,163 | 745,671 | 1,163 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Rosman | 11 | 701 | 745,671 | 701 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Rowland | 14 | 885 | 745,671 | 885 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Roxboro | 4 | 8,134 | 745,671 | 8,134 | 100.00 \% | 1.09 \% |
| Roxobel | 1 | 187 | 745,670 | 187 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Rural Hall | 5 | 3,351 | 745,670 | 3,351 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Ruth | 10 | 347 | 745,670 | 347 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Rutherford College (Burke) | 5 | 1,226 | 745,670 | 1,226 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Rutherford College (Caldwell) | 5 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Rutherfordton | 10 | 3,640 | 745,670 | 3,640 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Salemburg | 7 | 457 | 745,671 | 457 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Salisbury | 8 | 35,540 | 745,671 | 35,540 | 100.00 \% | 4.77 \% |
| Saluda (Henderson) | 11 | 11 | 745,671 | 11 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/25/2021

- Ex. 6028 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Saluda (Polk) | 11 | 620 | 745,671 | 620 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Sandy Creek | 7 | 248 | 745,671 | 248 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Sandyfield | 7 | 430 | 745,671 | 430 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Sanford | 13 | 30,261 | 745,671 | 30,261 | 100.00 \% | 4.06 \% |
| Saratoga | 1 | 353 | 745,670 | 353 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Sawmills | 5 | 5,020 | 745,670 | 5,020 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Scotland Neck | 1 | 1,640 | 745,670 | 1,640 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Seaboard | 1 | 542 | 745,670 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Seagrove | 8 | 235 | 745,671 | 235 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Sedalia | 6 | 676 | 745,670 | 676 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Selma | 7 | 6,317 | 745,671 | 6,317 | 100.00 \% | 0.85 \% |
| Seven Devils (Avery) | 5 | 38 | 745,670 | 38 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Seven Devils (Watauga) | 5 | 275 | 745,670 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Seven Springs | 7 | 55 | 745,671 | 55 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Severn | 1 | 191 | 745,670 | 191 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Shallotte | 7 | 4,185 | 745,671 | 4,185 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Sharpsburg (Edgecombe) | 1 | 215 | 745,670 | 215 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Sharpsburg (Nash) | 1 | 1,061 | 745,670 | 1,061 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Sharpsburg (Wilson) | 1 | 421 | 745,670 | 421 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Shelby | 10 | 21,918 | 745,670 | 21,918 | 100.00 \% | 2.94 \% |
| Siler City | 13 | 7,702 | 745,671 | 7,702 | 100.00 \% | 1.03 \% |
| Simpson | 3 | 390 | 745,671 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Sims | 1 | 275 | 745,670 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Smithfield | 7 | 11,292 | 745,671 | 11,292 | 100.00 \% | 1.51 \% |
| Snow Hill | 1 | 1,481 | 745,670 | 1,481 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Southern Pines | 14 | 15,545 | 745,671 | 15,545 | 100.00 \% | 2.08 \% |
| Southern Shores | 3 | 3,090 | 745,671 | 3,090 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Southport | 7 | 3,971 | 745,671 | 3,971 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Sparta | 5 | 1,834 | 745,670 | 1,834 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Speed | 1 | 63 | 745,670 | 63 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Spencer | 8 | 3,308 | 745,671 | 3,308 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Spencer Mountain | 10 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Spindale | 10 | 4,225 | 745,670 | 4,225 | 100.00 \% | 0.57 \% |
| Spring Hope | 1 | 1,309 | 745,670 | 1,309 | 100.00 \% | 0.18\% |
| Spring Lake | 14 | 11,660 | 745,671 | 11,660 | 100.00 \% | 1.56 \% |
| Spruce Pine | 11 | 2,194 | 745,671 | 2,194 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| St. Helena | 7 | 417 | 745,671 | 417 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| St. James | 7 | 6,529 | 745,671 | 6,529 | 100.00 \% | 0.88 \% |
| St. Pauls | 14 | 2,045 | 745,671 | 2,045 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Staley | 8 | 397 | 745,671 | 397 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Stallings (Mecklenburg) | 9 | 384 | 745,670 | 384 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Stallings (Union) | 9 | 15,728 | 745,670 | 15,728 | 100.00 \% | 2.11 \% |
| Stanfield | 9 | 1,585 | 745,670 | 1,585 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Stanley | 10 | 3,963 | 745,670 | 3,963 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Stantonsburg | 1 | 762 | 745,670 | 762 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Star | 14 | 806 | 745,671 | 806 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Statesville | 10 | 28,419 | 745,670 | 28,419 | 100.00 \% | 3.81 \% |
| Stedman | 14 | 1,277 | 745,671 | 1,277 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Stem | 1 | 960 | 745,670 | 960 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Stokesdale | 6 | 5,924 | 745,670 | 5,924 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Stoneville | 5 | 1,308 | 745,670 | 1,308 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Stonewall | 3 | 214 | 745,671 | 214 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Stovall | 1 | 324 | 745,670 | 324 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Sugar Mountain | 5 | 371 | 745,670 | 371 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Summerfield | 6 | 10,951 | 745,670 | 10,951 | 100.00 \% | 1.47 \% |
| Sunset Beach | 7 | 4,175 | 745,671 | 4,175 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Surf City (Onslow) | 3 | 334 | 745,671 | 334 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Surf City (Pender) | 3 | 3,533 | 745,671 | 3,533 | 100.00 \% | 0.47 \% |
| Swansboro | 3 | 3,744 | 745,671 | 3,744 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Swepsonville | 4 | 2,445 | 745,671 | 2,445 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Sylva | 11 | 2,578 | 745,671 | 2,578 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Tabor City | 7 | 3,781 | 745,671 | 3,781 | 100.00 \% | 0.51 \% |
| Tar Heel | 14 | 90 | 745,671 | 90 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Tarboro | 1 | 10,721 | 745,670 | 10,721 | 100.00 \% | 1.44 \% |
| Taylorsville | 5 | 2,320 | 745,670 | 2,320 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Taylortown | 14 | 634 | 745,671 | 634 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Teachey | 3 | 448 | 745,671 | 448 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Thomasville (Davidson) | 8 | 26,662 | 745,671 | 26,662 | 100.00 \% | 3.58 \% |
| Thomasville (Randolph) | 8 | 521 | 745,671 | 521 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Tobaccoville (Forsyth) | 5 | 2,578 | 745,670 | 2,578 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Tobaccoville (Stokes) | 5 | 0 | 745,670 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Topsail Beach | 3 | 461 | 745,671 | 461 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Trent Woods | 3 | 4,074 | 745,671 | 4,074 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Trenton | 3 | 238 | 745,671 | 238 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Trinity | 8 | 7,006 | 745,671 | 7,006 | 100.00 \% | 0.94 \% |
| Troutman | 8 | 3,698 | 745,671 | 807 | 21.82 \% | 0.11 \% |
|  | 10 | 3,698 | 745,670 | 2,891 | 78.18 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Troy | 14 | 2,850 | 745,671 | 2,850 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Tryon | 11 | 1,562 | 745,671 | 1,562 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Turkey | 7 | 213 | 745,671 | 213 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Unionville | 9 | 6,643 | 745,670 | 6,643 | 100.00 \% | 0.89 \% |
| Valdese | 5 | 4,689 | 745,670 | 4,689 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Vanceboro | 3 | 869 | 745,671 | 869 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Vandemere | 3 | 246 | 745,671 | 246 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Varnamtown | 7 | 525 | 745,671 | 525 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Vass | 14 | 952 | 745,671 | 952 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Waco | 10 | 310 | 745,670 | 310 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Wade | 14 | 638 | 745,671 | 638 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Wadesboro | 14 | 5,008 | 745,671 | 5,008 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Wagram | 14 | 615 | 745,671 | 615 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Wake Forest (Franklin) | 1 | 1,504 | 745,670 | 1,504 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Wake Forest (Wake) | 2 | 46,097 | 745,670 | 46,097 | 100.00 \% | 6.18 \% |
| Walkertown | 6 | 5,692 | 745,670 | 5,692 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Wallace (Duplin) | 3 | 3,413 | 745,671 | 3,413 | 100.00 \% | 0.46 \% |
| Wallace (Pender) | 7 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Wallburg | 8 | 3,051 | 745,671 | 3,051 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Walnut Cove | 5 | 1,586 | 745,670 | 1,586 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Walnut Creek | 7 | 1,084 | 745,671 | 1,084 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Walstonburg | 1 | 193 | 745,670 | 193 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Warrenton | 1 | 851 | 745,670 | 851 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Warsaw | 3 | 2,733 | 745,671 | 2,733 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Washington | 3 | 9,875 | 745,671 | 9,875 | 100.00 \% | 1.32 \% |
| Washington Park | 3 | 392 | 745,671 | 392 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Watha | 7 | 181 | 745,671 | 181 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Waxhaw | 9 | 20,534 | 745,670 | 20,534 | 100.00 \% | 2.75 \% |
| Waynesville | 11 | 10,140 | 745,671 | 10,140 | 100.00 \% | 1.36 \% |
| Weaverville | 11 | 4,567 | 745,671 | 4,567 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Webster | 11 | 372 | 745,671 | 372 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Weddington (Mecklenburg) | 9 | 5 | 745,670 | 5 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Weddington (Union) | 9 | 13,176 | 745,670 | 13,176 | 100.00 \% | 1.77 \% |
| Weldon | 1 | 1,444 | 745,670 | 1,444 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Wendell | 2 | 9,793 | 745,670 | 9,793 | 100.00 \% | 1.31 \% |
| Wentworth | 4 | 2,662 | 745,671 | 921 | 34.60 \% | 0.12 \% |
|  | 5 | 2,662 | 745,670 | 1,741 | 65.40 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Wesley Chapel | 9 | 8,681 | 745,670 | 8,681 | 100.00 \% | 1.16 \% |
| West Jefferson | 5 | 1,279 | 745,670 | 1,279 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Whispering Pines | 14 | 4,987 | 745,671 | 4,987 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Whitakers (Edgecombe) | 1 | 290 | 745,670 | 290 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Whitakers (Nash) | 1 | 337 | 745,670 | 337 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| White Lake | 7 | 843 | 745,671 | 843 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Whiteville | 7 | 4,766 | 745,671 | 4,766 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Whitsett | 6 | 584 | 745,670 | 584 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Wilkesboro | 5 | 3,687 | 745,670 | 3,687 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: CST-8

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Williamston | 1 | 5,248 | 745,670 | 5,248 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Wilmington | 7 | 115,451 | 745,671 | 115,451 | 100.00 \% | 15.48 \% |
| Wilson | 1 | 47,851 | 745,670 | 47,851 | 100.00 \% | 6.42 \% |
| Wilson's Mills | 7 | 2,534 | 745,671 | 2,534 | 100.00 \% | 0.34 \% |
| Windsor | 1 | 3,582 | 745,670 | 3,582 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Winfall | 1 | 555 | 745,670 | 555 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Wingate | 9 | 4,055 | 745,670 | 4,055 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Winston-Salem | 5 | 249,545 | 745,670 | 111,539 | 44.70 \% | 14.96 \% |
|  | 6 | 249,545 | 745,670 | 138,006 | 55.30 \% | 18.51 \% |
| Winterville | 3 | 10,462 | 745,671 | 10,462 | 100.00 \% | 1.40 \% |
| Winton | 1 | 629 | 745,670 | 629 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Woodfin | 11 | 7,936 | 745,671 | 7,936 | 100.00 \% | 1.06 \% |
| Woodland | 1 | 557 | 745,670 | 557 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Wrightsville Beach | 7 | 2,473 | 745,671 | 2,473 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Yadkinville | 5 | 2,995 | 745,670 | 2,995 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Yanceyville | 4 | 1,937 | 745,671 | 1,937 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Youngsville | 1 | 2,016 | 745,670 | 2,016 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Zebulon (Johnston) | 7 | 0 | 745,671 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Zebulon (Wake) | 2 | 6,903 | 745,670 | 6,903 | 100.00 \% | 0.93 \% |
| Total: |  |  |  | 6,017,605 |  |  |

Number of municipalities split within counties: 20
Display: all municipalities

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District <br> Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Ahoskie | 745,670 | 4,891 | 4,891 | 0.66 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Askewville | 745,670 | 184 | 184 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Aulander | 745,670 | 763 | 763 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bailey | 745,670 | 568 | 568 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bear Grass | 745,670 | 89 | 89 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bethel | 745,670 | 1,373 | 1,373 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Black Creek | 745,670 | 692 | 692 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bunn | 745,670 | 327 | 327 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Butner | 745,670 | 8,397 | 8,397 | 1.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Castalia | 745,670 | 264 | 264 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cofield | 745,670 | 267 | 267 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Colerain | 745,670 | 217 | 217 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Como | 745,670 | 67 | 67 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Conetoe | 745,670 | 198 | 198 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Conway | 745,670 | 752 | 752 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Creedmoor | 745,670 | 4,866 | 4,866 | 0.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Creswell | 745,670 | 207 | 207 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dortches | 745,670 | 1,082 | 1,082 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Edenton | 745,670 | 4,460 | 4,460 | 0.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabeth City (Pasquotank) | 745,670 | 18,593 | 18,593 | 2.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elm City (Nash) | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Elm City (Wilson) | 745,670 | 1,218 | 1,218 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Enfield | 745,670 | 1,865 | 1,865 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eureka | 745,670 | 214 | 175 | 0.02 \% | 81.78 \% |
|  | Everetts | 745,670 | 150 | 150 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Falkland | 745,670 | 47 | 47 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Farmville | 745,670 | 4,461 | 4,461 | 0.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fountain | 745,670 | 385 | 385 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Franklinton | 745,670 | 2,456 | 2,456 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Garysburg | 745,670 | 904 | 904 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gaston | 745,670 | 1,008 | 1,008 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gatesville | 745,670 | 267 | 267 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Goldsboro | 745,670 | 33,657 | 6,282 | 0.84 \% | 18.66 \% |
|  | Greenville | 745,670 | 87,521 | 45,905 | 6.16 \% | 52.45 \% |
|  | Halifax | 745,670 | 170 | 170 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hamilton | 745,670 | 306 | 306 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harrellsville | 745,670 | 85 | 85 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hassell | 745,670 | 49 | 49 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Henderson | 745,670 | 15,060 | 15,060 | 2.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hertford | 745,670 | 1,934 | 1,934 | 0.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hobgood | 745,670 | 268 | 268 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District <br> Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Hookerton | 745,670 | 413 | 413 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jackson | 745,670 | 430 | 430 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jamesville | 745,670 | 424 | 424 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kelford | 745,670 | 203 | 203 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kenly (Wilson) | 745,670 | 198 | 198 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kittrell | 745,670 | 132 | 132 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lasker | 745,670 | 64 | 64 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Leggett | 745,670 | 37 | 37 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lewiston Woodville | 745,670 | 426 | 426 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Littleton | 745,670 | 559 | 559 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Louisburg | 745,670 | 3,064 | 3,064 | 0.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lucama | 745,670 | 1,036 | 1,036 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Macclesfield | 745,670 | 413 | 413 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Macon | 745,670 | 110 | 110 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Middleburg | 745,670 | 101 | 101 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Middlesex | 745,670 | 912 | 912 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Momeyer | 745,670 | 277 | 277 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Murfreesboro | 745,670 | 2,619 | 2,619 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Nashville | 745,670 | 5,632 | 5,632 | 0.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Norlina | 745,670 | 920 | 920 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oak City | 745,670 | 266 | 266 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oxford | 745,670 | 8,628 | 8,628 | 1.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Parmele | 745,670 | 243 | 243 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pinetops | 745,670 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Plymouth | 745,670 | 3,320 | 3,320 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Powellsville | 745,670 | 189 | 189 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Princeville | 745,670 | 1,254 | 1,254 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Red Oak | 745,670 | 3,342 | 3,342 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rich Square | 745,670 | 894 | 894 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roanoke Rapids | 745,670 | 15,229 | 15,229 | 2.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Robersonville | 745,670 | 1,269 | 1,269 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rocky Mount (Edgecombe) | 745,670 | 15,414 | 15,414 | 2.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rocky Mount (Nash) | 745,670 | 38,927 | 38,927 | 5.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roper | 745,670 | 485 | 485 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roxobel | 745,670 | 187 | 187 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Saratoga | 745,670 | 353 | 353 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Scotland Neck | 745,670 | 1,640 | 1,640 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seaboard | 745,670 | 542 | 542 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Severn | 745,670 | 191 | 191 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sharpsburg (Edgecombe) | 745,670 | 215 | 215 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sharpsburg (Nash) | 745,670 | 1,061 | 1,061 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |

- Ex. 6034 -


## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Sharpsburg (Wilson) | 745,670 | 421 | 421 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sims | 745,670 | 275 | 275 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Snow Hill | 745,670 | 1,481 | 1,481 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Speed | 745,670 | 63 | 63 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spring Hope | 745,670 | 1,309 | 1,309 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stantonsburg | 745,670 | 762 | 762 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stem | 745,670 | 960 | 960 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stovall | 745,670 | 324 | 324 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tarboro | 745,670 | 10,721 | 10,721 | 1.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wake Forest (Franklin) | 745,670 | 1,504 | 1,504 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Walstonburg | 745,670 | 193 | 193 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Warrenton | 745,670 | 851 | 851 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weldon | 745,670 | 1,444 | 1,444 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whitakers (Edgecombe) | 745,670 | 290 | 290 | 0.04 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Whitakers (Nash) | 745,670 | 337 | 337 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Williamston | 745,670 | 5,248 | 5,248 | 0.70 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilson | 745,670 | 47,851 | 47,851 | 6.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Windsor | 745,670 | 3,582 | 3,582 | 0.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winfall | 745,670 | 555 | 555 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winton | 745,670 | 629 | 629 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Woodland | 745,670 | 557 | 557 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Youngsville | 745,670 | 2,016 | 2,016 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 2 | Cary (Wake) | 745,670 | 171,012 | 6,689 | 0.90 \% | 3.91 \% |
|  | Clayton (Wake) | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Durham (Wake) | 745,670 | 269 | 269 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fuquay-Varina (Wake) | 745,670 | 34,152 | 1,373 | 0.18 \% | 4.02 \% |
|  | Garner | 745,670 | 31,159 | 31,159 | 4.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Holly Springs | 745,670 | 41,239 | 1,675 | 0.22 \% | 4.06 \% |
|  | Knightdale | 745,670 | 19,435 | 19,435 | 2.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 745,670 | 466,106 | 460,066 | 61.70 \% | 98.70 \% |
|  | Rolesville | 745,670 | 9,475 | 9,475 | 1.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wake Forest (Wake) | 745,670 | 46,097 | 46,097 | 6.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wendell | 745,670 | 9,793 | 9,793 | 1.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Zebulon (Wake) | 745,670 | 6,903 | 6,903 | 0.93 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 3 | Alliance | 745,671 | 733 | 733 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Arapahoe | 745,671 | 416 | 416 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Atlantic Beach | 745,671 | 1,364 | 1,364 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Aurora | 745,671 | 455 | 455 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ayden | 745,671 | 4,977 | 4,977 | 0.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bath | 745,671 | 245 | 245 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bayboro | 745,671 | 1,161 | 1,161 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District <br> Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | Beaufort | 745,671 | 4,464 | 4,464 | 0.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Belhaven | 745,671 | 1,410 | 1,410 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Beulaville | 745,671 | 1,116 | 1,116 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bogue | 745,671 | 695 | 695 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bridgeton | 745,671 | 349 | 349 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Calypso | 745,671 | 327 | 327 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cape Carteret | 745,671 | 2,224 | 2,224 | 0.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cedar Point | 745,671 | 1,764 | 1,764 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chocowinity | 745,671 | 722 | 722 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Columbia | 745,671 | 610 | 610 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cove City | 745,671 | 378 | 378 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dover | 745,671 | 349 | 349 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Duck | 745,671 | 742 | 742 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabeth City (Camden) | 745,671 | 38 | 38 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Emerald Isle | 745,671 | 3,847 | 3,847 | 0.52 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Faison (Duplin) | 745,671 | 784 | 784 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grantsboro | 745,671 | 692 | 692 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greenevers | 745,671 | 567 | 567 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greenville | 745,671 | 87,521 | 41,616 | 5.58 \% | $47.55 \%$ |
|  | Grifton (Lenoir) | 745,671 | 147 | 147 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grifton (Pitt) | 745,671 | 2,301 | 2,301 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grimesland | 745,671 | 386 | 386 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harrells (Duplin) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Havelock | 745,671 | 16,621 | 16,621 | 2.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Holly Ridge | 745,671 | 4,171 | 4,171 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Indian Beach | 745,671 | 223 | 223 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jacksonville | 745,671 | 72,723 | 72,723 | 9.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kenansville | 745,671 | 770 | 770 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kill Devil Hills | 745,671 | 7,656 | 7,656 | 1.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kinston | 745,671 | 19,900 | 19,900 | 2.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kitty Hawk | 745,671 | 3,689 | 3,689 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | La Grange | 745,671 | 2,595 | 2,595 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Magnolia | 745,671 | 831 | 831 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Manteo | 745,671 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maysville | 745,671 | 818 | 818 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mesic | 745,671 | 144 | 144 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Minnesott Beach | 745,671 | 530 | 530 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morehead City | 745,671 | 9,556 | 9,556 | 1.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Olive (Duplin) | 745,671 | 5 | 5 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Nags Head | 745,671 | 3,168 | 3,168 | 0.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | New Bern | 745,671 | 31,291 | 31,291 | 4.20 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | Newport | 745,671 | 4,364 | 4,364 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | North Topsail Beach | 745,671 | 1,005 | 1,005 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oriental | 745,671 | 880 | 880 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pantego | 745,671 | 164 | 164 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Peletier | 745,671 | 769 | 769 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pine Knoll Shores | 745,671 | 1,388 | 1,388 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pink Hill | 745,671 | 451 | 451 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pollocksville | 745,671 | 268 | 268 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Richlands | 745,671 | 2,287 | 2,287 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | River Bend | 745,671 | 2,902 | 2,902 | 0.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rose Hill | 745,671 | 1,371 | 1,371 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Simpson | 745,671 | 390 | 390 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Southern Shores | 745,671 | 3,090 | 3,090 | 0.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stonewall | 745,671 | 214 | 214 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Surf City (Onslow) | 745,671 | 334 | 334 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Surf City (Pender) | 745,671 | 3,533 | 3,533 | 0.47 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Swansboro | 745,671 | 3,744 | 3,744 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Teachey | 745,671 | 448 | 448 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Topsail Beach | 745,671 | 461 | 461 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Trent Woods | 745,671 | 4,074 | 4,074 | 0.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Trenton | 745,671 | 238 | 238 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Vanceboro | 745,671 | 869 | 869 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Vandemere | 745,671 | 246 | 246 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wallace (Duplin) | 745,671 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 0.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Warsaw | 745,671 | 2,733 | 2,733 | 0.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Washington | 745,671 | 9,875 | 9,875 | 1.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Washington Park | 745,671 | 392 | 392 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winterville | 745,671 | 10,462 | 10,462 | 1.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 4 | Alamance | 745,671 | 988 | 988 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burlington (Alamance) | 745,671 | 55,481 | 55,481 | 7.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Carrboro | 745,671 | 21,295 | 21,295 | 2.86 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chapel Hill (Durham) | 745,671 | 2,906 | 2,906 | 0.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chapel Hill (Orange) | 745,671 | 59,054 | 59,054 | 7.92 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Durham (Durham) | 745,671 | 283,093 | 281,539 | 37.76 \% | 99.45 \% |
|  | Durham (Orange) | 745,671 | 144 | 144 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eden | 745,671 | 15,421 | 3,158 | 0.42 \% | 20.48 \% |
|  | Elon | 745,671 | 11,336 | 11,336 | 1.52 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gibsonville (Alamance) | 745,671 | 4,278 | 4,278 | 0.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Graham | 745,671 | 17,157 | 17,157 | 2.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Green Level | 745,671 | 3,152 | 3,152 | 0.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Haw River | 745,671 | 2,252 | 2,252 | 0.30 \% | $100.00 \%$ |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4 | Hillsborough | 745,671 | 9,660 | 9,660 | 1.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mebane (Alamance) | 745,671 | 14,626 | 14,626 | 1.96 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mebane (Orange) | 745,671 | 3,171 | 3,171 | 0.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Milton | 745,671 | 155 | 155 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morrisville (Durham) | 745,671 | 207 | 207 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ossipee | 745,671 | 536 | 536 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Durham) | 745,671 | 1,559 | 1,559 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Reidsville | 745,671 | 14,583 | 14,583 | 1.96 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roxboro | 745,671 | 8,134 | 8,134 | 1.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Swepsonville | 745,671 | 2,445 | 2,445 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wentworth | 745,671 | 2,662 | 921 | 0.12 \% | 34.60 \% |
|  | Yanceyville | 745,671 | 1,937 | 1,937 | 0.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 5 | Banner Elk | 745,670 | 1,049 | 1,049 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Beech Mountain (Avery) | 745,670 | 62 | 62 | $0.01 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Beech Mountain (Watauga) | 745,670 | 613 | 613 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bethania | 745,670 | 344 | 344 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Blowing Rock (Caldwell) | 745,670 | 91 | 91 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Blowing Rock (Watauga) | 745,670 | 1,285 | 1,285 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boone | 745,670 | 19,092 | 19,092 | 2.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boonville | 745,670 | 1,185 | 1,185 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cajah's Mountain | 745,670 | 2,722 | 2,722 | 0.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cedar Rock | 745,670 | 301 | 301 | 0.04 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Clemmons | 745,670 | 21,163 | 21,163 | 2.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Connelly Springs | 745,670 | 1,529 | 1,529 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Crossnore | 745,670 | 143 | 143 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Danbury | 745,670 | 189 | 189 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dobson | 745,670 | 1,462 | 1,462 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Drexel | 745,670 | 1,760 | 1,760 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Bend | 745,670 | 634 | 634 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eden | 745,670 | 15,421 | 12,263 | 1.64 \% | 79.52 \% |
|  | Elk Park | 745,670 | 542 | 542 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elkin (Surry) | 745,670 | 4,049 | 4,049 | 0.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elkin (Wilkes) | 745,670 | 73 | 73 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gamewell | 745,670 | 3,702 | 3,702 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Glen Alpine | 745,670 | 1,529 | 1,152 | 0.15 \% | 75.34 \% |
|  | Grandfather Village | 745,670 | 95 | 95 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Granite Falls | 745,670 | 4,965 | 4,965 | 0.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hickory (Burke) | 745,670 | 79 | 79 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hickory (Caldwell) | 745,670 | 32 | 32 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hildebran | 745,670 | 1,679 | 1,679 | 0.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hudson | 745,670 | 3,780 | 3,780 | 0.51 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5 | Jefferson | 745,670 | 1,622 | 1,622 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jonesville | 745,670 | 2,308 | 2,308 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | King (Forsyth) | 745,670 | 591 | 591 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | King (Stokes) | 745,670 | 6,606 | 6,606 | 0.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lansing | 745,670 | 126 | 126 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lenoir | 745,670 | 18,352 | 18,352 | 2.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lewisville | 745,670 | 13,381 | 13,381 | 1.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Long View (Burke) | 745,670 | 735 | 735 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Madison | 745,670 | 2,129 | 2,129 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mayodan | 745,670 | 2,418 | 2,418 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morganton | 745,670 | 17,474 | 16,963 | 2.27 \% | 97.08 \% |
|  | Mount Airy | 745,670 | 10,676 | 10,676 | 1.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newland | 745,670 | 715 | 715 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | North Wilkesboro | 745,670 | 4,382 | 4,382 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pilot Mountain | 745,670 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rhodhiss (Burke) | 745,670 | 639 | 639 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rhodhiss (Caldwell) | 745,670 | 358 | 358 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ronda | 745,670 | 438 | 438 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rural Hall | 745,670 | 3,351 | 3,351 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford College (Burke) | 745,670 | 1,226 | 1,226 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford College (Caldwell) | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Sawmills | 745,670 | 5,020 | 5,020 | 0.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seven Devils (Avery) | 745,670 | 38 | 38 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seven Devils (Watauga) | 745,670 | 275 | 275 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sparta | 745,670 | 1,834 | 1,834 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stoneville | 745,670 | 1,308 | 1,308 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sugar Mountain | 745,670 | 371 | 371 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Taylorsville | 745,670 | 2,320 | 2,320 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tobaccoville (Forsyth) | 745,670 | 2,578 | 2,578 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tobaccoville (Stokes) | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Valdese | 745,670 | 4,689 | 4,689 | 0.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Walnut Cove | 745,670 | 1,586 | 1,586 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wentworth | 745,670 | 2,662 | 1,741 | 0.23 \% | 65.40 \% |
|  | West Jefferson | 745,670 | 1,279 | 1,279 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilkesboro | 745,670 | 3,687 | 3,687 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winston-Salem | 745,670 | 249,545 | 111,539 | 14.96 \% | 44.70 \% |
|  | Yadkinville | 745,670 | 2,995 | 2,995 | 0.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 6 | Archdale (Guilford) | 745,670 | 380 | 380 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burlington (Guilford) | 745,670 | 1,822 | 1,822 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gibsonville (Guilford) | 745,670 | 4,642 | 4,642 | 0.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greensboro | 745,670 | 299,035 | 299,035 | 40.10 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6 | High Point (Forsyth) | 745,670 | 84 | 84 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Point (Guilford) | 745,670 | 107,321 | 107,321 | 14.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jamestown | 745,670 | 3,668 | 3,668 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kernersville (Forsyth) | 745,670 | 25,947 | 25,947 | 3.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kernersville (Guilford) | 745,670 | 502 | 502 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oak Ridge | 745,670 | 7,474 | 7,474 | $1.00 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pleasant Garden | 745,670 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 0.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sedalia | 745,670 | 676 | 676 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stokesdale | 745,670 | 5,924 | 5,924 | 0.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Summerfield | 745,670 | 10,951 | 10,951 | 1.47 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Walkertown | 745,670 | 5,692 | 5,692 | 0.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whitsett | 745,670 | 584 | 584 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winston-Salem | 745,670 | 249,545 | 138,006 | 18.51 \% | 55.30 \% |
| 7 | Archer Lodge | 745,671 | 4,797 | 4,797 | 0.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Atkinson | 745,671 | 296 | 296 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Autryville | 745,671 | 167 | 167 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bald Head Island | 745,671 | 268 | 268 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Belville | 745,671 | 2,406 | 2,406 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Benson (Johnston) | 745,671 | 3,967 | 3,967 | 0.53 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boardman | 745,671 | 166 | 166 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boiling Spring Lakes | 745,671 | 5,943 | 5,943 | 0.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bolivia | 745,671 | 149 | 149 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bolton | 745,671 | 519 | 519 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Brunswick | 745,671 | 973 | 973 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burgaw | 745,671 | 3,088 | 3,088 | 0.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Calabash | 745,671 | 2,011 | 2,011 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Carolina Beach | 745,671 | 6,564 | 6,564 | 0.88 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Carolina Shores | 745,671 | 4,588 | 4,588 | 0.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Caswell Beach | 745,671 | 395 | 395 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cerro Gordo | 745,671 | 131 | 131 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chadbourn | 745,671 | 1,574 | 1,574 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clarkton | 745,671 | 614 | 614 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clayton (Johnston) | 745,671 | 26,307 | 4,268 | 0.57 \% | 16.22 \% |
|  | Clinton | 745,671 | 8,383 | 8,383 | 1.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Arcadia | 745,671 | 418 | 418 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabethtown | 745,671 | 3,296 | 1,481 | 0.20 \% | 44.93 \% |
|  | Eureka | 745,671 | 214 | 39 | 0.01 \% | 18.22 \% |
|  | Fair Bluff | 745,671 | 709 | 709 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Faison (Sampson) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Falcon (Sampson) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Four Oaks | 745,671 | 2,158 | 2,158 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/25/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

$$
\text { - Ex. } 6040 \text { - }
$$

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7 | Fremont | 745,671 | 1,196 | 1,196 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Garland | 745,671 | 595 | 595 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Goldsboro | 745,671 | 33,657 | 27,375 | 3.67 \% | 81.34 \% |
|  | Harrells (Sampson) | 745,671 | 160 | 160 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Holden Beach | 745,671 | 921 | 921 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kenly (Johnston) | 745,671 | 1,293 | 1,293 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kure Beach | 745,671 | 2,191 | 2,191 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Waccamaw | 745,671 | 1,296 | 1,296 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Leland | 745,671 | 22,908 | 22,908 | 3.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Micro | 745,671 | 458 | 458 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Olive (Wayne) | 745,671 | 4,193 | 4,193 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Navassa | 745,671 | 1,367 | 1,367 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newton Grove | 745,671 | 585 | 585 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Northwest | 745,671 | 703 | 703 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oak Island | 745,671 | 8,396 | 8,396 | 1.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ocean Isle Beach | 745,671 | 867 | 867 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pikeville | 745,671 | 712 | 712 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pine Level | 745,671 | 2,046 | 2,046 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Princeton | 745,671 | 1,315 | 1,315 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roseboro | 745,671 | 1,163 | 1,163 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Salemburg | 745,671 | 457 | 457 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sandy Creek | 745,671 | 248 | 248 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sandyfield | 745,671 | 430 | 430 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Selma | 745,671 | 6,317 | 6,317 | 0.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seven Springs | 745,671 | 55 | 55 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Shallotte | 745,671 | 4,185 | 4,185 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Smithfield | 745,671 | 11,292 | 11,292 | 1.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Southport | 745,671 | 3,971 | 3,971 | 0.53 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | St. Helena | 745,671 | 417 | 417 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | St. James | 745,671 | 6,529 | 6,529 | 0.88 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sunset Beach | 745,671 | 4,175 | 4,175 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tabor City | 745,671 | 3,781 | 3,781 | 0.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Turkey | 745,671 | 213 | 213 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Varnamtown | 745,671 | 525 | 525 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wallace (Pender) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Walnut Creek | 745,671 | 1,084 | 1,084 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Watha | 745,671 | 181 | 181 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | White Lake | 745,671 | 843 | 843 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whiteville | 745,671 | 4,766 | 4,766 | 0.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilmington | 745,671 | 115,451 | 115,451 | 15.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilson's Mills | 745,671 | 2,534 | 2,534 | 0.34 \% | 100.00 \% |

$$
\text { - Ex. } 6041 \text { - }
$$

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7 | Wrightsville Beach | 745,671 | 2,473 | 2,473 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Zebulon (Johnston) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| 8 | Archdale (Randolph) | 745,671 | 11,527 | 11,527 | $1.55 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Asheboro | 745,671 | 27,156 | 27,156 | 3.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bermuda Run | 745,671 | 3,120 | 3,120 | 0.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | China Grove | 745,671 | 4,434 | 4,434 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cleveland | 745,671 | 846 | 846 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Concord | 745,671 | 105,240 | 80,520 | 10.80 \% | 76.51 \% |
|  | Cooleemee | 745,671 | 940 | 940 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Davidson (Iredell) | 745,671 | 378 | 378 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Denton | 745,671 | 1,494 | 1,494 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Spencer | 745,671 | 1,567 | 1,567 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Faith | 745,671 | 819 | 819 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Franklinville | 745,671 | 1,197 | 1,197 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Granite Quarry | 745,671 | 2,984 | 2,984 | 0.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Point (Davidson) | 745,671 | 6,646 | 6,646 | 0.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Point (Randolph) | 745,671 | 8 | 8 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kannapolis (Cabarrus) | 745,671 | 42,846 | 42,846 | 5.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kannapolis (Rowan) | 745,671 | 10,268 | 10,268 | 1.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Landis | 745,671 | 3,690 | 3,690 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lexington | 745,671 | 19,632 | 19,632 | 2.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Liberty | 745,671 | 2,655 | 2,655 | 0.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Midway | 745,671 | 4,742 | 4,742 | 0.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mocksville | 745,671 | 5,900 | 5,900 | 0.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mooresville | 745,671 | 50,193 | 50,193 | 6.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Pleasant | 745,671 | 1,671 | 1,666 | 0.22 \% | 99.70 \% |
|  | Ramseur | 745,671 | 1,774 | 1,774 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Randleman | 745,671 | 4,595 | 4,595 | 0.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rockwell | 745,671 | 2,302 | 2,302 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Salisbury | 745,671 | 35,540 | 35,540 | 4.77 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seagrove | 745,671 | 235 | 235 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spencer | 745,671 | 3,308 | 3,308 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Staley | 745,671 | 397 | 397 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Thomasville (Davidson) | 745,671 | 26,662 | 26,662 | 3.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Thomasville (Randolph) | 745,671 | 521 | 521 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Trinity | 745,671 | 7,006 | 7,006 | 0.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Troutman | 745,671 | 3,698 | 807 | 0.11 \% | 21.82 \% |
|  | Wallburg | 745,671 | 3,051 | 3,051 | 0.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 9 | Albemarle | 745,670 | 16,432 | 16,432 | 2.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Badin | 745,670 | 2,024 | 2,024 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Charlotte | 745,670 | 874,579 | 297,095 | 39.84 \% | 33.97 \% |

- Ex. 6042 -


## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 9 | Concord | 745,670 | 105,240 | 24,720 | 3.32 \% | 23.49 \% |
|  | Fairview | 745,670 | 3,456 | 3,456 | 0.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harrisburg | 745,670 | 18,967 | 18,967 | 2.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hemby Bridge | 745,670 | 1,614 | 1,614 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Indian Trail | 745,670 | 39,997 | 39,997 | 5.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Park | 745,670 | 3,269 | 3,269 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Locust (Cabarrus) | 745,670 | 541 | 541 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Locust (Stanly) | 745,670 | 3,996 | 3,996 | 0.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marshville | 745,670 | 2,522 | 2,522 | 0.34 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marvin | 745,670 | 6,358 | 6,358 | 0.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Matthews | 745,670 | 29,435 | 29,435 | 3.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Midland (Cabarrus) | 745,670 | 4,684 | 4,684 | 0.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Midland (Mecklenburg) | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Mineral Springs | 745,670 | 3,159 | 3,159 | 0.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mint Hill (Mecklenburg) | 745,670 | 26,444 | 26,444 | 3.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mint Hill (Union) | 745,670 | 6 | 6 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Misenheimer | 745,670 | 650 | 650 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Monroe | 745,670 | 34,562 | 34,562 | 4.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Pleasant | 745,670 | 1,671 | 5 | 0.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
|  | New London | 745,670 | 607 | 607 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Norwood | 745,670 | 2,367 | 2,367 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oakboro | 745,670 | 2,128 | 2,128 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Red Cross | 745,670 | 762 | 762 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Richfield | 745,670 | 582 | 582 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stallings (Mecklenburg) | 745,670 | 384 | 384 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stallings (Union) | 745,670 | 15,728 | 15,728 | 2.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stanfield | 745,670 | 1,585 | 1,585 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Unionville | 745,670 | 6,643 | 6,643 | 0.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Waxhaw | 745,670 | 20,534 | 20,534 | 2.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weddington (Mecklenburg) | 745,670 | 5 | 5 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weddington (Union) | 745,670 | 13,176 | 13,176 | 1.77 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wesley Chapel | 745,670 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 1.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wingate | 745,670 | 4,055 | 4,055 | 0.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 10 | Belmont | 745,670 | 15,010 | 15,010 | 2.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Belwood | 745,670 | 857 | 857 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bessemer City | 745,670 | 5,428 | 5,428 | 0.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boiling Springs | 745,670 | 4,615 | 4,615 | 0.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bostic | 745,670 | 355 | 355 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Brookford | 745,670 | 442 | 442 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Casar | 745,670 | 305 | 305 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Catawba | 745,670 | 702 | 702 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

$$
\text { - Ex. } 6043 \text { - }
$$

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 | Cherryville | 745,670 | 6,078 | 6,078 | 0.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Claremont | 745,670 | 1,692 | 1,692 | 0.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Conover | 745,670 | 8,421 | 8,421 | 1.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cramerton | 745,670 | 5,296 | 5,296 | 0.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dallas | 745,670 | 5,927 | 5,927 | 0.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dellview | 745,670 | 6 | 6 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Earl | 745,670 | 198 | 198 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ellenboro | 745,670 | 723 | 723 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fallston | 745,670 | 627 | 627 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Forest City | 745,670 | 7,377 | 7,377 | 0.99 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gastonia | 745,670 | 80,411 | 80,411 | 10.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Glen Alpine | 745,670 | 1,529 | 377 | 0.05 \% | 24.66 \% |
|  | Grover | 745,670 | 802 | 802 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harmony | 745,670 | 543 | 543 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hickory (Catawba) | 745,670 | 43,379 | 43,379 | 5.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Shoals | 745,670 | 595 | 595 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kings Mountain (Cleveland) | 745,670 | 10,032 | 10,032 | 1.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kings Mountain (Gaston) | 745,670 | 1,110 | 1,110 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kingstown | 745,670 | 656 | 656 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lattimore | 745,670 | 406 | 406 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lawndale | 745,670 | 570 | 570 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lincolnton | 745,670 | 11,091 | 11,091 | 1.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Long View (Catawba) | 745,670 | 4,353 | 4,353 | 0.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Love Valley | 745,670 | 154 | 154 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lowell | 745,670 | 3,654 | 3,654 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maiden (Catawba) | 745,670 | 3,736 | 3,736 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maiden (Lincoln) | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | McAdenville | 745,670 | 890 | 890 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mooresboro | 745,670 | 293 | 293 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morganton | 745,670 | 17,474 | 511 | 0.07 \% | 2.92 \% |
|  | Mount Holly | 745,670 | 17,703 | 17,703 | 2.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newton | 745,670 | 13,148 | 13,148 | 1.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Patterson Springs | 745,670 | 571 | 571 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Polkville | 745,670 | 516 | 516 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ranlo | 745,670 | 4,511 | 4,511 | 0.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ruth | 745,670 | 347 | 347 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherfordton | 745,670 | 3,640 | 3,640 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Shelby | 745,670 | 21,918 | 21,918 | 2.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spencer Mountain | 745,670 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Spindale | 745,670 | 4,225 | 4,225 | 0.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stanley | 745,670 | 3,963 | 3,963 | 0.53 \% | 100.00 \% |

$$
\text { - Ex. } 6044 \text { - }
$$

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 | Statesville | 745,670 | 28,419 | 28,419 | 3.81 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Troutman | 745,670 | 3,698 | 2,891 | 0.39 \% | 78.18 \% |
|  | Waco | 745,670 | 310 | 310 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 11 | Andrews | 745,671 | 1,667 | 1,667 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Asheville | 745,671 | 94,589 | 94,589 | 12.69 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bakersville | 745,671 | 450 | 450 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Biltmore Forest | 745,671 | 1,409 | 1,409 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Black Mountain | 745,671 | 8,426 | 8,426 | 1.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Brevard | 745,671 | 7,744 | 7,744 | 1.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bryson City | 745,671 | 1,558 | 1,558 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burnsville | 745,671 | 1,614 | 1,614 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Canton | 745,671 | 4,422 | 4,422 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chimney Rock Village | 745,671 | 140 | 140 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clyde | 745,671 | 1,368 | 1,368 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Columbus | 745,671 | 1,060 | 1,060 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dillsboro | 745,671 | 213 | 213 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Flat Rock | 745,671 | 3,486 | 3,486 | 0.47 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fletcher | 745,671 | 7,987 | 7,987 | 1.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fontana Dam | 745,671 | 13 | 13 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Forest Hills | 745,671 | 303 | 303 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Franklin | 745,671 | 4,175 | 4,175 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hayesville | 745,671 | 461 | 461 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hendersonville | 745,671 | 15,137 | 15,137 | 2.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Highlands (Jackson) | 745,671 | 12 | 12 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Highlands (Macon) | 745,671 | 1,060 | 1,060 | $0.14 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hot Springs | 745,671 | 520 | 520 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Lure | 745,671 | 1,365 | 1,365 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Santeetlah | 745,671 | 38 | 38 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Laurel Park | 745,671 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 0.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maggie Valley | 745,671 | 1,687 | 1,687 | 0.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marion | 745,671 | 7,717 | 7,717 | 1.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mars Hill | 745,671 | 2,007 | 2,007 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marshall | 745,671 | 777 | 777 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mills River | 745,671 | 7,078 | 7,078 | 0.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Montreat | 745,671 | 901 | 901 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Murphy | 745,671 | 1,608 | 1,608 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Old Fort | 745,671 | 811 | 811 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Robbinsville | 745,671 | 597 | 597 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rosman | 745,671 | 701 | 701 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Saluda (Henderson) | 745,671 | 11 | 11 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Saluda (Polk) | 745,671 | 620 | 620 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | Spruce Pine | 745,671 | 2,194 | 2,194 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sylva | 745,671 | 2,578 | 2,578 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tryon | 745,671 | 1,562 | 1,562 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Waynesville | 745,671 | 10,140 | 10,140 | $1.36 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weaverville | 745,671 | 4,567 | 4,567 | 0.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Webster | 745,671 | 372 | 372 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Woodfin | 745,671 | 7,936 | 7,936 | 1.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 12 | Charlotte | 745,671 | 874,579 | 577,484 | 77.44 \% | 66.03 \% |
|  | Cornelius | 745,671 | 31,412 | 31,412 | 4.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Davidson (Mecklenburg) | 745,671 | 14,728 | 14,728 | 1.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Huntersville | 745,671 | 61,376 | 61,376 | 8.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pineville | 745,671 | 10,602 | 10,602 | 1.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 13 | Angier (Harnett) | 745,671 | 4,709 | 4,709 | 0.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Angier (Wake) | 745,671 | 556 | 556 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Apex | 745,671 | 58,780 | 58,780 | 7.88 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Benson (Harnett) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Broadway (Harnett) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Broadway (Lee) | 745,671 | 1,267 | 1,267 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cary (Chatham) | 745,671 | 3,709 | 3,709 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cary (Wake) | 745,671 | 171,012 | 164,323 | 22.04 \% | 96.09 \% |
|  | Clayton (Johnston) | 745,671 | 26,307 | 22,039 | 2.96 \% | 83.78 \% |
|  | Coats | 745,671 | 2,155 | 2,155 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dunn | 745,671 | 8,446 | 8,446 | 1.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Durham (Durham) | 745,671 | 283,093 | 1,554 | 0.21 \% | 0.55 \% |
|  | Durham (Wake) | 745,671 | 269 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Erwin | 745,671 | 4,542 | 4,542 | 0.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fuquay-Varina (Harnett) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Fuquay-Varina (Wake) | 745,671 | 34,152 | 32,779 | 4.40 \% | 95.98 \% |
|  | Goldston | 745,671 | 234 | 234 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Holly Springs | 745,671 | 41,239 | 39,564 | 5.31 \% | 95.94 \% |
|  | Lillington | 745,671 | 4,735 | 4,735 | 0.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morrisville (Wake) | 745,671 | 29,423 | 29,423 | 3.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pittsboro | 745,671 | 4,537 | 4,537 | 0.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 745,671 | 466,106 | 6,040 | 0.81 \% | 1.30 \% |
|  | Sanford | 745,671 | 30,261 | 30,261 | 4.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Siler City | 745,671 | 7,702 | 7,702 | $1.03 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
| 14 | Aberdeen | 745,671 | 8,516 | 8,516 | 1.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ansonville | 745,671 | 440 | 440 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Biscoe | 745,671 | 1,848 | 1,848 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bladenboro | 745,671 | 1,648 | 1,648 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cameron | 745,671 | 244 | 244 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/25/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 14 of 16
Districts included: All

$$
\text { - Ex. } 6046 \text { - }
$$

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14 | Candor (Montgomery) | 745,671 | 813 | 813 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Candor (Moore) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Carthage | 745,671 | 2,775 | 2,775 | 0.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dobbins Heights | 745,671 | 687 | 687 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dublin | 745,671 | 267 | 267 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Laurinburg | 745,671 | 234 | 234 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eastover | 745,671 | 3,656 | 3,656 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabethtown | 745,671 | 3,296 | 1,815 | 0.24 \% | 55.07 \% |
|  | Ellerbe | 745,671 | 864 | 864 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fairmont | 745,671 | 2,191 | 2,191 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Falcon (Cumberland) | 745,671 | 324 | 324 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fayetteville | 745,671 | 208,501 | 208,501 | 27.96 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Foxfire | 745,671 | 1,288 | 1,288 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gibson | 745,671 | 449 | 449 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Godwin | 745,671 | 128 | 128 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hamlet | 745,671 | 6,025 | 6,025 | 0.81 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hoffman | 745,671 | 418 | 418 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hope Mills | 745,671 | 17,808 | 17,808 | 2.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Laurinburg | 745,671 | 14,978 | 14,978 | 2.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lilesville | 745,671 | 395 | 395 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Linden | 745,671 | 136 | 136 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lumber Bridge | 745,671 | 82 | 82 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lumberton | 745,671 | 19,025 | 19,025 | 2.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marietta | 745,671 | 111 | 111 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maxton (Robeson) | 745,671 | 1,902 | 1,902 | 0.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maxton (Scotland) | 745,671 | 208 | 208 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McDonald | 745,671 | 94 | 94 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McFarlan | 745,671 | 94 | 94 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morven | 745,671 | 329 | 329 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Gilead | 745,671 | 1,171 | 1,171 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Norman | 745,671 | 100 | 100 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Orrum | 745,671 | 59 | 59 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Parkton | 745,671 | 504 | 504 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Peachland | 745,671 | 390 | 390 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pembroke | 745,671 | 2,823 | 2,823 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pinebluff | 745,671 | 1,473 | 1,473 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pinehurst | 745,671 | 17,581 | 17,581 | 2.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Polkton | 745,671 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 0.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Proctorville | 745,671 | 121 | 121 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raeford | 745,671 | 4,559 | 4,559 | 0.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raynham | 745,671 | 60 | 60 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/25/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District - Municipality by County Report

District Plan: CST-8

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14 | Red Springs (Hoke) | 745,671 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00\% |
|  | Red Springs (Robeson) | 745,671 | 3,087 | 3,087 | 0.41 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Rennert | 745,671 | 275 | 275 | 0.04 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Robbins | 745,671 | 1,168 | 1,168 | $0.16 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Rockingham | 745,671 | 9,243 | 9,243 | 1.24 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Rowland | 745,671 | 885 | 885 | 0.12 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Southern Pines | 745,671 | 15,545 | 15,545 | 2.08 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Spring Lake | 745,671 | 11,660 | 11,660 | 1.56\% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | St. Pauls | 745,671 | 2,045 | 2,045 | 0.27 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Star | 745,671 | 806 | 806 | $0.11 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Stedman | 745,671 | 1,277 | 1,277 | 0.17 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Tar Heel | 745,671 | 90 | 90 | 0.01 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Taylortown | 745,671 | 634 | 634 | 0.09 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Troy | 745,671 | 2,850 | 2,850 | 0.38 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Vass | 745,671 | 952 | 952 | $0.13 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Wade | 745,671 | 638 | 638 | 0.09 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Wadesboro | 745,671 | 5,008 | 5,008 | 0.67 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Wagram | 745,671 | 615 | 615 | $0.08 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Whispering Pines | 745,671 | 4,987 | 4,987 | 0.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  |  |  | Total: | 6,017,605 |  |  |

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bertie | 12 | 0 |
|  | Chowan | 6 | 0 |
|  | Edgecombe | 21 | 0 |
|  | Franklin | 18 | 0 |
|  | Gates | 6 | 0 |
|  | Granville | 15 | 0 |
|  | Greene | 10 | 0 |
|  | Halifax | 23 | 0 |
|  | Hertford | 13 | 0 |
|  | Martin | 13 | 0 |
|  | Nash | 24 | 0 |
|  | Northampton | 13 | 0 |
|  | Pasquotank | 9 | 0 |
|  | Perquimans | 7 | 0 |
|  | Pitt | 20 | 1 |
|  | Vance | 12 | 0 |
|  | Warren | 14 | 0 |
|  | Washington | 6 | 0 |
|  | Wayne | 3 | 1 |
|  | Wilson | 24 | 0 |
| 2 | Wake | 143 | 1 |
| 3 | Beaufort | 21 | 0 |
|  | Camden | 3 | 0 |
|  | Carteret | 28 | 0 |
|  | Craven | 21 | 0 |
|  | Currituck | 11 | 0 |
|  | Dare | 16 | 0 |
|  | Duplin | 19 | 0 |
|  | Hyde | 7 | 0 |
|  | Jones | 7 | 0 |
|  | Lenoir | 22 | 0 |
|  | Onslow | 24 | 0 |
|  | Pamlico | 10 | 0 |
|  | Pender | 6 | 1 |
|  | Pitt | 19 | 1 |
|  | Tyrrell | 6 | 0 |
| 4 | Alamance | 37 | 0 |
|  | Caswell | 9 | 0 |
|  | Durham | 56 | 1 |
|  | Orange | 41 | 0 |
|  | Person | 11 | 0 |
|  | Rockingham | 6 | 1 |

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5 | Alexander | 10 | 0 |
|  | Alleghany | 4 | 0 |
|  | Ashe | 17 | 0 |
|  | Avery | 19 | 0 |
|  | Burke | 26 | 1 |
|  | Caldwell | 20 | 0 |
|  | Forsyth | 42 | 1 |
|  | Rockingham | 8 | 1 |
|  | Stokes | 18 | 0 |
|  | Surry | 24 | 0 |
|  | Watauga | 20 | 0 |
|  | Wilkes | 27 | 0 |
|  | Yadkin | 12 | 0 |
| 6 | Forsyth | 58 | 1 |
|  | Guilford | 165 | 0 |
| 7 | Bladen | 8 | 1 |
|  | Brunswick | 25 | 0 |
|  | Columbus | 26 | 0 |
|  | Johnston | 23 | 1 |
|  | New Hanover | 43 | 0 |
|  | Pender | 13 | 1 |
|  | Sampson | 23 | 0 |
|  | Wayne | 24 | 1 |
| 8 | Cabarrus | 28 | 1 |
|  | Davidson | 43 | 0 |
|  | Davie | 14 | 0 |
|  | Iredell | 8 | 1 |
|  | Randolph | 22 | 0 |
|  | Rowan | 41 | 0 |
| 9 | Cabarrus | 11 | 1 |
|  | Mecklenburg | 80 | 1 |
|  | Stanly | 22 | 0 |
|  | Union | 52 | 0 |
| 10 | Burke | 6 | 1 |
|  | Catawba | 40 | 0 |
|  | Cleveland | 21 | 0 |
|  | Gaston | 46 | 0 |
|  | Iredell | 20 | 1 |
|  | Lincoln | 23 | 0 |
|  | Rutherford | 15 | 1 |

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| District | County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | Buncombe | 79 | 0 |
|  | Cherokee | 16 | 0 |
|  | Clay | 9 | 0 |
|  | Graham | 4 | 0 |
|  | Haywood | 29 | 0 |
|  | Henderson | 34 | 0 |
|  | Jackson | 13 | 0 |
|  | Macon | 15 | 0 |
|  | Madison | 12 | 0 |
|  | McDowell | 17 | 0 |
|  | Mitchell | 9 | 0 |
|  | Polk | 7 | 0 |
|  | Rutherford | 1 | 1 |
|  | Swain | 5 | 0 |
|  | Transylvania | 15 | 0 |
|  | Yancey | 11 | 0 |
| 12 | Mecklenburg | 114 | 1 |
| 13 | Chatham | 18 | 0 |
|  | Durham | 0 | 1 |
|  | Harnett | 13 | 0 |
|  | Johnston | 12 | 1 |
|  | Lee | 10 | 0 |
|  | Wake | 60 | 1 |
| 14 | Anson | 9 | 0 |
|  | Bladen | 8 | 1 |
|  | Cumberland | 76 | 0 |
|  | Hoke | 15 | 0 |
|  | Montgomery | 14 | 0 |
|  | Moore | 26 | 0 |
|  | Richmond | 16 | 0 |
|  | Robeson | 39 | 0 |
|  | Scotland | 7 | 0 |
| Total |  | 2,652 | 14 |

## Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alamance | 37 | 0 |
| Alexander | 10 | 0 |
| Alleghany | 4 | 0 |
| Anson | 9 | 0 |
| Ashe | 17 | 0 |
| Avery | 19 | 0 |
| Beaufort | 21 | 0 |
| Bertie | 12 | 0 |
| Bladen | 16 | 1 |
| Brunswick | 25 | 0 |
| Buncombe | 79 | 0 |
| Burke | 32 | 1 |
| Cabarrus | 39 | 1 |
| Caldwell | 20 | 0 |
| Camden | 3 | 0 |
| Carteret | 28 | 0 |
| Caswell | 9 | 0 |
| Catawba | 40 | 0 |
| Chatham | 18 | 0 |
| Cherokee | 16 | 0 |
| Chowan | 6 | 0 |
| Clay | 9 | 0 |
| Cleveland | 21 | 0 |
| Columbus | 26 | 0 |
| Craven | 21 | 0 |
| Cumberland | 76 | 0 |
| Currituck | 11 | 0 |
| Dare | 16 | 0 |
| Davidson | 43 | 0 |
| Davie | 14 | 0 |
| Duplin | 19 | 0 |
| Durham | 56 | 1 |
| Edgecombe | 21 | 0 |
| Forsyth | 100 | 1 |
| Franklin | 18 | 0 |
| Gaston | 46 | 0 |
| Gates | 6 | 0 |
| Graham | 4 | 0 |
| Granville | 15 | 0 |
| Greene | 10 | 0 |
| Guilford | 165 | 0 |
| Halifax | 23 | 0 |
| Harnett | 13 | 0 |

## Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Haywood | 29 | 0 |
| Henderson | 34 | 0 |
| Hertford | 13 | 0 |
| Hoke | 15 | 0 |
| Hyde | 7 | 0 |
| Iredell | 28 | 1 |
| Jackson | 13 | 0 |
| Johnston | 35 | 1 |
| Jones | 7 | 0 |
| Lee | 10 | 0 |
| Lenoir | 22 | 0 |
| Lincoln | 23 | 0 |
| Macon | 15 | 0 |
| Madison | 12 | 0 |
| Martin | 13 | 0 |
| McDowell | 17 | 0 |
| Mecklenburg | 194 | 1 |
| Mitchell | 9 | 0 |
| Montgomery | 14 | 0 |
| Moore | 26 | 0 |
| Nash | 24 | 0 |
| New Hanover | 43 | 0 |
| Northampton | 13 | 0 |
| Onslow | 24 | 0 |
| Orange | 41 | 0 |
| Pamlico | 10 | 0 |
| Pasquotank | 9 | 0 |
| Pender | 19 | 1 |
| Perquimans | 7 | 0 |
| Person | 11 | 0 |
| Pitt | 39 | 1 |
| Polk | 7 | 0 |
| Randolph | 22 | 0 |
| Richmond | 16 | 0 |
| Robeson | 39 | 0 |
| Rockingham | 14 | 1 |
| Rowan | 41 | 0 |
| Rutherford | 16 | 1 |
| Sampson | 23 | 0 |
| Scotland | 7 | 0 |
| Stanly | 22 | 0 |
| Stokes | 18 | 0 |
| Surry | 24 | 0 |

Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Swain | 5 | 0 |
| Transylvania | 15 | 0 |
| Tyrrell | 6 | 0 |
| Union | 52 | 0 |
| Vance | 12 | 0 |
| Wake | 203 | 1 |
| Warren | 14 | 0 |
| Washington | 6 | 0 |
| Watauga | 20 | 0 |
| Wayne | 27 | 1 |
| Wilkes | 27 | 0 |
| Wilson | 24 | 0 |
| Yadkin | 12 | 0 |
| Yancey | 11 | 0 |
|  | $\mathbf{2 , 6 5 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 4}$ |

## District Plan: CST-8

| County | VTD | District | Total VTD <br> Population | VTD Pop in District | Percent of VTD <br> Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bladen | P10 | 7 | 939 | 805 | 85.73 \% |
|  |  | 14 | 939 | 134 | 14.27 \% |
| Burke | 051 | 5 | 4,802 | 1,404 | 29.24 \% |
|  |  | 10 | 4,802 | 3,398 | 70.76 \% |
| Cabarrus | 09-00 | 8 | 3,896 | 156 | 4.00 \% |
|  |  | 9 | 3,896 | 3,740 | 96.00 \% |
| Durham | 35.3 | 4 | 12,272 | 10,612 | 86.47 \% |
|  |  | 13 | 12,272 | 1,660 | 13.53 \% |
| Forsyth | 206 | 5 | 2,823 | 619 | 21.93 \% |
|  |  | 6 | 2,823 | 2,204 | 78.07 \% |
| Iredell | BA | 8 | 7,790 | 6,901 | 88.59 \% |
|  |  | 10 | 7,790 | 889 | 11.41 \% |
| Johnston | PR09 | 7 | 8,227 | 1,638 | 19.91 \% |
|  |  | 13 | 8,227 | 6,589 | 80.09 \% |
| Mecklenburg | 060 | 9 | 2,998 | 760 | $25.35 \%$ |
|  |  | 12 | 2,998 | 2,238 | 74.65 \% |
| Pender | LT18 | 3 | 6,377 | 4,184 | 65.61 \% |
|  |  | 7 | 6,377 | 2,193 | 34.39 \% |
| Pitt | 1512A | 1 | 9,256 | 86 | 0.93 \% |
|  |  | 3 | 9,256 | 9,170 | 99.07 \% |
| Rockingham | RC | 4 | 6,600 | 3,068 | 46.48 \% |
|  |  | 5 | 6,600 | 3,532 | 53.52 \% |
| Rutherford | 16A | 10 | 3,603 | 2,412 | 66.94 \% |
|  |  | 11 | 3,603 | 1,191 | 33.06 \% |
| Wake | 12-05 | 2 | 12,886 | 9,160 | $71.08 \%$ |
|  |  | 13 | 12,886 | 3,726 | 28.92 \% |
| Wayne | 002 | 1 | 5,146 | 2,588 | 50.29 \% |
|  |  | 7 | 5,146 | 2,558 | 49.71 \% |
|  |  |  | Total: | 87,615 |  |

[^8]District Plan: CST-8
Residence Set: Congress -9/22/2021

| Last Name | First Name | Party | Current District | District in this Plan |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Adams | Alma | Democratic | 12 | 12 |
| Bishop | Dan | Republican | 9 | 9 |
| Budd | Ted | Republican | 13 | 8 |
| Butterfield | GK | Democratic | 1 | 1 |
| Cawthorn | Madison | Republican | 11 | 11 |
| Foxx | Virginia | Republican | 5 | 5 |
| Hudson | Richard | Republican | 8 | 8 |
| Manning | Kathy | Democratic | 6 | 6 |
| McHenry | Patrick | Republican | 10 | 10 |
| Murphy | Greg | Republican | 3 | 3 |
| Price | David | Democratic | 4 | 4 |
| Ross | Deborah | Democratic | 2 | 2 |
| Rouzer | David | Republican | 7 | 7 |

District-Incumbent Report
District Plan: CST-8
Residence Set: Congress - 9/22/2021

| District in this Plan | Last Name | First Name | Party | Current District |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| 1 | Butterfield | GK | Democratic | 1 |
| 2 | Ross | Deborah | Democratic | 2 |
| 3 | Murphy | Greg | Republican | 3 |
| 4 | Price | David | Democratic | 4 |
| 5 | Foxx | Virginia | Republican | 5 |
| 6 | Manning | Kathy | Democratic | 6 |
| 7 | Rouzer | David | Republican | 7 |
| 8 | Budd | Ted | Republican | 13 |
|  | Hudson | Richard | Republican | 8 |
| 9 | Bishop | Dan | Republican | 9 |
| 10 | McHenry | Patrick | Republican | 10 |
| 11 | Cawthorn | Madison | Republican | 11 |
| 12 | Adams | Alma | Democratic | 12 |
| 13 |  |  |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

S.L. 2021-174 Congress


From:
Sent:
Subject:

## Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Wednesday, October 20, 2021 7:10 PM
[External]<NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at 5:30 PM (Joint)
Add meeting to calendar.ics

Principal Clerk $\qquad$ Reading Clerk $\qquad$
SENATE
NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING AND
BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:

DAY
DATE
October 26, 2021
Tuesday
TIME
5:30 PM
Virtual Public Hearing

Representative Destin Hall will be presiding.
Sign-up link will be available on ncleg.gov

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair
Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair
Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid$ Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:
Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Wednesday, October 20, 2021 7:11 PM
[External] <NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at 3:00 PM (Joint)
Add meeting to calendar.ics

Principal Clerk
Reading Clerk
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

## SENATE

NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING
AND
BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:
DAY
DATE
TIME
ROOM

Tuesday
October 26, 2021
3:00 PM
NCGA
Representative Destin Hall will be presiding.
Public comment hearing on the Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair
Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair
Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:
Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Wednesday, October 20, 2021 7:11 PM
[External] <NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at 5:30 PM (Joint)
Add meeting to calendar.ics

Principal Clerk $\qquad$
Reading Clerk $\qquad$

## SENATE <br> NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:
DAY
DATE
TIME
ROOM
Monday
October 25, 2021
5:30 PM
Virtual Public Hearing

Senator Ralph Hise will be presiding.
Sign-up link will be available on ncleg.gov

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair
Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair
Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:
Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Wednesday, October 20, 2021 7:11 PM
[External]<NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at 3:00 PM (Joint)
Add meeting to calendar.ics
$\qquad$ Reading Clerk $\qquad$

## SENATE <br> NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:
DAY
DATE
TIME
ROOM
Monday
October 25, 2021
3:00 PM
NCGA

Senator Ralph Hise will be presiding.
Public comment hearing on Congressional Maps.
Remote sites at UNC Wilmington and at Caldwell Community College will be available.

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair
Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair
Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 10:50 AM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at |
|  | $3: 00$ PM (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Add meeting to calendar.ics |

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Monday, October 25, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: NCGA
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Congressional Maps.
Remote sites at UNC Wilmington and at Caldwell Community College will be available.

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 10:55 AM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | $3: 00$ PM (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Add meeting to calendar.ics |

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: $\quad$ Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: NCGA
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 10:56 AM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at |
|  | 5:30 PM (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Add meeting to calendar.ics |

# NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION 

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Monday, October 25, 2021
TIME: 5:30 PM
LOCATION: Virtual Public Hearing
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Sign-up link will be available on ncleg.gov

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 10:55 AM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | 3:00 PM (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Add meeting to calendar.ics |

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: $\quad$ Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: NCGA
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:

Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Thursday, October 21, 2021 3:55 PM
[External]<NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at 3:00 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint)
Update meeting on calendar.ics
$\qquad$ Reading Clerk $\qquad$

# Updated \#1: Addresses and Speaker Sign-up Link Added <br> SENATE <br> NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTICE 

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:

DAY
Monday
October 25, 2021

## DATE

TIME
3:00 PM

## ROOM

Auditorium LB

Senator Ralph Hise will be presiding.
Public comment hearing on Congressional Maps.
Remote sites at UNC Wilmington and at Caldwell Community College will be available.
UNC Wilmington Address:
Lumina Theater, 615 Hamilton Drive, Wilmington, NC 28403
Caldwell Community College Address:
Broyhill Center, 1913 Hickory Blvd, Lenoir, NC 28645
Link for speaker sign-up: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/59

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair
Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair
Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

- Ex. 6067 -
$\underline{\text { North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | } 16 \text { West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC } 27601}$ $\underline{\text { Unsubscribe }} \mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$


## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:

Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:00 PM
[External]<NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at 3:00 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint)
Update meeting on calendar.ics
$\qquad$ Reading Clerk $\qquad$

# Updated \#1: Addresses and Speaker Sign-up Link Added <br> SENATE <br> NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTICE 

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:

DAY
Tuesday
October 26, 2021
TIME
3:00 PM
Auditorium LB

Representative Destin Hall will be presiding.
Public comment hearing on the Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.
East Carolina University Address:
Auditorium, East Carolina Heart Institute, ECU Health Science Campus, 115 Heart Drive, Greenville, NC 27834

Central Piedmont Community College Address:
Harris Conference Center, 3216 CPCC Harris Campus Dr, Charlotte 28208
Speaker sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/60

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair<br>Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair<br>Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:
Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:01 PM
[External] <NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at 5:30 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint)
Update meeting on calendar.ics

Principal Clerk Reading Clerk
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
Updated \#1: Speaker Sign-up Link Added
SENATE
NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING
AND
BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:

DAY
Monday
October 25, 2021

## DATE

TIME
5:30 PM
Virtual Public Hearing

Senator Ralph Hise will be presiding.
Speaker sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/61

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair<br>Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair<br>Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:
Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:06 PM
[External] <NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at 5:30 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint) Update meeting on calendar.ics

Principal Clerk Reading Clerk
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
Updated \#1: Speaker Sign-up Link Added
SENATE
NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING
AND
BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:

## DAY

Tuesday
October 26, 2021
TIME
5:30 PM
Virtual Public Hearing

Representative Destin Hall will be presiding.
Speaker sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair<br>Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair<br>Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

From:
Sent:
Subject:
Attachments:

Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:06 PM
[External]<NCGA> Senate Redistricting and Elections Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at 5:30 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint)
Update meeting on calendar.ics

Principal Clerk Reading Clerk
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
Updated \#1: Speaker Sign-up Link Added
SENATE
NOTICE OF JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING
AND
BILL SPONSOR NOTICE

The Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections will meet at the following time:

DAY
Tuesday
October 26, 2021

## DATE

TIME
5:30 PM
Virtual Public Hearing

Representative Destin Hall will be presiding.
Speaker sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Senator Warren Daniel, Co-Chair<br>Senator Ralph Hise, Co-Chair<br>Senator Paul Newton, Co-Chair

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

From: Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov)
Sent: Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:10 PM
Subject:
[External] < NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at 5:30 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint)
Attachments: Update meeting on calendar.ics

## Updated \#1: Speaker Sign-up Link Added

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Monday, October 25, 2021
TIME: 5:30 PM
LOCATION: Virtual Public Hearing
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Speaker Sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/61

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601
Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:11 PM |
| Subject: | $[$ External < NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at |
|  | $3: 00$ PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

Attachments:

## Updated \#1: Addresses and Speaker Sign-up Link Added

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Monday, October 25, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: Auditorium LB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Congressional Maps.
Remote sites at UNC Wilmington and at Caldwell Community College will be available.

Each participant will be asked to select a location where they will be speaking. Raleigh: Auditorium, Legislative Building, 16 W Jones Street, Raleigh, NC 27601 https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/59

UNC-Wilmington: Lumina Theater, 615 Hamilton Drive, Wilmington, NC 28403 https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/61

Caldwell County: Broyhill Center, 1913 Hickory Blvd, Lenoir, NC 28645 https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/61

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

- Ex. 6075 -

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:15 PM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | 3:00 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

## Updated \#1: Addresses and Speaker Sign-up Link Added

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: Auditorium LB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.

Raleigh: Auditorium, Legislative Building, 16 W Jones Street, Raleigh, NC 27601 https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/60

Pitt County: Auditorium, East Carolina Heart Institute, ECU Health Science Campus, 115 Heart Drive, Greenville, NC 27834 https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Mecklenburg County: Harris Conference Center, 3216 CPCC Harris Campus Dr, Charlotte 28208
https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

- Ex. 6077 -

Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 4:20 PM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | 5:30 PM - UPDATED \#1 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

## Updated \#1

# NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE <br> AND <br> BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION 

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: $\quad$ Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 5:30 PM
LOCATION: Virtual Public Hearing
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Speaker Sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601
Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 5:10 PM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at |
|  | 3:00 PM - UPDATED \#2 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

## Updated \#2: CORRECTED LINK

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Monday, October 25, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: Auditorium LB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Congressional Maps.
Remote sites at UNC Wilmington and at Caldwell Community College will be available.

Each participant will be asked to select a location where they will be speaking. https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/59

Raleigh: Auditorium, Legislative Building, 16 W Jones Street, Raleigh, NC 27601
UNC-Wilmington: Lumina Theater, 615 Hamilton Drive, Wilmington, NC 28403
Caldwell County: Broyhill Center, 1913 Hickory Blvd, Lenoir, NC 28645

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

- Ex. 6080 -


## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 5:15 PM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | 5:30 PM - UPDATED \#2 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

Updated \#2: UPDATED ROOM

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 5:30 PM
LOCATION: 643 LOB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Speaker Sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601
Unsubscribe | Privacy

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 5:16 PM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | 3:00 PM - UPDATED \#2 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

## Updated \#2: CORRECTED LINK

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: Auditorium LB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.

Each participant will be asked to select a location where they will be speaking. https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/62

Raleigh: Auditorium, Legislative Building, 16 W Jones Street, Raleigh, NC 27601
Pitt County: Auditorium, East Carolina Heart Institute, ECU Health Science Campus, 115 Heart Drive, Greenville, NC 27834

Mecklenburg County: Harris Conference Center, 3216 CPCC Harris Campus Dr, Charlotte 28208

Respectfully, Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

- Ex. 6083 -

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Friday, October 22, 2021 11:30 AM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Tuesday, October 26, 2021 at |
|  | 3:00 PM - UPDATED \#3 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

Updated \#3

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Tuesday, October 26, 2021
TIME: 3:00 PM
LOCATION: Auditorium LB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Public comment hearing on Senate and House Legislative Maps.
Remote sites at East Carolina University and at Central Piedmont Community College will be available.

Each participant will be asked to select a location where they will be speaking. https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/60

Raleigh: Auditorium, Legislative Building, 16 W Jones Street, Raleigh, NC 27601
Pitt County: Auditorium, East Carolina Heart Institute, ECU Health Science Campus, 115 Heart Drive, Greenville, NC 27834

Mecklenburg County: Harris Conference Center, 3216 CPCC Harris Campus Dr, Charlotte 28208

Respectfully, Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

- Ex. 6085 -

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601 Unsubscribe $\mid \underline{\text { Privacy }}$

## Katelin Kaiser

| From: | Email Subscriptions [EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov](mailto:EmailSubscriptions@ncleg.gov) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sent: | Thursday, October 21, 2021 5:16 PM |
| Subject: | [External]<NCGA> House Redistricting Meeting Notice for Monday, October 25, 2021 at |
|  | $5: 30$ PM - UPDATED \#2 (Joint) |
| Attachments: | Update meeting on calendar.ics |

Updated \#2: UPDATED ROOM

## NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE AND BILL SPONSOR NOTIFICATION 2021-2022 SESSION

You are hereby notified that the House Committee on Redistricting will meet JOINTLY as follows:
DAY \& DATE: Monday, October 25, 2021
TIME: 5:30 PM
LOCATION: 643 LOB
PRESIDING: Representative Destin Hall, Chair
COMMENTS: Speaker Sign-up link: https://www.ncleg.gov/requesttospeak/61

Respectfully,
Representative Destin Hall, Chair

For questions, please contact Chandra C. Reed (Committee Assistant) at chandra.reed@ncleg.gov.

North Carolina General Assembly | Legislative Building | 16 West Jones Street | Raleigh, NC 27601
Unsubscribe | Privacy

## OPINION: DAILY JOURNAL

## Redistricting, gerrymandering, and legislating from the bench

Andy Taylor<br>in Daily Journal

October 17, 2019
1:00AM

I have written about gerrymandering in these pages before, but the recent Superior Court ruling that the state's legislative districts constitute an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander makes me want to do it again.

This is a prime example of judicial overreach and regrettable encroachment of quantitative social science into legal decision making. I don't think there's any doubt the state legislative map in question was a gerrymander in the technical sense of the word - that is, the maps were drawn by legislators intent on maximizing their party's representation in the General Assembly. But how on earth did the court see it as violation of the N.C. Constitution?

I'm not going to take on the arguments about whether the plaintiffs enjoyed legal standing or gerrymandering is justiciable. Let me focus on the court's proposition that the map in question violates three important elements of the state's constitution: Its "equal protection," "free elections," and "free speech" and related "free assembly" provisions.

First: How does a partisan gerrymandering treat voters unequally? Everyone gets one vote. All voters in the jurisdiction get the same ballot. Of course, outcomes are always unequal, some voters will select winners, others losers regardless of the district's composition.

In fact, if voting rights are so sacred and should be weighted equally, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to reverse its 2016 ruling in Evenwel v. Abbot. In this case it upheld legislative districts should be the same size by total population, not number of eligible voters. This is how you "dilute" votes.

Next, all the things that seem to impinge on "free elections" as generally understood have nothing to do with gerrymandering. These include registration and voter ID requirements, interminable lines at the polls, a limited choice of candidates, and little or distorted information about the contest.

Finally, the free speech and assembly arguments are just as contorted. Any restrictions on political speech and organization - such as campaign finance rules, municipal ordinances concerning protesting, etc. - are also unrelated to map-drawing. People are of course members of political minorities all the time, just ask the Libertarians. Don't like it? Make your party more appealing or switch allegiances.

To demonstrate how these are not free, fair, or equal elections, the court used a favorite phrase of the anti-gerrymander crowd; that politicians are choosing voters rather than the other way around. I hate to be snarky, but that is what districting is. Legislators don't choose the candidates, either. The state's filing rules are very relaxed, and we also have primary elections for party nominees. A "sweetheart" gerrymander, one in which all incumbents regardless of party are safe and happy, is a clearer sign legislators as a class are "selecting their own voters". As "double-bunking" - districts pitting incumbent against incumbent - and many preemptive retirements demonstrated, this was not the case with the map under consideration.

Predictably, the court fell back on a fictitious right to choose representatives in competitive elections to bring about proportional outcomes - or where the shares of a party's seats in a legislature and total vote are roughly the same. But it showed tremendous ignorance of how to produce such a system. The concepts of competition and proportionality are different and often inversely correlated.

Take for example a 100-seat legislature in a state evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. We could plausibly create 100 50-50 seats and all would be highly competitive. But a small swing toward one party might give us something close to a 100-o legislature, in which the governing party only got, say, $53 \%$ of the vote. We can ensure total proportionately with 50 100\% Democratic districts and 50 100\% Republican districts. Now that's a partisan gerrymander. By the way, does Massachusetts have free congressional elections in which Republicans regularly get about $35 \%$ of the statewide vote but no seats?

Why do the maps get blamed for the kinds of outcomes the court believes are harmful? Why don't parties just nominate candidates appealing to a district's voters? In the 1960s and 1970s, both Democrats and Republicans could win in just about any kind of place. The court's allies say partisan gerrymanders cause polarization. If so, why is the U.S. Senate so polarized? In fact, homogenous districts in heterogeneous states can force the parties to run a diverse slate of candidates and therefore reach out to many different political interests.

The legislature's motive, maligned by the court, is irrelevant as well. The district maps were legislation. Give me an example of a vote on important matters of public policy -including those affecting voting and other constitutional rights - where lawmakers aren't driven by partisan considerations.

I find partisan gerrymanders distasteful. But the court has taken a legitimate technical definition of the practice built on solid social science and forced it into law. That is legislating from the bench. There is now a similar case against North Carolina's congressional districts. Get ready for more.

Andy Taylor is a professor of political science at the School of International and Public Affairs at N.C. State University. He does not speak for the university.
categories: Civil Society, History, North Carolina, Opinion, Politics \& Elections tags: Evenwel v. Abbot, gerrymandering, n.c. constitution, N.C. General Assembly


## Joint Meeting of Committees

August 12, 2021

House Committee on Redistricting Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections

Offered by:
Representative Reives
Pass: $\qquad$
Fail: $\qquad$

## Amendment to Proposed Criteria

## Proposed Criteria \#10

Community Consideration. So long as a plan complies with the foregoing criteria, local knowledge of the character of communities and connections between communities may be considered in the formation of legislative and congressional districts.

## Amendment to Proposed Criteria \#10

Gommunity Gonsideration. So long as a plan complies with the foregoing criteria, local knowledge of the eharacter of communities and connections between communities may be considered in the formation of legislative and congressional districts. Community of Interest Consideration. The Committees shall make reasonable efforts to preserve communities of interest in the construction of Congressional, House and Senate districts. For purposes of this criteria, communities of interest are geographically contiguous areas of cohesive populations of people that share common social, cultural, historical, and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of their effective, fair, and equitable representation. A community of interest does not include a community based on political affiliation or relationships with a political party, elected official, or candidate for office. Public and private institutions of higher education that offer a postsecondary degree, as defined in G.S. 116-15(a2)(1), and have a residential campus, including off-site housing near the campus, constitute communities of interest.

Geographic integrity of any city, town, local neighborhood or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the higher priority preceding criteria.
$\qquad$

Signature: $\qquad$

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF
CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs
and
Case No. 21 CVS 015426

COMMON CAUSE,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.

Defendants.

REBECCA HARPER, et al., Plaintiffs
v.

Case No. 21 CVS 500085

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.

Defendants.

## N.C. R. Evid. 1006 Summary ${ }^{1}$ OF North Carolina General Assembly Map-Drawing Sequences

[^9]Figure 1


PX1540: "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 1:50:29 (excerpt)

Figure 2


PX1543: "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 1:44:47 (excerpt)

Figure 3


PX1539: "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 5:35:18 (excerpt)

Figure 4


PX1543: "2021-10-11 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 5:05:22 (excerpt)

Figure 5


PX1551: "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 2:30:09 (excerpt)


PX1592 Daye DRA Re-Draw with election composite data shading

Figure 6


PX1550 "2021-10-07 Map
Drawing Station 04 (544)" at
timestamp 2:39:30 (excerpt)


PX1594 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with election
composite data shading


PX1595 Daye DRA ReDraw with BVAP data shading

Figure 7


PX1549 "2021-10-07 Map
Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 2:52:48 (excerpt)


PX1595 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with election
composite data shading


PX1596 Daye DRA ReDraw with BVAP data shading

Figure 8


PX1548 "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 3:09:35 (excerpt)

PX1598 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with election composite data shading

PX1599 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with BVAP data shading

Figure 9


PX1553 "2021-10-27 Map Drawing Station 04
(544)" at timestamp 54:40 (excerpt)


PX1599 Daye DRA ReDraw with election composite data shading


PX1600 Daye DRA ReDraw with BVAP data shading

Figure 10


PX1601 Daye DRA Re-Draw of 2019
Enacted Senate Plan (excerpt) with partisan lean

PX1602 Daye DRA Re-Draw of 2021
Enacted Senate Plan (excerpt) with partisan lean

Figure 11


PX1534 "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 6:13:18 (excerpt)


PX1603 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with election composite data shading


PX1604 Daye DRA ReDraw with BVAP data shading

Figure 12


PX1533 "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 6:20:54 (excerpt)


PX1605 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with election composite data shading


PX1606 Daye DRA ReDraw with BVAP data shading

Figure 13


PX1532 "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 7:02:27 (excerpt)

PX1607 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with election composite data shading


PX1608 Daye DRA Re-
Draw with BVAP data shading

Figure 14


PX1538 "2021-10-1[3] Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 3:33:16 (excerpt)

Figure 15


Figure 16


PX1611 Daye DRA Re-Draw of 2019
Enacted Senate Plan (excerpt) with partisan lean

PX1612 Daye DRA Re-Draw of 2021
Enacted Senate Plan (excerpt) with partisan lean

Figure 17


PX1559: "2021-10-14 Map Drawing (House)" at timestamp 2:18:43 (excerpt)

Figure 18


PX1558: "2021-10-14 Map Drawing (House)" at timestamp 2:20:50 (excerpt)

Figure 19


PX1557: "2021-10-14 Map Drawing Station 01 (643)" at timestamp 3:03:27.

Figure 20


PX1556: "2021-10-18 Redistricting Map Drawing (House)" at timestamp 8:10:59 (excerpt)

Figure 21


PX1555 "2021-10-18 Map Drawing Station 03 (544)" at timestamp 8:11:00 (excerpt)

PX1614 Daye DRA Re-Draw with election composite data shading

Figure 22


PX1615 Daye DRA Re-Draw of 10/14/2021 draft Buncombe House Cluster districts with partisan lean

PX1616 Daye DRA Re-Draw of 2021
Enacted House Plan (excerpt) with partisan lean


| 1 | We tried not to split VTDs. In 2011, |  | before you today has resulted in what I believe |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | when this process was performed by a consultant, | 2 | to be an impressive map that splits very few |
| 3 | and again, not out in the open, you saw hundreds | 3 | precincts, keeps municipalities whole, and |
| 4 | of VTD splits across this map. In my proposal, | 4 | creates compact districts. |
| 5 | there are only seven total VTD splits across the | 5 | Members, I hope that you will support |
| 6 | entire state of North Carolina. Again, formerly | 6 | this map, and I hope that you will all |
| 7 | there were hundreds. There are seven total VTD | 7 | acknowledge the truly historic nature of the |
| 8 | splits in this map. | 8 | process that we have seen this time around, the |
| 9 | We honored municipal boundaries. I | 9 | unprecedented transparency, and the |
| 10 | made every effort to keep municipalities whole | 10 | unprecedented decision to not use political data |
| 11 | throughout the draw. The report that you'll see | 11 | in drawing these maps, and I hope you will vote |
| 12 | says that there are 82 municipality splits, but | 12 | yes on this map. |
| 13 | the bulk of the splits that you see in the | 13 | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does |
| 14 | report either have no population or | 14 | the gentleman from Chatham, Representative |
| 15 | extraordinarily small populations. | 15 | Reives, rise? |
| 16 | Contiguity, every district in this map, | 16 | REPRESENTATIVE REIVES: Thank you, |
| 17 | of course, is contiguous. | 17 | Mr. Speaker. Ask to debate the bill. |
| 18 | We considered incumbency, and in this | 18 | SPEAKER MOORE: The gentleman has the |
| 19 | map, the bear minimum of members were | 19 | floor. |
| 20 | double-bunked. | 20 | REPRESENTATIVE REIVES: Thank you. And |
| 21 | We looked at compactness. Despite not | 21 | I appreciate the work that's gone in. |
| 22 | being drawn by a computer algorithm, this map | 22 | Obviously, any time we have to create a bill |
| 23 | contains the compactness of the current map that | 23 | such as this, I would probably have a little bit |
| 24 | we are currently sitting here under today, | 24 | of pushback in the sense that one of the things |
| 25 | despite not having that advantage of a computer | 25 | in not a talent I would say that I have, but one |
|  | 5 |  | 7 |
| 1 | algorithm and despite essentially drawing the | 1 | of the abilities that I've been able to hold |
| 2 | thing by hand, so to speak, in that committee | 2 | onto since I've gotten here is I've gotten an |
| 3 | room, live, where everyone could see. | 3 | uncanny ability to count. And because of that |
| 4 | We did not consider race, and I did not | 4 | ability to count, I know there are certain |
| 5 | consider race in drawing -- I did not consider | 5 | realities about the drawing of maps and the |
| 6 | racial data in drawing this map. | 6 | presenting of maps and things of that sort. |
| 7 | We did not consider political data, and | 7 | I know that a lot of my colleagues |
| 8 | I did not consider political data in drawing | 8 | recognize the reality of putting forth 51 maps |
| 9 | this map. | ${ }^{9}$ | and where that might go because, obviously, we |
| 10 | The other important thing to remember | 10 | can't pass a set of maps by ourselves. So I |
| 11 | in this map is the way that this thing used to | 11 | would just say to the chairman's comments, it |
| 12 | be done is through both parties, some consultant | 12 | was not a lack of interest, at all, that nobody |
| 13 | would be hired on the outside and they would | 13 | was drawing maps but trying to be realistic |
| 14 | draw a map and they'd bring it in and that would | 14 | about the process and trying to be efficient |
| 15 | be voted on, but this time around, we undertook | 15 | about a process to what we've done. |
| 16 | a different process, a transparent process, and | 16 | Secondly, for those who saw -- I mean, |
| 17 | that process included a room being open and any | 17 | I know at least I and a couple others did put |
| 18 | member who wanted to going and drawing districts | 18 | maps into certain areas. There are certain |
| 19 | within that room, and that's what I did. I went | 19 | groupings that are going to be what they are |
| 20 | in there with -- armed with essentially just the | 20 | going to be. There are certain groupings that |
| 21 | criteria that we had and tried to draw districts | 21 | there are some discussions about and decisions |
| 22 | as best I could that fit that criteria | 22 | to be made, and so that would take me to where |
| 23 | And given that I didn't have a | 23 | we are on this bill. |
| 24 | computer-based algorithm or consultants using | 24 | And I will be asking that you consider |
| 25 | that algorithm, the final product that you see | 25 | voting no on this for several reasons. And |
|  | 6 |  | 8 |
|  |  |  | 2 (Pages 5 to 8) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disco |  | ery | po.com 1-919-424-82 |



| 1 | that analysis, we've got an opportunity to | 1 | saying is use this history and use this time to |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | correct it, so let's correct it. | 2 | show that the most important aspect of bringing |
| 3 | We have a fundamental difference in our | 3 | our communities back together, to getting people |
| 4 | belief in how we're interpreting what the law | 4 | to have faith in their governments again, are |
| 5 | says we should be doing right now, and there is | 5 | the people in this chamber and that chamber over |
| 6 | some up in the air, but one of the things that | 6 | there. And it's just that simple. |
| 7 | we feel is clear, for instance, looking at the | 7 | And if we do things that continue to |
| 8 | Stephenson decision, is how we handle race. I | 8 | encourage separating into camps, then that's how |
| 9 | do not believe, and I think a lot of people | 9 | our communities will go. If we do things like |
| 10 | who -- or at least on this side of the aisle | 10 | we've done some already this session and like we |
| 11 | don't believe that any of the decisions said | 11 | can still continue to do this session and we can |
| 12 | that you can't contemplate race. Because the | 12 | continue to do in the short session, if we do |
| 13 | reality is at this point in time and in this | 13 | things to show people that none of these letters |
| 14 | stage in our history, race is there. That | 14 | matter, none of these background issues matter, |
| 15 | doesn't mean I'm racist, you're racist, voters | 15 | then we've got an opportunity to help move our |
| 16 | are racist, but it means that race is a factor | 16 | communities forward. And if we move our |
| 17 | that we've got to consider in order to make more | 17 | communities forward, we move our state forward. |
| 18 | fair districts. | 18 | If we move our state forward, then we start |
| 19 | So if we don't look at race at all, | 19 | moving other states forward. |
| 20 | then the risk we run is falling afoul of the | 20 | But a lot of this stuff that a lot of |
| 21 | Stephenson decision where the Stephenson | 21 | us complain about -- and I'm telling you I hear |
| 22 | decision says that we've got to make districts | 22 | from my side, your side, everybody. There's |
| 23 | that comply with the Voting Rights Act. By not | 23 | parts of this political process we're just sick |
| 24 | taking race into account at all, then how do we | 24 | of, and maps are a way that we encourage a lot |
| 25 | know we've complied? We're only going to know | 25 | of the badness in our political process. |
|  | 13 |  | 15 |
| 1 | whether we complied if there's litigation. I'd | 1 | So I'm asking that you vote no just to |
| 2 | rather we know without litigation to know that | 2 | attempt to be corrective. This is not casting |
| 3 | we've had some sort of compliance with the | 3 | aspersions. I cannot imagine being in |
| 4 | Voting Rights Act because, again, that is a | 4 | Chairman Hall's position where last year he was, |
| 5 | federal mandate. | 5 | like me, getting to kind of sit back and not |
| 6 | So again, to me, these can't be about | 6 | even have to pay attention to this process and |
| 7 | partisanism, I don't think I've ever talked | 7 | then all of a sudden you're dead in the middle |
| 8 | about these being about partisanism, and we can | 8 | and have to draw it and then he's going to hear |
| 9 | go back through history and who's done what and | 9 | somebody like me get up and say that something |
| 10 | all that type of thing. Every single day we | 10 | he spent four weeks on that I'm not happy with. |
| 11 | wake up, we've got a chance to be a new us. | 11 | But I'm comfortable, as much as I appreciate |
| 12 | Every single day we walk into this chamber, | 12 | chairman Hall, if the roles were reversed, he |
| 13 | we've got a chance to be something different | 13 | would feel very comfortable telling me that my |
| 14 | than what we were before. | 14 | four weeks of work he wasn't happy with. |
| 15 | I just don't care about the history in | 15 | But that's how we get better, and I |
| 16 | that sense because history can be used to excuse | 16 | know that he takes it in that sense. All I'm |
| 17 | any bad act we want to justify, but history can | 17 | trying to do is to get us better. And these |
| 18 | also be used to teach us how to be better, and | 18 | maps are a big deal to people outside of this |
| 19 | that is the way to use history just like we're | 19 | chamber, big deal. And when we were listening, |
| 20 | talking about with race. | 20 | when we were going around and we were listening |
| 21 | The courts don't want us using race | 21 | at these tours, this wasn't just Democrats |
| 22 | impermissibly. We don't want to use our history | 22 | talking, it's Republicans talking too. They're |
| 23 | in the wrong way. Don't use our history to | 23 | just tired. They don't want us governing from |
| 24 | figure out ways to get around things. And I'm | 24 | the edges. They want us governing from a |
| 25 | not saying we have in this case, but what I'm | 25 | different place in a different way, and a way to |
|  | 14 |  | 16 |
|  |  |  | 4 (Pages 13 to 16 ) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ery | po.com 1-919-424-8242 |



| 1 | 13 public hearings prior to map drawing and then |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | four post map drawing. If y'all remember, those |
| 3 | of you who were here in 2011, there were over 60 |
| 4 | scattered across the state with significant |
| 5 | opportunity for folks to participate virtually |
| 6 | and from remote locations which was really |
| 7 | important as we faced the COVID. |
| 8 | But the feedback I got -- now, I |
| 9 | appreciate that Chair Hall continues to say that |
| 10 | this is the most transparent process ever, but |
| 11 | the bar is really, really low. And the feedback |
| 12 | we kept getting from the public was that it was |
| 13 | difficult to find the information they needed on |
| 14 | the website, they couldn't navigate it, they |
| 15 | felt like we were giving last minute notice, the |
| 16 | maps went out on Friday and the public hearing |
| 17 | was on Monday and Tuesday and folks hadn't |
| 18 | really had a chance to analyze it. And I don't |
| 19 | believe the maps were ever interactive on the |
| 20 | legislative -- so you couldn't go in and figure |
| 21 | out your precinct or your community of interest. |
| 22 | And also, just that it was very |
| 23 | difficult to watch the map drawing, that the |
| 24 | audio wasn't great, that the video wasn't great |
| 25 | either. So I think there's a way -- and I don't |

mean this necessarily as a huge criticism. I just think if we can think about this going forward that there could have been a better way to actually -- for the public to understand what was going on because they didn't feel like they did. And I was just -- I didn't read all 4,000 comments that had been filed. I've been trying to get through and get a sense of what the biggest complaints were, but that was probably the biggest complaint was the public participation.

And the second biggest complaint was that they didn't think the maps were fair at all, and I heard that a ton and repeated references to the Princeton Gerrymandering Project giving our map an F and the Senate and the congressional maps, which I guess we'll be voting on tomorrow, Fs.

And I do agree with the points that have been made prior to me, that there's a better way to do this, a fairer way to do this in a way that reflects our values and our priorities. It was never clear to me with the criteria, and we asked about this repeatedly, what is the hierarchy here, what are the

```
priorities. We got a bunch of criteria that
we're considering, but when you have a conflict
between compactness and a municipality split or
a VTD split, what prevails, and it was never
clear to me how we were taking into account
communities of interest. And I'm not really
sure that the public right now could actually
tell from our maps that are on the website how
their communities of interest are impacted. We
heard a lot of public comments about communities
of interest.
    And I will just repeat -- I don't want
    to repeat. I will just echo the comments that
    there was a better way to do this, and I don't
    think this is it, and I don't think these maps
    are fair, and I'm going to be voting no. Thank
    you.
    SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does
    the lady from Wilson, Representative
    Cooper-Suggs, rise?
    REPRESENTATIVE COOPER-SUGGS: To debate
    the bill, Mr. Speaker.
    SPEAKER MOORE:The lady has the floor.
    REPRESENTATIVE COOPER-SUGGS: My
    colleagues, I rise today because I think we've
```

    23
    1 missed an opportunity to make these maps better and more fair for our constituents. When I say more fair, I mean creating districts that are competitive and that reflect their communities. When we split communities in thirds or pack together counties that span half the state, we're not giving the people of North Carolina what they deserve.

If people feel like they have had a fair opportunity to participate in their elections, they have more trust in government and more trust in elected officials. Is that not what our goal should be?

In the last decade, we've seen what happens when redistricting goes wrong: lots of lawsuits, lots of anger, and lots of distrust. We've had electoral maps repeatedly thrown out by the courts for the state house, the state senate, congress, and even local commissions.

All of this conflict has a price:
Taxpayers paid millions of dollars last decade to pay for legal fees and court costs during the redistricting cases. Some parts of our state had to hold new elections because candidates no longer lived in the district that they were

| 1 | elected to. | 1 | saw four to six people in there all the time |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | In addition to the financial cost, | 2 | every day, they were staff. |
| 3 | there is a cost as voters lose faith -- yes, I | 3 | The process -- I went to a lot -- a lot |
| 4 | said faith -- in democracy and lose faith in | 4 | of the public hearings, and the comments that I |
| 5 | this body, the General Assembly. It is | 5 | heard -- and I think that what I kept trying to |
| 6 | impossible to put a price tag on losing | 6 | remind myself of every one I went to, I read |
| 7 | something so inherent to our foundations as a | 7 | some of the ones entered on the public input. I |
| 8 | country, but it is a much bigger cost than just | 8 | read probably, as Representative Harrison said, |
| 9 | dollars and cents. | 9 | about 4,000, I read through some of those, I |
| 10 | The single best way we could afford all | 10 | skimmed through them, and they were very well |
| 11 | of this is to agree on a compromise that gets a | 11 | thought out, a lot of time and thought put into |
| 12 | majority of votes from both caucuses. With | 12 | what their comments were. |
| 13 | almost all Democratic amendments getting | 13 | I heard from a lot of people that once |
| 14 | defeated last night in the committee, the bill | 14 | in ten years we do this in North Carolina, |
| 15 | we have before us is a missed opportunity to | 15 | right? I heard that, right? Representative |
| 16 | instill faith in this body in our democracy. | 16 | Carney, is that right? Yeah. Well, when do we |
| 17 | I want to thank everyone who worked so | 17 | get to have our say? |
| 18 | hard on those maps, even though I strongly | 18 | So I said talk to your individual |
| 19 | disagree with all of them. If we end up back at | 19 | elected officials in your districts. Call them |
| 20 | the drawing board to draw new districts, I hope | 20 | up, tell them what you think these maps going |
| 21 | that we will seek to reach a consensus that | 21 | forward should look like. |
| 22 | better serves all of the people of | 22 | You can also -- and I directed them to |
| 23 | North Carolina rather than just a few. I ask | 23 | our website, to go in and make comments. |
| 24 | each of you, let's go back to the drawing board. | 24 | We had our first initial committee |
| 25 | I ask you to vote no on this bill. Thank you, | 25 | meetings of the full redistricting committee in |
|  | 25 |  | 27 |
| 1 | Mr. Speaker. | 1 | September. We couldn't really do anything, we |
| 2 | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does | 2 | were told, until the census came out. We could |
| 3 | the lady from Mecklenburg, Representative | 3 | have maybe in the beginning had some teaching to |
| 4 | Carney, rise? | 4 | the community, inform the community on how the |
| 5 | REPRESENTATIVE CARNEY: To speak on the | 5 | process would work when we actually got into our |
| 6 | bill. | 6 | work and we could have brought more people on at |
| 7 | SPEAKER MOORE: The lady has the floor. | 7 | that point of being a part of the process. |
| 8 | REPRESENTATIVE CARNEY: One minute. | 8 | So we had throughout -- you know, the |
| 9 | Thank you. I had to get fired up here, | 9 | most number, and maybe I'm wrong here so don't |
| 10 | my batteries. | 10 | quote me. The highest number of attendees was |
| 11 | I rise to speak on this bill, and I | 11 | like 110 at a couple of the public hearings. |
| 12 | might say some things that you might not think | 12 | Some had 25 people that spoke. Of the 110 |
| 13 | that I would be saying, but I have been on this | 13 | that -- when there was a large number there, |
| 14 | committee, and I'm going to start out saying | 14 | maybe 50 spoke. So not a lot of people got to |
| 15 | like everybody else is saying, we do appreciate | 15 | come and put their personal input into their |
| 16 | all the work that has gone into -- from the | 16 | maps. They're not our maps. What we've |
| 17 | chairman who has been in that room, that people | 17 | spent -- and the chairman has spent a ton of |
| 18 | at home if they knew it was on the audio they | 18 | time drawing his map that is before us today, |
| 19 | could -- they could -- on the livestream in | 19 | they're not our maps. They belong to the people |
| 20 | there, they could see it. They could watch | 20 | out here. And as someone said earlier, they're |
| 21 | people coming in, but people most of the time, | 21 | smart. They're probably smarter than some of |
| 22 | as I think the chairman pointed out, the screen | 22 | us. When we get up here we think we're smart. |
| 23 | was set so that if you looked at that screen you | 23 | But some of the comments were -- and |
| 24 | just saw the center of the room, a few screens | 24 | you've heard it over and over, but it bears |
| 25 | set up and you'd see one or two people, but you | 25 | repeating so that we're listening, we're |
|  | 26 |  | 28 |
|  |  |  | 7 (Pages 25 to 28 ) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ery | po.com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | listening. Fortunately, we're livestream now. |  | your job, that's what you're supposed to do, so |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | And I hope that a lot of people put it out there |  | you should be doing it -- should be doing it |
|  | to your constituents to watch today the debate | 3 | well. And if you got elected and you're in the |
|  | in the House on redistricting. So people wanted |  | minority, that's your job, that's our job, and |
|  | the livestreaming for them at the hearings. |  | that's why I took this redistricting seriously, |
|  | That was said at every hearing I attended and | 6 | to listen. It was about -- it's about all |
|  | the notes that I got from others. They called |  | that -- when you're in the minority that you can |
|  | it an autocratic practice. I thought wow. | 8 | do is listen and be the voice of those people |
|  | Transparency. So how do you define | 9 | that came out. |
| 10 | transparency? I asked a few people how do you | 10 | And the times of the day for some of |
| 11 | define transparency, and they said that so that | 11 | these public hearings, 3:00 on a Wednesday, and |
| 12 | every segment of the population that votes in | 12 | I thank the speaker for changing the session |
| 13 | the state can have access to what you all are | 13 | that day. Because it was in Mecklenburg, and we |
| 14 | doing. And particularly we heard why don't you | 14 | had a voting session that day, and I couldn't |
| 15 | have interpreters here for the people of | 15 | even go to my public hearing in my county unless |
| 16 | Hispanic communities, Asian communities. We | 16 | I missed a voting session. So the speaker |
| 17 | heard at one of the public hearings, why don't | 17 | worked with us, so I thanked him for that, and I |
| 18 | you have translators here. | 18 | thank him again, but there are a lot of people |
| 19 | And so we have -- we had an opportunity | 19 | that could not get there. They work in the |
| 20 | to reach a lot of people in North Carolina. | 20 | he day. And we all -- and a lot of |
| 21 | This is a big, big move that we're making | 21 | us here work, a lot of us involved in this work |
| 22 | I heard another statement. I just | 22 | and couldn't be there on Saturdays or Sundays. |
| 23 | jotted a few down so that I could share with you | ${ }^{23}$ | So there was opportunity missed, but there were |
| 24 | since we didn't have 120 people attending every | 24 | npu |
| 25 | public hearing in the state. We had -- from the | 25 | Did we have enough? Nobody's ever going to have |
|  | 29 |  | 31 |
|  | committee, we would have four to five. At one I | 1 | enough of anything. |
| 2 | think we had eight. So I'm sharing with you | 2 | But through all of that, I go back |
|  | that this should be an informative, not | 3 | to -- and I'll say it again, somebody has |
|  | performative experience for us. | 4 | already mentioned it, but I think it needs -- |
|  | And this other person said Don't let | 5 | worth saying again, and that is an independent |
| 6 | your fear stop your support of democracy," where | 6 | redistricting commission. I did my homework. I |
| 7 | he had expounded upon the fear of legislators | 7 | said yesterday in the committee, just an FYI to |
| 8 | losing their seats. So "Don't let your fear | 8 | committee members, that there were, since I came |
| 9 | stop your support of democracy." | 9 | here in 2003, sworn in, 39 in the Senate and the |
| 10 | Another one I heard was "Maps should | 10 | House between the two, 39 independent |
| 11 | promote democracy." I heard that numerous | 11 | redistricting commission bills. None went |
| 12 | times. And then it should -- it | 12 | anywhere. Notice 2003 to 2021, Democrats in |
| 13 | violates -- they said, you know, gerrymandering, | 13 | charge and Republicans in charge through my term |
| 14 | I heard from a lot of people, has been going on | 14 | here. No -- no bills got heard and went |
| 15 | for a long, long time historically. True, I | 15 | anywhere. |
| 16 | think a lot of us would say that, both sides of | 16 | So I even broke it down a little |
| 17 | the aisle. So this person said it violates | 17 | further than that. So starting in -- well, from |
| 18 | equal protection in the constitution, | 18 | 2003 to 2009, there were -- during the Democrat |
| 19 | gerrymandering does. | 19 | time in office, majority, there was one |
| 20 | So I thought about all of that through | 20 | bipartisan independent redistricting commission |
| ${ }^{21}$ | this whole process. And again, we need to -- | 21 | bill filed and there were four Republican during |
| 22 | some people pat yourselves on the back, and | 22 | the Democratic leadership. And then from |
| 23 | those that have been involved, both sides of the | 23 | 2009 -- well, 2010 to today, or 2021 , there have |
| 24 | aisle closely to the process, yeah, but you got | 24 | been numerous bipartisan bills, but there have |
| 25 | elected, and if you got in the majority, that's | 25 | been seven Democratic bills filed and eight |
|  | 30 |  | 32 |
|  |  |  | 8 (Pages 29 to 32) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.di |  |  | po.com 1-919-424-8242 |


| 1 | Republicans, five during the time that the | 1 | And one final quote from someone at one |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Republicans, here in this chamber, have been in | 2 | of the hearings said that the problem with these |
| 3 | the majority, and they've gone nowhere. | 3 | maps going forward are that most -- most of the |
| 4 | So I'm saying to you -- and some of the | 4 | elections from this map, as in the past, are |
| 5 | members that sponsored the bills and cosponsored | 5 | going to be won in primaries. Think about it. |
| 6 | them are still serving on both sides of the | 6 | I ask you to vote no. |
| 7 | aisle. Why can't we do that? Why can't we let | 7 | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does |
| 8 | go of it and bring in -- that's been studied and | 8 | the gentleman from Durham, Representative |
| 9 | looked at and recommended for several years in | 9 | Hawkins, rise? |
| 10 | the state. What are we -- as that one person | 10 | REPRESENTATIVE HAWKINS: To debate the |
| 11 | that came to the public hearing, what are we | 11 | bill. |
| 12 | afraid of. We cannot fear it. If we do, we're | 12 | SPEAKER MOORE: The gentleman has the |
| 13 | going to lose democracy. You don't want that in | 13 | floor. |
| 14 | the majority. We don't want that in the | 14 | REPRESENTATIVE HAWKINS: I want to |
| 15 | minority. | 15 | thank the chairman for the time and effort and |
| 16 | So I'm asking you today to think about | 16 | for the amazing words of my colleagues, and so |
| 17 | what we're about to do, and this is to the | 17 | I'll try not to repeat too much, but I fear that |
| 18 | citizens of this state, for the next ten years. | 18 | you're picking up on the themes that all of us |
| 19 | Demographics are going to change, but these maps | 19 | are really concerned about. And I think we're |
| 20 | are going to be with us, so what you're getting | 20 | all, you know, familiar with these words: To be |
| 21 | today, they may not be the same by the end of | 21 | rather than to seem. And so what defines |
| 22 | this ten-year term of new redistricting. | 22 | North Carolina as a state, its people, and the |
| 23 | I'm grateful to have had the | 23 | culture that we try to promote here, and |
| 24 | opportunity -- I'm not believing I'm saying this | 24 | nothing -- nothing more exemplifies that than |
| 25 | on the floor -- that I served on this committee. | 25 | what we do here in Raleigh, specifically on the |
|  | 33 |  | 35 |
| 1 | I've learned a lot. I came to this not knowing | 1 | issue of redistricting. |
| 2 | that much of all the acronyms, digging deep | 2 | And so as I get started, one of the |
| 3 | down, but I learned a lot from it. I still have | 3 | things that I want to make sure that people |
| 4 | a lot to learn. I'm sorry that the entire body | 4 | understand and what they have to realize, |
| 5 | has not had the opportunity to have a deep dive | 5 | especially because we have cameras here, is that |
| 6 | into redistricting and understanding it. Maybe | 6 | people are watching what we do. It's the people |
| 7 | you have on your own, and if you have I applaud | 7 | who go to work every single day who work for |
| 8 | you. So I'm thankful for serving on this | 8 | wages that are not a living wage, who try to put |
| 9 | committee. I'm grateful for the chairman and | 9 | food on their family's table, and who trust us |
| 10 | the work that he's done, and I will say that two | 10 | to make the decisions that will impact their |
| 11 | weeks of -- and I think it was ten days in 643, | 11 | lives. |
| 12 | there was a live camera and the public could see | 12 | We have young people who have seen the |
| 13 | live people in there, not sure what they were | 13 | world change in front of their eyes because of a |
| 14 | doing, but some drawing maps, but that's the | 14 | pandemic, social unrest, and all sorts of |
| 15 | public's perception. | 15 | political changes and want to know that they |
| 16 | I've never talked this long on the | 16 | have 120 people, at least in this house, that |
| 17 | floor, but it's really a passion with me, and I | 17 | have their best interest at heart. And so we |
| 18 | do want everybody to realize how important this | 18 | want them to have faith -- as one of my |
| 19 | vote is today and can you go back home and say | 19 | colleagues said, we want them to have faith in |
| 20 | to everyone in your district, not just the ones | 20 | this process. We want them to know that we're |
| 21 | of your party persuasion, but everyone in your | 21 | the people that they should look up to and that |
| 22 | district, this is a very fair map for our | 22 | we are going to do what we say we're going to |
| 23 | district. It gives everybody equal | 23 | do, that we have to make sure that we're |
| 24 | representation. It gives everybody a voice at | 24 | educating and we're informing so they see us as |
| 25 | the table. | 25 | people that they can trust, and so that's why |
|  | 34 |  | 36 |
|  |  |  | 9 (Pages 33 to 36) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ery | po.com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | I'll focus on just a few of the criteria. |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | And so based on the criteria that we |
| 3 | adopted, one of those is that we were going to |
| 4 | try and split the fewest VTDs. And the chairman |
| 5 | is absolutely correct, that we -- compared to |
| 6 | previous maps, we absolutely did that. Out of |
| 7 | the six or seven that we had that were proposed |
| 8 | in these maps, I guess I don't know whether I |
| 9 | should be proud to say or reluctant to say that |
| 10 | half of those are in Durham county. Three of |
| 11 | those are in Durham county. And I know we have |
| 12 | other options to choose in ways that we could |
| 13 | ensure that we don't split VTDs. |
| 14 | And let me give you sort of a zoom out |
| 15 | on what that sort of leads to next. When you |
| 16 | start to split VTDs, you start to split into |
| 17 | communities. And one of the things that we sort |
| 18 | of held dear in this process is compactness and |
| 19 | the fact that we wanted to ensure that |
| 20 | communities of interest remained whole. |
| 21 | I'll use my county as an example, and |
| 22 | I'll go on to others, but in Durham county, for |
| 23 | example, if you're in northern Durham, you do |
| 24 | things in northern Durham, on that side of town. |
| 25 | On the east side of town, that borders RTP. You |

they being drawn for interests that are not my own? Are they being drawn to favor one party over the other?

And we also saw this play out -- and one of the rules that we were trying to adhere to was the fewest changes, but in many ways we found that in the example of Pitt county, in a district that should have been rarely changed, with small changes, that we had many changes that resulted in a much, much different district.

One of the practices that results -that results in all of these things is that people believe that gerrymandering is a hateful practice, is a bad practice that only benefits one group over the other, and what it does, and they are tired of it, is that it promotes extremes.

Durham, no doubt, everyone knows this, is a pretty Democratic town, but let me tell you, when I get in front of those people and I talk about the fact that I have conversations across the aisle on common things with my colleagues, they clap every single time. It doesn't matter what sort of bill I'm working on

39
have eastern -- you have east Durham, all the shops that are connected to the downtown area, you have Brier Creek, which is just across the boarder, and people do things on those sides of town.

When they start to think about who they're going to vote for, they assume that they will be voting for the same person that their neighbor is voting for. That's only logical sense. And the reason that's important is because they'll talk about the schools that their kids go to, they'll talk about the way that those schools are zoned, the school funding that those areas receive, the bus rides, the roads that may be damaged, right, the things that they want to see improved in their community. They want to have commonality in the boundaries that they have so that they then can go to one person and get those problems solved.

And as we see sort of across this map and the way that we have drawn some of our districts that have violated the community of interest criteria, it really does go to everything that you heard from my colleagues. They wonder why -- why is this that way? Are
individually. It doesn't matter what type of thing I think is important, but when I tell them that we're putting the people of North Carolina ahead of our own political interest and we're working together, applause rings out. And if we don't get a chance to follow this criteria in the way that we said we were, right, being rather than to seem, it hurts their ability to trust what we're doing here and it makes them tune out to the process.

Now, the one thing I know about all of you is that because you serve, you care about your communities. You want more people to participate in democracy. And so if that's the case, I'm going to kindly sort of have to ask you to vote no on this because one thing that I know for sure is that North Carolina has had a history lately of not just doing this once a decade. Now, I know that the chairman wants to do this once this decade, I'm pretty sure of that, and I want to join him in that effort, but it does seem like we're going down the road of seeing each other again on the redistricting committee, and I don't want that to happen. I don't want that to happen at all.

| 1 | And so one of the things that I have | 1 | Representative Hall. You've done an amazing |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | proposed, and I said it quite a few times in our | 2 | amount of work, it's taken a long time. I was |
| 3 | committee, is that there's nothing wrong with | 3 | not on redistricting but watched with great |
| 4 | slowing this process down, pushing our primary | 4 | interest many times when it was being |
| 5 | back, and making sure that we get this done | 5 | livestreamed, and I have two very respectful and |
| 6 | right the first time, get this done right the | 6 | pretty simple questions. |
| 7 | first time. I'm a child that has a May | 7 | And so watching the livestream and |
| 8 | birthday. I grew up in North Carolina having | 8 | seeing you drawing the maps and getting up from |
| 9 | May primaries. I could always look forward to | 9 | the drawing and going with maps and coming |
| 10 | that, and this move to March doesn't benefit us | 10 | out -- going out of the room, coming back into |
| 11 | in any way outside of the presidential years. | 11 | the room with a map, setting down, redrawing or |
| 12 | And so us moving our primary back, taking our | 12 | continuing drawing -- two questions: |
| 13 | time, ensuring that we have all the interest and | 13 | When you left the rooms, was there any |
| 14 | the input from the people of North Carolina is | 14 | materials that you referred to or consulted with |
| 15 | not a bad thing. I think each of your | 15 | to make changes when you came back into the room |
| 16 | constituents would really appreciate that. | 16 | to keep drawing the maps? Was there any |
| 17 | And so that's what I'm asking and | 17 | demographic material, other materials you would |
| 18 | proposing as I vote no and for you to consider | 18 | use to make changes? |
| 19 | joining me in voting no. Because to me, nothing | 19 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: No. |
| 20 | is more important than good government. Nothing | 20 | REPRESENTATIVE MOREY: Thank you. |
| 21 | is more important than good government, and | 21 | One follow-up. |
| 22 | that's what people want. They want to make sure | 22 | SPEAKER MOORE: Does the gentleman |
| 23 | that they understand that we're working | 23 | yield? |
| 24 | together, that we're building together, and that | 24 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: I yield. |
| 25 | there are things that they can look at down the | 25 | SPEAKER MOORE: He yields. |
|  | 41 |  | 43 |
| 1 | road and say we did this as North Carolinians. | 1 | REPRESENTATIVE MOREY: And similarly, |
| 2 | And so if you believe that, if you | 2 | were there any consultants, experts, individuals |
| 3 | believe in a better North Carolina, if you | 3 | you would consult with when you would be drawing |
| 4 | believe in making sure that we uphold democracy | 4 | the map, leaving the room, coming back and |
| 5 | and that we adhere to democracy, that you'll | 5 | sitting down to continue your work? |
| 6 | vote no for this bill and join us in helping to | 6 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: There were no |
| 7 | make this a better process. | 7 | outside consultants that I used at all in any |
| 8 | So I want to thank, again, the chairman | 8 | way in the drawing of this map. |
| 9 | and all of the staff, all of my colleagues who | 9 | REPRESENTATIVE MOREY: Thank you. I |
| 10 | spent time drawing these maps, and I know this | 10 | appreciate it. |
| 11 | process is far from over, but I want to thank | 11 | May I speak on the bill. |
| 12 | everyone for all of their hard work and | 12 | SPEAKER MOORE: The lady has the floor |
| 13 | hopefully we can build this together later. | 13 | to debate the bill. |
| 14 | Thank you. | 14 | REPRESENTATIVE MOREY: And my questions |
| 15 | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does | 15 | to the chairman were not meant to be critical at |
| 16 | the lady from Durham, Representative Morey, | 16 | all. I think it just reflects our human nature. |
| 17 | rise? | 17 | We're sitting here as a body basically |
| 18 | REPRESENTATIVE MOREY: Thank you, | 18 | on two teams: 69 on that side, 51 on this side. |
| 19 | Mr. Speaker. To ask the bill sponsor a | 19 | We're getting ready to go decide how we're going |
| 20 | question. | 20 | to play the new sport, who's going to play what |
| 21 | SPEAKER MOORE: Representative Hall, | 21 | positions, who's going to draw the lines on the |
| 22 | does the gentleman yield? | 22 | field or what kind of field it's going to be. |
| 23 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: I yield. | 23 | You got 69 ; we got 51 . Why do we even go out on |
| 24 | SPEAKER MOORE: He yields. | 24 | the court? |
| 25 | REPRESENTATIVE MOREY: Thank you, | 25 | But we are very interested, but I think |
|  | 42 |  | 44 |
|  |  |  | 11 (Pages 41 to 44) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ery | epo.com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | that goes also to the rhetorical question I | 1 | and the majority leader about was we could do |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | think the chairman said why didn't we come out | 2 | the second reading and then we can take the |
| 3 | and draw the maps. We know the outcome. It's | 3 | amendments on third, that way we can go into a |
| 4 | 69 to 51 most likely. And if it were the | 4 | recess until we get those amendments. |
| 5 | opposite, and we're 69 on this side and 51, it's | 5 | REPRESENTATIVE GRAHAM: Thanks, |
| 6 | the same deal, but I think it goes exactly to | 6 | Mr. Speaker. I would like to debate the bill. |
| 7 | what Representative Carney said. I couldn't go | 7 | SPEAKER MOORE: The gentleman has the |
| 8 | in and offer a map because, fundamentally, I | 8 | floor. |
| 9 | represent people who have told me and I have | 9 | REPRESENTATIVE GRAHAM: Thank you, |
| 10 | told them it's an independent redistricting | 10 | Members. I'll be brief. |
| 11 | commission that should take charge. And so I | 11 | I've had the opportunity to serve in |
| 12 | can't in good faith in good conscience be a | 12 | this body for -- this is my sixth term, going |
| 13 | politician and go in and sit at a terminal and | 13 | through redistricting, obviously, for the second |
| 14 | draw a map that I want that will reflect my | 14 | time, and I'm really concerned about what I've |
| 15 | political belief and my political philosophies. | 15 | seen as it relates to my district. |
| 16 | You can't do that. It's hypocritical. It won't | 16 | I am the only one of me in this body. |
| 17 | happen. It's not human nature. | 17 | I represent approximately 50 plus thousand |
| 18 | And so I think that's why you're | 18 | Lumbees in Robeson county, of course, some in |
| 19 | hearing from our side of the aisle. Yes, we're | 19 | Scotland county and some over in Hoke county. |
| 20 | in the minority, yes, these maps will be passed, | 20 | Since the '70s, we've had a Lumbee serving in |
| 21 | but there's a better way to do it. It is | 21 | this body. And Representative Morey just |
| 22 | totally a political process. Even though we say | 22 | mentioned representation. That's very |
| 23 | we're not using political data, it's all about | 23 | important, and it's very important to my people, |
| 24 | politics, but it shouldn't be. It should be | 24 | the Lumbee people in Robeson county and the |
| 25 | about the representation of the people of this | 25 | other citizens in that county. But my district |
|  | 45 |  | 47 |
| 1 | state, at least one third who aren't even a | 1 | has always been primarily and without question a |
| 2 | member of either political party and where are | 2 | majority American Indian district, and I'm |
| 3 | they. | 3 | really concerned about what I'm seeing on the |
| 4 | So I hope we do introduce good | 4 | map that I've been presented today. |
| 5 | legislation and it takes us out of the politics | 5 | And I've been watching over the last |
| 6 | and the drawings and gives an even playing field | 6 | few days. I will be submitting an amendment, |
| 7 | not to us but to the people we represent. Thank | 7 | but I want to appeal to this committee and to |
| 8 | you. | 8 | the chair, let's not undermine the opportunity |
| ${ }^{9}$ | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does | ${ }^{9}$ | to have American Indians in this body. And I |
| 10 | the gentleman from Robeson, Representative | 10 | think if we proceed down the path that I'm |
| 11 | Graham, rise? | 11 | looking at, that could potentially happen, and |
| 12 | REPRESENTATIVE GRAHAM: Inquiry, | 12 | I'm really concerned about that, and I hope |
| 13 | Mr. Chair. | 13 | you're concerned about that. |
| 14 | SPEAKER MOORE: For me or the bill | 14 | And I appreciate the speaker allowing |
| 15 | sponsor? The gentleman is recognized. | 15 | me an opportunity this session to represent the |
| 16 | REPRESENTATIVE GRAHAM: Will we be | 16 | tribes of North Carolina as a committee chair. |
| 17 | taking in any amendments this afternoon? | 17 | To me, that's very important. It gives our |
| 18 | SPEAKER MOORE: We are. I think the | 18 | citizens a voice. It gives the tribes a voice |
| 19 | amendments are still -- I understand that maybe | 19 | here in this body. And from time to time I've |
| 20 | you had an amendment or someone else. The | 20 | had many of you over the course of the past |
| 21 | chair's not in possession of any amendments at | 21 | 12 years come to me and ask for advice on |
| 22 | this time. There's also an amendment that will | 22 | particular items as it related to American |
| 23 | simply try to do -- that will renumber the | 23 | Indians in this state. I can't imagine that you |
| 24 | matters, and we haven't received those. | 24 | would support -- or not support having an |
| 25 | So what I talked to the minority leader | 25 | American Indian in this body, and I hope you |
|  | 46 |  | 48 |
|  |  |  | 12 (Pages 45 to 48) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ery | po.com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | will really take this to heart. Our people need | 1 | lies, and the greatest care -- the greatest care |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | representation here too. I have communities of | 2 | should be employed in constituting the |
| 3 | interest. | 3 | representative assembly. It should be a |
| 4 | I hate to bring up the race card, but | 4 | miniature, an exact portrait of the people at |
| 5 | I'm going to talk about culture. And I will | 5 | large. It should think, feel, reason, and act |
| 6 | just pick out Chairman Hall. I mean, he's the | 6 | like them. That it may be the interest of the |
| 7 | chairman, he drew these maps, and I can say that | 7 | assembly to do strict justice at all times, it |
| 8 | I bet you that his district looks like him, no | 8 | should be an equal representation, or, in other |
| 9 | doubt in my mind it looks like him. I want a | 9 | words, equal interests among the people should |
| 10 | district that looks like me in this House, in | 10 | have equal interests in it. Great care -- great |
| 11 | this body, whether I'm standing here or not. | 11 | care should be taken to effect this and to |
| 12 | Our people deserve it, and I expect that I'll be | 12 | prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections." |
| 13 | sending an amendment that will support that at | 13 | John Adams. |
| 14 | some point. | 14 | The one thing that I've always |
| 15 | And I just want to make you aware that | 15 | respected about a conservative is that they, |
| 16 | I'm really concerned about potential that we're | 16 | probably more than any other group, profess that |
| 17 | getting to -- getting to obviously see happen is | 17 | they stand on principles of the constitution and |
| 18 | for the first time in over 50 years may not have | 18 | principles of their core beliefs, and I've seen |
| 19 | an American Indian standing on this floor. | 19 | many times the other side of the aisle has done |
| 20 | That's a possibility, and I just want to | 20 | this. |
| 21 | emphasize that. | 21 | Years ago, you were the leaders -- you |
| 22 | And, Mr. Speaker, thank you for the | 22 | were the leaders of impartial redistricting. |
| 23 | opportunity and thank you for listening. | 23 | What has happened? Why have you backed off that |
| 24 | SPEAKER MOORE: And actually, | 24 | belief? |
| 25 | Representative Graham, I want to let you know, | 25 | Caucus politics is hard, but standing |
|  | 49 |  | 51 |
|  | the amendments we are actually going to run on | 1 | on your merit and standing on your beliefs is |
| 2 | the second reading so they don't have to redraft | 2 | harder. Today is a day that each of you should |
| 3 | them for third, so I think the amendments are on | 3 | not listen to your caucus or what your caucus is |
| 4 | the way over. So if we get to a point where the | 4 | saying to the extent it overrides your basic |
| 5 | debate has ended and where the amendments have | 5 | core beliefs. |
| 6 | not -- we have not yet received the amendments, | 6 | And one of the hardest things we all do |
| 7 | what I will probably do is put everything at | 7 | in here, one of the most difficult things we do |
| 8 | ease until we get those amendments in. So we're | 8 | in here, and I do it time and again, is I often |
| 9 | going to try to take care of those on second. | 9 | will go against my basic core beliefs to back |
| 10 | For what purpose does the gentleman | 10 | and strengthen my caucus, but not at this |
| 11 | from Cumberland, Representative Richardson, | 11 | expense, not at this expense. |
| 12 | rise? | 12 | John Adams was right when he said what |
| 13 | REPRESENTATIVE RICHARDSON: To debate | 13 | he said here. We all know it. We just don't |
| 14 | the -- | 14 | have the courage to do it. We need to go to |
| 15 | SPEAKER MOORE: The gentleman has the | 15 | some form of impartial redistricting. It's the |
| 16 | floor. | 16 | only answer. |
| 17 | REPRESENTATIVE RICHARDSON: Thank you, | 17 | I watched an extraordinarily good man |
| 18 | Mr. Speaker. | 18 | that I have immense respect for, our rules |
| 19 | Members, this is where the rubber meets | 19 | chairman, struggle with this for two weeks and |
| 20 | the road. Two people far smarter than I have | 20 | struggle with the debate on the floor last |
| 21 | said it this way: | 21 | night. And it was hard -- it was a hard debate |
| 22 | "The right of voting for representation | 22 | for all of us. The reason is we're trying to |
| 23 | is a primary right by which other rights are | 23 | fit a square peg in a round hole. We're drawing |
| $24$ | protected." Thomas Paine. | 24 | the very districts and the very lines in which |
| 25 | John Adams. "The principal difficulty | 25 | the people are going to elect us. |
|  | 50 |  | 52 |
|  |  |  | 13 (Pages 49 to 52) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  |  | po.com 1-919-424-82 |



|  | this process that obviously is flawed. It's | 1 | a majority decision as they go to the polls and |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | flawed. And I don't care how long they've been | 2 | make a choice. The numbers work out very well. |
| 3 | doing it, but the great thing about a democracy, | 3 | Of course, it gives the municipalities of |
| 4 | we can change it and make it even better. | 4 | Rowland back to the district, which I served two |
| 5 | So I implore you down the road -- I | 5 | terms two years ago, and right now I'm serving |
| 6 | know today is sort of done, but down the road, | 6 | the area of Fairmont. And this amendment gives |
| 7 | why don't we look at this together in the | 7 | those districts back to this -- for this |
| 8 | nonelection years, in the non year after the ten | 8 | particular amendment. |
| 9 | and say let's make it better. Let's put | 9 | As I said earlier, this is an |
| 10 | something together that's different for the | 10 | opportunity to ensure -- I think a good |
| 11 | future. Thank you. | 11 | opportunity to ensure that a member of the tribe |
| 12 | SPEAKER MOORE: Thank you, | 12 | would be -- or the Lumbee Tribe would be |
| 13 | Representative Jones. | 13 | represented in this body, and I think that's |
| 14 | Ms. Churchill, are any of those | 14 | what I hope you would want to give us good |
| 15 | amendments -- actually, Ms. Churchill, could the | 15 | representation across the state. And I know |
| 16 | lady approach the dais, please. | 16 | some of you represent tribes, but those tribes |
| 17 | (Brief interruption.) | 17 | are not in the majority in your districts, but |
| 18 | SPEAKER MOORE: The House will come | 18 | this happens to be -- Robeson county happens to |
| 19 | back to order. | 19 | be the most diverse -- culturally diverse county |
| 20 | Members, before we get underway, we do | 20 | in this country, and this amendment will give |
| 21 | want to welcome a special guest on motion of | 21 | the citizens of that county representation and a |
| 22 | Representative Belk who actually herself is in | 22 | very good chance to have a member of the Lumbee |
| 23 | the gallery right now. We're pleased to extend | 23 | Tribe serving in this body, and I would ask you |
| 24 | the courtesy of the gallery to the mayor pro tem | 24 | to support this amendment. Thank you. |
| 25 | of Charlotte, Julie Eiselt who is with us. | 25 | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does |
|  | 57 |  | 59 |
| 1 | Ms. Eiselt, if you would stand, please. We want | 1 | the gentleman from Caldwell, |
| 2 | to thank you for being here with us today. | 2 | Representative Hall, rise? |
| 3 | Members, we are ready to proceed with | 3 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: To debate the |
| 4 | the amendments. We're going to take up | 4 | amendment. |
| 5 | Amendment ABW-23 V2. | 5 | SPEAKER MOORE: The gentleman has the |
| 6 | Representative Graham is recognized to | 6 | floor to debate the amendment. |
| 7 | send forth the amendment, and the clerk will | 7 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: Thank you, |
| 8 | read. | 8 | Mr. Speaker. |
| 9 | THE CLERK: Representative Graham moves | 9 | Members, I am going to respectfully ask |
| 10 | to amend the bill on page 5 , lines 42 through | 10 | you to vote no on the amendment. For those of |
| 11 | 48, by rewriting those lines to read. | 11 | you who were here in 2017, you may remember that |
| 12 | SPEAKER MOORE: The gentleman from | 12 | we had some litigation on our maps at that time |
| 13 | Robeson has the floor to debate the amendment. | 13 | and we had to come in and redraw, and the |
| 14 | REPRESENTATIVE GRAHAM: Thank you, | 14 | amendment that's before you in large part |
| 15 | Mr. Chair, and I'll be brief. | 15 | replicates the district that was struck down by |
| 16 | I think I stated earlier my concern, | 16 | the court. And of course, we want to avoid any |
| 17 | and with this amendment, the amendment really | 17 | such strike down this time around. So again, I |
| 18 | does give I guess it's House District 24 an | 18 | respectfully ask you to vote no on the |
| 19 | opportunity to have someone of the American | 19 | amendment. |
| 20 | Indian community here in the legislature. As I | 20 | SPEAKER MOORE: For what purpose does |
| 21 | said earlier, we can go back to the '70s and | 21 | the gentleman from Chatham, Representative |
| 22 | we've had a member of the tribe standing on this | 22 | Reives, rise? |
| 23 | floor, and my amendment will -- nothing's | 23 | REPRESENTATIVE REIVES: Thank you, |
| 24 | guaranteed, but it will give the citizens of | 24 | Mr. Speaker. Just ask for a recorded vote on |
| 25 | Robeson county and the folks of the Lumbee Tribe | 25 | both amendments. |
|  | 58 |  | 60 |
|  |  |  | 15 (Pages 57 to 60) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ery | epo.com 1-919-424-82 |






| A | 71 | 70:2,7 71:8,12 | 66:10 | backed 51:23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| a.m 3:10 |  |  | areas 3:25 4:4 | background |
| A1 63:12 | 5:25 | 72:4,13,25 | 0:2 | 15:14 |
| A2 71:12 | adv | 73:5,8,1 | :24 38:1 | ad 10:11 14:17 |
| A3 73:8,17 | 72:20 | amendme | 65:1 | 39:15 41:15 |
| abilities 8:1 | affi | 9:14 25:13 | argument 64 | adness 15:25 |
| ability 8:3, | 3:18 71: | 46:17,19,2 | 66:15 70:23 | bake 12:10 |
| . 8 | $674: 6$ | 4 50:1,3,5 | armed 6:20 | bar 21:11 |
| 8:1 | 75:2 | 50:6,8 57:15 | Asian 29:16 | ase 69:17 72:9 |
| :12 | afford 25 | 58:4 60:25 | asked 18:8 22:24 | based 37:2 |
| absolut | af | 61:2 64:11,15 | 29:10 72:2 | basic 52:4, |
|  | afraid 33:1 | 67:16 73:19 | asking 8:24 16 | basically $44: 1$ |
| ABW-23 58:5 | African 66:1 | American 48:2,9 | 33:16 41:17 | 70:13 |
| 22 | 5 | 48:22,25 49:19 | 2:3 | si |
| cep |  | 5:15 58:19 | asp | atteries 26:10 |
| (1) $61: 25$ | ago 18:23 51:21 | America | aspersions 16 | beach 69:14 |
| access 29:13 |  | 66:11,16,23 | assembly $1: 12: 9$ | bear 5:19 |
| cessib | agr | amount $3: 4$ | 4:10 25:5 51:3 | 28:2 |
| 20:13 | 25:1 | :25 43:2 | 51:7 53: | eginning |
| account |  |  |  |  |
| 23:5 | 69:1 |  | assume 38 | belief 13:4 45:15 |
| ccurate 76:12 | ah | anger 24:16 | A | 51:2 |
| , |  |  |  | beliefs 51:18 |
| 7:7 |  | anybody 67:22 | attended 18 | 52:1,5,9 53:16 |
| acronyms 34:2 | aisle 13:10 30:17 | anyway 72:21 | 29:6 | believe 7:1 13:9 |
| act $2: 613: 23$ | 30:24 33: |  | attendees 28:10 | 13:11 18:19 |
| 14:4,17 51:5 | :23 45 | a | , | 21:19 39:14 |
| 65:16,19,25 | 51:19 | appear 18:10 | ention 16:6 | 42:2,3,4 53:11 |
| 66:7,18 70:25 | algorithm | appears $17: 14$ | audio 2:1 20:15 | $55: 1056: 15$ |
| 71:4,6 | 24 | a | 26:18, | 18 72:24 |
| Adams 50:25 | al | applause 40:5 | 5:6 | believing 33:24 |
| 51:13 52:12 |  | applicable 4:11 | autocratic 29 | Belk 57:22 |
| 3:9 | al | 4:12 | le 20:16 | elong 28:19 |
| Adams ${ }^{\text {' }}$ | amazing | appreciate | 60:16 68:5 | enefit 41:10 |
| addition 25:2 |  | 16:11 21: | 68:5 | enefits 39:15 |
| Addition | amend 58:10 | :15 41:1 | aware 49:1 | best 6:22 25:10 |
| 68:13 | 2 | :10 48:1 | aye 63:14 71:14 | 36:17 53:10 |
| address 65:16 | amendme | 65:1 | 73:10,25 74:23 | 55:17 69:4 |
| 65:18 66:19 | $4: 1546: 20$ | approach 19 <br> 57:16 64:19 | B | 72:12 76:9 |
| 71:7 | 48:6 49:13 | $57: 1664: 1$ | B | bet 49:8 |
| address | 58:5,7,13,1 | 66:6 |  | better 12:7 |
| addresses 64:22 | 58:17,23 59:6 | approach |  | 14:18 16:15,17 |
| adhere 39:5 42:5 |  | 65:2 | 25:19,24 30:22 | 17:4 20:15 |
| admonition 53:2 | $60 \cdot 1961.2$ | approval 11:11 | $41: 5,1243: 10$ | $22: 3,2123: 14$ |
| adopt 20:22 | 60:19 61:23 | approximately | $41: 5,1243: 10$ $43: 1544: 4$ | $24: 1 \text { 25:22 }$ |
| adopted $2: 25$ | 62:5, |  | $\begin{aligned} & 43: 1 \\ & 52: 9 \end{aligned}$ | $42: 3,745: 21$ $53 \cdot 13,1457: 4$ |
| 4:18 37:3 | 63:12,19,22 $64: 5.8 .2265: 3$ | archived 2:20 | $\begin{aligned} & 52: 953: 3 \\ & 57: 1958: 21 \end{aligned}$ | 53:13,14 57:4 |
| 63:20 71:20 | 64:5,8,22 65:3 <br> $67 \cdot 13,8,14,17$ | area 11:13 38:2 $59.663: 1$ | $59: 4,7 \text { 68:23 }$ | $57: 969: 11$ |
| 73:17 | $\begin{aligned} & 67: 1,3,8,14,1 \\ & 67: 25,68: 14 \end{aligned}$ | $59: 663: 1$ $64: 1866$ | 59:4,7 68:23 69:2 | $\begin{array}{r} \text { big } 16: 18,19 \\ 19: 829: 21 . \end{array}$ |
| adoption 63:12 | 67 | 64:18 66:9,10 | 69.2 | 19:8 29:21,21 |


| bigger 25:8 | brought 28:6 | 42:1 | 45:11 56:12,13 | commence 66:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| biggest 22:9,10 | 66:3 | case 14:25 40:15 | Charlotte 57:25 | comment 3:7,23 |
| 22:12 | Brown 65:8 | cases 4:8,12 | Chatham 4:24 | 68:4 |
| bill 1:3 2:4,6,6 | build 42:13 | 24:23 | 7:14 60:21 | commenting |
| 2:13 7:17,22 | building 41:24 | casting 16:2 | 64:5 70:4 | 18:12 |
| 8:23 11:4,4,6 | bulk 5:13 | caucus 11:6 | child 41:7 | comments 8:11 |
| 17:10,13 18:23 | bunch 23:1 | 51:25 52:3,3 | choice 59:2 | 20:5 22:7 |
| 19:17 23:22 | Buncombe | 52:10 72:7,7 | 66:12,16,24 | 23:10,13 27:4 |
| 25:14,25 26:6 | 10:21,23 17:7 | caucuses 25:12 | choose 37:12 | 27:12,23 28:23 |
| 26:11 32:21 | 17:15,18,19,23 | caught $61: 16,19$ | chosen 68:22 | commission 18:2 |
| 35:11 39:25 | bus 38:14 | census 2:9 10:17 | Churchill 57:14 | 19:1 32:6,11 |
| 42:6,19 44:11 | business 18:19 | 28:2 | 57:15 | 32:20 45:11 |
| 44:13 46:14 | buy 61:21,21 | center 2 | circumstance | 55:7,16 56:9 |
| 47:6 53:3 54:3 | Byrd 1:18 76:4 | cen | 17:24 | 56:10 |
| 54:7 58: | 76.16 | certain 8:4,18,18 | citizens 33:18 | commissions |
| 64:2 71:25 |  | 8:20 | 47:25 48:18 | 24:19 |
| 73:22,24 74:7 | C | cer | 58:24 59:21 | committee 3:8 |
| 74:22 75:3,4 |  | chair 19:22 | clap 39:24 | 4:18 6:2 9:21 |
| bills 32:11,14,24 | cajoled 19:7 | 46:13 48:8,16 | clarify 66:20 | 20:6,9 25:14 |
| 32:25 33:5 | Caldwell 2:12 | 58:15 61:1 | clear 13:7 22:23 | 26:14 27:24,25 |
| bipartisan 18:22 | 60:1 67:5 | chair's 46:21 | 23:5 65:18 | 30:1 32:7,8 |
| 18:24 32:20,24 | call 27:19 72: | chairman 16:4 | clerk 2:4,5 58:7 | 33:25 34:9 |
| birthday 41:8 | called 29:7 | 16:12 26:17,22 | 58:9 63:14,16 | 40:24 41:3 |
| bit 7:23 72:10,16 | 68:10 | 28:17 34:9 | 63:22 64:1 | 48:7,16 64:17 |
| black 55:15 | camera 34: | 35:15 37:4 | 71:15,16,22,24 | 67:20 68:24 |
| Bladen 65:1 | cameras 36 | 40:19 42:8 | 73:11,14 74:1 | common 39:23 |
| 69:10,12,12,15 | camps 15:8 | 44:15 45:2 | 74:4,9,24,25 | commonality |
| 69:16 | candidate 53 | 49:6,7 52:19 | close 72:23 73:4 | 38:17 |
| blue 12 | 66:12,24 | 65:22 70:12 | 73:18 | commonalties |
| board 19:5 | candidates | chairman's 8: | clo | 12:4 |
| 25:20,24 | 24:24 | chamber 3:23 | closer 9:5,5,6,6 | communicate |
| boarder 38:4 | ca | 14:12 15:5,5 | 72:16 | 65:10 |
| body $25: 5,16$ | care 10:11 | 16:19 33:2 | CLR 76: | communities |
| 34:4 44:17 | 40:12 50:9 | chance $14: 11,13$ | coddled 19:7 | 15:3,9,16,17 |
| 47:12,16,21 | 51:1,1,10,11 | 21:18 40:6 | colleague 62:17 | 23:6,9,10 24:4 |
| 48:9,19,25 | 57:2 | 53:19,22 59:22 | colleagues 3:12 | 24:5 29:16,16 |
| 49:11 54:25 | cared 73:3 | change $4: 3,4$ | 3:21 8:7 17:13 | 37:17,20 40:13 |
| 55:9 59:13,23 | Carl 55:4 | 33:19 36:13 | 23:25 35:16 | 49:2 |
| 61:25 62:10 | Carney 26:4, | 56:11,25 57:4 | 36:19 38:24 | community |
| borders 37:25 | 27:16 45:7 | 64:25 70:14 | 39:24 42:9 | 21:21 28:4,4 |
| bottom 18:17 | Carolina 1:1,23 | 72:15,22 | 67:13 | 38:17,22 58:20 |
| boundaries 5:9 | 2:7,10,18,24 | changed 17:21 | come 28:15 45:2 | 69:11 |
| 38:18 | 3:6 4:1 5:6 | 39:8 61:20 | 8:21 57:18 | compact 7:4 |
| brief 47:10 | 24:7 25:23 | 62:1 | 60:13 67:22 | 9:20,24 10:2 |
| 57:17 58:15 | 27:14 29:20 | changes 10:4,22 | comes 9:4 54:19 | 68:8 69:19 |
| Brier 38:3 | 35:22 40:3,17 | 10:23 36:15 | comfortable | compactness |
| bring 6:14 33:8 | 41:8,14 42:3 | 39:6,9,9 43:15 | 16:11,13 | 5:21,23 10:1 |
| 49:4 | 48:16 54:14 | 43:18 | coming 26:21 | 23:3 37:18 |
| bringing 15:2 | 74:10 76:1,7 | changing 31:12 | 43:9,10 44:4 | 68:10 70:23 |
| broke 32:16 | Carolinians | charge 32:13,13 | 69:2 | compared 12:18 |


| $7: 5$ | considering 23:2 | counties 4:21,22 | criticism 22:1 | December 76:13 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ompetitive $24: 4$ | consisten | 0:20 24:6 | CSR 1:18 76:5 | Decennial 2:9 |
| m | 18: | 66:13,13 68:18 | 76:17 | ecide 44:19 |
| complaint 22:10 | constituen | 9:9 | culturally 59:19 | decision 7:10 |
| 22:12 | 18:17,18,2 | country $12: 1$ | culture 35:23 | 13:8,21,22 |
| complaints 22:9 | 24:2 2 | 5:8 59:20 | 49:5 | 59:1 68:21 |
| mplet | 41:16 | county 4:23,25 | Cumberland | decisions 8:21 |
| 64:10 | constitu | 4:25,25 18:2 | 10:21 50:11 | 13:11 36:10 |
| mpliance 14:3 | constitu | 31:15 37:10,11 | Cunningham | deemed 10:11 |
| om | 51:2 | 37:21,22 39:7 | :15,16,22 | deep 34:2,5 |
| 18.2 | constitu | 47:18,19,19,24 | 63:7 | defeated 25:14 |
| omplied 13:25 | 30:18 51:1 | 47:25 58:25 | current 4:13 | define 29:9,11 |
| 14 | 68:1 | 59:18,19,21 | 5:23 17:18,18 | defines 35:21 |
| omp | cons | 1:4,16,18,2 | 69:23 | finitely 9:19 |
| m | consultant | 69:13,14 76:2 | currently | definition 71:1 |
| 5 | 6:12 | county's 17:23 | 72:17 | democracy 25:4 |
| omprised 62:25 | consult | couple 8:17 |  | 25:16 30:6,9 |
| mpromise |  | 6 | D | 30:11 33:13 |
| 25:11 |  |  | 6:12 | 0:14 42:4,5 |
| \%omputer | con | course 4:8,14 | 6 | 54:15,24 55:18 |
| 5:22,25 | con | 5:17 47:18 | damaged 3 | 56:1 57:3 |
| m | 13: | 8:20 59:3 | dashed 74:18 | Democrat 32:18 |
| 6:24 | C | 0:16 61:19 | dat | 55:14 |
| om |  | 62:1 | 7:10 12:13 | Democratic 3:11 |
| oncern | continue 15:7,11 | court 1:194:8 | 20:18 45:23 | 3:19 25:13 |
| concerned 35:19 | 15:12 44:5 | 10:11 24:22 | day $14: 10,12$ | 32:22,25 39:20 |
| 47:14 48:3,12 | cont | 44:24 60:16 | 18:18 20:5 | Democrats 3:15 |
| :13 49:16 | con | 76:4 | 27:2 31:10, | 3:22 16:21 |
| configuration | 4 | cou | 31:14,20 36 | 32:1 |
| 4,17 | co |  | 52:2 76:13 | emographic |
| conflict 23 | 56:12 |  | d | 43:17 |
| 24 | co | co | dead 16:7 | Demographics |
| n | 72:2 | 24:1 | deal 16:18, | 33:19 |
| ong | con | co | 45:6 56:2 | Denise 1:18 76:4 |
|  | 39 | CO | dealing 11:10 | 76:16 |
| connected |  |  | deals 55:17 | denise |
| ectio |  | cr | dear 37: | 1:25 |
|  | core 51:18 52:5 | 13 | debate $2: 137: 17$ | deserve $24: 8$ |
| onscience $45 \cdot 12$ |  |  | 17:9,13 19:16 | 9:12 |
| onsensus 25:21 | cor | creati | 1 | esire 11:11 |
| conservative | 37:5 | creature 68:7 | 35:10 44:13 | despite 3:10,20 |
| 51:15 55:3 | corre | Cre | 47:6 50:5 | 5:21,25 6:1 |
| consider 6:4,5,5 | correctly 20:25 | criteria 4:17,20 | 20,21 58:13 | 67:19 |
| 6:7,8 8:24 | corrupt 51:12 | 4:21 6:21,22 | 0:3,6 63:10 | estin 2:5 |
| 13:17 17:2 | cosponsored | 9:10 10:5,6, | 64:5 67:7 | determined 69:1 |
| 41:18 | 33:5 | 22:24 23:1 | 71:10 73:7, | dictated 4:9 |
| considerably | $\boldsymbol{c o s t} 25: 2,3,8$ | 7:1,2 38:2 | 74:12,20 | differ 17:17 |
| 61:20 | costs $24: 2$ | 40:6 66:4 69: | decade 4:2,5,9 | differed 70:19 |
| considered 3:20 | count 8:3,4 | 69:8 | 17:16 24:14,2 | difference 13:3 |
| 5:18 | 55:25 | critical 44:15 | 40:19,20 | 65:20 66:21 |


| different 6:16 | 53:12,13 59:7 | drew 3:15 49:7 | engrossed 75:4 | F 22:16 76:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 12:6 14:13 | 59:17 62:9 | 64:13,14 70:13 | enormous 19:25 | faced $21: 7$ |
| 16:25,25 39:10 | 63:3 64:25 | Duplin 69:23 | ensure 37:13,19 | facing 20:12 |
| 53:15 57:10 | 65:25 66:1 | Durham 35:8 | 59:10,11 | fact 3:20 37:19 |
| 64:11 65:21 | 68:5 69:19 | 37:10,11,22,23 | ensuring 41:13 | 39:22 67:19 |
| 68:16 | 70:25 71:2,4 | 37:24 38:1 | entered 27:7 | 68:8 69:18 |
| difficult 21:13 | 72:9 | 39:19 42:16 | entire 3:24 5:6 | factor 13:16 |
| 21:23 52:7 | distrust 24 : |  | 34:4 68:12 | 61:12 |
| difficulty 20:14 | dive 34:5 | E | entitled 2:6 | failed 18:24 |
| 50:25 | diverse 59:19,19 | E 76 | equal 30:18 | fair 11:15 13:18 |
| digest 67:18 | doing 9:7 13:5 | earlier 28:20 | 34:23 51:8,9 | 22:13 23:16 |
| digging 34:2 | 29:14 31:2,2 | 58:16,21 59:9 | 51:10 | 24:2,3,10 |
| directed 27:22 | 34:14 40:9,18 | 64:21 | especially 19:24 | 34:22 55:22 |
| disagree 25:19 | 57:3 69:4 | early 20:2 | 36:5 66:9 | 56:15 |
| 61:14,20 70:15 | dollars 24:21 | ease 50:8 | essentially 6:1 | fairer 20:7,9 |
| 70:16 | 25:9 | east $37: 2538$ | 6:20 | 22:21 |
| disagreed 64:19 | double | e | everybody 15:22 | Fairmont 59:6 |
| disappointed | 69:5 | echo 19:22 23:13 | 26:15 34:18,23 | faith 15:4 25:3,4 |
| 3:11,18 | double-bunk | e | 34:24 53:21 | 25:4,16 36:18 |
| disclosed 20:19 | 5:20 69:6 | educating 36 | 65:5 | 36:19 45:12 |
| discover | double-bunking | effect 11:8 18:1 | exact 51:4 68:3 | falling 13:20 |
| 68:25 | 18:1 | 51:1 | exactly 45:6 | familiar 35:20 |
| Discovery 1:19 | dou | efficient 8:14 | exacts 74:10 | family's 36:9 |
| discussed 9:3 | 49:9 | effort 4:135:10 | example 4:24 | far 42:11 50:20 |
| discussion 63:9 | downtown 38:2 | 35:15 40:2 | 37:21,23 39:7 | 66:3 71:5 |
| 65:15 71:9 | draw 4:10 5:11 | eight 30:2 32:25 | excuse 14:16 | farther 11:21 |
| 73:6,21 74:1 | 6:14,21 9:20 | Eiselt 57:25 58:1 | exemplifies | favor 39:2 63:13 |
| 74:20 | 10:7 16:8 | either 5:14 | 35:24 | 71:13 73:9,25 |
| discussions 8 | 25:20 44:21 | 21:25 46:2 | expansive 11 | 74:23 |
| district 5:16 | 45:3,14 53:6 | elect 52:25 66:12 | expect 49:12 | fear 30:6,7,8 |
| 24:25 34:20,22 | 65:11,25 66:1 | 66:16,24 | expense 52:11 | 33:12 35:17 |
| 34:23 39:8,11 | 66:7 70:24,25 | elected $24: 12$ | 52:11 | federal 2:9 14:5 |
| 47:15,25 48:2 | 71:3 | 25:1 27:19 | experience 30:4 | feedback 21:8 |
| 49:8,10 53:16 | drawing 3:16 | 30:25 31:3 | expert 68:1 | 21:11 |
| 58:18 59:4 | 6:1,5,6,8,18 | election 54:15 | experts 44:2 | feel 13:7 16:13 |
| 60:15 61:17,18 | 7:11 8:5,13 | 55:2 | 55:14 | 22:5 24:9 51:5 |
| 62:1,2,24,24 | 18:5,20 19:5 | elections $24: 11$ | explain 72:4 | 55:21,24 64:16 |
| 63:5,5 66:8,22 | 19:10 20:19,23 | 24:24 35:4 | exponentially | 65:23 |
| 66:22 68:7,9 | 21:1,2,23 | 51:12 | 10:17 | feeling 11:14 |
| 68:11,19 72:16 | 25:20,24 28:1 | electoral 24:17 | expounded 30: | fees $24: 22$ |
| 72:21 | 34:14 42:10 | electrocutes | extend 57:23 | felt $21: 15$ |
| districting 18:2 | 43:8,9,12,16 | 54:2 | extent 52: | fewer 9:11,13,16 |
| districts 2:8 4:3 | 44:3,8 52:23 | embarked 2:16 | extraordinari | 9:1755:23 |
| 4:13 6:18,21 | 66:2 | emphasize 49:21 | 5:15 52:17 | fewest 37:4 39:6 |
| 7:4 9:2,20,24 | drawings 46:6 | employed 51:2 | 53:19,20 | field 44:22,22 |
| 10:16 11:21 | drawn 2:21 5:22 | enacts 2:10 | extremes 39:18 | 46:6 |
| 13:18,22 17:19 | 9:14,14 18:9 | encourage 4:14 | eye 70:1 | figure 12:2 |
| 17:24 24:3 | 18:11 38:21 | :8,24 19:4 | eyes 36:13 | 14:24 21:20 |
| 25:20 27:19 | 39:1,2 69:17 | ended 50:5 |  | filed $22: 732: 21$ |
| 38:22 52:24 | 69:20 | engage 54:24 | F | 32:25 |


| final 6:25 35:1 | 15:17,17,18,19 | 67:5,9 70:4,8 | 33:20 35:3,5 | 10:16 64:9 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| finally $69: 1$ | 17:4 22:3 | gentlemen 19:21 | 36:22,22 37:3 | 66:7 70:13 |
| financial 25:2 | 27:21 35:3 | gerrymanderi... | 38:7 40:15,22 | groups 12:14 |
| find $21: 13$ | 41:9 63:12,22 | 12:25 22:15 | 43:9,10 44:19 | grown 10:17 |
| fired 26:9 | 71:12 73:9 | 30:13,19 39:14 | 44:20,21,22 | growth 10:19 |
| first 2:24 3:2 | found 39:7 | 68:2 | 47:12 49:5 | guaranteed |
| 4:21 18:7 20:5 | foundations | getting 12:16 | 50:1,9 52:25 | 58:24 |
| 27:24 41:6,7 | 25:7 | 15:3 16:5 | 54:9,10 56:2,3 | guess 22:17 37:8 |
| 49:18 64:24 | four 16:10,14 | 21:12 25:13 | 56:5,7,8,9,20 | 58:18 |
| 65:4,25 70:13 | 21:2 27:1 30:1 | 33:20 43:8 | 58:4 60:9 | guest 57:21 |
| 70:25 71:4 | 32:21 | 44:19 49:17,17 | 67:14 71:1 | Guilford 19:14 |
| 74:14 | frankly 11:5 | 56:21 65:12 | 72:22 | gut 55:24 |
| Fisher 17:7,9,12 | free 72:19 | give 12:2 $37: 14$ | Goldsboro | guy 55:6 |
| fit 6:22 10:7 | Friday 3:9 21:16 | 58:18,24 59:14 | 69:18 |  |
| 52:23 | friend 54:25 | 59:20 61:23 | $\operatorname{good} 11: 15,15$ | H |
| five $30: 133: 1$ | friendly | 62:5 | 20:21 41:20,21 | half 24:6 37:10 |
| fix $61: 1772: 13$ | front | given $4: 6$ | 45:12,12 46:4 | Hall 2:5,12,14 |
| flawed 57:1,2 | 36:13 39:21 | 70:21 | 52:17 55:1,2 | 16:12 19:22 |
| floor 1:2 7:19 | Fs 22:18 | gives 34 | 59:10,14,22 | 21:9 42:21,23 |
| 17:11 19:18 | full $27: 25$ | 46:6 48:17,18 | gotten 8:2,2 9:4 | 43:1,19,24 |
| 23:23 26:7 | fundamental | 56:10 59:3,6 | governing 16:23 | 44:6 49:6 60:2 |
| 33:25 34:17 | 13:3 65:20 | giving 21:15 | 16:24 | 60:3,7 61:11 |
| 35:13 44:12 | fundamentally | 22:16 24:7 | governme | 67:6,7,11 |
| 47:8 49:19 | 45:8 64:18 | globally 54:11 | 24:11 41:20,21 | 71:21,24 72:3 |
| 50:16 52:20 | funding 38:13 | go 2:21 8:9 9:10 | governments | 72:5 73:9 |
| 54:5 58:13,23 | further 3:4,24 | 14:9 15:9 17:4 | 15:4 | Hall's 16:4 |
| 60:6 61:9 64:5 | 18:1,25 32:17 | 18:24 19:4 | Graham 46:11 | hand 6:2 |
| 67:10 70:9 | 63:9,10 71:9 | 20:10 21:20 | 46:12,16 47:5 | handle 13:8 |
| 76:7 | 71:10 73:6,7 | 25:24 27:23 | 47:9 49:25 | hands 55:13 |
| focus $37: 1$ | 73:21,21 74: | 31:15 32:2 | 58:6,9,14 61:4 | happen 40:24,25 |
| folks 21:5,17 | 74:12,20,20 | 33:8 34:19 | 61:6,10 62:17 | 45:17 48:11 |
| 53:658:25 | future 20:23 | 36:7 37:22 | 62:18,20,23 | 49:17 |
| 68:3 72:7,18 | 56:3,16,24,24 | 38:12,19,23 | 63:2,13 | happened 3:3 |
| follow 40:6 | 57:11 | 44:19,23 45:7 | grateful 33:23 | 51:23 |
| 56:18 | FYI 32:7 | 45:13 47:3 | 34:9 | happens $24: 15$ |
| follow-up 43:21 |  | 52:9,14 58:21 | great 3:4 21:24 | 56:19 59:18,18 |
| followed 20:24 | G | 59:1 63:25 | 21:24 43:3 | happy 16:10,14 |
| following $2: 8$ | gallery 57:2 | 69:7 | 51:10,10 57:3 | hard $25: 18$ |
| 5 | General 1:1 2:9 | goal 10:5,6 | greatest 51:1,1 | 42:12 51:25 |
| food 36:9 | 4:10 25:5 74:9 | 24:13 | Greene 68:20 | 52:21,21 |
| foregoing 76:11 | 76:6 | goes 24:15 45:1 | grew 41:8 | harder 52:2 |
| Forks 1:21 | gentleman 2:11 | 45:6 | group 12:21 | 53:15 |
| form 52:15 | $7: 14,1835: 8$ | going 4:16,17 | 39:16 51:16 | hardest 52:6 |
| formerly 5:6 | 35:12 42:22 | 6:18 8:19,20 | 53:20 | Harrison 19:14 |
| forth 3:19,22 8:8 | 43:22 46:10,15 | 10:22 11:3 | grouping 64:24 | 19:16,19 27:8 |
| 58:7 64:17 | 47:7 50:10,15 | 12:24 13:25 | 67:24 68:22 | hate 49:4 |
| 68:23 71:22 | 53:25 54:4 | 16:8,20 22:2,5 | 69:2,10,19,21 | hateful 39:14 |
| Fortunately | 58:12 60:1,5 | 23:16 26:14 | 70:12,14 | Hawkins 35:9 |
| 29:1 | 60:21 61:3,8 | 27:20 30:14 | groupings 3:14 | 35:10,14 73:12 |
| forward 15:16 | 62:19 64:4 | 31:25 33:13,19 | 4:4 8:19,20 | 73:13 |


| HB 19:4 76:7 | hopefully 20:22 | include 3:1 | interpreters | 14:2,2 16:16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ear 15:21 16:8 | 42:13 | included 6:17 | 29:15 | 18:9,14,15 |
| eard 20:2,4 | hopes | 8:1 | interpreting | 28:8 30:13 |
| 22:14 23:10 | house 1:2,3 2:4,6 | inclusive 76:11 | 13:4 | 35:20 36:15,20 |
| 27:5,13,15 | 2:7 3:6 4:18 | incumbency | interruption | 37:8,11 40:11 |
| 28:24 29:14,17 | 17:23 18:23 | 5:18 | 57:17 | 40:17,19 42:10 |
| 29:22 30:10,11 | 19:21 24:18 | independent | introduce 46:4 | 45:3 49:25 |
| 30:14 32:14 | 29:4 32:10 | 32:5,10,20 | introducing | 52:13 53:17 |
| 38:24 55:24 | 36:16 49:10 | 45:10 | 18:22 | $5: 8$ 56:4,19 |
| hearing 18:7,8 | 56:5,6 57:18 | Indian 48:2,25 | investment 20:1 | 57:6 59:15 |
| 18:10 21:16 | 58:18 63:11 | 49:19 58:20 | involved 20:20 | 62:25 64:23 |
| 29:6,25 31:15 | 71:11 73:8,23 | Indians 48:9,23 | 30:23 31:21 | 67:15 70:15,18 |
| 33:11 45:19 | 73:24 74:7,21 | 62:25 | issue 36:1 | 73:3 |
| hearings 18:5 | 74:22 75:3 | individual 27:18 | issues 11:19 12:6 | knowing 34:1 |
| 19:9 21:1 27 | 76:7 | individually | 15:14 | known 55:2 |
| 28:11 29:5,17 | huge 22:1 66:21 | 40:1 | items 48:22 | knows 39:19 |
| 31:11 35:2 | human 44:16 | individuals 44:2 |  |  |
| heart 36:17 49:1 | 45:17 54:21 | in | J | L |
| held 37:18 76:7 | hundreds 5:3,7 | inform 28: | job 31:1,4 | lack 8:12 |
| help 15:15 65:9 | hurts 40:8 | information | John 50:25 | adies 19:21 |
| helping 42:6 | hypocritical | 21:1 | 51:13 52:12 | lady 17:7,11 |
| hierarchy 22:25 | 45:16 | informative 30:3 | 53:1,8 | 19:14,18 23:19 |
| highest $28: 10$ |  | informing 36:24 | join 40:21 | 23:23 26:3,7 |
| hired 6:13 | I | infused 12:8 | joining 41:19 | 42:16 44:12 |
| Hispanic 29:16 | ign | inherent 25:7 | Jones 53:25 54:2 | 57:16 62:14 |
| historic 7:7 | ille | init | 54:6 57:13 | 74:13 |
| historically | imagine 16:3 | input 3:5 27:7 | jotted 29:23 | large 28:13 51:5 |
| 30:15 | 48:23 | 28:15 31:24 | Julie 57:25 | 60:14 |
| history 2:18,23 | immense 4: | 41:1 | justice 51:7 | late 65:5 |
| 2:24 13:14 | 52:18 | In | justify 14:17 | lately 40:18 |
| 14:9,15,16,17 | impact 36:10 | instance 13:7 | K | law 13:4 55:4 |
| 14:19,22,23 | impacted 23:9 | instill 25:16 | K | lawsuits 24:16 |
| 15:117:16 | impartial 9:6 | intact 4:13 | .13 | laying 70:18 |
| 40:18 | 51:22 52:15 | interactive | 7:3 43:16 | leader 46:25 |
| hobbles 11:22 | 53:5 | 21: | 54:10 | 47:1 |
| Hoke 47:19 | imperm | interest 8: | keeping 4:21 | leaders 51:21,22 |
| hold 8:1 24:24 | 14:22 | 20:2 | keeps 7:3 69:21 | leadership 32:22 |
| holding 74:17 | implications | 23:6,9,11 | kept 4:23,23 | leads 37:15 |
| hole 52:23 | 17:22 | 36:17 37:20 | 212 | learn 34:4 |
| Holleman 55:5 | impl | 38:23 40 | 27:5 69:18 | learned 34:1,3 |
| home 26:18 | important 6:10 | 41:13 43:4 | kids 38:12 | leaving 44:4 |
| 34:19 | 15:2 21:7 | 49:3 51:6 | kind 11:8 16:5 | Lee 4:25 |
| homework 32:6 | 34:18 38:10 | interested 44:25 | $4: 22$ 56:19 | left 43:13 |
| honor 53:8 | 40:2 41:20,21 | interesting 18:6 | 68:3 | legal 1:20 24:22 |
| honored 5:9 | 47:23,23 48:17 | interests 39:1 | kindly 40:15 | 64:20 |
| hope $7: 5,6,11$ | 53:18 54:14 | 51:9,10 | knew 26:18 55 | legislated 17:25 |
| 25:20 29:2 | 55:20 72:18 | interpretatio | $55: 4,569: 5$ $73 \cdot 2$ | legislation 46:5 |
| 46:4 48:12,25 | impossible 25:6 | 64:20 | 73:2 | legislative 1:2 |
| 56:2,21 59:14 | impressive 7:2 | interpretations | know 8:4,7,17 | $21: 20$ |
| $74: 17$ | improved 38:16 | $65: 21$ | 11:1 13:25,25 | legislators 30:7 |


| legislature 2:25 | longer 18:12 | 59:1,17 63:4,5 | 49:7 60:12 | misinterpreting |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 54:13 58:20 | 24:25 54:25 | majority-mino... | March 41:10 | 55:7 |
| Lenoir 66:13 | look 10:20 13:19 | 22 | material 43:17 | missed 12:11 |
| 68:20 | 19:5 27:21 | making 11:12 | materials 43:14 | 24:1 25:15 |
| let's 2:3 13:2 | 36:21 41:9,25 | 20:12,18 29:21 | 43:17 | 31:16,23 |
| 17:3 25:24 | 57:7 66:8 | 41:5 42:4 | matter 15:14,14 | moment 12:8 |
| 48:8 53:3 57:9 | 67:18,24 68:2 | 66:21,22 | 39:25 40:1 | Monday 3:9 |
| 57:9 69:7 | 68:6,7 69:7,9 | man 52:17 55: | matters 46:24 | 21:17 |
| letter 20:6,7 | 69:25 | mandate 14:5 | mayor 57:24 | monsters 68:6 |
| letters 15:13 | looked 5:21 | manipulate | mean 8:16 13:15 | MOORE 2:3,11 |
| lies $51: 1$ | 10:24 12:14,15 | 56:13,14 | 22:1 24:3 49:6 | 7:13,18 17:6 |
| life 12:9 | 26:23 33:9 | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { m a p }} 3: 6,194: 17$ | means 13:16 | 7:11 19:13,18 |
| lift 55:11 | 69:3 | 4:19,22 5:4,8 | meant 44:15 | 23:18,23 26:2 |
| lifts 56:10 | looking 12:13 | 5:16,19,22,23 | 66:19 | 26:7 35:7,12 |
| line 18:17 71:25 | 13:7 19:10 | 6:6,9,11,14 7:2 | Mecklenburg | 42:15,21,24 |
| 72:1 | 48:11 | 7:6,12 10:7 | 26:3 31:13 | 43:22,25 44:12 |
| lines 18:20 44:21 | looks 10:24 49:8 | 12:14,15 17:18 | 62:14 | 46:9,14,18 |
| 52:24 53:6 | 49:9,10 62:8,8 | 17:22 18:12 | meeting 9 | 47:7 49:24 |
| 54:9 56:20,21 | lose 25:3, $433: 13$ | 20:23 21:1,2 | meetings 27:25 | 50:15 53:24 |
| 58:10,11 64:2 | 55:21,23 | 21:23 22:16 | meets 50:19 | 54:4 57:12,18 |
| 64:3 72:1 | losing 25:6 30:8 | 28:18 34:22 | member 3:19 | 58:12 59:25 |
| listen 31:6,8 | $\boldsymbol{l o s t} 4: 1$ | 35:4 38:20 | 6:18 46:2 | 60:5,20 61:1,8 |
| 52:3 53:15 | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { l o t }} 8: 710: 3,14$ | 43:11 44:4,8 | 58:22 59:11,22 | 62:13,18,21 |
| listening 16:19 | 10:23 13:9 | 45:8,14 48:4 | 69:1,1 | 63:9 64:4 67:4 |
| 16:20 28:25 | 15:20,20,24 | 64:13,14 66:2 | members 2:16 | 67:9 70:3,8 |
| 29:1 49:23 | 20:2 23:10 | 68:12 69:10,17 | 5:19 7:5 20:7 | $71: 972: 373: 6$ |
| litigation 4:6 | 27:3,3,11,13 | 69:17,23 70:18 | 32:8 33:5 | 74:11,17 |
| 14:1,2 60:12 | 28:14 29:2,20 | 70:19 71:6 | 47:10 50:19 | Morey 42:16,18 |
| 62:3 | 30:14,16 31:18 | 72:9,13,15 | 55:11 57:20 | 42:25 43:20 |
| little 7:23 32:16 | 31:20,21 34:1 | map-making | 58:3 60:9 | 44:1,9,14 |
| 67:17 72:16 | 34:3,4 55:1 | 2:19 | 61:21 67:24 | 47:21 74:13,16 |
| live 6:3 34:12,13 | 64:23 | maps 2:21 3:5 | 68:13,22 69:24 | 74:19 |
| lived 24:25 | lots $24: 15,16,16$ | 4:7,10 7:11 8:5 | 72:5,6 | morning 65:7 |
| lives 36:11 | low 21:11 | 8:6,8,10,13,18 | men 55:14 | motion 57:21 |
| livestream 26:19 | Lumbee 47:20 | 9:8,14 10:10 | mentioned 32:4 | move 2:3 9:5 |
| 29:1 43:7 | 47:24 58:25 | 10:12,13,18 | 47:22 72:6,8 | 11:21 15:15,16 |
| livestreamed | 59:12,22 61:23 | 11:3,15 12:2 | merit 52:1 | 15:17,18 29:21 |
| 20:17 43:5 | 62:25 63:6 | 12:10 15:24 | messenger 75:5 | 41:10 |
| livestreaming | Lumbees 47:18 | 16:18 17:1,14 | middle 16:7 | moves 58:9 64:1 |
| 29:5 | 63:3 | 17:15,18 18:6 | 31:20 | 71:24 |
| living 36:8 55:1 |  | 18:9,11 20:19 | millions 24:21 | moving 15:19 |
| LLC 1:20 | M | 21:16,19 22:13 | mind 49:9 | 41:12 |
| local 12:4 24:19 | machine $63: 16$ | 22:17 23:8,15 | miniature 51:4 | municipal 5:9 |
| locations 21:6 | 71:16 73:14 | 24:1,17 25:18 | minimum 5:19 | municipalities |
| lock 63:16 71:16 | 74:4,25 | 27:20 28:16,16 | minority 31:4,7 | 5:10 7:3 9:12 |
| 73:14 74:4,25 | majority $11: 5$ | 28:19 30:10 | 33:15 45:20 | 9:13 59:3 |
| logical 38:9 | 25:12 30:25 | 33:19 34:14 | 46:25 55:12 | municipality |
| long 30:15,15 | 32:19 33:3,14 | 35:3 37:6,8 | 56:8 | 5:12 23:3 |
| 34:16 43:2 | 47:1 48:2 | 42:10 43:8,9 | minute 21:15 | Myers 1:18 76:4 |
| 56:5 57:2 | 55:12 56:6 | 43:16 45:3,20 | 26:8 | 76:16 |


| N | 76:8 | 47:11 48:8,15 | 14:7,8 | performed 5:2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Native 55:15 | number 28:9,10 | 49:23 58:19 | parts 15:23 | . 5 |
| nature 7:7 44:16 | 28:13 53:12 | 2:6 | 24:2 | $733: 10$ |
| 45:17 | 72:21 | 62:7,9 66:23 | party 11:13 | 8:8,19 53:14 |
| navigate 21:14 | number | 67:1,2 | 34:21 39:2 | 66:16 |
| necessarily $22: 1$ | 19 | opposed 63:14 | 46:2 | person's 55:25 |
| need 11:3 30:21 | numbers 17:20 | 71:14 73:10 | pass 8:10 11:4,6 | personal 28:15 |
| $152 \cdot 14$ | 59:2 72:10,13 | 74:1,23 | 70:1 | personalities 9: |
| needed 10:15 | 72:16 | opposite 45 | passage | persuasion |
| 21:13 | numerous 30:11 | options 37:12 | 74:22 | 34:21 |
| needs 32:4 | 32:24 | order 13:17 | passed 45: | philosophies |
| negative $4: 14$ | 0 | 57:19 65:23 | $74: 7$ | $45: 15$ |
| $63: 1971: 19$ |  | ordered 75:4 | passes 75:3 | pick 49:6 |
| 73:17 74:7 | obviously 7:22 | outcome 45:3 | passion 34:17 | picking 12:21 |
| $75: 3$ | $8: 912: 14$ | $53: 7$ | pat 30:22 | $35: 18$ |
| neighbor 38:9 | $47: 1349: 1$ | outside 6:13 | path 12:24 48:10 | piece 72:19 |
| never 22:23 23:4 | 57:1 65:4 | 16:18 41:1 | pay 16:6 24:22 | Pitt 10:20 39:7 |
| 34:16 | occasions 64 | $44: 7$ | PCS 64:23 | place 16:25 17:4 |
| new 10:13, 16 , | October 3:9 <br> odd 56.22 | overrides 52: | peg 52:23 | 66:17 |
| 14:11 24:24 |  | P | Pender 69:12,13 | ces 9 |
| 25:20 33:22 |  |  |  | an 54:6 69:2 |
| 44:20 64:24,25 |  |  | people 9:1 11:11 | an 54:6 69 |
| 66:14 |  |  | ,12,17 | anned 54:8 |
| night 9:22 10:3 |  |  |  | 39:4 $44 \cdot 20,20$ |
| 25:14 52:21 |  |  | 16:18 18:7,14 | 39:4 44:20,20 |
| 64:12 65:3,5 | officials 24:1 |  | 24:7, | playing 46:6 |
| 67:16 70:15,19 |  |  | 26:17,21,21,25 | please 53:23 |
| night's 64:23 | O | Paine 50 | 27:1,13 28:6 | 57:16 58:1 |
| Nobody's 31:25 |  |  | 8:12,14,19 | 3:4 |
| non 57:8 |  |  | 9:2,4,10,15 | pleased 57:23 |
| nonelection 57:8 | On | 28:7 60:14 | 29:20,24 30:14 | plenty 9:23 |
| nonpartisan | $40: 18,2066: 1$ ones $27.734 \cdot 20$ | $62: 365: 23$ partial $51: 12$ | 30:22 31:8,18 | $\text { plus } 47: 17$ |
| 19:1 | ones $27: 734: 20$ | partial 51:12 | 34:13 35:22 | point 10:10 11 |
| North 1:1,23 2:7 | online 3:7 | participate 3:12 | 36:3,6,6,12,16 | 11:21 13:13 |
| 2:10,18,24 3:6 | Onslow 69:21 | 21:5 24:10 | 36:21,25 38:4 | 20:22 28:7 |
| $4: 15: 624: 7$ | open $3: 8,17$ |  | 9:14,21 40:3 | 49:14 50:4 |
| $25: 23 \text { 27:14 }$ | $6: 1763: 15$ | particip | 40:13 41:14,22 | 66:20 69:5 |
| 29:20 35:22 | 67:20 71:15 | $22: 1$ | 45:9,25 46:7 | 73:20 |
| 40:3,17 41:8 | 1 | particula | $7: 23,24$ 49:1 | pointed 2 |
| 41:14 42:1,3 | opinion 68:17 | :24 12: | 49:12 50:20 | points 20:11, |
| 48:16 54:14 | opportuniti |  | 51:4,9 52:25 | 22:19 66:3 |
| 74:10 76:1,7 | 5,23 11:1 | 64.8 65.23 | 4:14 56:14 | political 3:2 6:7 |
| northern 37:23 | 31:24 | 69:21 70:12 | 61:2 | 6:8 7:10 15:23 |
| 37:24 | opportun | particular | percent 61:15 | 15:25 18:20 |
| note 18:7 | 9:19 10:2,18 |  | percentage | 6:15 40: |
| notes 29:7 | $12: 3,11 \quad 13: 1$ | parties 6 | 66:25 | 45:15,15,22,23 |
| nothing's 58:23 | $15: 15 \text { 21:5 }$ | 20:20 | perception | 46:2 72:19 |
| notice 21:15 | 24:1,10 25:15 | p | :15 56: | politician 45: |
| 32:12 | :19 31:23 | . | performative | politicians 18:19 |
| November 1:4 | 33:24 34:5 | partisanism | 30:4 | politics 12:8 |


| 45:24 46:5 | 50:23 | protection 30:18 | quite 41:2 | reason 38:10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 51:25 | Princeton 22:15 | proud 37:9 | quote 28:10 35:1 | $1: 5$ 52:22 |
| 0 | principal 50:25 | p |  | 5:10 |
| polls 59:1 | principles 51:17 | public 2:19 3:5,7 | R | sons 8:25 |
| Polsby-Poppe | 51:18 53:8 | 3:20,23 18:5,7 |  | 69:24 |
| 68:11 | 21:1 22:20 | 18:10 19:9 | R's | recall 20:25 |
| populatio | 64:12 | 20:3,3,4,5, | race 6:4,5 13:8 | receive $38: 14$ |
| 5:14 29:12 | priorities | 21:1,12,16 | :12,14, | received 3:4 |
| populatio | 23:1 | 22:4,10 23 | $3: 2414: 20,2$ | 20:6,7 46:24 |
|  |  | 23:10 27:4,7 | 49:4 | 50:6 |
| portra | pr | 28:11 29:17,25 | racial 6:6 | recess 47:4 |
| p | 22:9 27:8 | 31:11,15,24 | racist $13: 15,15$ | recognize 8:8 |
| positio | 28:21 50:7 | 33:11 34:12 | 13:16 | recognized 2 : |
| possession 46:21 | 51:16 72:2 | 68:4 | rail 54:18,19,20 | 46:15 58:6 |
| possibility 49:20 | problem 35:2 | public's 34:15 | 4:24 55:18 | 63:21 71:21 |
| possible 10:4 | problems 38:1 | purple 12:20 | rails 54:17 | 72:4 |
| :2 | proceed 48: | 68:19 | R | recommende |
| potential 49:16 | 58 | p | 5:25 65: | 33:9 |
| potentially | process | 9:13 | ranking 12 : | reconsider 53:22 |
| 48.11 | 2:23,25 3:2 | 23:18 26:2 | .22 | 53:23 |
| power 11 | 5:2 6:16,16,17 | 35:7 42:15 | rar | record 63:17 |
| 5 | 7:8 8:14,15 9:6 | 46:9 50:10 | reach $25: 21$ | 71:17 73:15 |
| powerful 54:22 | 15:23,25 16:6 | 53:24 59:2 | 29:20 | 74:5 75:1 |
| practice 29 | 18:3 19:2, | 60:20 61:3 | read 2:4 | recorded 2:20 |
| 39:15,15 | 20:4,8,10,19 | 62:13 67:4 | 27:6,8, | 60:24 61:2 |
| practices 39:12 | 20:22 21:10 | 70:3 | 58:11 | 74:14 76:6 |
|  | 2 | pushba | 64:3 | recording $2: 1$ |
| P | 30:21,24 36:20 | pushing 41: | 72:2 7 | 75:6 76:12 |
| prefer 18:21,21 | 37:18 40:10 | put 3:19 8:17 | read | red 12:19 |
| 18:25 | 41:4 42:7,11 | 19:23,24 25:6 | 0:2 73:2 | redistricting |
| presenta | 45:22 54:11,15 | 27:11 28:15 | 74:8,22 75 | 2:17 3:25 4:18 |
| 4:16 | 54:23 55:13,17 | 29:2 36:8 | ready 44:19 58:3 | 9:4,21 19:1 |
| presente | 55:21 56:9 | 53:3,4 55: | 65:3 | 20:21 24:15,23 |
| 4 | 5 | 57:9 66: | real 19 | 27:25 29:4 |
| presenti |  |  |  | $31: 532: 6,11$ |
| 12:16 | profess 51:16 | putting 3:22 8:8 | ealistic 8:1 | 32:20 33:22 |
| presiden | Project 22:16 | $40: 3$ | realities $8: 5$ | 34:6 36:1 |
|  | promise 54:1 | Q | reality $8: 8$ 13:13 | 40:23 43:3 |
| pretty 39:20 | promises 56:4 |  |  | 45:10 47:13 |
| 40:20 43:6 | promote 30:11 | qualified 66:8 |  | 51:22 52:15 |
|  | 35 | quality 20: | really 10:5,14 | $53: 5$ |
| previous 4.5 | p | q |  | redra |
| previous 4:5 |  | :1 | 1:11,18 23:6 | redraw 10:25 |
|  |  | 61:18 62:1 | 28:1 34:1 | 60:13 |
| previously | proposals 3:22 | 3:11 70:23 | 35:19 38:23 | redrawing 43:11 |
| price 24:20 | proposed 4:17 | 71:3,11 73:7 | 41:16 47:14 | redraws 10:8,9 |
| primaries 35:5 | 4:19 37:7 41:2 | 73:23 74:21 | 48:3,12 49:1 | references 22:15 |
|  | 67:2 | questions 43:6 | 49:16 58:17 | referred 43:14 |
| prima | proposing 41:18 | 43:12 44:14 | 65:11 68:1 | reflect 24:4 |
| primary 41:4,12 | protected 50:24 | quickly 65:13 | 69:14 73:3,3 | 45:14 |


| reflection 3:24 | 2:5,7,12,14 | resulted 3:5 4:2 | 68:24 | 6:3,25 12:25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| reflects 3:6 | 7:14,16,20 | 7:1 39:10 | rooms 43:13 | 26:20,25 34:12 |
| 22:22 44:16 | 17:7,9,12 | results 39:12,13 | round 52:23 | 36:24 38:16,20 |
| Regardless | 19:14,16,19,22 | Return 2:8 | Rowland 59:4 | 49:17 64:9 |
| 56:18 | 23:19,21,24 | reversed 16:12 | RPR 1:18 76:1 | seeing 40:23 |
| Reives 7:15,16 | 26:3,5,8 27:8 | rewriting 58:11 | RTP 37:25 | 43:8 48:3 |
| 7:20 60:22,23 | 27:15 35:8,10 | 64:3 72:1 | rubber 50:19 | 72:11 |
| 63:21,24 64:1 | 35:14 42:16,18 | rhetorical 45:1 | rules 39:5 52:18 | seek 4:15 11:11 |
| 64:6 68:16 | 42:21,23,25 | Richardson | 64:16 66:2 | 25:21 |
| 70:5,6,10 | 43:1,19,20,24 | 50:11,13,17 | run 13:20 50:1 | seen 7:8 24:14 |
| 71:13 72:8 | 44:1,6,9,14 | 74: | 53:11 54:17 | 36:12 47:15 |
| 73:1 | 45:7 46:10,12 | rides 38:14 | 69:3 | 51:18 69:20 |
| Reives' 19:22 | 46:16 47:5,9 | right 9:9 13:5 | running 72:20 | segment 29:12 |
| related 48:22 | 47:21 49:25 | 23:7 27:15,1 | runs 68:19 | segregation |
| relates 47:15 | 50:11,13,17 | 27:16 38:15 | rural 3:25 69:13 | 11:20 |
| reluctant 37:9 | 51:3 53:25 | 40:7 41:6,6 |  | senate 3:22 |
| remain 4:5 | 54:2,6 57:13 | 50:22,23 52:12 | S | 22:16 24:19 |
| remained 3:17 | 57:22 58:6,9 | 53:20,22 57:23 | Sampson 65:1 | 32:9 75:5 |
| 37:20 | 58:14 60:2,3,7 | 59:5 67:21 | 69:11,15 | send 58:7 63:22 |
| remember | 60:21,23 61:4 | 73:19 | Saturdays 31:22 | 71:22 73:1 |
| 6:10 10:8 21:2 | 61:6,10,11 | rights $13: 2$ | saw 5:3 8:16 | sending 49:13 |
| 60:11 61:11 | 62:14,16,17,18, | 14:4 50:23 | 9:22 26:24 | sense 7:24 11:12 |
| 66:10 | 62:20,22,23 | 65:16,19,25 | 27:1 39:4 | 11:14 14:16 |
| remind 27:6 | 63:2,7,13,21 | 66:7,18 70:25 | 64:24 65:4 | 16:16 18:16 |
| 70 | 63:24 64:1,6 | 71:4,6 | 70:14, | 22:8 38:10 |
| reminded 18:18 | 65:8 67:6,7,11 | rings 40:5 | saying 10:21 | 53:21 69:15 |
| reminder 70:11 | 68:15 70:4,6 | rise 7:15 17:8,13 | 14:25 15:1 | sent $63: 1271: 12$ |
| reminds 54:15 | 70:10 71:13,21 | 19:15 23:20,25 | 26:13,14,15 | 73:875:5 |
| remote | 71:24 72:3,5,8 | 26:4,11 35:9 | 32:5 33:4,24 | separating |
| renumber 46:23 | 72:25 73:9,12 | 42:17 46:11 | 52:4 56:7 | 11:24 15:8 |
| repeat $23: 12,13$ | 73:12 74:3,13 | 50:12 54:1,2 | says $5: 1213: 5$ | September 28:1 |
| 35:17 | 74:16,19 | 60:2,22 61:5 | 13:22 53:9 | seriously 31:5 |
| repeated 22 : | represented | 62:15 67:6 | scattered 21:4 | serve 11:12 |
| repeatedly $22: 24$ | 59:13 | 70:5 | school 38: | 40:12 47:11 |
| 24:17 | Republic | risk 13:20 | schools 38:11,13 | 66:10 |
| repeating $28: 25$ | 32:21 55:3,15 | road 1:21 40:22 | score 68:10,11 | served 12:7 |
| replicates 60:15 | Republicans | 42:1 50:20 | Scotland 47:19 | 33:25 59:4 |
| report 5:11,14 | :15 16:22 | 57:5,6 | scratch 10:15 | 62:10 |
| Reporter 76:5 | 32:13 33:1,2 | roads 38:15 | screen 3:16 | serves 25:22 |
| Reporters 1:19 | requesting $20: 7$ | Robeson 46:10 | :22, | serving 33:6 |
| represent 45:9 | requests $73: 1$ | 47:18,24 58:13 | screens 26:24 | 34:8 47:20 |
| 46:7 47:17 | require 70:24 | 58:25 59:18 | seats 30:8 | 59:5,23 |
| 48:15 59:16 | respect 4:7 | 61:4,24 | second 22:12 | session 1:2 15:10 |
| representation | 52:18 | role | 47:2,13 50:2,9 | 15:11,12 17:25 |
| 11:15 34:24 | respected 51:15 | roles 16:12 | 61:7 70:7 | 31:12,14,16 |
| 45:25 47:22 | respectful 43:5 | room 3:16 6 | 73:24 74:8 | 48:15 |
| 49:2 50:22 | respectfully | 6:17,19 26:17 | Secondly 8:16 | sessions 18:23 |
| 51:8 59:15,21 | 60:9,18 67:13 | 26:24 43:10,11 | 70:22 | 56:25 |
| 61:24 62:10 | response 70:21 | 43:15 44:4 | $4: 195: 11,13$ | set 8:10 10:5,6 |
| representative | rest 66:2 | 53:21 67:20 | 4:19 5:11,13 | 11:22,23 26:23 |


| 6:25 64:17 | slowing 41:4 | special 17:24 | stay 11:13 65:5 | T |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 53:20 57:21 | sta | T 76:1,1 |
| seven 5:5,7 | sn | 75: | Stenograp | table 34:25 36:9 |
| 32:25 37:7 | smart 28:21 | sp | 76 | 25:6 |
| seventh 68:8 | 55:5 | 7:14 35: | stenographica... | take 8:22 |
| share 29:23 | st | spen | 76:9 | 47:2 49:1 50:9 |
| sharing 30:2 | 50:2 | spent 16:1 | Stephenson 13:8 | 53:3 58:4 |
| shops 38:2 | social 36 | 28:17,17 42:10 | 13:21,21 64:9 | taken 43:2 51:11 |
| short 15:12 | So | split 5:19:11 | 65:17,24 66:6 | 73:20 76:8 |
| sh | so | 16,17 23:3, | 21 70:2 | takes 16:16 46:5 |
| show 9:15 10:18 | solved 38:19 | 24:5 37:4,13 | stop 30:6, | 64:9 |
| - 13 | somebody | 7:16,16 | stopped 75 | talent 7:25 |
| S | 32:3 69:6 | splits 5:4,5, | strengthen | talk 27:18 38:11 |
| side 13:10 15:22 | sorry 34:4 63:25 | 5:13 7:2 | 52:10 | 38:12 39:22 |
| 15:22 37:24,25 | sort 8:6 9:2,9 | spoke 28:12,1 | strict $51: 7$ | 49:5 |
| 44:18,18 45:5 | 12:22 14:3 | sponsor 42:19 | strike 60:1 | talked 10:3 14:7 |
| 45:19 51:19 | 37:14,15,17 | 46:15 | strongly 25 : | 34:16 46:25 |
| 54:18 55:12, | 38:20 39:25 | sponsore | struck 60:15 | talking 14:20 |
| sides 30:16,23 | 40:15 54:10 | sp | struggle 52: | 16:22,22 |
| 33:6 38:4 | 57:6 68:6 | square 52: | 52:20 | Taxpayers |
| Signed 76:13 | sorts 36:14 | staff 19:24 | studied 3 | 24:21 |
| significant 21: |  | 2:9 65:12 | stuff | ach 14 |
| significan | speak 6:2 26 | stage 13:1 | stupid 18:14 | teaching 28:3 |
| 17:17 | 26:11 44:1 | Stam 55:2 | submittin | teams 44:18 |
| similar 4:5 | 54:2,8,9,11 | stand 51:17 58 | suburban 69:1 | tell 10:25 23:8 |
|  | 61:6 67:22 | standing 3 | subway 54 : | 7:20 39:20 |
| similarly 12:23 | 70:6 | 49:11,19 51:25 | sudden 16:7 | 40:2 61:22 |
|  | speake | 52:1 58:22 | suggestion 56:17 | 70:1 |
| simple 15:6 | 2:15 7:13, | start 10:1 | Suite 1:22 | telling 15:21 |
| simply 46:23 | 7:18 17:6,10 | 15:18 26:14 | Sundays 31: | 16:13 |
| 70:24 | 17:11 19:13,1 | 37:16,16 38 | supervision | tem 57:24 |
| single 3:19 14: | 19:20 23:18,22 | started 2:2 36:2 | 76:10 | ten 11:9,18 |
| 14:12 18:18 | 23:23 26:1,2,7 | starting 32:17 | support 7:5 | 27:14 33:18 |
| 25:10 36:7 | 31:12,16 35:7 | starts 17:1 | 18:24 30:6,9 | 34:11 54:12 |
| 39 | 35:12 42:15, | state 2:23 | 48:24,24 49:13 | 7:8 |
| sir 63:8 74 | 42:21,24 43:2 | 11:9 15:17,18 | 56:8,9,16 | ten-year 33:22 |
| sit 16:5 45: | 43:25 44:12 | 21:4 24:6,18 | 59:24 62:11 | term 32:13 |
| sitting 5:24 44:5 | 46:9,14,18 | 24:18,23 29:13 | 67:3 71:7 73: | 33:22 47:12 |
|  | 47:6,7 48:1 | 29:25 33:10,1 | supports 55:7,10 | terminal 45:13 |
| situated | 49:22,24 50:15 | 35:22 46:1 | supposed $31: 1$ | terms 59:5 |
| situation 9: | 50:18 53:24 | 48:23 59:1 | sure 11:12 20:12 | y 65. |
| 20:13 64:20 | 54:4 57:12,18 | 68:4 76:1 | 20:18 23:7 | t70:1 |
| $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { s i x }} 1: 2127: 1$ | 58:12 59:25 | state's 68:14, | 34:13 36:3,23 | thank 2:14 7:16 |
|  | 60:5,8,20,24 | stated 58:16 | 40:17,20 41:5 | :20 17:5,12 |
|  | 61:1,8 62:13 | 65:1 | 41:22 42:4 | 19:12,19 23:16 |
| 68 | 62:18,21 63:9 | statement 29:22 | 53:8 | 25:17,25 26:9 |
| skeletons | 63:25 64:4,7 | 61:1 | swapping 69:22 | 31:12,18 35:15 |
| skimmed 27:10 | 67:4,9,12 70:3 | states 12:18,19 | sworn 32:9 | 42:8,11,14,18 |
| Skip 55:2,3,4,5, | 70:8 71:9 72:3 | 12:20,20,23 | system 54:16 | 42:25 43:20 |
| Skip's 55:5 | 73:674:11,17 | 15:19 |  | 44:9 46:7 47:9 |


| 49:22,23 50:17 | Thomas 50:24 | town 37:24,2 | 6:6 70:20 | 4:19 35:6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 53:23 57:11,12 | thoug | :20 | type 11:22 14:10 | 38:7 40:16 |
| 58:2,14 59:24 | 27:11,11 29:8 | train 54:17 | 40:1 | 41:18 42:6 |
| 60:7,23 62:12 | 30:20 | transcribed 1:16 |  | 55:24 |
| 3:7,24 | thousand 47: |  | U | 60:10,18,24 |
| , |  |  |  | 62:6 63:13,14 |
| hanked 31:17 | 67:20 | 2:175:6 76:6 | ultimate 53:7 | 3:15,17 67:14 |
| :8 |  | 76:12 | tely | 70:2 71:14,15 |
| 22 | ti | tr | 23,2 | 71:15,17 73:10 |
| 47:5 | $6 \cdot 157 \cdot 8,27$ | 29:18 | uncann | 73:10,11,13,15 |
| hemes | 9 9: | tr | undermine 48:8 | 73:25 74:1,2,3 |
| they'd 6:14 | 11:7 12:5 | 7:9 29:9 | understand 11:5 | 74:5,15,23,24 |
| thing 6.2, 10,11 | 13:13 15: | transparent | :4 36: | 4:24 75:1 |
| 14:10 40:2,11 | 19:23,24 20 | 17 | 41:23 46:1 | 76:7 |
| 40:16 41:15 | 26:21 27:1,11 | 20:8,10 21 | 54:12 68:15 | voted 6:15 63:18 |
| 51:14 56:7 | 28:18 30:15 | traveling 20:15 | understanding | 71:18 73:16 |
| 57:3 68:3 | 32:19 33:1 | traverses 68:18 | 34:6 | 74:6 75:2 |
| things 7:24 | 35:15 39:24 | tr | undertook 6:15 | voters 13:15 |
| 11:2 13:6 | 4 | $t$ | 0 | 25:3 |
| 14:24 15:7, | 42:10 43:2 |  | unfair 51:12 | votes 25:12 |
| 15:13 26:12 | 46:22 47:14 | tribes 48:16 |  | 9:12 55:22,23 |
| 36:3 37:17 | 48 |  | unprece | 61:2 |
| 38:4,15 39:13 | 52:8 | trie | 7:9,10 | voting 8:25 |
| 39:23 41:1,25 | 61:7 64:13,24 | 73:4 | unrest 36:14 | 13:23 14:4 |
|  | 65:4,8 67:17 |  |  | 7:2 22:18 |
| think 12:7 13: | 67:21,23 70:7 | true 19:10 | use $3: 17: 10$ | 23:16 31:14,16 |
| 14:7 19:5 | 70:14 74:8 | 61 | 12:13 14:19,22 | 8:8,9 41:19 |
| 21:25 22:2,2 | tim |  | :23 15:1 | 0:22 53:7 |
| 22:13 23:15,15 | 30:12 31:10 |  | 37:21 43:18 | $5: 19$ 65:16,18 |
| 23:25 26:12,22 | 41:2 43:4 51 | trust $24: 11,12$ | V | 65:25 66:7,18 |
| 27:5,20 28:22 | 51:19 68:19 |  | V2 58:5 | $70: 2571: 4,6$ |
| 30:2,16 32:4 | tir |  | V2 58:5 <br> values 22.22 | TD 5:4,5,7 |
| 33:16 34:11 | 39:1 | tr | video 21:24 | $23: 4$ |
| 35:5,19 38:6 | today | 7.3 35.17,23 | video 21:24 <br> Videographers | VTDs 5:1 9:16 |
| 40:2 41:15 | 9:25 | 6:8 37:4 | Videographers | 9:17 37:4,13 |
| 44:16,25 45:2 | $28:$ | 46:23 50:9 | $1: 20$ <br> viewpoint 68:16 | 37:16 |
| 45:6,18 46:18 | 32:23 33:16,21 |  | viewpoint 68:16 violate $68: 14,17$ |  |
| 48:10 50:3 | 34:19 48:4 | trying 8:13,14 | violate 68:14,17 | W |
| 51:5 55:6,6 | 52:2 | 10:3 16:17 | violated 38:22 | wage $36: 8$ |
| 58:16 59:10, | 57:6 58:2 | 22:7 27:5 39:5 | violates 30:13,17 | wages $36: 8$ |
| 61:12,12,13 | tol | T | violation 68:21 <br> virtually 20:14 | wait 70:18 |
|  |  | T | virtualiy 20:14 | wake $14: 11$ |
| th |  |  |  |  |
|  | tomorrow 22:18 | tweaking 17:3 | voice $31: 834: 24$ | $\text { walls } 11 \cdot 23$ |
| third 20:20 46:1 | ton 22:14 28:17 | two 18:4 26:25 | $48: 18,18$ | walls 11:23 want $11: 6,10$ |
| 47:3 50:3 |  | 3 | volition 3:1,3 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { vant } 11: 6,10 \\ & 1 \cdot \cdot 19: 14 \cdot 17 \end{aligned}$ |
| , 20,2 |  | 43:5,12 44:18 | volition 3:1,3 vote 1.3 4:14 | $12: 1,914: 17$ |
| 55:18 74:8,22 | touch 11:19 | 50:20 52:19 | vote 1:3 4:14 | 14:21,22 16:23 |
|  | 4. | 54:8,17 59:4,5 |  | 16:24 23.12 |
| thirds 24:5 | tours 16:21 | 64:9,15 65:21 | 19:3,11 25:25 | 25:17 33:13,14 |


| 34:18 35:14 | 36:20,22,23,24 | 55:8 56:24 | 120 29:24 36:16 | 45:4,5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 36:3,15,18,19 | 40:3,4,9,22 | 59:2 | 13 21:1 72:1 |  |
| 36:20 38:16,17 | 41:23,24 44:17 | worked 25:17 | $1972: 1$ | 6 |
| 40:13,21,24,25 | 44:19,19 45:5 | 31:17 68:24 |  | $6021: 3$ |
| 41:22,22 42:8 | 45:19,23 49:16 | working 39:25 | 2 | 643 34:11 |
| 42:11 45:14 | 50:8 52:22,23 | 40:5 41:23 | 2 1:476:8 | 66 63:19 |
| 48:7 49:9,15 | 53:2 54:23 | world 36:13 | 2:29:21 75:7 | 67 71:19 75:2 |
| 49:20,25 54:10 | 57:23 58:4 | worst 68:9 | 2003 32:9,12,18 | $6874: 6$ |
| 56:16 57:21 | 64:20 72:11,21 | worth 32:5 | 2009 32:18,23 | 69 44:18,23 45:4 |
| 58:1 59:14 | we've $2: 168: 15$ | wow $29: 8$ | 2010 10:17 | 45:5 |
| 60:16 65:5 | 9:3,11 10:8,16 | wrong 14:23 | 32:23 | 6th 3:9 |
| 66:20 | 10:19 12:12 | 24:15 28:9 | 2011 5:1 9:12,16 | 7 |
| wanted 6:18 | 13:1,17,22,25 | 41:3 | 10:18 21:3 $\mathbf{2 0 1 7} 60 \cdot 11$ | 70s 47:20 58:21 |
| 9:18 29:4 | 14:3,11,13 | $\mathbf{X}$ | $2017 \text { 60:11 }$ | 70s 47:20 58:21 |
| 37:19 67:23 | 15:10,15 23:25 | X | $20193: 13$ | 8 |
| 68:5,5 | 24:14,17 28:16 | Y | 2020 20211 202 | 82 5:12 |
| wants 40:19 | 47:20 58:22 |  | 2021 1:2,4 32:12 | $8240 \text { 76:17 }$ |
| wasn't 16:14,21 | 65:15 66:4,6 $71 \cdot 5$ | $\mathbf{y}^{\prime}$ all 21:2 53:18 yeah $27: 16$ | $\begin{aligned} & 32: 23 ~ 56: 23 \\ & 76: 8.13 \end{aligned}$ | $8340 \text { 1:18 76:5 }$ |
| 21:24,24 70:17 | 71:5 | $30: 24$ | $76: 8,13$ |  |
| watch $21: 23$ | website $21: 14$ | year 16:4 56:22 | 20th 76:13 | 9 |
| 26:20 29:3 | 23:8 27:23 |  | 23 62:24 63:3 | 971:25 |
| watched 43:3 | Wednesday | years 11:9,18 | $2458: 18$ 62:24 | 9:00 3:10 |
| 52:17 | 31:11 | $27: 1433: 9,18$ | $\begin{array}{r} 63: 3,5 \\ 2528 \cdot 12 \end{array}$ | 919 1:24 |
| watching 36:6 | week 70:20 | 27:14 33:9,18 <br> 41:11 48:21 | $25 \text { 28:12 }$ | $9761: 32: 4,6$ |
| 43:7 48:5 | weeks $3: 6,17$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41: 1148: 21 \\ & 49: 1851: 21 \end{aligned}$ | 27609 1:23 | 19:4 73:24 |
| way $3: 126: 11$ | 16:10,14 34:11 | $54: 1257: 8$ | 3 | 74:7,22 75:3 |
| 11:2 14:19,23 | 52:19 64:15 | $59: 566: 11$ |  | 76:7 |
| 15:24 16:25,25 | 67:21 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{3 : 0 0} 31: 11 \\ & \mathbf{3 0} 56: 23 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 21:25 22:3,21 | welcome 57:21 | yesterday $32: 7$ <br> yield $42: 22,23$ | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{3 0} 56: 23 \\ & \mathbf{3 0 3 1} 56: 23 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 22:21,22 23:14 | went $6: 1921: 16$ | yield 42:22,23 <br> $43 \cdot 23,2462 \cdot 19$ | $\begin{aligned} & 303156: 23 \\ & \mathbf{3 7 : 3 3} 2 \cdot 2 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 25:10 38:12,21 | 27:3,6 32:11 | $43: 23,24 \text { 62:19 }$ | 37:33 2:2 |  |
| 38:25 40:7 | 32:14 68:23 | 62:20 | 39 32:9,10 |  |
| 41:11 44:8 | 72:11 | yields 42:24 $43: 25 \text { 62:21 }$ | 4 |  |
| 45:21 47:3 | white 55:15 |  | $464: 2$ |  |
| 50:4,21 53:4 | wholesale 4:3 | young | 4,000 22:6 27:9 |  |
| 65:17 | Wilson 23:19 | Z | 42 58:10 |  |
| Wayne 65:1 | win 55:20,22 | zoned 38:13 | 4208 1:21 |  |
| 66:13 68:20 | wish 9:5 73:13 | zoom 37:14 | 424-8242 1:24 |  |
| ways $12: 214: 24$ | 74:3,14 |  | 43 64:2 |  |
| 37:12 39:6 | women 55:14 | 0 | 48 58:11 74:6 |  |
| we'll 20:22 | won $35: 5$ | 09 68:12 | $4963: 18$ 64:3 |  |
| 22:17 | wonder 38:25 |  | 71:18 75:3 |  |
| we're 10:12,21 | words 35:16,20 | 1 | 71.1875.3 |  |
| 10:22 11:2,9 | 51:9 | 171:25 | 5 |  |
| 11:24 12:15,16 | work 7:21 16:14 | 100 61:15 | 5 58:10 |  |
| 13:4,25 14:19 | 26:16 28:5,6 | 1000 1:22 | 5:00 3:10 |  |
| 15:23 23:2 | 31:19,21,21 | 102409-2 76:17 | 50 28:14 47:17 |  |
| 24:7 28:22,25 | 34:10 36:7,7 | $11028: 11,12$ | 49:18 |  |
| 28:25 29:1,21 | 42:12 43:2 | 11673:16 | 50/50 53:12,16 |  |
| 33:12,17 35:19 | 44:5 53:4,14 | 12 48:21 | 51 8:8 44:18,23 |  |




| 1 | Raleigh is too large for one senate | 1 | 36 percent of the population of Raleigh is in |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | district and, therefore, must be split. The | 2 | Senate District 15. Within the district, |
| 3 | chairs were unable to keep Cary or Apex whole | 3 | 85 percent of the population is in Raleigh and |
| 4 | within a district due to the populations and | 4 | 12 percent is in Cary. Senate District 15 |
| 5 | geography. However, all other municipalities -- | 5 | splits two precincts with other districts to |
| 6 | Fuquay-Varina, Garner, Holly Springs, | 6 | balance population. The incumbent in this |
| 7 | Knightdale, Morrisville, Rolesville, | 7 | district is Senator Chaudhuri. |
| 8 | Wake Forest, Wendell, and Zebulon -- were kept | 8 | Senate District 16 is centered in Cary |
| 9 | whole. Ten percent were split in Wake county to | 9 | and western Wake. 80 percent of the population |
| 10 | keep the municipalities whole and balance | 10 | of Cary is in Senate District 16. 45 percent of |
| 11 | populations between the districts. Ten | 11 | the population of Apex is in the district. The |
| 12 | precincts were split to keep the populations | 12 | town of Morrisville is kept whole within Senate |
| 13 | whole. | 13 | District 16. Of the population of the district, |
| 14 | Senate District 13 includes Granville | 14 | 69 percent is Cary, 15 percent is Morrisville, |
| 15 | county and unincorporated areas in northern Wake | 15 | and 13 percent is Apex. There are two split |
| 16 | county plus the north wake towns of Rolesville, | 16 | precincts to balance population. One was Senate |
| 17 | Wake Forest, Zebulon -- and Zebulon. Raleigh, | 17 | District 15 and one was Senate District 17. The |
| 18 | the second largest city in North Carolina, again | 18 | incumbent for Senate District 16 is |
| 19 | is too large for a senate district and was, | 19 | Senator Nickel. |
| 20 | therefore, contained in four senate districts | 20 | And Senate District 17 includes |
| 21 | Over 98 percent of Raleigh is in three senate | 21 | Holly Springs, Fuquay-Varina, 55 percent of |
| 22 | districts. Senate District 13 has the smallest | 22 | Apex, and 6.5 percent of Cary. Three VTDs were |
| 23 | portion of the population, less than 2 percent. | 23 | split to keep Garner whole in Senate |
| 24 | The towns of Rolesville, Wake Forest, and | 24 | District 13, and another VTD was split to |
| 25 | Zebulon are left whole and 100 percent of their | 25 | balance population between 17 and 16. The |
|  | 9 |  | 11 |
|  | Wake county populations are within Senate District 13. | 1 | incumbent in this district is Senator Batch. |
| 2 |  | 2 | To recap, the Wake county senate map, |
| 3 | One precinct was split with Senate | 3 | the chairs decided to split ten VTDs to balance |
| 4 | District 18 to keep Wake Forest whole. Two | 4 | the population of the districts and to make as |
| 5 | precincts were split with Senate District 14 to | 5 | many of the municipalities as whole as possible. |
| 6 | keep Wendell whole. In the district, there are | 6 | Apex, Cary, and Raleigh were each split into |
| 7 | no incumbents in Senate District 13. | 7 | more than one district, and Fuquay-Varina, |
| 8 | Senate District 14 includes Garner, | 8 | Garner, Holly Springs, Knightdale, Morrisville, |
| 9 | Knightdale, Wendell, southeast Raleigh and parts | 9 | Rolesville, Wake Forest, Wendell, and Zebulon |
| 10 | of downtown Raleigh. 21 percent of the | 10 | were each left whole within one district. |
| 11 | population of Raleigh is in Senate District 14. | 11 | Cumberland and Moore county form a |
| 12 | There are no split municipalities in the | 12 | two-county, two-district grouping in the base |
| 13 | district other than Raleigh. 100 percent of the | 13 | map. Senate District 19 was drawn to keep as |
| 14 | populations of Garner, Knightdale, and Wendell | 14 | much of Fayetteville as whole as possible. The |
| 15 | are in the district. As mentioned, two of the | 15 | city of Fayetteville has an irregular shape and |
| 16 | precincts are split with Senate District 13 to | 16 | many satellite annexations and shares precincts |
| 17 | keep Wendell whole in Senate District 14. Three | 17 | with other municipalities such as Hope Mills, |
| 18 | precincts are split along the southern edge of | 18 | and the chairs were not able to leave it whole. |
| 19 | the district to keep Garner whole. Two | 19 | The result is a district that includes over |
| 20 | precincts are split in east Raleigh to balance | 20 | 88 percent of the population of Fayetteville and |
| 21 | its population with the districts within the | 21 | nearly 15 percent of the population of |
| 22 | deviation range. The incumbent in Senate | 22 | Hope Mills. There are no split VTDs in the |
| 23 | District 14 is Senator Blue. | 23 | district. The incumbent in Senate District 9 is |
| 24 | Senate District 15 is in west Raleigh | 24 | Senator deViere. |
| 25 | downtown and contains a portion of eastern Cary. | 25 | Senate District 21 was drawn keeping |
|  | 10 |  | 12 |
|  |  |  | 3 (Pages 9 to 12) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ryd | .com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | Moore county whole in part with the remaining |  | grouping is the base group in the senate map. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | rural areas of Cumberland county. As stated | 2 | Because of how the counties are aligned and the |
| 3 | above, the irregular shapes of municipalities | 3 | populations that live there, the counties must |
|  | and precincts containing more than one | 4 | be split between districts are Cabarrus, |
| 5 | municipality in them made it difficult to keep | 5 | Randolph, and Union. Alamance, Anson, |
| 6 | all municipalities whole | 6 | Montgomery, and Richmond counties were left |
| 7 | Senate District 21 includes 85 percent | 7 | whole within the district. |
| 8 | of the population of Hope Mills and 12 percent | 8 | Senate District 25 comprises Alamance |
| 9 | of the population of Fayetteville. There are no | 9 | county and eastern Randolph county. The chairs |
| 10 | split VTDs in Senate District 21, and there is | 10 | opted to keep as many precincts whole in |
| 11 | no incumbent in the district. | 11 | Randolph as possible while also keeping |
| 12 | Chatham and Durham counties form a | 12 | municipalities whole. One precinct was split to |
| 13 | two-county, two-district grouping in the base | 13 | keep all of Asheboro whole in Senate District 29 |
| 14 | senate map. Senate District 20 includes all of | 14 | and to keep all of Randleman whole in Senate |
| 15 | Chatham county, any unincorporated Durham | 15 | District 25. All other precincts in Randolph |
| 16 | county, and the peripheral Durham city | 16 | county are left whole as are municipalities in |
| 17 | precincts. The town of Chapel Hill has some | 17 | the county. Senator Galey is the incumbent for |
| 18 | territory in two Durham county precincts. The | 18 | Senate District 25. |
| 19 | chairs decided to keep the town of Chapel Hill | 19 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Hise. |
| 20 | whole and place both the precincts in Senate | 20 | HAIRMAN HISE: Yes. |
| 21 | District 20. Most of the City of Durham is in | 21 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: I just want to |
| 22 | Senate District 20 and Senate District 22, but | 22 | congratulate you for being halfway through. |
| 23 | SD 20 includes 30 percent of the city's | 23 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Actually, it's a little |
| 24 | population. There are no split VTDs in the | 24 | more than that, but that's good. |
| 25 | district, and the incumbent is Senator Murdock. | 25 | Senate District 29 comprises the rest |
|  | 13 |  | 15 |
| 1 | Senate District 22 was drawn within the | 1 | of Randolph county, including all of Asheboro |
| 2 | city of Durham. The city is larger than a | 2 | and the eastern side of the county, all of |
| 3 | senate district and is, therefore, split between | 3 | Anson, Montgomery, and Richmond, and eastern and |
| 4 | Senate District 22 and Senate District 20. | 4 | southern portions of Union county. Within Union |
| 5 | 70 percent of the population of Durham will | 5 | county, the district line was drawn to keep all |
| 6 | reside in Senate District 22. There are no | 6 | precincts and municipalities whole. Senate |
| 7 | split VTDs in Senate District 22. Senator | 7 | District 29 shares one split precinct with |
| 8 | Woodard is the incumbent in the district. | 8 | Senate District 25 in Randolph county to keep |
| 9 | Senate District 23 is created by the | 9 | the city of Asheboro whole. There are no split |
| 10 | base county grouping map: Caswell, Orange, and | 10 | municipalities within counties in the district. |
| 11 | Person counties. This being a whole county | 11 | There are two incumbents in Senate District 29: |
| 12 | district, there are no split VTDs or spli | 12 | Senator Craven and Senator McInnis. |
| 13 | municipalities. The incumbent in Senate | 13 | Senate District 35 comprises of the |
| 14 | District 23 is Senator Foushee. | 14 | rest of Union county and parts of the |
| 15 | Senate District 24 is also created by | 15 | southernmost VTDs in Cabarrus county. The |
| 16 | the base county grouping map: Hoke, Robeson, | 16 | chairs opted to not take the entire VTD, leaving |
| 17 | and Scotland counties. This being a whole | 17 | the blocks north of the town of Midland in |
| 18 | county district, there are no split VTDs or | 18 | Senate District 34 to leave as much of the |
| 19 | split municipalities. There are two incumbents | 19 | population of Cabarrus county in the district |
| 20 | in this district, Senator Clark and Senator | 20 | base there as possible, that being Senate |
| 21 | Robins -- Senator Britt from Robeson. Sorry. | 21 | District 34 , and to make the populations of the |
| 22 | Alamance, Anson, Cabarrus, Montgomery, | 22 | districts within the pod fall within the plus or |
| 23 | Randolph, Richmond, and Union counties comprise | 23 | minus 5 percent range. All the districts in |
| 24 | a seven-county, four-district grouping with the | 24 | this county grouping are above the ideal |
| 25 | Senate Seats 25, 29, 34, and 35. The county | 25 | population number with Senate District 34 and 35 |
|  | 14 |  | 16 |
|  |  |  | 4 (Pages 13 to 16 ) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ry | O.com 1-919-424-82 |





| 1 | from here is I'm going to be making a statement |  | evidence -- quote, a strong basis in evidence, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | of the chairs. We have a number of amendments | 2 | for each of those three factors. Specific |
| 3 | that are being pulled together that I think will | 3 | evidence would come in the form of reliable |
| 4 | answer or go to many of the questions that you | 4 | racial bloc voting analysis by an expert in the |
| 5 | may have for Senator Hise | 5 | field. Spreadsheets and argument based on |
| 6 | So what we're going to do, I'm going to | 6 | inadequate data do not create the strong basis |
| 7 | provide you the statement of the chairs, we're | 7 | in evidence the General Assembly would need to |
| 8 | going to then pause, go into recess for enough | 8 | overcome a constitutional challenge. |
| 9 | time to get our arms around these amendments, | 9 | Second, if we draw districts using race |
| 10 | see what we've got, then we'll reconvene and | 10 | and we do not satisfy the Gingles preconditions, |
| 11 | you'll be able to ask Senator Hise any questions | 11 | we risk violating the Equal Protection Clause of |
| 12 | you have about the map and then follow that with | 12 | the 14th Amendment to the United States |
| 13 | your amendment if you think that cures a concern | 13 | Constitution. In short, making one districting |
| 14 | that you have | 14 | choice over another for racially predominant |
| 15 | So, Senator Hise, you're welcome to | 15 | reasons will be subjected to strict scrutiny by |
| 16 | take a seat at this point because you're not | 16 | the courts. |
| 17 | going to have to be asked any questions until a | 17 | Our present record and most recent |
| 18 | little bit later | 18 | litigation does not provide a yes answer to any |
| 19 | So the chairs wanted to be direct and | 19 | of the Gingles factors. Our two most recent |
| 20 | address an issue that's being raised by some, | 20 | redistricting efforts, overseen and approved by |
| 21 | and that is whether the General Assembly is | 21 | the courts, in the Covington case and the Lewis |
| 22 | required to draw districts using racial data. | 22 | case did not consider race. In fact, in Lewis, |
| 23 | We've also received a lawsuit already | 23 | a three-judge panel analyzed all regions of the |
| 24 | from -- against the General Assembly filed | 24 | state last year, last year, and found no region |
| 25 | before the plan has even passed. This interest | 25 | where the Gingles factors were met. Some have |
|  | 29 |  | 31 |
|  | group activity litigated against the General | 1 | asked about whether the Stephenson case require |
| 2 | Assembly this past decade and succeeded in | 2 | that race be used in redistricting. Stephenson |
| 3 |  | 3 | says VRA districts must be drawn first only if |
| 4 | permissible racial consideration -- racial | 4 | there are VRA districts. Stephenson does not |
| 5 | considerations it now asks us to defy. I want | 5 | require VRA districts be drawn independent of |
| 6 | to explain at the outset why we cannot do that. | 6 | the requirements of federal law. Stephenson |
| 7 | So just to be clear, they litigated to limit our | 7 | assumed there would be VRA districts because |
| 8 | ability to use racial data, we're choosing, as | 8 | Section 5 of the VRA then applied here which |
| 9 | we did in 2019, not to use racial data, and now | 9 | meant VRA districts would need to be preserved |
| 10 | they're litigating, saying we should have used | 10 | independent of the Gingles factors I just |
| 11 | racial data. | 11 | discussed, but the US Supreme Court has held |
| 12 | So first, the General Assembly, the | 12 | that VRA Section 5 no longer applies which means |
| 13 | allegation is, cannot draw districts using | 13 | it no longer protects the General Assembly from |
| 14 | race -- well, no, this is the law. Apologies | 14 | racial gerrymandering claims. |
| 15 | First, the General Assembly cannot draw | 15 | Now, I'll discuss district-specific |
| 16 | districts using race under the Voting Rights Act | 16 | issues several members have asked us about. |
| 17 | unless we satisfy the three Gingles | 17 | In the Wilson-Wayne area, we do not |
| 18 | preconditions. They are, one, a reasonably | 18 | have any proposed plan from any member of this |
| 19 | compact majority-minority VAP district; two, a | 19 | body that includes a reasonably compact |
| 20 | politically cohesive minority community; and | 20 | majority-minority district in that area. If you |
| 21 | three, white bloc voting usually defeating that | 21 | have one, and we mean a complete plan with a |
| 22 | community's candidate of choice. | 22 | majority-minority VAP district in that area, |
| 23 | To draw VRA districts according | 23 | please provide it. If no such district can be |
| 24 | Covington and other recent court cases, the | 24 | drawn, then there is no need to continue the |
| 25 | General Assembly would need a strong basis in | 25 | Gingles analysis. Creating such a district |
|  | 30 |  | 32 |
|  |  |  | 8 (Pages 29 to 32) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.d |  |  | com 1-919-424-82 |



| 1 | things interesting as we get started here. |  | northwestern precincts in Cumberland county as |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | SCH Amendment 1 is going to be the first | 2 | well as Hope Mills. So essentially it is |
| 3 | amendment to be discussed. If you want to go | 3 | splitting the same municipalities as your plan, |
| 4 | ahead and shuffle your packet, it should be the | 4 | both of them split Fayetteville and both of them |
| 5 | second one down in your packet | 5 | split Hope Mills, but I believe this supports |
| 6 | All right. Members, we are going to go | 6 | the community of interest concept much better. |
| 7 | ahead and get started again. And at this point | 7 | And for one thing, like the -- I guess you can |
| 8 | I'm opening the floor to members for amendments | 8 | say the top portion of this, what looks like a C |
| 9 | or questions of Senator Hise. | 9 | beneath the Manchester precinct, that is a part |
| 10 | Senator Clark. | 10 | of what we call the big bang expansion in |
| 11 | SENATOR CLARK: I'd like to send forth | 11 | Cumberland county, when Fayetteville expanded |
| 12 | an amendment, Mr. Chair | 12 | out from its original boundaries, and it picked |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Thank you, | 13 | that area up. And then to the south of that you |
| 14 | Senator Clark. Which amendment are you sending | 14 | have Hope Mills, so we have all of the |
| 15 | forth? | 15 | Hope Mills precincts. |
| 16 | SENATOR CLARK: SCH Amendment 1, | 16 | But as you indicated, because of the |
| 17 | Cumberland county and Moore county cluster. | 17 | irregularities in the VTDs within Cumberland |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. Thank | 18 | county, invariably you're going to, you know, |
| 19 | you. Senator Clark, are you moving for the | 19 | possibly split a municipality, and that's why we |
| 20 | amendment, or you just want to explain it at | 20 | split a little bit of Hope Mills, just as your |
| 21 | this point? | 21 | plan does, in addition to splitting |
| 22 | SENATOR CLARK: I will explain and ask | 22 | Fayetteville. |
| 23 | that it be accepted. | 23 | So that being said, Mr. Chair, I |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you. You have | 24 | recommend to the committee that we adopt this |
| 25 | the floor. | 25 | version of the cluster. |
|  | 37 | 39 |  |
| 1 | SENATOR CLARK: Okay. Thank you, <br> Mr. Chair. I appreciate y'all's effort to do a grouping -- or should I say separation within the group of a senate district between Moore and Cumberland counties. However, I think I have an option that will probably serve the communities of that -- those two counties a little bit better. <br> As you come down from Moore county, | 1 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, Senator Clark. |
| 2 |  | 2 |  |
| 3 |  | 3 | So Senator Clark is moving that we |
| 4 |  | 4 | adopt this amendment. First, are there any |
| 5 |  | 5 | questions by members before we take that vote? |
| 6 |  | 6 | Any questions of Senator Clark on his amendment? |
| 7 |  | 7 | All right. If not, those in favor of |
| 8 |  | 8 | Senator Clark's adopting this amendment to the |
|  |  | 9 | map say aye. |
| 10 | which is numbered Senate District 21 in this | 10 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Aye. |
| 11 | particular iteration, the first thing you see | 11 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Those opposed. |
| 12 | essentially is Fort Bragg, which is that large | 12 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: No. |
| 13 | block Manchester precinct that is there, and | 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. The nos |
| 14 | adjacent to it in the top right-hand corner you | 14 | have it. |
| 15 | will find the Spring Lake precinct, and then | 15 | So thank you, Senator Clark. Are you |
| 16 | this little knob down at the bottom is what we | 16 | up next as well? |
| 17 | call west area. Essentially, they provide for a | 17 | SENATOR CLARK: I'm not up next. |
| 18 | very tight community of interest within the | 18 | Senator Blue is up next. |
| 19 | Fort Bragg community that is also associated | 19 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. So just |
| 20 | with this lower tier in Moore county which much | 20 | so the record is clear, SCH Amendment 1 was |
| 21 | of it has been designated as a protection for | 21 | voted nay, and now we have SBV Amendment 3; is |
| 22 | the military training environment. | 22 | that correct? |
| 23 | But instead of coming down and forming | 23 | SENATOR BLUE: Is that the first one? |
| 24 | a block such as you all do, I connect this | 24 | I'm sorry, I'm out of order here. I'm trying |
| 25 | Manchester precinct with some of the | 25 | to -- is that the northeast one? |
| 38 |  |  | 40 |
|  |  |  | 10 (Pages 37 to 40) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | yd | .com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: I have -- we took | 1 | and all that, you got it reinforced, and when I |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Senator Clark's out of order at his request. | 2 | was in college in the '70s you got it reinforced |
| 3 | SENATOR BLUE: I want the northeast | 3 | again. And those counties have not |
| 4 | cluster. | 4 | significantly changed population percentages. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Senator Blue | 5 | They're losing populations like all of the other |
| 6 | is asking to go to the northeast cluster which | 6 | counties -- almost all of the other counties in |
| 7 | is SBA Amend-2. Is that what you'd like? | 7 | that region. |
| 8 | SENATOR BLUE: Yes, that's it. It was | 8 | Starting in 1980, after the census, |
| 9 | initially SST 10 | 9 | arting in ' 81 , when the districts were drawn, |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: It should be the next | 10 | there was no minority district drawn up there. |
| 11 | to last map in your packet, Members, | 11 | There was one black House member who had gotten |
| 12 | SBA Amend-2. And this is -- Senator Blue is | 12 | elected in 1980, the first African American from |
| 13 | offering this amendment | 13 | that area, that entire area of the state to be |
| 14 | SENATOR BLUE: Yes. Thank you, | 14 | elected since 1900 -- either 1898 or 1900. And |
| 15 | Mr. Chairman. If everybody has gotten it, I'll | 15 | so following that is what led to the Gingles |
| 16 | comment. | 16 | decision. A lawsuit was filed. It was |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Senator Blue, | 17 | originally Gingles versus Edmisten, because |
| 18 | you have the floor. | 18 | Rufus Edmisten was the attorney general. A |
| 19 | SENATOR BLUE: Thank you, Senator | 19 | lawsuit was filed. It was a Section 5 lawsuit, |
| 20 | Newton. | 20 | meaning that the counties had to be pre-cleared. |
| 21 | First, I'd like to sort of follow up | 21 | There were 42 counties in North Carolina under |
| 22 | and explain in this district what the comments | 22 | Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that had to |
| 23 | that the chair ably stated just before we took | 23 | be pre-cleared. You couldn't change them |
| 24 | recess, and that is whether the General Assembly | 24 | without getting the justice department's |
| 25 | is required to draw districts regarding race. | 25 | permission. |
|  | 41 |  | 43 |
| 1 | And I simply go back to the Stephenson decision that said that before you do any clusters or do any kind of redistricting, you first must determine the VRA districts. And I say it against this context. At least as I understand it -- and I don't hold myself out to be an expert in this area and haven't litigated in it in 40 years, but let me simply say that if you look at Senate District Number 1 and Number 2, there are two clusters up there, and there was a choice of clusters that the committee made. | 1 | The justice department objected. Went back, tried to fix them again. A district was drawn up there in 1984, after the Gingles decision, and that's where the doctrine that you just recited came from. And the Gingles |
| 2 |  | 2 |  |
| 3 |  | 3 |  |
|  |  | 4 |  |
| 5 |  | 5 |  |
| 6 |  | 6 | decision, later changed to Gingles versus -- the |
|  |  | 7 | successor to Rufus Edmisten as attorney general |
| 8 |  | 8 | and later on another name. But anyhow, the |
|  |  | 9 | court in that case decided that you had to, |
| 10 |  | 10 | because of history in that area, and that |
| 11 |  | 11 | history was a history of polarized voting, that |
| 12 |  | 12 | you had to draw certain districts in there if |
| 13 | I heard Senator Hise explain the | 13 | as -- again, using your criteria, if they were |
| 14 | historic reason of putting certain counties | 14 | reasonably compact, if there were politically |
| 15 | together in that area, but history indicates | 15 | cohesive, meaning they voted primarily, |
| 16 | just the opposite has happened. | 16 | minorities in that area, as a bloc, and you |
| 17 | There are seven or eight counties along | 17 | could show racially polarized voting, that is, |
| 18 | the North Carolina-Virginia border that | 18 | you could show that whites tended not to vote |
| 19 | historically I'll call the black belt of | 19 | for African Americans in that district. |
| 20 | North Carolina because they're majority black | 20 | The districts were drawn, it later |
| 21 | counties, and you don't need to consider race or | 21 | evolved in the mid ' 80 s to a senate district |
| 22 | statistics to know that. If you -- again, I go | 22 | drawn pretty much along that same area, with |
| 23 | back to eighth grade geography. It's one of the | 23 | those seven counties in it. |
| 24 | lessons you learned. And if you go to th | 24 | What you have here is -- and in Senate |
| 25 | efforts in the 1960s, voter registration efforts | 25 | District 1, with the amendment that I'm |
|  | 42 |  | 44 |
|  |  |  | 11 (Pages 41 to 44) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.d |  | y | .com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | offering, is putting those counties back | 1 | would put all of the African Americans, or the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | together naturally, because that's how they've | 2 | minorities, in as few districts as possible, and |
| 3 | been, and they have elected a minority from that | 3 | that's what you did when -- this assembly did, |
| 4 | district I think since it was created. That | 4 | you were not here so you didn't do it. |
| 5 | became the case in the 1990s in the various | 5 | So when you took all of these districts |
| 6 | lawsuits that came about. Even when the justice | 6 | up to 50 percent plus, the court did not make |
| 7 | department wasn't sure what they were requiring | 7 | the specific determination that they were -- the |
| 8 | with congressional districts, they required that | 8 | determination was not made that you could |
| 9 | one up there. That was the case in 2000, the | 9 | justify 50 percent certainly in non-VRA |
| 10 | district was drawn with those counties together, | 10 | districts but even more so in VRA districts such |
| 11 | and it was the case in 2011 | 11 | as this district was. And it said now because |
| 12 | Now, an interesting thing happened in | 12 | the idea behind the Voting Rights Act was |
| 13 | America during that time and particularly in | 13 | overtime to ameliorate the effects of polarized |
| 14 | North Carolina. Initially, Guilford county and | 14 | voting and the inability of blacks to get whites |
| 15 | Cumberland county and Mecklenburg county were | 15 | to vote for them, and all of the counties in |
| 16 | affected counties because of their voting | 16 | eastern North Carolina were part of the 42 that |
| 17 | patterns, and you can show all of these Gingles | 17 | were covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights |
| 18 | factors | 18 | Act. |
| 19 | Over the course of the last almost | 19 | Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act |
| 20 | 40 years, since the Gingles decision by the | 20 | covered the entire country, not just this -- the |
| 21 | United States Supreme Court, areas of the state | 21 | way Section 5 affected 42 counties out of 100 in |
| 22 | are less polarized in their voting patterns. | 22 | North Carolina. But the court said in Rucho |
| 23 | Wake county never was a Section 5 county, | 23 | that what you have done in taking all of these |
| 24 | neither was Durham county. And in fact, in the | 24 | districts above 50 percent is in violation of |
| 25 | Gingles decision, the court pointed out that | 25 | the Voting Rights Act. First, you haven't shown |
|  | 45 |  | 47 |
| 1 | Durham was not a Voting Rights district because | 1 | the Gingles measurements, and it is possible to |
| 2 | you could not show polarized voting, although | 2 | have VRA districts that are not 50 percent plus. |
| 3 | you could show the other aspects of it. Durham, | 3 | Justice Kennedy said in his ruling that if in |
| 4 | as Wake county, had elected African Americans | 4 | fact you try to dismantle a VRA district where |
| 5 | countywide, the judgeships, county commission | 5 | you can create one, then that raises serious |
| 6 | races, and various other races, so you could not | 6 | questions under the 14th Amendment and the |
| 7 | show polarized voting and, consequently, you | 7 | Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause |
| 8 | couldn't create majority-minority districts. | 8 | of the 14th Amendment. |
| 9 | The problem -- and I think the way it | 9 | So when you say that you haven't shown |
| 10 | was described, and I know that folk interpre | 10 | any VRA violations, it begs the question that |
| 11 | this different ways -- is that Rucho -- the case | 11 | you don't have to show 50 percent in the |
| 12 | Rucho in 2011 that was filed was because even in | 12 | district for it to be an operating VRA district. |
| 13 | places that you had not had -- you could not | 13 | The point that I've been trying to make |
| 14 | prove racially polarized voting, this General | 14 | all along is if you can show that you can draw a |
| 15 | Assembly took the number of minority voters in | 15 | VRA district that meets these criteria, you |
| 16 | every district in the urban areas, in every | 16 | don't have to draw that district because you can |
| 17 | district that African Americans represented with | 17 | analyze what's been going on over time, and you |
| 18 | the exception of Orange county, took them up to | 18 | can take that number down because ideally, all |
| 19 | 50 percent plus one minority voters, voting age | 19 | of us want that number to disappear, but you |
| 20 | population and minority voters. That way all of | 20 | gradually take it down without doing it |
| 21 | the districts that were represented by African | 21 | abruptly. And when you do it abruptly, you |
| 22 | Americans were placed in the category of Voting | 22 | dismantle districts where you've shown a history |
| 23 | Rights Act districts, they weren't, but what | 23 | of polarized voting. |
| 24 | that case brought to the forefront was a | 24 | And that's what the letters to the |
| 25 | doctrine called packing which meant that you | 25 | chairs and to all of the members were trying to |
|  | 46 |  | 48 |
|  |  |  | 12 (Pages 45 to 48) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | yd | .com 1-919-424-82 |



| 1 | face is not violating the Voting Rights Act | 1 | back to pre-1965 practices. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | unless you can show packing again in Guilford | 2 | So this district in the northeast, |
| 3 | county or Cumberland county. But with respect | 3 | District 1, whatever it is officially, |
| 4 | to the others, there is no Voting Rights Act | 4 | would -- it's reasonably compact, because it's a |
| 5 | violation unless you unreasonably take the black | 5 | cluster; it's politically cohesive, because |
| 6 | vote beyond the level where it is functioning | 6 | that's what the information from these various |
| 7 | effectively, but that doesn't say that you can | 7 | groups have told you that it is; and there is |
| 8 | go 50 percent plus without justification because | 8 | racially polarized voting in it to some extent |
| 9 | that was Gingles -- I mean, that was Rucho. And | 9 | but not to the degree -- not to the degree that |
| 10 | Rucho did not say you no longer look for Voting | 10 | you got to create a district that's 50 percent |
| 11 | Rights Act districts and that there are none any | 11 | plus African American minority. |
| 12 | more. Rucho just said you hadn't done the study | 12 | Now, you say that there's no expert |
| 13 | that supports your taking these districts to | 13 | evidence available. The burden is on this |
| 14 | 50 percent plus. And the case was finally | 14 | General Assembly to have the experts tell you |
| 15 | resolved when this legislature redrew the | 15 | that there's no need for it, not on the |
| 16 | districts, took them down in the 30s and 40s. | 16 | citizenry to tell you that there is a need. But |
| 17 | There are African Americans representing senate | 17 | if you're looking for that, the public hearings |
| 18 | districts with 20 some percent African American | 18 | tell you that the citizens in this district |
| 19 | population that went up to 50 plus. Rucho said | 19 | think you ought to preserve the district as it |
| 20 | you got to bring that back down. There were | 20 | is and keep those counties together. |
| 21 | districts such as mine that went back into the | 21 | What you've done in choosing one option |
| 22 | low 30s and had not been in the 40s. | 22 | over the other with these two -- and again, |
| 23 | And I'll just make one comment and I'll | 23 | they're two clusters. You can choose one |
| 24 | shut up on this amendment. There were nine | 24 | cluster over the other. Senator Hise explained |
| 25 | senate districts represented by African | 25 | why you chose the first cluster. Well, the |
|  | 53 |  | 5 |
|  | Americans prior to 2011. Nine. None of them except this one -- I believe this was the only one. There were three districts in the east, but none of them, I believe except one, had a VRA greater than 50 percent, yet all of them had elected African Americans which showed that the Voting Rights Act was working and you were bringing the polarization down and we were all getting to the point that I hope all of us aspire to. | 1 | first cluster hasn't been like that over the years. It hasn't been like that in the earlier cluster, and it should not present an excuse to you to do it like that when you know that you're dismantling a functioning VRA district. <br> So I'll answer any questions, but I |
| 2 |  | 2 |  |
| 3 |  | 3 |  |
| 4 |  | 4 |  |
| 5 |  | 5 |  |
| 6 |  | 6 |  |
| 7 |  | 7 | would move the adoption of the amendment, |
| 8 |  | 8 | Mr. Chair, because I believe -- I sincerely |
| 9 |  | 9 | believe that in this map that you've presented |
| 10 |  | 10 | there are two viable Voting Rights Act claims |
| 11 | So I'm suggesting to you that this | 11 | that would survive in this action. |
| 12 | district, this district recognizes the progress | 12 | Now, the theory might be -- and I don' |
| 13 | that's been made, but it does not dismantle a | 13 | know what the lawyers' strategies may be on |
| 14 | district without at least doing the baseline | 14 | this. The theory might be that maybe you want |
| 15 | study which has a burden on the General Assembly | 15 | to tee it up and let the supreme court decide |
| 16 | to do. You indicated you had not done it, you | 16 | further what Section 2 means or what the Voting |
| 17 | did not plan to do it, and this morning, Senator | 17 | Rights Act means, but what you do is put the |
| 18 | Newton, you indicated you were not doing it | 18 | burden of doing that on the taxpayers of |
| 19 | because you didn't see any need to do it because | 19 | North Carolina. And again, we spend tens of |
| 20 | the people who litigated it to the limit -- to | 20 | millions of dollars litigating something that at |
| 21 | limit it now want to make you look at it. The | 21 | the end of the day we're going to lose unless |
| 22 | people who litigated it litigated it because you | 22 | the United States Supreme Court significantly |
| 23 | had packed all of these other districts and said | 23 | changes the law on it. And we go back up to a |
| 24 | you got to unpack and make sure that the Voting | 24 | fourth circuit that issued some of the harshest |
| 25 | Rights Act is working, not that you're going | 25 | rulings in the last cycle about North Carolina's |
|  | 54 |  | 56 |
|  |  |  | 14 (Pages 53 to 56) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.di |  | yd | com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | redistricting than it did of any other |  | consideration of county pods, if it's necessary. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | redistricting in the country from any of the | 2 | We may disagree on the concept of whether those |
| 3 | circuit courts -- or any of the three-judge | 3 | standards have been met, whether the anecdotal |
| 4 | panels. I'm sorry. | 4 | evidence proves those standards have been met. |
| 5 | And so I would ask you to really look | 5 | But this decision is clearly about |
| 6 | seriously at this. And I will offer one more | 6 | Stephenson groupings in the two districts. We |
| 7 | amendment so that you can absolve the state of | 7 | have moved on -- Stephenson requires, says ten |
| 8 | Voting Rights Act violations and litigate | 8 | counties are grouped in one manner and eight |
| 9 | whatever else you have done in the context of | 9 | counties are grouped in another, there are two |
| 10 | whether it is political gerrymandering because | 10 | options for doing so. And so his amendment |
| 11 | those are the choices. You had two issues in | 11 | presents one of those options, our amendment |
| 12 | 2010 decade: Racial gerrymandering, which | 12 | presents -- our bill presents a different option |
| 13 | have just described to you why the cour | 13 | chosen. Both meet the Stephenson criteria. |
| 14 | reversed it, but the court didn't say you didn't | 14 | Both are drawn under the Stephenson criteria. |
| 15 | have to look at it. And secondly, political | 15 | As I have said previously, the chairs |
| 16 | gerrymandering. The issues that might remain in | 16 | looked at this extensively and made a decision |
| 17 | Guilford county and Cumberland county or the | 17 | as to which of those best conformed communities |
| 18 | other urban counties are issues of politica | 18 | of interest. We looked at compactness. The map |
| 19 | gerrymandering unless you far exceed what the | 19 | you currently have -- not the amendment. |
| 20 | court said in 2015 or '16 you had to do with | 20 | District 1 is the most compact of the four |
| 21 | respect to creating minority districts within | 21 | districts that are created in the map. The |
| 22 | those areas if you were going to create them, | 22 | fingerling counties and [unintelligible] are |
| 23 | and no requirement that you create them, but you | 23 | most contained within this map. Four of the |
| 24 | can't unreasonably -- I don't think there | 24 | five are placed together in the current map. It |
| 25 | requirement except maybe again in Greensboro and | 25 | moves it to a $3 / 2$ split in the other map. |
|  | 57 |  | 59 |
|  | Fayetteville because it was covered -- as long as you don't unreasonably discriminate against minorities. | 1 | Particularly looking at the northern Outer Banks region, the map that you have contains all of those counties together in a more compact district. So I would ask that the committee reject the amendment and consider the map as is. <br> SENATOR BLUE: Mr. Chairman, can I ask Senator Hise a question. |
| 2 |  | 2 |  |
| 3 |  | 3 |  |
| 4 | But what I am trying to offer to you is | 4 |  |
| 5 | a way to stay clear of federal court with | 5 |  |
| 6 | respect to the racial gerrymander and leave open | 6 |  |
| 7 | these issues of the political gerrymander, | 7 |  |
| 8 | because that's the only thing that I've seen the | 8 |  |
| 9 | letters about, these two districts, and those | 9 | Hise. |
| 10 | clearly are racial gerrymander issues that bring | 10 | Yes, you may. Senator His |
| 11 | in other parts of the state that don't have to | 11 | SENATOR BLUE: Senator Hise, you |
| 12 | be involved in we fix them here without leaving | 12 | indicate that your map is more compact. How do |
| 13 | it to the courts to send it back and involving a | 13 | you determine that having a map that runs from |
| 14 | much broader swath of the state. | 14 | Warren county down to Carteret county is more |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 15 | compact than what we see on the board up here. |
| 16 | Senator Blue. | 16 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Senator Blue, I'll be |
| 17 | Senator Hise, or any other members that | 17 | clear on what I said, not transpose what I said. |
| 18 | may have comments or questions. | 18 | There are four districts that can be |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I'd like to respond. | 19 | created. District 1 in the map that we |
| 20 | Members, I think it is clear with what | 20 | currently have is the most compact of the four |
| 21 | we have here that this is not a consideration | 21 | districts. |
| 22 | under the Voting Rights Act. I think | 22 | SENATOR BLUE: Let me ask another |
| 23 | Senator Blue has made it clear several times | 23 | question |
| 24 | that that is a separate consideration that must | 24 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Follow-up. Sure, |
| 25 | be done first and considered prior to the | 25 | Senator Blue. |
| 58 |  |  | 60 |
|  |  |  | 15 (Pages 57 to 60) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.di |  | yd | com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | SENATOR BLUE: And so it's your | 1 | traditionally African American counties and |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | testimony that you chose -- you chose the | 2 | agricultural counties as opposed to aquacultural |
| 3 | district in your map because it is more compact | 3 | counties or various other things that the |
| 4 | than the other two? | 4 | coastal counties might entail? |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I can repeat my answer. | 5 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Senator, we looked at |
| 6 | SENATOR BLUE: Please do. | 6 | as many considerations as we could to identify |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN HISE: District 1 that is | 7 | which of these two choices were the better |
| 8 | created is the most compact of the districts | 8 | choice to make between the grouping -- the 10/8 |
| 9 | formed. I also stated that it keeps more of the | 9 | groupings of the counties, and from what we |
| 10 | finger counties, which we heard from both | 10 | concluded, with keeping the fingerling counties |
| 11 | comments and others that are community of | 11 | whole as well as the northern Outer Banks region |
| 12 | interest, keeps more of those counties together | 12 | together that this better met the needs of that |
| 13 | within that map and keeps the northern | 13 | region. |
| 14 | Outer Banks region together within a map. | 14 | SENATOR BLUE: Further question. |
| 15 | I also talked about in the choice for | 15 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Yes, Senator Blue. |
| 16 | the districts comparing the media markets that | 16 | SENATOR BLUE: Did you consider the |
| 17 | the two were in versus which ones are in the | 17 | community of interest of the northern border |
| 18 | Norfolk media markets and which ones are in the | 18 | counties? |
| 19 | Raleigh or Greenville media markets for those | 19 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I would say that with |
| 20 | considerations. All of that went into those | 20 | the exception of inland to Halifax or Warren, |
| 21 | considerations for determining communities of | 21 | so -- and the only one of those that happens to |
| 22 | interest as well as looking at the compactness. | 22 | be different would be Warren, all the northern |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Follow-up, | 23 | border counties are the same -- with the |
| 24 | Senator Blue. | 24 | exception of Warren county are in the same |
| 25 | SENATOR BLUE: Follow-up. | 25 | district in both maps. |
|  | 61 |  | 63 |
| 1 | So that I understand, then, compactness | 1 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Follow-up, |
| 2 | is the dominant issue in this choice of | 2 | Senator Blue? |
| 3 | districts. | 3 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah, further question. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I never said that. I | 4 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Yes. |
| 5 | said it is one of the issues. | 5 | SENATOR BLUE: In looking at the map |
| 6 | SENATOR BLUE: What are the other | 6 | that's displayed on the screen, could you tell |
|  | issues that -- | 7 | me what the communities of interest are if you |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Considering communities | 8 | start in the northeast at Warren county, which |
| 9 | of interest, and that included a consideration | 9 | is the extreme -- northwest, rather, in the pink |
| 10 | of the fingerling counties, that included a | 10 | and go all the way down to Carteret county which |
| 11 | consideration of the media markets that the | 11 | is in -- below the south central eastern part of |
| 12 | counties are in and the northern Outer Banks | 12 | North Carolina. |
| 13 | region. | 13 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Senator Blue, I did not |
| 14 | SENATOR BLUE: Follow-up. | 14 | determine the two possible groupings for the |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Follow-up. | 15 | counties. We were just in a position to make a |
| 16 | SENATOR BLUE: So the media market is | 16 | choice between the two possible groupings. |
| 17 | in your opinion a legitimate community of | 17 | SENATOR BLUE: Further follow-up. |
| 18 | interest? | 18 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Another follow-up. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN HISE: It identifies -- it | 19 | SENATOR BLUE: My question is what is a |
| 20 | would help identify a community of interest, | 20 | community of interest if I flow through them |
| 21 | yes. | 21 | from Warren county, then looks like is it |
| 22 | SENATOR BLUE: Follow-up. | 22 | Halifax, Northampton and then down a couple |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Yes, sir. | 23 | hundred miles or so to Carteret county which is |
| 24 | SENATOR BLUE: Did you examine the | 24 | a coastal county? |
| 25 | community of interest of all of these | 25 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Other than looking at |
|  | 62 |  | 64 |
|  |  |  | 16 (Pages 61 to 64) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ryd | .com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | what I've said previously about a similar media |  | media market? Is it Raleigh? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | market for those counties, I would say that we | 2 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I can go back through |
| 3 | have identified and mentioned the communities we | 3 | and see if I've got |
| 4 | were trying to keep whole and keep together, and | 4 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue, we're |
| 5 | when choosing between two groupings of counties, | 5 | hearing someone in the gallery saying, yes, it |
| 6 | there was only one grouping of counties that did | 6 | is in fact Raleigh |
| 7 | that. | 7 | SENATOR BLUE: What about Carteret |
| 8 | SENATOR BLUE: I think one last |  | county? |
| ${ }^{9}$ | question, if I could, Mr. Chairman | ${ }^{9}$ | CHAIRMAN HISE: Bertie, Tyrrell, |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Yes, sir | 10 | Northampton, Raleigh |
| 11 | SENATOR BLUE: Senator Daniel pointed | 11 | So I have that the Greenville media |
| 12 | out yesterday, when we were considering the | 12 | market is Carteret, Hyde, Martin, Pamlico, and |
| 13 | congressional map, that one of the things that | 13 | Washington that's coming in. The Raleigh media |
| 14 | you had considered or that you thought about was | 14 | market will be Halifax and Warren. The Norfolk |
| 15 | the travel time. One of the congressional maps | 15 | media market will be Chowan. The Greenville |
| 16 | caused him some hiccups with respect to travel | 16 | media market would also be Bertie and Tyrrell in |
| 17 | time. I think it may have been from Forsyth | 17 | the northern, and Raleigh would be in the |
| 18 | county down to Lincoln county | 18 | Northampton media market. The rest, Camden, |
| 19 | Did you have an idea of what the travel | 19 | Currituck, Dare, Gates, Hertford, Pasquotank, |
| 20 | time is from Warren county down to | 20 | Perquimans, in the Norfolk market. |
| 21 | Morehead City? | 21 | SENATOR BLUE: Would Carteret -- |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I don't. I'm sure | 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue, you |
| 23 | that's a number we could get you on what the | 23 | have a last, last, last, last, last question. |
| 24 | travel time | 24 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah, just a follow-up |
| 25 | I will tell you that it is clear that | 25 | because I'm intrigued by this media market |
|  | 65 |  | 67 |
|  | when you're doing congressional maps, you are not drawing predetermined poddings of counties that you choose between. So congressional maps are open. There -- we did the analysis. There are no poddings of counties in congressional maps. In this manner, we had two choices of podding between two groups of poddings to choose from. | element. |  |
| 2 |  | 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Sure. |
| 3 |  | 3 | SENATOR BLUE: But is it fair to say, |
| 4 |  | 4 | and I'll put multiple ones together, there's a |
| 5 |  | 5 | New Bern media market that would be affecting |
| 6 |  | 6 | this district, there's a Wilmington media market |
| 7 |  | 7 | that would be affecting this district as well as |
| 8 |  | 8 | a Greenville media market? |
| 9 | SENATOR BLUE: So -- and one last one. <br> CHAIRMAN NEWTON: One last, last one. SENATOR BLUE: As I understand it -- as | 9 | CHAIRMAN HISE: We have identified a |
| 10 |  | 10 | Greenville media market. I'm assuming the |
| 11 |  | 11 | others -- |
| 12 | I understand it, in this grouping, the only thing that mattered was compactness. | 12 | SENATOR BLUE: Well, there are TV |
| 13 |  | 13 | stations in all of those towns. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I never said that. I | 14 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I come from the |
| 15 | said we looked at a lot of considerations, and | 15 | mountains so we're all pretty consistent on |
| 16 | what we -- and I could go through them all | 16 | where WLOS or those go to, but they identify -- |
| 17 | again, which communities were important to stay | 17 | those areas identify their media markets. |
| 18 | as together as possible, what media markets they | 18 | SENATOR BLUE: Thank you. |
| 19 | were in and others and made the choice for the | 19 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, |
| 20 | other podding different than this amendment. | 20 | Senator Blue. |
| 21 | SENATOR BLUE: Well, that does call for one last question. | 21 | Senator Marcus, no, your question has |
| 22 |  | 22 | been answered. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. <br> SENATOR BLUE: And as I understand it, the media market in Warren county, what's that | 23 | Seeing no -- Senator Nickel. |
| 24 |  | 24 | SENATOR NICKEL: Yeah. I just kind of |
|  |  | 25 | did a double take with the distance and looked |
|  | 66 |  | 68 |
|  |  |  | 17 (Pages 65 to 68) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.d |  |  | com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | on my phone to try to figure out how long it | 1 | [Unintelligible.] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | would take someone to go from Emerald Isle in | 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Not that one. |
| 3 | Carteret county all the way up to -- I found | 3 | Members. |
| 4 | Wise, North Carolina, right along the Virginia | 4 | SCH Amendment 2. Is that the Moore, |
| 5 | border. And Senator Blue is about right, if you | 5 | Cumberland 21, 19 districts. Okay, very good. |
| 6 | stop for a rest break, it's about 4 hours, | 6 | All right. And who is going to be offering |
| 7 | 177 miles, and that's if you're cutting through | 7 | these? |
| 8 | Senator Perry, Senator Davis, Senator Barnes' | 8 | SENATOR BLUE: I'll talk about it. I |
| 9 | districts to get there. | 9 | want to first ask Senator Hise a couple |
| 10 | You know, so my question just is what | 10 | questions since this is before us, but I want to |
| 11 | does somebody living in Emerald Isle, all the | 11 | ask Senator Hise a couple questions. |
| 12 | way on the bottom there on the coast, have in | 12 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Go ahead. |
| 13 | common with someone living in Wise, | 13 | SENATOR BLUE: Yes. Senator Hise, I'm |
| 14 | North Carolina, way on the Virginia border, up | 14 | trying to get straight in my mind these criteria |
| 15 | there, in Warren county. | 15 | that the committee adopted, and they were all |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: So, Senator Nickel, | 16 | listed with specific statement by you, I |
| 17 | I'll allow Senator Hise to answer that question, | 17 | believe, that you couldn't rank order them, but |
| 18 | but I think it's essentially asked and answered | 18 | you could consider all of them depending on what |
| 19 | multiple times with Senator Blue, but Senator | 19 | you were looking at at the time. |
| 20 | Hise. | 20 | And what I'm trying to figure out about |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Having served for 10 | 21 | this is you mentioned that keeping |
| 22 | years in a district that's over a three-hour | 22 | municipalities whole was one of the priorities |
| 23 | drive from Marshall to Tryon, about three and a | 23 | at least in the other maps that you've drawn; is |
| 24 | half, if you do that, I understand the | 24 | that right. |
| 25 | complexities of doing so, but that is in a lot | 25 | CHAIRMAN HISE: And continues to be in |
|  | 69 |  | 71 |
|  | of ways the geographics of the map and the county pods that formed. <br> CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you. <br> Anything else, Senator Nickel? <br> Okay. Well, with that, Senator Blue has moved for the adoption of SBA Amendment 2. All those in favor say aye. <br> COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Aye. <br> CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All those opposed, | 1 | both maps, yes. |
| 2 |  | 2 | SENATOR BLUE: Keeping municipalities |
| 3 |  | 3 | whole. And following that, what was the next |
| 4 |  | 4 | most important criteria that you think you |
| 5 |  | 5 | applied? |
| 6 |  | 6 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Senator Blue, I can go |
| 7 |  | 7 | through the entire list of the criteria. We |
| 8 |  | 8 | have made no statements about most important or |
| 9 |  | 9 | next important. These are the criteria of the |
| 10 | no. | 10 | committee, and we considered them when drawing |
| 11 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: No. | 11 | maps. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: The nos have it. | 12 | SENATOR BLUE: Okay. So is it fair to |
| 13 | So the next amendment -- I'll ask the | 13 | say -- |
| 14 | proponent. The next one that I have on my list | 14 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Each member will make |
| 15 | is actually right back up to the top which is | 15 | their own choice. |
| 16 | SBV Amendment 3. Is that what you would like to | 16 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue. |
| 17 | pursue next? | 17 | SENATOR BLUE: Thank you. So is it |
| 18 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just Buncombe | 18 | fair to say that you got this set of criteria |
| 19 | county. | 19 | and no one criteria determined the outcome? |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Buncombe, McDowell, | 20 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Hise. |
| 21 | Burke. It's red and pink. It's on the screen | 21 | CHAIRMAN HISE: So, Senator Blue, I |
| 22 | as well. | 22 | would not say that that -- I think that is true |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: It's up to the | 23 | for several criteria. There are criteria in the |
| 24 | sponsor what order you'd like to take these in. | 24 | maps that I do see as absolute. We had said |
| 25 | I've done my best. | 25 | that -- when we said that we would comply with |
|  | 70 |  | 72 |
|  |  |  | 18 (Pages 69 to 72) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ryd | .com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | the Voting Rights Act, we will comply with the | 1 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Follow-up. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Voting Rights Act. When we said that the | 2 | SENATOR BLUE: Now, in your map, I |
| 3 | Stephenson groupings -- so violating the | 3 | believe you split Fayetteville several times; is |
| 4 | Stephenson groupings would be absolutes for the | 4 | that right? |
| 5 | committee to consider. Not using race, not | 5 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Fayetteville is split. |
| 6 | using political data were absolute | 6 | SENATOR BLUE: Several times. |
| 7 | considerations of the committee. | 7 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Fayetteville is split. |
| 8 | Beyond that, we moved to considerations | 8 | There's a portion -- I think it came to |
| 9 | minimizing -- which is not an exact science, but | 9 | 12 percent or something like that of |
| 10 | minimizing, dividing counties, dividing VTDs, | 10 | Fayetteville is in a different district. |
| 11 | dividing municipalities. All of those have | 11 | SENATOR BLUE: Just for information, |
| 12 | varying levels that maps are drawn to try to | 12 | you had to split it because of Fort Bragg, I |
| 13 | accommodate them, but there were also absolute | 13 | believe you got to split it at least once, but |
| 14 | criteria that we felt were important to comply | 14 | you split it more than once. |
| 15 | with. | 15 | CHAIRMAN HISE: We did keep -- all the |
| 16 | SENATOR BLUE: Another question. | 16 | military installations are whole within a |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Yes, Senator Blue. | 17 | district. |
| 18 | SENATOR BLUE: And what made me ask you | 18 | SENATOR BLUE: And one last follow-up. |
| 19 | that question, Senator Hise, is because in many | 19 | But you split Hope Mills also. |
| 20 | of the clusters, as you explained them earlier | 20 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I believe we did. |
| 21 | this morning, it appears that you prioritize not | 21 | SENATOR BLUE: And would you agree that |
| 22 | splitting municipalities. For example, when you | 22 | a better cluster map in Cumberland county would |
| 23 | say that next door in Sampson county that you | 23 | be one where you didn't jeopardize any of the |
| 24 | decided -- you went out of the way to split a | 24 | other criteria? You kept municipalities whole, |
| 25 | precinct in order to keep I believe the | 25 | you didn't split precincts, et cetera, |
|  | 73 |  | 75 |
|  | municipality of Plain View, one of those places next to the hollerin' capital of the world. | 1 | et cetera. |
| 23 |  | 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue. I |
|  | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Spivey's Corner. | 3 | mean, I'm sorry. Senator Hise. |
| 4 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah, Spivey's Corner. | 4 | CHAIRMAN HISE: He'll answer his own |
| 5 | You went out of the way not to split | 5 | question. That's the attorney side. |
| 6 | precincts -- or you went out of the way, rather, | 6 | What I would say is, again, it is |
|  | to split a precinct to keep the municipality | 7 | weighing multiple considerations, and the |
| 8 | whole, but in Cumberland county your map decided | 8 | challenge would be, in doing so, taking a |
| 9 | to split Hope Mills. | 9 | district that was 80 percent contained in |
| 10 | Tell me, what was your thought process | 10 | Fayetteville and trying to divide it to more of |
| 11 | in determining the split Hope Mills and not | 11 | a 50/50 district would be something that would |
| 12 | Plain View? | 12 | weight that decision I think more towards |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Hise. | 13 | keeping more of Fayetteville within a district. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN HISE: And I believe in the | 14 | SENATOR BLUE: Okay. Thank you, |
| 15 | same map we, by necessity, also split | 15 | Mr. Chairman. |
| 16 | Fayetteville. With coming in, for the way it | 16 | Senator Hise, I offer you a district |
| 17 | was coming, it is a balancing factor, and in | 17 | that does not split Hope Mills in Cumberland |
| 18 | choosing to make -- you know, could we choose to | 18 | county and it splits Fayetteville only in the |
| 19 | split a single VTD in order to keep a | 19 | place that you split it. I believe it splits |
| 20 | municipality whole, we made that choice and | 20 | Fayetteville only at that place. I'm trying to |
| 21 | could do so. Would that choice be different if | 21 | remember my geography of my used-to-be next door |
| 22 | it required splitting multiple VTDs that's | 22 | neighboring county, but I think it -- but if it |
| 23 | coming in in order to keep a municipality whole | 23 | splits Cumberland -- or Fayetteville, it doesn't |
| 24 | would be a different consideration and decision. | 24 | split it more times than you do, but it keeps |
| 25 | SENATOR BLUE: Follow-up. | 25 | Hope Mills totally whole as you did the |
|  | 74 |  | 76 |
|  |  |  | 19 (Pages 73 to 76) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ryd | .com 1-919-424-8242 |


| 1 | surrounding districts up in its neighboring | 1 | SENATOR BLUE: It's a Wake county map. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Sampson county. | 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Members, SCG |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Is that a question or | 3 | Amendment 6 we think is the -- Granville and |
| 4 | a comment? | 4 | Wake. SCH -- SCH Amendment 6? Sorry. |
| 5 | SENATOR BLUE: It's a statement. And | 5 | SENATOR BLUE: SCG Amendment 6, is that |
| 6 | with that said, unless I'm wrong on that, which | 6 | it? |
| 7 | I don't believe I am, I would move the adoption | 7 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: That's it. I got it. |
| 8 | of the map. | 8 | SENATOR BLUE: Question first of |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 9 | Senator Hise. And it might -- it might help if |
| 10 | Senator Blue. | 10 | we could have displayed the map that Senator |
| 11 | Senator Hise, any other comments? | 11 | Hise is defending. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I am trying to find, | 12 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: So I'll ask staff if |
| 13 | and I don't believe that it's in this pack, the | 13 | we can -- you want a split screen, if we can get |
| 14 | percentage of Fayetteville that is now in the | 14 | that. |
| 15 | district. It now takes Fayetteville I believe | 15 | SENATOR BLUE: Yes. |
| 16 | to a $53 / 47$ split between the two districts, as I | 16 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: So, staff, if we |
| 17 | had said earlier, and makes a district that was | 17 | can -- if not, you just want Senator Hise -- |
| 18 | a predominant Fayetteville district and kept as | 18 | SENATOR BLUE: Just Wake county |
| 19 | much of it as whole as possible to almost an | 19 | portion. |
| 20 | even split between the two, and I see no reason | 20 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Wake county portion |
| 21 | and would not support making that decision. | 21 | SENATOR BLUE: With the Wake-Granville |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. Thank | 22 | county portion of Senator Hise -- that cluster. |
| 23 | you. | 23 | There it is. |
| 24 | Seeing no other comments or questions, | 24 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: How about that. |
| 25 | Senator Blue has moved to amend the map | 25 | SENATOR BLUE: That's perfect. |
|  | 77 |  | 79 |
| 1 | SCH Amendment 2. All those in favor say aye. | 1 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue, you |
| 2 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Aye. | 2 | have the floor. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All those opposed say | 3 | SENATOR BLUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
| 4 | no. | 4 | And, Senator Hise, correct me if I'm |
| 5 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: No. | 5 | wrong, and I'll ask you because I can't keep up |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: The nos have it. | 6 | with all this stuff. In looking at your drawing |
| 7 | Okay. Senator Blue, which is your | 7 | of Wake county, if I could first go to the |
| 8 | next? | 8 | Granville-Wake county district. |
| 9 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah, let me get out of | 9 | It looks like in doing those six |
| 10 | my own way. | 10 | districts you appear to split ten precincts and |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: No worries. Take | 11 | split three municipalities; is that right? |
| 12 | your time. | 12 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I believe that is |
| 13 | SENATOR BLUE: Question of -- I'm going | 13 | accurate. |
| 14 | to introduce -- the next one I'm going to | 14 | SENATOR BLUE: I think you split |
| 15 | introduce is going to be SBK 3 is the number I | 15 | Raleigh -- |
| 16 | have. I don't know what the corresponding new | 16 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I don't have that |
| 17 | number for the amendment is. | 17 | report in front of me. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: SBA -- | 18 | SENATOR BLUE: I think you split |
| 19 | SENATOR BLUE: SBK. SBK 3. | 19 | Raleigh -- Raleigh, Apex, and Cary, I believe. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: SBA Amendment 3. | 20 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Yes. |
| 21 | SENATOR BLUE: Is that it? | 21 | SENATOR BLUE: And did you find keeping |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: I don't have an SB 8. | 22 | municipalities whole to be of higher importance |
| 23 | SENATOR BLUE: No. It's -- SBK 3 was | 23 | than splitting VTDs? |
| 24 | my old one. | 24 | CHAIRMAN HISE: There were individual |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: SBA 3. Is this it? | 25 | cases in which we felt like we could pick an |
|  | 78 |  | 80 |
|  |  |  | 20 (Pages 77 to 80) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ry | .com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | individual VTD and as a result not split | 1 | it protrudes up into the district, that is, the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | municipalities, but again, there was no priority | 2 | blue district. |
| 3 | on the criteria that ranks one higher than the | 3 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Correct. Well, we |
| 4 | other. | 4 | can't show it on these. On the map you could |
| 5 | SENATOR BLUE: Then if you -- so none | 5 | put the city limits up and I could better |
| 6 | of them have -- again, and you said this, but I | 6 | respond to that question, but we -- again, by |
|  | want to make sure I understand it. None of them | 7 | adding the unincorporated areas and kind of |
| 8 | have necessarily a higher priority. It just | 8 | moving down to get towards that equal population |
| 9 | depends on the specific district that you're | 9 | number. |
| 10 | drawing at the time. | 10 | SENATOR BLUE: Further question. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN HISE: And we are showing how | 11 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Question. |
| 12 | we considered each of them in the reports for | 12 | SENATOR BLUE: In looking at the stat |
| 13 | what the results are. | 13 | pack on that district, you did split Raleigh, |
| 14 | SENATOR BLUE: Okay. If you will take | 14 | and you have part of Raleigh into the blue |
| 15 | a look at that protrusion from the green | 15 | district. And so could you tell me why you |
| 16 | district into the blue district up there, that's | 16 | chose to put the part of Raleigh to the left of |
| 17 | from -- I can't see the Raleigh district number. | 17 | that green protrusion into the blue district and |
| 18 | I think it may be -- I don't know what the | 18 | not part of the green since both of them are |
| 19 | district is, but there's a protrusion reaching | 19 | part of Raleigh's corporate limits. |
| 20 | sort of north that extends from the green | 20 | CHAIRMAN HISE: A specific decision for |
| 21 | district into the blue district. | 21 | that choice, I think you're looking at as we |
| 22 | Do you see that? | 22 | were coming south, when you look in the other |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN HISE: I see it. | 23 | part of the green area, those seem to be |
| 24 | SENATOR BLUE: Okay. If you look at | 24 | smaller, more compact VTDs, particularly with |
| 25 | that, tell me why you determined to put that | 25 | higher populations that's with coming in. And |
|  | 81 |  | 83 |
|  | protrusion in the map as you were drawing it. | 1 | so when we're trying to balance populations, as |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN HISE: As I said when I | 2 | we're getting close, we're looking for the VTDs |
|  | explained this map, our intent was to connect | 3 | that closest match that in order to minimize the |
|  | Granville county with the unincorporated, more | 4 | splitting of VTDs. |
| 5 | rural areas of the northern county. All of | 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Follow-up. |
| 6 | drawing this two-county pod was exceptionally | 6 | SENATOR BLUE: Follow-up. |
| 7 | difficult compared to the fact that our variance | 7 | But you could split one precinct and |
| 8 | for the district was already at 4.9 percent | 8 | one VTD and make up for any difference in |
| 9 | below the average district, and so we really | 9 | population. |
| 10 | only had an average variance of about 52 | 10 | CHAIRMAN HISE: And that would be an |
| 11 | individuals per district. I know you and others | 11 | additional split VTD. |
| 12 | that have drawn in Wake county ran into this | 12 | SENATOR BLUE: Yes, sir. |
| 13 | same complexities in doing so. | 13 | Another question. |
| 14 | And so balancing populations required | 14 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Yes. Follow-up. |
| 15 | many more circumstances in which you could not | 15 | SENATOR BLUE: And one of the criteria |
| 16 | keep VTDs whole and others in doing so in | 16 | that you looked at, one of the criteria adopted |
| 17 | drawing it, but literally this district was | 17 | by the committee was not to split precincts |
| 18 | drawn starting with Granville county and looking | 18 | except where it was necessary. |
| 19 | at the northern particularly unincorporated | 19 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Yeah. |
| 20 | areas of Wake county and adding the two of those | 20 | SENATOR BLUE: And that was because |
| 21 | into the district and then coming down into the | 21 | when you start splitting precincts, you create a |
| 22 | district as was necessary to balance population. | 22 | lot of districts for election officials in |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue. | 23 | trying to match up all of these areas with |
| 24 | SENATOR BLUE: Follow-up. | 24 | what's in and what's out since we elect on a |
| 25 | So you chose not to split Raleigh where | 25 | precinct basis. |
|  | 82 |  | 84 |
|  |  |  | 21 (Pages 81 to 84) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ryd | .com 1-919-424-82 |





| 1 | we -- so we see ourselves as representing the |  | district. You can see it's a tight circle |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | county. So these fine points that you're | 2 | around the center of the city of Durham there, |
| 3 | raising don't register as much here as they do | 3 | that green area inside all the purple. |
| 4 | in some of the other areas where you have other | 4 | And then the other part of this county |
|  | entities that are being represented in so | 5 | cluster is not compact at all. It's pretty |
| 6 | many -- you know, if you're representing a | 6 | stretched out. It's oddly shaped. It goes |
| 7 | senate district, most of you have six or eight | 7 | around, it goes over the next two and then under |
| 8 | school districts and those kinds of things or | 8 | Durham and then picks up all of Chatham county, |
| 9 | other cities and towns outside the immediate | 9 | so it's pretty contorted. It also, this map, |
| 10 | area that you're in. | 10 | unfortunately cuts up some communities of |
| 11 | But I want to fix this map by putting | 11 | interest. |
| 12 | those six people into a -- so that we're not | 12 | So the amended map that we're offering |
| 13 | making another municipal split so that you can | 13 | here makes two equally compact districts |
| 14 | see that we can draw a map that still protects | 14 | instead, that's the one on the left without any |
| 15 | all of the interests that the criteria pointed | 15 | odd shape, and it has a better both |
| 16 | out that we were going to consider and have | 16 | Polsby-Popper average compactness score. Ours |
| 17 | fewer split municipalities and fewer split VTDs. | 17 | is a 42 versus the map on the right which is 32 . |
| 18 | So with that said, I will withdraw this | 18 | The Reock scores are about the same since when |
| 19 | map -- and no hurry to get it done. I will just | 19 | you look at an average of the two they come out |
| 20 | offer it again tomorrow. Okay. | 20 | to be about the same. |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 21 | So between these two maps there's no |
| 22 | Senator Blue. | 22 | difference in municipality or VTD splits, so we |
| 23 | All right. So SCH Amendment 6 has been | 23 | don't have to worry about that, and we're |
| 24 | withdrawn. | 24 | offering this alternative to make both districts |
| 25 | What's up next, Senator Blue? | 25 | compact, for the map to make more sense to the |
|  | 97 | 99 |  |
| 1 | SENATOR BLUE: Senator Marcus. | 1 | community, and to improve the compactness of the |
| 2 | SENATOR MARCUS: Mr. Chair, I believe | 2 | overall county cluster. So unless there are any |
| 3 | we are going to move to Durham and Chatham | 3 | questions. |
| 4 | county now, and that's amendment -- SBVA | 4 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, |
| 5 | Amend-2. | 5 | Senator Marcus. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: SBVA Amendment 2. | 6 | The chair has two questions for Senator |
| 7 | SENATOR MARCUS: Yeah. I said that A | 7 | Murdock because she's the most impacted -- just |
| 8 | twice. Sorry about that. If staff could have | 8 | not catching you cold. We talked about this |
| 9 | the side-by-side up again, that would be I think | 9 | with respect to one other amendment and one |
| 10 | most helpful for people following along. | 10 | other senator as well. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. | 11 | Are you in favor of this amendment? |
| 12 | Senator Marcus, you have the floor. | 12 | SENATOR MURDOCK: Yes, I am. |
| 13 | SENATOR MARCUS: Shall I let Erika get | 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: And is it your view |
| 14 | that other map up before I start. | 14 | that it complies with the VRA? |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: It's up to you. | 15 | SENATOR MURDOCK: That it complies with |
| 16 | SENATOR MARCUS: Okay, here we go. | 16 | the VRA? |
| 17 | Thank you so much. | 17 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: It complies -- is it |
| 18 | This amendment that we're submitting | 18 | your understanding, your view, your belief that |
|  | here is an amendment that honors the criteria of | 19 | it complies with the Voting Rights Act if we |
| 20 | compactness better than the map that | 20 | take this amendment? |
| 21 | otherwise drawn here, the Republican map. | 21 | SENATOR MURDOCK: It's my |
| 22 | So the map that we're offering is the | 22 | understanding. |
| 23 | one on the screen to the left compared to the | 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Very good. |
| 24 | one on the right which is the Republican map. | 24 | All right. Anybody else have any |
| 25 | And that one on the right has one very compact | 25 | questions? Senator Hise? |
| 98 |  |  | 100 |
|  |  |  | 25 (Pages 97 to 100) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ryd | O.com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | CHAIRMAN HISE: So, Members, I will | 1 | up next; is that right? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | just add, in choosing this district was unique. | 2 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. |
| 3 | We tried to keep as much of Durham as possible, | 3 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Is that SBV |
| 4 | but Durham is sufficiently too large to be | 4 | Amendment 3? |
| 5 | contained in a senate district and -- both in | 5 | SENATOR CLARK: Yes. I'll do that, |
| 6 | this amendment and the map we had to divide | 6 | Mr. Chair. |
| 7 | Durham in order to do so, and so I'm actually | 7 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Wait a minute. Hold |
| 8 | okay with it. | 8 | on. I've got the wrong one there. Let's find |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. | 9 | the right map. Which one is it? |
| 10 | Senator Marcus, have you moved for the | 10 | SCG Amendment 3? Is that the one, SCG? |
| 11 | adoption of the amendment? | 11 | SENATOR CLARK: I will handle SCG |
| 12 | SENATOR MARCUS: I believe Senator Blue | 12 | Amendment 3, Mr. Chair. |
| 13 | would like to be recognized. | 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Thank you, |
| 14 | SENATOR BLUE: I just want to make one | 14 | Senator Clark. You have the floor. |
| 15 | point, Mr. Chairman. And again, I want to | 15 | SENATOR BLUE: Is it SCG Amendment 1, |
| 16 | disclaim any expertise in the area, but I just | 16 | the one that Senator Lowe has? |
| 17 | don't see any Voting Rights Act violations in | 17 | SENATOR LOWE: Yes. I have 3. |
| 18 | Durham, not that there aren't some and maybe | 18 | SENATOR BLUE: Senator Clark just said |
| 19 | experts can tell you differently, but I know | 19 | he has 3. |
| 20 | that Senator Murdock indicated to her | 20 | SENATOR CLARK: I have SCG Amendment 3. |
| 21 | understanding that it complied with the VRA. | 21 | That's the one that's on the screen now. |
| 22 | I'd rephrase that to say that I am | 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Lowe has made |
| 23 | aware of no violations of the Voting Rights Act | 23 | the handoff, a good, clean handoff to |
| 24 | that exist in the Durham county redistricting. | 24 | Senator Clark. |
| 25 | I think that they just want to do it because it | 25 | SENATOR CLARK: Okay. Thank you, |
|  | 101 |  | 103 |
|  | satisfies some community-of-interest issues, but I'm not aware of any VRA issues in the way that | 1 | Mr. Chair. Thank you, Senator Lowe. Sorry for |
| 2 |  | 2 | the confusion there. |
| 3 | Durham county is -- there may be some other | 3 | But anyway, Mr. Chair, I would like to |
| 4 |  | 4 | move that the committee accept this amendment. |
| 5 | gerrymandering still, even though it might not | 5 | What it does, it follows one of the criteria |
| 6 | have any effect, but again, that's my lay | 6 | that we have established, and that is to give, I |
| 7 | opinion. That's not an expert opinion. | 7 | guess, relief to the double-bunking of members |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank | 8 | if we can do so in a reasonable way. |
| 9 | Senator Blue. | 9 | And what this particular amendment does |
| 10 | And is there a motion. | 10 | is it essentially changes the orientation of the |
| 11 | SENATOR MARCUS: I move for the | 11 | Senate District 28 and 27 as in the plan put |
| 12 | adoption of this amendment. | 12 | forth by the Senate Republicans by shifting it |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you. | 13 | from a north-south orientation essentially to an |
| 14 | Senator Marcus has moved for the | 14 | east-west orientation, and also it avoids the |
| 15 | adoption of SBV Amendment 2. All those in favor | 15 | double-bunking of Senators Robinson and Garrett. |
| 16 | say aye. | 16 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, |
| 17 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Aye. | 17 | Senator Clark. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All those opposed. | 18 | And, Senator Robinson, I do have the |
| 19 | All right. The amendment is in fact | 19 | same two questions for you that we asked Senator |
| 20 | adopted. | 20 | Murdock. Are you in favor of this redraw, this |
| 21 | Next up. Who would like to lead the | 21 | amendment? |
| 22 | charge on whatever amendment you prefer next? | 22 | SENATOR ROBINSON: Yes, I am. |
| 23 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Looks like -- | 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: And is it your |
| 24 | SENATOR BLUE: It's my understanding | 24 | understanding, belief, view that it complies |
| 25 | that there's a Guilford county amendment that's | 25 | with the VRA to take this amendment? |
|  | 102 |  | 104 |
|  |  |  | 26 (Pages 101 to 104 ) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.di |  | ry | O.com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | SENATOR ROBINSON: Yes. Based on the |  | it gets to the point and it does what the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | previous ruling of the courts, yes. | 2 | criteria is trying to do. And I certainly |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, Senator | 3 | submit this map -- submit this amendment unto |
| 4 | Robinson. | 4 | you. |
| 5 | Senator Blue. | 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, |
| 6 | SENATOR BLUE: I make the same | 6 | Senator Lowe. |
| 7 | observation that I'm certainly not an expert, | 7 | Members or Senator Hise, do you have |
| 8 | and I don't think Senator Robinson is holding | 8 | any comments? |
| 9 | herself out as one in this area, but I believe | 9 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Yeah. I would just |
| 10 | that the issue in Guilford county that we | 10 | say, technically, I think this amendment would |
| 11 | wrestle with with these two districts the last | 11 | undo the previous amendment we just did and |
| 12 | time had to do with partisan gerrymandering, and | 12 | replace the two-county podding with a different |
| 13 | there was a special master appointed who drew | 13 | two counties, three districts, replace them with |
| 14 | what had been earlier VRA district and we | 14 | different others. This seems to significantly |
| 15 | complied with the special master's | 15 | change, I don't have them on top of it, but |
| 16 | recommendation and that's how we settled the | 16 | where High Point would go as well as what in |
| 17 | last lawsuit. And so I'm assuming that this | 17 | Greensboro would go and how it was configured |
| 18 | configuration doesn't change radically anything | 18 | and would not support -- especially in light of |
| 19 | that the special master did in District 28. I | 19 | having just changed it to change it again for |
| 20 | think that was the number of it when he did it | 20 | the committee, I don't think that's a really |
| 21 | the last time, and that resolved the voting | 21 | good fit. |
| 22 | rights issues in that district as well as | 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, Senator |
| 23 | political gerrymandering issues. | 23 | Hise. |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 24 | Senator Blue. |
| 25 | Senator Blue. | 25 | SENATOR BLUE: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I |
|  | 105 |  | 107 |
| 1 | Senator Hise, do you have any comments on the proposed amendment? | 1 | will simply say that's why they were staged in the order that they were staged. |
| 2 |  | 2 |  |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN HISE: No, I think | 3 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Do you want to -- |
| 4 | [unintelligible] ...functionally equivalent. | 4 | SENATOR LOWE: I will withdraw. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. So Senator | 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: The motion to amend |
| 6 | Hise endorses the amendment as well, and | 6 | SCGA Amend-1 has been withdrawn. |
| 7 | Senator Clark has moved that we adopt SCG | 7 | Members, we're getting very close now. |
| 8 | Amendment 3. | 8 | Next map or next amendment. |
| 9 | All those in favor say aye. | 9 | SENATOR MARCUS: Okay, Mr. Chair, I |
| 10 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Aye. | 10 | believe I'm up next. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All those opposed. | 11 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: What number? |
| 12 | The amendment is adopted. | 12 | SENATOR MARCUS: This is SCH Amend-5 |
| 13 | All right. Senator Blue, we'll look to | 13 | for Mecklenburg and Iredell. |
| 14 | you to determine which amendment is up next. | 14 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: You have the floor to |
| 15 | SENATOR BLUE: I think Senator Lowe | 15 | explain proposed Amendment SCH Amend-5. |
| 16 | has -- on the list I got is SCG Amendment 1. | 16 | SENATOR MARCUS: I'll give staff just a |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: All right. Senator | 17 | minute to get the side-by-side up. I'll get my |
| 18 | Lowe, I think we have the pink SCG Amendment 1 | 18 | papers here. |
| 19 | in front of us. | 19 | Okay, thank you so much. |
| 20 | SENATOR LOWE: We do have pink. | 20 | So this amendment concerns the new |
| 21 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: And you have the | 21 | two-county cluster of Mecklenburg and Iredell |
| 22 | floor. | 22 | counties. As you know, this body must carve |
| 23 | SENATOR LOWE: Just looking at this | 23 | those two counties into six districts, trying to |
| 24 | map, it's a much cleaner-looking map, and I | 24 | keep population as equal as possible and |
| 25 | think it can be well seen that it's cleaner and | 25 | following all the other criteria that this body |
| 106 |  |  | 108 |
|  |  |  | 27 (Pages 105 to 108 ) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.disc |  | ryd | .com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | has adopted. As the chairs have mentioned |  | criteria about considering member residences and |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | several times throughout this process, the | 2 | the rule that this committee has followed in the |
| 3 | criteria are not ranked, rather the criteria are | 3 | past with the court's blessing, I will mention, |
| 4 | considered co-equal and in the chair's own words | 4 | to avoid pairing incumbents in the same district |
| 5 | should be blended to be fair and to honor all of | 5 | when it can be avoided with reasonable efforts. |
| 6 | the criteria whenever possible. | 6 | Unfortunately, when I saw the |
| 7 | So the Republican map, which is on the | 7 | Republican-proposed map, it seemed to me that my |
| 8 | left, for this cluster, it fails to meet at | 8 | information was used for the opposite purpose, |
| 9 | least two of the criteria that this committee | 9 | since the Republican map double-bunks me, |
| 10 | adopted. First, it has low compactness scores. | 10 | pitting me against one of the few other female |
| 11 | I'll note that when the chair presented the map, | 11 | members of this body who also happens to be of |
| 12 | he did not even mention this criteria in his | 12 | the opposite political party. |
| 13 | discussion of the map to justify why it's drawn | 13 | Now, it's true that some incumbents |
| 14 | as it was and that he also has emphasized | 14 | from other parts of the state, including one of |
| 15 | frequently, when he was speaking to Senator Blue | 15 | the chairs of this committee, ended up in the |
| 16 | earlier, that there should not be any one | 16 | same district with another member due to the |
| 17 | criteria that trumps all the other criteria, | 17 | county clustering rules. Those double-bunks |
| 18 | that we should blend them all | 18 | were unavoidable, they're not in anyone's |
| 19 | The second reason that this map, as | 19 | control, and they will eliminate some members of |
| 20 | drawn, fails to meet this committee's criteria | 20 | this body on a partisan-blind basis. But the |
| 21 | is that it double-bunks two current members of | 21 | double-bunk in Mecklenburg-Iredell that is in |
| 22 | this body, putting the precinct where I live in | 22 | this map on your screen now is not necessary and |
| 23 | a district that is now represented by Senator | 23 | in fact drawing the map that way makes it less |
| 24 | Sawyer in Iredell county. This double-bunk is | 24 | compact and therefore less fair on two of the |
| 25 | especially egregious for two reasons. First, it | 25 | criteria that this committee said it would |
|  | 109 |  | 111 |
|  | takes me across county lines, out of the county | 1 | follow when drawing maps. |
| 2 | in the community where I live and I serve, | 2 | In Common Cause v Lewis, the court |
|  | north Mecklenburg, to tack me into a distric | 3 | approved using reasonable efforts to avoid |
| 4 | that is made up almost entirely of Iredell | 4 | pairing incumbents in the same district. It is |
| 5 | county. And the second reason is it's the only | 5 | certainly reasonable in this case where the map |
| 6 | double-bunk that still exists in this entire | 6 | that avoids pairing incumbents is more compact |
| 7 | state map that could have been avoided. | 7 | than the map that double-bunks. Now that you've |
| 8 | The members of the Mecklenburg | 8 | fixed Guilford county's map, there aren't any |
| 9 | delegation thought that we could do a better job | 9 | other double-bunk members when it can be |
| 10 | of honoring all of the criteria, so we sat | 10 | avoided. |
| 11 | together and we drew this map that is now on the | 11 | And I'm asking you to treat me and the |
| 12 | right of your screen which I now offer to you as | 12 | voters I represent fairly based on their public |
| 13 | an amendment | 13 | comment that does not like your map and taking |
| 14 | Our map puts all incumbents in separate | 14 | into account all the criteria in a blended way |
| 15 | districts and is significantly more compact | 15 | and applying those criteria consistently across |
| 16 | Our Reock average score is .48 which is | 16 | all districts. |
| 17 | 11 points higher than the Republican map which | 17 | This map that I'm offering is more |
| 18 | scores only a .37 . Our map has a better | 18 | fair, it is more compact on both Reock and |
| 19 | Polsby-Popper compactness score too. Our score | 19 | Polsby-Popper, it splits zero precincts or VTDs, |
| 20 | is .39 while the Republican map scores only .32 . | 20 | and it allows all current members to remain in |
| 21 | At the start of this redistricting | 21 | separate districts. It's fair, and I ask for |
| 22 | process, this committee required all current | 22 | your support for this amendment. |
| 23 | senators to provide a map which marked with an X | 23 | I'll pause to see if there's any |
| 24 | exactly where we live. I did that. I hoped | 24 | questions. |
| 25 | that that information would be used to honor the | 25 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, |
|  | 110 |  | 112 |
|  |  |  | 28 (Pages 109 to 112) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | yd | O.com 1-919-424-82 |



|  | to stay with north Mecklenburg. | 1 | Senator Marcus is asking for. In the dialogue |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Daniel, you | 2 | between Senator Hise and me a little bit |
| 3 | good? | 3 | earlier, I think I pointed out to him that |
|  | SENATOR DANIEL: No follow-up. | 4 | decisions are made to split townships or not |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. Any other | 5 | split -- not townships. I'm sorry. -- towns, |
| 6 | comments, questions? | 6 | municipalities, and we've done it in Sampson |
| 7 | Senator Nickel. | 7 | county, putting it together, but yet we come to |
| 8 | SENATOR NICKEL: Yeah. You know, I | 8 | Cumberland county and we split Hope Mills, a |
| 9 | just want to say I think, you know, if we reject | 9 | town which I'm very familiar, they still stay in |
| 10 | this amendment, you're ending Senator Marcus's | 10 | the same cluster, and that's in effect what you |
| 11 | career in the senate, and I just -- I hope that | 11 | would be doing here. Yeah, you come down from |
| 12 | this committee and the chairs will continue to | 12 | the north, which is what Granville did to Wake |
| 13 | meet with Senator Marcus and the members of the | 13 | county, came down from the north, and you |
| 14 | Mecklenburg delegation about this issue. We're | 14 | decided to take a radical left turn. That's |
| 15 | not done yet, we're not at the floor, and I | 15 | strange, but you took a left turn when you could |
| 16 | think the way we address this is going to | 16 | have taken a right turn coming down in Wake |
| 17 | determine how we proceed as a body. And I | 17 | county from Granville. Took a left turn to go |
| 18 | hope -- I hope there's a way to find a solution | 18 | over to Zebulon and in that area. |
| 19 | here that follows the committee criteria and | 19 | And here you're coming down, you got |
| 20 | allows folks to have a real choice here. | 20 | these four, five precincts across the top -- or |
| 21 | So I know where this is going, I | 21 | towns across the top of Mecklenburg county, you |
| 22 | believe, but I truly, truly hope that, you know, | 22 | can come down the -- as I look at it, the left |
| 23 | the conversation can continue here because I | 23 | edge from here and allow this split in that city |
| 24 | have been with Senator Marcus here since I got | 24 | just like you did in Hope Mills. And that's |
| 25 | here and seen how hard she works every day to | 25 | what I was trying to get at. If none of the |
|  | 117 |  | 119 |
|  | represent her constituents. | 1 | criteria trumps the other, that is, if none is |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thanks, | 2 | more important than the other criteria and you |
|  | Senator Nickel. | 3 | got eight or ten criteria, none is more |
|  | Senator Lowe, do you have a comment or | 4 | important than any other criteria and you got |
| 5 | are you good? | 5 | eight of them, you've shown that you're willing |
|  | SENATOR LOWE: Yes. As I look at this | 6 | to elevate one to a higher level depending on |
|  | amendment, I am really hoping that there is a | 7 | what you're trying to achieve. |
|  | way that given the criteria that is given that | 8 | So there's no reason not to split |
|  | we can make the necessary adjustments so that we | 9 | Davidson, it's still got the same group of |
| 10 | don't have these two senators double-bunked. I | 10 | people representing it, and you can do it within |
| 11 | think that there is a way. As a matter of fact, | 11 | these other five districts in Mecklenburg county |
| 12 | I know there is a way. If we put our heads to | 12 | in that cluster without -- you can accommodate |
| 13 | it, we can figure this one out, and I'm hoping | 13 | the question of members who already occupy this |
| 14 | that we'll do everything that is necessary, | 14 | body. That's why you put it in as one of the |
| 15 | hopefully in this meeting, to figure this out so | 15 | considerations, one of the criteria. |
| 16 | that we don't have a two of our members | 16 | And as I told you privately, I'll tell |
| 17 | double-bunked. I think it's important to the | 17 | you publicly, I appreciate the efforts that the |
| 18 | work that we're doing to figure this one out. | 18 | three of you have made to unbunk Democrats |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 19 | because we're the ones in the urban areas who |
| 20 | Senator Lowe. | 20 | ended up being double-bunked. You did it in the |
| 21 | Any other comments, questions? | 21 | case of Wake county. You did it in one instance |
| 22 | SENATOR BLUE: One here, Mr. Chairman. | 22 | in the case of Mecklenburg county. You did it |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue. | 23 | in Guilford county. You may have done it |
| 24 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah, and I would simply | 24 | somewhere else, but you've done it in the places |
| 25 | say that there is precedent for what | 25 | where we ended up double-bunked. |
|  | 118 |  | 120 |
|  |  |  | 30 (Pages 117 to 120) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ry | .com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | Certainly, you didn't have to split | 1 | Senator Marcus. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | municipalities or anything like that, you can | 2 | SENATOR MARCUS: And I'll be happy to |
| 3 | shift things around, but again, this is a case | 3 | displace this for today. |
| 4 | where you can do some of the things that you've | 4 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you. |
| 5 | done in other districts and observe that | 5 | Senator Blue, what's the next |
| 6 | criterion in this decision. | 6 | amendment? |
|  | Again, as Senator Nickel said, there | 7 | SENATOR BLUE: Since this one is |
| 8 | are ways you can do it and still preserve the | 8 | displaced, Mr. Chair, I have I think one other |
| 9 | efforts that you've made in the rest of this | 9 | amendment, and I'll be very brief on that. |
| 10 | map, and you know you can in southern | 10 | That's SBK 4. It's a VRA district based in |
| 11 | Mecklenburg county still preserve the effort | 11 | Wilson county. |
| 12 | that you've made down there, but not just end up | 12 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: I don't have that |
| 13 | in this being the single double-bunk where you | 13 | nomenclature before me. |
| 14 | could do something about that you didn't do | 14 | SENATOR BLUE: Let's see. |
| 15 | something about. | 15 | SENATOR MARCUS: Senator Blue, I |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Senator Blue and | 16 | believe it's SCH Amend-7. |
| 17 | Members, in the discretion of the chair, I'm | 17 | SENATOR BLUE: Okay. I've got it here. |
| 18 | going to recommend that we displace this | 18 | SBA Amend-3. |
| 19 | amendment. Let's get our heads together. I | 19 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay, got it. |
| 20 | will -- I will point out, just for fun, the | 20 | So, Members, it's SBA Amend-3. |
| 21 | humor in the fact that I think Senator Marcus | 21 | SENATOR MARCUS: I'm sorry. |
| 22 | championed an amendment to remove consideration | 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Members found that |
| 23 | of members' residences from the criteria, but | 23 | map, we're good to go. The map's up on the |
| 24 | that's okay, that was yesterday. Today's today. | 24 | screen. |
| 25 | And why don't we displace this and we'll spend a | 25 | Senator Blue, you have the floor. |
|  | 121 |  | 123 |
|  | little time seeing if we can find a solution. | 1 | SENATOR BLUE: Is that it? |
| 2 | All right. Thank you. Next amendment. | 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Vance. That is |
| 3 | SENATOR MARCUS: Mr. Chair, can I just | 3 | not -- that is not it. |
| 4 | set the record straight on that since you | 4 | SENATOR BLUE: That's not it. |
| 5 | represented what I said | 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: How about to the left |
| 6 | This caucus, not me, did put forward an | 6 | there. Yeah. |
| 7 | amendment when we were adopting these criteria | 7 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah, that's it, that's |
| 8 | to say let's not consider anybody's residence, |  | it. I'm looking at the wrong one. |
| 9 | to be fair, and the committee turned that down. | 9 | I won't repeat everything I said about |
| 10 | They said, no, no, we want to consider member | 10 | a VRA district, but this was one of the |
| 11 | residence. So my amendment, for the record, was | 11 | originally created VRA senate districts, and it |
| 12 | to say let's be fair and make sure that we use | 12 | stayed in place through 2011. I think it was |
| 13 | that data for everyone to not double-bunk. | 13 | created in the -- in 2003 with the whole county |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 14 | provision applicable, and this body redid it in |
| 15 | Senator Marcus. | 15 | 2011, and Senator Angela Bryant was representing |
| 16 | SENATOR MARCUS: And you turned that | 16 | various portions of it. |
| 17 | amendment down. So we are where we are for | 17 | The only thing I've done here -- and |
| 18 | exactly that reason. I don't think I've been | 18 | again, this is a solution to a problem before it |
| 19 | inconsistent. I'm trying to be consistent and | 19 | becomes a problem. The only thing I've done is |
| 20 | honest. Obviously, I have feelings about this, | 20 | take districts whatever it was beforehand, but |
| 21 | and I hope you'll forgive me for being a little | 21 | as to Wilson, Nash, Edgecombe area, and it |
| 22 | bit emotional about it, but I don't want you to | 22 | starts up in Vance county, comes down to |
| 23 | misrepresent or suggest that I've been | 23 | Franklin, then through Nash. It takes those two |
| 24 | inconsistent in how I feel about this issue. | 24 | clusters -- there are two clusters. It takes |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 25 | those two clusters and it combines them because |
|  | 122 |  | 124 |
|  |  |  | 31 (Pages 121 to 124) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ry | .com 1-919-424-82 |


| 1 | you can create the functioning VRA district |  | I guess I want to point out that this |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | without going through the exercise of the |  | fails to create a two-county pod for Edgecombe |
| 3 | original VRA district which had Wilson, Nash, | 3 | and Pitt, a three-county pod for Wilson, Green |
|  | Edgecombe, Northampton -- I think Northampton, |  | and Wayne, and a three-county pod for Vance, |
|  | but Halifax and Warren and maybe even Vance, but | 5 | Franklin, and Nash, and instead creates an |
|  | it went into all of those counties | 6 | ght-county pod that it divides among three |
|  | And its configuration after Rucho -- or |  | members. No evidence to suggest that that is |
| 8 | as a result of Rucho was Wilson -- Wilson, | 8 | required that I have seen before you bypass the |
| 9 | Halifax, and Edgecombe, those three counties, | 9 | entire podding and destroy three pods. |
| 10 | and it met the requirements of a VRA district as | 10 | Even if I accepted that, I do not -- |
| 11 | it was intended to be. And once it got thrown | 11 | the challenges of why Edgecombe would be divided |
| 12 | into this new cluster that it was thrown into | 12 | seems to make no sense to me when Edgecombe and |
| 13 | it dissolves that VRA district. And as I sai | 13 | Pitt form a two-county pod already, and so |
| 14 | earlier, Stephenson can't in and of itsel | 14 | you've got this small, little blip that was |
| 15 | dissolve a VRA district. You've got to make the | 15 | divided just because |
| 16 | study | 16 | But trying to get into those, I think |
| 17 | pointed out by those who were telling you some | 17 | that the request here is to throw out the |
| 18 | problem areas and it showed the statistics. | 18 | Stephenson poddings of a two-county pod and two, |
| 19 | What | 19 | three-county pods and instead make that an |
| 20 | district and it would combine those | 20 | eight-county pod and divide it among three |
| 21 | distric | 21 | districts, splitting all those counties and |
| 22 | again, just as with my first formulation over in | 22 | others. |
| 23 | the northeast, it would combine the districts | 23 | They claim that -- the claim is being |
| 24 | and the remaining district would be the second | 24 | ade that there are some VRA requirement that |
| 25 | district of those two. It would still be three | 25 | has to do so. I refer everyone to the statement |
|  | 125 |  | 127 |
|  | counties. It wouldn't cause any other configurations under the Stephenson criteria because you will have created a VRA district and then you are left with three counties from that |  | we've made earlier today that we don't see that, and I think it would be a tremendous mistake for |
|  |  | 2 |  |
|  |  | 3 | us to go this far in violating all the pods and |
|  |  | 4 | thers in order to accommodate with certain |
|  | VRA district -- from creating that VRA district just as it is going into it. So it's a | 5 | other people's opinions of what's required of |
|  |  | 6 | us |
|  | three-county cluster. It would still be a | 7 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, Senator |
|  | three-county cluster. The cluster around it | 8 | Hise. |
| 9 | would still be a two-county cluster, and this | 9 | Senator Blue, comment. |
| 10 | would be a cluster going into three or four | 10 | SENATOR BLUE: Just to be clear, |
| 11 | counties, but it would be a VRA district so it | 11 | Stephenson says you first draw the VRA |
| 12 | wouldn't count against that, and it solves a | 12 | districts. That's an instruction to the General |
| 13 | problem before you have to address it in any | 13 | Assembly. Nobody disputes that. That is the |
| 14 | other proceeding win or lose. It gives you | 14 | first thing that the opinion says that you do. |
| 15 | certainty through this decade, and it doesn't do | 15 | It says first draw the VRA districts. |
| 16 | any harm to the other stuff that you've come up | 16 | After you draw the VRA districts, then |
| 17 | with cluster-wise or any other way. So I offer | 17 | you group counties, those that can be separate |
| 18 | it to you for your consideration and move its adoption. | 18 | in and of themselves, a single-member district, |
| 19 |  | 19 | you do that. Those that contain within |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, Senator Blue. | 20 | themselves a concrete number of districts, then |
| 21 |  | 21 | you do that. So you get Wake -- you used to get |
| 22 | And before we take up the motion, | 22 | Wake and Mecklenburg, and that's how you got |
| 23 | Senator Hise. | 23 | Onslow. |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN HISE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | 24 | Then it says after -- after you do the |
| 25 |  | 25 | VRA district, you do the clustering. After I've |
| 126 |  |  | 128 |
|  |  |  | 32 (Pages 125 to 128) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.d |  | yd | .com 1-919-424-82 |


|  | done this proposed VRA district, the clustering | 1 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: So that takes care of |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | is still the Pitt-Edgecombe cluster. That's the | 2 | 7. And then so I still -- |
| 3 | cluster. That's a two-county cluster because it | 3 | SENATOR BLUE: And we're pulling back |
| 4 | disregarded what you did to draw the VRA | 4 | on 3. |
| 5 | district. The cluster is still Nash, Wilson, | 5 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: You're pulling back |
| 6 | and Wayne, a three-county cluster which is what | 6 | on 3 as well? Okay. |
| 7 | it is now. So those are the clusters that you | 7 | So that is all the amendments. Am I |
| 8 | draw after you've drawn the VRA district. | 8 | missing anything? That's all the amendments you |
| 9 | And that's what Stephenson says you do, | 9 | wanted to offer today. |
| 10 | no difference than what you did when you started | 10 | SENATOR BLUE: I think it is. It's all |
| 11 | initially. You just didn't recognize the | 11 | that I have. I don't know whether some other |
| 12 | obligation to do a VRA district. That's all | 12 | members have other amendments. |
| 13 | this does. It doesn't make an eight-county | 13 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Okay. I want to make |
| 14 | super cluster. You haven't -- remember, you | 14 | the committee aware that we will be having a |
| 15 | haven't done the clusters when you do the VRA | 15 | committee meeting tomorrow. The time is TBD |
| 16 | district. You do the clustering afterwards, and | 16 | because I think it's dependent on some work the |
| 17 | that's why it leaves these counties intact. You | 17 | House is doing, but I wanted to put that on your |
| 18 | don't -- you're still observing the clustering | 18 | radar. As soon as we know the schedule, we will |
| 19 | mandate. | 19 | certainly let you know. |
| 20 | Remember, the whole theory behind | 20 | And I'd like to stand at east for just |
| 21 | Stephenson was that you harmonized the whole | 21 | five minutes or less here. The chairs need to |
| 22 | county provision with -- and that's the language | 22 | caucus a second. |
| 23 | from the case, you harmonize it with federal | 23 | SENATOR BLUE: Can I do one thing |
| 24 | law, which is what I just tried to do, and | 24 | before you go at ease -- |
| 25 | that's what I was pointing out to you. It does | 25 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Sure. |
|  | 129 |  | 131 |
|  | not create an eight-county super cluster. | 1 | SENATOR BLUE: -- to make sure that the -- so the staff knows where we're going. Again, and I appreciate publicly the |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, | 2 |  |
| 3 | Senator Blue. | 3 |  |
| 4 | Seeing no other comments or questions, | 4 | effort that the three chairs made with respect |
| 5 | Senator Blue has moved for the adoption of SBA | 5 | to not unnecessarily changing district numbers |
| 6 | Amendment 3. All those in favor say aye | 6 | in the same counties, and I acknowledge that, |
| 7 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Aye | 7 | and I certainly appreciate it for those members |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Those opposed no. | 8 | in these counties who are returning who order |
| 9 | COMMITTEE MEMBERS: No. | ${ }^{9}$ | their supplies in great quantities -- in great |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: The nos have it, so | 10 | quantities so that you'll save some trees. And |
| 11 | we will not be amending the map. | 11 | I'm sure that Senator Hise recognizes that from |
| 12 | All right. So I know Senator Blue said | 12 | the western part of the state where they just |
| 13 | that was his last amendment, but I do have a | 13 | cut down Christmas trees. |
| 14 | couple other maps here. I don't know i | 14 | But so that the staff will understand, |
| 15 | somebody else moving for those amendments, or | 15 | in case there's a need for them to renumber |
| 16 | are those withdrawn at this point? I've got | 16 | whatever the final districts are within your map |
| 17 | SBVA Amend-3 and SCHA Amend-7. | 17 | where you've changed, and we won't be rushed to |
| 18 | SENATOR BLUE: SCH -- I pulled back | 18 | do it, if you could sort of give them some |
| 19 | SCH 10 Amend-7 because you said you're going to | 19 | direction in that regard. I know you changed |
| 20 | set the discussion that Senator Marcus was | 20 | mine in the ones in Wake county, but I didn't |
| 21 | having aside. | 21 | know whether there were others where you had |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: 3 and 7. | 22 | made those kinds of -- |
| 23 | SENATOR BLUE: Yeah. So it wouldn't be | 23 | CHAIRMAN NEWTON: Thank you, |
| 24 | appropriate to do that one until I see how | 24 | Senator Blue. The staff's got that on their |
| 25 | that's resolved. | 25 | radar. |
|  | 130 |  | 132 |
|  |  |  | 33 (Pages 129 to 132) |
| discovery court reporters www.dis |  | y | .com 1-919-424-82 |





| 94:23 | 50:24,25 51:6 | Cavness 2:9 | 70:12,20,23 | 131:1,5,13,25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| boundaries | Canton 28:5 | census 43:8 | 71:2,12,25 | 132:23 133:8 |
| 39:12 | capital 74:2 | center 99:2 | 72:6,14,16,20 | 133:11,24,25 |
| Bragg 38:12,19 | care 131:1 | centered 11:8 | 72:21 73:17 | 134:7,12,19,24 |
| 75:12 | career 117:11 | central 64:11 | 74:3,13,14 | chairs 3:10 6:2 |
| break 2:17 | Carolina 1:1,23 | certain 42:14 | 75:1,5,7,15,20 | 8:12 9:3 12:3 |
| 34:18 69:6 | 3:10 4:1 5:25 | 44:12 128:4 | 76:2,4,15 77:3 | 12:18 13:19 |
| brief 123:9 | 6:24 9:18 21:7 | certainly 47:9 | 77:9,12,22 | 15:9 16:16 |
| bring 53:20 | 23:18 27:4 | 50:13 105:7 | 78:3,6,11,18 | 17:6 19:13 |
| 58:10 | 42:20 43:21 | 107:2 112:5 | 78:20,22,25 | 21:11 25:11,17 |
| bringing 54:8 | 45:14 47:16,22 | 116:6 121:1 | 79:2,7,12,16 | 27:15 28:2 |
| Britt 14:21 | 56:19 64:12 | 131:19 132:7 | 79:20,24 80:1 | 29:2,7,19 |
| broader 58:14 | 69:4,14 136:1 | certainty $126: 15$ | 80:3,12,16,20 | 48:25 59:15 |
| brought 46:24 | Carolina's 56:25 | certify 136:5 | 80:24 81:11,23 | 109:1 111:15 |
| Brunswick 5:22 | Carolina-Virg... | cetera 75:25 | 82:2,23 83:3 | 117:12 131:21 |
| 6:15 | 42:18 | 76:1 | 83:11,20 84:5 | 132:4 133:5,12 |
| Bryant 124:15 | carry 96:22 | CFO-1 6:6 | 84:10,14,19 | 133:20 134:6 |
| bunch 36:4 | cars 49:22 | CFO-6 6:7 | 85:1,12 86:2 | 135:7 |
| Buncombe | Carteret 49:21 | chair 7:2 37:12 | 86:11,20,22 | challenge 31:8 |
| 25:15 26:15,22 | 60:14 64:10,23 | 38:2 39:23 | 87:1,2,9,13,17 | 76:8 |
| 70:18,20 | 67:7,12,21 | 41:23 50:9 | 87:19 88:3,9 | challenges |
| burden 49:4 | 69:3 | 52:2 56:8 98:2 | 88:11,15,18 | 127:11 |
| 54:15 55:13 | carve 108:22 | 100:6 103:6,12 | 89:5,11,15,20 | championed |
| 56:18 | Cary 9:3 10:25 | 104:1,3 107:25 | 90:6,7,22 91:8 | 121:22 |
| Burke 25:15 | 11:4,8,10,14 | 108:9 109:11 | 91:18,24 93:13 | change 43:23 |
| 26:14 70:21 | 11:22 12:6 | 114:20 121:17 | 93:14,20 95:1 | 86:15 105:18 |
| business 96:17 | 80:19 | 122:3 123:8 | 95:19,22,23 | 107:15,19 |
| bypass 127:8 | case 31:21,22 | 133:1 | 97:21 98:6,11 | changed 43:4 |
| Byrd 1:18 136:4 | 32:1 44:9 45:5 | chair's 109:4 | 98:15 100:4,13 | 44:6 107:19 |
| 136:15 | 45:9,11 46:11 | Chairman 2:3 | 100:17,23 | 114:11 132:17 |
|  | 46:24 53:14 | 3:2 15:19,20 | 101:1,9,15 | 132:19 |
| C | 112:5 120:21 | 15:21,23 28:19 | 102:8,13,18 | changes 56:23 |
| C 39:8 136:1,1 | 120:22 121:3 | 28:23 35:1,12 | 103:3,7,13,22 | 104:10 133:18 |
| Cabarrus 14:22 | 129:23 132:15 | 35:17,19,24 | 104:16,23 | 134:4 135:5 |
| 15:4 16:15,19 | cases 30:24 | 36:7,10 37:13 | 105:3,24 106:3 | changing 132:5 |
| 17:7,9,9,15,17 | 52:22 80:25 | 37:18,24 40:1 | 106:5,11,17,21 | Chapel 13:17,19 |
| 22:13 24:10 | 116:18 | 40:11,13,19 | 107:5,9,22 | 25:23 |
| 116:14 | Caswell 14:10 | 41:1,5,10,15 | 108:3,5,11,14 | charge 102:22 |
| Caldwell 27:6 | Catawba 27:6 | 41:17 58:15,19 | 112:25 113:3 | Charlotte 23:8,8 |
| 27:11,14,15,19 | 27:14 | 60:6,8,16,24 | 114:14,19 | 23:12,19,22,25 |
| 27:25 | catch 49:22 | 61:5,7,23 62:4 | 115:16,23 | 24:6,8,15,18 |
| call 38:17 39:10 | catching 95:24 | 62:8,15,19,23 | 117:2,5 118:2 | 24:23 25:2,2,3 |
| 42:19 66:21 | 100:8 | 63:5,15,19 | 118:19,22,23 | 25:4 |
| 95:5 | category 46:22 | 64:1,4,13,18 | 121:16 122:14 | Charlotte's 25:5 |
| called 46:25 | caucus 122:6 | 64:25 65:9,10 | 122:25 123:4 | Chatham 13:12 |
| 85:16 | 131:22 133:9 | 65:22 66:10,14 | 123:12,19,22 | 13:15 98:3 |
| Camden 3:12,21 | caught 95:25 | 66:23 67:2,4,9 | 124:2,5 126:20 | 99:8 |
| 67:18 | cause 112:2 | 67:22 68:2,9 | 126:24,25 | Chaudhuri 11:7 |
| candidate 30:22 | 126:1 | 68:14,19 69:16 | 128:7 130:2,8 | Cherokee 27:7 |
| candidates | caused 65:16 | 69:21 70:3,9 | 130:10,22 | 28:14 |


| Cherryville | 24:6 | 129:2,3,3,5,6 | 114:18 115:17 | 17:25 30:20 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 25:23 | claim 127:23,23 | 129:14 130:1 | 118:4 128:9 | 38:18,19 39:6 |
| choice 5:24 7:4 | claims 32:14 | cluster-wise | commented 95:5 | 61:11 62:17,20 |
| 21:6 30:22 | 33:22 56:10 | 126:17 | comments 3:17 | 62:25 63:17 |
| 31:14 42:11 | clarification | clustering 49:9 | 41:22 58:18 | 64:20 95:11 |
| 51:13 61:15 | 134:20 | 49:13 50:11 | 61:11 77:11,24 | 96:17 100:1 |
| 62:2 63:8 | Clark 2:19 | 111:17 128:25 | 88:2,5 106:1 | 110:2 116:2 |
| 64:16 66:19 | 14:20 35:9,10 | 129:1,16,18 | 107:8 115:18 | community's |
| 72:15 74:20,21 | 35:15,18 37:10 | clusters 42:3,10 | 117:6 118:21 | 30:22 |
| 83:21 116:6,7 | 37:11,14,16,19 | 42:11 55:23 | 130:4 134:9 | community-of... |
| 117:20 | 37:22 38:1 | 73:20 124:24 | commission 46:5 | 102:1 |
| choices 57:11 | 40:2,3,6,15,17 | 124:24,25 | commissioners | compact 19:18 |
| 63:7 66:6 | 103:5,11,14,18 | 129:7,15 | 96:25 | 20:10 21:13 |
| choose 55:23 | 103:20,24,25 | co-equal 109:4 | committee 1:2 | 25:18 30:19 |
| 66:3,7 74:18 | 104:17 106:7 | coast 69:12 | 2:5 33:13 | 32:19 44:14 |
| choosing 30:8 | Clark's 35:13 | coastal 63:4 | 34:16 35:7 | 49:25 50:13 |
| 55:21 65:5 | 40:8 41:2 | 64:24 | 39:24 40:10,12 | 55:4 59:20 |
| 74:18 101:2 | Clause 31:11 | cohesive 30:20 | 42:12 50:14 | 60:3,12,15,20 |
| chose 3:10 6:2 | 33:2 48:7 | 44:15 55:5 | 52:2 60:4 70:8 | 61:3,8 83:24 |
| 7:2 55:25 61:2 | Clay 27:7 28:1 | cold 100:8 | 70:11 71:15 | 98:25 99:5,13 |
| 61:2 82:25 | clean 103:23 | collectively | 72:10 73:5,7 | 99:25 110:15 |
| 83:16 | cleaner 106:25 | 96:18 | 78:2,5 84:17 | 111:24 112:6 |
| chosen 3:9 59:13 | cleaner-looking | college 43:2 | 88:8,10 90:5 | 112:18 |
| Chowan 4:3,9 | 106:24 | Columbus 5:22 | 102:17 104:4 | compactness |
| 67:15 | clear 30:7 34:10 | 6:16 | 106:10 107:20 | 59:18 61:22 |
| Christmas | 40:20 58:5,20 | combine 125:20 | 109:9 110:22 | 62:1 66:13 |
| 132:13 | 58:23 60:17 | 125:23 | 111:2,15,25 | 89:22 98:20 |
| church 116:24 | 65:25 94:11 | combined 26:7 | 115:6 117:12 | 99:16 100:1 |
| CHURCHILL | 128:10 134:15 | combines 25:12 | 117:19 122:9 | 109:10 110:19 |
| 133:1 | clearly $52: 7$ | 124:25 | 130:7,9 131:14 | 113:25 114:24 |
| circle 99:1 114:5 | 58:10 59:5 | come 2:22 31 | 131:15 134:23 | 115:1,3,5 |
| circles 114:4,6 | Clemmons 20: | 38:9 50:9 | 135:3,4 136:7 | compare 114:1 |
| circuit 56:24 | Cleveland 25:12 | 68:14 94:3 | committee's | compared 82:7 |
| 57:3 | 26:2 | 99:19 119:7,11 | 90:20 95:18 | 90:2 98:23 |
| circumstances | close 8:23 84:2 | 119:22 126:16 | 109:20 | comparing |
| 2:15 | 108:7 | 133:6,14 | common 69:13 | 61:16 |
| cities 97:9 | clo | comes 124:2 | 95:14 112:2 | comparison |
| citizenry 55:16 | CLR 136:16 | coming 3: | communicat | 14:8 |
| citizens 49:6,6 | cluster 6:22 | 36:14 38:23 | 52:1 | complete 32:21 |
| 55:18 | 37:17 39:25 | 67:13 74:16,17 | communication | completed 94:6 |
| city 9:18 12:15 | 41:4,6 49:12 | 74:23 82:21 | 50:23 | complexities |
| 13:16,21 14:2 | 50:16,17 55:5 | 83:22,25 85:18 | communicatio... | 69:25 82:13 |
| 14:2 16:9 | 55:24,25 56:1 | 85:24 87:25 | 50:9 | complied 91:5 |
| 18:17,20 19:1 | 56:3 75:22 | 89:23 94:5,9 | communiti | 101:21 105:15 |
| 19:1 20:24 | 79:22 99:5 | 94:11 113:19 | 8:6 59:17 | complies 100:14 |
| 23:7,8 25:4 | 100:2 108:21 | 114:2 119:16 | 61:21 62:8 | 100:15,17,19 |
| 65:21 83:5 | 109:8 115:2,4 | 119:19 | 4:7 65 | 104:24 |
| 99:2 119:23 | 119:10 120:12 | comment 41:16 | 66:17 96:21 | comply 8:15,24 |
| city's 13:23 18:7 | 125:12 126:7,8 | 53:23 77:4 | 99:10 | 72:25 73:1,14 |
| 18:18 20:20 | 126:8,9,10 | 91:19 112:13 | community | comprise 5:22 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| iscovery court reporters |  | www.discoverydepo.com |  | 1-919-424-82 |




| 13:7,10,11,14 | 51:14,18 52:1 | 32:9 33:8,10 | dollars 56:20 | 59:14 71:23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 13:21,22,22,25 | 52:3 54:12,12 | 33:18,19 41:25 | dominant 62:2 | 73:12 82:12,18 |
| 14:1,3,4,4,6,7 | 54:14 55:2,3 | 42:4 43:9 | door 73:23 | 91:20 94:10 |
| 14:8,9,12,14 | 55:10,18,19 | 44:12,20 45:8 | 76:21 | 98:21 109:13 |
| 14:15,18,20 | 56:5 59:20 | 46:8,21,23 | double 68:25 | 109:20 115:10 |
| 15:7,8,13,15 | 60:4,19 61:3,7 | 47:2,5,10,10 | double-bunk | 129:8 |
| 15:18,25 16:5 | 63:25 68:6,7 | 47:24 48:2,22 | 109:24 110:6 | drew 89:3 92:19 |
| 16:7,8,10,11 | 69:22 75:10,17 | 49:16,24 50:14 | 111:21 112:9 | 105:13 110:11 |
| 16:13,18,19,21 | 76:9,11,13,16 | 51:5 53:11,13 | 121:13 122:13 | drive 69:23 |
| 16:25 17:4,5 | 77:15,17,18 | 53:16,18,21,25 | 133:15 | driving 90:24 |
| 17:11,11,12,14 | 80:8 81:9,16 | 54:3,23 57:21 | double-bunked | due 9:4 111:16 |
| 17:18,23,23 | 81:16,17,19,21 | 58:9 59:6,21 | 118:10,17 | Duplin 6:24 |
| 18:2,4,11,15 | 81:21 82:8,9 | 60:18,21 61:8 | 120:20,25 | Durham 13:12 |
| 18:16,19,19,22 | 82:11,17,21,22 | 61:16 62:3 | double-bunking | 13:15,16,18,21 |
| 18:23,24 19:4 | 83:1,2,13,15 | 69:9 71:5 77:1 | 23:2 104:7,15 | 14:2,5 45:24 |
| 19:5,7,10,11 | 83:17 89:4 | 77:16 80:10 | double-bunks | 46:1,3 52:23 |
| 19:22,25 20:13 | 90:15 93:7,24 | 84:22 85:25 | 109:21 111:9 | 98:3 99:2,8 |
| 20:17,18,18,19 | 94:1,6 95:17 | 89:22 93:5,12 | 111:17 112:7 | 101:3,4,7,18 |
| 20:21,22,23,25 | 97:7 99:1 | 94:14 95:8 | downtown 10:10 | 101:24 102:3 |
| 21:1,4,5,9,13 | 101:2,5 104:11 | 96:10,10 97:8 | 10:25 |  |
| 21:17,18,19,21 | 105:14,19,22 | 99:13,24 | dozen 23:12 | E |
| 21:23,24 22:2 | 109:23 110:3 | 105:11 107:13 | draw 29:22 | E 136:1,1 |
| 22:5,9,14,16 | 111:4,16 112:4 | 108:23 110:15 | 30:13,15,23 | earlier 33:7 56:2 |
| 22:17,20,21,25 | 113:16,17 | 112:16,21 | 31:9 41:25 | 73:20 77:17 |
| 23:1,3,5,11,13 | 114:10 115:9 | 120:11 121: | 44:12 48:14,16 | 105:14 109:16 |
| 23:15,22,25 | 123:10 124:10 | 124:11,20 | 50:3 91:14 | 113:6 119:3 |
| 24:2,4,5,7,11 | 125:1,3,10,13 | 125:16,21,23 | 92:8,25 93:9 | 125:14 128:1 |
| 24:13,14,17,17 | 125:15,20,21 | 127:21 128:12 | 93:19 95:7 | ease 131:24 |
| 24:24,25 25:1 | 125:24,25 | 128:15,16,20 | 96:4 97:14 | 133:10 |
| 25:5,7,8,13,15 | 126:3,5,5,11 | 132:16 134:5 | 113:5 116:12 | easier 36:16 |
| 25:19,22,25 | 128:18,25 | 135:6 | 128:11,15,16 | easily 90:14 |
| 26:1,5,5,7,10 | 129:1,5,8,12 | divide 76:10 | 129:4,8 | east 10:20 25:2 |
| 26:11,13,17,18 | 129:16 132:5 | 101:6 127:20 | drawing 33:21 | 54:3 94:8 |
| 26:19,21 27:1 | district's 3:25 | divided 3:23 | 34:3 50:11 | 95:14 131:20 |
| 27:2,13,17,18 | 25:3 | 113:10 127:1 | 52:23 66:2 | east-west 104:14 |
| 27:21,23,24 | district-specific | 127:15 | 72:10 80:6 | eastern 10:25 |
| 28:5,7,8,9,11 | 32:15 | divides 127:6 | 81:10 82:1,6 | 15:9 16:2,3 |
| 28:13,17,18 | districted 51:21 | dividing 73:10 | 82:17 91:5 | 24:10 47:16 |
| 30:19 32:20,22 | districting 31:13 | 73:10,11 85:20 | 92:1 93:1,5,15 | 64:11 |
| 32:23,25 34:4 | districts 3:6 7:2 | division 86:1 | 94:12,22 | edge 10:18 24:10 |
| 38:4,10 41:22 | 8:19,21,22 | doctrine 44:4 | 111:23 112:1 | 119:23 |
| 42:9 43:10 | 9:11,20,22 | 46:25 | 113:7,22 133:5 | Edgecombe 5:12 |
| 44:2,19,21,25 | 10:21 11:5 | doing 48:20 | drawn 12:13,25 | 124:21 125:4,9 |
| 45:4,10 46:1 | 12:4 15:4 | 54:14,18 56:18 | 14:1 16:5 | 127:2,11,12 |
| 46:16,17 47:11 | 16:22,23 19:15 | 59:10 66:1 | 18:16 19:22 | Edmisten 43:17 |
| 48:4,12,12,15 | 20:10 21:25 | 69:25 76:8 | 20:23 25:19 | $3: 1844$ |
| 48:16 49:4,17 | 23:11 25:18 | 80:9 82:13,16 | 32:3,5,24 34:4 | 134:17 |
| 49:20 50:5,10 | 27:5,11 29:22 | 92:9 93:12 | 43:9,10 44:3 | Edwards 26:12 |
| 50:17,22,23 | 30:13,16,23 | 94:19 118:18 | 44:20,22 45:10 | effect 102:6 |
| 51:9,10,11,13 | 31:9 32:3,4,5,7 | 119:11 131:17 | 49:24 50:4 | 119:10 |
|  |  |  |  | 14 |





| interests 96:18 | justify 33:4 47:9 | 81:18 82:11 | 19:18 21:13 | litigate 57:8 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 96:19 97:15 | 109:13 | 85:13 88:12 | 90:13 129:17 | litigated 30:1,7 |
| terpret 46:10 |  | 92:2,2,3,4,5,11 | leaving 7:11 | 42:7 54:20,22 |
| intrigued 67:25 | K | 92:12,18 93:2 | 16:16 19:2 | 54:22 |
| introduce 78:14 | keep 6:8,9 8:13 | 94:21 95:4,10 | 58:12 | litigating 30:10 |
| 78:15 | 9:3,10,12 10:4 | 95:11,12,16 | led 43:15 | 56:20 |
| invariably 39:18 | 10:6,17,19 | 96:6,24 97:6 | Lee 6:14 7:19 | litigation 31:18 |
| involved 58:12 | 11:23 12:13 | 101:19 108:22 | left 9:25 12:10 | litigious 34:11 |
| 94:12 | 13:5,19 15:10 | 114:8 116:3,15 | 15:6,16 17:22 | little 2:21 15:23 |
| involving 58:13 | 15:13,14 16:5 | 116:21 117:8,9 | 21:2 28:6 | 29:18 36:15 |
| Iredell $22: 1,5,8$ | 16:8 17:4 18:8 | 117:21,22 | 83:16 98:23 | 38:7,16 39:20 |
| 22:11,24 | 19:22,23 26:16 | 118:12 121:10 | 99:14 109:8 | 85:7 94:24 |
| 108:13,21 | 26:25 27:19 | 130:12,14 | 119:14,15,17 | 119:2 122:1,21 |
| 109:24 110:4 | 28:10 55:20 | 131:11,18,19 | 119:22 124:5 | 127:14 133:12 |
| 113:8 116:8 | 65:4,4 73:25 | 132:19,21 | 126:4 | live 4:19 15:3 |
| irregular 12:15 | 74:7,19,23 | knowledge | legal 1:20 34:8 | 92:4,21 94:21 |
| 13:3 | 75:15 80:5 | 94:20 | legislature 49:5 | 109:22 110:2 |
| irregularities | 82:16 101:3 | known 134:13 | 53:15 | 110:24 116:9 |
| 39:17 | 108:24 | knows 132:2 | legitimate 62:17 | living 69:11,13 |
| Isle 69:2,11 | keeping 3:18 | Krawiec 20:22 | Lenoir 5:2 27:16 | LLC 1:20 |
| issue 29:20 62:2 | 12:25 15:11 |  | 27:16,18,20 | Locust 17:7,10 |
| 105:10 117:14 | 22:10 63:10 | L | 28:10 | 17:17 |
| 122:24 | 71:21 72:2 | Lake 38:15 | lens 89:13 | long 58:1 69:1 |
| issued 56:24 | 76:13 80:21 | Landers 25:23 | lessons 42:24 | longer 32:12,13 |
| issues 32:16 | keeps 19:25 20:4 | language 129:22 | let's 34:18,20 | 52:13,13 53:10 |
| 57:11,16,18 | 20:10 22:5 | large 9:1,19 18:1 | 36:5 103:8 | look 42:9 49:18 |
| 58:7,10 62:5,7 | 25:20 61:9,12 | 18:18 20:16 | 121:19 122:8 | 53:10 54:21 |
| 102:1,2,4,4 | 61:13 76:24 | 22:15 38:12 | 122:12 123:14 | 57:5,15 81:15 |
| 105:22,23 | Kennedy 48:3 | 101:4 | letter 18:6 | 81:24 83:22 |
| iterating 134:16 | kept 9:8 11:12 | larger 6:1 14:2 | letters 48:24 | 96:14 99:19 |
| iteration 38:11 | 27:15 28:3 | 20:24 28:6 | 58:9 | 106:13 114:9 |
| 134:17 | 75:24 77:18 | largest 9:18 23:8 | level 53:6 120:6 | 115:12 118:6 |
| J | 13:9 | law 30:14 32:6 | levels 73:12 | 119:22 |
|  | Kernersvil | 33:8 56:23 | Lewis 20:2 | looked 59:16,18 |
|  | 0:2 | 129:24 | 31:21,22 112:2 | 63:5 66:15 |
|  | , | lawsuit 29 | life 36:15 | 8:25 84:16 |
|  | 83:7 85:2 94:9 | 34:11 43:16,19 | light 107:18 | 89:12 |
|  | 96.2 | 43:19 105:17 | limit 17:1 30:7 | looking 50:22 |
| jeopardize 75.23 | kinds 97:8 | lawsuits 45:6 | 54:20,21 91:18 | 55:17 60:1 |
| Jerry 87:12 92:6 | 132:22 | lawyer 92:11,12 | limits 18:17 30:3 | 61:22 64:5,25 |
| $\boldsymbol{J i m} 2: 11,11$ | King 19:20 20:2 | lawyers' 56:13 | 83:5,19 | 71:19 80:6 |
| job 110:9 | 20:4 | lay 102:6 | Lincoln 25:13 | 82:18 83:12,21 |
| Johnson 17:13 | knew 94:3 | layer 89:12 | 26:3 65:18 | 84:2 106:23 |
| Johnston 8:2 | Knightdale 9:7 | lead 85:7 87: | line 16:5 19:21 | 124:8 |
| Jones 6:24 | 10:9,14 12:8 | 02:21 | 20:7 89:6 | looks 39:8 64:21 |
| judgeships 46:5 | knob 38:16 | learned 42 | lines 110:1 | 0:9 96:16 |
| justice 43:24 | know 39:18 | leave 7:2 12:18 | list 70:14 72:7 | 102:23 |
| 44:1 45:6 48:3 | 42:22 46:10 | 6:18 17:6 | 86:17 106:16 | lose 56:21 |
| justification | 56:4,13 69:10 | 58:6 134:3 | listed 71:16 | 126:14 |
| 53:8 | 74:18 78:16 | leaves 3:15 | literally $82: 17$ | losing 43:5 |


| lot 28:20 66:15 | 79:1,10 82:1,3 | 122:3,15,16 | 24:21 45:15 | 130:7,9 131:12 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 69:25 84:22 | 83:4 85:8,11 | 123:1,2,15,21 | 52:24 108:13 | 132:7 134:23 |
| 88:16 90:22 | 86:6,7,9 87:25 | 130:20 133:15 | 108:21 110:3,8 | members' |
| 95:13,17 114:7 | 88:1 189:25 | Marcus's 117:10 | 113:9,11,12,13 | 113:21 121:23 |
| low 53:22 | 90:1,3,4,20 | marked 110:23 | 116:22 117:1 | mention 109:12 |
| 109:10 | 91:5,14,16,21 | market 3:21 4:2 | 117:14 119:21 | 111:3 |
| Lowe 21:4 | 92:1 94:1 | 4:16,18,18,20 | 120:11,22 | mentioned 6:17 |
| 103:16,17,22 | 95:13,25 96:5 | 62:16 65:2 | 121:11 128:22 | 7:22 10:15 |
| 104:1 106:15 | 97:11,14,19 | 66:25 67:1,12 | Mecklenburg-... | 17:16 26:24 |
| 106:18,20,23 | 98:14,20,21,22 | 67:14,15,16,18 | 111:21 | 65:3 71:21 |
| 107:6 108:4 | 98:24 99:9,12 | 67:20,25 68:5 | media 3:21 4:2 | 109:1 113:6 |
| 118:4,6,20 | 99:17,25 101:6 | 68:6,8,10 | 4:16,17,18,20 | met 31:25 59:3,4 |
| lower 38:20 | 103:9 106:24 | markets 61:16 | 61:16,18,19 | 63:12 91:1,3,6 |
|  | 106:24 107:3 | 61:18,19 62:11 | 62:11,16 65:1 | 125:10 |
| M | 108:8 109:7,11 | 66:18 68:17 | 66:18,25 67:1 | Michael 2:9,9 |
| Macon 27:7 | 109:13,19 | Marshall 69:23 | 67:11,13,15,16 | mid 44:21 |
| 28:15 | 110:7,11,14,17 | Martin 67:12 | 67:18,25 68:5 | Midland 16:17 |
| Madison 27:8 | 110:18,20,23 | master 105:13 | 68:6,8,10,17 | 17:5 |
| 28:1 | 111:7,9,22,23 | 105:19 | meet 59:13 | Mike 2:11 |
| majority 42:20 | 112:5,7,8,13 | master's 105:15 | 86:11 91:19 | miles 64:23 69:7 |
| majority-mino... | 112:17 113:5 | match 84:3,23 | 93:23 109:8,20 | 94:21 |
| 30:19 32:20,22 | 114:12 115:4,4 | math 28:21 | 117:13 | military 38:22 |
| 33:8 46:8 | 115:12,13,15 | matter 50:8 | meeting 91:3 | 75:16 |
| making 29:1 | 116:4,12,25 | 118:11 | 118:15 131:15 | millions 56:20 |
| 31:13 49:5 | 121:10 123:23 | mattered 66:13 | meets $48: 15$ | Mills 12:17,22 |
| 77:21 97:13 | 130:11 132:16 | Matthews 24:15 | 86:18 115:14 | 13:8 39:2,5,14 |
| 114:6 | 133:3,17 | 24:18 | member 32:18 | 39:15,20 74:9 |
| Manchester | map's 123:23 | maximum 6:1 | 43:11 72:14 | 74:11 75:19 |
| 38:13,25 39:9 | maps 63:25 | Mayfield 27:2 | 111:1,16 115:8 | 76:17,25 119:8 |
| mandate 129:19 | 65:15 66:1,3,6 | McDowell 25:16 | 122:10 | 119:24 |
| manner 59:8 | 71:23 72:1,11 | 26:14 70:20 | members 3:2 | mind 49:12 |
| 66:6 91:4,7 | 72:24 73:12 | McInnis 16:12 | 28:25 32:16 | 71:14 |
| map 2:23 3:4 5:1 | 89:23 92:8,19 | mean 32:21 53:9 | 33:13 35:4,7 | mine 53:21 |
| 5:6,12,18 8:2,6 | 92:25 93:9,19 | 76:3 85:5 95:3 | 35:14,25 36:10 | 132:20 |
| 8:12 12:2,13 | 94:10,13 95:5 | 115:2,20 | 36:14,20,24 | minimize 36:1 |
| 13:14 14:10,16 | 99:21 112:1 | meander 50:1 | 37:6,8 40:5,10 | 84:3 |
| 15:1 17:22 | 113:22 130:14 | meaning 8:18 | 40:12 41:11 | minimizing 73:9 |
| 19:6 21:20 | Marcus 22:22 | 43:20 44:15 | 48:25 58:17,20 | 73:10 |
| 22:4 27:3 | 68:21 98:1,2,7 | means 32:12 | 70:8,11 71:3 | minimum 8:21 |
| 29:12 33:11,18 | 98:12,13,16 | 56:16,17 | 78:2,5 79:2 | 8:23 85:22 |
| 34:6 36:21,22 | 100:5 101:10 | meant 32:9 | 88:8,10 101:1 | minorities 44:16 |
| 40:9 41:11 | 101:12 102:11 | 46:25 | 102:17 104:7 | 47:2 58:3 |
| 56:9 59:18,21 | 102:14 108:9 | measurements | 106:10 107:7 | minority 30:20 |
| 59:23,24,25 | 108:12,16 | 48:1 | 108:7 109:21 | 43:10 45:3 |
| 60:2,5,12,13 | 113:1 114:16 | mechanis | 110:8 111:11 | 46:15,19,20 |
| 60:19 61:3,13 | 114:17,20 | 133:13 | 111:19 112:9 | 55:11 57:21 |
| 61:14 64:5 | 115:17,21,23 | Mecklenburg | 112:20 117:13 | Mint 24:16,19 |
| 65:13 70:1 | 115:25 116:3 | 22:2,7,8,9,11 | 118:16 120:13 | minus 6:6 8:20 |
| 74:8,15 75:2 | 117:13,24 | 22:24 23:4,10 | 121:17 123:20 | 8:23 16:23 |
| 75:22 77:8,25 | 119:1 121:21 | 23:16,21 24:9 | 123:22 127:7 | minute 91:23 |
|  |  |  |  | 14 |


| 103:7 108:17 | 130:15 | naturally 45:2 | 78:3,6,11,18 | Norfolk 3:21 4:2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| minutes 34:22 | multiple 68:4 | nay 40:21 | 78:20,22,25 | 4:18 61:18 |
| 131:21 | 69:19 74:22 | nearly 12:21 | 79:2,7,12,16 | 67:14,20 |
| misrepresent | 76:7 | neat 92:23 | 79:20,24 80:1 | north 1:1,23 |
| 122:23 | municipal 97:13 | necessarily $81: 8$ | 82:23 83:11 | 3:10 4:1 5:25 |
| misrepresenta... | municipalities | necessary 34:2 | 84:5,14 85:1 | 6:24 9:16,18 |
| 113:24 | 4:5,22 5:4,9,14 | 59:1 82:22 | 86:2,20,22 | 16:17 21:7 |
| misses 114:6 | 5:20 6:8,12,18 | 84:18 111:22 | 87:2,9,13,19 | 23:12 27:4 |
| missing 131:8 | 7:7,15,19,23 | 118:9,14 | 88:3,9,11,18 | 42:18,20 43:21 |
| mistake 128:2 | 8:4,8,13 9:5,10 | necessitates 86:1 | 89:15 90:6 | 45:14 47:16,22 |
| Mitchell 27:8 | 10:12 12:5,17 | necessity 74:15 | 91:8,24 93:13 | 56:19,25 64:12 |
| 28:1 | 13:3,6 14:13 | need 30:25 31:7 | 95:1,19,22 | 69:4,14 81:20 |
| Mohammed | 14:19 15:12,16 | 32:9,24 35:15 | 97:21 98:6,11 | 94:7 110:3 |
| 23:14 | 16:6,10 17:6 | 42:21 49:3 | 98:15 100:4,13 | 113:15 116:22 |
| moment 133:9 | 18:10 19:3,9 | 52:23 54:19 | 100:17,23 | 117:1 119:12 |
| Montgomery | 19:19,24 20:4 | 55:15,16 | 101:9 102:8,13 | 119:13 136:1 |
| 14:22 15:6 | 20:6,11 21:14 | 131:21 132:15 | 102:18 103:3,7 | north-south |
| 16:3 | 21:16,22 24:20 | needs 63:12 | 103:13,22 | 104:13 |
| $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { m o o d }} 94: 9$ | 25:21 26:4,10 | neighboring | 104:16,23 | Northampton |
| Moore 12:11 | 26:18 27:1,15 | 76:22 77:1 | 105:3,24 106:5 | 3:13 64:22 |
| 13:1 37:17 | 27:20,21 28:3 | 90:15 | 106:11,17,21 | 67:10,18 125:4 |
| 38:4,9,20 71:4 | 28:8,16 39:3 | neither 45:24 | 107:5,22 108:3 | 125:4 |
| Morehead 65:21 | 71:22 72:2 | neutral 34:4 | 108:5,11,14 | northeast 3:9,16 |
| morning 2:4,6 | 73:11,22 75:24 | never 45:23 62:4 | 112:25 114:14 | 40:25 41:3,6 |
| 2:15,20 54:17 | 80:11,22 81:2 | 66:14 | 114:19 115:16 | 49:16 55:2 |
| 73:21 | 86:15 89:21,25 | new 5:23,25 6:5 | 115:23 117:2,5 | 64:8 125:23 |
| Morrisville 9:7 | 90:10,18,25 | 6:8,13,17 68:5 | 118:2,19,23 | northeastern |
| 11:12,14 12:8 | 91:1 97:17 | 78:16 108:20 | 121:16 122:14 | 24:5 33:15 |
| motion 87:18,20 | 119:6 121:2 | 125:12 134:2 | 122:25 123:4 | northern 3:18 |
| 87:21,23 88:7 | municipality | 135:3 | 123:12,19,22 | 7:5 9:15 18:20 |
| 102:10 108:5 | 13:5 17:4,16 | Newton 2:3 | 124:2,5 126:20 | 23:3 60:1 |
| 126:22 133:23 | 18:13 22:7,12 | 15:19,21 17:19 | 128:7 130:2,8 | 61:13 62:12 |
| 134:21,25 | 22:14,17,19 | 28:19,23 35:1 | 130:10,22 | 63:11,17,22 |
| mountains | 26:16 28:6 | 35:12,19,24 | 131:1,5,13,25 | 67:17 82:5,19 |
| 68:15 | 39:19 74:1,7 | 36:10 37:13,18 | 132:23 133:8 | 93:21 94:2,4 |
| move 6:2 56:7 | 74:20,23 99:22 | 37:24 40:1,11 | 133:11 134:7 | 113:11 |
| 77:7 86:21 | 113:15 116:5 | 40:13,19 41:1 | 134:12,19,24 | northmost 22:6 |
| 91:10 98:3 | 116:17,19 | 41:5,10,17,20 | Nickel 11:19 | northwest 64:9 |
| 102:11 104:4 | Murdock 13:25 | 54:18 58:15 | 68:23,24 69:16 | 95:12 |
| 126:18 134:1 | 100:7,12,15,21 | 60:8,24 61:23 | 70:4 86:24 | northwestern |
| moved 59:7 70:6 | 101:20 104:20 | 62:15,23 63:15 | 87:2,3,10,11 | 21:6 39:1 |
| 73:8 77:25 | Myers 1:18 | 64:1,4,18 | 87:16,24 91:23 | nos 40:13 70:12 |
| 94:23 101:10 | 136:4,15 | 65:10 66:10,23 | 91:24,25 93:19 | 78:6 88:11 |
| 102:14 106:7 |  | 67:4,22 68:2 | 95:1,3,19,21 | 130:10 |
| 116:10 130:5 | N | 68:19 69:16 | 117:7,8 118:3 | note 22:23 85:2 |
| moves 59:25 | name 44:8 | 70:3,9,12,23 | 121:7 | 109:11 116:17 |
| 86:23 | narrow 113:10 | 71:2,12 72:16 | nine 53:24 54:1 | notion 34:9 |
| moving 7:4 | Nash 8:6 124:21 | 72:20 73:17 | nomenclature | November 1:3 |
| 37:19 40:3 | 124:23 125:3 | 74:3,13 75:1 | 123:13 | 136:7 |
| 83:8 95:20 | 127:5 129:5 | 76:2 77:3,9,22 | non-VRA 47:9 | nuances 96:20 |
|  |  |  |  | 14 |


| number 2:17 | 87:13 89:14 | 128:4 132 | 132:12 | 53:18 54:5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 16:25 29:2 | 91:22 97:20 | orientation | particular 38:11 | 55:10 75:9 |
| 42:9,10 46:15 | 98:16 100:23 | 104:10,13,14 | 91:6 104:9 | 76:9 82:8 |
| 48:18,19 65:23 | 101:8 103:13 | original 39:12 | particularly | percentage |
| 78:15,17 81:17 | 103:25 106:5 | 125:3 134:6 | 45:13 60:1 | 77:14 114: |
| 83:9 105:20 | 108:9,19 117:5 | 135:2 | 82:19 83:24 | ercentages |
| 108:11 128:20 | 121:24 123:17 | original | partisan 92:1,7 | 43:4 |
| numbered 38:10 | 123:19 131:6 | 124:11 | 95:6 105:12 | rfect |
| numbering | 131:13 | ought 50:2 55:19 | parti | perform 92:4 |
| 134:4 | old | outcome 72 | 11 | erfo |
| numbers 90:16 | once 3:6 75:13 | Outer 3:19 60:1 | parts 10:9 16:14 | 94:16 |
| 132:5 | 75:14 96:20 | 61:14 62:12 | 20:13 23:19 | periph |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} \text { ones } 61: 17,18 \\ 68: 4120: 19 \end{array}$ | outset 30:6 | 111:14 | permissible 30:4 |
| $\frac{\mathrm{O}}{\text { objected 44:1 }}$ |  |  |  |  |
| obligation | 132:20 | 116:11 | Pasquotan | 43:25 |
| 129:12 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Onslow 5:18 } \\ & \text { 128:23 } \\ & \text { open 34:16 } 35: 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \text { overall 8:16 91:4 } \\ 100: 2 \end{array}$ | 3:14,22 67 | Perquimans |
| observation 105:7 |  |  | passed 29:25 | 3:14,23 67:20 |
|  |  | overcome 31:8 | 35:16 | Perry 5:4 69:8 |
| observe 121:5 | 35:8 58:6 66:4 | overseen 31:20 | patterns 4 | person 8:16,25 |
| observing | opening 37 | overtime 47:13 | 45:22 | 14:11 96:6 |
| 129:18 | operating 48:12 |  | pause 29 | hone 69:1 |
| obvious 49 |  | P | 12:23 | ck 80:25 |
| :4 | 102:7,7 128:14 | pack 77:13 | PCS 134:2 | pred 39:12 |
| Obviously |  | 13 | de | kings 96:20 |
| 22:20 | opposed 40:11 | packed 54:23 | people 8:20 17:1 | picks 99:8 |
| occupy 120 | 63:2 70:9 78:3 | packet 37:4,5 | 23:9 54:20,22 | piece 22:13 |
| odd 99:15 | 88:9 90:1 | 1:11 | 85:25 90:13,14 | Pineville 23:20 |
| oddly 99:6 | 10:18 106:1 | packets 36:8 | 92:4,13,15,25 | 23:23 |
| 116:16,19 | 130:8 134:24 | packing 46:25 | 97:12 98:10 | pink 64:9 70:21 |
| offer 35:6 57:6 | opposite 42:16 | 53:2 | 16:9,21 | 106:18,20 |
| 58:4 76:16 | 111:8,12 | pages 136:10 | 120:10 | Pitt 5:12,16 |
| 97:20 110:12 | opted 15:10 | painful 116:4 | people | 127:3,13 |
| 126:17 131:9 | 16:16 19:13 | pair 19:13 | percent 3:20,24 | Pitt-Edgecomb |
| offered 36:5 | 21:12 | pairing 111 | 8:20 9:9,21,23 | 129:2 |
| 50:6 | option 20:8,10 | 112:4,6 | 9:25 10:10,13 | pitting 111:10 |
| offering 2:19 | 38:6 55:21 | Pamlico 4:14,1 | 11:1,3,4,9,10 | place 13:20 |
| 41:13 45:1 | 59:12 | 4:15 67:12 | 11:14,14,15,21 | 76:19,20 |
| 51:25 71:6 | options 25:9 | panel 31:23 | 11:22 12:20,21 | 124:12 |
| 98:22 99:12,24 | 59:10,11 88:17 | panels 57:4 | 13:7,8,23 14:5 | placed 46:22 |
| 112:17 | 93:16 113:18 | papers 108:18 | 16:23 18:7,20 | 59:24 |
| officially 55:3 | Orange 14:10 | part 2:13 13:1 | 20:19 21:1 | places 46:13 |
| officials 84:22 | 46:18 | :12 25:10 | 22:18 23:6,7 | 74:1 120:24 |
| Oh 92:16 | order 34:14 36:1 | 33:16 39:9 | 23:22,23,23 | plain 7:11,20 |
| okay 35:15 | 36:13,15,18,25 | 47:16 64:1 | 24:1,6,8,8,18 | 52:3 74:1,12 |
| 37:13 38:1 | 40:24 41:2 | 83:14,16,18,19 | 24:18,19,20,22 | plan 29:25 32:18 |
| 41:5,17 66:23 | 70:24 71:17 | 83:23 92:19,20 | 25:3,5 46:19 | 32:21 33:10 |
| 70:5 71:2,5,12 | 73:25 74:19,23 | 92:21,22 93:4 | 47:6,9,24 48:2 | 39:3,21 54:17 |
| 72:12 76:14 | 84:3 87:18 | 96:16 99:4 | 48:11 51:1,1,5 | 104:11 |
| 78:7 81:14,24 | 101:7 108:2 | 113:11 116:22 | 51:10 53:8,14 | planes 49:22 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| scovery court |  | www.discoverydepo.com |  | 1-919-424-8 |


| please 32:23 | Polsby-Popper | pre-1965 55: | 90:8 109: | 135:3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 61:6 | 99:16 110:19 | pre-cleared | presentin | proposing 88:19 |
| plus 6:16 7:19 | 2:19 | :20,2 | 8:21 | prosecut |
| 9:16 16:22 | population 3:20 | precedence 34:8 | presents 59:11 | 92:11 |
| 26:14 46:19 | 3:25 4:19 6:10 | 89:2 | 59:12,12 | protection 31:11 |
| 47:6 48:2 51:1 | 8:16,18 9:23 | precedent 34:10 | preserve 55:19 | 33:2,24 38:21 |
| 51:10,20 53:8 | 10:11,21 11:1 | 118:25 | 121:8,11 | 48:7 |
| 53:14,19 55:11 | 11:3,6,9,11,13 | precinct 7:5 | 125:19 | protects 32:13 |
| pod 16:22 19:12 | 11:16,25 12:4 | 10:3 15:12 | preserved 32:9 | 97:14 |
| 25:13,15,16 | 12:20,21 13:8 | 16:7 38:13,1 | pretty 44:22 | protrude |
| 82:6 113:8 | 13:9,24 14:5 | 38:25 39:9 | 68:15 89:9,10 | protrusion |
| 127:2,3,4,6,1 | 16:19,25 18:7 | 73:25 74:7 | 92:3 95:4 99:5 | 81:15,19 82:1 |
| 127:18,20 | 18:9,21 20:20 | 84:7,25 92:3 | 99:9 | 83:17 |
| podding 66:7,20 | 20:25 21:2 | 94:15 109:22 | previous 105:2 | prove 46:14 |
| 107:12 127:9 | 22:18 23:21,25 | precincts 6:3,6,7 | 107:11 | proves 59:4 |
| poddings 66:2,5 | 24:1,7,7,17,23 | 6:17 7:10 8:14 | previously 6:16 | provide 29:7 |
| 66:7 127:18 | 25:4,6,24 43:4 | 9:12 10:5,16 | 7:22 59:15 | 31:18 32:23 |
| pods 59:1 70:2 | 46:20 50:4 | 10:18,20 11:5 | 65:1 | 38:17 110:23 |
| 127:9,19 128:3 | 53:19 82:22 | 11:16 12:16 | primarily 44:15 | provision 51:19 |
| point 19:1 29:16 | 83:8 84:9 | 13:4,17,18,20 | prior 33:9 51:19 | 51:22 124:14 |
| 35:3 37:7,21 | 108:24 | 15:10,15 16:6 | 54:1 58:25 | 129:22 |
| 48:13 49:23 | populations 9:4 | 18:5 19:8 | priorities 71:22 | public 3:17 |
| 51:4 52:6,12 | 9:11,12 10:1 | 20:14 22:6,10 | prioritize 73:21 | 55:17 112:12 |
| 52:17,20 54:9 | 10:14 15:3 | 22:20 23:12,13 | priority 81:2,8 | publicly 120:17 |
| 87:18 90:12 | 16:21 20:15 | 24:11,24 25:6 | privately 120:16 | 132:3 |
| 96:4 101:15 | 27:10 43:5 | 25:20 26:3,11 | probably $38: 6$ | pulled 25:21 |
| 107:1,16 | 82:14 83:25 | 26:15 27:19 | 49:19 85:22 | 29:3 130:18 |
| 116:14 121:20 | 84:1 | 28:9,16 39:1 | 89:2 90:4 94:8 | pulling 131:3,5 |
| 127:1 130:16 | portion 9:23 | 39:15 74:6 | 96:6 | purple 99:3 |
| pointed 45:25 | 10:25 17:9,17 | 75:25 80:10 | problem 46:9 | purpose 94:17 |
| 50:8 65:11 | 18:10 19:2 | 84:17,21 85:9 | 50:7 124:18,19 | 111:8 |
| 97:15 119:3 | 27:14 28:2 | 85:16 86:8,10 | 125:18 126:13 | pursue 70:17 |
| 125:17 | 39:8 75:8 | 89:3,7 91:2 | proceed 117:17 | put 33:11 36:7 |
| pointing 129:25 | 79:19,20,22 | 112:19 119:20 | 133:17 | 47:1 56:17 |
| points 52:20 | portions 16:4 | preconditions | proceedin | 68:4 81:25 |
| 97:2 110:17 | 17:8 22:11 | 30:18 31:10 | 126:14 | 83:5,16 104:11 |
| polarization | 124:16 | predetermined | process 2:20 | 113:5 116:4,8 |
| 51:2 54:8 | position 3 | 66:2 | 74:10 87:8 | 118:12 120:14 |
| polarized 44:11 | 64:15 | predom | 2:24 93:21 | 122:6 131:17 |
| 44:17 45:22 | possible 6:10 7:4 | 31:14 77:1 | 109:2 110:22 | puts 110:14 |
| 46:2,7,14 | 8:14 12:5,14 | predominantly | Proctor 27:22 | putting 42:1 |
| 47:13 48:23 | 15:11 16:20 | 33:5 | progress 54:12 | 45:1 97:1 |
| 52:8,14 55:8 | 18:18 19:24 | predom | propensity 94:7 | 109:22 119:7 |
| political 57:10 | 47:2 48:1 | 34:5 | proponent 70:14 |  |
| 57:15,18 58:7 | 64:14,16 66:18 | prefer | proposal 113:4 | $\mathbf{Q}$ |
| 73:6 94:18,20 | 77:19 89:19 | prelimin | propose 88:13 | quantities 132:9 |
| 105:23 111:12 | 101:3 108:24 | 49:1 | proposed 2:18 | 32: |
| politically 30:20 | 109:6 | present 2:15 | 32:18 34:15 | quarter 34:20 |
| 44:14 55:5 | possibly 39:19 | 31:17 56:3 | 36:11 106:2 | question 35:19 |
| Polk 25:14 26:8 | practices 55:1 | presented 56:9 | 108:15 129:1 | 48:10 60:7,23 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| discovery court |  | www.discoverydepo.com |  | 1-919-424-8 |


| 63:14 64:3,19 | raised 29:20 | 33:6 109:25 | register 97:3 | 97:1,6 120:10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 65:9 66:22 | raises 48:5 | recap 12:2 | registration | 124:15 |
| 67:23 68:2 | raising 97:3 | received $29: 23$ | 42:25 | Republican |
| 69:10,17 73:16 | Raleigh 1:23 | receiving 36:20 | reinforced 43:1 | 87:11 92:19 |
| 73:19 76:5 | 3:24 4:17 9:1 | recess 2:21 29:8 | 43:2 | 93:6,9 98:21 |
| 77:3 78:13 | 9:17,21 10:9 | 34:14,19,21,23 | reject 34:9 60:5 | 98:24 109:7 |
| 79:8 83:6,10 | 10:10,11,13,20 | 35:2 41:24 | 117:9 | 110:17,20 |
| 83:11 84:13 | 10:24 11:1,3 | recited 44:5 | relevant 87:14 | 111:9 115:4 |
| 85:3 86:24 | 12:6 61:19 | recognize | 115:7 | Republican-p... |
| 87:6,16 88:20 | 67:1,6,10,13 | 129:11 | reliable 31 | 111:7 |
| 88:22 89:6 | 67:17 80:15,19 | recognized | relief 104:7 | Republicans |
| 91:10,25 92:10 | 80:19 81:17 | 101:13 | remain 57:16 | 92:21 95:9 |
| 92:17 93:8,10 | 82:25 83:13,14 | recognizes 54:12 | 93:25 112:20 | 104:12 |
| 115:22,24 | 83:16 | 132:11 | remaining 13:1 | request 33:11 |
| 120:13 | Raleigh's | recommen | 24:19 125:21 | 41:2 127:17 |
| questions 29:4 | ran 82:12 | 39:24 121 | 125:24 | require 32:1,5 |
| 29:11,17 34:17 | Randleman | recommendati... | remember 76:21 | 33:19 51:13 |
| 35:5,8 37:9 | 15:14 | 105:16 | 129:14,20 | required 29:22 |
| 40:5,6 48:6 | Randolph 14:23 | recommended | remove 36:17 | 33:8 41:25 |
| 56:6 58:18 | 15:5,9,11,15 | 49:20 | 121:22 | 45:8 74:22 |
| 71:10,11 77:24 | 16:1,8 | recomme | removed 7 | 82:14 94:23 |
| 91:11 100:3,6 | range 10:22 | 50:14 | renumber | 110:22 113:1 |
| 100:25 104:19 | 16:23 20:25 | reconvene 29:10 | 132:15 133 | 127:8 128:5 |
| 112:24 115:18 | 25:24 | record 31:1 | renumberin | requirement |
| 117:6 118:21 | rank | 40:20 122:4,11 | 135:6 | 57:23,25 93:22 |
| 130:4 134:9 | ranked 109 | 34:15,20 | Reock 99 | 127:24 |
| quote $31: 1$ | ranks 81:3 | recorded 136 | 10:16 11 | requireme |
| R |  |  |  |  |
| R 136:1 | reactivated | red 70:21 | repeat 6 | requiring 45:7 |
| Rabon 6:20 | 19 | d 124 | 124:9 | reside 14:6 |
| race 30:14,16 | read 52:19 | redistricting 1:2 | rephrase 101:22 | residence 12 |
| 31:9,22 32:2 | ready 36:2 | 2:5 31:20 32:2 | replace 107:12 | 122:11 |
| 41:25 42:21 | real 96:20 | 2:3 57:1,2 | 107:13 | residences 111:1 |
| 50:22 73:5 | 117:20 | 01:24 110:21 | report 80:17 | 115:8 121:23 |
| race-predomi | really 57:5 82:9 | 136:6 | 90:10 134:1 | residents 7:8 |
| 33:21 | 92:24 96:14,22 | redraw 104 | 135:4 | residing 50:21 |
| races 46:6,6 | 107:20 113:24 | redrew 53:1 | Reporter 136:5 | resolved 53:15 |
| racial 29:22 30:4 | 118:7 | refer 86:6 | Reporters 1:19 | 105:21 130:2 |
| 30:4,8,9,11 | reason 42:14 | 116:23 127:25 | reports 81:12 | respect 53:3 |
| 31:4 32:14 | 77:20 109:19 | referred 52:21 | represent 92:2 | 57:21 58:6 |
| 33:5,22 57:12 | 110:5 120:8 | regard 51:21 | 96:18 112:12 | 65:16 100:9 |
| 58:6,10 | 122:18 | 32:19 | 118 |  |
| racially $31: 14$ | reasonable | regarding 41:25 | represented | respecting 18:16 |
| 44:17 46:14 | 104:8 111:5 | region 31:24 | 46:17,21 50:19 | respond 58:19 |
| 52:8 55:8 | 112:3,5 | 3:7 60:2 | 53:25 96:7,8 | 83:6 114:21 |
| radar 131:18 | reasonably | :14 62: | 97:5 109:23 | responsibility |
| 132:25 | 0:18 32:19 | :11, | 122:5 | 49:2 |
| radical 119 | 44:14 55:4 | 113:10 | representing | rest 7:13 15:25 |
| radically 105:18 | reasons 31:15 | regions 31:23 | 53:17 96:15 | 16:14 18:25 |
|  |  |  |  | 15 |
| ISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS |  | www.discoverydepo.com |  | 24 |


| 26:21 27:24 | 105:1,4,8 | says $32: 349: 8$ | 123:24 | 10:16,17,22,24 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 28:13 67:18 | Rockingham | 49:14 59:7 | scrutiny $31: 15$ | 11:2,4,8,10,12 |
| 69:6121:9 | 17:20,22 18:1 | 113:21 128:11 | 33:25 | 11:16,17,18,20 |
| result 12:19 81:1 | Rod 2:10,11 | 128:14,15,24 | SD 3:11,20 4:2,5 | 11:23 12:2,13 |
| 125:8 | role 34:7 | 129:9 | 13:23 33:15 | 12:23,25 13:7 |
| resulting 19:15 | Rolesville 9:7,16 | SB 78:22 | SDRI 18:8 | 13:10,14,14,20 |
| 25:17 | 9:24 12:9 | SBA 41:7,12 | seat 29:16 | 13:22,22 14:1 |
| results 81:13 | rolled 134:2 | 70:6 78:18,20 | Seats 14:25 | 14:3,4,4,6,7,9 |
| 94:14 | 135:3 | 78:25 123:18 | second 9:18 17:3 | 14:13, 15,25 |
| returning 132:8 | room 133:5 | 123:20 130:5 | 31:9 33:20 | 15:1,8,13,14 |
| reverse 36:15,18 | Rowan 21:20 | SBK 78:15,19 | 37:5 88:1 | 15:18,25 16:6 |
| reversed 57:14 | RPR 1:18 | 78:19,23 | 109:19 110:5 | 16:8,11,13,18 |
| Richmond 14:23 | 136:16 | 123:10 | 125:24 131:22 | 16:20,25 17:3 |
| 15:6 16:3 | Rucho 46:11,12 | SBV 40:21 70:16 | 134:17 | 17:5,10,11,12 |
| ridiculous 94:25 | 47:22 53:9,10 | 102:15 103:3 | secondly 57:15 | 17:14,18,22,23 |
| right $2: 337: 6,18$ | 53:12,19 125:7 | SBVA 36:20 | Section 32:8,12 | 17:23 18:2,4 |
| 40:7,13,19 | 125:8 | 98:4,6 130:17 | 33:9,18 43:19 | 18:11,14,16,18 |
| 69:4,5 70:15 | Rufus 43:18 | SCG 79:2,5 88:7 | 43:22 45:23 | 18:19,21,24 |
| 71:6,24 75:4 | 44:7 | 103:10,10,11 | 47:17,19,21 | 19:4,5,10,11 |
| 77:22 80:11 | rule 33:5 111 | 103:15,20 | 52:15,16 56:16 | 19:22,25 20:13 |
| 86:22 88:3,6 | rules 111:17 | 106:7,16,18 | sections 19:1 | 20:16,17,18,19 |
| 88:18 97:23 | ruling 48:3 | SCG-3 35:18 | see 29:10 34:15 | 20:21,23,25,25 |
| 98:11,24,25 | 105:2 | SCGA 108:6 | 38:11 54:19 | 21:4,5,17,19 |
| 99:17 100:24 | rulings 56:25 | SCH 37:2,16 | 60:15 67:3 | 21:24,25 22:2 |
| 101:9 102:19 | run 33:22 | 40:20 71:4 | 72:24 77:20 | 22:5,9,14,16 |
| 103:1,9 106:13 | runs 60:13 | 78:1 79:4,4 | 81:17,22,23 | 22:17,21,23,25 |
| 106:17 110:12 | rural 13:2 20:3 | 88:14,14 90:9 | 95:9,12,15 | 23:3,4,10,11 |
| 119:16 122:2 | 82:5 116:10 | 95:20 97:23 | 97:1,14 99:1 | 23:15,25 24:3 |
| 130:12 133:8 | rushed 132:17 | 108:12,15 | 101:17 112:23 | 24:5,12,14,25 |
| right-hand | Rutherford | 123:16 130:18 | 123:14 128:1 | 25:1,7,19 26:1 |
| 38:14 | 25:14 26:9 | 130:19 | 130:24 | 26:4,7,11,13 |
| rights 30:16 |  | SCHA 130: | seeing 68:23 | 26:17,21 27:3 |
| 43:22 46:1,23 | S | schedule 131:18 | 77:24 122:1 | 27:13,16,18,22 |
| 47:12,17,19,25 | Salvador 24:3 | school 96:23,24 | 130:4 | 27:24 28:4,7,9 |
| 48:7 49:4,12 | Sampson 7:1,3,5 | 97:8 116:24 | seen 58:8 106:25 | 28:11,13,18 |
| 51:24 53:1,4 | 7:8,13,20 | science 73:9 | 117:25 127:8 | 38:4,10 42:9 |
| 53:11 54:7,25 | 73:23 77:2 | score 99:16 | selected 6:7 7:10 | 44:21,24 53:17 |
| 56:10,17 57:8 | 119:6 | 110:16,19,19 | 25:11,17 | 53:25 87:7 |
| 58:22 73:1,2 | Sanderson | 114:24 | selecting 20:9 | 96:9 97:7 |
| 100:19 101:17 | sat 110:10 | scored 50:25 | senate 1:2 2:4,14 | 101:5 104:11 |
| 101:23 105:22 | satellite 12:16 | scores 99:18 | 3:3,8 4:7,22,25 | 104:12 117:11 |
| risk 31:11 | satisfies 102:1 | 109:10 110:18 | 5:5,9,11,15,17 | 124:11 134:2 |
| River 4:8,14 | satisfy 30:17 | 110:20 113:25 | 5:21,23 6:1,3,4 | 136:6 |
| Road 1:21 | :10 | 113:25 114:2 | 6:5,10,14,15 | senator $2: 15,18$ |
| Roanoke 4:7 | save 132:10 | 115:3 | 6:21,25 7:3,6,8 | 2:19,25 4:6,24 |
| Robeson 14:16 | saw 111:6 | Scotland 14:17 | 7:11,13,16,18 | 4:24 5:4,10,16 |
| 14:21 | Sawyer 22:22 | screen 64:6 | 7:22,24 8:1,5,9 | 6:14,20 7:17 |
| Robins 14:21 | 109:24 | 70:21 79:13 | 8:12,21 9:1,14 | 7:25 8:9 10:23 |
| Robinson 18:23 | saying 30:10 | 98:23 103:21 | 9:19,20,21,22 | 11:7,19 12:1 |
| 104:15,18,22 | 67:5 114:21,22 | 110:12 111:22 | 10:1,3,5,7,8,11 | 12:24 13:25 |
|  |  |  |  | 153 |


| 14:7,14,20,20 | 78:21,23 79:1 | 117:2,4,7,8,10 | shaped 99:6 | 84:12 85:4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14:21 15:17,19 | 79:5,8,9,10,15 | 117:13,24 | 116:17,19 | situated 18:19 |
| 16:12,12 17:12 | 79:17,18,21,22 | 118:3,4,6,20 | shapes 13:3 | six 1:21 8:19,22 |
| 17:18 18:15,23 | 79:25 80:1,3,4 | 118:22,23,24 | shared 7:21 | 21:25 80:9 |
| 18:23 19:9 | 80:14,18,21 | 119:1,2 121:7 | 20:14 28:9 | 90:13 97:7,12 |
| 20:22 21:4,23 | 81:5,14,24 | 121:16,21 | shares 12:16 | 108:23 113:25 |
| 22:22,22 23:14 | 82:23,24 83:10 | 122:3,15,16 | 16:7 | 114:3,5 |
| 24:3,12 25:8 | 83:12 84:6,12 | 123:1,2,5,7,14 | Sherrie 2:12 | six-district 8:11 |
| 25:25 26:6,12 | 84:15,20 85:1 | 123:15,15,17 | shift 121:3 | size 85:22 93:24 |
| 26:19,20 27:2 | 85:4,12 86:3,5 | 123:21,25 | shifting 104:12 | skip 93:12 |
| 27:22 28:11,17 | 86:21,23,24 | 124:1,4,7,15 | shop 116:24 | skipped 93:5 |
| 28:19 29:5,11 | 87:2,3,4,10,11 | 126:21,23 | short 31:13 34:7 | slightly 6:1 |
| 29:15 34:17 | 87:11,12,16,24 | 128:7,9,10 | 34:14 | small 26:15 |
| 35:5,9,10,13 | 88:1,4,12,19 | 130:3,5,12,18 | Shortly 2:16 | 27:17 127:14 |
| 35:15,18 37:9 | 88:20,22,23,24 | 130:20,23 | show 44:17,18 | smaller 83:24 |
| 37:10,11,14,16 | 88:24 89:9,14 | 131:3,10,23 | 45:17 46:2,3,7 | smallest 9:22 |
| 37:19,22 38:1 | 89:16,24 90:6 | 132:1,11,24 | 48:11,14 49:16 | so-called 33:17 |
| 40:2,3,6,8,15 | 90:7,11 91:8,9 | 133:5,13,15,22 | 49:18 53:2 | solution 50:7,7 |
| 40:17,18,23 | 91:22,23,24,25 | 134:8,11,12,14 | 83:4 86:5 | 117:18 122:1 |
| 41:2,3,5,8,12 | 92:6 93:13,19 | senators 104:15 | 89:24 96:4 | 124:18 |
| 41:14,17,19,19 | 95:1,3,10,19 | 110:23 118:10 | showed 54:6 | solves 126:12 |
| 42:13 54:17 | 95:21,22,23,24 | send 35:10 36:5 | 115:3 125:18 | somebody 69:11 |
| 55:24 58:16,17 | 97:22,25 98:1 | 37:11 58:13 | showing 81:11 | 130:15 |
| 58:23 60:6,7,8 | 98:1,2,7,12,13 | sending 35:13 | shown 47:25 | soon 131:18 |
| 60:10,11,11,16 | 98:16 100:5,6 | 37:14 | 48:9,22 50:15 | sorry 14:21 |
| 60:22,25 61:1 | 100:10,12,15 | sense 95:17 | 120:5 | 19:10 40:24 |
| 61:6,24,25 | 100:21,25 | 99:25 127:12 | shows 49:1 | 57:4 76:3 79:4 |
| 62:6,14,16,22 | 101:10,12,12 | separate 58:24 | shuffle 37:4 | 87:9 98:8 |
| 62:24 63:5,14 | 101:14,20 | 110:14 112:21 | shuffling 36:2 | 104:1 119:5 |
| 63:15,16 64:2 | 102:9,11,14,24 | 114:4 128:17 | shut 53:24 | 123:21 |
| 64:3,5,13,17 | 103:5,11,14,15 | separation 38:3 | side 16:2 76:5 | sort 41:21 81:20 |
| 64:19 65:8,11 | 103:16,17,18 | sergeant-at-ar... | 95:15 | 132:18 |
| 65:11 66:9,11 | 103:18,20,22 | 2:8 | side-by-side | Sound 4:8,10,13 |
| 66:21,24 67:4 | 103:24,25 | series 88:25 | 98:9 108:17 | sounds 114:22 |
| 67:7,21,22,24 | 104:1,17,18,19 | serious 48:5 | Signed 136:12 | south 23:4,18 |
| 68:3,12,18,20 | 104:22 105:1,3 | seriously 34:8 | significantly | 24:14 25:2 |
| 68:21,23,24 | 105:5,6,8,25 | 57:6 96:14 | 43:4 56:22 | 39:13 64:11 |
| 69:5,8,8,8,16 | 106:1,5,7,13 | serve 38:6 110:2 | 107:14 110:15 | 83:22 94:8 |
| 69:17,19,19 | 106:15,15,17 | served 69:21 | similar 65:1 | southeast 10:9 |
| 70:4,5 71:8,9 | 106:20,23 | serving 87:14 | 113:4 | 27:17 |
| 71:11,13,13 | 107:6,7,22,24 | session 87:8 92:5 | simple 50:7 | southeastern |
| 72:2,6,12,16 | 107:25 108:4,9 | set 72:18 92:7 | simply 42:1,8 | 5:25 6:23 |
| 72:17,20,21 | 108:12,16 | 122:4 130:20 | 108:1 118:24 | southern 10:18 |
| 73:16,17,18,19 | 109:15,23 | settled 105:16 | sincerely 56:8 | 16:4 18:25 |
| 74:4,13,25 | 113:1,2 114:14 | seven 3:19 42:17 | single 5:19 8:3 | 23:21 24:21 |
| 75:2,6,11,18 | 114:16,17,20 | 44:23 | 74:19 92:3 | 121:10 |
| 75:21 76:2,3 | 114:22 115:17 | seven-county | 96:7 121:13 | southernmo |
| 76:14,16 77:5 | 115:19,20,21 | 6:22 14:24 | single-member | 16:15 |
| 77:10,11,25 | 115:23,25 | shape 12:15 | 128:18 | southwest 25:10 |
| 78:7,9,13,19 | 116:1,3,7 | 99:15 | sir 62:23 65:10 | span 19:20 20:6 |
|  |  |  |  | 154 |


| 21:14 | 74:19 75:3,5,7 | start 64:8 84:21 | 127:18 128:11 | sure $45: 754: 24$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| spanning 19:19 | 75:12,13,14,19 | 93:11 94:7 | 129:9,21 | 60:24 65:22 |
| spans 22:8 | 75:25 76:17,19 | 98:14 110:21 | Stokes 19:12,14 | 68:2 81:7 87:1 |
| speak 87:21 | 76:24 77:16,20 | 133:11 | 19:23 21:11,11 | 115:25 122:12 |
| SPEAKER | 79:13 80:10,11 | started 2:1,6 | 21:15 | 131:25 132:1 |
| 35:22 70:18 | 80:14,18 81:1 | 34:25 37:1,7 | stop 69:6 | 132:11 |
| 87:17 102:23 | 82:25 83:13 | 93:2 94:10 | straight 71 | surrounding |
| 103:2 | 84:7,11,17 | 129:10 | 122:4 | 77:1 |
| speaking | 85:8 86:10 | starting 43:8,9 | strange 1 | Surry 21:7,10 |
| special 105:13 | 89:18,25 90:1 | 82:18 | strategies 56:13 | survive 33:24 |
| 105:15,19 | 90:2,3,17,18 | starts 124:22 | stretched 99:6 | 56: |
| specific 31:2 | 90:19,25 91:2 | stat 83:12 | strict 30:3 31:15 | Swain 27:8 |
| 47:7 71:16 | 97:13,17,17 | state 8:21 23:9 | 33:25 | 28:15 |
| 81:9 83:20 | 113:19 116:5 | 23:24 25:10 | strong 30:25 | swath 58:14 |
| 90:23 92:18 | 116:16,19 | 1:24 33:16 | 31:1,6 33:6 | sway 96:22 |
| specifically | 119:4,5,8,23 | 43:13 45:21 | 34:2 | system $85: 14$ |
| 18:25 114:9,12 | 120:8 121:1 | 51:21,22 57:7 | study 53:12 | 89:12 96:23 |
| 116:18 | splits 11:5 26:24 | 58:11,14 85:6 | 54:15 125:1 |  |
| spend 56:19 | 76:18,19,23 | 94:10,15,16 | stuff 80:6 126:16 | T |
| 121:25 | 86:8 90:10 | 96:19 110:7 | subjected 31:15 | T136.1, |
| Spivey's 7: | 99:22 112:19 | 111:14 115:10 | submit 107:3,3 | 110:3 |
| 74:3,4 | 113:20 | 132:12 136:1 | submitting | take 2:16,21 |
| split 4:4,4,17,21 | splitting 8:14 | stated 13:2 | 98:18 | 16:16 29:16 |
| 4:22 5:3,3,8,8 | 39:3,21 73:22 | 41:23 61:9 | substitute 135:3 | 34:7,14,18 |
| 5:14,14,19,20 | 74:22 80:23 | statement 29:1,7 | 135:5 | 40:5 48:18,20 |
| 6:12,12,18,18 | 84:4,21 86:12 | 71:16 77:5 | suburban 19:25 | 9:19 53:5 |
| 7:1,7,10,14,15 | 86:14,17,18 | 127:25 134:15 | succeeded 30:2 | 8:25 69:2 |
| 7:21,23 8:3,7,8 | 88:25 89:2,13 | statements $72: 8$ | successor 44:7 | 70:24 78:11 |
| 8:24 9:2,9,12 | 89:17,21 91:1 | States 31:12 | sue 49:7 | 1:14 96:14 |
| 10:3,5,12,16 | 116:13 127:21 | 45:21 56:22 | sufficient | 0:20 104:25 |
| 10:18,20 11:15 | sponsor 70:24 | statewide 51:6 | 101:4 | 14:3 119:14 |
| 11:23,24 12:3 | Spreadsheets | stations 68:13 | suggest 5 | 24:20 126:20 |
| 12:6,22 13:10 | 31:5 | statistics 42:22 | 94:19 122:23 | taken 115:9 |
| 13:24 14:3,7 | Spring 38:15 | 115:2 125:18 | 127:7 | 9:16 136 |
| 14:12,12,18,19 | Springs 9:6 | stay 25:24 58:5 | suggesting 54:11 | takes 77:15 |
| 15:4,12 16:7,9 | 11:21 12:8 | 66:17 117:1 | Suite 1:22 | 10:1 124:23 |
| 17:3,10,15,16 | squarely $33: 1$ | 119:9 | super 129: | 124:24 131:1 |
| 18:3,8,12,13 | SST 41:9 | stayed | 130:1 | talk 71:8 92: |
| 19:8,8 20:17 | staff 35:19 79 | Steinburg 4:24 | superior 85:10 | talked 61:15 |
| 20:20 21:16,16 | 79:16 98:8 | Stenographic | 86:9 | 00: |
| 21:22,22 22:16 | 108:16 132:2 | 36 | supervis | , |
| 22:19,20 23:13 | 132:14 133:19 | stenographica... | 136:9 | task 8:15 |
| 24:2,11,24 | 134:3 | 136:8 | supplies 132:9 | taxpayers 56 |
| 25:6 26:3,10 | staff's 132:24 | Stephenson 21:9 | support 50:5 | TBD 131:15 |
| 26:16,18,25 | staged 108:1,2 | 32:1,2,4,6 | 77:21 107:18 | team 2:13 |
| 27:11,19,21 | stand 115:24 | 33:10 42:1 | 112:22 114:13 | tear 51:15 |
| 28:7,9,16 39:4 | 131:20 135:7 | 49:8,13 59:6,7 | supports 39:5 | technical 133:18 |
| 39:5,19,20 | standards 59:3,4 | 59:13,14 73:3 | 53:13 | 134:3,5 135 |
| 59:25 73:24 | Stanly 17:8 | 73:4 93:22 | supreme 32:11 | technically |
| 74:5,7,9,11,15 | 21:20 | 125:14 126:2 | 45:21 56:15,22 | 107:10 |
|  |  |  |  | 15 |
| discovery court reporters |  | www.discoverydepo.com |  | 24 |











| 1 | courtesies to the gallery to Cheryl Key, Allison | 1 | this morning that I just learned about, but I |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Duncan, and their students who are here with us | 2 | think that it's essentially an amendment that |
| 3 | from the Redeemer School. Would y'all please | 3 | was drafted by Senate Democrats. |
| 4 | stand so we can recognize you and welcome you. | 4 | Members, after the map itself that's |
| 5 | Thanks for being with us today. | 5 | before you today, I'll mention that the House |
| 6 | Also on motion of Representative Meyer | 6 | and Senate have filed the same map. I filed the |
| 7 | of Orange county, the chair is happy to extend | 7 | same map that you see before you today in the |
| 8 | the courtesy of the gallery to Mebane city | 8 | Senate, but for procedural purposes, we're using |
| 9 | council member Sean Ewing. Sean, would you | 9 | the map that was passed over by the Senate. |
| 10 | please stand. Thanks for being with us here | 10 | The map before you, and the one that I |
| 11 | today, sir. | 11 | filed, were both drafted in the Senate committee |
| 12 | The gentleman from Caldwell, | 12 | room, and I drew a separate map that was posted |
| 13 | Representative Hall, has the floor to debate the | 13 | for the public to view before our public |
| 14 | bill. | 14 | comment, but I ultimately decided that the map |
| 15 | REPRESENTATIVE HALL: Thank you, | 15 | drawn in the Senate committee was a better map |
| 16 | Mr. Speaker. | 16 | because, among other reasons, it splits fewer |
| 17 | Members, I've said this before in this | 17 | municipalities. |
| 18 | process, and I'm going to say it again because I | 18 | Also, we heard from public comment that |
| 19 | think it's important and it bears repeating, and | 19 | it was important to keep the finger counties, as |
| 20 | that is that the 2021 redistricting process that | 20 | they're called, in the northeast together, so I |
| 21 | has been undertaken by this body is a historic | 21 | advocated with the Senate chairs that change be |
| 22 | process. We have an unprecedented amount of | 22 | made, and it was, and therefore I felt that the |
| 23 | transparency in this process with every single | 23 | map drawn in the Senate committee was ultimately |
| 24 | district that was drawn done so in full public | 24 | the best member-submitted map that I saw. |
| 25 | view with live audio and live video in the | 25 | As I did with our State House map, I am |
|  | 5 |  | 7 |
| 1 | committee room. | 1 | going to briefly go through the criteria the |
| 2 | We also made the unprecedented and | 2 | committee adopted and how it corresponds with |
| 3 | historic decision to voluntarily not use | 3 | the proposed map that's before you today. |
| 4 | election data in the drawing of these maps. | 4 | The first thing we tried to do was keep |
| 5 | Maps have been being drawn by this state by this | 5 | counties whole. Within the map, where counties |
| 6 | body for literally hundreds of years, and that | 6 | could be kept whole, they are. In total, there |
| 7 | has never happened voluntarily until now. When | 7 | are only 11 counties split, and that's done for |
| 8 | our committees adopted criteria to say we're not | 8 | equalizing population across the map, which, of |
| 9 | going to use election data, we're going to focus | 9 | course, is tougher to do because for congress |
| 10 | on traditional redistricting criteria. We're | 10 | you have to have zero deviation. You don't have |
| 11 | going to look at things like keeping counties | 11 | that plus or minus 5 percent that you do on the |
| 12 | whole, keeping municipalities whole, not | 12 | State House and State Senate maps. |
| 13 | splitting precincts or VTDs. And the result | 13 | One of our criteria was to not split |
| 14 | that you see of that is the maps that we've had | 14 | VTDs. And again, this is important. It's |
| 15 | before this body and the congressional map that | 15 | important to understand context. In 2011, there |
| 16 | you have before you now. | 16 | were many, many VTD splits across the map. In |
| 17 | I will say that I have been | 17 | this map, there are only 24 total VTD splits for |
| 18 | disappointed about the lack of involvement of | 18 | a statewide for a congressional map, 24 VTD |
| 19 | the Democrats in drawing congressional maps in | 19 | splits, that's it, across the entire map. |
| 20 | our committee room. Senate Democrats submitted | 20 | This map honors municipal boundaries. |
| 21 | proposed congressional maps, they spent time in | 21 | Again, another very important note about this |
| 22 | the committee room drawing, and as far as I | 22 | map is that there are only two total municipal |
| 23 | know, none of our members, unfortunately, | 23 | splits in the entire congressional map. If you |
| 24 | participated in that process, although I have | 24 | spent any time at all over in that committee |
| 25 | learned that there's apparently an amendment | 25 | room drafting, you know how hard that is to do. |
|  | 6 |  | 8 |
|  |  |  | 2 (Pages 5 to 8) |
| DISCOVERY COURT REPORTERS www.dis |  | ery | po.com 1-919-424-82 |










| A | 12:8,17,24 | 12 15:3 35: | briefly 2:25 8:1 | :25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A1 15:1 36:15 | 13:4,8,19,21 | 5:17 36:6,9 | Brody 3:17,19 | cle |
| 36:18 | 14:2,6,17,21 | 15,18 | :10 | 14:2 |
| aback 28:6 | 4:23 15:1,3,9 |  | budget 33: | erk 2:5,7 3:16 |
| al | 26:2 27:15,16 | B | building 17:2 | 3:20,25 4:5,13 |
| 28:18 37:9 | :6,10,15,18 | b | 28:10 | 8,9 |
| able 3:3 23:7 | amendments $3: 8$ | 27:15 33:13 | Byrd 1:18 37: | 5:4,6 35:5, |
| absolutely 9:24 | American 17:24 |  | 37:16 | 35:12,18,20 |
| accepted 3:8 | 20 20:24 |  |  | CLR 37:17 |
| accessible 15:25 |  |  |  |  |
| accomplishme... | Americ | bat $14 \cdot 11$ | Cabarrus 17•14 | olleagues 21:10 |
|  | 20 | bat 14:11 | Cabarrus 17:14 | $1: 1624: 1$ |
| a |  |  |  | ctively |
| accurate $37: 12$ |  | believe 19.2 | $21: 22 \text { 27:24 }$ | come 33:20 |
| Act 17.22 20.5 | an | believe 19:25 Benefits 11:2 | 21:22 27:24 calendar 36:23 | comes 10:22 |
|  | an | best $3: 17: 24$ | alled 7:2 | coming 27 |
| Additionally 3:7 | 14:9 | 31:7 37:9 | amera 33 | comment 7: |
|  |  | bet 10:19 | Carolina 1:1,23 | :18 14:13 |
| 15:10 |  | b |  | 19:4,5, |
| ado |  | 26:1 | 13:12,22 | commenta |
|  | Ap |  | 35: | 8:25 |
| advantage 25:22 | 21:2 |  | 37:1,7 | comments 16:8 |
|  |  |  |  | 16,20 |
| dvocated | ap |  |  | committee 2:18 |
| affirmative 3:22 | 32:7 | bill 2:3,5, | chair 4:7,22, | 6:1,20,22 7:11 |
| 4:15 15:8 35:9 | appr | 3:14,23 4:3,16 | 5:7 | 7:15,23 8:2,24 |
| 35:22 | ap | 4:17,18,19 | Chairman 34:13 | 10:4 22:25 |
| African | approximately | 10: | chairmen $24: 2$ | 23:19 29:5 |
| 18:17,20 20:20 | 34:15,17,18 | :13 15:14,16 | c | committees 6:8 |
| 20:24 32:8 | ar | 20:12 21:6 | chance 11:3,4 | common 16:25 |
| $\text { ago } 14: 719: 14$ | ar | , | change 7:2 | 7:8,1 |
| agree 24:11 |  | 30:21 31:20,22 | 27:13 | communiti |
| agreeing 20:16 | argument 20 | 34:9 35.3,10 | changed 2:21 | :18 26:6 |
| ahead $32: 18$ |  | 7,15,22 | 9 | commute 16:17 |
| aisles 33:14 |  | ,7,15,22 | Charlotte 9:2,3 | compact 9:15 |
| Alamance 16:7 | asking $21: 1$ | bipartisan 19:16 | 20. | 26:4 |
|  |  | b | 0: | compactn |
| algorithm | 2:10 3:25 29:3 | Blowing |  | 9:12 |
| algorithm | :12 | 21: |  | compared |
| A | A |  | choice 21:20 | 26:6 |
| 27: |  | $6.1520: 1$ | $3: 22.242$ |  |
| allows 22:17 | audio 2:1 | 6,15 20:1 | $3: 22,2429$ | $12: 1125: 2$ |
| gside 22 | 8 35:25 |  |  | $11: 21$ |
| alternative | A | borders 22 .10 | cities 30 . | 11:21 |
|  |  | borders 22:10 <br> boundaries 8:20 | cities 30:10 <br> citizens $13 \cdot 14,21$ | complia |
| amend 10 | Autry 4:8 36: | boundaries 8:20 | 13:14,21 | $17: 22$ |
| amendment |  | b | $\text { arify } 31 \cdot 3$ |  |
| 6:25 7:2 10 | available 29:15 | bragging 15:21 <br> breathing 31:24 | clarify $31: 3,5$ <br> clear 23.22 | computer 25:10 |
| 10:13,25 11:19 | aye $3: 15,194: 4$ | breathing 31:24 | clear 23:22 | $29: 11$ |


| concern 27:21 | county 4:24 5:7 | 30:15 31:20,22 | dispute 17:21 | efficiency 12:3,5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 32:9 | 13:9,12,14,18 | 35:2,15 | district 5:24 9:9 | 12:13 |
| concerned 26:19 | 13:20,22 16:4 | debates 4:22 | 9:11 13:15 | lect 32:10 |
| concerns 24:16 | 16:5,6,10,16 | decade 22:7 | 16:15,25 17:3 | elected 25:17 |
| confused 31:4 | 16:20 17:12,25 | 28:16 | 17:9 18:14,15 | electing 34:20 |
| confusing 19:24 | 18:12,23 19:9 | December 37:13 | 18:16 19:13 | election 6:4,9 |
| congratulatory | 19:19 20:16,23 | decided 7:14 | 22:13 23:4,4 | 9:18,20 28:23 |
| 13:10 | 21:12,23 22:1 | decision 6:3 | 23:10,10 26:8 | 30:6 31:13 |
| congress 8:9 | 22:9,10,10,11 | decisions 22:4,7 | districts 9:15 | electoral 30:2 |
| congressional | 22:18 37:2 | 23:8 | 13:13 18:1,7 | enacts 2:10 4:1 |
| 6:15,19,21 | couple 3:7 11:3 | deliberate 21:17 | 19:7,9 20:5 | 35:13 |
| 8:18,23 9:2,10 | course 8:9 9:11 | 21:19,25 | 26:3,4 | enrolled 4:17 |
| 11:10,18,23 | 9:15 14:8 | Democratic 3:8 | doing 26:18 | 35:24 |
| 12:17 13:15 | 28:15 | 25:1 29:9 | 32:23,25 33:18 | entire 8:19,23 |
| 17:8,17 18:1 | Cour | Democratic | 33:19 | 9:2,7 32:2 33:7 |
| 19:6,13,21 | court's 20:19 | 12:10 | double-bun | entitled 2:9 |
| 21:13 22:2,13 | courtesies 5:1 | Democrats 6:19 | 21:20 | equalizing $8: 8$ |
| 24:23 25:11 | courtesy 4:23 | 6:20 7:3 10:20 | double-bunked | especially $21: 18$ |
| 26:8,15,18 | 5:8 | 12:2 19:17 | 22:2 | essentially 7:2 |
| 29:21 32:12 | Covington 17:23 | 28:7,14 29:1 | downtown 16:22 | 28:11 |
| 34:19 | cracking 18:16 | 29:21 33:10 | 17 | everybody 29:15 |
| consider 9:16 | crazy 16:21 | 34:15,20,23 | drafted 7:3,11 | Ewing 5:9 |
| 27:21 30:6, | created 26:7 | Democrats' | drafting 8:25 | example 17:17 |
| considerate | criteria 6:8,10 | 10:18 | 30: | experiencing |
| 27:20 | 8:1,13 9:22 | Denise 1:18 37:4 | draw 18:7 21:13 | 33:12 |
| considered | 10:3,4 14:22 | 37:16 | 21:25 22:19 | experts $24: 24$ |
| 10:24 12:6 | 23:1,10,15 | denise@ | 27:17 28:18 | extend 4:22,25 |
| considering 30:2 | 25:14 30:9 | 1:25 | 33:3 | 5:7 |
| consistent 23:9 | criticize $34: 23$ | de | drawing 6:4,19 | eyebrow 27:21 |
| constituent | crystal $23: 22$ | depending 23:4 | 6:22 10:23 |  |
| 23:14 | CSR 1:18 37:5 | deserves 13:16 | 18:5 19:6 | $\frac{\mathbf{F}}{\mathbf{F} 11 \cdot 1237 .}$ |
| constituents | 37: | desire 10: | 20:5 34:24 | F 11:12 37: |
| $1623: 7$ | cur | de | drawn 2:17 5:24 | fact 29:13 |
| constitute 37:11 | curiously 16:24 | deviation 8:10 | 6:5 7:15,23 | fair 11:21 $24: 17$ |
| contains 9:15 |  | difference 12:4 | 19:1 22:17 | 25:7 |
| context 8:15 | D | :5 | 23:5 28:9 | fairly 25:2, |
| contiguous 9:12 | Dahle 36:20,21 | different 17:25 | drew 7:12 18:25 | fairness 11:20 |
| continued 36:1 | Daniel 2:7 16 | 26:15 27:13 | 29:10 34:25 | faith $24: 13$ |
| conversation | data 6:4,9 9:16 | direct 22 | due 34:1 | far 6:22 |
| 23:13 | 9:18,21 11:7 | direction 27:13 | Duke 25:8 | farmer 19:18 |
| correlation | 25:14,15 28:23 | disappointed | Duncan 5:2 | favor $3: 154: 4$ |
| 22:19 | 30:2,2,6 31:13 | 6:18 33:10 | Durham 21:3 | 15:3 35:4,17 |
| corresponds 8:2 | Davie 17:14 | disconnec | 22:10 | favoring 12:3 |
| council 5:9 | day 37:13 | D |  | feat 9:10 |
| counties 6:11 | days 19:12 | Discovery 1:19 | E | feel 12:16 15:24 |
| 7:19 8:5,5,7 | debate $2: 13$ 3:12 | discussion 3:11 | E 37:1,1 | 15:25 16:1 |
| 13:11 14:12,18 | 5:13 10:13 | 14:24 30:14 | earlier 9:17 | 18:11,13 19:4 |
| 18:19,21 22:15 | 13:3 14:1,25 | 35:1,14 | 20:18 | 24:14,16,22 |
| 30:10 | 15:13,16 20:11 | dishonest 19:23 | early 18 : | 26:11 33:1 |
| country 27:5 | 21:5 24:7 28:1 | displaced 2:4 | eastern 17:11 | feels 18:11,12 |


| $\begin{gathered} 20: 24 \\ \text { felt } 7: 22 \quad 16: 5 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { game } 26: 15 \\ & \text { gap } 12: 3,5,13 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Guilford } 13: 1,9 \\ 13: 14,1915: 12 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 31: 12 \\ \text { hold } 22: 12 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6: 1828: 8 \\ \text { issue } 27: 7 \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| fewer 7:16 25:17 | general 1:1 2:10 | 16:4,6,10 | honors 8:20 | sues 13:17 27:6 |
| 26:3 | $3: 25$ 29:3 | 17:25 18:23 | hope 10:4 22:5 |  |
| fifth $16: 15$ | 35:12 37:6 | 19:9 20:9,16 | house 1:2 $2: 19$ | J |
| filed 7:6,6,11 | generally $25: 17$ | 20:23 21:12 | 2:22 3:13 4:3 | rso |
| final 26:22,22 | generates 12:2 | 22:1 25:5 | 7:5,25 8:12 | join 21:16 23:25 |
| finger 7:19 | gentleman 2:11 | 26:10 34:6 | 12:19 15:1 | Joining 20:15 |
| 14:12 | 4:21,24 5:12 | 36:3 | 17:4 26:14 | Julian 17:1 |
| first 8:4 9:17 | 10:11 13:1,5 | guys 12:20 | 29:21 32:13 | justification |
| 16:3 18:3,7 | 13:24 14:3 |  | 35:3,16 37:7 | 16:20 |
| 28:15 | 20:9,13 21:3,7 | $\frac{\mathrm{H}}{\text { Hall } 2 \cdot 12.14}$ | hundreds 6:6 |  |
| Fisher 17:4 | 24:4,8 27:24 | Hall 2:12,14 |  | K |
| FiveThirtyEight | 28:3 30:24 | 5:13,15 13:25 | I | 19 8:4 |
| 11:23 | 34:6,10 36:11 | 14:1,5 27:25 | idea 30:3 | 1914 |
| flag 32:6 | 36:17 | 28:1,5 30:23 | ideas 30:13 31:5 | 5:21 16:9,10 |
| floor 1:2 4 | ger | 30:25 31:7,10 | 31:17 | keeping 6 |
| 5:13 13:6 14:4 | 20:2 | hand 12:8 | ignored | keeping 6:11,12 |
| 15:15 20:14 | gerry | happen 28:20 | 32:3 | 13:11 17:18,19 |
| 21:8 24:9 28:4 | 11:10 32:22 | happened 6:7 | illusion 22:17 | 30:9 |
| 33:5 34:11 | Gill 4:7 | 18:20 24:22 | impact 22:18 | kept 8:6 |
| 37:7 | gives 24:25 | 33:7 | important 5:19 | Key 5:1 |
| focus 6:9 | go 2:5 8:1 21:23 | happy 4:25 | 7:19 8:14,15 | know 6:23 8:25 |
| focuses 13:17 | 26:23 33:3,13 | hard 8:25 24:2 | 8:21 19:6 | 2:20 1 |
| folks 24:13 28:6 | goal 23:18 | Harnett 17:12 | 24:12 26:10 | 17:21 18:18 |
| following 25:13 | goes 17:5,10,13 | Harrison 15:12 | 31:24 32:9 | 21:22 22:12 |
| foregoing 37:11 | going 5:18 6:9,9 | 15:13,17 36:3 | inclusive 37:11 | 7:9,10, |
| Forks 1:21 | 6:11 8:1 18:8 | 36:5 | inconsistently | 29:7,13,14,16 |
| Forsyth 4:24 | 21:14 22:4,7 | Hawkins 21:4,5 | 23:2 | 1:13 32:9,20 |
| 16:7 | 24:21 25:7 | 21:9 | incredible 9:9 | knows 28:2 |
| forth $10: 731: 1$ | 27:1,15,19 | headed 32:11 | independently | L |
| 32:1 | 28:12 30:4 | hear 28:6 32:3 | $32: 5$ indicate 10:18 | lack 6:18 10:17 |
| forward 15:2 | 33:4,9,15 | heard 7:18 13:9 | indicate 10:18 | 10:18 33:10 |
| found 25:11 | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { g o o d }} 12: 1627: 2$ | 14:12 16:2,9,9 | 11:1 | 10:18 35:1 |
| four $12: 9,10$ | 33:21 | 16:14 18:24 | indicates 11:23 | $30: 1631: 21$ |
| Fox's 16:23 | grade | 19:13, 16,17 | individuals 16:5 | $36: 3,8,19$ |
| friend $34: 13$ | grandfather | 24:15 29:23 | 32:24 33:1,25 | land 17:6 |
| friendly 15:24 | 17:1 | 32:2 | information 3:2 | largest 13:11,17 |
| friends 29:9 | great 10:3 12:21 | hearing 16:4 | input 28:17 <br> intent 25.24 | 13:22 16:4 |
| full 5:24 30:8 | 15:21 16:25 | $18: 319: 14$ | intent 25:24 | $22: 9$ |
| further 3:11,12 | Greensboro 9:3 | 32:16 | 26:21 29:19 | lastly 22:24 |
| 14:24,25 30:14 | 9:7,8 16:12,22 | hearings 1 | intentional 22:3 | law 28:23 |
| $30: 1535: 1,2$ | 17:3,11 18:11 | held 37:8 High 16:12 | intentionally | lawyers 18:2 |
| 35:14,15 | 20:23 21:18 | High 16:12 | 29:25 | lead 22:8 27:8 |
| furthermore | gross 20:2,3 | highly 12:10 <br> hired $17 \cdot 2$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { interest } 17: 18 \\ 26: 732: 25 \end{gathered}$ | lean 12:2 |
| 17:20 | grossly 19:22 <br> group $25: 8$ | hired 17:2 <br> Hise 2:7 | 26:7 32:25 <br> interesting | leaning 11:2 |
| G |  | historic 5:21 6:3 | 19:1 | arned 6:25 |
| gallery 4:23 5:1 | groups 11:8,9 | historically $2: 21$ | involved 12:19 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { led } 27: 6 \\ & \text { Lee } 17: 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| 5:8 | 24:20 29:24 | history 9:17 | involvement | Lee 17:13 |


| Legal 1:20 | 14:11,15,20,22 | Monday 19:14 | 37:1,7 | P |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LEGISLATIVE | 16:6 19:21 | MOORE 2:3,11 | northeast 7:20 | packing 32:23 |
| 1:2 | 20:1 23:7,15 | 3:11 4:2 10:6 | 14:12 | pages 37:11 |
| legislator 23:6 | 24:24,25,25 | 10:11 12:25 | note 8:21 19:15 | paper 23:16 |
| Let's 2:5 | 25:4,7,9,12,25 | 13:5,23 14:3 | notice 14:10 | park 17:4,5,7 |
| limit 3:3 | 26:18 28:11 | 14:24 15:15 | 16:24 27:4 | part 10:18,19 |
| limited 14:10,19 | 29:21 33:3 | 20:8,13 21:2,7 | noting 17:20 | 16:21 17:6,10 |
| listen 19:8 33:15 | 34:19,25 | 24:3,8 $27: 23$ | November 1:4 | 17:13 28:16 |
| 34:1 | map's 26:15 | 28:3 30:14,20 | 37:8 | participated |
| listening 33:16 | map-drawing | 30:23 31:1,21 |  | 6:24 |
| literally 6:6 | 34:22 | 34:5,10 35:1 | $\frac{\mathrm{O}}{\text { diect 36:22 }}$ | participation |
| little 17:7,15 | maps 2:22 6: | 35:14 36:2,8 | object 36:22 | 33:11 |
| live 5:25,25 | 6:14,19,21 | 36:17 | October 29:6 | articular 11:12 |
| LLC 1:20 | 8:12 10:23 | morning 2:20 | offered 11:1 | 7:16 22:1 |
| lock 3:20 4:13 | 18:5 19:1,1 | 7.1 | 26:2 27:16 | parties 28:19 |
| 15:6 35:7,20 | 23:24 24:18,20 | motion 4:23 5:6 | offering 11:1 | partisan 11:7,14 |
| look 6:11 11:4 | 25:13,16 26:14 | move 27:13 | oh 33:20 | 11:17 19:22 |
| 16:7 21:21 | 26:14,16,25 | moves 10:9 | Okay 4:11 31:19 | 20:3 22:20 |
| 24:19,20,23 | 27:17 28:9,18 | multiple 22:6, | 31:23 | 25:15 |
| 28:12 32:12,13 | 29:11,25 30:3 | 22:23 | once 23:20 | party 11:21 |
| looked 9:12 11:8 | 30:13 31:14,16 | municipal 8:20 | ones 33:2 | party's 12:6 |
| 24:25 25:8 | 32:13,13,18,20 | 8:22 | online 16:8 | passage 3:13 4:3 |
| 30:1 | 34:24,25 | municipalities | open 3:16 4:5 | 35:3,16 |
| looking 26:25 | matter 9:5 | 3:3,6 6:12 7:17 | 15:4 29:5 30:7 | passed 2:19 3:23 |
| looks 12:12 20:4 | mean 25:21,23 | 9:1 14:15,16 | 35:5,18 | 7:9 |
| $\boldsymbol{l o t} 24: 2129: 8,11$ | means 25:20 | 17:12,19 | opinion 10:24 | passes 4:16 |
| 29:23 | measure 10:2 | municipality 3:4 | opportunity | 35:10,23 |
| love 27:12 | measures 11:1 | 9:24 10:1 | 10:21,22 12:21 | path 22:8 |
| loved 10:20 | Mebane 5:8 | Myers 1:18 37:4 | 26:13 27:9,10 | people 11:3 19:1 |
| Ludicrous 19:22 | Meck 25 | 37:16 | opposed 3:15 | 21:14 25:6 |
| M | Ivi | N | 35:18 | 26:19 32:10,21 |
| machine 3:20 | meetings | national 17:7 | options 32:1 |  |
| 4:13 15:6 35:7 | 32:20 | necessary 18:21 | Orange 5:7 | $34: 3$ |
| 35:20 | meets 10 | necessity 17:21 | ordered 4:17 | people's 29:19 |
| majority 23:22 | member 5: | need 18:23 | 35:2 | 32:19 |
| maneuvering | 2 | 23:23 26:2 | original 13:13 | percent 3:6 8:11 |
| 21:23 | member | 33:23,24 | originally $26: 9$ | 9:8 11:14 12:3 |
| $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { m a p }} 2: 17,19,24$ | 7:24 | needed 18:4 | other's 2:22 | 12:6,13 18:10 |
| 3:1,2,4,9,10 | members $2: 16$ | negative 3:23 | outcome 30:4,11 | 18:13,14,15 |
| 6:15 7:4,6,7,9 | 2:18 3:10 5:17 | 4:16 15:9 | 31:13,14 | $34: 14,15,17$ |
| 7:10,12,14,15 | 6:23 7:4 9:19 | 35:10,23 | utcomes 29:24 | personally 27:12 |
| 7:23,24,25 8:3 | 14:5 28:5,19 | neither 11:21 | outlined 23:21 | picks 16:23 |
| 8:5,8,16,17,18 | mention 7:5 | 18:6 | outside 11:8 | pieces 3:1 2 |
| 8:19,20,22,23 | merits 2:25 | never 6: | 24:19 26:17 | Piedmont 16:10 |
| 9:2,5,7,10,12 | Meyer 5:6 | Newton 2:8 | 28:10 29:24 | $16: 11,19 \text { 19:2 }$ |
| 9:14,23,25 | minus 8:11 | North 1:1,23 | outstanding | Pitt 30:17 |
| 10:3,5 11:11 | minute 33:6,9,11 | 2:10 3:5 4:1 | 27:7 | placed 22:14 |
| 11:16,18,19,24 | minutes 14:7 | 12:12 13:12,22 | overperform | $23: 2$ |
| 12:12,17 14:9 | missing 27:8, 9 | 25:4 35:13 | 11:15 | places 16:8 |


| 21:18 | process 5:18,20 | R | 21 | 24:12 26:22,23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Plan | 5:22,23 6:24 | r | remember 19:18 | results 11:25 |
|  | 9:19 10:19,2 |  | reminded 20:18 | 24:24 |
| please 5:3,10 | 11:12 15:20,22 | rated 11:12 | Reock 26:5 | retired 19:19 |
| 19:2 27:21 | 15:24 24:13 | 29:25 | repeat 10:1 | retirees 19:18 |
| :20 33:22 | 25:24 26:20 | r | 15 | reviewing 19:11 |
| 34:4,25 36:7 | 28:8 29:15,22 | :18 10:8 | repeating 5:19 | revisit 23:20 |
| 36:16 | 30:5,7,12 | 35:11 | Reporter 37:5 | 26:24 |
| plus 8:11 | 31:11,15 | reading | Reporters 1:19 | right 14:11 27:6 |
| point 16:12 | Proj | :4,17 35:4,11 | represent 34:1 | 28:25 33:2 |
| 19:10 | proposed 2:17 | 35:17,24 | rep | Rights 17:22 |
| p | 6:21 8:3 17:8 | real 16:19 18: | 13:16 26:11 | 20:4 |
|  | 29:20 | really 3:3 | representative | rise 13:2,25 |
| political 3 | proud 19 | 27:11,11, | 2:12,14 3:17 | 15:12 20:10 |
| Polsby-Po | 20:1 | 33:7,15 | 3:17 4:7,8,8,10 | 21:4 24:5 |
| 26:5 | public 5 | reasonable | 4:24 5:6,13,15 | 27:25 30:17,18 |
| populated 22:15 | 7:13,18 11:2 | 20:22 | 10:6,9,12,14 | 34:7 36:4,12 |
| population 8:8 | 14:13 15:20,2 | reasons 7:16 | 13:1,3,7,8,25 | 36:20 |
| 9:4 18:20 | 15:23,24 16:2 | 21:15 22:20 | 14:1,5 15:2,12 | Road 1:21 |
| 20:24 | 16:3 18:3,24 | receive $33: 6$ | 15:13,17 20:9 | Rock 16:23 17:5 |
| populatio | 19:4,5,8 28:18 | recog | 20:11,15 21:3 | 21:24 |
| 17:24 18:5 | 28:22 31:18 | recog | 21:5,9 24:4 | room 6:1,20,22 |
| posted 7:12 | purpose 12:25 | 10:7,12 31:21 | 24:10 27:25 | 7:12 8:25 29:5 |
| praise 32:4 | 13:23 15:11 | reconsider $21: 1$ | 28:1,5 30:17 | 33:3,18,19,19 |
| precinct 16:23 | 20:8 21:2 24:3 | 22:2 | 30:18,21,23,25 | 33:20 |
| precincts 6: | 27:23 30:16 | reco | 31:2,7,9,10,19 | RPR 1:18 37:17 |
| precision 20:2 | 34:5 36:2,11 | 15 | 31:23 34:6,8 | ruling 17:23 |
| 20:25 | 36:19 | recorded 36:6,9 | :12 36:3,5 | running $25: 15$ |
|  |  | 36:14,18 37:6 | 36:12,13,20,21 | 25:17 |
| present 12:15 |  | rec | rep | runs 16:21 17:4 |
| $\text { ted } 25: 18$ | pu | :24 | r | S |
| 11:20 23:1 | Q |  | re | Saine 3:18 4:12 |
|  | question 3 |  | represen | 4:12 |
| rever | 4:2 14:2 | redistricting $2: 9$ | Republican | Sandhills 26:7 |
| previously 14:6 | :18 30:19 | 5:20 6:10 9:22 | 11:14,25 25:1 | sat 13:9 14:8 |
| Price 17:1,5 | 31:2 | 15:23 23:19 | 27:17,18 34:18 | saw 7:24 $29: 11$ |
| Price 17 11:9 | q | r | Republican-le... | SB 1:3,3 37:7,8 |
| inted 23:16 |  | reek | 12: | SBK-7 2:9 |
| probability | Quick 13:2,3,7 | reflecting 12:1 | Republicans | scary 19:23 |
| 34:19 | 20:10,11,15 | reflection 26:1 | 11:15 12:4 | School 5:3 |
| robably 24:21 | 34:7,8,12 | registered $34: 1$ | 19:17 25:18 | scores 26:5 |
|  | R | 34:16,17 | 28:15 29:12 | Sean 5:9,9 |
| problem 18:8,17 |  | Reives 10:6, | 34:20,23,24 | seat 12:1 25:2 |
| 30:12,13 31:15 | race $11 \cdot 16$ | $10: 1415: 2$ | require 28:24 | seats 11:25 12:1 |
| 34:21,22 | race 11:16 | $24: 5,6,1036$ | resoundingly | $12: 9,10,11$ |
| roblemati |  | 36:9 | 9 | 25:1,1 |
|  |  |  | re | second 3:14,24 |
|  | raise 27:20 | remains | $\text { rest } 27$ | $\begin{aligned} & 28: 234: 935: 4 \\ & 35 \cdot 11 \end{aligned}$ |
| procedural 7:8 |  | remarks 13:10 | result 6:13 12:9 | 35.11 |


| Secondly 22:9 | Smith 30:17,18 | 37:1 | 34:20 | 12:12 20:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| see 6 | 3 | sta | Tennessee 16:22 | 25:19 |
| :20 24:24 | 31:19,23 | statewide 8:18 | 25:9,12,1 | d 9:23 19:2 |
| 27:12 29:8 | somebody 9 | 11:16 | rminals 29:12 | otal 3:4 8:6,17 |
| 30:8 32:11 | Sorry 4:19 | statistic | rms 2:2 | 8:22 9:25 |
| seen 26 | sort 11:7 23:8,11 | statisti | thank 2:14 5: | tougher 8:9 |
| $\boldsymbol{s e e s} 4: 7$ | 25:22 | Stenographi | 10:14 15:17 | traditional 6:10 |
| senate $2: 5,8,9,16$ | speak 2:25 34:8 | 37:4 | 20:6 21:10 | 9:21 30:9 |
| 2:17,19,23 | Speaker 2:3,11 | stenogr | 24:2,6,10 34 | ranscribed 1:16 |
| 3:10,14,23 4:3 | 2:15 3:114:2 | 37:9 | 36:13 | 37:10 |
| 4:16,18,19 | 5:16 10:6,11 | stick 21 | Than | ranscrip |
| 6:20 7:3,6,8,9 | 10:15 12:25 | stink 32:14 | thing 8:4 10:2 | :1 35:25 |
| 7:11,15,21,23 | 13:5,23 14:3 | stopped 36:1,2 | 12:22 16:18,24 | 36:24 37:6,12 |
| 8:12 11:2,24 | 14:24 15:15,18 | strategic $23: 3$ | 18:19 24:11 | ransparency |
| 12:18,21,22 | 20:8,13 21:2,7 | strong 16:3 | 28:25 | :23 15:22 |
| 26:14 35:3,10 | 24:3,7,8 27:23 | 18:24 | thing | 32:16,17 33:17 |
| 35:16,23 36:7 | 28:3 30:14,20 |  | 23:21 26:13 | ransparent |
| 36:15 | 30:23 31:1,20 | S | 27:14 28:13 | 9:20 16:1 |
| senator | 31:21 34:5,10 | stu | 32:1 | 31:11 |
| 22:25 | 35:1,14 36:2,8 | stu | think 3 | Triad 16:10,11 |
| Sen | 36:14,17 | S | 7:2 10:17,22 | 6:19 19:3 |
| sen | specifi | 10:17 | 12:16 15:23 | ried 8:4 9:21 |
| sens | , 13 | su | 6,23 | rue 26:11 37:11 |
| 25:23 |  |  | 8:8 | truly 32:17 |
| sent | sp | Su | 19:15 20:22 | :14 |
| separate 7:12 | split 3:3 8:7,1 | sup | 22:11 23:23 | trying 12:14,15 |
| 32 | 9:1,4 13:12 | 37 | 24:11,19,23 | Tuesday 15:20 |
| serv | 14:11,17 18 | sup | 25:5,7 27:2, | two 8:22 9:1,25 |
| ser | 18:23,25 21:19 | 12:23 13:8, | 34:21,21 | 14:16 |
| session 1:2 3 | 22:11 | supposed 32 : | third 3:24 4:3,17 | two-thirds 13:15 |
| 33:7 | splits 3:5 7:16 | sure 23:17,23 | 13:11,17,21 | 25. |
| sharing 22:20 | 16,17,19,23 | 31:25 33:22,24 | 16:4 35:11, | 27:19 |
|  | , | 34:1 |  |  |
| S | 14:14,16 $25:$ |  |  | U |
| .11 |  |  | thousands 2 | 7:14, |
| 5 | .20 17.24 |  | , | 7:14,23 26:12 |
| sign 12:7 |  | system 23:11 | three 12: | 6:21 29: |
|  |  | T | 1:11 | $30: 5$ |
|  |  |  |  | $34: 16$ |
|  | S | 8: | time 3:24 | unbelievable |
|  |  | taken 28:6 37:8 | , | , |
| 14.92 | state 2:16,17, | 11: | 14.10,20 23.24 | undemocra |
| sitting 10:23 | 2:22,23 3:6,10 |  | 28:2,20 29:7 |  |
| 29:13 | 6:5 7:25 8:12 |  | 29:16 32:18,19 | understand $8: 1$ |
| situation 12:1 | 8:129: | targeting 20:20 | 34:9 35:11 | 27:2 |
| 24:17 | 13:18,22 14:17 | 2:18 23 | mes 22:6,11,23 | n |
| $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { s i x }} 1: 21$ | 16:5 21:24 |  | tired 26:25 27:1 | 2 |
| slow | 22:10 23:12 | temporarily 2 : | today 5:5,11 7:5 | nfortunate |
| smaller 17:11 | 31:12 34:13 | ten 11:25 25:1 | 7:7 8:3 11:1,11 | 29:10 33:12 |


| unfortunately | voting 12:16 | welcome 5:4 | 2019 29:10,11 | 8240 37:17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6:23 | 17:22 18:6 | went 15:22 16:7 | 2021 1:2,4 2:9 | 8340 1:18 37:5 |
| unintelligible | 20:1,4 24:1 | 23:12 | 5:20 37:8,13 |  |
| 21:22 | 27:21 36:15 | Winston-Salem | 2030 23:20 | 9 |
| unprecedented | VRA 18:7 | 16:13 | $21.411: 14$ | 90 9:8 18:10 |
| 5:22 6:2 | VTD 8:16,17,18 | wish 4:8 $28: 7$ | 24 8:17,18 26:3 | 919 1:24 |
| untrue 33:14 | 10:1 | wonder 34:22 | 26 18:14 |  |
| urban 18:18 | VTDs 6:13 8:14 | work 16:17 24:2 | 27609 1:23 |  |
| urge 20:6 33:22 | $\mathbf{W}$ | 32:4 33:18,19 | $3$ |  |
| $\text { use } 6: 3,99: 14,18$ | W | working 32:5 | 3 |  |
| $23: 1,11 \quad 28: 23$ | Wake 16:16 | 33:13 | $3026: 634: 17$ |  |
| $31: 13$ | $22: 10,1123: 2$ | world 30:8 | $33 \text { 34:15 }$ |  |
|  | 25:4 36:20 | worrying 25:21 | 36 26:6 34:14 |  |
| V | 37:2 | worse 26:18 |  |  |
| verify $18: 10$ | walk 23:7,14 | worship 16:17 | 4 |  |
| version 25:18 | 24:14 | worst $17: 17$ | $41: 437: 8$ |  |
| versus 32:5 | want 15:19 21:9 | worth 17:20 | 42 26:5 |  |
| video 5:25 30:7 | 21:11 22:22 | 23:16 | 4208 1:21 |  |
| Videographers | 23:6,17,19 | wrong 12:22 | 424-8242 1:24 |  |
| 1:20 | 25:25 31:24 | 20:5 32:15 | 44:51 36:1 |  |
| view 5:25 7:13 | 32:21,23,24 |  | 45 26:5 |  |
| 11:2 | 33:25 | X | 46:37 36:1 |  |
| views 24:15 | wanting 14:13 |  | 47 15:8 |  |
| violated 20:4 | wards 11:25 | Y | 47:14 36:25 |  |
| Virginia 16:23 | warned 18:2 | $y^{\prime}$ all 5:3 | $483: 23$ |  |
| voice $33: 25$ | warning 20:19 | years 6:6 28:14 | 49 4:16 35:10,23 |  |
| voluntarily 6:3,7 | wasted 12:6 | 29:3 | $5$ |  |
| 28:22 31:12 | 32:19 | yesterday 16:14 | $\frac{5}{58 \cdot 11}$ |  |
| vote $1: 33: 10,15$ | Watauga 21:12 | yield 30:24,25 | $58: 11$ |  |
| 3:15,16,21 4:4 | 21:23 | yields $31: 1$ | $5.812: 13$ |  |
| 4:5,6,9,14 | way $22: 1626: 9$ | Z | $\mathbf{5 0 / 5 0} 11: 16$ |  |
| 11:11 12:20 | 27:6,13 28:13 | $\frac{Z}{\text { Zenger } 4 \cdot 05}$ | 552 3:5 |  |
| 14:23 15:3,4,5 | 29:24 32:11 | Zenger 4:25 <br> zero 8:10 | 6 |  |
| 15:7 18:17 | ways $25: 5$ | zero 8.10 | 6:53 2:2 |  |
| 20:6 21:1,16 | we're 6:8,9,10 | 0 | 6.518 .13 |  |
| 22:21 24:12 |  | 0 | 64 3:22 |  |
| 32:8 33:4,23 | 12:14,15 27:8 | 1 | $65 \text { 4:15 35:9,22 }$ |  |
| 33:25 34:4,25 | 27:9,10,11 | 1.83:6 | $67 \text { 15:9 }$ |  |
| 35:4,5,6,8,17 | $31: 2532: 11,23$ | $103: 4,4$ | 6th 29:6,7 |  |
| 35:18,19,21 | 32:25 33:9,13 | 1000 1:22 | 6th 29:6,7 |  |
| 37:7 | 33:15 34:2 | 102409-2 37:17 | 7 |  |
| voted 3:22 4:15 | we've 6:14 9:19 | 11 8:7 17:9 | 739 1:3 2:5,8 |  |
| 15:8 28:12 | 18:13 26:12 | 14 18:15 26:4 | 3:14,23 4:3,16 |  |
| 35:9,22 36:9 | 28:21 29:23 | $150 \text { 28:14 29:2 }$ | $3.14,7$ $37: 7$ |  |
| 36:18 | 33:12 | 19th 37:13 | 740 1:3 4:18,19 |  |
| voter 26:3 | website 11:22 |  | 35:3,10,16,23 |  |
| voters 22:5 | week 19:14 | 2 | 36:7,15 37:8 |  |
| 24:14,21 34:14 | weeks 11:3 | $20.112: 3$ |  |  |
| 34:16 | weighed $23: 10$ | $20029: 3$ | 8 |  |
| votes 12:6 | weight $23: 11$ | 2011 8:15 | 8 12:6 |  |



Show more

Terms of Service Privacy Policy Accessibility Ads info More... © 2021 Twitter, Inc.

Allison Riggs
@AlisonJRiggs


Messages
守 人

IN THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF ) NAACP, COMMON CAUSE, MARILYN HARRIS, GARY GRANT, JOYAH BULLUCK, ) and THOMASINA WILLIAMS,

Plaintiffs,
v.

PHILLIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate;
TIMOTHY K. MOORE, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; RALPH E. HISE, JR., WARREN DANIEL, PAUL NEWTON, in their official capacities as Co-Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections; DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chairman of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting; THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; DAMON CIRCOSTA, in his official capacity as Chair
of the State Board of Elections; STELLA ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Secretary of the State Board of Elections; STACY EGGERS IV, in his official capacity as Member of the State Board of Elections; JEFF CARMON III, in his ) official capacity as Member of the ) State Board of Elections; TOMMY ) TUCKER, in his official capacity as Member of the State Board of Elections; KAREN BRINSON BELL, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the State Board of Elections,

Defendants.

Wake County 21-CVS-14476

## $* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *$

TRANSCRIPT, Volume 1 of 1
Pages 1 - 62
Tuesday, November 30, 2021
$* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *$
November 30, 2021, Civil Session
The Honorable A. Graham Shirley, II, Judge Presiding Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Legislative Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Reported by: Dawn M. Dantschisch, RMR, CRR, CRC Official Court Reporter Dawn.M.Dantschisch@nccourts.org
APPEARANCES:
Hilary H. Klein, Esquire
Allison J. Riggs, Esquire Mitchell Brown, Esquire
Katelin Kaiser, Esquire
Southern Coalition For Social Justice
1415 West Highway 54, Suite 101
Durham, North Carolina 27707
hilaryhklein@scsj.org
allison@scsj.org
mitchellbrown@scsj.org
katelin@scsj.org
J. Tom Boer, Esquire

Olivia T. Molodanof, Esquire
Hogan Lovells US, LLP
3 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1500
San Francisco, California 94111
tom.boer@hoganlovells.com
olivia.molodanof@hoganlovells.com
On behalf of the Plaintiffs
Phillip J. Strach, Esquire
John E. Branch, III, Esquire
Nelson Mullins Riley \& Scarborough, LLP
4140 Parklake Avenue, Suite 200
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612
phillip.strach@nelsonmullins.com
john.branch@nelsonmullins.com
APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
Katherine L. McKnight, Esquire
Baker Hostetler
1050 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 200336
kmcknight@bakerlaw.com
On behalf of the Legislative Defendants
Terence Steed, Esquire
North Carolina Department of Justice
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
tsteed@ncdoj.gov
On behalf of the Defendants State of North Carolina;North Carolina State Board of Elections; DamonCircosta, Stella Anderson, Stacy Eggers IV, JeffCarmon, III, Tommy Tucker and Karen Brinson Bell, intheir official capacities with the State Board ofElections
INDEX
Page
Argument by Ms. Klein ..... 6
Response by Mr. Strach ..... 44
Further Argument by Ms. Klein ..... 54
Response by Mr. Steed ..... 59
Court's Ruling ..... 60
Certification of Transcript ..... 62
(Superior Court of Wake County convened civil court session November 30, 2021, before the Honorable A. Graham Shirley, II. The case of NC State Conference of NAACP, et al. v. Berger, et al., was called for hearing at 10:31 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. All right. We are here in North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al., v. Phillip E. Berger, et al., in 21-CVS-14476. If counsel for the parties, starting with the plaintiff, would introduce themselves for the record.

MS. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor, and good morning. My name is Hilary Harris Klein of the Southern Coalition For Social Justice on behalf of Plaintiffs. I'm joined by my co-counsel, Allison Riggs, also of the Southern Coalition For Social Justice, as well as Mitchell Brown and Katelin Kaiser.

I'm also joined by co-counsel from the firm Hogan Lovells -- they're sitting behind me -- Tom Boer and Olivia Molodanof.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. KLEIN: I would also introduce the Court to our client, Bob Phillips of Common Cause, who is the executive director, who is also here today, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. STRACH: Good morning, Your Honor.
Phil Strach with Nelson Mullins here for the Legislative Defendants.

MS. MCKNIGHT: Good morning, Your Honor.
Kate McKnight here on behalf of the Legislative Defendants.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. STEED: Good morning, Your Honor. Terence Steed on behalf of the State Defendants.

MR. BRANCH: Good morning, Your Honor. John Branch here on behalf of Legislative Defendants.

THE COURT: All right. As a housekeeping matter, I have one motion for pro hac vice that has been submitted to me. That is for Ms. McKnight.

Is there any objection from the plaintiffs to her admission?

MS. KLEIN: Plaintiffs do not object, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I noticed that there were a number of individuals on the complaint that said -- that stated pro hac vice motions to be filed. Have those been filed, and do they need to be acted upon?

MS. KLEIN: No, Your Honor, they have not yet been filed, but they will be imminently. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So, what -- I see you have the "backslash $S$ backslash." What is that?

MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, that is to indicate the
signature of attorneys that have appeared in this case, but we're happy to not do that going forward, if necessary.

THE COURT: Well, only -- under North Carolina General Statute Rule 84.4 , or Section 84.4 , only attorneys licensed to practice law in the state, or otherwise admitted to practice, may sign pleadings; otherwise, it constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. So, in the future, no one is to sign a pleading unless they have been admitted pro hac vice or been admitted to the State Bar of North Carolina, just as a point of clarification.

That breach is observed -- that rule is observed more in its breach than its rule, but it's something that the Court places emphasis on, because, of course, when you put a signature on, you're certifying certain things pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

All right. Any other administrative matters before we proceed?

MS. KLEIN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. When counsel is actively speaking, they will be permitted to take their mask off. Otherwise, I request that you keep your mask on. Since this is Plaintiffs' -- we'll proceed with Plaintiffs' motion first.

MS. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor, and may it please the Court. Your Honor, if it's amenable to the

Court, because of the overlapping issues and the many motions, $I$ plan to address our motion, as well as just a few of the points raised by Legislative Defendants in theirs.

THE COURT: That's fine.
MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, Plaintiffs are here before you today with a fairly straightforward request, and that is to declare their rights and the Legislative Defendants' duties to adhere to the North Carolina Constitution when undertaking their mandate to redistrict state legislative maps.

Plaintiffs have further requested injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction, that would enjoin and delay the March 2022 primaries and their related deadlines to protect Plaintiffs from irreparable harm.

THE COURT: All right. Just a minute. So you're not seeking to have the maps invalidated in this action; is that correct?

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So what we're going to end up with is a set of maps that have been approved by the legislature, and as a matter of operation by law, until a court determines otherwise, they are presumed to be constitutional, and at the same time telling -- asking me to say you can't proceed on the maps that are presumed to be constitutional, because we don't want you to invalidate
them, and we're going to delay the election; is that essentially what you're asking this Court to do?

MS. KLEIN: Not exactly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, would you agree with me that until those maps are declared invalid they are presumed to be constitutional? Until a court declares those maps invalid, that they are presumed as a matter of law to be constitutional?

MS. KLEIN: I would agree with that. And the key language is until a court declares them invalid. And here, Plaintiffs' action is under the Declaratory Judgment Act specifically, which was designed to give the type of anticipatory relief we have asked for here.

THE COURT: But you are not asking me to declare the maps invalid, are you?

MS. KLEIN: We have not yet requested that.
THE COURT: Okay. In fact, had you done that, you would have been required to serve a copy of your complaint on the senior resident judge of Wake County, who would then be required to send it to the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court to appoint a three-judge panel; is that correct?

MS. KLEIN: That's my understanding.
THE COURT: All right. So, sitting here today, I cannot, I have no -- absolutely no authority under the
general statutes to declare these maps unconstitutional or invalid, because that power is solely vested in the three-judge panel constituted under North Carolina General Statute 1-267; is that correct?

MS. KLEIN: Yes. And Plaintiffs have not asked for that relief.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: Plaintiffs have asked for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act to resolve an ongoing controversy as to what the state constitution requires of Legislative Defendants. And Plaintiffs have separately alleged harm arising out of that.

THE COURT: Well, you're asking me to give an advisory opinion, aren't you, before an actual act is passed?

MS. KLEIN: We are asking for relief that is specifically afforded under the Declaratory Judgment Act. So, the Declaratory Judgment Act was passed in 1931, Your Honor. And it was -- it was passed, and I can refer the Court to a Law Review article written by the dean of UNC at the time talking about that act soon after it had been passed.

And it was passed to give parties the opportunity, when there is uncertainty and an imminent breach arising out of that uncertainty, when there is an uncertainty as to duties,
as to legal status, as to rights, as there is here, the parties can ask for judicial review earlier to prevent that harm. And what that judicial review allows for here, Your Honor, is for the Court to provide certainty.

The parties can go back and do with that what they wanted, but the argument that we have to also act to enjoin the maps, which, by the way, were not passed when we filed this suit, so the argument that we have to enjoin the maps --

THE COURT: But you could have waited. You could have waited.

MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, we could have waited. And at that time, we had no idea how long the process for enacting maps was going to extend. It could have gone until Thanksgiving.

THE COURT: So --
MS. KLEIN: And the declaratory judgment allows the Court to provide that anticipatory review now, and the parties get to do what they want. Their position and what the Court has mentioned about needing to enjoin the final maps, that's like asking -- in the classic contract situation, that's like asking for parties to not only bring a Declaratory Judgment Act, but also bring breach of contract before that has even happened.

And the declaratory judgment does not require that,

Your Honor. Everything is possible until the primaries happen, until voters vote --

THE COURT: And just --
MS. KLEIN: -- under these new maps.
THE COURT: -- as anything was possible until the maps were enacted, wasn't it?

MS. KLEIN: It remains possible, and, in fact --
THE COURT: No, everything was possible in terms of compliance with Stephenson or compliance with the VHA (sic) up until the time the maps were enacted?

MS. KLEIN: And it remains possible, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: Legislative Defendants have provided no reason other than their own unwillingness to comply with the law.

THE COURT: But you could have waited until the maps were enacted to determine whether there was a violation of the Whole County Provision or violation of the VRA.

MS. KLEIN: We didn't have to, Your Honor, because at the time --

THE COURT: Wait a minute.
MS. KLEIN: -- that we filed this suit -- -
THE COURT: I didn't ask whether you had to. I said you could have.

MS. KLEIN: We could have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Let's say our legislature -- let's imagine a legislature that is -- either has a governor who will sign this legislation or they have a veto-proof majority. And this fictitious legislature in North Carolina is going to -- is poised to pass legislation that states no citizen of North Carolina or anyone within the geographical boundaries of North Carolina can use the word "north" in the spoken or written word. Now, I hope we could all agree that that proposed legislation is a violation of the First Amendment.

Could you -- could a court enjoin the legislature from voting on such an act, or does the act have to pass before we declare it unconstitutional?

MS. KLEIN: To answer your question, Your Honor, the judicial branch could not enjoin the General Assembly from voting on that. And that's not what Plaintiffs have asked for here.

But it is the sole responsibility of the judicial branch, Your Honor, to state what the state constitution requires and how it's applied in certain situations. And courts have done this time and time again, to state this is what the constitution requires --

THE COURT: Well --
MS. KLEIN: -- and it has to be followed.
THE COURT: -- hasn't the Stephenson court
already said what the constitution requires?
MS. KLEIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I mean, this is not -- this is -what Stephenson says is a well settled matter of law. Why do you need to come to me to say what the law is? Why didn't you wait, once they enacted it, and say, you violated Stephenson and you violated the VRA?

MS. KLEIN: We came here because it was very clear they skipped the first step of Stephenson. They decided to skip entirely the first step of Stephenson, and that was apparent when the criteria were passed and Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel --

THE COURT: When were the criteria passed?
MS. KLEIN: The criteria were passed on August -on August 5th. No, on August 12th, Your Honor. They were first proposed, I think, around the 5 th. They were passed, and Plaintiffs pointed this out. Plaintiffs wrote a letter --

THE COURT: Why did you wait until October 29th to file the motion for preliminary -- or motion for declaratory relief and preliminary injunction?

MS. KLEIN: To understand whether this would actually cause harm, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: -- and --

THE COURT: So, when did the harm occur? Does the harm occur when the maps are passed? Or what harm occurs before the maps are passed?

MS. KLEIN: The irreparable harm, Your Honor, occurs when voters are going to vote under these maps. It was very clear --

THE COURT: Okay. So, when voters -- voters can only vote under those maps once they're enacted. So, the harm doesn't occur until the maps are enacted.

MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, hypothetically, right now, this legislature, as it has done in the past, could still comply with Stephenson. There is still time. The primaries have not taken place, and --

THE COURT: Does Stephenson -- does compliance with Stephenson necessarily mean compliance with the VRA?

MS. KLEIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It does. So, you can comply with Stephenson, and if you comply with Stephenson, there will never be a violation of the VRA?

MS. KLEIN: As Stephenson is written.
THE COURT: No, it says all you do is create VRA districts first. But sometimes people create VRA districts that pack more African-Americans into the district than is necessary, don't they? And that's not in compliance with the VRA.

NC NAACP, et al. v. Berger, et al. - Wake County 21-CVS-14476-Volume 1 of 1

MS. KLEIN: So, Legislative Defendants attempted to do what you're saying last cycle in the Covington matter, and the court explicitly found not only is this first step of Stephenson crucial, but it has to be followed properly. And the court found specifically they had not followed the requirements of the VRA, specifically.

By skipping this step, they're saying, okay, we got called afoul, we got called afoul in the game last cycle, but --

THE COURT: So, what you're saying is that the process is wrong, because not only did they create VRA districts, they failed to create VRA districts that complied with the constitution and the VRA?

MS. KLEIN: The court in the last cycle --
THE COURT: No, I'm talking about in this case.
MS. KLEIN: In this case?
THE COURT: In this case.
MS. KLEIN: In this case, Your Honor, they never made any meaningful attempt --

THE COURT: Okay. So --
MS. KLEIN: -- to determine what the VRA requires at all. They never made any meaningful attempt --

THE COURT: So, if they --
MS. KLEIN: -- no analysis.
THE COURT: -- if they made an analysis, but it
was wrong, does that violate Stephenson?
MS. KLEIN: That would -- that is not this case. That's not what happened.

THE COURT: That's not what I'm asking you. You need to please answer the questions I ask.

MS. KLEIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: If they misconstrued the VRA or if they misconstrued Stephenson but make an honest attempt to comply with the VRA, is Stephenson satisfied?

MS. KLEIN: Unless -- no, unless they have properly -- unless they have properly determined what the VRA requires.

THE COURT: Okay. So, under that analysis, you would be able to bring a declaratory judgment before any map is passed anytime you believe they've made a mistake in the application of the VRA and the Whole County Provision?

MS. KLEIN: I'm not sure that's correct, Your Honor, and this is because in that hypothetical case, which is very different from this one, that would be a disagreement between the parties as to whose analysis is correct. That is not what happened here. In their brief, Legislative Defendants admit they are not aware of any such analysis.

THE COURT: Why are we sitting here 30 days after the complaint was filed on a preliminary injunction motion
when the harm of the process, you claim, was irreparable?
MS. KLEIN: Plaintiffs filed -- I don't know the answer to that question. Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction the same day the complaint was filed, Your Honor, and we have acted --

THE COURT: Why didn't you request a TRO? Because a TRO gets you into court quick. TROs have a tendency to bring the defendants to the table much more quickly, and TROs are typically brought when there is irreparable harm, when the parties are screaming that there is irreparable harm. But here we sit 30 days later.

MS. KLEIN: Well, first of all, Your Honor, the triggering -- the first deadline for the upcoming primaries is December 6th, and we filed this on October 29th. So, as far as the TRO, you know, crying imminent harm at that point, within days, we did not -- we thought that -- we made the reasoned judgment, Your Honor, that a preliminary injunction was the more appropriate standard, because --

THE COURT: But I thought it was the process that was causing the harm. And you -- your complaint had not only originally asked for the Court to enjoin the elections, you asked this Court to enjoin the process the legislature was using. So, if -- because that process was causing imminent harm to the plaintiffs.

If that is the case, why was a TRO not requested to
stop the process and stop the imminent harm that you claim here?

MS. KLEIN: The ship has not sailed -- because the ship has not sailed until the primaries take place. And the first -- and the first deadline related to that, Your Honor, is December 6th. Plaintiffs seek for the orderly administration of elections. Unlike last cycle where several elections were undertaken under unlawful maps --

THE COURT: If you're seeking --
MS. KLEIN: -- here --
THE COURT: -- for the orderly process of elections, I still don't understand why the TRO was -- why a TRO was not sought prior to a preliminary injunction and why you waited until October 29 th, when, in August, you knew the criteria -- did you doubt that they were going to use the criteria that they said would be used to create the maps?

MS. KLEIN: We did not doubt that, but at that -perhaps could I go briefly through the --

THE COURT: Sure.
MS. KLEIN: -- procedural history and how things played out in this case, Your Honor? Thank you.

So, in this matter, that first step, Your Honor, as we've talked about, happened in August when they proposed race blind -- what are called race-blind criteria. And at

NC NAACP, et al. v. Berger, et al. - Wake County 21-CVS-14476-Volume 1 of 1
that point, Plaintiffs' counsel provided public comment, indicating the first step of Stephenson, this is not required under law, and, in fact, the law requires the consideration of racial data in order to comply with Stephenson's requirement that the VRA be -- the requirements under the VRA be ascertained.

After that point, it was not clear. There was plenty of opportunity for Legislative Defendants to still comply with Stephenson. They could have performed an analysis. They could have done several different things at that time. And, Your Honor, Plaintiffs do not seek judicial intervention lightly. This is not the first -- this is not the first option for Plaintiffs. This is a last resort, to be before Your Honor.

So, when --
THE COURT: Can you -- can you use a process other than that set out by Stephenson and come up with a map that satisfies the VRA and the Whole County Provision of the constitution?

MS. KLEIN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: And court processes -- court processes have outlined in past cases, in Covington and Common Cause. The courts ordered briefing, extensive -there's extensive briefing on what the VRA requires, and
that after, the courts ordered remedial processes that followed -- that followed the other Stephenson requirements.

THE COURT: In fact, the VRA doesn't command the state to adopt any particular map, does it?

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor. And Plaintiffs --

THE COURT: Rather, it prevents the enforcement of plans, the enforcement of plans, the purpose or effect of which is to dilute the voting strength of legally protected minorities. The plan.

MS. KLEIN: But the state constitution requires -- as interpreted by the court in Stephenson, the state constitution requires a process that requires consideration of federal law first. Federal law is an express, not an implied requirement of the state's constitution. And the court in Stephenson issued a process requirement. The language in Stephenson, which I'm happy to walk the Court through --

THE COURT: I've read Stephenson numerous times.
MS. KLEIN: -- does that. Wonderful, Your Honor.
And Dickson v. Rucho, a recent 2015 decision, when they talk about Stephenson, they even said, again, this is a process requirement. And it imparts a process --

THE COURT: If you don't follow the process, if you don't follow the process, but the end results are plans
that are compliant with the VHA and the Whole County Provision of the constitution, what is the harm?

MS. KLEIN: So, first of all, the harm there would be the maps. But that is not this case.

THE COURT: No, we're assuming that they didn't follow Stephenson, but we're assuming that the maps comply with the VHA -- pardon me, the VRA and the Whole County Provision, and throw in the one-person-one-vote requirement.

Because you can create a map that complies with those three requirements without following Stephenson. It may take you longer to do it, and it's not what the Supreme Court has said you should do, but you can create a map that satisfies all three of those legislative and constitutional requirements. So, if you do create that map without following Stephenson, what is the harm?

MS. KLEIN: So, the harm there, Your Honor -first of all, I would say that -- I would start by saying, Your Honor, that that is a hypothetical that is not this case here. Plaintiffs have alleged --

THE COURT: I know it's a hypothetical.
MS. KLEIN: Okay.
THE COURT: But we're talking about when you filed the suit, what was hypothetically going to happen with these maps. It was hypothetical that the maps would be enacted. I don't even think it's hypothetical that they
violate the VRA or the whole county requirement. All you've alleged is they violate the procedural requirements of Stephenson.

MS. KLEIN: So, in that case, Your Honor, the declaratory judgment, $I$ believe, would still allow, still allow for judicial intervention, and here's why. It's because the declaratory judgment squarely provides that plaintiffs and parties can come to the court for anticipatory relief, whether or not further -- they have -whether or not further relief could be claimed.

THE COURT: So, what do I do -- what do I do if I grant your preliminary injunction, what do I do with this plan that is -- these plans that have been passed that are presumed to be constitutional under our law because no court has struck them down? What do I do with those plans?

MS. KLEIN: Plaintiffs have not asked for the Court to do anything with them.

THE COURT: No, but I've got to deal with them, because they're plans passed by the legislature that are presumed to be constitutional. And since they're presumed to be constitutional, I mean, do $I$ just let them -- it's almost a pocket veto, is what you're asking me to do with the plans. Just let them remain there, don't -- we're not going to attack the constitutionality or the legality of the plans, don't do anything, but at the same time make them go
back and do new plans.
MS. KLEIN: Respectfully, Your Honor, I think it would be helpful to draw an analogy to this case to a classic contract dispute where the Declaratory Judgment Act also would apply. So, what we're saying in that dispute, where parties have a disagreement as to what is required on an instrument, they come to the court to resolve that disagreement. After that declaratory judgment ruling, the parties can go and act accordingly, and one would hope the parties go and act accordingly to follow what the judge has declared. And that transforms into this case precisely.

Legislative Defendants can take a declaration from this Court, and they can decide to act accordingly. They have not pointed to any reason they couldn't do that. And until the primaries have been elected, that's possible. What they're saying, by presuming we have to also challenge the map, that's like saying you have to bring declaratory judgment and breach of contract at the same time.

And the Declaratory Judgment Act was specifically designed so that parties didn't have to wait for that step. You don't have to bring declaratory judgment and breach of contract at the same time. You can ask for the declaratory judgment, and the parties go back and they act accordingly.

Now, Plaintiffs can also, as other parties have already done, they can also seek further, you know, intervention
from a three-judge panel on the maps. I think we know these maps are problematic, but that's not what Plaintiffs are doing here. They are asking for this Court to provide badly and urgently needed certainty as to what the court required in Stephenson, as to what the state constitution requires.

THE COURT: Again, when we start talking about badly and urgently and we're sitting here almost four months since the criteria was announced, when I hear badly and urgently and see that four-month lapse in time, it makes me wonder how urgent it's needed, if we're going to address in a three-judge panel whether the maps actually comply with the -- or whether that there's proof that they comply or don't comply with the VHA or whether there's permissible or impermissible political gerrymandering.

MS. KLEIN: So here, Your Honor, I think principles of equity really come in, because Plaintiffs relied upon specific statements by the Legislative Defendants that they would consider evidence. They said in committee -- several times, the committee chair said, hey, if anybody has evidence of, you know, VRA requirements, racially polarized voting, if anybody has evidence, you know, we will consider that. And Plaintiffs did that.

Plaintiffs' counsel wrote two letters, one on October 8 th, one again on the 25 th when proposed maps were coming out, saying, this is going to harm votes of color.

There are serious VRA issues with these maps. You have to take a look. And after -- and they repeatedly disregarded those.

And it was only until it became absolutely clear, after Plaintiff Common Cause had provided racially polarized voting analyses, saying this is what's going to happen in these districts that you proposed, when they ignored that, it was, I believe, days after that that we filed the complaint and sought judicial intervention.

THE COURT: So, they've come out with --
MS. KLEIN: It was a last resort.
THE COURT: They've come out with proposed maps, they had come out with the proposed maps, and letters were written saying you've got problems with these maps. Well, wasn't there a violation of Stephenson before they even sent the letters?

MS. KLEIN: Stephenson requires them before setting districts that they do federally -- it says, districts required by the VRA shall be drawn before.

THE COURT: And what --
MS. KLEIN: And during the criteria, during the process, no districts had been drawn yet. And when I say they had proposed maps, this was on the website. They were posting what are called member-proposed maps to a specific place on the website. And those maps were the first

NC NAACP, et al. v. Berger, et al. - Wake County 21-CVS-14476-Volume 1 of 1
indication that they had failed to take the step. They had drawn all of the other districts --

THE COURT: When's the district actually set?
MS. KLEIN: -- before --
A district would actually be set when the map is enacted.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: And it became very clear when they started proposing these maps that they had skipped and they were not going to do the first step of Stephenson. They actually stated affirmatively in committee during this process, this was after -- after, you know, the criteria -this was in October. They stated affirmatively that they had no intention, the committees had no intention of commissioning any needed, you know, racial analysis that would be needed to comply with the VRA.

And it was after that process and it was after it was clear that they had skipped the first step of Stephenson that -- and after many efforts to ask them to undertake that step.

THE COURT: How soon after you filed your lawsuit did they enact the maps?

MS. KLEIN: It was four days after. But prior to that, Your Honor, there was no announced schedule, there was no indication of when those maps would be passed. It could
have extended through Thanksgiving. There was no indication to anyone of how long these maps would take to make their way through. Or, you know, the House map, for example, Your Honor, that was filed on the 28 th, was a placeholder. You know, we have that in the binder of exhibits we provided to the Court.

THE COURT: Let me ask you --
MS. KLEIN: It didn't even have specific lines, it was just a blank placeholder. So, it was not clear how long these maps would take to make their way through the process. If we had to wait until Thanksgiving, Your Honor, it would have been -- you know, if that's when this whole thing had happened and then we had sought to get in front of a court -- you know, it took five weeks for us to get in front of the court. There are natural administrative things that have to happen before getting --

THE COURT: You could have gotten in front of the court within a week on a temporary restraining order.

MS. KLEIN: And there, Your Honor, we would have faced an argument like this one, the other side of this coin. They would have said there's no deadline until December 6th. The primary -- you know, the primaries candidate -- the candidate deadline for the 2020 (sic) election isn't until December 6th, and Plaintiffs have filed this too early, and the legislature can still
decide to do this analysis. If we had -- that's what would have happened if we had filed.

Instead, Your Honor, Plaintiffs came here as a last resort, after many efforts, after many efforts to convince the Legislative Defendants to follow the law. And we asked here to seek minimal -- the minimum relief here that we have requested is just a declaration of what the state constitution requires and time. And the schedule that we've requested, an injunction until May, is the schedule that was followed in the last cycle when the, you know, primaries were classically scheduled in May.

So, Plaintiffs have really made extreme efforts, first of all, to resolve this without the need for court intervention and also to only seek court intervention, again, with time before those deadlines start happening.

But it should be clear that anything is possible until the primary elections happen. Legislative Defendants can -upon a declaration of this Court that they violated their duties, Legislative Defendants can decide to comply. They have forecasted unwillingness to do so, but that doesn't change the fact that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief.

THE COURT: All right. And you've submitted a number of affidavits in support of your motion; is that correct?

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Your motion was filed and served on October 29th, the day the complaint was filed?

MS. KLEIN: That's correct.
THE COURT: And the affidavits were served on November 5th; is that correct?

MS. KLEIN: Shortly after. And they were served with a copy of the motion. They were served with a copy of the motion.

THE COURT: All right. But the initial motion was served on October 29th?

MS. KLEIN: That's correct.
THE COURT: Is that in compliance with Rule 6(d)?
MS. KLEIN: So, I understand it to be, and this is why, Your Honor. So, that rule provides -- the North Carolina rules provide that Legislative Defendants have to have notice of a motion five days -- more than five days before that hearing. And here, there was much more. There was many, many weeks of notice.

And that rule, Your Honor, I believe, only requires that the affidavits be served with a copy of the motion. And I'm not aware that Legislative Defendants have objected to that.

THE COURT: And Mr. Bartlett's affidavit, even though he signed it on November 3 of 2021, it appears that he swore to it on January 20th of 2021. I'm not sure how
that happens. Is that a typo?
MS. KLEIN: Oh, Your Honor, that is a typo. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: So, when was he sworn to that?
MS. KLEIN: He swore to that on the 3rd or the 4th. I'm happy to have us submit --

THE COURT: That's all right.
MS. KLEIN: Very, very promptly we can submit a corrected --

THE COURT: I will consider the affidavit, understanding that it's a typo. And on your --

MS. KLEIN: Oh, Your Honor, I'm sorry. It says executed November 3rd at the top of that page. So that is -- that is just the notary public. And the notary public -- that's just for the notary public's affirmation.

THE COURT: Well, you can't swear someone to something in January of 2021 when $I$ don't think the census data was out then.

MS. KLEIN: Yeah. I'm sorry for that --
THE COURT: So that would be November 3rd?
MS. KLEIN: -- but it is November 3rd, and it says that. I apologize, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
MS. KLEIN: So, would it be helpful for the Court if I walked through more of the exhibits here, including the
affidavits? I'd like to actually direct the Court's attention to the letters --

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: -- that I had. That's in the index of exhibits, Your Honor, starting with Exhibit M, Tab M. These are the letters that were written by Plaintiffs' counsel first. And N and then 0 is the racially polarized voting study that was submitted to Legislative Defendants. That was submitted to Legislative Defendants as a final plea to get them to comply with Stephenson.

And as we've discussed, Your Honor, Stephenson requires -- it requires that legislators follow a particular process. And it does this in language that said that districts required by the VRA shall be formed prior to all others. That temporal language, Your Honor, mandates a specific process. As we've described, the Legislative Defendants not only failed to do this, but the criteria that they imposed prevented other members from complying with this.

In addition to the race-blind criteria that we've discussed, Your Honor, the Legislative Defendants also required other legislators to use specific templates for their maps. These templates are called county clusters or county groupings, and they were devised by a set of Duke professors doing a -- following a mathematical algorithm,
and that was reflected in a paper that Legislative Defendants referred to.

But, importantly, Your Honor, that paper -- those professors admitted, clearly on the first page of that paper, this paper does not consider the first step of Stephenson. This paper does not. So, by requiring all members to use these template maps, Your Honor, the Legislative Defendants effectively prevented anyone from drawing districts required by the VRA first. They required everyone to skip that first step of Stephenson.

Each of these steps was done intentionally and knowingly by the Legislative Defendants. They were warned several times not just by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel, they were also warned by their fellow legislators who, in committee, time after time, asked them, how are we going to comply with Stephenson if we are prohibited from using racial data?

And what did they do after all of this, Your Honor? As we have seen and as we've discussed, they didn't take heed of any of those warnings, and after the filing of this complaint, they rushed to enact the final maps. And all of the harm -- importantly, all of the harm that Plaintiffs forecast are included in those final maps. In other words, this case is not mooted by the final maps, because the harm that Plaintiffs have alleged still remains.

THE COURT: Well, there was no harm until the final maps were enacted.

MS. KLEIN: The harm that Plaintiffs have forecasted, Your Honor, that will occur when the elections occur is still -- is still possible with the -- they have not resolved that issue. They have not mooted this case by resolving the issues and making the controversy go away.

In other words, a declaration of this Court would have a very practical effect. A declaration of this Court would provide the certainty to the parties as to what Stephenson requires, there's an act of controversy of that, and the additional relief, which the declaratory judgment specifically provides for. It says, any additional relief as necessary and proper. And Plaintiffs have asked here for time. They have asked for a two-month delay in the primaries set to a schedule they have historically taken, set to a schedule that the state board actually requested back in February, a two-month delay in primaries to allow the parties to act upon that declaration of the Court.

That means Legislative Defendants can decide what they're going to do, and it means that, if needed, Plaintiffs can further pursue their rights. Plaintiffs -in addition to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Your Honor, Plaintiffs have also brought claims that Legislative Defendants have violated their rights under equal protection
and freedom of assembly, and that Legislative Defendants have done this by intentionally acting. They made this intentional decision to act and skip the first step of Stephenson in a way that will dilute the votes of individual plaintiffs.

THE COURT: But to the extent that there is the violation of those rights, that violation does not occur until the maps are actually enacted. We can talk all we want about what we're going to do, we can tell everybody what our plan is going to do, but nothing really matters until the plan is executed.

MS. KLEIN: When the -- yes, when the --
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. KLEIN: -- people have to vote under these maps, there will be irreparable harm. There's no take-back of votes, can't do over.

But the harm I would say to the -- the declaratory judgment is here to provide certainty. That act of controversy remains. Legislative Defendants haven't said they agree with Plaintiffs, and they haven't otherwise acted in a way that would resolve that uncertainty at all. In fact, that certainty risks to haunt not just this cycle, but, you know, it risks to haunt future cycles if it's not clear that mandates from the state supreme court need be followed.

THE COURT: The purpose of Stephenson was what, to harmonize the provisions of the North Carolina Constitution regarding the whole county requirement and the VHA?

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: VRA. The plaintiffs in that case contended -- one party contended you could do it, and one party said that the Whole County Provisions of the constitution were violated. It basically violated the constitution because the constitution incorporates the U.S. Constitution and federal law, and Chief Justice Lake said the constitution cannot violate the constitution. And so they harmonized.

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And the whole purpose was to determine how you can -- I mean, the focus of Stephenson was not necessarily the VRA, the focus of Stephenson was how do you implement the Whole County Provision requirements of the constitution in light of the mandate of the VRA.

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor. And that's why it's important that the Court specify that the first step is federal law. And that's when counties are to be drawn. First, you must draw districts. Sorry, when districts are to be drawn, Your Honor, you must first take steps to ascertain what is required by the VRA. It did not
say, you know, districts that legislators assume were or want to draw because of the VRA, it said required by the VRA, which requires them to ascertain --

THE COURT: But federal law doesn't require you to draft them first. All federal law requires is that you comply with the VRA. You could draw your maps, and after the maps are initially drawn, you can go back and do a VRA analysis to ensure that the maps comply with the VRA, and then massage them to comply with the VRA, so long as you still -- or comply with the whole county requirement, but making sure they comply with the VRA.

MS. KLEIN: That might be true under federal law, but state legislative redistricting is commanded by our state's constitution. It incorporates federal laws and express provisions, but the mandate that they had is under this state's constitution, and the issue before the Court is a matter of state constitutional law.

THE COURT: Well, what Chief Justice Lake was doing was giving a procedure whereby that the courts -- it basically provided a safe harbor. Here's how you make sure you comply with the Whole County Provision. If you follow this procedure, you're going to be fine. I don't know, I guess they didn't do it, and that's why we have Stephenson II.

MS. KLEIN: That's correct, Your Honor. And the
court further confirmed this reading of Stephenson as requiring -- saying the state constitution requires certain procedures in Dickson v. Rucho, where it said, you know, specifically, this is the procedure that we outlined. This is the procedure that must be followed.

And the record reflects, the evidence shows that not only did Legislative Defendants fail to do that, but they effectively prevented any member from -- any member from doing this, and they -- as a result, they completely were derelict in their duty to follow the first step of Stephenson.

THE COURT: Let's say I grant your relief. When do you plan on attacking the validity of the maps that have been passed?

MS. KLEIN: I don't know that that has been determined yet.

THE COURT: Well, you've had -- you've had 30 days to figure that out. I mean, because that's -- that's a key issue, because those maps are presumed constitutional at this point.

MS. KLEIN: Honestly, Your Honor, that's going to depend on whether the Legislative Defendants indicate they're going to follow a declaration of this Court. They went so far in their brief as to call a declaration of this Court an advisory, a lobbyist 's opinion. And we strongly
disagree with that. The judiciary has the sole responsibility of declaring what the state constitution requires and how it should be applied. And we would hope, Your Honor, that a declaration of this Court, a declaration of this Court would cause Legislative Defendants to change their course of action.

Now, as other -- as others have observed, there may and probably are additional issues with these maps. And I don't want to come here before you to say that Plaintiffs aren't also concerned with those issues, but as it pertains to the case as it's been filed, Your Honor, as it's been filed here, Plaintiffs would hope that Legislative Defendants would follow a declaration of this Court.

THE COURT: In the case of Parker v. Raleigh Savings Bank, that was a case where the parties came before the Supreme Court asking the court to determine whether said bonds -- whether certain bonds and coupons were subject to taxation when they constituted part of the surplus at the bank. And the Supreme Court noted that decision ultimately rests with the state Corporation Commission. And only until the body authorized by statute, the sole body authorized by statute, makes that decision can the court actually give a declaratory judgment of whether -- whether the bonds can be, because the decision is first up to that legislatively created body to make a decision.

So, our constitution gives first crack at redistricting maps to the legislature. And the undisputed juris prudence, not only in this state, in this country, is that after that, they are going to be subject to judicial review.

Are you aware of any case in the United States where something like we're in the procedural posture -- that was in the procedural posture where we are here, where the process was attacked and not the maps and the court entered an injunction?

MS. KLEIN: So, Your Honor, first, I would say I'm not specifically aware of a specific case, but I am aware of several instances in which this -- the Supreme Court of this state has explicitly required certain procedures of the legislature in order to follow requirements of the state constitutional law. That is very well established, and we cite to several of those cases, such as Hoke. And, actually, Legislative Defendants cite to two other cases in which the courts did that.

THE COURT: Here's the Court's concern. Anytime anyone wants to raise an issue that the legislature is not following proper procedure, which is -- this Court will see an onslaught of suits asking us to determine what is the proper procedure for the legislature to follow in order to carry out their constitutional and statutory mandate.

MS. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Thanks for
that clarification. I understand the Court's concern. I think that's -- that concern is not -- would -- that concern would not be implicated here for a couple reasons. First of all, the procedural requirement in Stephenson is very clear as to what's required. So, this isn't --

THE COURT: Then why do you need a declaration from this Court if it's so clear?

MS. KLEIN: Because they have failed to follow it. They've taken a contrary view of that.

THE COURT: Then what you do -- I mean, the law is clear as to what they're supposed to follow under Stephenson. When they enact the maps, you file a lawsuit and say they didn't comply with what this Court has already declared is the proper procedure.

MS. KLEIN: And the declaratory judgment -- and if we had done that, if this had taken until Thanksgiving, they would have been here in court arguing that it's too late, that the candidate filing's on December 6 th and that there's no chance. If Plaintiffs had waited -- and this creates -- that would create a loophole, an incredible loophole to the -- and narrowing of the state's --

THE COURT: I couldn't --
MS. KLEIN: -- important role --
THE COURT: -- guarantee you a court sitting in equity is not going to consider a loophole like that. I
mean, these are extremely important questions that affect all members of this state. And the fact -- I mean, we're having a hearing on Friday in a three-judge panel, and we have to make a decision before Monday.

I mean, this Court -- courts are asked all the time to make decisions in a very quick manner. Sometimes it doesn't look like we do, but we are faced with that very task. A three-judge panel is on Friday, and we will not shirk our duties. And we won't -- you know, the fact that -- I mean, there are so many factors that have led this to be where we are now, as opposed to other years that, you know, it's -it can't be -- once the maps were passed, Plaintiffs have to examine those maps to determine whether they meet Gingles first, at least the three -- you know, whether they meet Stephenson, whether they meet the first three criteria of Gingles, and that takes time, and the courts understand that.

And so, the fact that we are here today less than a week before the primary, or the filing period, and the fact that on Friday we will be less than a business day away from the filing period, I do not believe is determinative of the legal issue. The legal issue is whether the plaintiffs in that case can prove or can prove a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and then whether, at that point, injunctive relief is required to protect the status quo.

And I don't think the Court's going to say, well, since this is going Monday, we're just going to automatically go and let it go. That's not the analysis the Court goes through or will go through, I can assure you of that.

MS. KLEIN: And I feel very assured and thankful for that fact and very thankful for the Court's time today as well.

And I would say two things. If the Court -- as the Court rightly observed, it takes time to consider those enacted maps. And, here, if the Court were to take the position that the process -- and this would be contrary to Stephenson v. Bartlett's express language, but if the Court were to take the position that in redistricting, it cannot look to process, then that would be an unprecedented narrowing of the Court's important role in redistricting to protect voters' rights.

In other words, this whole -- this whole issue that you've just raised, Your Honor, begs the question of why Legislative Defendants didn't do as the state board requested in February, knowing about the census delay and moving the primaries back to where they have been in prior years. That was a specific request by the executive director that was not followed, and, instead, they drew out the process and only rushed to enact the maps, quite frankly, after this case was filed.

Stephenson specifically addresses what Your Honor raised in your initial question, saying that although the respective state legislators maintain primary responsibility for redistricting and reapportionment of legislative districts, such procedures must comport with federal law. Stephenson said such procedures must comport with federal law, and then it provided the procedure that must be followed.

And in that procedure, going back this case, back to that language, it said VRA -- districts required by the VRA must be formed prior to it. It used temporal language. And the "required by the VRA" is important, Your Honor, because that requires them to ascertain what the VRA requires. That's exactly what they failed and adamantly refused to do in this case. They skipped that entire step entirely.

THE COURT: Process is important. The ultimate result is more important, because that's ultimately what the process is designed, and here you're not attacking the ultimate result, at least yet.

Anything further?
MS. KLEIN: If Your Honor will give me indulgence of just one minute.
(Pause in proceedings.)
MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, I have nothing further at this moment. Thank you so much.

THE COURT: We're going to take -- we're going to be in recess until 11:30.

THE BAILIFF: Court's in recess until 11:30. (A recess was taken from 11:22 a.m. to 11:33 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from the plaintiffs. Pardon me, defendants. I'll hear from the Legislative Defendants first.

MR. STRACH: Thank you, Your Honor. Phil Strach for the Legislative Defendants. I just want to make a few points, Your Honor.

I think when we're talking about what Stephenson did or didn't do, the Plaintiffs, I think, are conflating two issues. Stephenson set up a set of rules, the Court referenced them as a safe harbor, which I think is correct, for complying with the Whole County Provision. Those rules go to how you actually construct districts, how do you actually go in and construct the districts. Those are not -- those are different, distinguishable from the legislative process itself.

The constitution doesn't speak to that, except by saying bills have to be read in each house three times before they can be enacted. But constructing districts, having rules and following rules for constructing districts is one thing; the legislative process is another. I think
the Plaintiffs were conflating those two issues and thinking that Stephenson said that there's some part of the legislative process that's impacted by Stephenson.

And I think particularly when it comes to the VRA, Stephenson itself says, "Interpretation of the federal limitations upon the redistricting process is unnecessary to the resolution of the instant case." So the court made it pretty clear, we're not speaking to that. They also acknowledge that the VRA does not command a state to adopt any particular legislative reapportionment.

THE COURT: But does it command a legislature that's redistricting to assess whether the new districts it contemplates are in compliance with the VRA?

MR. STRACH: Section 2 of the VRA does not.
THE COURT: But Cooper v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court case, does, doesn't it?

MR. STRACH: No.
THE COURT: "True enough, a legislature undertaking a redistricting case must assess whether the new districts it contemplates, not the old one it sheds, conform to the VRA requirements." That's coming right out of Cooper v. Harris. So, tell me why -- why -- well, let me ask this.

The VRA is not a safe harbor for using -- it was not enacted as a safe harbor for using racial criteria in
redistricting, was it?
MR. STRACH: No. Because if you use it in the wrong way, and that line is not clear, you might violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.

THE COURT: And, in fact, it was enacted to protect the dilution of the minority vote.

MR. STRACH: Correct.
THE COURT: And is there not a duty on the legislative body to comply with the VRA?

MR. STRACH: They have to comply with it because it's federal law. They don't have to undertake some sort of analysis to assess whether they're complying with it. That's not an affirmative command. The court is simply saying, look, if you don't want your map struck down because of VRA issues, then you might want to look at this. And it does not say you have to undertake any particular kind of analysis to do that.

Now, under Section 5 of the VRA, which was in effect when -- in the 2011 round of redistricting, the burden was on the legislature to demonstrate that the plan did not cause any retrogression of minority rights. So, in that case, the legislature certainly did have to examine racial issues on the front end to be able to meet their burden of proof, but that's not the case under VRA Section 2.

THE COURT: So, there's an obligation on the
legislature to comply with Section 2 ?
MR. STRACH: There is.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. STRACH: And we believe they have.
THE COURT: And, so, how do you do that without looking at race?

MR. STRACH: Well, Your Honor, once the districts are drawn, then the legislators can look at those districts and racial data, obviously, becomes known. People post it out there. And one can look at that and say, huh, do we have any issues here? No, don't think we do.

THE COURT: Does the census data not inform you of race in districts?

MR. STRACH: So, the legislature, in drawing the districts, did not use the racial demographic data provided by the census.

THE COURT: I understand that. But you don't have to wait for people to post it, do you? Can't you get racial data after you draw your districts from the census?

MR. STRACH: How the legislature chooses to do any sort of back-end analysis is not dictated by anything. You could certainly get the census data if you wanted to. You could wait for it to get posted on Dave's Redistricting App. There's lots of ways you could do it.

THE COURT: Well, why is it doing a back-end
analysis when Stephenson seems to state that you need to create -- I don't know how you create a VRA district first without considering racial data.

MR. STRACH: Right. We don't believe that that's what Stephenson requires. Even the Covington court dropped a footnote acknowledging that it was unclear whether what Stephenson required was to draw VRA districts first in time, like literally chronologically, or just first in priority in the sense that federal law supersedes the state law.

And, so, we believe that the map that was enacted by the legislature does comply with Section 2 of the VRA, and I think it's notable that no one -- of all the lawsuits that have been filed, no one has said that the map violates the Voting Rights Act. So, no one's come forward with any evidence whatsoever that says we're wrong that our maps comply with the Voting Rights Act.

So, we did comply with Stephenson. What the legislature did conclude was there were no, quote, required VRA districts. Even if you -- even if you say that Stephenson requires VRA districts to be drawn first chronologically, it only speaks to districts that are required by the VRA. And we've taken the position in this litigation and in the legislative process that VRA districts were not required because of the long litigation history that preceded this redistricting.

THE COURT: And that long litigation history dealt with data from the 2010 census, not the 2020 census, correct?

MR. STRACH: It did. But there's an order as recent as 2020 that examined districts drawn in 2019, using the 2010 data, of course.

THE COURT: Okay. But there's been -- the 2020 census takes into account immigration and migration to and from North Carolina, correct?

MR. STRACH: Correct.
THE COURT: And logic would tell me that because we had -- we have one new congressional district, we have more people coming to this state than leaving the state.

MR. STRACH: Correct.
THE COURT: And, so, shouldn't we know where those people are going and what their racial makeup is in order to be VHA compliant?

MR. STRACH: There's no requirement that we inform ourselves of that data to comply with the VRA. And we believe the maps do comply with the VRA, and no one has said otherwise to date.

THE COURT: So, what you're telling me is you all threw -- someone threw a dart and it hit the intended target even though they had a blindfold on, and it just -and because of that, it complies?

MR. STRACH: Well, Your Honor, in 2019, we drew legislative maps, in part, using a lottery machine. So, yeah, I mean, that happens. And what I --

THE COURT: You know, a blind squirrel finds a nut every now and then.

MR. STRACH: Exactly. Exactly. So, yes, we believe that the maps are VRA compliant. And if the Court tells us otherwise, we'll modify them.

THE COURT: And what analysis has been done to determine whether they're VRA compliant?

MR. STRACH: There's been no formal -- there's been no -- the legislature hasn't had a hearing or done anything like that. They're not required to.

THE COURT: Explain to me the relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 of the VRA.

MR. STRACH: So, they're really two sides of the same coin, because VRA Section 5 put the burden of proof on the legislature to show that their redistricting plan did not retrogress the voting rights of minority voters. So, in order to comply with that, the legislature had to go to DOJ and say, hey, we've looked at the racial data, here's why we did not retrogress, engage in retrogression.

Under VRA Section 2, the burden of proof is on any plaintiff who believes that the map dilutes the votes of minority voters or intentionally violates the VRA to go to
court, and the burden of proof is on them to examine the racial data themselves and make a claim and prove a claim that the maps violate the VRA. And that's where the Gingles preconditions come into play and all that.

So, they're actually very different. And, of course, Section 5 is not operative right now. And, so, the burden of proof would be on any group of plaintiffs that say the current maps violate the VRA, dilute the votes of minority voters. They would need to get the census demographic data, they would have to prove the three Gingles preconditions and make their case in court.

THE COURT: So, there's no burden or duty of any kind of the state legislature to comply with the VRA?

MR. STRACH: Well, the map has to be compliant, otherwise it could be enjoined. There's no affirmative duty on the legislature to engage in any particular process to get to a compliant VRA map.

THE COURT: But is there an affirmative duty to have a VRA compliant map?

MR. STRACH: I don't know if I would describe it that way. The map has to comply with the VRA or it could be enjoined, is the way $I$ would describe it.

Your Honor, I have another topic to go to, but I'll wait if the Court has any other questions on this particular topic.

THE COURT: All right. Under Stephenson v. Bartlett, the court stated, "Section 2 of the VRA generally provides that states or their political subdivisions may not impose any voting qualification or prerequisite that impairs or dilutes, on account of race or color, a citizen's opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of his or her choice"; is that correct?

MR. STRACH: That's what the VRA says, correct.
THE COURT: So, it places the prohibition on the state. It prohibits the state from doing certain things that cause certain harms to -- well, on account of someone's race or color.

MR. STRACH: On pain of being enjoined. It doesn't require an affirmative process, but it's correct that if the map -- if it dilutes the votes of minority voters, then it could be enjoined under the VRA.

THE COURT: All right. Go on to your next topic.
MR. STRACH: All right, Your Honor. I just wanted to briefly address the Declaratory Judgment Act that points -- that counsel was raising an analogy about a breach of contract case. And I just wanted to point out that if you thought the contract was going to be breached and you file a dec action to have the court address that, if the contract was then breached, obviously, what you would do is
amend the complaint and allege a breach of the contract and have the court address the breach of contract.

Effectively, that's the posture of this case. The maps have been passed. They've been enacted. And, frankly, surprisingly to me, the Plaintiffs have made no move to amend their complaint and actually attack the maps, which would then flesh out all these issues, these VRA issues, because there would actually be evidence and data to look at.

So, without an amended complaint -- and it's -- to me, it's just seems to be a strange procedure to say a single judge should make a declaration, but then nothing could be done with the map unless it's actually enjoined, and that would have to be done later by a three-judge panel. So, it would seem to -- it would seem to just further delay things and create a very unusual posture for a case like this.

So, to the extent that the theory is it's an anticipatory breach, then there's already been an alleged breach, and so, a request should have been made of the Court to amend the complaint actually seeking injunction.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
MR. STRACH: No, Your Honor. We are -- we think for the reasons we've briefed and the reasons that have been discussed here today, the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, I didn't know if the Court wanted to hear from the State Defendants first -THE COURT: Sure.

MS. KLEIN: -- or Plaintiffs. If I may, just a few points in rebuttal, Your Honor. And the first is that the interpretation that my colleague has put forward is contravened by the Supreme Court of North Carolina itself.

In Dickson v. Rucho -- I have that decision, I can hand it to the parties and to the Court -- the court specifically said the process established by this court in Stephenson and its progeny requires that, in establishing legislative districts, the General Assembly first must create all necessary VRA districts.

There's nothing in there about safe harbor, doing the analysis later. There's nothing. And I don't think -- they have not cited any case, from the Supreme Court or otherwise, that adopts that interpretation. Adopting their view of Stephenson, Your Honor, would render Stephenson advisory and dicta. That's not what was intended, and that would have disastrous results. It would be a narrowing of this -- the court's, the judiciary's role in stating what the state constitution requires.

And I'm happy to hand that opinion up to the Court and the other parties with the highlighted section if that would be helpful --

THE COURT: That would be fine.
MS. KLEIN: -- for the Court. May I approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. KLEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Second, Your Honor, I'd like to -- my colleague, Ms. Riggs, rightly reminded me that the Court asked about the unique procedural posture of this and a concern that this would create ripple effects of allowing people to inject themselves in the legislative process, and I was rightly reminded that in all prior redistricting cycles, there was preclearance. And, in fact, in preclearance, while parties were seeking preclearance, before the maps could be finalized, while they were seeking preclearance, litigants did, courts did consider VRA requirements.

In other words, just like this case, courts did peer into what the VRA would require. And I can give a specific citation. For example, in the Perez v. Perry case, this is out of the Western District of Texas, that's 891 F.Supp. 2d, 2012, in that matter -- in that matter -- thank you. In that matter, Your Honor, the court did, while also considering issues of preclearance, took evidence on Section 2 compliance. Now, we no longer have preclearance, but the courts weighing in at this stage is not unprecedented, and I wanted to make sure the Court understood that.

THE COURT: But you're asking -- your lawsuit was essentially asking for preclearance or seeking pre-non-clearance. Instead of the defendant seeking preclearance, you're seeking pre-denial of something that --

MS. KLEIN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- has not been enacted. In preclearance, do they enact the maps and then go get clearance?

MS. KLEIN: That was how it worked.
THE COURT: Okay. So, even preclearance required maps to be enacted before the Department of Justice would look at it. And then if no one -- if someone was displeased with how the Department of Justice saw it, it would go to court?

MS. KLEIN: Your Honor, it would -- the preclearance required them to get an affirmative approval, either from a district court or a declaratory -- from the district court or from the DOJ. And further issues could still be litigated after that, and certainly were.

But that actually leads into the third point I wanted to make, Your Honor, which is this is not a Section 2 case. It is not incumbent upon Plaintiffs as an element of any of their claims to plead the Gingles requirements, these preconditions. This is not a Section 2 case. This is about their obligations to follow our state constitution's law, as
stated in Stephenson by the highest court of this land, to ascertain what the VRA requires first. And this case is rooted in state constitutional law.

And as the Court just heard, Legislative Defendants can't affirmatively say -- they can't affirmatively say no VRA districts are required. They can't affirmatively say they did that step. They made a legal assumption. They have made a legal assumption based on past cases. They've made a legal assumption on their erroneous reading of Stephenson. And I think that exchange highlights why the declaratory relief in this case is so needed to relieve that uncertainty.

THE COURT: All right. So, if a legislature departs from Stephenson, the process set forth in Stephenson, and draws maps that are compliant with the VHA, the Whole County Provision of the constitution, does someone have a right to come and challenge the process and then ask the legislature to go back and follow that process and draw maps?

MS. KLEIN: Not necessarily. And that's different from this, because Plaintiffs have alleged harm. Plaintiffs not only in those letters told all -- told the Legislative Defendants of the harm, but they've alleged harm in the claim. And for the purpose of the motion to dismiss and the complaint, Your Honor, those allegations are assumed
true.
The Plaintiffs have alleged vote dilution. They actually provided proof in Exhibit 0, that's the letter sent by Common Cause, of racially polarized voting. They sent proof that voters of color were going to be denied their ability to elect candidates of choice, and the Legislative Defendants ignored it despite --

THE COURT: If the maps were passed.
MS. KLEIN: Yeah. And the Legislative Defendants -- so, here, this case, the process matters. And this case shows why. The process in Stephenson matters. And courts in other matters have looked in and -- looked in and said, during the legislative process, did the legislature comply with notice requirements? Did the legislature comply with notice requirements for public hearings? There are a host of procedural requirements from the state constitution.

The right to instruct has these requirements. That's the Common Cause v. Forest case that they have cited to. In that case, the court explicitly said, we're going to look at what process the state constitution requires, that includes notice, that includes ability of the public to actually instruct their members while in session. And they stated affirmatively that's what the constitution requires. They didn't decline -- they didn't step back and decline

NC NAACP, et al. v. Berger, et al. - Wake County 21-CVS-14476-Volume 1 of 1
entirely. That's what Legislative Defendants are asking you to do here.

THE COURT: All right. Anything more from the Legislative Defendants?

MR. STRACH: No, Your Honor.
MR. STEED: Your Honor, from the State Defendants, I would only add that we've briefed the reasons why we agree that the point is moot at this point. We've also laid out the administrative concerns in our briefing. And if Your Honor would like to hear about them, I'm prepared to answer any questions.

THE COURT: That's all right. I have read your brief.

MR. STEED: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I have a motion for permission to file an amicus brief, which $I$ will grant. Although, it doesn't really address the issues before the Court. It's probably more suited for the North Carolina League of Conservation Voters case, but I will -- at least for purposes of this hearing, I've read it, I'll grant the motion and accept the brief.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm glad to provide a copy if you care for one.

THE COURT: I've got a copy already.
All right. We're going to take a 15 -minute recess.

THE BAILIFF: Court's in recess 15 minutes. (A recess was taken from 11:55 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. As to the preliminary injunction requiring Plaintiffs to go back and follow the process set out in Stephenson I, the Court finds that's essentially asking this Court to undo what has already been done without attacking the validity of the maps. And under the longstanding case law of this state, asking the Court to undo what has already been done does not form the basis for preliminary injunction, because the issue is moot, and the Court denies a preliminary injunction as to that issue.

As to a preliminary injunction delaying the filing period and the primary, as long as the maps have not been declared unconstitutional or violative of federal law, there's no harm to address in this case, and, therefore, the motion for preliminary injunction as it relates to delaying the filing period or primary is denied in this case.

The Court is going to dismiss the action as moot and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as it essentially asks the Court to interfere with the process of the General Assembly prior to the completion of that process, which would violate the principle of separation of power. Certainly, once the process is complete, the Court can pass upon the end result of that process.

NC NAACP, et al. v. Berger, et al. - Wake County 21-CVS-14476-Volume 1 of 1

Nothing I have said, nor should this order be construed as any opinion of the Court on the constitutionality or validity of the maps that have been passed. This is a very narrow issue, and it is not in any way reflective of whatever opinion I may hold or I may form as to what will be presented to the Court on the three-judge panel that will occur this Friday.

We will draft an order, and once the order is drafted, we will have it filed. Court will be in recess.

THE BAILIFF: Court's in recess.
(Proceedings concluded at 12:18 p.m.)

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings taken the November 30, 2021, Session of Wake County Superior Court is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings as reported by me and transcribed by me or under my supervision. I further certify that I am not related to any party or attorney, nor do I have any interest whatsoever in the outcome of this action.

This, the 2nd day of December, 2021.
sounum. oantochol
Dawn M. Dantschisch, RMR, CRR, CRC
Official Court Reporter
Tenth Judicial District (919) 792-5202

Dawn.M.Dantschisch@nccourts.org

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
21 CVS 015426

## NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF

CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC., et al.,
REBECCA HARPER, et al.,
COMMON CAUSE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.

## Defendants.

## AFFIDAVIT OF TYLER DAYE

I, Tyler Daye, swear under penalty of perjury that the following information is true to the best of my knowledge and state as follows:

## Background and Experience

1. I am over the age of 18 years old and am competent to give this affidavit.
2. I work at Common Cause North Carolina, where I serve as the Redistricting Community Engagement Specialist. I started in this role in May 2021. Before starting at Common Cause, I worked extensively in different democracy advocacy organizations as a community advocate since graduating with a degree in Political Science and Sociology from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in May 2017. I worked on a wide variety of issues in these roles, with a particular focus on redistricting.
3. In my work at Common Cause as the Redistricting Community Engagement Specialist, I have been responsible for working with other Common Cause staff to conduct redistricting outreach and education workshops to help community members participate in the redistricting process, as well as helping to monitor the North Carolina General Assembly's 2021 redistricting process. I also work to engage community groups and elected officials in the redistricting process, research and identify state-level trends in redistricting, and help coalition partners conduct their own trainings on the redistricting process.
4. I have completed several trainings on redistricting and using map-drawing applications. In May 2020, I attended the CROWD Academy Redistricting School, where I learned how to analyze and draw maps in Dave's Redistricting App (DRA), ${ }^{1}$ a free online web application that allows anyone to simulate redistricting congressional and legislative districts. ${ }^{2}$ This training was non-partisan and intended to educate members of the public about the redistricting process. This training taught me about the redistricting process and provided me with the technical skills necessary to understand how lines are drawn during redistricting. I also received training in June 2021 on using Districtr, ${ }^{3}$ another free, public web tool for districting and identifying communities of interest. This training was also non-partisan and geared toward teaching individuals how to identify and map communities of shared interest.

## Redistricting Process in 2021

5. During the General Assembly's 2021 statewide redistricting process, I was part of the Common Cause team monitoring state legislative map drawing. I observed many hearings and meetings in person and by watching the General Assembly's live-stream and/or on the NCGA redistricting YouTube channel, where all of the live-streamed videos were uploaded afterwards. In particular, when the House and Senate redistricting committees first met in August 2021, I monitored the meetings and observed what was discussed while the committees determined the structure of this year's redistricting process. During the public hearings in September 2021, my colleagues at Common Cause and I live-streamed several of the hearings on Common Cause NC's Facebook page. We did this because the legislature did not offer live streams of the hearings held before the maps were drawn. Many people expressed appreciation to us for doing this. Recorded videos of the hearings were made available on the NCGA's redistricting YouTube channel only after the hearings had taken place. I attended the hearings held in Forsyth County on September 14, 2021, Durham County on September 15, 2021, and Alamance County on September 16, 2021. I spoke at the public hearing held in Alamance County, where I urged legislators to prioritize keeping communities together as they drew the maps. When legislators started drawing maps in October 2021, I closely monitored the redistricting live-streams made available on ncleg.gov and on the NCGA YouTube redistricting channel. During my observations of the livestreams and YouTube videos, I tracked the maps being drawn, who was drawing the maps, and the possible impacts of the maps on communities throughout the state to the best of my ability. I also worked to facilitate public education regarding the process.
6. On October 5, 2021, the House and Senate Chairs of the Redistricting Committees announced in their respective Committee meetings that they would be making computer stations available to legislators to draw maps starting the following morning, with four stations available to the House (in Room 643 of the Legislative Office Building) and the Senate (in Room 544 of the Legislative Office Building) each. These stations were open

[^10]during business hours, and it was announced that the screens of the station computers and the overall rooms would be live-streamed while the stations were open.
7. I encountered several aspects of the Chairs' map-drawing process that made it very difficult for me and my colleagues at Common Cause to actually monitor that process.
8. First, there was no public announcement of how long the map-drawingprocess would extend for, so we did not know how long the live-streams would continue. Overall, from October 6 going forward, there were at least 10 streams (one for each station, and one of the whole room in each chamber) to monitor for approximately 40 hours per week, with no way to know exactly when legislators would decide to come draw maps. There was no notice as to when a legislator or legislators would physically be in the room drawing, just when the stations would be available generally.
9. At least one time (that I am aware of), legislators drew maps during times that were not properly noticed beforehand. On the morning of October 28, I checked the NCGA calendar and did not see a meeting scheduled for the Senate redistricting committee. I only saw a committee meeting scheduled in the House. Later in the evening of October 28, while looking at past video live-streams I came across a video labeled "2021-10-28 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)," available at https://youtu.be/ID z9TjlXTQ?t=970. This video had been streamed earlier in the day from the Senate Committee map-drawing room at Station 4. The feed begins at timestamp 16:11 (1:34pm), indicating that, unlike other videos which generally extended 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM, the livestream of this station began around 1:19 PM and extended less than an hour and a half. At timestamp 16:56, Senator Hise directed the staff member who was assisting him to "switch the pods" for Senate Districts 1 and 3 in the map. Based on my monitoring of the process, I believe Senator Hise was referring to switching between the county grouping options for the northeast part of the state between the county groupings for "Z1" and "Y1" illustrated in Duke_Senate 03 to those illustrated in Duke_Senate 04. ${ }^{4}$ At timestamp 19:25, Senator Hise told the staff member, "We've not decided which will be filed but we want to be prepared to file either one." The next day, I checked the NCGA's legislative calendar again and it showed a Senate redistricting map drawing had been scheduled for 1:30 PM on October 28. I am not sure when exactly this was posted on the NCGA website, but I did not see it when I had checked earlier in the morning of October 28, 2021.
10. In addition to this issue, every terminal had long periods where no one was using it, but given the lack of any reliable means of knowing in advance when these periods of inactivity would occur or how long they would last, my colleague and I were forced to monitor all 10 video feeds simultaneously. Some days, while I watched the NCLEG live-stream and the NCGA YouTube channel, there were multiple people in the room, drawing for hours at a time; other days I saw virtually no use of the terminals. Given the sheer number of video feeds to monitor simultaneously, our team at Common Cause split up the task. I assumed primary responsibility for monitoring the Senate. I also spent time monitoring the House. Our team at Common Cause worked together to ensure coverage over both legislative chambers. We

[^11]found it necessary to split up video monitoring in order to effectively monitor all 8 different map-drawing stations (4 in the House, 4 in the Senate) at which legislators could be drawing at any time. To keep track of who was drawing the districts, I usually kept two displays open: one showing the station camera (with just the screen of the map-drawing station) that I was focusing on, and the other to show the wide camera view of the room, allowing me to see the actual people who were standing at the map-drawing stations. I felt this was necessary because the NCLEG live-stream did not provide any close camera view of the people at each individual map-drawing station - or any other way to identify map-drawers. My use of dual displays also helped me keep track as legislators came and went out of the map-drawing room.
11. After extensive observation of the NCLEG live-stream and NCGA YouTube channel, I have identified the periods during which certain maps were drawn that were eventually enacted, as described below. This was incredibly time-consuming, as there are a total of 213 "mapdrawing" videos posted on the ncleg.gov website, ${ }^{5}$ each with a varying amount of footage, but many of which contain eight hours or more. These are listed in Exhibit A to this affidavit. Overall, the amount of time and number of livestreams that our Common Cause team had to monitor felt overwhelming given how unpredictable it was to know when a map would be drawn.
12. Second, in addition to the sheer volume and unpredictable nature of the Chairs' map-drawing process, it was very difficult to know who was engaged in drawing maps and whether the maps they were working on would end up being proposed or enacted. In the House, it was difficult to see on the NCLEG live-stream which legislators were drawing the districts because the camera in the map-drawing room was physically placed so far back from where the legislators were drawing. While I watched the live-stream in both the House and Senate chambers, there was no information posted about who was drawing the districts. While legislators do have public profiles available with their picture, they often brought other, similarly unidentified, individuals to work with them, without publicly disclosing the identities of these individuals. Relying on legislators' public profiles as a resource did allow me to identify the legislators I saw on the livestreams, but I was unable to identify other individuals accompanying them.
13. For example, I watched the NCLEG live-stream of an October 7, 2021 map-drawing session in the Senate, and observed Senator Newton (seated in the below screen shot, wearing a white shirt) sitting with an individual (seated on the far left, wearing a beige jacket) who I observed assisting him in drawing the Senate map that would eventually be enacted.

[^12]14. Below is the relevant portion of the livestream video "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)," available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1 Re6 J1g8Q, at timestamp 1:50:29 of the video. I have been unable to identify this individual using the public information on the NCLEG website.

15. When I watched the NCLEG live-stream, I observed this unidentified person and others frequently accompanying legislators to draw maps in the House and Senate rooms and consulting with them, without the public knowing who they are. Another example from a House drawing session is described below in Paragraph 53. Some of these issues could have been resolved easily, for example if mapmakers had been required to sign-up publicly or at least announce who they were and what they were working on before they started drawing, or even if forward-facing cameras had been mounted on the computer monitors. None of these steps were taken, even though I am aware that Common Cause and other advocacy groups asked specifically for this type of transparency early on in the process.
16. Third, I watched the NCLEG live-stream and observed legislators and individuals accompanying them bring papers and communications devices, such as cell phones, with them during the process. There was no way for those of us trying to monitor the process to know what those papers were, what map-drawers were looking at on their phones, or who they might be communicating with while they were drawing. If, for example, map-drawers were communicating on their phones with others watching the livestream and were receiving feedback or additional information during the process from others, there would be no way for the public to know about that, much less know what was being communicated. Given that the Chairs' expressly prohibited the use of racial data and chose to exclude it from the data made available at map-drawing stations, I believe the public had an interest in knowing whether any such data was being accessed by legislators who brought additional materials and communication devices with them to the map-drawing stations. Unfortunately, the Chairs chose not to monitor this themselves and provided no means by which we could take it upon ourselves to do so on behalf of the public.
17. An example of this issue is shown below, where I observed that Senator Newton had brought with him papers that he referenced when drawing the Senate enacted map, in the video "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 1:44:47 of the video, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_Re6_J1g8Q. The relevant portion of the video feed is shown below:

18. While I watched the same video, I observed Senator Hise come into the room to continue drawing the Senate map that Senator Daniel started. During this time, I observed the unidentified individual he was with was looking at his phone and assisting Senator Hise. I believe that this was the same unidentified individual who assisted Senator Newton on October 7. The below is the relevant portion from the video feed of the video "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)," at timestamp 5:35:18 of the video, available at the same link as above:

19. As a member of the public, I do not know who this individual was or what communications he was having while helping to draw maps.
20. The fourth challenge presented by the Chairs' process was that the audio on the live streams was very low quality; at times while I was watching the live-streams, it was difficult for me to understand what was being said. To follow the conversation, I often had to turn the volume up on my computer or TV to a high level. Although YouTube offers the ability to allow viewers to access an automatically generated transcript of a video, this feature was not made available for recordings at the map-drawing stations.
21. Fifth, while I watched the NCLEG live-streams, I also saw legislators ask for print-outs of draft maps which they would take out of the room, and there was of course no way of knowing how those print-outs were used or what type of analysis of those printouts might be happening out of the public view. It is hard for me to understand why printouts would have been necessary unless legislators were conducting analysis and consideration of the draft maps outside of the public view and behind closed doors.
22. For example, on October 8, 2021, an aide asked legislative staff member Erika Churchill for a printout of the Senate map that the Senate Co-Chairs had been working on (called "SBR-3 at the time"). I observed this aide specifically ask for "county-level printouts so we can see the precinct numbers in a few counties" and the ability to see "precinct lines and names potentially?" for several areas. The audio of this is available in the video "2021-10-08 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 2:30:57, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $\mathrm{v}=2 \mathrm{dL} 4 \mathrm{wM} 6 \mathrm{O}$ vA. The visual of this is in the video "2021-10-08 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 2:43:16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMXPG3PuxPs. Based upon my map-drawing knowledge gained from the trainings I have completed and observations of the 2021 mapdrawing process, the level of detail on those map printouts would allow map-drawers to redraw the maps outside of the room, which would enable them to conduct analysis using data not available on the House and Senate station computers (and specifically election and racial data that were not on these computers).
23. When Senator Newton came back to work on the same map on October 11, 2021, I observed him and his aide walk into the room with a large volume of papers, which they used during the map-drawing. Below is the relevant portion of the video feed where I observed this from the video "2021-10-11 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 5:05:22, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $\mathrm{v}=\mathrm{kZkD7shJmnA}$.

24. While watching the NCLEG live-streams and the NCGA YouTube videos, I observed similar instances of aides and staff members printing and taking papers outside of the room during the drawing in the House as well.
25. Overall, I observed issues raising a lack of transparency transparency consistently throughout the map-drawing process in both the House and Senate rooms.

## Sequence of Drawing Senate Districts

26. I spent several days closely monitoring the Senate Co-Chairs' Senate plan, which I observed being drafted on Senate Station 4 at the far side of the Senate drafting room and to the left of the room camera. I monitored the start and end times of their sessions and which county cluster or area of the map they worked on, as well as which Senators worked on the map during each session. I also monitored the changes in the plan's name. The name of the plan changed every time a new staff person assisted the Senators in drawing the plans (this was also true for Congressional plans and House plans). I closely monitored all of these details in order to compile a summary timeline of the drawing of a single Senate map. ${ }^{6}$
27. It was really only possible to compile a timeline of the drawing of a single map by closely monitoring the name of the plan during each session, since there was no public disclosure of map drafts or who was working on a particular version or map at a particular station or time. I compiled all of the plans by watching the parts of the video where a new staff member happened to take over for a prior one (or a new session started) and the map was re-named. As far as I am aware, the system for naming different map drafts was not published anywhere. Monitoring this process took a great deal of time and attention to detail.
28. The sub-sections below include a description with screen shots from the video that I watched of Senate Station 4 during various sessions in which legislators were drawing what would eventually become the proposed Senate map. I have confirmed that this eventually became the enacted Senate map by following the draft map titles over the weeks of drafting in October and by combing through dozens of hours of video of both the Senate Station 4 feed and the Senate room feed. These sequences were not published anywhere publicly for the Senate (or any other) map as far as I am aware. Overall, I observed the following by watching the NCGA redistricting YouTube videos:
a. On October 7, Senators Newton and Hise alternated working with an unidentified man to draw draft maps starting with SCC-1 and ending with SBR-3. ${ }^{7}$
b. On October 8, 2021, an unidentified aide requested detailed printouts of 8 different counties in SBR-3as described above, including Mecklenburg County and Wake County.

[^13]c. On October 11-14, 2021, Senators Newton and Hise alternated working with an unidentified aide at Senate Station 4 on the draft map starting with version SBR-3 and ending with SST-4. ${ }^{8}$
d. On October 14, 2021, a statistical "stat pack" for SST-4 was generated, ${ }^{9}$ and the map was printed and posted on the NCGA website on or around October 18, 2021. ${ }^{10}$
e. On October 27-28, 2021, Senators Hise and Newton and an unidentified man began work at Senate Station 4 starting with version SST-4 and ending with SST-13, ${ }^{11}$ which was filed as SB739 on October 28, 2021. ${ }^{12}$ After it was amended in Committee on November 2, 2021, the map name was changed yet again, this time to SBK-7. ${ }^{13}$
29. Using Dave's Redistricting App (DRA), I have overlaid DRA's election and racial data on the draft districts displayed in the NCGA's public process at the time stamps indicated below. I did this by inputting information about each step the legislative map-drawers made on the map-drawing terminals in DRA, with election and racial data visible in the manner displayed in the screenshots below. All DRA data information can be found at https://davesredistricting.org/maps\#aboutdata and is appended to this Affidavit as Exhibit B. DRA' demographic (including race) data is from the 2020 Census. DRA combines recent election data (from elections listed in Exhibit B) into a composite score that averages those election results to give a composite partisan performance/"partisan lean" for each precinct. ${ }^{14}$

## Mecklenburg/Iredell Senate Cluster

30. I watched the NCGA YouTube video from the October 7, 2021 live-stream, where I observed Senator Newton and an unidentified aide draw the six districts within the Mecklenburg/Iredell Senate cluster. This is visible in the video "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station (544)" at timestamp 2:28:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $=6 \mathrm{CVbWSWL}-\mathrm{I}$.

[^14]31. At timestamp 2:30:09, I observed Senator Newton and an unidentified aide begin with selecting Iredell County in its entirety. Then I observed them include portions of the northern part of Mecklenburg.
32. Below is the first completed draft district in this cluster, visible at timestamp 2:30:09 (left), as well as a DRA overlay of this figure with partisan lean color-coding by VTD (Voter Tabulation District)/Precinct, where the blue indicates Democratic-leaning and red indicates Republican-leaning areas. These screenshots show that the portion of Mecklenburg County paired with Iredell captures a Democratic area on the border between the two counties.

33. Instead of continuing in the northern area of Mecklenburg County adjacent to this first draft district, I observed Senator Newton and the unidentified man next draw a district on the southernmost area of Mecklenburg County. Specifically, at timestamp 2:39:30, I observed Senator Newton and the unidentified man do this by first grouping together areas with relatively low Democratic partisan lean and low Black Voting Age Population (BVAP) areas.
34. A view of this completed second district is visible at timestamp 2:39:30 (left). Below is also the DRA overlay with partisan color coding (center) as well as a DRA overlay with colorcoding for Black Voting Age Population (BVAP), in which darker colors indicating higher BVAPs (right):

35. I then observed Senator Newton and the unidentified man go back to the northern part of Mecklenburg County and draw another district to ensure they kept the remaining Republicanleaning and white areas together. Due to population equality requirements, this district had to take in some of northeastern Charlotte. This sequenceis visible at timestamp 2:52:48:

36. I then observed Senator Newton and the unidentified man complete the remaining three districts using the remaining heavily Democratic and non-white districts, and a view of this can be seen at timestamp 3:09:35 (left) with the partisan (center) and BVAP (right) colorcoded overlays below:

37. On October 27, 2021, I observed Senator Daniel and an unidentified man return to make modifications to the draft districts in Mecklenburg/Iredell at Senate Station $4 .{ }^{15}$
38. In the video, I observed Senator Daniel and the unidentified man discuss reducing "splits" throughout the map, including municipality splits. However, I observed that their edits retained the overall shape of the map that was completed on October 7, 2021. The video "2021-10-27 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" shows these changes at timestamp 46:32, and is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DARoI9MG3p8.

[^15]39. A wide view of the overall county near completion is available at timestamp 54:40 and shown below:

40. The below figures show the 2021 enacted Senate plan in this cluster with DRA's partisan (left) and BVAP (right) color coding visible:

41. The below figures show the 2019 and 2021 enacted plans with the DRA partisan lean for each district overall visible, with the "D+\#\#" indicating the percentage lean of the district using the DRA election composite described above. For example, District 41 in the 2021 enacted plan has an estimated Democratic vote share of $49.5 \%$ and an estimated Republican vote share of $47.9 \%$. Therefore, the Democratic lean of the district is $1.6 \%$, and it is displayed as $\mathrm{D}+1.6$ :


## Wake/Granville Senate Cluster

42. While watching the NCGA YouTube video from the October 7, 2021 live-stream, I observed Senator Hise and an unidentified aide follow a similar process when drawing six districts in the Wake/Granville Cluster. ${ }^{16}$ They began drawing on Station 4 on October 7, 2021. This is visible in the video "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 6:00:15, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $\mathrm{v}=6 \mathrm{CVbWSWL}-\mathrm{I}$.
43. Like in the Mecklenburg/Iredell cluster, I observed Senator Hise and the unidentified aide begin with the northern rural whole county of Granville, and then add in the part of northern Wake County with a greater Republican partisan lean and lower non-white population.

[^16]44. This detailed first draft district can be viewed at timestamp 6:13:18 (left), with the DRA partisan lean (center) and BVAP (right) overlays of the entire district below:

45. After forming this northern district, I observed that the map drawers did not continue to draw within adjacent areas. Instead, I observed that they started from the southernmost part of Wake County to draw another district formed of relatively low Democratic partisan lean and non-BVAP populations.
46. A detailed view of this second draft district can be seen at timestamp 6:20:54 below (left) with the DRA overlay showing partisan lean (center) and BVAP (right) color-coding below:

47. Then, I observed the map drawers proceed to draw four districts from the remaining heavily Democratic partisan lean areas in the middle of Wake County. A view of the completed draft districts can be seen at timestamp 7:02:27 (left), with the partisan lean (center) and BVAP color coding visible (right):

48. When watching the NCGA YouTube video from the October 13, 2021 live-stream, ${ }^{17}$ I observed Senator Newton and an unidentified man working at Station 4 make some modifications to these districts but retain their overall core locations. ${ }^{18}$ These modifications can be seen in the video "2021-10-14 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 2:41:25, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=OW808P8OLhs. A screen shot of the draft districts when they finished working on October 13, 2021 can be seen at timestamp 3:33:16 of this video:

49. While watching the NCGA YouTube video from the October 27, 2021 live-stream, I observed Senator Daniel and an unidentified aide make additional small changes to the maps,

[^17]including in Wake County. ${ }^{19}$ A wide view of the finished Wake County districts can be seen in the video "2021-10-27 Map Drawing Station 04 (544)" at timestamp 2:09:01, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=DARoI9MG3p8:

50. The below shows the 2021 enacted Senate plan in this cluster with DRA's partisan and BVAP color coding visible:


19 The video "2021-10-27 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)," available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A44AbmkAkrg, displays Senator Daniel and the unidentified aide at approximately timestamp 1:54:00.
51. The below figures show the 2019 and 2021 enacted plans with the DRA partisan lean for each district overall visible. The partisan lean for each district accurately reflects the values generated by the DRA election composite described above:


Sequence of Drawing House Districts
52. I have also reviewed sequences of how the House map was drawn using the process described above for the state Senate map, and below is a similar description with screen shots provided in the same manner as used above for the state Senate map of certain areas.

## Buncombe County House Districts

53. While watching the NCGA YouTube video from the October 14, 2021 live-stream, I observed Representative Hall and an unidentified man begin drawing House districts at House Station 1.I observed them walking into the room in the video "2021-10-14 Redistricting Map Drawing (House)" at timestamp 2:18:43, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $\mathrm{v}=\mathrm{os} 7 \mathrm{hNbXoBmE}$. A screenshot of the relevant portion of the video feed is shown below:

54. During their time drawing at House Station 1 on October 14, 2021, I observed Representative Hall and the unidentified aide using their phones while at the map-drawing station. This can be seen at timestamp 2:20:50, and the screen shot of this portion of the video feed is below. It is impossible for me to tell from any of the publicly available feeds whom they may be communicating with while drawing the maps.

55. I observed Representative Hall and the unidentified aide begin drawing the three House districts within Buncombe County in the video "2021-10-14 Map Drawing Station 01 (643)" at timestamp 2:51:02, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEsgnuK3YUU. I observed them finish a version titled HAS-1. A screen shot of the initial draft districts are visible below from timestamp 3:03:27 (left) with the DRA overlay showing partisan lean (right):
56. At this time, I observed Representative Hall ask staff for a print-out of the Buncombe cluster along with the previous cluster they were working on. I observed the staff member proceed to print out a copy of the newly drawn districts in the Buncombe cluster with population numbers labeled for each precinct, and provide it to the individual assisting Representative Hall (who I observed had left the room).
57. While watching the NCGA YouTube video from the October 18, 2021, I observed a man I believe to be Representative Hall and another unidentified man begin to work in House Station 3 and revisit the Buncombe County House districts, stating a desire to "make these districts more compact." This is audible in the video "2021-10-18 Map Drawing Station 03 (643)" at timestamp 7:53:30, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $\mathrm{v}=\mathrm{j} 1$ zeRpCwCes. In my observations of the video, I am unable to confirm their identities definitively because I am unable to see who is sitting at House Station 3 (on the far right), but I recognize Representative Hall's voice from other recordings and believe I observed him make this statement.
58. A screen shot from shortly after they sat down at the station camera is below from the video "2021-10-18 Redistricting Map Drawing (House)" at timestamp 8:10:59, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5f 3wg3jg0k:

59. I then observed who I believe to be Representative Hall and another unidentified man, after reviewing the draft House districts in Buncombe County, decide to discard the entire draft and start drafting anew. I observed this happen in the video "2021-10-14 Map Drawing Station 01 (643)" from timestamps 7:53:21 to 8:01:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=XEsgnuK3YUU.
60. Later, when they started again with this county, I observed Representative Hall and the unidentified man begin by first drawing a House district in the southeastern portion of Buncombe County, then moving to a second district encompassing areas of Asheville and running to the northeastern corner of Buncombe County, leaving a third district of the remaining unassigned areas in Buncombe County, wrapping from the area north of Asheville, around the city to the west, and around Asheville again to the south. After minor modifications, I observed them finish.
61. A view of the finalized districts is visible at timestamp 8:11:00 (left), and my DRA overlay with partisan lean is included below (right) as well. Again, I observed Representative Hall
and the unidentified man immediately ask for detailed printouts of this county, with VTD data visible.

62. Below is a comparison of the partisan lean (explanation of $\mathrm{D}+$ numbers) on the DRA overlays of the Buncombe House districts drawn and abandoned by the legislature on October 14, 2021 (left) and the enacted Buncombe House districts drawn by the legislature on October 18, 2021 (right):


Public Posting of Member Submitted Maps
63. On or around October 18, I observed "Member Submitted Maps" begin to be posted on the redistricting website, https://ncleg.gov/Redistricting. When I viewed these "Member Submitted Maps," there was no information on the face of these documents about who had worked on these maps, when they had been worked on, what the goals or priorities of these maps reflected, nor even when or if they would be submitted for consideration.
64. However, not all maps that were considered or even enacted were posted beforehand. Based on my review of the website, the House map debated by the House Redistricting Committee during the meeting on November 1, 2021, titled "HBK-12", was not posted with the other Member Submitted Maps in the House. When the proposed bill, House Bill 976, was first filed, I observed that it was filed without any district lines specified at all, which made it difficult for me to find the proposed map. I checked the Member Submitted Maps page multiple times and never saw it. Instead, I eventually found it posted on a different page entirely, inside a folder on the House Redistricting Committee's page entitled "11-01-21 2nd". The folder can be found at
https://www.ncleg.gov/Committees/CommitteeInfo/HouseStanding/182\#2021\11-0121\ 2nd.

## Public Comments

65. During the 2021 redistricting process, I reviewed a substantial number of the public comments submitted online or given during the public hearings. I counted more than three dozen comments which asked legislators to keep the Triad or at least Guilford County in one Congressional district. Other comments that I reviewed included several people explaining the deep ties between the cities of Greensboro, High Point and Winston-Salem. I also read comments where many people talked about how Guilford County had been split in previous Congressional plans and how it negatively impacted their ability to be represented.
66. The final enacted map adopted during this redistricting cycle splits Guilford County into three Congressional districts. This map also places Winston-Salem and High Point in separate districts and splits Greensboro between three districts. When asked during a Senate Redistricting Committee meeting on November 1, 2021 if he believed people in Greensboro and High Point shared a common interest, I observed Senator Daniel - one of the Senate Redistricting Co-Chairs who helped draw the map - respond that he did not know. ${ }^{20}$
67. I can also say, as a lifelong resident of Guilford County and a member of the League of Women Voters of the Piedmont Triad, many people in the Triad are displeased with how Guilford County was split in the final version of the Congressional map. For years, Guilford County and Greensboro have been split in Congressional plans. The plan enacted in 2019 kept Guilford County in one Congressional district for the first time in my life. I believe this issue goes to the heart of what redistricting is all about: creating districts so that communities can be represented. I expressed this in public comments I gave at the NCGA redistricting public hearing held earlier this year in Alamance County.
${ }^{20}$ See video titled "2021-11-01 Committee (Senate)" starting timestamp 1:04:10, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop\&t=3848\&v=KgSkfFY7r7g\&feature=youtu.be.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on December 23, 2021.


Sworn and subscribed before me this $23^{\text {rd }}$ day of December, 2021.


My commission expires: $11 / 6 / 2024$

## DAYE AFFIDAVIT - EXHIBIT A:

## List of Video Files referencing "Map Drawing" on https://ncleg.gov/Documents/493\#Video:

1. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station_01
2. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station_03
3. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station_04
4. 2021-10-06 544 Map Drawing-Station-02
5. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
6. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
7. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
8. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
9. 2021-10-06_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
10. 2021-10-06_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
11. 2021-10-07 544 Map Drawing Station 01
12. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
13. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
14. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
15. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
16. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
17. 2021-10-07 643 Map Drawing Station 03
18. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
19. 2021-10-07_Redistricting-Map-Drawing_House
20. 2021-10-07_Redistricting-Map-Drawing_Senate
21. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
22. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
23. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
24. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
25. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
26. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
27. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
28. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
29. 2021-10-08_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
30. 2021-10-08_Senate Redistricting_Map_Drawing
31. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
32. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
33. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
34. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
35. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
36. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
37. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
38. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
39. 2021-10-11_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
40. 2021-10-11_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
41. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
42. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
43. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
44. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
45. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
46. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
47. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
48. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
49. 2021-10-12 House Redistricting Map Drawing
50. 2021-10-12_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
51. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
52. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
53. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
54. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
55. 2021-10-13 643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
56. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
57. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
58. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
59. 2021-10-13_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
60. 2021-10-13_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
61. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
62. 2021-10-14 $544^{-}$Map Drawing Station 02
63. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
64. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
65. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
66. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
67. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
68. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
69. 2021-10-14_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
70. 2021-10-14_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
71. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
72. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
73. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
74. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
75. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
76. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
77. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
78. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
79. 2021-10-15_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
80. 2021-10-15_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
81. 2021-10-18 544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
82. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
83. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
84. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
85. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
86. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
87. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
88. 2021-10-18 643 Map Drawing Station 04
89. 2021-10-18_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
90. 2021-10-18_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
91. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
92. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
93. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
94. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
95. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
96. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
97. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
98. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
99. 2021-10-19_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
100. 2021-10-19 Senate Redistricting Map Drawing
101. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
102. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
103. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
104. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
105. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
106. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
107. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
108. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
109. 2021-10-20_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
110. 2021-10-20_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
111. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
112. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
113. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
114. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
115. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
116. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
117. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
118. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
119. 2021-10-21_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
120. 2021-10-21_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
121. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
122. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
123. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
124. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
125. 2021-10-22_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
126. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
127. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
128. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
129. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
130. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
131. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
132. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
133. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
134. 2021-10-25_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
135. 2021-10-25_Public-Hearing-Remote_Joint
136. 2021-10-25_Public-Hearing-Virtual_Joint
137. 2021-10-25_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
138. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
139. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
140. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
141. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
142. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
143. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
144. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
145. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
146. 2021-10-26_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
147. 2021-10-26_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
148. 2021-10-27_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
149. 2021-10-27-544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
150. 2021-10-27_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
151. 2021-10-27_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
152. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
153. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
154. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
155. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
156. 2021-10-27_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
157. 2021-10-27_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing 158. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
158. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
159. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
160. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
161. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
162. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
163. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
164. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
165. 2021-10-28_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
166. 2021-10-28_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
167. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
168. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
169. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
170. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
171. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
172. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
173. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
174. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
175. 2021-10-29_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
176. 2021-10-29_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
177. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
178. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
179. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
180. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
181. 2021-10-30_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
182. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
183. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
184. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_-03
185. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
186. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
187. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
188. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
189. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
190. 2021-11-01_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
191. 2021-11-01_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
192. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
193. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01_Part2
194. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
195. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
196. 2021-11-02_-544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
197. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
198. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
199. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
200. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
201. 2021-11-02_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
202. 2021-11-02_-Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
203. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_-Station_01
204. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
205. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
206. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
207. 2021-11-03_House_Redistricting_Map_D Drawing
208. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
209. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
210. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
211. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
212. 2021-11-04_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing

# - Ex. 6313 - <br> DAYE AFFIDATIVE EXHIBIT B <br> DRA 2020 

12/23/21, 2:25 AM

## About Data <br> Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

## Shapes

DRA 2020 has 2020 Shapes. For most states, maps that use 2020 Shapes allow you to work with Precincts (Voting Districts or VTDs), as the main unit for making redistricting maps. For four states (CA, HI, OR and WV), you use Block Groups instead. For all states, you can shatter a precinct or block group into census blocks, and work with them individually.
DRA 2020 also has 2010 Shapes. These are Precincts for most states, and Block Groups for CA, MT, OR and RI. Census block editing is not available with 2010 Shapes. Maps that use 2010 Shapes can be converted to 2020 Shapes, yielding an approximation of the source map.
Precinct-level demographic and election data can be downloaded from our public repository vtd_data.

## Demographic Data

DRA 2020 has demographic data from the 2020 and 2010 Censuses and from the 2018 and 2019 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. The 2020 and 2010 data include total population and voting age population data (VAP), and was obtained directly from the Census Bureau. The 2018 and 2019 data include total population and citizen voting age population data (CVAP).
For 2020 Shapes, 2010, 2018 and 2019 data was disaggregated using Voting and Election Science Team's method as described here. More detail is in the Disaggregation section below. All data that has been disaggregated contains some margin of error, and should be treated accordingly.
For all years the following ethnic and racial categories are included. Because the categories overlap, their sum will be greater than the total population for the same area. Note that for CVAP data, the racial categories are estimates calculated from other fields, because the Census Bureau does not provide them directly in those datasets, and they tend to underrepresent the Asian and Pacific categories.

- White (alone, not Hispanic)
- Hispanic (all Hispanics regardless of race)
- Black (Black alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)
- Asian (Asian alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)
- Native (American Indian and Alaska Native alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)
- Pacific (Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)

For some states we provide additional 2020 VAP data with Non-Hispanic Race Alone categories.

- White (alone, not Hispanic)
- Hispanic (all Hispanics regardless of race)
- Black (Black alone, not Hispanic)
- Asian (Asian alone, not Hispanic)
- Native (American Indian and Alaska Native alone, not Hispanic)
- Pacific (Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander alone, not Hispanic)
- Other (Other race alone, not Hispanic)
- TwoOrMore (Two or more races, not Hispanic)

Some states adjust their 2020 Total Population numbers to count incarcerated individuals in their home precincts, to be used for congressional and/or legislative redistricting. See Reallocating Inmate Data for Redistricting, Prison Gerrymandering Project and state pages for more details. Adjusted data can have negative population values for some blocks.

## Election Data

DRA 2020 has election data for a range of elections, varying by state.
In addition to data for individual elections, we construct an Election Composite of two or more elections. The Composite gives a measure of partisanship over different contests and years, which we prefer, because individual elections can be skewed by various factors. We use the latest available elections, and those not available are simply left out. We also exclude uncontested elections and those that have a significant third-party vote percentage (usually >10\%). The formula is the following:

```
Composite = Mean(Pres, Sen, GovAg), where
Pres = Mean(1 or 2 Presidential elections),
Sen = Mean(1 or 2 Senate elections) and
GovAg = Mean(Governor and Attorney General elections).
```

All of our election data has come from partners who have done the work to obtain the data, marry it to some geography (e.g. precincts), and process necessary changes, such as distributing absentee votes that are not allocated to precincts. We thank them for their valuable work. The following table shows the data we have for each state, along with attributions for each election dataset. We continue to add election data as it becomes available.

- CSDB=California State Database
- MGGG=Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group
- MIT=MIT Election Data Science Lab
- $O P=$ Open Precincts


## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

- PVI=Cook PVI data from Ryne Rohla/Decision Desk HQ; See also Atlas of Redistricting.
- SA=Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden
- SG=Steve Gerontakis, with John Mifflin
- TC=Tyler Chafee
- $V E=$ Voting and Election Science Team
* This election is part of the Election Composite.


## Election Data By State/Shapes

| State | 2020 Shapes | 2010 Shapes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alabama | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2017 Senator (Special) (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI)* |
| Alaska | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE)* <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * |
| Arizona | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| Arkansas | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (OP) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (OP)* |
| California | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (CSDB) * <br> - 2018 Governor (CSDB) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (CSDB) * <br> - 2020 President (CSDB) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (CSDB) ${ }^{\star}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (CSDB) * |
| Colorado | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (TC) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (MGGG,OP) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (MGGG,OP)* |
| Connecticut | - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI)* |
| Delaware | - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

| District of Columbia | - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | - 2020 President (VE) |${ }^{*} 2020$ Senator (VE) ${ }^{*} \quad$ - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$


| Florida | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE)* <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Georgia | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (Special) (VE) <br> - 2020 Senator (Runoff) (VE) <br> - 2020 Senator (Special Runoff) (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) |
| Hawaii | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Idaho | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE)* <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| Illinois | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * |
| Indiana | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SA) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI) * |
| lowa | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

| Kansas | - 2012 President (VE) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kentucky | - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2019 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2019 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2019 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2019 Attorney General (VE) * |
| Louisiana | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2016 Senator (Runoff) (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2019 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2019 Governor (Runoff) (VE) <br> - 2019 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE)* <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Maine | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) |
| Maryland | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Massachusetts | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) * <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Michigan | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE)* <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Minnesota | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Attorney General (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG)* <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Attorney General (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

| Mississippi | - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (PVI) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Missouri | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE)* <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) |
| Montana | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * |
| Nebraska | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) |
| Nevada | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (OP)* <br> - 2018 Governor (OP)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (OP) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (OP) |
| New Hampshire | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| New Jersey | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2017 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (PVI) * |
| New Mexico | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SA) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
|  | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* | - 2008 President (SG) |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

|  | - 2012 President (PVI) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\star}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) |
| New York | - 2020 Senator (VE)* | - 2012 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2018 Governor (VE)* | - 2016 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2018 Attorney General (VE)* |  |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* |  |
| North Carolina | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) |  |
|  | - 2016 President (VE)* | - 2008 President (SA) |
|  | - 2016 Senator (VE)* | - 2012 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2016 Governor (VE) | - 2014 Senator (MGGG)* |
|  | - 2016 Attorney General (VE) | - 2016 President (VE)* |
|  | - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2016 Senator (VE)* |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* | - 2016 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ |
|  | - 2020 Senator (VE)* | - 2016 Attorney General (VE)* |
|  | - 2020 Governor (VE)* | - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) |
|  | - 2020 Attorney General (VE)* |  |
|  | - 2020 Lt. Governor (VE) |  |
| North Dakota | - 2016 President (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) |
|  | - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | - 2016 President (VE)* |
|  | - 2016 Governor (VE) | - 2016 Senator (VE)* |
|  | - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2016 Governor (VE) * |
|  | - 2018 Senator (VE)* | - 2016 Governor (VE) |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* | - 2018 Attorney General (VE) |
|  | - 2020 Governor (VE)* | 2018 Senator (VE) |
| Ohio | - 2012 President (PVI) |  |
|  | - 2016 President (VE)* |  |
|  | - 2016 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) |
|  | - 2018 Senator (VE) * | - 2012 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2018 Governor (VE)* | - 2016 President (MGGG)* |
|  | - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2016 Senator (MGGG) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* |  |


| Oklahoma | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE)* | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oregon | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (MGGG,OP)* |
| Pennsylvania | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE)* <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{\star}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * |
| Rhode Island | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |

## About Data



## About Data

- 2016 President (VE) *
- 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 Governor (VE) $\quad$ - 2016 Attorney General (VE) 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$
- 2016 President (VE) 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2016 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2016 Governor (VE)
- 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2016 Attorney General (VE)

Vermont

- 2018 Attorney General (VE)
- 2016 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2018 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$

2018 Lt. Governor (VE)

- 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\star}$
- 2020 Governor (VE)*
- 2018 Attorney General (VE) *

2020 Attorney GEneral (VE) * 2018 Lt. Governor (VE)

- 2020 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2016 President (VE) *
- 2008 President (SG)
- 2017 Governor (VE)* - 2012 President (PVI)*
- 2017 Attorney General (VE)* - 2016 President (VE)*

Virginia

- 2017 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2017 Governor (VE) *
- 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\star}$ - 2017 Attorney General (VE)
- 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ - 2017 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2020 Senator (VE)* - 2018 Senator (VE)*
- 2012 President (PVI)
- 2016 President (VE)* - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 Senator (VE) *
- 2012 President (PVI)*
- 2016 Governor (VE)
- 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2016 Attorney General (VE)
- 2016 Senator (VE) *

Washington

West Virginia
2016 Lt. Governor (VE)

- 2016 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2018 Senator (MIT,OP) *
- 2016 Attorney General (VE) *
- 2020 President (VE) *
- 2016
- 2020 Governor (VE)*
- 2016 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2020 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2018 Senator (MIT,OP) ${ }^{\star}$
- 2020 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2008 President (SG)
$\square$
- 2012 President (PVI) *
- 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{\star}$
- 2016 President (PVI)*
- 2012 President (PVI) - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 President (VE)* ${ }^{*} 2012$ President (PVI)*
- 2016 Senator (VE)* ${ }^{*}$ - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$

Wisconsin
2018

- 2018 Governor (VE) *
- 2016 Senator (VE)
- 2018 Senator (VE)
- 2018 Attorney General (VE) *
- 2018 Governor (VE)*
- 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2018 Attorney General (VE) *
- 2016 President (VE)* ${ }^{*} 2008$ President (SG)
- 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\star}$
- 2018 Governor (VE)*
- 2018 Senator (VE) *
- 2020 President (VE) *
- 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$


## Disaggregation

To map election results and demographic data from a source geography (shape set) to a destination geography (shape set), we disaggregate the data from the source geography to census blocks and then aggregate from those to the destination geography. For example, 2016 election data for many states is presented in terms of each state's 2016 precincts (or voting districts), which typically differ from their 2010 and 2020 precincts. Our algorithm determines the geographic mapping between the source geography and 2010 or 2020 census blocks and then distributes the results for each precinct among the blocks in that precinct, according to the population of each block. (That's disaggregation.) The Census Bureau provides the geographic mapping between 2010 census blocks and 2010 precincts, and between 2020 census blocks and 2020 precincts. Using that we add the results from all the blocks in each precinct. (That's aggregation.)

For 2020 shapes, all demographic data $(2010,2018$ and 2019) has been disaggregated using Voting and Election Science Team's method. All 2020 block population estimates were calculated by VEST using their method. To disaggregate we used these block population numbers and the Hare Quota (Hamilton) largest remainder method.

All election data presented in DRA 2020 has been disaggregated to census blocks, because election results are never reported to the block level. For 2020 shapes, for states having 2020 election data, disaggregation of 2016-2020 data uses VEST's method. For other states our older method was used; when we get 2020 election data, we will update all 2016-2020 election data to use VEST's method. Disaggregation necessarily introduces some error. In addition, ACS/CVAP data are estimates and thus have some error even before disaggregation. All election data and all ACS/CVAP data contain some margin of error at both the census block and precinct levels, and should be treated accordingly.

## Population Deviation Report

District Plan: SST-4

| District | Seats | Ideal Pop | Actual Pop | Deviation | Deviation \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 1 | 208,788 | 199,623 | -9,165 | -4.39\% |
| 2 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,557 | -10,231 | -4.90\% |
| 3 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,494 | -8,294 | -3.97\% |
| 4 | 1 | 208,788 | 219,143 | 10,355 | 4.96\% |
| 5 | 1 | 208,788 | 204,576 | -4,212 | -2.02\% |
| 6 | 1 | 208,788 | 212,582 | 3,794 | 1.82\% |
| 7 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,436 | -8,352 | -4.00\% |
| 8 | 1 | 208,788 | 204,809 | -3,979 | -1.91\% |
| 9 | 1 | 208,788 | 216,568 | 7,780 | 3.73\% |
| 10 | 1 | 208,788 | 215,999 | 7,211 | 3.45\% |
| 11 | 1 | 208,788 | 206,121 | -2,667 | -1.28\% |
| 12 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,389 | -10,399 | -4.98\% |
| 13 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,409 | -10,379 | -4.97\% |
| 14 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,376 | -10,412 | -4.99\% |
| 15 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,420 | -10,368 | -4.97\% |
| 16 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,383 | -10,405 | -4.98\% |
| 17 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,425 | -10,363 | -4.96\% |
| 18 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,260 | -8,528 | -4.08\% |
| 19 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,858 | -7,930 | -3.80\% |
| 20 | 1 | 208,788 | 198,776 | -10,012 | -4.80\% |
| 21 | 1 | 208,788 | 217,984 | 9,196 | 4.40\% |
| 22 | 1 | 208,788 | 216,471 | 7,683 | 3.68\% |
| 23 | 1 | 208,788 | 210,529 | 1,741 | 0.83\% |
| 24 | 1 | 208,788 | 202,786 | -6,002 | -2.87\% |
| 25 | 1 | 208,788 | 218,484 | 9,696 | 4.64\% |
| 26 | 1 | 208,788 | 201,428 | -7,360 | -3.53\% |
| 27 | 1 | 208,788 | 216,058 | 7,270 | 3.48\% |
| 28 | 1 | 208,788 | 214,909 | 6,121 | 2.93\% |
| 29 | 1 | 208,788 | 214,631 | 5,843 | 2.80\% |
| 30 | 1 | 208,788 | 212,299 | 3,511 | 1.68\% |
| 31 | 1 | 208,788 | 214,811 | 6,023 | 2.88\% |
| 32 | 1 | 208,788 | 211,642 | 2,854 | 1.37\% |
| 33 | 1 | 208,788 | 209,379 | 591 | 0.28\% |
| 34 | 1 | 208,788 | 219,157 | 10,369 | 4.97\% |
| 35 | 1 | 208,788 | 218,137 | 9,349 | 4.48\% |
| 36 | 1 | 208,788 | 210,986 | 2,198 | 1.05\% |
| 37 | 1 | 208,788 | 215,708 | 6,920 | 3.31\% |
| 38 | 1 | 208,788 | 217,671 | 8,883 | 4.25\% |
| 39 | 1 | 208,788 | 219,006 | 10,218 | 4.89\% |
| 40 | 1 | 208,788 | 216,693 | 7,905 | 3.79\% |
| 41 | 1 | 208,788 | 216,686 | 7,898 | 3.78\% |
| 42 | 1 | 208,788 | 216,411 | 7,623 | 3.65\% |
| 43 | 1 | 208,788 | 209,997 | 1,209 | 0.58\% |
| 44 | 1 | 208,788 | 203,043 | -5,745 | -2.75\% |

Population Deviation Report
District Plan: SST-4

| District | Seats | Ideal Pop | Actual Pop | Deviation | Deviation \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 45 | 1 | 208,788 | 211,229 | 2,441 | 1.17\% |
| 46 | 1 | 208,788 | 218,487 | 9,699 | 4.65\% |
| 47 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,614 | -8,174 | -3.91\% |
| 48 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,053 | -8,735 | -4.18\% |
| 49 | 1 | 208,788 | 200,986 | -7,802 | -3.74\% |
| 50 | 1 | 208,788 | 213,909 | 5,121 | 2.45\% |
| Totals: | 50 |  | 10,439,388 |  |  |

## County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| County | District | Total County Population | Total District Population | County Pop in District | Percent of County Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alamance | 25 | 171,415 | 218,484 | 171,415 | 100.00 \% | 78.46 \% |
| Alexander | 36 | 36,444 | 210,986 | 36,444 | 100.00 \% | 17.27 \% |
| Alleghany | 46 | 10,888 | 218,487 | 10,888 | 100.00 \% | 4.98 \% |
| Anson | 29 | 22,055 | 214,631 | 22,055 | 100.00 \% | 10.28 \% |
| Ashe | 46 | 26,577 | 218,487 | 26,577 | 100.00 \% | 12.16 \% |
| Avery | 46 | 17,806 | 218,487 | 17,806 | 100.00 \% | 8.15 \% |
| Beaufort | 3 | 44,652 | 200,494 | 44,652 | 100.00 \% | 22.27 \% |
| Bertie | 1 | 17,934 | 199,623 | 17,934 | 100.00 \% | 8.98 \% |
| Bladen | 8 | 29,606 | 204,809 | 29,606 | 100.00 \% | 14.46 \% |
| Brunswick | 7 | 136,693 | 200,436 | 136,693 | 100.00 \% | 68.20 \% |
| Buncombe | 47 | 269,452 | 200,614 | 68,466 | 25.41 \% | 34.13 \% |
|  | 49 | 269,452 | 200,986 | 200,986 | 74.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Burke | 47 | 87,570 | 200,614 | 87,570 | 100.00 \% | 43.65 \% |
| Cabarrus | 34 | 225,804 | 219,157 | 219,157 | 97.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 35 | 225,804 | 218,137 | 6,647 | 2.94 \% | 3.05 \% |
| Caldwell | 43 | 80,652 | 209,997 | 49,387 | 61.23 \% | 23.52 \% |
|  | 46 | 80,652 | 218,487 | 31,265 | 38.77 \% | 14.31 \% |
| Camden | 1 | 10,355 | 199,623 | 10,355 | 100.00 \% | 5.19 \% |
| Carteret | 2 | 67,686 | 198,557 | 67,686 | 100.00 \% | 34.09 \% |
| Caswell | 23 | 22,736 | 210,529 | 22,736 | 100.00 \% | 10.80 \% |
| Catawba | 43 | 160,610 | 209,997 | 160,610 | 100.00 \% | 76.48 \% |
| Chatham | 19 | 76,285 | 200,858 | 76,285 | 100.00 \% | 37.98 \% |
| Cherokee | 50 | 28,774 | 213,909 | 28,774 | 100.00 \% | 13.45 \% |
| Chowan | 2 | 13,708 | 198,557 | 13,708 | 100.00 \% | 6.90 \% |
| Clay | 50 | 11,089 | 213,909 | 11,089 | 100.00 \% | 5.18 \% |
| Cleveland | 44 | 99,519 | 203,043 | 99,519 | 100.00 \% | 49.01 \% |
| Columbus | 7 | 50,623 | 200,436 | 50,623 | 100.00 \% | 25.26 \% |
| Craven | 3 | 100,720 | 200,494 | 100,720 | 100.00 \% | 50.24 \% |
| Cumberland | 21 | 334,728 | 217,984 | 118,257 | 35.33 \% | 54.25 \% |
|  | 22 | 334,728 | 216,471 | 216,471 | 64.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Currituck | 1 | 28,100 | 199,623 | 28,100 | 100.00 \% | 14.08 \% |
| Dare | 1 | 36,915 | 199,623 | 36,915 | 100.00 \% | 18.49 \% |
| Davidson | 32 | 168,930 | 211,642 | 168,930 | 100.00 \% | 79.82 \% |
| Davie | 32 | 42,712 | 211,642 | 42,712 | 100.00 \% | 20.18 \% |
| Duplin | 8 | 48,715 | 204,809 | 48,715 | 100.00 \% | 23.79 \% |
| Durham | 18 | 324,833 | 200,260 | 200,260 | 61.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 19 | 324,833 | 200,858 | 124,573 | 38.35 \% | 62.02 \% |
| Edgecombe | 4 | 48,900 | 219,143 | 48,900 | 100.00 \% | 22.31 \% |
| Forsyth | 30 | 382,590 | 212,299 | 167,779 | 43.85 \% | 79.03 \% |
|  | 31 | 382,590 | 214,811 | 214,811 | 56.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Franklin | 11 | 68,573 | 206,121 | 68,573 | 100.00 \% | 33.27 \% |

## County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| County | District | Total County Population | Total District Population | County Pop in District | Percent of County Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gaston | 44 | 227,943 | 203,043 | 16,714 | 7.33 \% | 8.23 \% |
|  | 45 | 227,943 | 211,229 | 211,229 | 92.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Gates | 1 | 10,478 | 199,623 | 10,478 | 100.00 \% | 5.25 \% |
| Graham | 50 | 8,030 | 213,909 | 8,030 | 100.00 \% | 3.75 \% |
| Granville | 12 | 60,992 | 198,389 | 60,992 | 100.00 \% | 30.74 \% |
| Greene | 9 | 20,451 | 216,568 | 20,451 | 100.00 \% | 9.44 \% |
| Guilford | 26 | 541,299 | 201,428 | 110,332 | 20.38 \% | 54.77 \% |
|  | 27 | 541,299 | 216,058 | 216,058 | 39.91 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 28 | 541,299 | 214,909 | 214,909 | 39.70 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Halifax | 2 | 48,622 | 198,557 | 48,622 | 100.00 \% | 24.49 \% |
| Harnett | 20 | 133,568 | 198,776 | 133,568 | 100.00 \% | 67.20 \% |
| Haywood | 46 | 62,089 | 218,487 | 23,299 | 37.53 \% | 10.66 \% |
|  | 50 | 62,089 | 213,909 | 38,790 | 62.47 \% | 18.13 \% |
| Henderson | 48 | 116,281 | 200,053 | 116,281 | 100.00 \% | 58.13 \% |
| Hertford | 1 | 21,552 | 199,623 | 21,552 | 100.00 \% | 10.80 \% |
| Hoke | 24 | 52,082 | 202,786 | 52,082 | 100.00 \% | 25.68 \% |
| Hyde | 2 | 4,589 | 198,557 | 4,589 | 100.00 \% | 2.31 \% |
| Iredell | 37 | 186,693 | 215,708 | 186,693 | 100.00 \% | 86.55 \% |
| Jackson | 50 | 43,109 | 213,909 | 43,109 | 100.00 \% | 20.15 \% |
| Johnston | 10 | 215,999 | 215,999 | 215,999 | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Jones | 8 | 9,172 | 204,809 | 9,172 | 100.00 \% | 4.48 \% |
| Lee | 20 | 63,285 | 198,776 | 63,285 | 100.00 \% | 31.84 \% |
| Lenoir | 3 | 55,122 | 200,494 | 55,122 | 100.00 \% | 27.49 \% |
| Lincoln | 44 | 86,810 | 203,043 | 86,810 | 100.00 \% | 42.75 \% |
| Macon | 50 | 37,014 | 213,909 | 37,014 | 100.00 \% | 17.30 \% |
| Madison | 46 | 21,193 | 218,487 | 21,193 | 100.00 \% | 9.70 \% |
| Martin | 2 | 22,031 | 198,557 | 22,031 | 100.00 \% | 11.10 \% |
| McDowell | 47 | 44,578 | 200,614 | 44,578 | 100.00 \% | 22.22 \% |
| Mecklenburg | 37 | 1,115,482 | 215,708 | 29,015 | 2.60 \% | 13.45 \% |
|  | 38 | 1,115,482 | 217,671 | 217,671 | 19.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 39 | 1,115,482 | 219,006 | 219,006 | 19.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 40 | 1,115,482 | 216,693 | 216,693 | 19.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 41 | 1,115,482 | 216,686 | 216,686 | 19.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 42 | 1,115,482 | 216,411 | 216,411 | 19.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Mitchell | 46 | 14,903 | 218,487 | 14,903 | 100.00 \% | 6.82 \% |
| Montgomery | 29 | 25,751 | 214,631 | 25,751 | 100.00 \% | 12.00 \% |
| Moore | 21 | 99,727 | 217,984 | 99,727 | 100.00 \% | 45.75 \% |
| Nash | 11 | 94,970 | 206,121 | 94,970 | 100.00 \% | 46.07 \% |
| New Hanover | 6 | 225,702 | 212,582 | 212,582 | 94.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 7 | 225,702 | 200,436 | 13,120 | 5.81 \% | 6.55 \% |
| Northampton | 1 | 17,471 | 199,623 | 17,471 | 100.00 \% | 8.75 \% |
| Onslow | 5 | 204,576 | 204,576 | 204,576 | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |

[^18]Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina
Printed 10/14/2021 [G20-CntyDist]

## County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| County | District | Total County Population | Total District Population | County Pop in District | Percent of County Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Orange | 23 | 148,696 | 210,529 | 148,696 | 100.00 \% | 70.63 \% |
| Pamlico | 2 | 12,276 | 198,557 | 12,276 | 100.00 \% | 6.18 \% |
| Pasquotank | 1 | 40,568 | 199,623 | 40,568 | 100.00 \% | 20.32 \% |
| Pender | 8 | 60,203 | 204,809 | 60,203 | 100.00 \% | 29.39 \% |
| Perquimans | 1 | 13,005 | 199,623 | 13,005 | 100.00 \% | 6.51 \% |
| Person | 23 | 39,097 | 210,529 | 39,097 | 100.00 \% | 18.57 \% |
| Pitt | 4 | 170,243 | 219,143 | 170,243 | 100.00 \% | 77.69 \% |
| Polk | 48 | 19,328 | 200,053 | 19,328 | 100.00 \% | 9.66 \% |
| Randolph | 25 | 144,171 | 218,484 | 47,069 | 32.65 \% | 21.54 \% |
|  | 29 | 144,171 | 214,631 | 97,102 | 67.35 \% | 45.24 \% |
| Richmond | 29 | 42,946 | 214,631 | 42,946 | 100.00 \% | 20.01 \% |
| Robeson | 24 | 116,530 | 202,786 | 116,530 | 100.00 \% | 57.46 \% |
| Rockingham | 26 | 91,096 | 201,428 | 91,096 | 100.00 \% | 45.23 \% |
| Rowan | 33 | 146,875 | 209,379 | 146,875 | 100.00 \% | 70.15 \% |
| Rutherford | 48 | 64,444 | 200,053 | 64,444 | 100.00 \% | 32.21 \% |
| Sampson | 8 | 59,036 | 204,809 | 57,113 | 96.74 \% | 27.89 \% |
|  | 20 | 59,036 | 198,776 | 1,923 | 3.26 \% | 0.97 \% |
| Scotland | 24 | 34,174 | 202,786 | 34,174 | 100.00 \% | 16.85 \% |
| Stanly | 33 | 62,504 | 209,379 | 62,504 | 100.00 \% | 29.85 \% |
| Stokes | 30 | 44,520 | 212,299 | 44,520 | 100.00 \% | 20.97 \% |
| Surry | 36 | 71,359 | 210,986 | 71,359 | 100.00 \% | 33.82 \% |
| Swain | 50 | 14,117 | 213,909 | 14,117 | 100.00 \% | 6.60 \% |
| Transylvania | 50 | 32,986 | 213,909 | 32,986 | 100.00 \% | 15.42 \% |
| Tyrrell | 1 | 3,245 | 199,623 | 3,245 | 100.00 \% | 1.63 \% |
| Union | 29 | 238,267 | 214,631 | 26,777 | 11.24 \% | 12.48 \% |
|  | 35 | 238,267 | 218,137 | 211,490 | 88.76 \% | 96.95 \% |
| Vance | 11 | 42,578 | 206,121 | 42,578 | 100.00 \% | 20.66 \% |
| Wake | 12 | 1,129,410 | 198,389 | 137,397 | 12.17 \% | 69.26 \% |
|  | 13 | 1,129,410 | 198,409 | 198,409 | 17.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 14 | 1,129,410 | 198,376 | 198,376 | 17.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 15 | 1,129,410 | 198,420 | 198,420 | 17.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 16 | 1,129,410 | 198,383 | 198,383 | 17.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 17 | 1,129,410 | 198,425 | 198,425 | 17.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
| Warren | 2 | 18,642 | 198,557 | 18,642 | 100.00 \% | 9.39 \% |
| Washington | 2 | 11,003 | 198,557 | 11,003 | 100.00 \% | 5.54 \% |
| Watauga | 46 | 54,086 | 218,487 | 54,086 | 100.00 \% | 24.75 \% |
| Wayne | 9 | 117,333 | 216,568 | 117,333 | 100.00 \% | 54.18 \% |
| Wilkes | 36 | 65,969 | 210,986 | 65,969 | 100.00 \% | 31.27 \% |
| Wilson | 9 | 78,784 | 216,568 | 78,784 | 100.00 \% | 36.38 \% |
| Yadkin | 36 | 37,214 | 210,986 | 37,214 | 100.00 \% | 17.64 \% |
| Yancey | 46 | 18,470 | 218,487 | 18,470 | 100.00 \% | 8.45 \% |
|  |  |  | Total: | 10,439,388 |  |  |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

## County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| County | District | Total County <br> Population | Total District <br> Population | County Pop in <br> District | Percent of County <br> Pop in District | Percent of District <br> Pop in County |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Number of split counties: 15
Display: all counties

[^19]District - County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | County | Total District Population | Total County Population | District Pop in County | Percent of District Pop in County | Percent of County Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bertie | 199,623 | 17,934 | 17,934 | 8.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Camden | 199,623 | 10,355 | 10,355 | 5.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Currituck | 199,623 | 28,100 | 28,100 | 14.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dare | 199,623 | 36,915 | 36,915 | 18.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gates | 199,623 | 10,478 | 10,478 | 5.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hertford | 199,623 | 21,552 | 21,552 | 10.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Northampton | 199,623 | 17,471 | 17,471 | 8.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pasquotank | 199,623 | 40,568 | 40,568 | 20.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Perquimans | 199,623 | 13,005 | 13,005 | 6.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tyrrell | 199,623 | 3,245 | 3,245 | 1.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 2 | Carteret | 198,557 | 67,686 | 67,686 | 34.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chowan | 198,557 | 13,708 | 13,708 | 6.90 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Halifax | 198,557 | 48,622 | 48,622 | 24.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hyde | 198,557 | 4,589 | 4,589 | 2.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Martin | 198,557 | 22,031 | 22,031 | 11.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pamlico | 198,557 | 12,276 | 12,276 | 6.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Warren | 198,557 | 18,642 | 18,642 | 9.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Washington | 198,557 | 11,003 | 11,003 | 5.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 3 | Beaufort | 200,494 | 44,652 | 44,652 | 22.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Craven | 200,494 | 100,720 | 100,720 | 50.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lenoir | 200,494 | 55,122 | 55,122 | 27.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 4 | Edgecombe | 219,143 | 48,900 | 48,900 | 22.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pitt | 219,143 | 170,243 | 170,243 | 77.69 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 5 | Onslow | 204,576 | 204,576 | 204,576 | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 6 | New Hanover | 212,582 | 225,702 | 212,582 | 100.00 \% | 94.19 \% |
| 7 | Brunswick | 200,436 | 136,693 | 136,693 | 68.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Columbus | 200,436 | 50,623 | 50,623 | 25.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | New Hanover | 200,436 | 225,702 | 13,120 | 6.55 \% | 5.81 \% |
| 8 | Bladen | 204,809 | 29,606 | 29,606 | 14.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Duplin | 204,809 | 48,715 | 48,715 | 23.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jones | 204,809 | 9,172 | 9,172 | 4.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pender | 204,809 | 60,203 | 60,203 | 29.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sampson | 204,809 | 59,036 | 57,113 | 27.89 \% | 96.74 \% |
| 9 | Greene | 216,568 | 20,451 | 20,451 | 9.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wayne | 216,568 | 117,333 | 117,333 | 54.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilson | 216,568 | 78,784 | 78,784 | 36.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 10 | Johnston | 215,999 | 215,999 | 215,999 | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 11 | Franklin | 206,121 | 68,573 | 68,573 | 33.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Nash | 206,121 | 94,970 | 94,970 | 46.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Vance | 206,121 | 42,578 | 42,578 | 20.66 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 12 | Granville | 198,389 | 60,992 | 60,992 | 30.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wake | 198,389 | 1,129,410 | 137,397 | 69.26 \% | 12.17 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina
[G20-DistCnty] - Generated 10/14/2021

District - County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | County | Total District Population | Total County Population | District Pop in County | Percent of District Pop in County | Percent of County Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 13 | Wake | 198,409 | 1,129,410 | 198,409 | 100.00 \% | 17.57 \% |
| 14 | Wake | 198,376 | 1,129,410 | 198,376 | 100.00 \% | 17.56 \% |
| 15 | Wake | 198,420 | 1,129,410 | 198,420 | 100.00 \% | 17.57 \% |
| 16 | Wake | 198,383 | 1,129,410 | 198,383 | 100.00 \% | 17.57 \% |
| 17 | Wake | 198,425 | 1,129,410 | 198,425 | 100.00 \% | 17.57 \% |
| 18 | Durham | 200,260 | 324,833 | 200,260 | 100.00 \% | 61.65 \% |
| 19 | Chatham | 200,858 | 76,285 | 76,285 | 37.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Durham | 200,858 | 324,833 | 124,573 | 62.02 \% | 38.35 \% |
| 20 | Harnett | 198,776 | 133,568 | 133,568 | 67.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lee | 198,776 | 63,285 | 63,285 | 31.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sampson | 198,776 | 59,036 | 1,923 | 0.97 \% | 3.26 \% |
| 21 | Cumberland | 217,984 | 334,728 | 118,257 | 54.25 \% | 35.33 \% |
|  | Moore | 217,984 | 99,727 | 99,727 | 45.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 22 | Cumberland | 216,471 | 334,728 | 216,471 | 100.00 \% | 64.67 \% |
| 23 | Caswell | 210,529 | 22,736 | 22,736 | 10.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Orange | 210,529 | 148,696 | 148,696 | 70.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Person | 210,529 | 39,097 | 39,097 | 18.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 24 | Hoke | 202,786 | 52,082 | 52,082 | 25.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Robeson | 202,786 | 116,530 | 116,530 | 57.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Scotland | 202,786 | 34,174 | 34,174 | 16.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 25 | Alamance | 218,484 | 171,415 | 171,415 | 78.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Randolph | 218,484 | 144,171 | 47,069 | 21.54 \% | 32.65 \% |
| 26 | Guilford | 201,428 | 541,299 | 110,332 | 54.77 \% | 20.38 \% |
|  | Rockingham | 201,428 | 91,096 | 91,096 | 45.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 27 | Guilford | 216,058 | 541,299 | 216,058 | 100.00 \% | 39.91 \% |
| 28 | Guilford | 214,909 | 541,299 | 214,909 | 100.00 \% | 39.70 \% |
| 29 | Anson | 214,631 | 22,055 | 22,055 | 10.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Montgomery | 214,631 | 25,751 | 25,751 | 12.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Randolph | 214,631 | 144,171 | 97,102 | 45.24 \% | 67.35 \% |
|  | Richmond | 214,631 | 42,946 | 42,946 | 20.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Union | 214,631 | 238,267 | 26,777 | 12.48 \% | 11.24 \% |
| 30 | Forsyth | 212,299 | 382,590 | 167,779 | 79.03 \% | 43.85 \% |
|  | Stokes | 212,299 | 44,520 | 44,520 | 20.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 31 | Forsyth | 214,811 | 382,590 | 214,811 | 100.00 \% | 56.15 \% |
| 32 | Davidson | 211,642 | 168,930 | 168,930 | 79.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Davie | 211,642 | 42,712 | 42,712 | 20.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 33 | Rowan | 209,379 | 146,875 | 146,875 | 70.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stanly | 209,379 | 62,504 | 62,504 | 29.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 34 | Cabarrus | 219,157 | 225,804 | 219,157 | 100.00 \% | 97.06 \% |
| 35 | Cabarrus | 218,137 | 225,804 | 6,647 | 3.05 \% | 2.94 \% |
|  | Union | 218,137 | 238,267 | 211,490 | 96.95 \% | 88.76 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

District - County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | County | Total District Population | Total County Population | District Pop in County | Percent of District Pop in County | Percent of County Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 36 | Alexander | 210,986 | 36,444 | 36,444 | 17.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Surry | 210,986 | 71,359 | 71,359 | 33.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilkes | 210,986 | 65,969 | 65,969 | 31.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Yadkin | 210,986 | 37,214 | 37,214 | 17.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 37 | Iredell | 215,708 | 186,693 | 186,693 | 86.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mecklenburg | 215,708 | 1,115,482 | 29,015 | 13.45 \% | 2.60 \% |
| 38 | Mecklenburg | 217,671 | 1,115,482 | 217,671 | 100.00 \% | 19.51 \% |
| 39 | Mecklenburg | 219,006 | 1,115,482 | 219,006 | 100.00 \% | 19.63 \% |
| 40 | Mecklenburg | 216,693 | 1,115,482 | 216,693 | 100.00 \% | 19.43 \% |
| 41 | Mecklenburg | 216,686 | 1,115,482 | 216,686 | 100.00 \% | 19.43 \% |
| 42 | Mecklenburg | 216,411 | 1,115,482 | 216,411 | 100.00 \% | 19.40 \% |
| 43 | Caldwell | 209,997 | 80,652 | 49,387 | 23.52 \% | 61.23 \% |
|  | Catawba | 209,997 | 160,610 | 160,610 | 76.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 44 | Cleveland | 203,043 | 99,519 | 99,519 | 49.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gaston | 203,043 | 227,943 | 16,714 | 8.23 \% | 7.33 \% |
|  | Lincoln | 203,043 | 86,810 | 86,810 | 42.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 45 | Gaston | 211,229 | 227,943 | 211,229 | 100.00 \% | 92.67 \% |
| 46 | Alleghany | 218,487 | 10,888 | 10,888 | 4.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ashe | 218,487 | 26,577 | 26,577 | 12.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Avery | 218,487 | 17,806 | 17,806 | 8.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Caldwell | 218,487 | 80,652 | 31,265 | 14.31 \% | 38.77 \% |
|  | Haywood | 218,487 | 62,089 | 23,299 | 10.66 \% | 37.53 \% |
|  | Madison | 218,487 | 21,193 | 21,193 | 9.70 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mitchell | 218,487 | 14,903 | 14,903 | 6.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Watauga | 218,487 | 54,086 | 54,086 | 24.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Yancey | 218,487 | 18,470 | 18,470 | 8.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 47 | Buncombe | 200,614 | 269,452 | 68,466 | 34.13 \% | 25.41 \% |
|  | Burke | 200,614 | 87,570 | 87,570 | 43.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McDowell | 200,614 | 44,578 | 44,578 | 22.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 48 | Henderson | 200,053 | 116,281 | 116,281 | 58.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Polk | 200,053 | 19,328 | 19,328 | 9.66 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford | 200,053 | 64,444 | 64,444 | 32.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 49 | Buncombe | 200,986 | 269,452 | 200,986 | 100.00 \% | 74.59 \% |
| 50 | Cherokee | 213,909 | 28,774 | 28,774 | 13.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clay | 213,909 | 11,089 | 11,089 | 5.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Graham | 213,909 | 8,030 | 8,030 | 3.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Haywood | 213,909 | 62,089 | 38,790 | 18.13 \% | 62.47 \% |
|  | Jackson | 213,909 | 43,109 | 43,109 | 20.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Macon | 213,909 | 37,014 | 37,014 | 17.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Swain | 213,909 | 14,117 | 14,117 | 6.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Transylvania | 213,909 | 32,986 | 32,986 | 15.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  |  |  | Total: | 10,439,388 |  |  |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina
[G20-DistCnty] - Generated 10/14/2021

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aberdeen | 21 | 8,516 | 217,984 | 8,516 | 100.00 \% | 3.91 \% |
| Ahoskie | 1 | 4,891 | 199,623 | 4,891 | 100.00 \% | 2.45 \% |
| Alamance | 25 | 988 | 218,484 | 988 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Albemarle | 33 | 16,432 | 209,379 | 16,432 | 100.00 \% | 7.85 \% |
| Alliance | 2 | 733 | 198,557 | 733 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Andrews | 50 | 1,667 | 213,909 | 1,667 | 100.00 \% | 0.78 \% |
| Angier | 16 | 5,265 | 198,383 | 556 | 10.56 \% | 0.28 \% |
|  | 20 | 5,265 | 198,776 | 4,709 | 89.44 \% | 2.37 \% |
| Ansonville | 29 | 440 | 214,631 | 440 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Apex | 16 | 58,780 | 198,383 | 34,326 | 58.40 \% | 17.30 \% |
|  | 17 | 58,780 | 198,425 | 24,454 | 41.60 \% | 12.32 \% |
| Arapahoe | 2 | 416 | 198,557 | 416 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Archdale | 28 | 11,907 | 214,909 | 380 | 3.19 \% | 0.18 \% |
|  | 29 | 11,907 | 214,631 | 11,527 | 96.81 \% | 5.37 \% |
| Archer Lodge | 10 | 4,797 | 215,999 | 4,797 | 100.00 \% | 2.22 \% |
| Asheboro | 25 | 27,156 | 218,484 | 925 | 3.41 \% | 0.42 \% |
|  | 29 | 27,156 | 214,631 | 26,231 | 96.59 \% | 12.22 \% |
| Asheville | 49 | 94,589 | 200,986 | 94,589 | 100.00 \% | 47.06 \% |
| Askewville | 1 | 184 | 199,623 | 184 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Atkinson | 8 | 296 | 204,809 | 296 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Atlantic Beach | 2 | 1,364 | 198,557 | 1,364 | 100.00 \% | 0.69 \% |
| Aulander | 1 | 763 | 199,623 | 763 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Aurora | 3 | 455 | 200,494 | 455 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Autryville | 8 | 167 | 204,809 | 167 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Ayden | 4 | 4,977 | 219,143 | 4,977 | 100.00 \% | 2.27 \% |
| Badin | 33 | 2,024 | 209,379 | 2,024 | 100.00 \% | 0.97 \% |
| Bailey | 11 | 568 | 206,121 | 568 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Bakersville | 46 | 450 | 218,487 | 450 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Bald Head Island | 7 | 268 | 200,436 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Banner Elk | 46 | 1,049 | 218,487 | 1,049 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Bath | 3 | 245 | 200,494 | 245 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Bayboro | 2 | 1,161 | 198,557 | 1,161 | 100.00 \% | 0.58 \% |
| Bear Grass | 2 | 89 | 198,557 | 89 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Beaufort | 2 | 4,464 | 198,557 | 4,464 | 100.00 \% | 2.25 \% |
| Beech Mountain | 46 | 675 | 218,487 | 675 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Belhaven | 3 | 1,410 | 200,494 | 1,410 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Belmont | 45 | 15,010 | 211,229 | 15,010 | 100.00 \% | 7.11 \% |
| Belville | 7 | 2,406 | 200,436 | 2,406 | 100.00 \% | 1.20 \% |
| Belwood | 44 | 857 | 203,043 | 857 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Benson | 10 | 3,967 | 215,999 | 3,967 | 100.00 \% | 1.84 \% |
|  | 20 | 3,967 | 198,776 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Bermuda Run | 32 | 3,120 | 211,642 | 3,120 | 100.00 \% | 1.47 \% |

[^20]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bessemer City | 44 | 5,428 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 45 | 5,428 | 211,229 | 5,428 | 100.00 \% | 2.57 \% |
| Bethania | 30 | 344 | 212,299 | 344 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Bethel | 4 | 1,373 | 219,143 | 1,373 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.63 \% |
| Beulaville | 8 | 1,116 | 204,809 | 1,116 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Biltmore Forest | 49 | 1,409 | 200,986 | 1,409 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Biscoe | 29 | 1,848 | 214,631 | 1,848 | 100.00 \% | 0.86 \% |
| Black Creek | 9 | 692 | 216,568 | 692 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.32 \% |
| Black Mountain | 47 | 8,426 | 200,614 | 8,426 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.20 \% |
| Bladenboro | 8 | 1,648 | 204,809 | 1,648 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.80 \% |
| Blowing Rock | 46 | 1,376 | 218,487 | 1,376 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.63 \% |
| Boardman | 7 | 166 | 200,436 | 166 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Bogue | 2 | 695 | 198,557 | 695 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.35 \% |
| Boiling Spring Lakes | 7 | 5,943 | 200,436 | 5,943 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.97 \% |
| Boiling Springs | 44 | 4,615 | 203,043 | 4,615 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.27 \% |
| Bolivia | 7 | 149 | 200,436 | 149 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Bolton | 7 | 519 | 200,436 | 519 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Boone | 46 | 19,092 | 218,487 | 19,092 | $100.00 \%$ | 8.74 \% |
| Boonville | 36 | 1,185 | 210,986 | 1,185 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.56 \% |
| Bostic | 48 | 355 | 200,053 | 355 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.18 \% |
| Brevard | 50 | 7,744 | 213,909 | 7,744 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.62 \% |
| Bridgeton | 3 | 349 | 200,494 | 349 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.17 \% |
| Broadway | 20 | 1,267 | 198,776 | 1,267 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.64 \% |
| Brookford | 43 | 442 | 209,997 | 442 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Brunswick | 7 | 973 | 200,436 | 973 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.49 \% |
| Bryson City | 50 | 1,558 | 213,909 | 1,558 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.73 \% |
| Bunn | 11 | 327 | 206,121 | 327 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.16 \% |
| Burgaw | 8 | 3,088 | 204,809 | 3,088 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.51 \% |
| Burlington | 25 | 57,303 | 218,484 | 55,481 | 96.82 \% | 25.39 \% |
|  | 26 | 57,303 | 201,428 | 1,822 | 3.18 \% | 0.90 \% |
| Burnsville | 46 | 1,614 | 218,487 | 1,614 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.74 \% |
| Butner | 12 | 8,397 | 198,389 | 8,397 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.23 \% |
| Cajah's Mountain | 43 | 2,722 | 209,997 | 2,722 | 100.00 \% | 1.30 \% |
|  | 46 | 2,722 | 218,487 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Calabash | 7 | 2,011 | 200,436 | 2,011 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Calypso | 8 | 327 | 204,809 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Cameron | 21 | 244 | 217,984 | 244 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Candor | 21 | 813 | 217,984 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 29 | 813 | 214,631 | 813 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Canton | 46 | 4,422 | 218,487 | 4,422 | 100.00 \% | 2.02 \% |
| Cape Carteret | 2 | 2,224 | 198,557 | 2,224 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |
| Carolina Beach | 6 | 6,564 | 212,582 | 6,564 | 100.00 \% | 3.09 \% |

[^21]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Carolina Shores | 7 | 4,588 | 200,436 | 4,588 | 100.00 \% | 2.29 \% |
| Carrboro | 23 | 21,295 | 210,529 | 21,295 | 100.00 \% | 10.11 \% |
| Carthage | 21 | 2,775 | 217,984 | 2,775 | 100.00 \% | 1.27 \% |
| Cary | 15 | 174,721 | 198,420 | 4,080 | 2.34 \% | 2.06 \% |
|  | 16 | 174,721 | 198,383 | 11,113 | 6.36 \% | 5.60 \% |
|  | 17 | 174,721 | 198,425 | 155,819 | 89.18 \% | 78.53 \% |
|  | 19 | 174,721 | 200,858 | 3,709 | 2.12 \% | 1.85 \% |
| Casar | 44 | 305 | 203,043 | 305 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Castalia | 11 | 264 | 206,121 | 264 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Caswell Beach | 7 | 395 | 200,436 | 395 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Catawba | 43 | 702 | 209,997 | 702 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Cedar Point | 2 | 1,764 | 198,557 | 1,764 | 100.00 \% | 0.89 \% |
| Cedar Rock | 43 | 301 | 209,997 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 46 | 301 | 218,487 | 301 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Cerro Gordo | 7 | 131 | 200,436 | 131 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Chadbourn | 7 | 1,574 | 200,436 | 1,574 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Chapel Hill | 18 | 61,960 | 200,260 | 2,322 | 3.75 \% | $1.16 \%$ |
|  | 19 | 61,960 | 200,858 | 584 | 0.94 \% | 0.29 \% |
|  | 23 | 61,960 | 210,529 | 59,054 | 95.31 \% | 28.05 \% |
| Charlotte | 38 | 874,579 | 217,671 | 121,442 | 13.89 \% | 55.79 \% |
|  | 39 | 874,579 | 219,006 | 210,910 | 24.12 \% | 96.30 \% |
|  | 40 | 874,579 | 216,693 | 216,685 | 24.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 41 | 874,579 | 216,686 | 153,144 | 17.51 \% | 70.68 \% |
|  | 42 | 874,579 | 216,411 | 172,398 | 19.71 \% | 79.66 \% |
| Cherryville | 44 | 6,078 | 203,043 | 6,078 | 100.00 \% | 2.99 \% |
| Chimney Rock Village | 48 | 140 | 200,053 | 140 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| China Grove | 33 | 4,434 | 209,379 | 4,434 | 100.00 \% | 2.12 \% |
| Chocowinity | 3 | 722 | 200,494 | 722 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Claremont | 43 | 1,692 | 209,997 | 1,692 | 100.00 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Clarkton | 8 | 614 | 204,809 | 614 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Clayton | 10 | 26,307 | 215,999 | 26,307 | 100.00 \% | 12.18 \% |
|  | 13 | 26,307 | 198,409 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Clemmons | 30 | 21,163 | 212,299 | 21,163 | 100.00 \% | 9.97 \% |
| Cleveland | 33 | 846 | 209,379 | 846 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Clinton | 8 | 8,383 | 204,809 | 8,383 | 100.00 \% | 4.09 \% |
| Clyde | 46 | 1,368 | 218,487 | 1,368 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |
| Coats | 20 | 2,155 | 198,776 | 2,155 | 100.00 \% | 1.08 \% |
| Cofield | 1 | 267 | 199,623 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Colerain | 1 | 217 | 199,623 | 217 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Columbia | 1 | 610 | 199,623 | 610 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Columbus | 48 | 1,060 | 200,053 | 1,060 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Como | 1 | 67 | 199,623 | 67 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |

[^22]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Concord | 34 | 105,240 | 219,157 | 105,240 | 100.00 \% | 48.02 \% |
| Conetoe | 4 | 198 | 219,143 | 198 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Connelly Springs | 47 | 1,529 | 200,614 | 1,529 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.76 \% |
| Conover | 43 | 8,421 | 209,997 | 8,421 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.01 \% |
| Conway | 1 | 752 | 199,623 | 752 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Cooleemee | 32 | 940 | 211,642 | 940 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Cornelius | 37 | 31,412 | 215,708 | 12,415 | 39.52 \% | 5.76 \% |
|  | 38 | 31,412 | 217,671 | 18,997 | 60.48 \% | 8.73 \% |
| Cove City | 3 | 378 | 200,494 | 378 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.19 \% |
| Cramerton | 45 | 5,296 | 211,229 | 5,296 | 100.00 \% | 2.51 \% |
| Creedmoor | 12 | 4,866 | 198,389 | 4,866 | 100.00 \% | 2.45 \% |
| Creswell | 2 | 207 | 198,557 | 207 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| Crossnore | 46 | 143 | 218,487 | 143 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.07 \% |
| Dallas | 45 | 5,927 | 211,229 | 5,927 | 100.00 \% | 2.81 \% |
| Danbury | 30 | 189 | 212,299 | 189 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Davidson | 37 | 15,106 | 215,708 | 15,106 | 100.00 \% | 7.00 \% |
| Dellview | 44 | 6 | 203,043 | 6 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.00 \% |
| Denton | 32 | 1,494 | 211,642 | 1,494 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.71 \% |
| Dillsboro | 50 | 213 | 213,909 | 213 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Dobbins Heights | 29 | 687 | 214,631 | 687 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.32 \% |
| Dobson | 36 | 1,462 | 210,986 | 1,462 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.69 \% |
| Dortches | 11 | 1,082 | 206,121 | 1,082 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.52 \% |
| Dover | 3 | 349 | 200,494 | 349 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.17 \% |
| Drexel | 47 | 1,760 | 200,614 | 1,760 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.88 \% |
| Dublin | 8 | 267 | 204,809 | 267 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Duck | 1 | 742 | 199,623 | 742 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.37 \% |
| Dunn | 20 | 8,446 | 198,776 | 8,446 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.25 \% |
| Durham | 14 | 283,506 | 198,376 | 269 | 0.09 \% | 0.14 \% |
|  | 15 | 283,506 | 198,420 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 18 | 283,506 | 200,260 | 195,933 | 69.11 \% | 97.84 \% |
|  | 19 | 283,506 | 200,858 | 87,160 | 30.74 \% | 43.39 \% |
|  | 23 | 283,506 | 210,529 | 144 | 0.05 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Earl | 44 | 198 | 203,043 | 198 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.10 \% |
| East Arcadia | 8 | 418 | 204,809 | 418 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.20 \% |
| East Bend | 36 | 634 | 210,986 | 634 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.30 \% |
| East Laurinburg | 24 | 234 | 202,786 | 234 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Eastover | 21 | 3,656 | 217,984 | 3,656 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.68 \% |
| East Spencer | 33 | 1,567 | 209,379 | 1,567 | 100.00 \% | 0.75 \% |
| Eden | 26 | 15,421 | 201,428 | 15,421 | $100.00 \%$ | 7.66 \% |
| Edenton | 2 | 4,460 | 198,557 | 4,460 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.25 \% |
| Elizabeth City | 1 | 18,631 | 199,623 | 18,631 | $100.00 \%$ | 9.33 \% |
| Elizabethtown | 8 | 3,296 | 204,809 | 3,296 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.61 \% |

[^23]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Elkin | 36 | 4,122 | 210,986 | 4,122 | 100.00 \% | 1.95 \% |
| Elk Park | 46 | 542 | 218,487 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Ellenboro | 48 | 723 | 200,053 | 723 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Ellerbe | 29 | 864 | 214,631 | 864 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.40 \% |
| Elm City | 9 | 1,218 | 216,568 | 1,218 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
|  | 11 | 1,218 | 206,121 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Elon | 25 | 11,336 | 218,484 | 11,336 | 100.00 \% | 5.19 \% |
| Emerald Isle | 2 | 3,847 | 198,557 | 3,847 | 100.00 \% | 1.94 \% |
| Enfield | 2 | 1,865 | 198,557 | 1,865 | 100.00 \% | 0.94 \% |
| Erwin | 20 | 4,542 | 198,776 | 4,542 | 100.00 \% | 2.28 \% |
| Eureka | 9 | 214 | 216,568 | 214 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Everetts | 2 | 150 | 198,557 | 150 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.08 \% |
| Fair Bluff | 7 | 709 | 200,436 | 709 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Fairmont | 24 | 2,191 | 202,786 | 2,191 | 100.00 \% | 1.08 \% |
| Fairview | 35 | 3,456 | 218,137 | 3,456 | 100.00 \% | 1.58 \% |
| Faison | 8 | 784 | 204,809 | 784 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Faith | 33 | 819 | 209,379 | 819 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.39 \% |
| Falcon | 8 | 324 | 204,809 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 21 | 324 | 217,984 | 324 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Falkland | 4 | 47 | 219,143 | 47 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Fallston | 44 | 627 | 203,043 | 627 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Farmville | 4 | 4,461 | 219,143 | 4,461 | 100.00 \% | 2.04 \% |
| Fayetteville | 21 | 208,501 | 217,984 | 24,573 | 11.79 \% | 11.27 \% |
|  | 22 | 208,501 | 216,471 | 183,928 | 88.21 \% | 84.97 \% |
| Flat Rock | 48 | 3,486 | 200,053 | 3,486 | 100.00 \% | 1.74 \% |
| Fletcher | 48 | 7,987 | 200,053 | 7,987 | 100.00 \% | 3.99 \% |
| Fontana Dam | 50 | 13 | 213,909 | 13 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Forest City | 48 | 7,377 | 200,053 | 7,377 | 100.00 \% | 3.69 \% |
| Forest Hills | 50 | 303 | 213,909 | 303 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Fountain | 4 | 385 | 219,143 | 385 | 100.00 \% | 0.18\% |
| Four Oaks | 10 | 2,158 | 215,999 | 2,158 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Foxfire | 21 | 1,288 | 217,984 | 1,288 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Franklin | 50 | 4,175 | 213,909 | 4,175 | 100.00 \% | 1.95 \% |
| Franklinton | 11 | 2,456 | 206,121 | 2,456 | 100.00 \% | 1.19 \% |
| Franklinville | 25 | 1,197 | 218,484 | 1,197 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Fremont | 9 | 1,196 | 216,568 | 1,196 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.55 \% |
| Fuquay-Varina | 16 | 34,152 | 198,383 | 34,152 | 100.00 \% | 17.22 \% |
|  | 20 | 34,152 | 198,776 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Gamewell | 43 | 3,702 | 209,997 | 3,702 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.76 \%$ |
|  | 46 | 3,702 | 218,487 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Garland | 8 | 595 | 204,809 | 595 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Garner | 13 | 31,159 | 198,409 | 26,967 | 86.55 \% | 13.59 \% |
|  | 15 | 31,159 | 198,420 | 490 | 1.57 \% | 0.25 \% |
|  | 16 | 31,159 | 198,383 | 3,702 | 11.88 \% | 1.87 \% |
| Garysburg | 1 | 904 | 199,623 | 904 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.45 \% |
| Gaston | 1 | 1,008 | 199,623 | 1,008 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.50 \% |
| Gastonia | 44 | 80,411 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 45 | 80,411 | 211,229 | 80,411 | 100.00 \% | 38.07 \% |
| Gatesville | 1 | 267 | 199,623 | 267 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Gibson | 24 | 449 | 202,786 | 449 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.22 \% |
| Gibsonville | 25 | 8,920 | 218,484 | 4,278 | 47.96 \% | 1.96 \% |
|  | 26 | 8,920 | 201,428 | 4,642 | 52.04 \% | 2.30 \% |
| Glen Alpine | 47 | 1,529 | 200,614 | 1,529 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.76 \% |
| Godwin | 21 | 128 | 217,984 | 128 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Goldsboro | 9 | 33,657 | 216,568 | 33,657 | $100.00 \%$ | 15.54 \% |
| Goldston | 19 | 234 | 200,858 | 234 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.12 \% |
| Graham | 25 | 17,157 | 218,484 | 17,157 | $100.00 \%$ | 7.85 \% |
| Grandfather Village | 46 | 95 | 218,487 | 95 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.04 \% |
| Granite Falls | 43 | 4,965 | 209,997 | 4,965 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.36 \% |
| Granite Quarry | 33 | 2,984 | 209,379 | 2,984 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.43 \% |
| Grantsboro | 2 | 692 | 198,557 | 692 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.35 \% |
| Greenevers | 8 | 567 | 204,809 | 567 | 100.00 \% | 0.28\% |
| Green Level | 25 | 3,152 | 218,484 | 3,152 | 100.00 \% | 1.44 \% |
| Greensboro | 26 | 299,035 | 201,428 | 12,873 | 4.30 \% | 6.39 \% |
|  | 27 | 299,035 | 216,058 | 204,686 | 68.45 \% | 94.74 \% |
|  | 28 | 299,035 | 214,909 | 81,476 | 27.25 \% | 37.91 \% |
| Greenville | 4 | 87,521 | 219,143 | 87,521 | 100.00 \% | 39.94 \% |
| Grifton | 3 | 2,448 | 200,494 | 147 | 6.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
|  | 4 | 2,448 | 219,143 | 2,301 | 94.00 \% | 1.05 \% |
| Grimesland | 4 | 386 | 219,143 | 386 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Grover | 44 | 802 | 203,043 | 802 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Halifax | 2 | 170 | 198,557 | 170 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Hamilton | 2 | 306 | 198,557 | 306 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Hamlet | 29 | 6,025 | 214,631 | 6,025 | 100.00 \% | 2.81 \% |
| Harmony | 37 | 543 | 215,708 | 543 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Harrells | 8 | 160 | 204,809 | 160 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Harrellsville | 1 | 85 | 199,623 | 85 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Harrisburg | 34 | 18,967 | 219,157 | 18,967 | 100.00 \% | 8.65 \% |
| Hassell | 2 | 49 | 198,557 | 49 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Havelock | 3 | 16,621 | 200,494 | 16,621 | 100.00 \% | 8.29 \% |
| Haw River | 25 | 2,252 | 218,484 | 2,252 | 100.00 \% | 1.03 \% |
| Hayesville | 50 | 461 | 213,909 | 461 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Hemby Bridge | 35 | 1,614 | 218,137 | 1,614 | 100.00 \% | 0.74 \% |

[^24]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Henderson | 11 | 15,060 | 206,121 | 15,060 | 100.00 \% | 7.31 \% |
| Hendersonville | 48 | 15,137 | 200,053 | 15,137 | 100.00 \% | 7.57 \% |
| Hertford | 1 | 1,934 | 199,623 | 1,934 | 100.00 \% | 0.97 \% |
| Hickory | 43 | 43,490 | 209,997 | 43,411 | 99.82 \% | 20.67 \% |
|  | 47 | 43,490 | 200,614 | 79 | 0.18 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Highlands | 50 | 1,072 | 213,909 | 1,072 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| High Point | 28 | 114,059 | 214,909 | 107,321 | 94.09 \% | 49.94 \% |
|  | 29 | 114,059 | 214,631 | 8 | 0.01 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 30 | 114,059 | 212,299 | 84 | 0.07 \% | 0.04 \% |
|  | 32 | 114,059 | 211,642 | 6,646 | 5.83 \% | 3.14 \% |
| High Shoals | 44 | 595 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 45 | 595 | 211,229 | 595 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.28 \% |
| Hildebran | 47 | 1,679 | 200,614 | 1,679 | 100.00 \% | 0.84 \% |
| Hillsborough | 23 | 9,660 | 210,529 | 9,660 | 100.00 \% | 4.59 \% |
| Hobgood | 2 | 268 | 198,557 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Hoffman | 29 | 418 | 214,631 | 418 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Holden Beach | 7 | 921 | 200,436 | 921 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.46 \% |
| Holly Ridge | 5 | 4,171 | 204,576 | 4,171 | 100.00 \% | 2.04 \% |
| Holly Springs | 16 | 41,239 | 198,383 | 41,239 | 100.00 \% | 20.79 \% |
| Hookerton | 9 | 413 | 216,568 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Hope Mills | 21 | 17,808 | 217,984 | 15,215 | 85.44 \% | 6.98 \% |
|  | 22 | 17,808 | 216,471 | 2,593 | 14.56 \% | 1.20 \% |
| Hot Springs | 46 | 520 | 218,487 | 520 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Hudson | 43 | 3,780 | 209,997 | 3,780 | 100.00 \% | 1.80 \% |
|  | 46 | 3,780 | 218,487 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Huntersville | 37 | 61,376 | 215,708 | 117 | 0.19 \% | 0.05 \% |
|  | 38 | 61,376 | 217,671 | 61,259 | 99.81 \% | 28.14 \% |
| Indian Beach | 2 | 223 | 198,557 | 223 | 100.00 \% | 0.11\% |
| Indian Trail | 35 | 39,997 | 218,137 | 39,997 | 100.00 \% | 18.34 \% |
| Jackson | 1 | 430 | 199,623 | 430 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Jacksonville | 5 | 72,723 | 204,576 | 72,723 | $100.00 \%$ | $35.55 \%$ |
| Jamestown | 28 | 3,668 | 214,909 | 3,668 | 100.00 \% | 1.71 \% |
| Jamesville | 2 | 424 | 198,557 | 424 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Jefferson | 46 | 1,622 | 218,487 | 1,622 | 100.00 \% | 0.74 \% |
| Jonesville | 36 | 2,308 | 210,986 | 2,308 | 100.00 \% | 1.09 \% |
| Kannapolis | 33 | 53,114 | 209,379 | 10,268 | 19.33 \% | 4.90 \% |
|  | 34 | 53,114 | 219,157 | 42,846 | 80.67 \% | 19.55 \% |
| Kelford | 1 | 203 | 199,623 | 203 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Kenansville | 8 | 770 | 204,809 | 770 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Kenly | 9 | 1,491 | 216,568 | 198 | 13.28 \% | 0.09 \% |
|  | 10 | 1,491 | 215,999 | 1,293 | 86.72 \% | 0.60 \% |

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kernersville | 26 | 26,449 | 201,428 | 94 | 0.36 \% | 0.05 \% |
|  | 28 | 26,449 | 214,909 | 408 | 1.54 \% | 0.19 \% |
|  | 30 | 26,449 | 212,299 | 25,947 | 98.10 \% | 12.22 \% |
| Kill Devil Hills | 1 | 7,656 | 199,623 | 7,656 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.84 \% |
| King | 30 | 7,197 | 212,299 | 7,197 | 100.00 \% | 3.39 \% |
| Kings Mountain | 44 | 11,142 | 203,043 | 10,032 | 90.04 \% | 4.94 \% |
|  | 45 | 11,142 | 211,229 | 1,110 | 9.96 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Kingstown | 44 | 656 | 203,043 | 656 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Kinston | 3 | 19,900 | 200,494 | 19,900 | $100.00 \%$ | 9.93 \% |
| Kittrell | 11 | 132 | 206,121 | 132 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Kitty Hawk | 1 | 3,689 | 199,623 | 3,689 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.85 \% |
| Knightdale | 12 | 19,435 | 198,389 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 13 | 19,435 | 198,409 | 19,435 | $100.00 \%$ | 9.80 \% |
| Kure Beach | 6 | 2,191 | 212,582 | 2,191 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.03 \% |
| La Grange | 3 | 2,595 | 200,494 | 2,595 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.29 \% |
| Lake Lure | 48 | 1,365 | 200,053 | 1,365 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.68 \% |
| Lake Park | 35 | 3,269 | 218,137 | 3,269 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.50 \% |
| Lake Santeetlah | 50 | 38 | 213,909 | 38 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Lake Waccamaw | 7 | 1,296 | 200,436 | 1,296 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.65 \% |
| Landis | 33 | 3,690 | 209,379 | 3,690 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.76 \% |
| Lansing | 46 | 126 | 218,487 | 126 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.06 \% |
| Lasker | 1 | 64 | 199,623 | 64 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.03 \% |
| Lattimore | 44 | 406 | 203,043 | 406 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.20 \% |
| Laurel Park | 48 | 2,250 | 200,053 | 2,250 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.12 \% |
| Laurinburg | 24 | 14,978 | 202,786 | 14,978 | $100.00 \%$ | 7.39 \% |
| Lawndale | 44 | 570 | 203,043 | 570 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.28 \% |
| Leggett | 4 | 37 | 219,143 | 37 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.02 \% |
| Leland | 7 | 22,908 | 200,436 | 22,908 | $100.00 \%$ | 11.43 \% |
| Lenoir | 43 | 18,352 | 209,997 | 1 | 0.01 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 46 | 18,352 | 218,487 | 18,351 | 99.99 \% | 8.40 \% |
| Lewiston Woodville | 1 | 426 | 199,623 | 426 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Lewisville | 30 | 13,381 | 212,299 | 13,381 | $100.00 \%$ | 6.30 \% |
| Lexington | 32 | 19,632 | 211,642 | 19,632 | 100.00 \% | 9.28 \% |
| Liberty | 25 | 2,655 | 218,484 | 2,655 | 100.00 \% | 1.22 \% |
| Lilesville | 29 | 395 | 214,631 | 395 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Lillington | 20 | 4,735 | 198,776 | 4,735 | 100.00 \% | 2.38 \% |
| Lincolnton | 44 | 11,091 | 203,043 | 11,091 | 100.00 \% | 5.46 \% |
| Linden | 21 | 136 | 217,984 | 136 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Littleton | 2 | 559 | 198,557 | 559 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Locust | 33 | 4,537 | 209,379 | 3,996 | 88.08 \% | 1.91 \% |
|  | 34 | 4,537 | 219,157 | 423 | 9.32 \% | 0.19 \% |
|  | 35 | 4,537 | 218,137 | 118 | 2.60 \% | 0.05 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Long View | 43 | 5,088 | 209,997 | 4,353 | 85.55 \% | 2.07 \% |
|  | 47 | 5,088 | 200,614 | 735 | 14.45 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Louisburg | 11 | 3,064 | 206,121 | 3,064 | 100.00 \% | 1.49 \% |
| Love Valley | 37 | 154 | 215,708 | 154 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Lowell | 45 | 3,654 | 211,229 | 3,654 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.73 \% |
| Lucama | 9 | 1,036 | 216,568 | 1,036 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Lumber Bridge | 24 | 82 | 202,786 | 82 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Lumberton | 24 | 19,025 | 202,786 | 19,025 | 100.00 \% | 9.38 \% |
| McAdenville | 45 | 890 | 211,229 | 890 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Macclesfield | 4 | 413 | 219,143 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| McDonald | 24 | 94 | 202,786 | 94 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| McFarlan | 29 | 94 | 214,631 | 94 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Macon | 2 | 110 | 198,557 | 110 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Madison | 26 | 2,129 | 201,428 | 2,129 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.06 \%$ |
| Maggie Valley | 50 | 1,687 | 213,909 | 1,687 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Magnolia | 8 | 831 | 204,809 | 831 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Maiden | 43 | 3,736 | 209,997 | 3,736 | 100.00 \% | 1.78 \% |
|  | 44 | 3,736 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Manteo | 1 | 1,600 | 199,623 | 1,600 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.80 \% |
| Marietta | 24 | 111 | 202,786 | 111 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Marion | 47 | 7,717 | 200,614 | 7,717 | 100.00 \% | 3.85 \% |
| Marshall | 46 | 777 | 218,487 | 777 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Mars Hill | 46 | 2,007 | 218,487 | 2,007 | 100.00 \% | 0.92 \% |
| Marshville | 29 | 2,522 | 214,631 | 2,522 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.18 \% |
| Marvin | 35 | 6,358 | 218,137 | 6,358 | 100.00 \% | 2.91 \% |
| Matthews | 41 | 29,435 | 216,686 | 29,435 | 100.00 \% | 13.58 \% |
| Maxton | 24 | 2,110 | 202,786 | 2,110 | 100.00 \% | 1.04 \% |
| Mayodan | 26 | 2,418 | 201,428 | 2,418 | 100.00 \% | 1.20 \% |
| Maysville | 8 | 818 | 204,809 | 818 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Mebane | 23 | 17,797 | 210,529 | 3,171 | 17.82 \% | 1.51 \% |
|  | 25 | 17,797 | 218,484 | 14,626 | 82.18 \% | 6.69 \% |
| Mesic | 2 | 144 | 198,557 | 144 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Micro | 10 | 458 | 215,999 | 458 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Middleburg | 11 | 101 | 206,121 | 101 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Middlesex | 11 | 912 | 206,121 | 912 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Midland | 34 | 4,684 | 219,157 | 25 | 0.53 \% | 0.01 \% |
|  | 35 | 4,684 | 218,137 | 4,659 | 99.47 \% | 2.14 \% |
|  | 41 | 4,684 | 216,686 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Midway | 32 | 4,742 | 211,642 | 4,742 | 100.00 \% | 2.24 \% |
| Mills River | 48 | 7,078 | 200,053 | 7,078 | 100.00 \% | 3.54 \% |
| Milton | 23 | 155 | 210,529 | 155 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Mineral Springs | 35 | 3,159 | 218,137 | 3,159 | 100.00 \% | 1.45 \% |

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Minnesott Beach | 2 | 530 | 198,557 | 530 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Mint Hill | 35 | 26,450 | 218,137 | 6 | 0.02 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 39 | 26,450 | 219,006 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 41 | 26,450 | 216,686 | 26,444 | 99.98 \% | 12.20 \% |
| Misenheimer | 33 | 650 | 209,379 | 650 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Mocksville | 32 | 5,900 | 211,642 | 5,900 | 100.00 \% | 2.79 \% |
| Momeyer | 11 | 277 | 206,121 | 277 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Monroe | 35 | 34,562 | 218,137 | 34,562 | 100.00 \% | 15.84 \% |
| Montreat | 47 | 901 | 200,614 | 901 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Mooresboro | 44 | 293 | 203,043 | 293 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Mooresville | 37 | 50,193 | 215,708 | 50,193 | 100.00 \% | 23.27 \% |
| Morehead City | 2 | 9,556 | 198,557 | 9,556 | 100.00 \% | 4.81 \% |
| Morganton | 47 | 17,474 | 200,614 | 17,474 | 100.00 \% | 8.71 \% |
| Morrisville | 15 | 29,630 | 198,420 | 18,571 | 62.68 \% | 9.36 \% |
|  | 17 | 29,630 | 198,425 | 10,852 | 36.63 \% | 5.47 \% |
|  | 19 | 29,630 | 200,858 | 207 | 0.70 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Morven | 29 | 329 | 214,631 | 329 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Mount Airy | 36 | 10,676 | 210,986 | 10,676 | 100.00 \% | 5.06 \% |
| Mount Gilead | 29 | 1,171 | 214,631 | 1,171 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Mount Holly | 45 | 17,703 | 211,229 | 17,703 | 100.00 \% | 8.38 \% |
| Mount Olive | 8 | 4,198 | 204,809 | 5 | 0.12 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 9 | 4,198 | 216,568 | 4,193 | 99.88 \% | 1.94 \% |
| Mount Pleasant | 34 | 1,671 | 219,157 | 1,671 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Murfreesboro | 1 | 2,619 | 199,623 | 2,619 | 100.00 \% | 1.31 \% |
| Murphy | 50 | 1,608 | 213,909 | 1,608 | 100.00 \% | 0.75 \% |
| Nags Head | 1 | 3,168 | 199,623 | 3,168 | 100.00 \% | 1.59 \% |
| Nashville | 11 | 5,632 | 206,121 | 5,632 | 100.00 \% | 2.73 \% |
| Navassa | 7 | 1,367 | 200,436 | 1,367 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| New Bern | 3 | 31,291 | 200,494 | 31,291 | 100.00 \% | 15.61 \% |
| Newland | 46 | 715 | 218,487 | 715 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| New London | 33 | 607 | 209,379 | 607 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Newport | 2 | 4,364 | 198,557 | 4,364 | 100.00 \% | 2.20 \% |
| Newton | 43 | 13,148 | 209,997 | 13,148 | 100.00 \% | 6.26 \% |
| Newton Grove | 8 | 585 | 204,809 | 585 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Norlina | 2 | 920 | 198,557 | 920 | 100.00 \% | 0.46 \% |
| Norman | 29 | 100 | 214,631 | 100 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| North Topsail Beach | 5 | 1,005 | 204,576 | 1,005 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Northwest | 7 | 703 | 200,436 | 703 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| North Wilkesboro | 36 | 4,382 | 210,986 | 4,382 | 100.00 \% | 2.08 \% |
| Norwood | 33 | 2,367 | 209,379 | 2,367 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Oakboro | 33 | 2,128 | 209,379 | 2,128 | 100.00 \% | 1.02 \% |
| Oak City | 2 | 266 | 198,557 | 266 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |

[^25]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oak Island | 7 | 8,396 | 200,436 | 8,396 | 100.00 \% | 4.19 \% |
| Oak Ridge | 26 | 7,474 | 201,428 | 7,474 | 100.00 \% | 3.71 \% |
| Ocean Isle Beach | 7 | 867 | 200,436 | 867 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Old Fort | 47 | 811 | 200,614 | 811 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Oriental | 2 | 880 | 198,557 | 880 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Orrum | 24 | 59 | 202,786 | 59 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Ossipee | 25 | 536 | 218,484 | 536 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Oxford | 12 | 8,628 | 198,389 | 8,628 | 100.00 \% | 4.35 \% |
| Pantego | 3 | 164 | 200,494 | 164 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Parkton | 24 | 504 | 202,786 | 504 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Parmele | 2 | 243 | 198,557 | 243 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Patterson Springs | 44 | 571 | 203,043 | 571 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Peachland | 29 | 390 | 214,631 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Peletier | 2 | 769 | 198,557 | 769 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Pembroke | 24 | 2,823 | 202,786 | 2,823 | 100.00 \% | 1.39 \% |
| Pikeville | 9 | 712 | 216,568 | 712 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Pilot Mountain | 36 | 1,440 | 210,986 | 1,440 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| Pinebluff | 21 | 1,473 | 217,984 | 1,473 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| Pinehurst | 21 | 17,581 | 217,984 | 17,581 | 100.00 \% | 8.07 \% |
| Pine Knoll Shores | 2 | 1,388 | 198,557 | 1,388 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Pine Level | 10 | 2,046 | 215,999 | 2,046 | 100.00 \% | 0.95 \% |
| Pinetops | 4 | 1,200 | 219,143 | 1,200 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Pineville | 41 | 10,602 | 216,686 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Pineville | 42 | 10,602 | 216,411 | 10,602 | 100.00 \% | 4.90 \% |
| Pink Hill | 3 | 451 | 200,494 | 451 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Pittsboro | 19 | 4,537 | 200,858 | 4,537 | 100.00 \% | 2.26 \% |
| Pleasant Garden | 26 | 5,000 | 201,428 | 5,000 | 100.00 \% | 2.48 \% |
| Plymouth | 2 | 3,320 | 198,557 | 3,320 | 100.00 \% | 1.67 \% |
| Polkton | 29 | 2,250 | 214,631 | 2,250 | 100.00 \% | 1.05 \% |
| Polkville | 44 | 516 | 203,043 | 516 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Pollocksville | 8 | 268 | 204,809 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Powellsville | 1 | 189 | 199,623 | 189 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Princeton | 10 | 1,315 | 215,999 | 1,315 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Princeville | 4 | 1,254 | 219,143 | 1,254 | 100.00 \% | 0.57 \% |
| Proctorville | 24 | 121 | 202,786 | 121 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Raeford | 24 | 4,559 | 202,786 | 4,559 | 100.00 \% | 2.25 \% |
| Raleigh | 12 | 467,665 | 198,389 | 7,009 | 1.50 \% | 3.53 \% |
|  | 13 | 467,665 | 198,409 | 105,867 | 22.64 \% | 53.36 \% |
|  | 14 | 467,665 | 198,376 | 187,340 | 40.06 \% | 94.44 \% |
|  | 15 | 467,665 | 198,420 | 165,880 | 35.47 \% | 83.60 \% |
|  | 17 | 467,665 | 198,425 | 10 | 0.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
|  | 19 | 467,665 | 200,858 | 1,559 | 0.33 \% | 0.78 \% |

[^26]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
[G20-MuniDist] - Generated 10/14/2021

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ramseur | 25 | 1,774 | 218,484 | 1,774 | 100.00 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Randleman | 25 | 4,595 | 218,484 | 4,595 | 100.00 \% | 2.10 \% |
|  | 29 | 4,595 | 214,631 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Ranlo | 45 | 4,511 | 211,229 | 4,511 | 100.00 \% | 2.14 \% |
| Raynham | 24 | 60 | 202,786 | 60 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Red Cross | 33 | 762 | 209,379 | 762 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Red Oak | 11 | 3,342 | 206,121 | 3,342 | 100.00 \% | 1.62 \% |
| Red Springs | 24 | 3,087 | 202,786 | 3,087 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.52 \% |
| Reidsville | 26 | 14,583 | 201,428 | 14,583 | 100.00 \% | 7.24 \% |
| Rennert | 24 | 275 | 202,786 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Rhodhiss | 43 | 997 | 209,997 | 358 | 35.91 \% | 0.17 \% |
|  | 47 | 997 | 200,614 | 639 | 64.09 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Richfield | 33 | 582 | 209,379 | 582 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Richlands | 5 | 2,287 | 204,576 | 2,287 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.12 \% |
| Rich Square | 1 | 894 | 199,623 | 894 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| River Bend | 3 | 2,902 | 200,494 | 2,902 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.45 \% |
| Roanoke Rapids | 2 | 15,229 | 198,557 | 15,229 | 100.00 \% | 7.67 \% |
| Robbins | 21 | 1,168 | 217,984 | 1,168 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Robbinsville | 50 | 597 | 213,909 | 597 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Robersonville | 2 | 1,269 | 198,557 | 1,269 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.64 \% |
| Rockingham | 29 | 9,243 | 214,631 | 9,243 | $100.00 \%$ | 4.31 \% |
| Rockwell | 33 | 2,302 | 209,379 | 2,302 | 100.00 \% | 1.10 \% |
| Rocky Mount | 4 | 54,341 | 219,143 | 15,414 | 28.37 \% | 7.03 \% |
|  | 11 | 54,341 | 206,121 | 38,927 | 71.63 \% | 18.89 \% |
| Rolesville | 12 | 9,475 | 198,389 | 9,475 | 100.00 \% | 4.78 \% |
| Ronda | 36 | 438 | 210,986 | 438 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.21 \% |
| Roper | 2 | 485 | 198,557 | 485 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.24 \% |
| Roseboro | 8 | 1,163 | 204,809 | 1,163 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.57 \% |
| Rose Hill | 8 | 1,371 | 204,809 | 1,371 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Rosman | 50 | 701 | 213,909 | 701 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Rowland | 24 | 885 | 202,786 | 885 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Roxboro | 23 | 8,134 | 210,529 | 8,134 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.86 \% |
| Roxobel | 1 | 187 | 199,623 | 187 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Rural Hall | 30 | 3,351 | 212,299 | 3,351 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.58 \% |
| Ruth | 48 | 347 | 200,053 | 347 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Rutherford College | 43 | 1,226 | 209,997 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 47 | 1,226 | 200,614 | 1,226 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Rutherfordton | 48 | 3,640 | 200,053 | 3,640 | 100.00 \% | 1.82 \% |
| St. Helena | 8 | 417 | 204,809 | 417 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.20 \% |
| St. James | 7 | 6,529 | 200,436 | 6,529 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.26 \% |
| St. Pauls | 24 | 2,045 | 202,786 | 2,045 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.01 \% |
| Salemburg | 8 | 457 | 204,809 | 457 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salisbury | 33 | 35,540 | 209,379 | 35,540 | 100.00 \% | 16.97 \% |
| Saluda | 48 | 631 | 200,053 | 631 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Sandy Creek | 7 | 248 | 200,436 | 248 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Sandyfield | 7 | 430 | 200,436 | 430 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Sanford | 20 | 30,261 | 198,776 | 30,261 | 100.00 \% | 15.22 \% |
| Saratoga | 9 | 353 | 216,568 | 353 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Sawmills | 43 | 5,020 | 209,997 | 5,020 | 100.00 \% | 2.39 \% |
| Scotland Neck | 2 | 1,640 | 198,557 | 1,640 | 100.00 \% | 0.83 \% |
| Seaboard | 1 | 542 | 199,623 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Seagrove | 25 | 235 | 218,484 | 235 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Sedalia | 26 | 676 | 201,428 | 676 | 100.00 \% | 0.34 \% |
|  | 27 | 676 | 216,058 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Selma | 10 | 6,317 | 215,999 | 6,317 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.92 \% |
| Seven Devils | 46 | 313 | 218,487 | 313 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.14 \% |
| Seven Springs | 9 | 55 | 216,568 | 55 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Severn | 1 | 191 | 199,623 | 191 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Shallotte | 7 | 4,185 | 200,436 | 4,185 | 100.00 \% | 2.09 \% |
| Sharpsburg | 4 | 1,697 | 219,143 | 215 | 12.67 \% | 0.10 \% |
|  | 9 | 1,697 | 216,568 | 421 | 24.81 \% | 0.19 \% |
|  | 11 | 1,697 | 206,121 | 1,061 | 62.52 \% | 0.51 \% |
| Shelby | 44 | 21,918 | 203,043 | 21,918 | $100.00 \%$ | 10.79 \% |
| Siler City | 19 | 7,702 | 200,858 | 7,702 | 100.00 \% | 3.83 \% |
| Simpson | 4 | 390 | 219,143 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Sims | 9 | 275 | 216,568 | 275 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.13 \% |
| Smithfield | 10 | 11,292 | 215,999 | 11,292 | 100.00 \% | 5.23 \% |
| Snow Hill | 9 | 1,481 | 216,568 | 1,481 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.68 \% |
| Southern Pines | 21 | 15,545 | 217,984 | 15,545 | $100.00 \%$ | 7.13 \% |
| Southern Shores | 1 | 3,090 | 199,623 | 3,090 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.55 \% |
| Southport | 7 | 3,971 | 200,436 | 3,971 | 100.00 \% | 1.98 \% |
| Sparta | 46 | 1,834 | 218,487 | 1,834 | 100.00 \% | 0.84 \% |
| Speed | 4 | 63 | 219,143 | 63 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Spencer | 33 | 3,308 | 209,379 | 3,308 | 100.00 \% | 1.58 \% |
| Spencer Mountain | 45 | 0 | 211,229 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Spindale | 48 | 4,225 | 200,053 | 4,225 | 100.00 \% | 2.11 \% |
| Spring Hope | 11 | 1,309 | 206,121 | 1,309 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Spring Lake | 21 | 11,660 | 217,984 | 11,660 | $100.00 \%$ | 5.35 \% |
| Spruce Pine | 46 | 2,194 | 218,487 | 2,194 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Staley | 25 | 397 | 218,484 | 397 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Stallings | 35 | 16,112 | 218,137 | 15,728 | 97.62 \% | 7.21 \% |
|  | 41 | 16,112 | 216,686 | 384 | 2.38 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Stanfield | 33 | 1,585 | 209,379 | 1,585 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Stanley | 45 | 3,963 | 211,229 | 3,963 | 100.00 \% | 1.88 \% |

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Stantonsburg | 9 | 762 | 216,568 | 762 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Star | 29 | 806 | 214,631 | 806 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Statesville | 37 | 28,419 | 215,708 | 28,419 | 100.00 \% | 13.17 \% |
| Stedman | 21 | 1,277 | 217,984 | 1,277 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.59 \% |
| Stem | 12 | 960 | 198,389 | 960 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Stokesdale | 26 | 5,924 | 201,428 | 5,924 | 100.00 \% | 2.94 \% |
| Stoneville | 26 | 1,308 | 201,428 | 1,308 | 100.00 \% | 0.65 \% |
| Stonewall | 2 | 214 | 198,557 | 214 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Stovall | 12 | 324 | 198,389 | 324 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.16 \% |
| Sugar Mountain | 46 | 371 | 218,487 | 371 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Summerfield | 26 | 10,951 | 201,428 | 10,951 | 100.00 \% | 5.44 \% |
| Sunset Beach | 7 | 4,175 | 200,436 | 4,175 | 100.00 \% | 2.08 \% |
| Surf City | 5 | 3,867 | 204,576 | 334 | 8.64 \% | 0.16 \% |
|  | 8 | 3,867 | 204,809 | 3,533 | $91.36 \%$ | 1.73 \% |
| Swansboro | 5 | 3,744 | 204,576 | 3,744 | 100.00 \% | 1.83 \% |
| Swepsonville | 25 | 2,445 | 218,484 | 2,445 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |
| Sylva | 50 | 2,578 | 213,909 | 2,578 | 100.00 \% | 1.21 \% |
| Tabor City | 7 | 3,781 | 200,436 | 3,781 | 100.00 \% | 1.89 \% |
| Tarboro | 4 | 10,721 | 219,143 | 10,721 | 100.00 \% | 4.89 \% |
| Tar Heel | 8 | 90 | 204,809 | 90 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Taylorsville | 36 | 2,320 | 210,986 | 2,320 | 100.00 \% | 1.10 \% |
| Taylortown | 21 | 634 | 217,984 | 634 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Teachey | 8 | 448 | 204,809 | 448 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Thomasville | 29 | 27,183 | 214,631 | 521 | 1.92 \% | 0.24 \% |
|  | 32 | 27,183 | 211,642 | 26,662 | 98.08 \% | 12.60 \% |
| Tobaccoville | 30 | 2,578 | 212,299 | 2,578 | 100.00 \% | 1.21 \% |
| Topsail Beach | 8 | 461 | 204,809 | 461 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Trenton | 8 | 238 | 204,809 | 238 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Trent Woods | 3 | 4,074 | 200,494 | 4,074 | 100.00 \% | 2.03 \% |
| Trinity | 29 | 7,006 | 214,631 | 7,006 | 100.00 \% | 3.26 \% |
| Troutman | 37 | 3,698 | 215,708 | 3,698 | 100.00 \% | 1.71 \% |
| Troy | 29 | 2,850 | 214,631 | 2,850 | 100.00 \% | 1.33 \% |
| Tryon | 48 | 1,562 | 200,053 | 1,562 | 100.00 \% | 0.78 \% |
| Turkey | 8 | 213 | 204,809 | 213 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Unionville | 35 | 6,643 | 218,137 | 6,643 | 100.00 \% | 3.05 \% |
| Valdese | 47 | 4,689 | 200,614 | 4,689 | 100.00 \% | 2.34 \% |
| Vanceboro | 3 | 869 | 200,494 | 869 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Vandemere | 2 | 246 | 198,557 | 246 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Varnamtown | 7 | 525 | 200,436 | 525 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Vass | 21 | 952 | 217,984 | 952 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Waco | 44 | 310 | 203,043 | 310 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Wade | 21 | 638 | 217,984 | 638 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Wadesboro | 29 | 5,008 | 214,631 | 5,008 | 100.00 \% | 2.33 \% |
| Wagram | 24 | 615 | 202,786 | 615 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Wake Forest | 11 | 47,601 | 206,121 | 1,504 | 3.16 \% | 0.73 \% |
|  | 12 | 47,601 | 198,389 | 44,497 | 93.48 \% | 22.43 \% |
|  | 14 | 47,601 | 198,376 | 1,600 | 3.36 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Walkertown | 30 | 5,692 | 212,299 | 5,692 | 100.00 \% | 2.68 \% |
| Wallace | 8 | 3,413 | 204,809 | 3,413 | 100.00 \% | 1.67 \% |
| Wallburg | 32 | 3,051 | 211,642 | 3,051 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.44 \% |
| Walnut Cove | 30 | 1,586 | 212,299 | 1,586 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.75 \% |
| Walnut Creek | 9 | 1,084 | 216,568 | 1,084 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Walstonburg | 9 | 193 | 216,568 | 193 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.09 \% |
| Warrenton | 2 | 851 | 198,557 | 851 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Warsaw | 8 | 2,733 | 204,809 | 2,733 | 100.00 \% | 1.33 \% |
| Washington | 3 | 9,875 | 200,494 | 9,875 | 100.00 \% | 4.93 \% |
| Washington Park | 3 | 392 | 200,494 | 392 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Watha | 8 | 181 | 204,809 | 181 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Waxhaw | 29 | 20,534 | 214,631 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 35 | 20,534 | 218,137 | 20,534 | 100.00 \% | 9.41 \% |
| Waynesville | 50 | 10,140 | 213,909 | 10,140 | 100.00 \% | 4.74 \% |
| Weaverville | 47 | 4,567 | 200,614 | 4,567 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.28 \% |
| Webster | 50 | 372 | 213,909 | 372 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Weddington | 35 | 13,181 | 218,137 | 13,176 | 99.96 \% | 6.04 \% |
|  | 41 | 13,181 | 216,686 | 5 | 0.04 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Weldon | 2 | 1,444 | 198,557 | 1,444 | 100.00 \% | 0.73 \% |
| Wendell | 12 | 9,793 | 198,389 | 3,180 | 32.47 \% | 1.60 \% |
|  | 13 | 9,793 | 198,409 | 6,613 | 67.53 \% | 3.33 \% |
| Wentworth | 26 | 2,662 | 201,428 | 2,662 | 100.00 \% | 1.32 \% |
| Wesley Chapel | 35 | 8,681 | 218,137 | 8,681 | $100.00 \%$ | 3.98 \% |
| West Jefferson | 46 | 1,279 | 218,487 | 1,279 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.59 \% |
| Whispering Pines | 21 | 4,987 | 217,984 | 4,987 | 100.00 \% | 2.29 \% |
| Whitakers | 4 | 627 | 219,143 | 290 | 46.25 \% | 0.13 \% |
|  | 11 | 627 | 206,121 | 337 | 53.75 \% | 0.16 \% |
| White Lake | 8 | 843 | 204,809 | 843 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Whiteville | 7 | 4,766 | 200,436 | 4,766 | 100.00 \% | 2.38 \% |
| Whitsett | 26 | 584 | 201,428 | 584 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.29 \% |
| Wilkesboro | 36 | 3,687 | 210,986 | 3,687 | $100.00 \%$ | 1.75 \% |
| Williamston | 2 | 5,248 | 198,557 | 5,248 | $100.00 \%$ | 2.64 \% |
| Wilmington | 6 | 115,451 | 212,582 | 115,451 | $100.00 \%$ | 54.31 \% |
|  | 7 | 115,451 | 200,436 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Wilson | 9 | 47,851 | 216,568 | 47,851 | $100.00 \%$ | $22.10 \%$ |
| Wilson's Mills | 10 | 2,534 | 215,999 | 2,534 | 100.00 \% | 1.17 \% |
| Windsor | 1 | 3,582 | 199,623 | 3,582 | 100.00 \% | 1.79 \% |

[^27]Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District <br> Population | Muni Pop in <br> District | Percent of Muni <br> Pop in District | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Winfall | 1 | 555 | 199,623 | 555 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.28 \%$ |
| Wingate | 29 | 4,055 | 214,631 | 4,055 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.89 \%$ |
| Winston-Salem | 30 | 249,545 | 212,299 | 40,795 | $16.35 \%$ | $19.22 \%$ |
|  | 31 | 249,545 | 214,811 | 208,750 | $83.65 \%$ | $97.18 \%$ |
| Winterville | 4 | 10,462 | 219,143 | 10,462 | $100.00 \%$ | $4.77 \%$ |
| Winton | 1 | 629 | 199,623 | 629 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.32 \%$ |
| Woodfin | 49 | 7,936 | 200,986 | 7,936 | $100.00 \%$ | $3.95 \%$ |
| Woodland | 1 | 557 | 199,623 | 557 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.28 \%$ |
| Wrightsville Beach | 6 | 2,473 | 212,582 | 2,473 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.16 \%$ |
| Yadkinville | 36 | 2,995 | 210,986 | 2,995 | $100.00 \%$ | $1.42 \%$ |
| Yanceyville | 1,937 | 210,529 | 1,937 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.92 \%$ |  |
| Youngsville | 23 | 2,016 | 206,121 | 2,016 | $100.00 \%$ | 0.9 |
| Zebulon | 6,903 | 215,999 |  | 0 | $0.00 \%$ |  |

Number of split municipalities: 65
Display: all municipalities

- Ex. 6346 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aberdeen | 21 | 8,516 | 217,984 | 8,516 | 100.00 \% | 3.91 \% |
| Ahoskie | 1 | 4,891 | 199,623 | 4,891 | 100.00 \% | 2.45 \% |
| Alamance | 25 | 988 | 218,484 | 988 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Albemarle | 33 | 16,432 | 209,379 | 16,432 | 100.00 \% | 7.85 \% |
| Alliance | 2 | 733 | 198,557 | 733 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Andrews | 50 | 1,667 | 213,909 | 1,667 | 100.00 \% | 0.78 \% |
| Angier (Harnett) | 20 | 4,709 | 198,776 | 4,709 | 100.00 \% | 2.37 \% |
| Angier (Wake) | 16 | 556 | 198,383 | 556 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Ansonville | 29 | 440 | 214,631 | 440 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Apex | 16 | 58,780 | 198,383 | 34,326 | 58.40 \% | 17.30 \% |
|  | 17 | 58,780 | 198,425 | 24,454 | 41.60 \% | 12.32 \% |
| Arapahoe | 2 | 416 | 198,557 | 416 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Archdale (Guilford) | 28 | 380 | 214,909 | 380 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Archdale (Randolph) | 29 | 11,527 | 214,631 | 11,527 | 100.00 \% | 5.37 \% |
| Archer Lodge | 10 | 4,797 | 215,999 | 4,797 | 100.00 \% | 2.22 \% |
| Asheboro | 25 | 27,156 | 218,484 | 925 | 3.41 \% | 0.42 \% |
|  | 29 | 27,156 | 214,631 | 26,231 | 96.59 \% | 12.22 \% |
| Asheville | 49 | 94,589 | 200,986 | 94,589 | 100.00 \% | 47.06 \% |
| Askewville | 1 | 184 | 199,623 | 184 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Atkinson | 8 | 296 | 204,809 | 296 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Atlantic Beach | 2 | 1,364 | 198,557 | 1,364 | 100.00 \% | 0.69 \% |
| Aulander | 1 | 763 | 199,623 | 763 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Aurora | 3 | 455 | 200,494 | 455 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Autryville | 8 | 167 | 204,809 | 167 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Ayden | 4 | 4,977 | 219,143 | 4,977 | 100.00 \% | 2.27 \% |
| Badin | 33 | 2,024 | 209,379 | 2,024 | 100.00 \% | 0.97 \% |
| Bailey | 11 | 568 | 206,121 | 568 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Bakersville | 46 | 450 | 218,487 | 450 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Bald Head Island | 7 | 268 | 200,436 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Banner Elk | 46 | 1,049 | 218,487 | 1,049 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Bath | 3 | 245 | 200,494 | 245 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Bayboro | 2 | 1,161 | 198,557 | 1,161 | 100.00 \% | 0.58 \% |
| Bear Grass | 2 | 89 | 198,557 | 89 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Beaufort | 2 | 4,464 | 198,557 | 4,464 | 100.00 \% | 2.25 \% |
| Beech Mountain (Avery) | 46 | 62 | 218,487 | 62 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Beech Mountain (Watauga) | 46 | 613 | 218,487 | 613 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Belhaven | 3 | 1,410 | 200,494 | 1,410 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Belmont | 45 | 15,010 | 211,229 | 15,010 | 100.00 \% | 7.11 \% |
| Belville | 7 | 2,406 | 200,436 | 2,406 | 100.00 \% | 1.20 \% |
| Belwood | 44 | 857 | 203,043 | 857 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| Benson (Harnett) | 20 | 0 | 198,776 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Benson (Johnston) | 10 | 3,967 | 215,999 | 3,967 | 100.00 \% | 1.84 \% |
| Bermuda Run | 32 | 3,120 | 211,642 | 3,120 | 100.00 \% | 1.47 \% |
| Bessemer City | 44 | 5,428 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 45 | 5,428 | 211,229 | 5,428 | 100.00 \% | 2.57 \% |
| Bethania | 30 | 344 | 212,299 | 344 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Bethel | 4 | 1,373 | 219,143 | 1,373 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |
| Beulaville | 8 | 1,116 | 204,809 | 1,116 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |
| Biltmore Forest | 49 | 1,409 | 200,986 | 1,409 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Biscoe | 29 | 1,848 | 214,631 | 1,848 | 100.00 \% | 0.86 \% |
| Black Creek | 9 | 692 | 216,568 | 692 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Black Mountain | 47 | 8,426 | 200,614 | 8,426 | 100.00 \% | 4.20 \% |
| Bladenboro | 8 | 1,648 | 204,809 | 1,648 | 100.00 \% | 0.80 \% |
| Blowing Rock (Caldwell) | 46 | 91 | 218,487 | 91 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Blowing Rock (Watauga) | 46 | 1,285 | 218,487 | 1,285 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Boardman | 7 | 166 | 200,436 | 166 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Bogue | 2 | 695 | 198,557 | 695 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Boiling Spring Lakes | 7 | 5,943 | 200,436 | 5,943 | 100.00 \% | 2.97 \% |
| Boiling Springs | 44 | 4,615 | 203,043 | 4,615 | 100.00 \% | 2.27 \% |
| Bolivia | 7 | 149 | 200,436 | 149 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Bolton | 7 | 519 | 200,436 | 519 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Boone | 46 | 19,092 | 218,487 | 19,092 | 100.00 \% | 8.74 \% |
| Boonville | 36 | 1,185 | 210,986 | 1,185 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Bostic | 48 | 355 | 200,053 | 355 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Brevard | 50 | 7,744 | 213,909 | 7,744 | 100.00 \% | 3.62 \% |
| Bridgeton | 3 | 349 | 200,494 | 349 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Broadway (Harnett) | 20 | 0 | 198,776 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Broadway (Lee) | 20 | 1,267 | 198,776 | 1,267 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Brookford | 43 | 442 | 209,997 | 442 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Brunswick | 7 | 973 | 200,436 | 973 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| Bryson City | 50 | 1,558 | 213,909 | 1,558 | 100.00 \% | 0.73 \% |
| Bunn | 11 | 327 | 206,121 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Burgaw | 8 | 3,088 | 204,809 | 3,088 | 100.00 \% | 1.51 \% |
| Burlington (Alamance) | 25 | 55,481 | 218,484 | 55,481 | 100.00 \% | 25.39 \% |
| Burlington (Guilford) | 26 | 1,822 | 201,428 | 1,822 | 100.00 \% | 0.90 \% |
| Burnsville | 46 | 1,614 | 218,487 | 1,614 | 100.00 \% | 0.74 \% |
| Butner | 12 | 8,397 | 198,389 | 8,397 | 100.00 \% | 4.23 \% |
| Cajah's Mountain | 43 | 2,722 | 209,997 | 2,722 | 100.00 \% | 1.30 \% |
|  | 46 | 2,722 | 218,487 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Calabash | 7 | 2,011 | 200,436 | 2,011 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Calypso | 8 | 327 | 204,809 | 327 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Cameron | 21 | 244 | 217,984 | 244 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

- Ex. 6348 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Candor (Montgomery) | 29 | 813 | 214,631 | 813 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Candor (Moore) | 21 | 0 | 217,984 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Canton | 46 | 4,422 | 218,487 | 4,422 | 100.00 \% | 2.02 \% |
| Cape Carteret | 2 | 2,224 | 198,557 | 2,224 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |
| Carolina Beach | 6 | 6,564 | 212,582 | 6,564 | 100.00 \% | 3.09 \% |
| Carolina Shores | 7 | 4,588 | 200,436 | 4,588 | 100.00 \% | 2.29 \% |
| Carrboro | 23 | 21,295 | 210,529 | 21,295 | 100.00 \% | 10.11 \% |
| Carthage | 21 | 2,775 | 217,984 | 2,775 | 100.00 \% | 1.27 \% |
| Cary (Chatham) | 19 | 3,709 | 200,858 | 3,709 | 100.00 \% | 1.85 \% |
| Cary (Wake) | 15 | 171,012 | 198,420 | 4,080 | 2.39 \% | 2.06 \% |
|  | 16 | 171,012 | 198,383 | 11,113 | 6.50 \% | 5.60 \% |
|  | 17 | 171,012 | 198,425 | 155,819 | 91.12 \% | 78.53 \% |
| Casar | 44 | 305 | 203,043 | 305 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Castalia | 11 | 264 | 206,121 | 264 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Caswell Beach | 7 | 395 | 200,436 | 395 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Catawba | 43 | 702 | 209,997 | 702 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Cedar Point | 2 | 1,764 | 198,557 | 1,764 | 100.00 \% | 0.89 \% |
| Cedar Rock | 43 | 301 | 209,997 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 46 | 301 | 218,487 | 301 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Cerro Gordo | 7 | 131 | 200,436 | 131 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Chadbourn | 7 | 1,574 | 200,436 | 1,574 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Chapel Hill (Durham) | 18 | 2,906 | 200,260 | 2,322 | 79.90 \% | 1.16 \% |
|  | 19 | 2,906 | 200,858 | 584 | 20.10 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Chapel Hill (Orange) | 23 | 59,054 | 210,529 | 59,054 | 100.00 \% | 28.05 \% |
| Charlotte | 38 | 874,579 | 217,671 | 121,442 | 13.89 \% | 55.79 \% |
|  | 39 | 874,579 | 219,006 | 210,910 | 24.12 \% | 96.30 \% |
|  | 40 | 874,579 | 216,693 | 216,685 | 24.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | 41 | 874,579 | 216,686 | 153,144 | 17.51 \% | 70.68 \% |
|  | 42 | 874,579 | 216,411 | 172,398 | 19.71 \% | 79.66 \% |
| Cherryville | 44 | 6,078 | 203,043 | 6,078 | 100.00 \% | 2.99 \% |
| Chimney Rock Village | 48 | 140 | 200,053 | 140 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| China Grove | 33 | 4,434 | 209,379 | 4,434 | 100.00 \% | 2.12 \% |
| Chocowinity | 3 | 722 | 200,494 | 722 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Claremont | 43 | 1,692 | 209,997 | 1,692 | 100.00 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Clarkton | 8 | 614 | 204,809 | 614 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Clayton (Johnston) | 10 | 26,307 | 215,999 | 26,307 | 100.00 \% | 12.18 \% |
| Clayton (Wake) | 13 | 0 | 198,409 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Clemmons | 30 | 21,163 | 212,299 | 21,163 | 100.00 \% | 9.97 \% |
| Cleveland | 33 | 846 | 209,379 | 846 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Clinton | 8 | 8,383 | 204,809 | 8,383 | 100.00 \% | 4.09 \% |
| Clyde | 46 | 1,368 | 218,487 | 1,368 | 100.00 \% | 0.63 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Coats | 20 | 2,155 | 198,776 | 2,155 | 100.00 \% | 1.08 \% |
| Cofield | 1 | 267 | 199,623 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Colerain | 1 | 217 | 199,623 | 217 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Columbia | 1 | 610 | 199,623 | 610 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Columbus | 48 | 1,060 | 200,053 | 1,060 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Como | 1 | 67 | 199,623 | 67 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Concord | 34 | 105,240 | 219,157 | 105,240 | 100.00 \% | 48.02 \% |
| Conetoe | 4 | 198 | 219,143 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Connelly Springs | 47 | 1,529 | 200,614 | 1,529 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Conover | 43 | 8,421 | 209,997 | 8,421 | 100.00 \% | 4.01 \% |
| Conway | 1 | 752 | 199,623 | 752 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Cooleemee | 32 | 940 | 211,642 | 940 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Cornelius | 37 | 31,412 | 215,708 | 12,415 | 39.52 \% | 5.76 \% |
|  | 38 | 31,412 | 217,671 | 18,997 | 60.48 \% | 8.73 \% |
| Cove City | 3 | 378 | 200,494 | 378 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Cramerton | 45 | 5,296 | 211,229 | 5,296 | 100.00 \% | 2.51 \% |
| Creedmoor | 12 | 4,866 | 198,389 | 4,866 | 100.00 \% | 2.45 \% |
| Creswell | 2 | 207 | 198,557 | 207 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Crossnore | 46 | 143 | 218,487 | 143 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Dallas | 45 | 5,927 | 211,229 | 5,927 | 100.00 \% | 2.81 \% |
| Danbury | 30 | 189 | 212,299 | 189 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Davidson (Iredell) | 37 | 378 | 215,708 | 378 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Davidson (Mecklenburg) | 37 | 14,728 | 215,708 | 14,728 | 100.00 \% | 6.83 \% |
| Dellview | 44 | 6 | 203,043 | 6 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Denton | 32 | 1,494 | 211,642 | 1,494 | 100.00 \% | 0.71 \% |
| Dillsboro | 50 | 213 | 213,909 | 213 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Dobbins Heights | 29 | 687 | 214,631 | 687 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Dobson | 36 | 1,462 | 210,986 | 1,462 | 100.00 \% | 0.69 \% |
| Dortches | 11 | 1,082 | 206,121 | 1,082 | 100.00 \% | 0.52 \% |
| Dover | 3 | 349 | 200,494 | 349 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Drexel | 47 | 1,760 | 200,614 | 1,760 | 100.00 \% | 0.88 \% |
| Dublin | 8 | 267 | 204,809 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Duck | 1 | 742 | 199,623 | 742 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Dunn | 20 | 8,446 | 198,776 | 8,446 | 100.00 \% | 4.25 \% |
| Durham (Durham) | 18 | 283,093 | 200,260 | 195,933 | 69.21 \% | 97.84 \% |
|  | 19 | 283,093 | 200,858 | 87,160 | 30.79 \% | 43.39 \% |
| Durham (Orange) | 23 | 144 | 210,529 | 144 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Durham (Wake) | 14 | 269 | 198,376 | 269 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
|  | 15 | 269 | 198,420 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Earl | 44 | 198 | 203,043 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| East Arcadia | 8 | 418 | 204,809 | 418 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |

[^28]
## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| East Bend | 36 | 634 | 210,986 | 634 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| East Laurinburg | 24 | 234 | 202,786 | 234 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| East Spencer | 33 | 1,567 | 209,379 | 1,567 | 100.00 \% | 0.75 \% |
| Eastover | 21 | 3,656 | 217,984 | 3,656 | 100.00 \% | 1.68 \% |
| Eden | 26 | 15,421 | 201,428 | 15,421 | 100.00 \% | 7.66 \% |
| Edenton | 2 | 4,460 | 198,557 | 4,460 | 100.00 \% | 2.25 \% |
| Elizabeth City (Camden) | 1 | 38 | 199,623 | 38 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Elizabeth City (Pasquotank) | 1 | 18,593 | 199,623 | 18,593 | 100.00 \% | 9.31 \% |
| Elizabethtown | 8 | 3,296 | 204,809 | 3,296 | 100.00 \% | 1.61 \% |
| Elk Park | 46 | 542 | 218,487 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Elkin (Surry) | 36 | 4,049 | 210,986 | 4,049 | 100.00 \% | 1.92 \% |
| Elkin (Wilkes) | 36 | 73 | 210,986 | 73 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Ellenboro | 48 | 723 | 200,053 | 723 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Ellerbe | 29 | 864 | 214,631 | 864 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Elm City (Nash) | 11 | 0 | 206,121 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Elm City (Wilson) | 9 | 1,218 | 216,568 | 1,218 | 100.00 \% | 0.56 \% |
| Elon | 25 | 11,336 | 218,484 | 11,336 | 100.00 \% | 5.19 \% |
| Emerald Isle | 2 | 3,847 | 198,557 | 3,847 | 100.00 \% | 1.94 \% |
| Enfield | 2 | 1,865 | 198,557 | 1,865 | 100.00 \% | 0.94 \% |
| Erwin | 20 | 4,542 | 198,776 | 4,542 | 100.00 \% | 2.28 \% |
| Eureka | 9 | 214 | 216,568 | 214 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Everetts | 2 | 150 | 198,557 | 150 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Fair Bluff | 7 | 709 | 200,436 | 709 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Fairmont | 24 | 2,191 | 202,786 | 2,191 | 100.00 \% | 1.08 \% |
| Fairview | 35 | 3,456 | 218,137 | 3,456 | 100.00 \% | 1.58 \% |
| Faison (Duplin) | 8 | 784 | 204,809 | 784 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Faison (Sampson) | 8 | 0 | 204,809 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Faith | 33 | 819 | 209,379 | 819 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Falcon (Cumberland) | 21 | 324 | 217,984 | 324 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Falcon (Sampson) | 8 | 0 | 204,809 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Falkland | 4 | 47 | 219,143 | 47 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Fallston | 44 | 627 | 203,043 | 627 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Farmville | 4 | 4,461 | 219,143 | 4,461 | 100.00 \% | 2.04 \% |
| Fayetteville | 21 | 208,501 | 217,984 | 24,573 | 11.79 \% | 11.27 \% |
|  | 22 | 208,501 | 216,471 | 183,928 | 88.21 \% | 84.97 \% |
| Flat Rock | 48 | 3,486 | 200,053 | 3,486 | 100.00 \% | 1.74 \% |
| Fletcher | 48 | 7,987 | 200,053 | 7,987 | 100.00 \% | 3.99 \% |
| Fontana Dam | 50 | 13 | 213,909 | 13 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Forest City | 48 | 7,377 | 200,053 | 7,377 | 100.00 \% | 3.69 \% |
| Forest Hills | 50 | 303 | 213,909 | 303 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Fountain | 4 | 385 | 219,143 | 385 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |

[^29]- Ex. 6351 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Four Oaks | 10 | 2,158 | 215,999 | 2,158 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| Foxfire | 21 | 1,288 | 217,984 | 1,288 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Franklin | 50 | 4,175 | 213,909 | 4,175 | 100.00 \% | 1.95 \% |
| Franklinton | 11 | 2,456 | 206,121 | 2,456 | 100.00 \% | 1.19 \% |
| Franklinville | 25 | 1,197 | 218,484 | 1,197 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Fremont | 9 | 1,196 | 216,568 | 1,196 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Fuquay-Varina (Harnett) | 20 | 0 | 198,776 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Fuquay-Varina (Wake) | 16 | 34,152 | 198,383 | 34,152 | 100.00 \% | 17.22 \% |
| Gamewell | 43 | 3,702 | 209,997 | 3,702 | 100.00 \% | 1.76 \% |
|  | 46 | 3,702 | 218,487 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Garland | 8 | 595 | 204,809 | 595 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Garner | 13 | 31,159 | 198,409 | 26,967 | 86.55 \% | 13.59 \% |
|  | 15 | 31,159 | 198,420 | 490 | 1.57 \% | 0.25 \% |
|  | 16 | 31,159 | 198,383 | 3,702 | 11.88 \% | 1.87 \% |
| Garysburg | 1 | 904 | 199,623 | 904 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Gaston | 1 | 1,008 | 199,623 | 1,008 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Gastonia | 44 | 80,411 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 45 | 80,411 | 211,229 | 80,411 | 100.00 \% | 38.07 \% |
| Gatesville | 1 | 267 | 199,623 | 267 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Gibson | 24 | 449 | 202,786 | 449 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Gibsonville (Alamance) | 25 | 4,278 | 218,484 | 4,278 | 100.00 \% | 1.96 \% |
| Gibsonville (Guilford) | 26 | 4,642 | 201,428 | 4,642 | 100.00 \% | 2.30 \% |
| Glen Alpine | 47 | 1,529 | 200,614 | 1,529 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Godwin | 21 | 128 | 217,984 | 128 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Goldsboro | 9 | 33,657 | 216,568 | 33,657 | 100.00 \% | 15.54 \% |
| Goldston | 19 | 234 | 200,858 | 234 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Graham | 25 | 17,157 | 218,484 | 17,157 | 100.00 \% | 7.85 \% |
| Grandfather Village | 46 | 95 | 218,487 | 95 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Granite Falls | 43 | 4,965 | 209,997 | 4,965 | 100.00 \% | 2.36 \% |
| Granite Quarry | 33 | 2,984 | 209,379 | 2,984 | 100.00 \% | 1.43 \% |
| Grantsboro | 2 | 692 | 198,557 | 692 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Green Level | 25 | 3,152 | 218,484 | 3,152 | 100.00 \% | 1.44 \% |
| Greenevers | 8 | 567 | 204,809 | 567 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Greensboro | 26 | 299,035 | 201,428 | 12,873 | 4.30 \% | 6.39 \% |
|  | 27 | 299,035 | 216,058 | 204,686 | 68.45 \% | 94.74 \% |
|  | 28 | 299,035 | 214,909 | 81,476 | 27.25 \% | 37.91 \% |
| Greenville | 4 | 87,521 | 219,143 | 87,521 | 100.00 \% | 39.94 \% |
| Grifton (Lenoir) | 3 | 147 | 200,494 | 147 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Grifton (Pitt) | 4 | 2,301 | 219,143 | 2,301 | 100.00 \% | 1.05 \% |
| Grimesland | 4 | 386 | 219,143 | 386 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Grover | 44 | 802 | 203,043 | 802 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

- Ex. 6352 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Halifax | 2 | 170 | 198,557 | 170 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Hamilton | 2 | 306 | 198,557 | 306 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Hamlet | 29 | 6,025 | 214,631 | 6,025 | 100.00 \% | 2.81 \% |
| Harmony | 37 | 543 | 215,708 | 543 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Harrells (Duplin) | 8 | 0 | 204,809 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Harrells (Sampson) | 8 | 160 | 204,809 | 160 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Harrellsville | 1 | 85 | 199,623 | 85 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Harrisburg | 34 | 18,967 | 219,157 | 18,967 | 100.00 \% | 8.65 \% |
| Hassell | 2 | 49 | 198,557 | 49 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Havelock | 3 | 16,621 | 200,494 | 16,621 | 100.00 \% | 8.29 \% |
| Haw River | 25 | 2,252 | 218,484 | 2,252 | 100.00 \% | 1.03 \% |
| Hayesville | 50 | 461 | 213,909 | 461 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Hemby Bridge | 35 | 1,614 | 218,137 | 1,614 | 100.00 \% | 0.74 \% |
| Henderson | 11 | 15,060 | 206,121 | 15,060 | 100.00 \% | 7.31 \% |
| Hendersonville | 48 | 15,137 | 200,053 | 15,137 | 100.00 \% | 7.57 \% |
| Hertford | 1 | 1,934 | 199,623 | 1,934 | 100.00 \% | 0.97 \% |
| Hickory (Burke) | 47 | 79 | 200,614 | 79 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Hickory (Caldwell) | 43 | 32 | 209,997 | 32 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Hickory (Catawba) | 43 | 43,379 | 209,997 | 43,379 | 100.00 \% | 20.66 \% |
| High Point (Davidson) | 32 | 6,646 | 211,642 | 6,646 | 100.00 \% | 3.14 \% |
| High Point (Forsyth) | 30 | 84 | 212,299 | 84 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| High Point (Guilford) | 28 | 107,321 | 214,909 | 107,321 | 100.00 \% | 49.94 \% |
| High Point (Randolph) | 29 | 8 | 214,631 | 8 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| High Shoals | 44 | 595 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 45 | 595 | 211,229 | 595 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Highlands (Jackson) | 50 | 12 | 213,909 | 12 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Highlands (Macon) | 50 | 1,060 | 213,909 | 1,060 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Hildebran | 47 | 1,679 | 200,614 | 1,679 | 100.00 \% | 0.84 \% |
| Hillsborough | 23 | 9,660 | 210,529 | 9,660 | 100.00 \% | 4.59 \% |
| Hobgood | 2 | 268 | 198,557 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Hoffman | 29 | 418 | 214,631 | 418 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Holden Beach | 7 | 921 | 200,436 | 921 | 100.00 \% | 0.46 \% |
| Holly Ridge | 5 | 4,171 | 204,576 | 4,171 | 100.00 \% | 2.04 \% |
| Holly Springs | 16 | 41,239 | 198,383 | 41,239 | 100.00 \% | 20.79 \% |
| Hookerton | 9 | 413 | 216,568 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Hope Mills | 21 | 17,808 | 217,984 | 15,215 | 85.44 \% | 6.98 \% |
|  | 22 | 17,808 | 216,471 | 2,593 | 14.56 \% | 1.20 \% |
| Hot Springs | 46 | 520 | 218,487 | 520 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Hudson | 43 | 3,780 | 209,997 | 3,780 | 100.00 \% | 1.80 \% |
|  | 46 | 3,780 | 218,487 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Huntersville | 37 | 61,376 | 215,708 | 117 | 0.19 \% | 0.05 \% |
|  | 38 | 61,376 | 217,671 | 61,259 | 99.81 \% | 28.14 \% |
| Indian Beach | 2 | 223 | 198,557 | 223 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Indian Trail | 35 | 39,997 | 218,137 | 39,997 | 100.00 \% | 18.34 \% |
| Jackson | 1 | 430 | 199,623 | 430 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Jacksonville | 5 | 72,723 | 204,576 | 72,723 | 100.00 \% | 35.55 \% |
| Jamestown | 28 | 3,668 | 214,909 | 3,668 | 100.00 \% | 1.71 \% |
| Jamesville | 2 | 424 | 198,557 | 424 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Jefferson | 46 | 1,622 | 218,487 | 1,622 | 100.00 \% | 0.74 \% |
| Jonesville | 36 | 2,308 | 210,986 | 2,308 | 100.00 \% | 1.09 \% |
| Kannapolis (Cabarrus) | 34 | 42,846 | 219,157 | 42,846 | 100.00 \% | 19.55 \% |
| Kannapolis (Rowan) | 33 | 10,268 | 209,379 | 10,268 | 100.00 \% | 4.90 \% |
| Kelford | 1 | 203 | 199,623 | 203 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Kenansville | 8 | 770 | 204,809 | 770 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Kenly (Johnston) | 10 | 1,293 | 215,999 | 1,293 | 100.00 \% | 0.60 \% |
| Kenly (Wilson) | 9 | 198 | 216,568 | 198 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Kernersville (Forsyth) | 30 | 25,947 | 212,299 | 25,947 | 100.00 \% | 12.22 \% |
| Kernersville (Guilford) | 26 | 502 | 201,428 | 94 | 18.73 \% | 0.05 \% |
|  | 28 | 502 | 214,909 | 408 | 81.27 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Kill Devil Hills | 1 | 7,656 | 199,623 | 7,656 | 100.00 \% | 3.84 \% |
| King (Forsyth) | 30 | 591 | 212,299 | 591 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| King (Stokes) | 30 | 6,606 | 212,299 | 6,606 | 100.00 \% | 3.11 \% |
| Kings Mountain (Cleveland) | 44 | 10,032 | 203,043 | 10,032 | 100.00 \% | 4.94 \% |
| Kings Mountain (Gaston) | 45 | 1,110 | 211,229 | 1,110 | 100.00 \% | 0.53 \% |
| Kingstown | 44 | 656 | 203,043 | 656 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Kinston | 3 | 19,900 | 200,494 | 19,900 | 100.00 \% | 9.93 \% |
| Kittrell | 11 | 132 | 206,121 | 132 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Kitty Hawk | 1 | 3,689 | 199,623 | 3,689 | 100.00 \% | 1.85 \% |
| Knightdale | 12 | 19,435 | 198,389 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 13 | 19,435 | 198,409 | 19,435 | 100.00 \% | 9.80 \% |
| Kure Beach | 6 | 2,191 | 212,582 | 2,191 | 100.00 \% | 1.03 \% |
| La Grange | 3 | 2,595 | 200,494 | 2,595 | 100.00 \% | 1.29 \% |
| Lake Lure | 48 | 1,365 | 200,053 | 1,365 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| Lake Park | 35 | 3,269 | 218,137 | 3,269 | 100.00 \% | 1.50 \% |
| Lake Santeetlah | 50 | 38 | 213,909 | 38 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Lake Waccamaw | 7 | 1,296 | 200,436 | 1,296 | 100.00 \% | 0.65 \% |
| Landis | 33 | 3,690 | 209,379 | 3,690 | 100.00 \% | 1.76 \% |
| Lansing | 46 | 126 | 218,487 | 126 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Lasker | 1 | 64 | 199,623 | 64 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Lattimore | 44 | 406 | 203,043 | 406 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Laurel Park | 48 | 2,250 | 200,053 | 2,250 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |

[^30]
## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Laurinburg | 24 | 14,978 | 202,786 | 14,978 | 100.00 \% | 7.39 \% |
| Lawndale | 44 | 570 | 203,043 | 570 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Leggett | 4 | 37 | 219,143 | 37 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Leland | 7 | 22,908 | 200,436 | 22,908 | 100.00 \% | 11.43 \% |
| Lenoir | 43 | 18,352 | 209,997 | 1 | 0.01 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 46 | 18,352 | 218,487 | 18,351 | 99.99 \% | 8.40 \% |
| Lewiston Woodville | 1 | 426 | 199,623 | 426 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Lewisville | 30 | 13,381 | 212,299 | 13,381 | 100.00 \% | 6.30 \% |
| Lexington | 32 | 19,632 | 211,642 | 19,632 | 100.00 \% | 9.28 \% |
| Liberty | 25 | 2,655 | 218,484 | 2,655 | 100.00 \% | 1.22 \% |
| Lilesville | 29 | 395 | 214,631 | 395 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Lillington | 20 | 4,735 | 198,776 | 4,735 | 100.00 \% | 2.38 \% |
| Lincolnton | 44 | 11,091 | 203,043 | 11,091 | 100.00 \% | 5.46 \% |
| Linden | 21 | 136 | 217,984 | 136 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Littleton | 2 | 559 | 198,557 | 559 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Locust (Cabarrus) | 34 | 541 | 219,157 | 423 | 78.19 \% | 0.19 \% |
|  | 35 | 541 | 218,137 | 118 | 21.81 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Locust (Stanly) | 33 | 3,996 | 209,379 | 3,996 | 100.00 \% | 1.91 \% |
| Long View (Burke) | 47 | 735 | 200,614 | 735 | 100.00 \% | 0.37 \% |
| Long View (Catawba) | 43 | 4,353 | 209,997 | 4,353 | 100.00 \% | 2.07 \% |
| Louisburg | 11 | 3,064 | 206,121 | 3,064 | 100.00 \% | 1.49 \% |
| Love Valley | 37 | 154 | 215,708 | 154 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Lowell | 45 | 3,654 | 211,229 | 3,654 | 100.00 \% | 1.73 \% |
| Lucama | 9 | 1,036 | 216,568 | 1,036 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Lumber Bridge | 24 | 82 | 202,786 | 82 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Lumberton | 24 | 19,025 | 202,786 | 19,025 | 100.00 \% | 9.38 \% |
| Macclesfield | 4 | 413 | 219,143 | 413 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Macon | 2 | 110 | 198,557 | 110 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Madison | 26 | 2,129 | 201,428 | 2,129 | 100.00 \% | 1.06 \% |
| Maggie Valley | 50 | 1,687 | 213,909 | 1,687 | 100.00 \% | 0.79 \% |
| Magnolia | 8 | 831 | 204,809 | 831 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Maiden (Catawba) | 43 | 3,736 | 209,997 | 3,736 | 100.00 \% | 1.78 \% |
| Maiden (Lincoln) | 44 | 0 | 203,043 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Manteo | 1 | 1,600 | 199,623 | 1,600 | 100.00 \% | 0.80 \% |
| Marietta | 24 | 111 | 202,786 | 111 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Marion | 47 | 7,717 | 200,614 | 7,717 | 100.00 \% | 3.85 \% |
| Mars Hill | 46 | 2,007 | 218,487 | 2,007 | 100.00 \% | 0.92 \% |
| Marshall | 46 | 777 | 218,487 | 777 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Marshville | 29 | 2,522 | 214,631 | 2,522 | 100.00 \% | 1.18 \% |
| Marvin | 35 | 6,358 | 218,137 | 6,358 | 100.00 \% | 2.91 \% |
| Matthews | 41 | 29,435 | 216,686 | 29,435 | 100.00 \% | 13.58 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File. Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Maxton (Robeson) | 24 | 1,902 | 202,786 | 1,902 | 100.00 \% | 0.94 \% |
| Maxton (Scotland) | 24 | 208 | 202,786 | 208 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Mayodan | 26 | 2,418 | 201,428 | 2,418 | 100.00 \% | $1.20 \%$ |
| Maysville | 8 | 818 | 204,809 | 818 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| McAdenville | 45 | 890 | 211,229 | 890 | 100.00 \% | 0.42 \% |
| McDonald | 24 | 94 | 202,786 | 94 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| McFarlan | 29 | 94 | 214,631 | 94 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Mebane (Alamance) | 25 | 14,626 | 218,484 | 14,626 | 100.00 \% | 6.69 \% |
| Mebane (Orange) | 23 | 3,171 | 210,529 | 3,171 | 100.00 \% | 1.51 \% |
| Mesic | 2 | 144 | 198,557 | 144 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Micro | 10 | 458 | 215,999 | 458 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Middleburg | 11 | 101 | 206,121 | 101 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| Middlesex | 11 | 912 | 206,121 | 912 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Midland (Cabarrus) | 34 | 4,684 | 219,157 | 25 | 0.53 \% | 0.01 \% |
|  | 35 | 4,684 | 218,137 | 4,659 | 99.47 \% | 2.14 \% |
| Midland (Mecklenburg) | 41 | 0 | 216,686 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Midway | 32 | 4,742 | 211,642 | 4,742 | 100.00 \% | 2.24 \% |
| Mills River | 48 | 7,078 | 200,053 | 7,078 | 100.00 \% | 3.54 \% |
| Milton | 23 | 155 | 210,529 | 155 | 100.00 \% | 0.07 \% |
| Mineral Springs | 35 | 3,159 | 218,137 | 3,159 | 100.00 \% | 1.45 \% |
| Minnesott Beach | 2 | 530 | 198,557 | 530 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Mint Hill (Mecklenburg) | 39 | 26,444 | 219,006 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 41 | 26,444 | 216,686 | 26,444 | 100.00 \% | 12.20 \% |
| Mint Hill (Union) | 35 | 6 | 218,137 | 6 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Misenheimer | 33 | 650 | 209,379 | 650 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Mocksville | 32 | 5,900 | 211,642 | 5,900 | 100.00 \% | 2.79 \% |
| Momeyer | 11 | 277 | 206,121 | 277 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Monroe | 35 | 34,562 | 218,137 | 34,562 | 100.00 \% | 15.84 \% |
| Montreat | 47 | 901 | 200,614 | 901 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Mooresboro | 44 | 293 | 203,043 | 293 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Mooresville | 37 | 50,193 | 215,708 | 50,193 | 100.00 \% | 23.27 \% |
| Morehead City | 2 | 9,556 | 198,557 | 9,556 | 100.00 \% | 4.81 \% |
| Morganton | 47 | 17,474 | 200,614 | 17,474 | 100.00 \% | 8.71 \% |
| Morrisville (Durham) | 19 | 207 | 200,858 | 207 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Morrisville (Wake) | 15 | 29,423 | 198,420 | 18,571 | 63.12 \% | 9.36 \% |
|  | 17 | 29,423 | 198,425 | 10,852 | 36.88 \% | 5.47 \% |
| Morven | 29 | 329 | 214,631 | 329 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Mount Airy | 36 | 10,676 | 210,986 | 10,676 | 100.00 \% | 5.06 \% |
| Mount Gilead | 29 | 1,171 | 214,631 | 1,171 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Mount Holly | 45 | 17,703 | 211,229 | 17,703 | 100.00 \% | 8.38 \% |
| Mount Olive (Duplin) | 8 | 5 | 204,809 | 5 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File. Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mount Olive (Wayne) | 9 | 4,193 | 216,568 | 4,193 | 100.00 \% | 1.94 \% |
| Mount Pleasant | 34 | 1,671 | 219,157 | 1,671 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Murfreesboro | 1 | 2,619 | 199,623 | 2,619 | 100.00 \% | 1.31 \% |
| Murphy | 50 | 1,608 | 213,909 | 1,608 | 100.00 \% | 0.75 \% |
| Nags Head | 1 | 3,168 | 199,623 | 3,168 | 100.00 \% | 1.59 \% |
| Nashville | 11 | 5,632 | 206,121 | 5,632 | 100.00 \% | 2.73 \% |
| Navassa | 7 | 1,367 | 200,436 | 1,367 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| New Bern | 3 | 31,291 | 200,494 | 31,291 | 100.00 \% | 15.61 \% |
| New London | 33 | 607 | 209,379 | 607 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Newland | 46 | 715 | 218,487 | 715 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Newport | 2 | 4,364 | 198,557 | 4,364 | 100.00 \% | 2.20 \% |
| Newton | 43 | 13,148 | 209,997 | 13,148 | 100.00 \% | 6.26 \% |
| Newton Grove | 8 | 585 | 204,809 | 585 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Norlina | 2 | 920 | 198,557 | 920 | 100.00 \% | 0.46 \% |
| Norman | 29 | 100 | 214,631 | 100 | 100.00 \% | 0.05 \% |
| North Topsail Beach | 5 | 1,005 | 204,576 | 1,005 | 100.00 \% | 0.49 \% |
| North Wilkesboro | 36 | 4,382 | 210,986 | 4,382 | 100.00 \% | 2.08 \% |
| Northwest | 7 | 703 | 200,436 | 703 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Norwood | 33 | 2,367 | 209,379 | 2,367 | 100.00 \% | 1.13 \% |
| Oak City | 2 | 266 | 198,557 | 266 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Oak Island | 7 | 8,396 | 200,436 | 8,396 | 100.00 \% | 4.19 \% |
| Oak Ridge | 26 | 7,474 | 201,428 | 7,474 | 100.00 \% | 3.71 \% |
| Oakboro | 33 | 2,128 | 209,379 | 2,128 | 100.00 \% | 1.02 \% |
| Ocean Isle Beach | 7 | 867 | 200,436 | 867 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Old Fort | 47 | 811 | 200,614 | 811 | 100.00 \% | 0.40 \% |
| Oriental | 2 | 880 | 198,557 | 880 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Orrum | 24 | 59 | 202,786 | 59 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Ossipee | 25 | 536 | 218,484 | 536 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Oxford | 12 | 8,628 | 198,389 | 8,628 | 100.00 \% | 4.35 \% |
| Pantego | 3 | 164 | 200,494 | 164 | 100.00 \% | 0.08 \% |
| Parkton | 24 | 504 | 202,786 | 504 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Parmele | 2 | 243 | 198,557 | 243 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Patterson Springs | 44 | 571 | 203,043 | 571 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Peachland | 29 | 390 | 214,631 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Peletier | 2 | 769 | 198,557 | 769 | 100.00 \% | 0.39 \% |
| Pembroke | 24 | 2,823 | 202,786 | 2,823 | 100.00 \% | 1.39 \% |
| Pikeville | 9 | 712 | 216,568 | 712 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Pilot Mountain | 36 | 1,440 | 210,986 | 1,440 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| Pine Knoll Shores | 2 | 1,388 | 198,557 | 1,388 | 100.00 \% | 0.70 \% |
| Pine Level | 10 | 2,046 | 215,999 | 2,046 | 100.00 \% | 0.95 \% |
| Pinebluff | 21 | 1,473 | 217,984 | 1,473 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

- Ex. 6357 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pinehurst | 21 | 17,581 | 217,984 | 17,581 | 100.00 \% | 8.07 \% |
| Pinetops | 4 | 1,200 | 219,143 | 1,200 | 100.00 \% | 0.55 \% |
| Pineville | 41 | 10,602 | 216,686 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 42 | 10,602 | 216,411 | 10,602 | 100.00 \% | 4.90 \% |
| Pink Hill | 3 | 451 | 200,494 | 451 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Pittsboro | 19 | 4,537 | 200,858 | 4,537 | 100.00 \% | 2.26 \% |
| Pleasant Garden | 26 | 5,000 | 201,428 | 5,000 | 100.00 \% | 2.48 \% |
| Plymouth | 2 | 3,320 | 198,557 | 3,320 | 100.00 \% | 1.67 \% |
| Polkton | 29 | 2,250 | 214,631 | 2,250 | 100.00 \% | 1.05 \% |
| Polkville | 44 | 516 | 203,043 | 516 | 100.00 \% | 0.25 \% |
| Pollocksville | 8 | 268 | 204,809 | 268 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Powellsville | 1 | 189 | 199,623 | 189 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Princeton | 10 | 1,315 | 215,999 | 1,315 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Princeville | 4 | 1,254 | 219,143 | 1,254 | 100.00 \% | 0.57 \% |
| Proctorville | 24 | 121 | 202,786 | 121 | 100.00 \% | 0.06 \% |
| Raeford | 24 | 4,559 | 202,786 | 4,559 | 100.00 \% | 2.25 \% |
| Raleigh (Durham) | 19 | 1,559 | 200,858 | 1,559 | 100.00 \% | 0.78 \% |
| Raleigh (Wake) | 12 | 466,106 | 198,389 | 7,009 | 1.50 \% | 3.53 \% |
|  | 13 | 466,106 | 198,409 | 105,867 | 22.71 \% | 53.36 \% |
|  | 14 | 466,106 | 198,376 | 187,340 | 40.19 \% | 94.44 \% |
|  | 15 | 466,106 | 198,420 | 165,880 | 35.59 \% | 83.60 \% |
|  | 17 | 466,106 | 198,425 | 10 | 0.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Ramseur | 25 | 1,774 | 218,484 | 1,774 | 100.00 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Randleman | 25 | 4,595 | 218,484 | 4,595 | 100.00 \% | 2.10 \% |
|  | 29 | 4,595 | 214,631 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Ranlo | 45 | 4,511 | 211,229 | 4,511 | 100.00 \% | 2.14 \% |
| Raynham | 24 | 60 | 202,786 | 60 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Red Cross | 33 | 762 | 209,379 | 762 | 100.00 \% | 0.36 \% |
| Red Oak | 11 | 3,342 | 206,121 | 3,342 | 100.00 \% | 1.62 \% |
| Red Springs (Hoke) | 24 | 0 | 202,786 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Red Springs (Robeson) | 24 | 3,087 | 202,786 | 3,087 | 100.00 \% | 1.52 \% |
| Reidsville | 26 | 14,583 | 201,428 | 14,583 | 100.00 \% | 7.24 \% |
| Rennert | 24 | 275 | 202,786 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.14 \% |
| Rhodhiss (Burke) | 47 | 639 | 200,614 | 639 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Rhodhiss (Caldwell) | 43 | 358 | 209,997 | 358 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Rich Square | 1 | 894 | 199,623 | 894 | 100.00 \% | 0.45 \% |
| Richfield | 33 | 582 | 209,379 | 582 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Richlands | 5 | 2,287 | 204,576 | 2,287 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |
| River Bend | 3 | 2,902 | 200,494 | 2,902 | 100.00 \% | 1.45 \% |
| Roanoke Rapids | 2 | 15,229 | 198,557 | 15,229 | 100.00 \% | 7.67 \% |
| Robbins | 21 | 1,168 | 217,984 | 1,168 | 100.00 \% | 0.54 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File. Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Robbinsville | 50 | 597 | 213,909 | 597 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Robersonville | 2 | 1,269 | 198,557 | 1,269 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Rockingham | 29 | 9,243 | 214,631 | 9,243 | 100.00 \% | 4.31 \% |
| Rockwell | 33 | 2,302 | 209,379 | 2,302 | 100.00 \% | 1.10 \% |
| Rocky Mount (Edgecombe) | 4 | 15,414 | 219,143 | 15,414 | 100.00 \% | 7.03 \% |
| Rocky Mount (Nash) | 11 | 38,927 | 206,121 | 38,927 | 100.00 \% | 18.89 \% |
| Rolesville | 12 | 9,475 | 198,389 | 9,475 | 100.00 \% | 4.78 \% |
| Ronda | 36 | 438 | 210,986 | 438 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Roper | 2 | 485 | 198,557 | 485 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Rose Hill | 8 | 1,371 | 204,809 | 1,371 | 100.00 \% | 0.67 \% |
| Roseboro | 8 | 1,163 | 204,809 | 1,163 | 100.00 \% | 0.57 \% |
| Rosman | 50 | 701 | 213,909 | 701 | 100.00 \% | 0.33 \% |
| Rowland | 24 | 885 | 202,786 | 885 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Roxboro | 23 | 8,134 | 210,529 | 8,134 | 100.00 \% | 3.86 \% |
| Roxobel | 1 | 187 | 199,623 | 187 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Rural Hall | 30 | 3,351 | 212,299 | 3,351 | 100.00 \% | 1.58 \% |
| Ruth | 48 | 347 | 200,053 | 347 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Rutherford College (Burke) | 47 | 1,226 | 200,614 | 1,226 | 100.00 \% | 0.61 \% |
| Rutherford College (Caldwell) | 43 | 0 | 209,997 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Rutherfordton | 48 | 3,640 | 200,053 | 3,640 | 100.00 \% | 1.82 \% |
| Salemburg | 8 | 457 | 204,809 | 457 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Salisbury | 33 | 35,540 | 209,379 | 35,540 | 100.00 \% | 16.97 \% |
| Saluda (Henderson) | 48 | 11 | 200,053 | 11 | 100.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
| Saluda (Polk) | 48 | 620 | 200,053 | 620 | 100.00 \% | 0.31 \% |
| Sandy Creek | 7 | 248 | 200,436 | 248 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Sandyfield | 7 | 430 | 200,436 | 430 | 100.00 \% | 0.21 \% |
| Sanford | 20 | 30,261 | 198,776 | 30,261 | 100.00 \% | 15.22 \% |
| Saratoga | 9 | 353 | 216,568 | 353 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Sawmills | 43 | 5,020 | 209,997 | 5,020 | 100.00 \% | 2.39 \% |
| Scotland Neck | 2 | 1,640 | 198,557 | 1,640 | 100.00 \% | 0.83 \% |
| Seaboard | 1 | 542 | 199,623 | 542 | 100.00 \% | 0.27 \% |
| Seagrove | 25 | 235 | 218,484 | 235 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Sedalia | 26 | 676 | 201,428 | 676 | 100.00 \% | 0.34 \% |
|  | 27 | 676 | 216,058 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Selma | 10 | 6,317 | 215,999 | 6,317 | 100.00 \% | 2.92 \% |
| Seven Devils (Avery) | 46 | 38 | 218,487 | 38 | 100.00 \% | 0.02 \% |
| Seven Devils (Watauga) | 46 | 275 | 218,487 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Seven Springs | 9 | 55 | 216,568 | 55 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Severn | 1 | 191 | 199,623 | 191 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Shallotte | 7 | 4,185 | 200,436 | 4,185 | 100.00 \% | 2.09 \% |
| Sharpsburg (Edgecombe) | 4 | 215 | 219,143 | 215 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File. Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sharpsburg (Nash) | 11 | 1,061 | 206,121 | 1,061 | 100.00 \% | 0.51 \% |
| Sharpsburg (Wilson) | 9 | 421 | 216,568 | 421 | 100.00 \% | 0.19 \% |
| Shelby | 44 | 21,918 | 203,043 | 21,918 | 100.00 \% | 10.79 \% |
| Siler City | 19 | 7,702 | 200,858 | 7,702 | 100.00 \% | 3.83 \% |
| Simpson | 4 | 390 | 219,143 | 390 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Sims | 9 | 275 | 216,568 | 275 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Smithfield | 10 | 11,292 | 215,999 | 11,292 | 100.00 \% | 5.23 \% |
| Snow Hill | 9 | 1,481 | 216,568 | 1,481 | 100.00 \% | 0.68 \% |
| Southern Pines | 21 | 15,545 | 217,984 | 15,545 | 100.00 \% | 7.13 \% |
| Southern Shores | 1 | 3,090 | 199,623 | 3,090 | 100.00 \% | 1.55 \% |
| Southport | 7 | 3,971 | 200,436 | 3,971 | 100.00 \% | 1.98 \% |
| Sparta | 46 | 1,834 | 218,487 | 1,834 | 100.00 \% | 0.84 \% |
| Speed | 4 | 63 | 219,143 | 63 | 100.00 \% | 0.03 \% |
| Spencer | 33 | 3,308 | 209,379 | 3,308 | 100.00 \% | 1.58 \% |
| Spencer Mountain | 45 | 0 | 211,229 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Spindale | 48 | 4,225 | 200,053 | 4,225 | 100.00 \% | 2.11 \% |
| Spring Hope | 11 | 1,309 | 206,121 | 1,309 | 100.00 \% | 0.64 \% |
| Spring Lake | 21 | 11,660 | 217,984 | 11,660 | 100.00 \% | 5.35 \% |
| Spruce Pine | 46 | 2,194 | 218,487 | 2,194 | 100.00 \% | 1.00 \% |
| St. Helena | 8 | 417 | 204,809 | 417 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| St. James | 7 | 6,529 | 200,436 | 6,529 | 100.00 \% | 3.26 \% |
| St. Pauls | 24 | 2,045 | 202,786 | 2,045 | 100.00 \% | 1.01 \% |
| Staley | 25 | 397 | 218,484 | 397 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Stallings (Mecklenburg) | 41 | 384 | 216,686 | 384 | 100.00 \% | 0.18 \% |
| Stallings (Union) | 35 | 15,728 | 218,137 | 15,728 | 100.00 \% | 7.21 \% |
| Stanfield | 33 | 1,585 | 209,379 | 1,585 | 100.00 \% | 0.76 \% |
| Stanley | 45 | 3,963 | 211,229 | 3,963 | 100.00 \% | 1.88 \% |
| Stantonsburg | 9 | 762 | 216,568 | 762 | 100.00 \% | 0.35 \% |
| Star | 29 | 806 | 214,631 | 806 | 100.00 \% | 0.38 \% |
| Statesville | 37 | 28,419 | 215,708 | 28,419 | 100.00 \% | 13.17 \% |
| Stedman | 21 | 1,277 | 217,984 | 1,277 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Stem | 12 | 960 | 198,389 | 960 | 100.00 \% | 0.48 \% |
| Stokesdale | 26 | 5,924 | 201,428 | 5,924 | 100.00 \% | 2.94 \% |
| Stoneville | 26 | 1,308 | 201,428 | 1,308 | 100.00 \% | 0.65 \% |
| Stonewall | 2 | 214 | 198,557 | 214 | 100.00 \% | 0.11 \% |
| Stovall | 12 | 324 | 198,389 | 324 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Sugar Mountain | 46 | 371 | 218,487 | 371 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Summerfield | 26 | 10,951 | 201,428 | 10,951 | 100.00 \% | 5.44 \% |
| Sunset Beach | 7 | 4,175 | 200,436 | 4,175 | 100.00 \% | 2.08 \% |
| Surf City (Onslow) | 5 | 334 | 204,576 | 334 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| Surf City (Pender) | 8 | 3,533 | 204,809 | 3,533 | 100.00 \% | 1.73 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

$$
\text { - Ex. } 6360 \text { - }
$$

## Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Swansboro | 5 | 3,744 | 204,576 | 3,744 | 100.00 \% | 1.83 \% |
| Swepsonville | 25 | 2,445 | 218,484 | 2,445 | 100.00 \% | 1.12 \% |
| Sylva | 50 | 2,578 | 213,909 | 2,578 | 100.00 \% | 1.21 \% |
| Tabor City | 7 | 3,781 | 200,436 | 3,781 | 100.00 \% | 1.89 \% |
| Tar Heel | 8 | 90 | 204,809 | 90 | 100.00 \% | 0.04 \% |
| Tarboro | 4 | 10,721 | 219,143 | 10,721 | 100.00 \% | 4.89 \% |
| Taylorsville | 36 | 2,320 | 210,986 | 2,320 | 100.00 \% | 1.10 \% |
| Taylortown | 21 | 634 | 217,984 | 634 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Teachey | 8 | 448 | 204,809 | 448 | 100.00 \% | 0.22 \% |
| Thomasville (Davidson) | 32 | 26,662 | 211,642 | 26,662 | 100.00 \% | 12.60 \% |
| Thomasville (Randolph) | 29 | 521 | 214,631 | 521 | 100.00 \% | 0.24 \% |
| Tobaccoville (Forsyth) | 30 | 2,578 | 212,299 | 2,578 | 100.00 \% | 1.21 \% |
| Tobaccoville (Stokes) | 30 | 0 | 212,299 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Topsail Beach | 8 | 461 | 204,809 | 461 | 100.00 \% | 0.23 \% |
| Trent Woods | 3 | 4,074 | 200,494 | 4,074 | 100.00 \% | 2.03 \% |
| Trenton | 8 | 238 | 204,809 | 238 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Trinity | 29 | 7,006 | 214,631 | 7,006 | 100.00 \% | 3.26 \% |
| Troutman | 37 | 3,698 | 215,708 | 3,698 | 100.00 \% | 1.71 \% |
| Troy | 29 | 2,850 | 214,631 | 2,850 | 100.00 \% | 1.33 \% |
| Tryon | 48 | 1,562 | 200,053 | 1,562 | 100.00 \% | 0.78 \% |
| Turkey | 8 | 213 | 204,809 | 213 | 100.00 \% | 0.10 \% |
| Unionville | 35 | 6,643 | 218,137 | 6,643 | 100.00 \% | 3.05 \% |
| Valdese | 47 | 4,689 | 200,614 | 4,689 | 100.00 \% | 2.34 \% |
| Vanceboro | 3 | 869 | 200,494 | 869 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Vandemere | 2 | 246 | 198,557 | 246 | 100.00 \% | 0.12 \% |
| Varnamtown | 7 | 525 | 200,436 | 525 | 100.00 \% | 0.26 \% |
| Vass | 21 | 952 | 217,984 | 952 | 100.00 \% | 0.44 \% |
| Waco | 44 | 310 | 203,043 | 310 | 100.00 \% | 0.15 \% |
| Wade | 21 | 638 | 217,984 | 638 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Wadesboro | 29 | 5,008 | 214,631 | 5,008 | 100.00 \% | 2.33 \% |
| Wagram | 24 | 615 | 202,786 | 615 | 100.00 \% | 0.30 \% |
| Wake Forest (Franklin) | 11 | 1,504 | 206,121 | 1,504 | 100.00 \% | 0.73 \% |
| Wake Forest (Wake) | 12 | 46,097 | 198,389 | 44,497 | 96.53 \% | 22.43 \% |
|  | 14 | 46,097 | 198,376 | 1,600 | 3.47 \% | 0.81 \% |
| Walkertown | 30 | 5,692 | 212,299 | 5,692 | 100.00 \% | 2.68 \% |
| Wallace (Duplin) | 8 | 3,413 | 204,809 | 3,413 | 100.00 \% | 1.67 \% |
| Wallace (Pender) | 8 | 0 | 204,809 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Wallburg | 32 | 3,051 | 211,642 | 3,051 | 100.00 \% | 1.44 \% |
| Walnut Cove | 30 | 1,586 | 212,299 | 1,586 | 100.00 \% | 0.75 \% |
| Walnut Creek | 9 | 1,084 | 216,568 | 1,084 | 100.00 \% | 0.50 \% |
| Walstonburg | 9 | 193 | 216,568 | 193 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
[G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

- Ex. 6361 -

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni Population | Total District Population | Muni Pop in District | Percent of Muni Pop in District | Percent of District Pop in Muni |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Warrenton | 2 | 851 | 198,557 | 851 | 100.00 \% | 0.43 \% |
| Warsaw | 8 | 2,733 | 204,809 | 2,733 | 100.00 \% | 1.33 \% |
| Washington | 3 | 9,875 | 200,494 | 9,875 | 100.00 \% | 4.93 \% |
| Washington Park | 3 | 392 | 200,494 | 392 | 100.00 \% | 0.20 \% |
| Watha | 8 | 181 | 204,809 | 181 | 100.00 \% | 0.09 \% |
| Waxhaw | 29 | 20,534 | 214,631 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | 35 | 20,534 | 218,137 | 20,534 | 100.00 \% | 9.41 \% |
| Waynesville | 50 | 10,140 | 213,909 | 10,140 | 100.00 \% | 4.74 \% |
| Weaverville | 47 | 4,567 | 200,614 | 4,567 | 100.00 \% | 2.28 \% |
| Webster | 50 | 372 | 213,909 | 372 | 100.00 \% | 0.17 \% |
| Weddington (Mecklenburg) | 41 | 5 | 216,686 | 5 | 100.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Weddington (Union) | 35 | 13,176 | 218,137 | 13,176 | 100.00 \% | 6.04 \% |
| Weldon | 2 | 1,444 | 198,557 | 1,444 | 100.00 \% | 0.73 \% |
| Wendell | 12 | 9,793 | 198,389 | 3,180 | 32.47 \% | 1.60 \% |
|  | 13 | 9,793 | 198,409 | 6,613 | 67.53 \% | 3.33 \% |
| Wentworth | 26 | 2,662 | 201,428 | 2,662 | 100.00 \% | 1.32 \% |
| Wesley Chapel | 35 | 8,681 | 218,137 | 8,681 | 100.00 \% | 3.98 \% |
| West Jefferson | 46 | 1,279 | 218,487 | 1,279 | 100.00 \% | 0.59 \% |
| Whispering Pines | 21 | 4,987 | 217,984 | 4,987 | 100.00 \% | 2.29 \% |
| Whitakers (Edgecombe) | 4 | 290 | 219,143 | 290 | 100.00 \% | 0.13 \% |
| Whitakers (Nash) | 11 | 337 | 206,121 | 337 | 100.00 \% | 0.16 \% |
| White Lake | 8 | 843 | 204,809 | 843 | 100.00 \% | 0.41 \% |
| Whiteville | 7 | 4,766 | 200,436 | 4,766 | 100.00 \% | 2.38 \% |
| Whitsett | 26 | 584 | 201,428 | 584 | 100.00 \% | 0.29 \% |
| Wilkesboro | 36 | 3,687 | 210,986 | 3,687 | 100.00 \% | 1.75 \% |
| Williamston | 2 | 5,248 | 198,557 | 5,248 | 100.00 \% | 2.64 \% |
| Wilmington | 6 | 115,451 | 212,582 | 115,451 | 100.00 \% | 54.31 \% |
|  | 7 | 115,451 | 200,436 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| Wilson | 9 | 47,851 | 216,568 | 47,851 | 100.00 \% | 22.10 \% |
| Wilson's Mills | 10 | 2,534 | 215,999 | 2,534 | 100.00 \% | 1.17 \% |
| Windsor | 1 | 3,582 | 199,623 | 3,582 | 100.00 \% | 1.79 \% |
| Winfall | 1 | 555 | 199,623 | 555 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Wingate | 29 | 4,055 | 214,631 | 4,055 | 100.00 \% | 1.89 \% |
| Winston-Salem | 30 | 249,545 | 212,299 | 40,795 | 16.35 \% | 19.22 \% |
|  | 31 | 249,545 | 214,811 | 208,750 | 83.65 \% | 97.18 \% |
| Winterville | 4 | 10,462 | 219,143 | 10,462 | 100.00 \% | 4.77 \% |
| Winton | 1 | 629 | 199,623 | 629 | 100.00 \% | 0.32 \% |
| Woodfin | 49 | 7,936 | 200,986 | 7,936 | 100.00 \% | 3.95 \% |
| Woodland | 1 | 557 | 199,623 | 557 | 100.00 \% | 0.28 \% |
| Wrightsville Beach | 6 | 2,473 | 212,582 | 2,473 | 100.00 \% | 1.16 \% |
| Yadkinville | 36 | 2,995 | 210,986 | 2,995 | 100.00 \% | 1.42 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File. Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

Municipality by County - District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| Municipality | District | Total Muni <br> Population | Total District <br> Population | Muni Pop in <br> District | Percent of Muni <br> Pop in District | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Yanceyville | 23 | 1,937 | 210,529 | 1,937 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.92 \%$ |
| Youngsville | 11 | 2,016 | 206,121 | 2,016 | $100.00 \%$ | $0.98 \%$ |
| Zebulon (Johnston) | 10 | 0 | 215,999 | 0 | $0.00 \%$ | $0.00 \%$ |
| Zebulon (Wake) | 12 | 6,903 | 198,389 | 6,903 | $100.00 \%$ | $3.48 \%$ |

Number of municipalities split within counties: 36
Display: all municipalities

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Ahoskie | 199,623 | 4,891 | 4,891 | 2.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Askewville | 199,623 | 184 | 184 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Aulander | 199,623 | 763 | 763 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cofield | 199,623 | 267 | 267 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Colerain | 199,623 | 217 | 217 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Columbia | 199,623 | 610 | 610 | 0.31 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Como | 199,623 | 67 | 67 | 0.03 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Conway | 199,623 | 752 | 752 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Duck | 199,623 | 742 | 742 | 0.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabeth City (Camden) | 199,623 | 38 | 38 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabeth City (Pasquotank) | 199,623 | 18,593 | 18,593 | 9.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Garysburg | 199,623 | 904 | 904 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gaston | 199,623 | 1,008 | 1,008 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gatesville | 199,623 | 267 | 267 | 0.13 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Harrellsville | 199,623 | 85 | 85 | 0.04 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Hertford | 199,623 | 1,934 | 1,934 | 0.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jackson | 199,623 | 430 | 430 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kelford | 199,623 | 203 | 203 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kill Devil Hills | 199,623 | 7,656 | 7,656 | 3.84 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Kitty Hawk | 199,623 | 3,689 | 3,689 | 1.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lasker | 199,623 | 64 | 64 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lewiston Woodville | 199,623 | 426 | 426 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Manteo | 199,623 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 0.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Murfreesboro | 199,623 | 2,619 | 2,619 | 1.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Nags Head | 199,623 | 3,168 | 3,168 | 1.59 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Powellsville | 199,623 | 189 | 189 | 0.09 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Rich Square | 199,623 | 894 | 894 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roxobel | 199,623 | 187 | 187 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seaboard | 199,623 | 542 | 542 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Severn | 199,623 | 191 | 191 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Southern Shores | 199,623 | 3,090 | 3,090 | 1.55 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Windsor | 199,623 | 3,582 | 3,582 | 1.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winfall | 199,623 | 555 | 555 | 0.28 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Winton | 199,623 | 629 | 629 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Woodland | 199,623 | 557 | 557 | 0.28 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
| 2 | Alliance | 198,557 | 733 | 733 | 0.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Arapahoe | 198,557 | 416 | 416 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Atlantic Beach | 198,557 | 1,364 | 1,364 | 0.69 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bayboro | 198,557 | 1,161 | 1,161 | 0.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bear Grass | 198,557 | 89 | 89 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Beaufort | 198,557 | 4,464 | 4,464 | 2.25 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/14/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 1 of 17
Districts included: All

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Bogue | 198,557 | 695 | 695 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cape Carteret | 198,557 | 2,224 | 2,224 | 1.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cedar Point | 198,557 | 1,764 | 1,764 | 0.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Creswell | 198,557 | 207 | 207 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Edenton | 198,557 | 4,460 | 4,460 | 2.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Emerald Isle | 198,557 | 3,847 | 3,847 | 1.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Enfield | 198,557 | 1,865 | 1,865 | 0.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Everetts | 198,557 | 150 | 150 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grantsboro | 198,557 | 692 | 692 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Halifax | 198,557 | 170 | 170 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hamilton | 198,557 | 306 | 306 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hassell | 198,557 | 49 | 49 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hobgood | 198,557 | 268 | 268 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Indian Beach | 198,557 | 223 | 223 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jamesville | 198,557 | 424 | 424 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Littleton | 198,557 | 559 | 559 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Macon | 198,557 | 110 | 110 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mesic | 198,557 | 144 | 144 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Minnesott Beach | 198,557 | 530 | 530 | 0.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morehead City | 198,557 | 9,556 | 9,556 | 4.81 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newport | 198,557 | 4,364 | 4,364 | 2.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Norlina | 198,557 | 920 | 920 | 0.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oak City | 198,557 | 266 | 266 | 0.13 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Oriental | 198,557 | 880 | 880 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Parmele | 198,557 | 243 | 243 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Peletier | 198,557 | 769 | 769 | 0.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pine Knoll Shores | 198,557 | 1,388 | 1,388 | 0.70 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Plymouth | 198,557 | 3,320 | 3,320 | 1.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roanoke Rapids | 198,557 | 15,229 | 15,229 | 7.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Robersonville | 198,557 | 1,269 | 1,269 | 0.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roper | 198,557 | 485 | 485 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Scotland Neck | 198,557 | 1,640 | 1,640 | 0.83 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stonewall | 198,557 | 214 | 214 | 0.11 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Vandemere | 198,557 | 246 | 246 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Warrenton | 198,557 | 851 | 851 | 0.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weldon | 198,557 | 1,444 | 1,444 | 0.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Williamston | 198,557 | 5,248 | 5,248 | 2.64 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
| 3 | Aurora | 200,494 | 455 | 455 | 0.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bath | 200,494 | 245 | 245 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Belhaven | 200,494 | 1,410 | 1,410 | 0.70 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bridgeton | 200,494 | 349 | 349 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | Chocowinity | 200,494 | 722 | 722 | 0.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cove City | 200,494 | 378 | 378 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dover | 200,494 | 349 | 349 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grifton (Lenoir) | 200,494 | 147 | 147 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Havelock | 200,494 | 16,621 | 16,621 | 8.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kinston | 200,494 | 19,900 | 19,900 | 9.93 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | La Grange | 200,494 | 2,595 | 2,595 | 1.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | New Bern | 200,494 | 31,291 | 31,291 | 15.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pantego | 200,494 | 164 | 164 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pink Hill | 200,494 | 451 | 451 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | River Bend | 200,494 | 2,902 | 2,902 | 1.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Trent Woods | 200,494 | 4,074 | 4,074 | 2.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Vanceboro | 200,494 | 869 | 869 | 0.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Washington | 200,494 | 9,875 | 9,875 | 4.93 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Washington Park | 200,494 | 392 | 392 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 4 | Ayden | 219,143 | 4,977 | 4,977 | 2.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bethel | 219,143 | 1,373 | 1,373 | 0.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Conetoe | 219,143 | 198 | 198 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Falkland | 219,143 | 47 | 47 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Farmville | 219,143 | 4,461 | 4,461 | 2.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fountain | 219,143 | 385 | 385 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greenville | 219,143 | 87,521 | 87,521 | 39.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grifton (Pitt) | 219,143 | 2,301 | 2,301 | 1.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Grimesland | 219,143 | 386 | 386 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Leggett | 219,143 | 37 | 37 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Macclesfield | 219,143 | 413 | 413 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pinetops | 219,143 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 0.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Princeville | 219,143 | 1,254 | 1,254 | 0.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rocky Mount (Edgecombe) | 219,143 | 15,414 | 15,414 | 7.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sharpsburg (Edgecombe) | 219,143 | 215 | 215 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Simpson | 219,143 | 390 | 390 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Speed | 219,143 | 63 | 63 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tarboro | 219,143 | 10,721 | 10,721 | 4.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whitakers (Edgecombe) | 219,143 | 290 | 290 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winterville | 219,143 | 10,462 | 10,462 | 4.77 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 5 | Holly Ridge | 204,576 | 4,171 | 4,171 | 2.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jacksonville | 204,576 | 72,723 | 72,723 | 35.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | North Topsail Beach | 204,576 | 1,005 | 1,005 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Richlands | 204,576 | 2,287 | 2,287 | 1.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Surf City (Onslow) | 204,576 | 334 | 334 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Swansboro | 204,576 | 3,744 | 3,744 | 1.83 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6 | Carolina Beach | 212,582 | 6,564 | 6,564 | 3.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kure Beach | 212,582 | 2,191 | 2,191 | 1.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilmington | 212,582 | 115,451 | 115,451 | 54.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wrightsville Beach | 212,582 | 2,473 | 2,473 | 1.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 7 | Bald Head Island | 200,436 | 268 | 268 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Belville | 200,436 | 2,406 | 2,406 | 1.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boardman | 200,436 | 166 | 166 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boiling Spring Lakes | 200,436 | 5,943 | 5,943 | 2.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bolivia | 200,436 | 149 | 149 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bolton | 200,436 | 519 | 519 | 0.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Brunswick | 200,436 | 973 | 973 | 0.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Calabash | 200,436 | 2,011 | 2,011 | 1.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Carolina Shores | 200,436 | 4,588 | 4,588 | 2.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Caswell Beach | 200,436 | 395 | 395 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cerro Gordo | 200,436 | 131 | 131 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chadbourn | 200,436 | 1,574 | 1,574 | 0.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fair Bluff | 200,436 | 709 | 709 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Holden Beach | 200,436 | 921 | 921 | 0.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Waccamaw | 200,436 | 1,296 | 1,296 | 0.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Leland | 200,436 | 22,908 | 22,908 | 11.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Navassa | 200,436 | 1,367 | 1,367 | 0.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Northwest | 200,436 | 703 | 703 | 0.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oak Island | 200,436 | 8,396 | 8,396 | 4.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ocean Isle Beach | 200,436 | 867 | 867 | 0.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sandy Creek | 200,436 | 248 | 248 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sandyfield | 200,436 | 430 | 430 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Shallotte | 200,436 | 4,185 | 4,185 | 2.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Southport | 200,436 | 3,971 | 3,971 | 1.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | St. James | 200,436 | 6,529 | 6,529 | 3.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sunset Beach | 200,436 | 4,175 | 4,175 | 2.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tabor City | 200,436 | 3,781 | 3,781 | 1.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Varnamtown | 200,436 | 525 | 525 | 0.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whiteville | 200,436 | 4,766 | 4,766 | 2.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilmington | 200,436 | 115,451 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| 8 | Atkinson | 204,809 | 296 | 296 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Autryville | 204,809 | 167 | 167 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Beulaville | 204,809 | 1,116 | 1,116 | 0.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bladenboro | 204,809 | 1,648 | 1,648 | 0.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burgaw | 204,809 | 3,088 | 3,088 | 1.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Calypso | 204,809 | 327 | 327 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clarkton | 204,809 | 614 | 614 | 0.30 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/14/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 4 of 17
Districts included: All

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 8 | Clinton | 204,809 | 8,383 | 8,383 | 4.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dublin | 204,809 | 267 | 267 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Arcadia | 204,809 | 418 | 418 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elizabethtown | 204,809 | 3,296 | 3,296 | 1.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Faison (Duplin) | 204,809 | 784 | 784 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Faison (Sampson) | 204,809 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Falcon (Sampson) | 204,809 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Garland | 204,809 | 595 | 595 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greenevers | 204,809 | 567 | 567 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harrells (Duplin) | 204,809 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Harrells (Sampson) | 204,809 | 160 | 160 | 0.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kenansville | 204,809 | 770 | 770 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Magnolia | 204,809 | 831 | 831 | $0.41 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maysville | 204,809 | 818 | 818 | 0.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Olive (Duplin) | 204,809 | 5 | 5 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newton Grove | 204,809 | 585 | 585 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pollocksville | 204,809 | 268 | 268 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rose Hill | 204,809 | 1,371 | 1,371 | 0.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roseboro | 204,809 | 1,163 | 1,163 | 0.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Salemburg | 204,809 | 457 | 457 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | St. Helena | 204,809 | 417 | 417 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Surf City (Pender) | 204,809 | 3,533 | 3,533 | 1.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tar Heel | 204,809 | 90 | 90 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Teachey | 204,809 | 448 | 448 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Topsail Beach | 204,809 | 461 | 461 | 0.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Trenton | 204,809 | 238 | 238 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Turkey | 204,809 | 213 | 213 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wallace (Duplin) | 204,809 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 1.67 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wallace (Pender) | 204,809 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Warsaw | 204,809 | 2,733 | 2,733 | 1.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Watha | 204,809 | 181 | 181 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | White Lake | 204,809 | 843 | 843 | 0.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 9 | Black Creek | 216,568 | 692 | 692 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elm City (Wilson) | 216,568 | 1,218 | 1,218 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eureka | 216,568 | 214 | 214 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fremont | 216,568 | 1,196 | 1,196 | 0.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Goldsboro | 216,568 | 33,657 | 33,657 | 15.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hookerton | 216,568 | 413 | 413 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kenly (Wilson) | 216,568 | 198 | 198 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lucama | 216,568 | 1,036 | 1,036 | 0.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Olive (Wayne) | 216,568 | 4,193 | 4,193 | 1.94 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 9 | Pikeville | 216,568 | 712 | 712 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Saratoga | 216,568 | 353 | 353 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seven Springs | 216,568 | 55 | 55 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sharpsburg (Wilson) | 216,568 | 421 | 421 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sims | 216,568 | 275 | 275 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Snow Hill | 216,568 | 1,481 | 1,481 | 0.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stantonsburg | 216,568 | 762 | 762 | $0.35 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Walnut Creek | 216,568 | 1,084 | 1,084 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Walstonburg | 216,568 | 193 | 193 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilson | 216,568 | 47,851 | 47,851 | 22.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 10 | Archer Lodge | 215,999 | 4,797 | 4,797 | 2.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Benson (Johnston) | 215,999 | 3,967 | 3,967 | 1.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clayton (Johnston) | 215,999 | 26,307 | 26,307 | 12.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Four Oaks | 215,999 | 2,158 | 2,158 | 1.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kenly (Johnston) | 215,999 | 1,293 | 1,293 | 0.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Micro | 215,999 | 458 | 458 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pine Level | 215,999 | 2,046 | 2,046 | 0.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Princeton | 215,999 | 1,315 | 1,315 | 0.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Selma | 215,999 | 6,317 | 6,317 | 2.92 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Smithfield | 215,999 | 11,292 | 11,292 | 5.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilson's Mills | 215,999 | 2,534 | 2,534 | 1.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Zebulon (Johnston) | 215,999 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| 11 | Bailey | 206,121 | 568 | 568 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bunn | 206,121 | 327 | 327 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Castalia | 206,121 | 264 | 264 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dortches | 206,121 | 1,082 | 1,082 | 0.52 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elm City (Nash) | 206,121 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Franklinton | 206,121 | 2,456 | 2,456 | 1.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Henderson | 206,121 | 15,060 | 15,060 | 7.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kittrell | 206,121 | 132 | 132 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Louisburg | 206,121 | 3,064 | 3,064 | 1.49 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Middleburg | 206,121 | 101 | 101 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Middlesex | 206,121 | 912 | 912 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Momeyer | 206,121 | 277 | 277 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Nashville | 206,121 | 5,632 | 5,632 | 2.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Red Oak | 206,121 | 3,342 | 3,342 | 1.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rocky Mount (Nash) | 206,121 | 38,927 | 38,927 | 18.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sharpsburg (Nash) | 206,121 | 1,061 | 1,061 | 0.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spring Hope | 206,121 | 1,309 | 1,309 | 0.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wake Forest (Franklin) | 206,121 | 1,504 | 1,504 | 0.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whitakers (Nash) | 206,121 | 337 | 337 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | Youngsville | 206,121 | 2,016 | 2,016 | 0.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 12 | Butner | 198,389 | 8,397 | 8,397 | 4.23 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Creedmoor | 198,389 | 4,866 | 4,866 | 2.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Knightdale | 198,389 | 19,435 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Oxford | 198,389 | 8,628 | 8,628 | 4.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 198,389 | 466,106 | 7,009 | 3.53 \% | $1.50 \%$ |
|  | Rolesville | 198,389 | 9,475 | 9,475 | 4.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stem | 198,389 | 960 | 960 | 0.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stovall | 198,389 | 324 | 324 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wake Forest (Wake) | 198,389 | 46,097 | 44,497 | 22.43 \% | 96.53 \% |
|  | Wendell | 198,389 | 9,793 | 3,180 | 1.60 \% | 32.47 \% |
|  | Zebulon (Wake) | 198,389 | 6,903 | 6,903 | 3.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 13 | Clayton (Wake) | 198,409 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Garner | 198,409 | 31,159 | 26,967 | 13.59 \% | 86.55 \% |
|  | Knightdale | 198,409 | 19,435 | 19,435 | 9.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 198,409 | 466,106 | 105,867 | 53.36 \% | 22.71 \% |
|  | Wendell | 198,409 | 9,793 | 6,613 | 3.33 \% | 67.53 \% |
| 14 | Durham (Wake) | 198,376 | 269 | 269 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 198,376 | 466,106 | 187,340 | 94.44 \% | 40.19 \% |
|  | Wake Forest (Wake) | 198,376 | 46,097 | 1,600 | 0.81 \% | 3.47 \% |
| 15 | Cary (Wake) | 198,420 | 171,012 | 4,080 | 2.06 \% | 2.39 \% |
|  | Durham (Wake) | 198,420 | 269 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Garner | 198,420 | 31,159 | 490 | 0.25 \% | 1.57 \% |
|  | Morrisville (Wake) | 198,420 | 29,423 | 18,571 | 9.36 \% | 63.12 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 198,420 | 466,106 | 165,880 | 83.60 \% | 35.59 \% |
| 16 | Angier (Wake) | 198,383 | 556 | 556 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Apex | 198,383 | 58,780 | 34,326 | 17.30 \% | 58.40 \% |
|  | Cary (Wake) | 198,383 | 171,012 | 11,113 | 5.60 \% | 6.50 \% |
|  | Fuquay-Varina (Wake) | 198,383 | 34,152 | 34,152 | 17.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Garner | 198,383 | 31,159 | 3,702 | 1.87 \% | 11.88 \% |
|  | Holly Springs | 198,383 | 41,239 | 41,239 | 20.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 17 | Apex | 198,425 | 58,780 | 24,454 | 12.32 \% | 41.60 \% |
|  | Cary (Wake) | 198,425 | 171,012 | 155,819 | 78.53 \% | 91.12 \% |
|  | Morrisville (Wake) | 198,425 | 29,423 | 10,852 | 5.47 \% | 36.88 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Wake) | 198,425 | 466,106 | 10 | 0.01 \% | 0.00 \% |
| 18 | Chapel Hill (Durham) | 200,260 | 2,906 | 2,322 | 1.16 \% | 79.90 \% |
|  | Durham (Durham) | 200,260 | 283,093 | 195,933 | 97.84 \% | 69.21 \% |
| 19 | Cary (Chatham) | 200,858 | 3,709 | 3,709 | 1.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chapel Hill (Durham) | 200,858 | 2,906 | 584 | 0.29 \% | 20.10 \% |
|  | Durham (Durham) | 200,858 | 283,093 | 87,160 | 43.39 \% | 30.79 \% |
|  | Goldston | 200,858 | 234 | 234 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/14/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 7 of 17
Districts included: All

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 19 | Morrisville (Durham) | 200,858 | 207 | 207 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pittsboro | 200,858 | 4,537 | 4,537 | 2.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raleigh (Durham) | 200,858 | 1,559 | 1,559 | 0.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Siler City | 200,858 | 7,702 | 7,702 | 3.83 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 20 | Angier (Harnett) | 198,776 | 4,709 | 4,709 | 2.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Benson (Harnett) | 198,776 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Broadway (Harnett) | 198,776 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Broadway (Lee) | 198,776 | 1,267 | 1,267 | 0.64 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Coats | 198,776 | 2,155 | 2,155 | 1.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dunn | 198,776 | 8,446 | 8,446 | 4.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Erwin | 198,776 | 4,542 | 4,542 | 2.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fuquay-Varina (Harnett) | 198,776 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Lillington | 198,776 | 4,735 | 4,735 | 2.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sanford | 198,776 | 30,261 | 30,261 | 15.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 21 | Aberdeen | 217,984 | 8,516 | 8,516 | 3.91 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cameron | 217,984 | 244 | 244 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Candor (Moore) | 217,984 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Carthage | 217,984 | 2,775 | 2,775 | 1.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eastover | 217,984 | 3,656 | 3,656 | 1.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Falcon (Cumberland) | 217,984 | 324 | 324 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fayetteville | 217,984 | 208,501 | 24,573 | 11.27 \% | 11.79 \% |
|  | Foxfire | 217,984 | 1,288 | 1,288 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Godwin | 217,984 | 128 | 128 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hope Mills | 217,984 | 17,808 | 15,215 | 6.98 \% | 85.44 \% |
|  | Linden | 217,984 | 136 | 136 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pinebluff | 217,984 | 1,473 | 1,473 | 0.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pinehurst | 217,984 | 17,581 | 17,581 | 8.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Robbins | 217,984 | 1,168 | 1,168 | 0.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Southern Pines | 217,984 | 15,545 | 15,545 | 7.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spring Lake | 217,984 | 11,660 | 11,660 | 5.35 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stedman | 217,984 | 1,277 | 1,277 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Taylortown | 217,984 | 634 | 634 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Vass | 217,984 | 952 | 952 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wade | 217,984 | 638 | 638 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whispering Pines | 217,984 | 4,987 | 4,987 | 2.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 22 | Fayetteville | 216,471 | 208,501 | 183,928 | 84.97 \% | 88.21 \% |
|  | Hope Mills | 216,471 | 17,808 | 2,593 | 1.20 \% | 14.56 \% |
| 23 | Carrboro | 210,529 | 21,295 | 21,295 | 10.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chapel Hill (Orange) | 210,529 | 59,054 | 59,054 | 28.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Durham (Orange) | 210,529 | 144 | 144 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hillsborough | 210,529 | 9,660 | 9,660 | 4.59 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/14/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 8 of 17
Districts included: All

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 23 | Mebane (Orange) | 210,529 | 3,171 | 3,171 | $1.51 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Milton | 210,529 | 155 | 155 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Roxboro | 210,529 | 8,134 | 8,134 | 3.86 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Yanceyville | 210,529 | 1,937 | 1,937 | 0.92 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 24 | East Laurinburg | 202,786 | 234 | 234 | 0.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fairmont | 202,786 | 2,191 | 2,191 | 1.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gibson | 202,786 | 449 | 449 | 0.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Laurinburg | 202,786 | 14,978 | 14,978 | 7.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lumber Bridge | 202,786 | 82 | 82 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lumberton | 202,786 | 19,025 | 19,025 | 9.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marietta | 202,786 | 111 | 111 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maxton (Robeson) | 202,786 | 1,902 | 1,902 | 0.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maxton (Scotland) | 202,786 | 208 | 208 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McDonald | 202,786 | 94 | 94 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Orrum | 202,786 | 59 | 59 | 0.03 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Parkton | 202,786 | 504 | 504 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pembroke | 202,786 | 2,823 | 2,823 | 1.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Proctorville | 202,786 | 121 | 121 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raeford | 202,786 | 4,559 | 4,559 | 2.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Raynham | 202,786 | 60 | 60 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Red Springs (Hoke) | 202,786 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Red Springs (Robeson) | 202,786 | 3,087 | 3,087 | 1.52 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rennert | 202,786 | 275 | 275 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rowland | 202,786 | 885 | 885 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | St. Pauls | 202,786 | 2,045 | 2,045 | $1.01 \%$ | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wagram | 202,786 | 615 | 615 | 0.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 25 | Alamance | 218,484 | 988 | 988 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Asheboro | 218,484 | 27,156 | 925 | 0.42 \% | 3.41 \% |
|  | Burlington (Alamance) | 218,484 | 55,481 | 55,481 | 25.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elon | 218,484 | 11,336 | 11,336 | 5.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Franklinville | 218,484 | 1,197 | 1,197 | 0.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gibsonville (Alamance) | 218,484 | 4,278 | 4,278 | 1.96 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Graham | 218,484 | 17,157 | 17,157 | 7.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Green Level | 218,484 | 3,152 | 3,152 | 1.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Haw River | 218,484 | 2,252 | 2,252 | 1.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Liberty | 218,484 | 2,655 | 2,655 | 1.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mebane (Alamance) | 218,484 | 14,626 | 14,626 | 6.69 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ossipee | 218,484 | 536 | 536 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ramseur | 218,484 | 1,774 | 1,774 | 0.81 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Randleman | 218,484 | 4,595 | 4,595 | 2.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seagrove | 218,484 | 235 | 235 | 0.11 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 25 | Staley | 218,484 | 397 | 397 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Swepsonville | 218,484 | 2,445 | 2,445 | 1.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 26 | Burlington (Guilford) | 201,428 | 1,822 | 1,822 | 0.90 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Eden | 201,428 | 15,421 | 15,421 | 7.66 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gibsonville (Guilford) | 201,428 | 4,642 | 4,642 | 2.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greensboro | 201,428 | 299,035 | 12,873 | 6.39 \% | 4.30 \% |
|  | Kernersville (Guilford) | 201,428 | 502 | 94 | 0.05 \% | 18.73 \% |
|  | Madison | 201,428 | 2,129 | 2,129 | 1.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mayodan | 201,428 | 2,418 | 2,418 | 1.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oak Ridge | 201,428 | 7,474 | 7,474 | 3.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pleasant Garden | 201,428 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 2.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Reidsville | 201,428 | 14,583 | 14,583 | 7.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sedalia | 201,428 | 676 | 676 | 0.34 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stokesdale | 201,428 | 5,924 | 5,924 | 2.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stoneville | 201,428 | 1,308 | 1,308 | 0.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Summerfield | 201,428 | 10,951 | 10,951 | 5.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wentworth | 201,428 | 2,662 | 2,662 | 1.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Whitsett | 201,428 | 584 | 584 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 27 | Greensboro | 216,058 | 299,035 | 204,686 | 94.74 \% | 68.45 \% |
|  | Sedalia | 216,058 | 676 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| 28 | Archdale (Guilford) | 214,909 | 380 | 380 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Greensboro | 214,909 | 299,035 | 81,476 | 37.91 \% | 27.25 \% |
|  | High Point (Guilford) | 214,909 | 107,321 | 107,321 | 49.94 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jamestown | 214,909 | 3,668 | 3,668 | 1.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kernersville (Guilford) | 214,909 | 502 | 408 | 0.19 \% | 81.27 \% |
| 29 | Ansonville | 214,631 | 440 | 440 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Archdale (Randolph) | 214,631 | 11,527 | 11,527 | 5.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Asheboro | 214,631 | 27,156 | 26,231 | 12.22 \% | 96.59 \% |
|  | Biscoe | 214,631 | 1,848 | 1,848 | 0.86 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Candor (Montgomery) | 214,631 | 813 | 813 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dobbins Heights | 214,631 | 687 | 687 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ellerbe | 214,631 | 864 | 864 | 0.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hamlet | 214,631 | 6,025 | 6,025 | 2.81 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Point (Randolph) | 214,631 | 8 | 8 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hoffman | 214,631 | 418 | 418 | 0.19 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lilesville | 214,631 | 395 | 395 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marshville | 214,631 | 2,522 | 2,522 | 1.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McFarlan | 214,631 | 94 | 94 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Morven | 214,631 | 329 | 329 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Gilead | 214,631 | 1,171 | 1,171 | 0.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Norman | 214,631 | 100 | 100 | 0.05 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 29 | Peachland | 214,631 | 390 | 390 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Polkton | 214,631 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 1.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Randleman | 214,631 | 4,595 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Rockingham | 214,631 | 9,243 | 9,243 | 4.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Star | 214,631 | 806 | 806 | 0.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Thomasville (Randolph) | 214,631 | 521 | 521 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Trinity | 214,631 | 7,006 | 7,006 | 3.26 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Troy | 214,631 | 2,850 | 2,850 | 1.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wadesboro | 214,631 | 5,008 | 5,008 | 2.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Waxhaw | 214,631 | 20,534 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Wingate | 214,631 | 4,055 | 4,055 | 1.89 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 30 | Bethania | 212,299 | 344 | 344 | 0.16 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clemmons | 212,299 | 21,163 | 21,163 | 9.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Danbury | 212,299 | 189 | 189 | 0.09 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Point (Forsyth) | 212,299 | 84 | 84 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kernersville (Forsyth) | 212,299 | 25,947 | 25,947 | 12.22 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | King (Forsyth) | 212,299 | 591 | 591 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | King (Stokes) | 212,299 | 6,606 | 6,606 | 3.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lewisville | 212,299 | 13,381 | 13,381 | 6.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rural Hall | 212,299 | 3,351 | 3,351 | 1.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tobaccoville (Forsyth) | 212,299 | 2,578 | 2,578 | 1.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tobaccoville (Stokes) | 212,299 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Walkertown | 212,299 | 5,692 | 5,692 | 2.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Walnut Cove | 212,299 | 1,586 | 1,586 | 0.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Winston-Salem | 212,299 | 249,545 | 40,795 | 19.22 \% | 16.35 \% |
| 31 | Winston-Salem | 214,811 | 249,545 | 208,750 | 97.18 \% | 83.65 \% |
| 32 | Bermuda Run | 211,642 | 3,120 | 3,120 | 1.47 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cooleemee | 211,642 | 940 | 940 | 0.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Denton | 211,642 | 1,494 | 1,494 | 0.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Point (Davidson) | 211,642 | 6,646 | 6,646 | 3.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lexington | 211,642 | 19,632 | 19,632 | 9.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Midway | 211,642 | 4,742 | 4,742 | 2.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mocksville | 211,642 | 5,900 | 5,900 | 2.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Thomasville (Davidson) | 211,642 | 26,662 | 26,662 | 12.60 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wallburg | 211,642 | 3,051 | 3,051 | 1.44 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 33 | Albemarle | 209,379 | 16,432 | 16,432 | 7.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Badin | 209,379 | 2,024 | 2,024 | 0.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | China Grove | 209,379 | 4,434 | 4,434 | 2.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cleveland | 209,379 | 846 | 846 | 0.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Spencer | 209,379 | 1,567 | 1,567 | 0.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Faith | 209,379 | 819 | 819 | 0.39 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 33 | Granite Quarry | 209,379 | 2,984 | 2,984 | 1.43 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kannapolis (Rowan) | 209,379 | 10,268 | 10,268 | 4.90 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Landis | 209,379 | 3,690 | 3,690 | 1.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Locust (Stanly) | 209,379 | 3,996 | 3,996 | 1.91 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Misenheimer | 209,379 | 650 | 650 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | New London | 209,379 | 607 | 607 | 0.29 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Norwood | 209,379 | 2,367 | 2,367 | 1.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Oakboro | 209,379 | 2,128 | 2,128 | 1.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Red Cross | 209,379 | 762 | 762 | 0.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Richfield | 209,379 | 582 | 582 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rockwell | 209,379 | 2,302 | 2,302 | 1.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Salisbury | 209,379 | 35,540 | 35,540 | 16.97 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spencer | 209,379 | 3,308 | 3,308 | 1.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stanfield | 209,379 | 1,585 | 1,585 | 0.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 34 | Concord | 219,157 | 105,240 | 105,240 | 48.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harrisburg | 219,157 | 18,967 | 18,967 | 8.65 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kannapolis (Cabarrus) | 219,157 | 42,846 | 42,846 | 19.55 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Locust (Cabarrus) | 219,157 | 541 | 423 | 0.19 \% | 78.19 \% |
|  | Midland (Cabarrus) | 219,157 | 4,684 | 25 | 0.01 \% | 0.53 \% |
|  | Mount Pleasant | 219,157 | 1,671 | 1,671 | 0.76 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
| 35 | Fairview | 218,137 | 3,456 | 3,456 | 1.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hemby Bridge | 218,137 | 1,614 | 1,614 | 0.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Indian Trail | 218,137 | 39,997 | 39,997 | 18.34 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Park | 218,137 | 3,269 | 3,269 | 1.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Locust (Cabarrus) | 218,137 | 541 | 118 | 0.05 \% | 21.81 \% |
|  | Marvin | 218,137 | 6,358 | 6,358 | 2.91 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Midland (Cabarrus) | 218,137 | 4,684 | 4,659 | 2.14 \% | 99.47 \% |
|  | Mineral Springs | 218,137 | 3,159 | 3,159 | 1.45 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mint Hill (Union) | 218,137 | 6 | 6 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Monroe | 218,137 | 34,562 | 34,562 | 15.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Stallings (Union) | 218,137 | 15,728 | 15,728 | 7.21 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Unionville | 218,137 | 6,643 | 6,643 | 3.05 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Waxhaw | 218,137 | 20,534 | 20,534 | 9.41 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weddington (Union) | 218,137 | 13,176 | 13,176 | 6.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wesley Chapel | 218,137 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 3.98 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 36 | Boonville | 210,986 | 1,185 | 1,185 | 0.56 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dobson | 210,986 | 1,462 | 1,462 | 0.69 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | East Bend | 210,986 | 634 | 634 | 0.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elkin (Surry) | 210,986 | 4,049 | 4,049 | 1.92 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elkin (Wilkes) | 210,986 | 73 | 73 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Jonesville | 210,986 | 2,308 | 2,308 | 1.09 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 36 | Mount Airy | 210,986 | 10,676 | 10,676 | 5.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | North Wilkesboro | 210,986 | 4,382 | 4,382 | 2.08 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pilot Mountain | 210,986 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 0.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ronda | 210,986 | 438 | 438 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Taylorsville | 210,986 | 2,320 | 2,320 | 1.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Wilkesboro | 210,986 | 3,687 | 3,687 | 1.75 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Yadkinville | 210,986 | 2,995 | 2,995 | 1.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 37 | Cornelius | 215,708 | 31,412 | 12,415 | 5.76 \% | 39.52 \% |
|  | Davidson (Iredell) | 215,708 | 378 | 378 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Davidson (Mecklenburg) | 215,708 | 14,728 | 14,728 | 6.83 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Harmony | 215,708 | 543 | 543 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Huntersville | 215,708 | 61,376 | 117 | 0.05 \% | 0.19 \% |
|  | Love Valley | 215,708 | 154 | 154 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mooresville | 215,708 | 50,193 | 50,193 | 23.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Statesville | 215,708 | 28,419 | 28,419 | 13.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Troutman | 215,708 | 3,698 | 3,698 | 1.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 38 | Charlotte | 217,671 | 874,579 | 121,442 | 55.79 \% | 13.89 \% |
|  | Cornelius | 217,671 | 31,412 | 18,997 | 8.73 \% | 60.48 \% |
|  | Huntersville | 217,671 | 61,376 | 61,259 | 28.14 \% | 99.81 \% |
| 39 | Charlotte | 219,006 | 874,579 | 210,910 | 96.30 \% | 24.12 \% |
|  | Mint Hill (Mecklenburg) | 219,006 | 26,444 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
| 40 | Charlotte | 216,693 | 874,579 | 216,685 | 100.00 \% | 24.78 \% |
| 41 | Charlotte | 216,686 | 874,579 | 153,144 | 70.68 \% | 17.51 \% |
|  | Matthews | 216,686 | 29,435 | 29,435 | 13.58 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Midland (Mecklenburg) | 216,686 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Mint Hill (Mecklenburg) | 216,686 | 26,444 | 26,444 | 12.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Pineville | 216,686 | 10,602 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Stallings (Mecklenburg) | 216,686 | 384 | 384 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weddington (Mecklenburg) | 216,686 | 5 | 5 | 0.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 42 | Charlotte | 216,411 | 874,579 | 172,398 | 79.66 \% | 19.71 \% |
|  | Pineville | 216,411 | 10,602 | 10,602 | 4.90 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 43 | Brookford | 209,997 | 442 | 442 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cajah's Mountain | 209,997 | 2,722 | 2,722 | 1.30 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Catawba | 209,997 | 702 | 702 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cedar Rock | 209,997 | 301 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Claremont | 209,997 | 1,692 | 1,692 | 0.81 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Conover | 209,997 | 8,421 | 8,421 | 4.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gamewell | 209,997 | 3,702 | 3,702 | 1.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Granite Falls | 209,997 | 4,965 | 4,965 | 2.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hickory (Caldwell) | 209,997 | 32 | 32 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hickory (Catawba) | 209,997 | 43,379 | 43,379 | 20.66 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/14/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 13 of 17
Districts included: All

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 43 | Hudson | 209,997 | 3,780 | 3,780 | 1.80 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lenoir | 209,997 | 18,352 | 1 | 0.00 \% | 0.01 \% |
|  | Long View (Catawba) | 209,997 | 4,353 | 4,353 | 2.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maiden (Catawba) | 209,997 | 3,736 | 3,736 | 1.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newton | 209,997 | 13,148 | 13,148 | 6.26 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Rhodhiss (Caldwell) | 209,997 | 358 | 358 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford College (Caldwell) | 209,997 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Sawmills | 209,997 | 5,020 | 5,020 | 2.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 44 | Belwood | 203,043 | 857 | 857 | 0.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bessemer City | 203,043 | 5,428 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Boiling Springs | 203,043 | 4,615 | 4,615 | 2.27 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Casar | 203,043 | 305 | 305 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cherryville | 203,043 | 6,078 | 6,078 | 2.99 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dellview | 203,043 | 6 | 6 | 0.00 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Earl | 203,043 | 198 | 198 | 0.10 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Fallston | 203,043 | 627 | 627 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gastonia | 203,043 | 80,411 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Grover | 203,043 | 802 | 802 | 0.39 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | High Shoals | 203,043 | 595 | 0 | 0.00 \% | $0.00 \%$ |
|  | Kings Mountain (Cleveland) | 203,043 | 10,032 | 10,032 | 4.94 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Kingstown | 203,043 | 656 | 656 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lattimore | 203,043 | 406 | 406 | 0.20 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lawndale | 203,043 | 570 | 570 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lincolnton | 203,043 | 11,091 | 11,091 | 5.46 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maiden (Lincoln) | 203,043 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Mooresboro | 203,043 | 293 | 293 | 0.14 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Patterson Springs | 203,043 | 571 | 571 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Polkville | 203,043 | 516 | 516 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Shelby | 203,043 | 21,918 | 21,918 | 10.79 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Waco | 203,043 | 310 | 310 | 0.15 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 45 | Belmont | 211,229 | 15,010 | 15,010 | 7.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bessemer City | 211,229 | 5,428 | 5,428 | 2.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cramerton | 211,229 | 5,296 | 5,296 | 2.51 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Dallas | 211,229 | 5,927 | 5,927 | 2.81 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gastonia | 211,229 | 80,411 | 80,411 | 38.07 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | High Shoals | 211,229 | 595 | 595 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Kings Mountain (Gaston) | 211,229 | 1,110 | 1,110 | 0.53 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lowell | 211,229 | 3,654 | 3,654 | 1.73 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | McAdenville | 211,229 | 890 | 890 | 0.42 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mount Holly | 211,229 | 17,703 | 17,703 | 8.38 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ranlo | 211,229 | 4,511 | 4,511 | 2.14 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 45 | Spencer Mountain | 211,229 | 0 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Stanley | 211,229 | 3,963 | 3,963 | 1.88 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 46 | Bakersville | 218,487 | 450 | 450 | 0.21 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Banner Elk | 218,487 | 1,049 | 1,049 | 0.48 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Beech Mountain (Avery) | 218,487 | 62 | 62 | 0.03 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Beech Mountain (Watauga) | 218,487 | 613 | 613 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Blowing Rock (Caldwell) | 218,487 | 91 | 91 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Blowing Rock (Watauga) | 218,487 | 1,285 | 1,285 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Boone | 218,487 | 19,092 | 19,092 | 8.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Burnsville | 218,487 | 1,614 | 1,614 | 0.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cajah's Mountain | 218,487 | 2,722 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Canton | 218,487 | 4,422 | 4,422 | 2.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Cedar Rock | 218,487 | 301 | 301 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Clyde | 218,487 | 1,368 | 1,368 | 0.63 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Crossnore | 218,487 | 143 | 143 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Elk Park | 218,487 | 542 | 542 | 0.25 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Gamewell | 218,487 | 3,702 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Grandfather Village | 218,487 | 95 | 95 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hot Springs | 218,487 | 520 | 520 | 0.24 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hudson | 218,487 | 3,780 | 0 | 0.00 \% | 0.00 \% |
|  | Jefferson | 218,487 | 1,622 | 1,622 | 0.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lansing | 218,487 | 126 | 126 | 0.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lenoir | 218,487 | 18,352 | 18,351 | 8.40 \% | 99.99 \% |
|  | Mars Hill | 218,487 | 2,007 | 2,007 | 0.92 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marshall | 218,487 | 777 | 777 | 0.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Newland | 218,487 | 715 | 715 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Seven Devils (Avery) | 218,487 | 38 | 38 | 0.02 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Seven Devils (Watauga) | 218,487 | 275 | 275 | 0.13 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sparta | 218,487 | 1,834 | 1,834 | 0.84 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spruce Pine | 218,487 | 2,194 | 2,194 | 1.00 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Sugar Mountain | 218,487 | 371 | 371 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | West Jefferson | 218,487 | 1,279 | 1,279 | 0.59 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 47 | Black Mountain | 200,614 | 8,426 | 8,426 | 4.20 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Connelly Springs | 200,614 | 1,529 | 1,529 | 0.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Drexel | 200,614 | 1,760 | 1,760 | 0.88 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Glen Alpine | 200,614 | 1,529 | 1,529 | 0.76 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hickory (Burke) | 200,614 | 79 | 79 | 0.04 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hildebran | 200,614 | 1,679 | 1,679 | 0.84 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Long View (Burke) | 200,614 | 735 | 735 | 0.37 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Marion | 200,614 | 7,717 | 7,717 | 3.85 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Montreat | 200,614 | 901 | 901 | 0.45 \% | 100.00 \% |

## District - Municipality by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total District Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop in Muni | Percent of District Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 47 | Morganton | 200,614 | 17,474 | 17,474 | 8.71 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Old Fort | 200,614 | 811 | 811 | 0.40 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rhodhiss (Burke) | 200,614 | 639 | 639 | 0.32 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherford College (Burke) | 200,614 | 1,226 | 1,226 | 0.61 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Valdese | 200,614 | 4,689 | 4,689 | 2.34 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Weaverville | 200,614 | 4,567 | 4,567 | 2.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 48 | Bostic | 200,053 | 355 | 355 | 0.18 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Chimney Rock Village | 200,053 | 140 | 140 | 0.07 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Columbus | 200,053 | 1,060 | 1,060 | 0.53 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ellenboro | 200,053 | 723 | 723 | 0.36 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Flat Rock | 200,053 | 3,486 | 3,486 | 1.74 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fletcher | 200,053 | 7,987 | 7,987 | 3.99 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Forest City | 200,053 | 7,377 | 7,377 | 3.69 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Hendersonville | 200,053 | 15,137 | 15,137 | 7.57 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Lure | 200,053 | 1,365 | 1,365 | 0.68 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Laurel Park | 200,053 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 1.12 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Mills River | 200,053 | 7,078 | 7,078 | 3.54 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Ruth | 200,053 | 347 | 347 | 0.17 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rutherfordton | 200,053 | 3,640 | 3,640 | 1.82 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Saluda (Henderson) | 200,053 | 11 | 11 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Saluda (Polk) | 200,053 | 620 | 620 | 0.31 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Spindale | 200,053 | 4,225 | 4,225 | 2.11 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Tryon | 200,053 | 1,562 | 1,562 | 0.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 49 | Asheville | 200,986 | 94,589 | 94,589 | 47.06 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Biltmore Forest | 200,986 | 1,409 | 1,409 | 0.70 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Woodfin | 200,986 | 7,936 | 7,936 | 3.95 \% | 100.00 \% |
| 50 | Andrews | 213,909 | 1,667 | 1,667 | 0.78 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Brevard | 213,909 | 7,744 | 7,744 | 3.62 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Bryson City | 213,909 | 1,558 | 1,558 | 0.73 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Dillsboro | 213,909 | 213 | 213 | 0.10 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Fontana Dam | 213,909 | 13 | 13 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Forest Hills | 213,909 | 303 | 303 | 0.14 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Franklin | 213,909 | 4,175 | 4,175 | 1.95 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Hayesville | 213,909 | 461 | 461 | 0.22 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Highlands (Jackson) | 213,909 | 12 | 12 | 0.01 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Highlands (Macon) | 213,909 | 1,060 | 1,060 | 0.50 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Lake Santeetlah | 213,909 | 38 | 38 | 0.02 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Maggie Valley | 213,909 | 1,687 | 1,687 | 0.79 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Murphy | 213,909 | 1,608 | 1,608 | 0.75 \% | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Robbinsville | 213,909 | 597 | 597 | 0.28 \% | 100.00 \% |
|  | Rosman | 213,909 | 701 | 701 | 0.33 \% | 100.00 \% |

District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/14/2021
Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
Page 16 of 17
Districts included: All

District Plan: SST-4

| District | Municipality | Total <br> District <br> Population | Total Muni <br> Population | District Pop <br> in Muni | Percent of <br> District <br> Pop in Muni | Percent of Muni <br> Pop in District |
| :---: | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Sylva | 213,909 | 2,578 | 2,578 | $1.21 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Waynesville | 213,909 | 10,140 | 10,140 | $4.74 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |
|  | Webster | 213,909 | 372 | 372 | $0.17 \%$ | $100.00 \%$ |

District Plan: SST-4

| District | County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bertie | 12 | 0 |
|  | Camden | 3 | 0 |
|  | Currituck | 11 | 0 |
|  | Dare | 16 | 0 |
|  | Gates | 6 | 0 |
|  | Hertford | 13 | 0 |
|  | Northampton | 13 | 0 |
|  | Pasquotank | 9 | 0 |
|  | Perquimans | 7 | 0 |
|  | Tyrrell | 6 | 0 |
| 2 | Carteret | 28 | 0 |
|  | Chowan | 6 | 0 |
|  | Halifax | 23 | 0 |
|  | Hyde | 7 | 0 |
|  | Martin | 13 | 0 |
|  | Pamlico | 10 | 0 |
|  | Warren | 14 | 0 |
|  | Washington | 6 | 0 |
| 3 | Beaufort | 21 | 0 |
|  | Craven | 21 | 0 |
|  | Lenoir | 22 | 0 |
| 4 | Edgecombe | 21 | 0 |
|  | Pitt | 40 | 0 |
| 5 | Onslow | 24 | 0 |
| 6 | New Hanover | 40 | 0 |
| 7 | Brunswick | 25 | 0 |
|  | Columbus | 26 | 0 |
|  | New Hanover | 3 | 0 |
| 8 | Bladen | 17 | 0 |
|  | Duplin | 19 | 0 |
|  | Jones | 7 | 0 |
|  | Pender | 20 | 0 |
|  | Sampson | 21 | 2 |
| 9 | Greene | 10 | 0 |
|  | Wayne | 28 | 0 |
|  | Wilson | 24 | 0 |
| 10 | Johnston | 36 | 0 |
| 11 | Franklin | 18 | 0 |
|  | Nash | 24 | 0 |
|  | Vance | 12 | 0 |
| 12 | Granville | 15 | 0 |
|  | Wake | 25 | 1 |
| 13 | Wake | 32 | 3 |

District Plan: SST-4

| District | County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14 | Wake | 43 | 3 |
| 15 | Wake | 35 | 4 |
| 16 | Wake | 26 | 1 |
| 17 | Wake | 36 | 2 |
| 18 | Durham | 42 | 0 |
| 19 | Chatham | 18 | 0 |
|  | Durham | 15 | 0 |
| 20 | Harnett | 13 | 0 |
|  | Lee | 10 | 0 |
|  | Sampson | 0 | 2 |
| 21 | Cumberland | 20 | 0 |
|  | Moore | 26 | 0 |
| 22 | Cumberland | 56 | 0 |
| 23 | Caswell | 9 | 0 |
|  | Orange | 41 | 0 |
|  | Person | 11 | 0 |
| 24 | Hoke | 15 | 0 |
|  | Robeson | 39 | 0 |
|  | Scotland | 7 | 0 |
| 25 | Alamance | 37 | 0 |
|  | Randolph | 8 | 1 |
| 26 | Guilford | 30 | 0 |
|  | Rockingham | 15 | 0 |
| 27 | Guilford | 73 | 0 |
| 28 | Guilford | 62 | 0 |
| 29 | Anson | 9 | 0 |
|  | Montgomery | 14 | 0 |
|  | Randolph | 13 | 1 |
|  | Richmond | 16 | 0 |
|  | Union | 8 | 0 |
| 30 | Forsyth | 40 | 0 |
|  | Stokes | 18 | 0 |
| 31 | Forsyth | 61 | 0 |
| 32 | Davidson | 43 | 0 |
|  | Davie | 14 | 0 |
| 33 | Rowan | 41 | 0 |
|  | Stanly | 22 | 0 |
| 34 | Cabarrus | 39 | 1 |
| 35 | Cabarrus | 0 | 1 |
|  | Union | 44 | 0 |

District Plan: SST-4

| District | County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 36 | Alexander | 10 | 0 |
|  | Surry | 24 | 0 |
|  | Wilkes | 27 | 0 |
|  | Yadkin | 12 | 0 |
| 37 | Iredell | 29 | 0 |
|  | Mecklenburg | 3 | 0 |
| 38 | Mecklenburg | 24 | 0 |
| 39 | Mecklenburg | 40 | 0 |
| 40 | Mecklenburg | 56 | 0 |
| 41 | Mecklenburg | 42 | 0 |
| 42 | Mecklenburg | 30 | 0 |
| 43 | Caldwell | 10 | 2 |
|  | Catawba | 40 | 0 |
| 44 | Cleveland | 21 | 0 |
|  | Gaston | 5 | 0 |
|  | Lincoln | 23 | 0 |
| 45 | Gaston | 41 | 0 |
| 46 | Alleghany | 4 | 0 |
|  | Ashe | 17 | 0 |
|  | Avery | 19 | 0 |
|  | Caldwell | 8 | 2 |
|  | Haywood | 12 | 0 |
|  | Madison | 12 | 0 |
|  | Mitchell | 9 | 0 |
|  | Watauga | 20 | 0 |
|  | Yancey | 11 | 0 |
| 47 | Buncombe | 20 | 2 |
|  | Burke | 33 | 0 |
|  | McDowell | 17 | 0 |
| 48 | Henderson | 34 | 0 |
|  | Polk | 7 | 0 |
|  | Rutherford | 17 | 0 |
| 49 | Buncombe | 57 | 2 |
| 50 | Cherokee | 16 | 0 |
|  | Clay | 9 | 0 |
|  | Graham | 4 | 0 |
|  | Haywood | 17 | 0 |
|  | Jackson | 13 | 0 |
|  | Macon | 15 | 0 |
|  | Swain | 5 | 0 |
|  | Transylvania | 15 | 0 |
|  | Total: | 2,651 | 15 |

District Plan: SST-4

| County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alamance | 37 | 0 |
| Alexander | 10 | 0 |
| Alleghany | 4 | 0 |
| Anson | 9 | 0 |
| Ashe | 17 | 0 |
| Avery | 19 | 0 |
| Beaufort | 21 | 0 |
| Bertie | 12 | 0 |
| Bladen | 17 | 0 |
| Brunswick | 25 | 0 |
| Buncombe | 77 | 2 |
| Burke | 33 | 0 |
| Cabarrus | 39 | 1 |
| Caldwell | 18 | 2 |
| Camden | 3 | 0 |
| Carteret | 28 | 0 |
| Caswell | 9 | 0 |
| Catawba | 40 | 0 |
| Chatham | 18 | 0 |
| Cherokee | 16 | 0 |
| Chowan | 6 | 0 |
| Clay | 9 | 0 |
| Cleveland | 21 | 0 |
| Columbus | 26 | 0 |
| Craven | 21 | 0 |
| Cumberland | 76 | 0 |
| Currituck | 11 | 0 |
| Dare | 16 | 0 |
| Davidson | 43 | 0 |
| Davie | 14 | 0 |
| Duplin | 19 | 0 |
| Durham | 57 | 0 |
| Edgecombe | 21 | 0 |
| Forsyth | 101 | 0 |
| Franklin | 18 | 0 |
| Gaston | 46 | 0 |
| Gates | 6 | 0 |
| Graham | 4 | 0 |
| Granville | 15 | 0 |
| Greene | 10 | 0 |
| Guilford | 165 | 0 |
| Halifax | 23 | 0 |
| Harnett | 13 | 0 |

District Plan: SST-4

| County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Haywood | 29 | 0 |
| Henderson | 34 | 0 |
| Hertford | 13 | 0 |
| Hoke | 15 | 0 |
| Hyde | 7 | 0 |
| Iredell | 29 | 0 |
| Jackson | 13 | 0 |
| Johnston | 36 | 0 |
| Jones | 7 | 0 |
| Lee | 10 | 0 |
| Lenoir | 22 | 0 |
| Lincoln | 23 | 0 |
| Macon | 15 | 0 |
| Madison | 12 | 0 |
| Martin | 13 | 0 |
| McDowell | 17 | 0 |
| Mecklenburg | 195 | 0 |
| Mitchell | 9 | 0 |
| Montgomery | 14 | 0 |
| Moore | 26 | 0 |
| Nash | 24 | 0 |
| New Hanover | 43 | 0 |
| Northampton | 13 | 0 |
| Onslow | 24 | 0 |
| Orange | 41 | 0 |
| Pamlico | 10 | 0 |
| Pasquotank | 9 | 0 |
| Pender | 20 | 0 |
| Perquimans | 7 | 0 |
| Person | 11 | 0 |
| Pitt | 40 | 0 |
| Polk | 7 | 0 |
| Randolph | 21 | 1 |
| Richmond | 16 | 0 |
| Robeson | 39 | 0 |
| Rockingham | 15 | 0 |
| Rowan | 41 | 0 |
| Rutherford | 17 | 0 |
| Sampson | 21 | 2 |
| Scotland | 7 | 0 |
| Stanly | 22 | 0 |
| Stokes | 18 | 0 |
| Surry | 24 | 0 |

Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report

## District Plan: SST-4

| County | Whole VTDs | Split VTDs |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Swain | 5 | 0 |
| Transylvania | 15 | 0 |
| Tyrrell | 6 | 0 |
| Union | 52 | 0 |
| Vance | 12 | 0 |
| Wake | 197 | 7 |
| Warren | 14 | 0 |
| Washington | 6 | 0 |
| Watauga | 20 | 0 |
| Wayne | 28 | 0 |
| Wilkes | 27 | 0 |
| Wilson | 24 | 0 |
| Yadkin | 12 | 0 |
| Yancey | 11 | 0 |
|  | $\mathbf{2 , 6 5 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 5}$ |

## District Plan: SST-4

| County | VTD | District | Total VTD <br> Population | VTD Pop in District | Percent of VTD Pop in District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Buncombe | 41.1 | 47 | 4,941 | 4,898 | 99.13 \% |
|  |  | 49 | 4,941 | 43 | 0.87 \% |
|  | 71.1 | 47 | 5,830 | 2,400 | 41.17 \% |
|  |  | 49 | 5,830 | 3,430 | 58.83 \% |
| Cabarrus | 10-00 | 34 | 8,241 | 1,594 | 19.34 \% |
|  |  | 35 | 8,241 | 6,647 | 80.66 \% |
| Caldwell | PR29 | 43 | 5,041 | 54 | 1.07 \% |
|  |  | 46 | 5,041 | 4,987 | 98.93 \% |
|  | PR33 | 43 | 8,538 | 7,830 | 91.71 \% |
|  |  | 46 | 8,538 | 708 | 8.29 \% |
| Randolph | RN | 25 | 9,167 | 8,875 | 96.81 \% |
|  |  | 29 | 9,167 | 292 | 3.19 \% |
| Sampson | MING | 8 | 3,942 | 3,662 | 92.90 \% |
|  |  | 20 | 3,942 | 280 | 7.10 \% |
|  | PLVW | 8 | 3,941 | 2,298 | 58.31 \% |
|  |  | 20 | 3,941 | 1,643 | 41.69 \% |
| Wake | 01-28 | 13 | 7,107 | 5,392 | 75.87 \% |
|  |  | 15 | 7,107 | 1,715 | 24.13 \% |
|  | 04-05 | 15 | 5,069 | 970 | 19.14 \% |
|  |  | 17 | 5,069 | 4,099 | 80.86 \% |
|  | 05-07 | 15 | 14,766 | 12,639 | 85.60 \% |
|  |  | 17 | 14,766 | 2,127 | 14.40 \% |
|  | 07-12 | 14 | 4,145 | 197 | 4.75 \% |
|  |  | 15 | 4,145 | 3,948 | 95.25 \% |
|  | 15-01 | 13 | 6,482 | 1,941 | 29.94 \% |
|  |  | 16 | 6,482 | 4,541 | 70.06 \% |
|  | 17-10 | 13 | 2,507 | 180 | 7.18 \% |
|  |  | 14 | 2,507 | 2,327 | 92.82 \% |
|  | 19-16 | 12 | 4,340 | 2,697 | 62.14 \% |
|  |  | 14 | 4,340 | 1,643 | 37.86 \% |
|  |  |  | Total: | 94,057 |  |

Number of split VTDs: 15

## Incumbent-District Report

## District Plan: SST-4

Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/20/2021

| Last Name | First Name | Party | Current District | District in this Plan |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alexander | W. Ted | Republican | 44 | 44 |
| Ballard | Deanna | Republican | 45 | 46 |
| Barnes | Lisa | Republican | 11 | 11 |
| Batch | Sydney | Democratic | 17 | 16 |
| Bazemore | Ernestine | Democratic | 3 | 1 |
| Berger | Philip | Republican | 30 | 26 |
| Blue | Daniel | Democratic | 14 | 13 |
| Britt | Danny | Republican | 13 | 24 |
| Burgin | James | Republican | 12 | 20 |
| Chaudhuri | Jay | Democratic | 15 | 15 |
| Clark | Robert | Democratic | 21 | 24 |
| Corbin | Harold | Republican | 50 | 50 |
| Craven | David | Republican | 26 | 29 |
| Crawford | Sarah | Democratic | 18 | 14 |
| Daniel | Warren | Republican | 46 | 47 |
| Davis | Donald | Democratic | 5 | 4 |
| deViere | Kirk | Democratic | 19 | 22 |
| Edwards | Charles | Republican | 48 | 48 |
| Fitch | Milton | Democratic | 4 | 9 |
| Ford | Carl | Republican | 33 | 33 |
| Foushee | Valerie | Democratic | 23 | 23 |
| Galey | Amy | Republican | 24 | 25 |
| Garrett | Michael | Democratic | 27 | 27 |
| Harrington | Kathryn | Republican | 43 | 45 |
| Hise | Ralph | Republican | 47 | 46 |
| Jackson | Brent | Republican | 10 | 8 |
| Jackson | Jeffrey | Democratic | 37 | 41 |
| Jarvis | Steven | Republican | 29 | 32 |
| Johnson | Matthew | Republican | 35 | 35 |
| Krawiec | Joyce | Republican | 31 | 30 |
| Lazzara | Michael | Republican | 6 | 5 |
| Lee | Michael | Republican | 9 | 6 |
| Lowe | Paul | Democratic | 32 | 31 |
| Marcus | Natasha | Democratic | 41 | 37 |
| Mayfield | Julie | Democratic | 49 | 49 |
| McInnis | Thomas | Republican | 25 | 29 |
| Mohammed | Mujtaba | Democratic | 38 | 38 |
| Murdock | Natalie | Democratic | 20 | 19 |
| Newton | Paul | Republican | 36 | 34 |
| Nickel | George | Democratic | 16 | 17 |
| Perry | Jim | Republican | 7 | 3 |
| Proctor | Dean | Republican | 42 | 43 |

District Plan: SST-4
Residence Set: NC Senate -9/20/2021

| Last Name | First Name | Party | Current District | District in this Plan |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Rabon | William | Republican | 8 | 7 |
| Robinson | Gladys | Democratic | 28 | 27 |
| Salvador | DeAndrea | Democratic | 39 | 42 |
| Sanderson | Norman | Republican | 2 | 2 |
| Sawyer | Vickie | Republican | 34 | 37 |
| Steinburg | Bob | Republican | 1 | 2 |
| Waddell | Joyce | Democratic | 40 | 38 |
| Woodard | Mike | Democratic | 22 | 18 |

District-Incumbent Report
District Plan: SST-4
Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/20/2021

| District in this Plan | Last Name | First Name | Party | Current District |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bazemore | Ernestine | Democratic | 3 |
| 2 | Sanderson | Norman | Republican | 2 |
|  | Steinburg | Bob | Republican | 1 |
| 3 | Perry | Jim | Republican | 7 |
| 4 | Davis | Donald | Democratic | 5 |
| 5 | Lazzara | Michael | Republican | 6 |
| 6 | Lee | Michael | Republican | 9 |
| 7 | Rabon | William | Republican | 8 |
| 8 | Jackson | Brent | Republican | 10 |
| 9 | Fitch | Milton | Democratic | 4 |
| 10 |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | Barnes | Lisa | Republican | 11 |
| 12 |  |  |  |  |
| 13 | Blue | Daniel | Democratic | 14 |
| 14 | Crawford | Sarah | Democratic | 18 |
| 15 | Chaudhuri | Jay | Democratic | 15 |
| 16 | Batch | Sydney | Democratic | 17 |
| 17 | Nickel | George | Democratic | 16 |
| 18 | Woodard | Mike | Democratic | 22 |
| 19 | Murdock | Natalie | Democratic | 20 |
| 20 | Burgin | James | Republican | 12 |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |
| 22 | deViere | Kirk | Democratic | 19 |
| 23 | Foushee | Valerie | Democratic | 23 |
| 24 | Britt | Danny | Republican | 13 |
|  | Clark | Robert | Democratic | 21 |
| 25 | Galey | Amy | Republican | 24 |
| 26 | Berger | Philip | Republican | 30 |
| 27 | Garrett | Michael | Democratic | 27 |
|  | Robinson | Gladys | Democratic | 28 |
| 28 |  |  |  |  |
| 29 | Craven | David | Republican | 26 |
|  | McInnis | Thomas | Republican | 25 |
| 30 | Krawiec | Joyce | Republican | 31 |
| 31 | Lowe | Paul | Democratic | 32 |
| 32 | Jarvis | Steven | Republican | 29 |
| 33 | Ford | Carl | Republican | 33 |
| 34 | Newton | Paul | Republican | 36 |
| 35 | Johnson | Matthew | Republican | 35 |
| 36 |  |  |  |  |
| 37 | Marcus | Natasha | Democratic | 41 |
|  | Sawyer | Vickie | Republican | 34 |

District Plan: SST-4
Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/20/2021

| District in this Plan | Last Name | First Name | Party | Current District |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| 38 | Mohammed | Mujtaba | Democratic | 38 |
|  | Waddell | Joyce | Democratic | 40 |
| 39 |  |  |  |  |
| 40 |  |  |  |  |
| 41 | Jackson | Deffrey | Democratic | 37 |
| 42 | Salvador | Dean | Remocratic | 39 |
| 43 | Proctor | W. Ted | Republican | 42 |
| 44 | Alexander | Kathryn | Republican | 44 |
| 45 | Harrington | Deanna | Republican | 43 |
| 46 | Ballard | Ralph | Republican | 45 |
|  | Hise | Warren | Republican | 47 |
| 47 | Daniel | Charles | Republican | 46 |
| 48 | Edwards | Julie | Democratic | 48 |
| 49 | Mayfield | Harold | Republican | 49 |
| 50 | Corbin |  | 50 |  |

# - Ex. 6391 - <br> GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA <br> SESSION 2021 

SENATE BILL 739
PROPOSED COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE S739-PCS15347-ST-38

Short Title: Senate Redistricting Plan 2021/SBK-7.
(Public)
Sponsors:
Referred to:
November 1, 2021

## A BILL TO BE ENTITLED

AN ACT TO REALIGN THE DISTRICTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE SENATE FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THE 2020 FEDERAL DECENNIAL CENSUS.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
SECTION 1. G.S. 120-1(a), (b), and (c) are rewritten to read:
"(a) For the purpose of nominating and electing members of the Senate in 2022 and periodically thereafter, senatorial districts are established and seats in the Senate are apportioned among those districts so that each district elects one senator, and the composition of each district is as follows:
District 1: Bertie County, Camden County, Currituck County, Dare County, Gates County, Hertford County, Northampton County, Pasquotank County, Perquimans County, Tyrrell County.
District 2: Carteret County, Chowan County, Halifax County, Hyde County, Martin County, Pamlico County, Warren County, Washington County.
District 3: Beaufort County, Craven County, Lenoir County.
District 4: Greene County, Wayne County, Wilson County.
District 5: Edgecombe County, Pitt County.
District 6: Onslow County.
District 7: New Hanover County: VTD CF02, VTD CF05, VTD FP03, VTD FP04, VTD FP06, VTD FP07, VTD FP08, VTD H02, VTD H03, VTD H04, VTD H05, VTD H06, VTD H08, VTD H10, VTD H11, VTD H12, VTD H13, VTD M02, VTD M03, VTD M04, VTD M06, VTD M07, VTD W03, VTD W08, VTD W12, VTD W13, VTD W15, VTD W16, VTD W17, VTD W18, VTD W21, VTD W24, VTD W25, VTD W26, VTD W27, VTD W28, VTD W29, VTD W30, VTD W31, VTD WB.
District 8: Brunswick County, Columbus County, New Hanover County: VTD CF01, VTD CF06, VTD H01.
District 9: Bladen County, Duplin County, Jones County, Pender County, Sampson County: VTD AUTR, VTD CLCE, VTD CLEA, VTD CLEM, VTD CLNE, VTD CLSW, VTD CLWE, VTD GARL, VTD GIDD, VTD HARR, VTD HERR, VTD INGO, VTD KEEN, VTD KFRK, VTD LAKE, VTD MING: Block(s) 1639703021000, 1639703021001, 1639703021002, 1639703021003, 1639703021004, 1639703021005, 1639703021006, 1639703021007, 1639703021008, 1639703021009, 1639703021010, 1639703021011, 1639703021012, 1639703021013, 1639703021014, 1639703021015, 1639703021016, 1639703021017, 1639703021018, 1639703021019, 1639703021020, 1639703021021, 1639703021022, 1639703021023, 1639703021024, 1639703021025, 1639703021026, 1639703021027, 1639703021028, 1639703021029, 1639703021030, 1639703021031,


1639703021032, 1639703021033, 1639703021037, 1639703021038, 1639703022013, 1639703022014,
1639703031000, 1639703031001,
1639703031005,
1639703031010,
1639703031015
1639703031020 ,
1639703031020, 1639703031021,
1639703031025, 1639703031026,
1639703031030, 1639703031031,
1639703032002, 1639703032003,
1639703032007, 1639703032008, 1639703032009, 1639703032012, 1639703042022; VTD NGRV, VTD P 1639702021004, 1639702021009,
1639702021033, 1639703041000,
1639703041004, 1639703041005,
1639703041009, 1639703041010,
1639703041014, 1639703041015,
1639703041020 , 1639703041021 1639703041022, 1639703041023, 1639703041024, 1639703041025, 1639703041030, 1639703041031, 1639703041033, 1639703041036, 1639703042023, 1639703042024; VTD ROSE, VTD ROWA, VTD SBRG, VTD TURK, VTD WBRK.
District 10: Johnston County.
District 11: Franklin County, Nash County, Vance County.
District 12: Harnett County, Lee County, Sampson County: VTD MING: Block(s) 1639703042001, 1639703042002, 1639703042003, 1639703042010, 1639703042011, 1639703042012, 1639703042019, 1639703042020, 1639703042021; VTD PLVW: Block(s) 1639703041017, 1639703041026, 1639703041027, 1639703041028, 1639703041029, 1639703041032, 1639703041034, 1639703041035, 1639703042000, 1639703042004, 1639703042005, 1639703042006, 1639703042007, 1639703042008, 1639703042009, 1639703042013, 1639703042014, 1639703042015, 1639703042016, 1639703042017, 1639703042018.

District 13: Granville County, Wake County: VTD 02-01, VTD 02-02, VTD 02-03, VTD 02-04, VTD 02-05, VTD 02-06, VTD 08-04, VTD 08-07, VTD 09-01, VTD 09-02, VTD 09-03, VTD 10-01: $\operatorname{Block}(\mathrm{s})$ 1830541082013, 1830541082014, 1830541082015, 1830541082067, 1830544023000, 1830544023001, 1830544023002, 1830544023003, 1830544023014, 1830544023015, 1830544023016, 1830544032005, 1830544032006, 1830544032007, 1830544032008, 1830544032009, 1830544032012, 1830544032013, 1830544033000, 1830544033001, 1830544033002, 1830544033003, 1830544033004, 1830544033005, 1830544033006, 1830544033007, 1830544033008, 1830544033009, 1830544033010, 1830544033011, 1830544033012, 1830544043016, 1830544043023, 1830544043024, 1830544043041, 1830544043042, 1830544043043, 1830544043044, 1830544043045, 1830544043046, 1830544043047, 1830544043048, 1830544043049, 1830544043050, 1830544043051, 1830544043052, 1830544043053, 1830544043054, 1830544043055, 1830544043056, 1830544043057, 1830544043058, 1830544043059, 1830544043060, 1830544043061; VTD 10-02: Block(s) 1830544031000, 1830544031001, 1830544031002, 1830544031003, 1830544031004, 1830544031005, 1830544031006, 1830544031007, 1830544031008, 1830544031009, 1830544031010, 1830544031011, 1830544031012, 1830544031013, 1830544031014, 1830544031015, 1830544032000, 1830544032001, 1830544032002, 1830544032003, 1830544032004, 1830544032010, 1830544032011, 1830544041000, 1830544041001, 1830544042000, 1830544042001, 1830544042002,

[^31]10-04, VTD 15-02: Block(s) 1830530094000, 1830530094001, 1830530094002, 1830530094003, 1830530094004, 1830530094005, 1830530094006, 1830530094007, 1830530094008, 1830530094009, 1830530094010, 1830530095000, 1830530095001, 1830530095002, 1830530095003, 1830530095004, 1830530095005, 1830530095006, 1830530095007 , 1830530095008, 1830530095009, 1830530095010, 1830530095011, 1830530095012, 1830530095013, 1830530095014, 1830530095015, 1830530095016, 1830530095017, 1830530095018, 1830530095019, 1830530095020, 1830530095021, 1830530095022, 1830530095023, 1830530095024, 1830530095025; VTD 15-04: Block(s) 1830528011011, 1830528122012, 1830529031003, 1830529031006, 1830529031012, 1830529032000, 1830529032001, 1830529032002, 1830529032003, 1830529032004, 1830529032005, 1830529032006, 1830529032007, 1830529032008, 1830529032009, 1830529032010, 1830529032011, 1830529032012, 1830529032013; VTD 16-01, VTD 16-02, VTD 16-03, VTD 16-04, VTD 16-05, VTD 16-06, VTD 16-07, VTD 16-09, VTD $16-10$, VTD 16-11, VTD 17-01, VTD 17-02, VTD 17-03, VTD 17-04: Block(s) 1830541111000, 1830541111001, 1830541111002, 1830541111003, 1830541111004, 1830541111005, 1830541111006, 1830541111007, 1830541111008, 1830541111009, 1830541111010, 1830541111011, 1830541111012, 1830541111013, 1830541111014, 1830541111015, 1830541111016, 1830541111017, 1830541112004, 1830541112005, 1830541121000, 1830541121001, 1830541121002, 1830541121003, 1830541121004, 1830541121005, 1830541121006, 1830541121007, 1830541121008, 1830541121009, 1830541121010, 1830541121011, 1830541121012, 1830541121013, 1830541121014, 1830541121015, 1830541121016, 1830541122000, 1830541122001, 1830541122002, 1830541122003, 1830541122008, 1830541122013, 1830541122018, 1830541122023, 1830541131001, 1830541131006, 1830541131011, 1830541131016, 1830541131021, 1830541131026, 1830541131031, 1830541131036, 1830541131041, 1830541132003, 1830541132008 , 1830541132013, 1830541132018, 1830541132023, 1830541132028, 1830541132033, 1830541132038, 1830541132046, 1830541132051 , 1830541212033, 1830541212034, 1830541212036, 1830541212037, 1830541212038, 1830541212039, 1830541212040, 1830541212042; VTD 17-05, VTD 17-06, VTD 17-07, VTD 17-09, VTD 17-12, VTD 17-13, VTD 18-04: Block(s) 1830530091006, 1830530091010, 1830530091011, 1830530091012, 1830530091014, 1830530091015,

General Assembly Of North Carolina
Session 2021

1830530091016, 1830530091017, 1830530091018, 1830530091019, 1830530091020, 1830530091021, 1830530091023.
District 15: Wake County: VTD 01-01, VTD 01-02, VTD 01-03, VTD 01-04, VTD 01-05, VTD 01-06, VTD 01-07, VTD 01-09, VTD 01-10, VTD 01-11, VTD 01-12, VTD 01-13, VTD $01-14$, VTD 01-16, VTD 01-21, VTD 01-23, VTD 01-27, VTD 01-28: Block(s) 1830527053022, 1830527053023, 1830527053024, 1830527053025, 1830527053026, 1830527053028 ; VTD 01-29, VTD 01-31, VTD 01-32, VTD 01-33, VTD 01-36, VTD 01-41, VTD 01-48, VTD 01-49, VTD 04-02: Block(s) 1830535062000, 1830535062012, 1830535162005 ; VTD 04-03, VTD 04-05, VTD 04-12, VTD 04-21, VTD 05-05, VTD 07-01, VTD 07-10, VTD 08-03, VTD 08-08, VTD 11-01, VTD 11-02, VTD 18-01, VTD 18-03, VTD 18-06, VTD 18-08.
District 16: Wake County: VTD 04-01, VTD 04-02: Block(s) 1830524011095, 1830535061000, 1830535061001, 1830535061002, 1830535061003, 1830535061004, 1830535061005, 1830535061006, 1830535061007, 1830535061008, 1830535061009, 1830535061010, 1830535061011, 1830535062001, 1830535062002, 1830535062003, 1830535062004, 1830535062005, 1830535062006, 1830535062007, 1830535062008, 1830535062009, 1830535062010, 1830535062011, 1830535171000, 1830535171001, 1830535171002, 1830535171003, 1830535171004, 1830535171005, 1830535171006, 1830535171007, 1830535171008, 1830535171009, 1830535171010, 1830535171011, 1830535171012, 1830535171013, 1830535171014, 1830535173000, 1830535173003, 1830535173004, 1830535173005, 1830535173006, 1830535173007, 1830535173008, 1830535173009, 1830535173010, 1830535173011, 1830535173012, 1830535173013, 1830535173014, 1830535174018, 1830535174019, 1830535211051, 1830535211067, 1830535211068, 1830535211072, 1830535211073, 1830535211074, 1830535211075; VTD 04-04, VTD 04-06, VTD 04-07, VTD 04-08, VTD 04-09, VTD 04-10, VTD 04-11, VTD 04-13, VTD $04-14$, VTD $04-15$, VTD 04-16, VTD 04-17, VTD 04-18, VTD 04-19, VTD 04-20, VTD $05-01$, VTD 05-03, VTD 05-06, VTD 05-07, VTD 05-08, VTD 20-01: Block(s) 1830534291012, 1830534291013, 1830534291014, 1830534291016, 1830534311000, 1830534311001, 1830534311002, 1830534311003, 1830534311004, 1830534311005, 1830534311006, 1830534311007, 1830534311008, 1830534311009, 1830534311010, 1830534311011, 1830534311012, 1830534311013, 1830534311015, 1830534311017, 1830534311018, 1830534311019, 1830534312000, 1830534312007, 1830534361000, 1830534361001, 1830534361002, 1830534361003, 1830534361004, 1830534361005, 1830534361006, 1830534361007, 1830534361008, 1830534361009, 1830534361010, 1830534361011, 1830534361012, 1830534361013, 1830534361014, 1830534361015, 1830534361016, 1830534361017, 1830534361018, 1830534361019, 1830534361020, 1830534361021, 1830534361022, 1830534361023, 1830534361024, 1830534361025, 1830534361026, 1830534361027, 1830534361028, 1830534361029, 1830534361030, 1830534361031, 1830534361032, 1830534361033, 1830534361034, 1830534361035, 1830534361036, 1830534361037, 1830534361038, 1830534361039, 1830534361040, 1830534361041, 1830534361042, 1830534361043, 1830534361044, 1830534361045, 1830534361046, 1830534361047, 1830534361048, 1830534361050, 1830534361051, 1830534361052, 1830534361053, 1830534361054; VTD 20-03, VTD 20-04, VTD 20-05, VTD 20-08, VTD 20-09, VTD 20-10, VTD 20-12, VTD 20-14, VTD 20-15, VTD 20-16, VTD 20-17.
District 17: Wake County: VTD 03-00, VTD 06-04, VTD 06-05, VTD 06-06, VTD 06-07, VTD $06-08$, VTD $06-09$, VTD $06-10$, VTD 12-01, VTD 12-02, VTD 12-04, VTD 12-05, VTD $12-06$, VTD 12-07, VTD 12-08, VTD 12-09, VTD 15-01, VTD 15-02: Block(s) 1830529061000, 1830529061001, 1830529061002, 1830529061003, 1830529061004, 1830529061005, 1830529061006, 1830529061007, 1830529061008, 1830529061009, 1830529061010, 1830529061011, 1830529061012, 1830529063000, 1830529063001,

[^32]VTD G5B-1, VTD G5B-2, VTD G5C, VTD G8A, VTD G8B, VTD G8C, VTD LR63, VTD MB62, VTD MR02.
District 20: Chatham County, Durham County: VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 016, VTD 027, VTD 031, VTD 033, VTD 038, VTD 039, VTD 041, VTD 042, VTD 047, VTD 048, VTD 051, VTD 054, VTD 055-11, VTD 055-49, VTD 34-1, VTD 34-2, VTD 35.3, VTD 53-1, VTD 53-2.
District 21: Cumberland County: VTD AL51, VTD EO61-1, VTD EO61-2, VTD G10B, VTD G10C, VTD G11B, VTD G1B, VTD G2D, VTD G6A, VTD G6B, VTD G6C, VTD G7A, VTD G7B, VTD G8D, VTD G9A, VTD G9B-1, VTD G9B-2, VTD LI65, VTD SH77, VTD SL78-3; Moore County.
District 22: Durham County: VTD 001, VTD 002, VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 008, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 015, VTD 017, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 026, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 032, VTD 036, VTD 037, VTD 040, VTD 043, VTD 044, VTD 045, VTD 046, VTD 050, VTD 052, VTD 30-1, VTD 30-2.
District 23: Caswell County, Orange County, Person County.
District 24: Hoke County, Robeson County, Scotland County.
District 25: Alamance County, Randolph County: VTD DR, VTD LB, VTD LC, VTD PR, VTD RM, VTD RN: Block(s) 1510305031020, 1510305032005, 1510305032006, 1510305032009, 1510305032011, 1510305032012, 1510305032013, 1510305032014, 1510305032015, 1510305032018, 1510305032019, 1510305032020, 1510305032021, 1510305032022, 1510305032023, 1510305032024, 1510305032025, 1510305032026, 1510305032027, 1510305032028, 1510305032029, 1510305032030, 1510305032031, 1510305032033, 1510305032037, 1510305032050, 1510305032051, 1510305032061, 1510305032063, 1510311011021, 1510311011027, 1510311011028, 1510311011029, 1510311011030, 1510311011031, 1510311011032, 1510311011033, 1510311011034, 1510311011035, 1510311011036, 1510311011037, 1510311011038, 1510311011039, 1510311011040, 1510311011041, 1510311011042, 1510313051011, 1510313051012, 1510313051013, 1510313051014, 1510313052003, 1510313052004, 1510313052005, 1510313052006, 1510313052016, 1510313052017, 1510314011001, 1510314011002, 1510314011003, 1510314011004, 1510314011007, 1510314011008, 1510314011009, 1510314011010, 1510314011011, 1510314011012, 1510314011013, 1510314011014, 1510314011015, 1510314011016, 1510314011017, 1510314011018, 1510314011019, $1510314011020,1510314011021,1510314011022,1510314011023,1510314011024$, 1510314011025, 1510314011026, 1510314011027, 1510314011028, 1510314011029, 1510314011030, 1510314011031, 1510314011032, 1510314011033, 1510314011034, 1510314011035, 1510314011036, 1510314011037, 1510314011038, 1510314011039, 1510314011040, 1510314011041, 1510314011042, 1510314011043, 1510314011044, 1510314011045, 1510314011046, 1510314011047, 1510314011048, 1510314011049, 1510314011052, 1510314011053, 1510314012000, 1510314012001, 1510314012002, 1510314012003, 1510314012004, 1510314012008, 1510314012009, 1510314012005, 1510314012006, 1510314012007, 1510314012013, 1510314012018, 1510314012019, 1510314012023, 1 1510314012028, 1 1510314012033, 1510314012038, 1510314012039, 1510314012043, 1510314012044, 15 1510314012048, 1510314012049, 1 1510314013006, 1510314013007, 1

1510314013011, 1510314013012, 1510314013013, 1510314013014, 1510314013015, 1510314013016, 1510314013017, 1510314013018, 1510314013019, 1510314013020, 1510314013021, 1510314013026, 1510314013031,

> 1510314013036,

1510314021003,
1510314021010,
1510314021015, 1510314021016, 1510314021017, 1510314021018, 1510314021019, 1510314021026, 1510314021028, 1510314021029, 1510314021030, 1510314021043, 1510314021045 ; VTD SE, VTD SO, VTD ST.
District 26: Guilford County: VTD FEN2, VTD FR5B, VTD GIB, VTD GR, VTD JEF4, VTD MON3, VTD NCGR1, VTD NCGR2, VTD NCLAY1, VTD NCLAY2, VTD NDRI, VTD NMAD, VTD NWASH, VTD OR1, VTD OR2, VTD PG1, VTD PG2, VTD RC1, VTD RC2, VTD SCLAY, VTD SDRI: Block(s) 0810162033004, 0810162033005, 0810162033006, 0810162033007 , 0810162033008, 0810162033011; VTD SF1, VTD SF2, VTD SF3, VTD SF4, VTD SMAD, VTD STOK, VTD SUM2, VTD SUM3, VTD SUM4, VTD SWASH; Rockingham County.
District 27: Guilford County: VTD FR1, VTD FR2, VTD FR3, VTD FR4, VTD FR5A, VTD G13, VTD G14, VTD G15, VTD G16, VTD G17, VTD G30, VTD G31, VTD G32, VTD G33, VTD G34, VTD G35, VTD G36, VTD G37, VTD G38, VTD G39, VTD G40A1, VTD G40A2, VTD G40B, VTD G41A, VTD G41B, VTD G42A, VTD G42B, VTD G43, VTD G48, VTD G49, VTD G62, VTD G63, VTD G64, VTD G65, VTD G66, VTD H01, VTD H02, VTD H03, VTD H04, VTD H05, VTD H06, VTD H07, VTD H08, VTD H09, VTD H10, VTD H11, VTD H12, VTD H13, VTD H14, VTD H15, VTD H16, VTD H17, VTD H18, VTD H19A, VTD H19B, VTD H20A, VTD H20B, VTD H21, VTD H22, VTD H23, VTD H24, VTD H25, VTD H26, VTD H27-A, VTD H27-B, VTD H28, VTD H29A, VTD H29B, VTD JAM1, VTD JAM2, VTD JAM3, VTD JAM4, VTD JAM5, VTD SDRI: Block(s) 0810162031000, 0810162031001, 0810162031002, 0810162031003, 0810162031004, 0810162031005, 0810162031006, 0810162031008, 0810162031009, 0810162031010, 0810162031011, 0810162031013, 0810162031022, 0810162031023, 0810162031026, 0810162031027, 0810162031032, 0810162031033, 0810162031034, 0810162031035, 0810162031036, 0810162031037, 0810162031041, 0810162031042, 0810162031049, 0810162032000, 0810162032001, 0810162032002, 0810162032003, 0810162032004, 0810162032005, 0810162032006, 0810162032007, 0810162032008, 0810162032009, 0810162032010, 0810162032011, 0810162032012, 0810162032013, 0810162032014, 0810162032015, 0810162032016, 0810162032017, 0810162032018, 0810162032019, 0810162033000, 0810162033001, 0810162033002, 0810162033003, 0810162033009, 0810162033010, 0810162033012, 0810162033013, 0810162033014, 0810162033015, 0810162033016, 0810162033017, 0810162033018, 0810162033019, 0810162033020, 0810162033021, 0810162033022, 0810162033023, 0810162033024, 0810162033025, 0810162033026, 0810162033027, 0810162033028, 0810162033029, 0810162033030, 0810162033031, 0810162033032, 0810162033033, 0810162033034, 0810162033035, 0810162033036, 0810162033037, 0810162033041, 0810162033042, 0810162033046, 0810162033047, 0810162033051,0810162033052 , 0810162033053, 0810162033054,0810162033055 , 0810162033056, 0810162033057, 0810162033061, 0810162041001, 0810162041002, 0810162041003, 0810162041006, 0810162041007, 0810162041008, 0810162041009, 0810162041010, 0810162041011, 0810162041012, 0810162041013, 0810162041014, 0810162041015, 0810162041016,

0810162041017, 0810162041018, 0810162041019, 0810162041020, 0810162041021, 0810162041022, 0810162041023, 0810162041024, 0810162041025, 0810162041026, 0810162041027, 0810162041028, 0810162041029, 0810162041030, 0810162041031, 0810162041032, 0810162041033, 0810162041034, 0810162041035, 0810162041036, 0810162041037, 0810162041039, 0810162041040, 0810162041042, 0810162041043, 0810162041044, 0810162041045, 0810162041046, 0810162041047, 0810162041048, 0810162041049, 0810162041050, 0810162041051, 0810162041052, 0810162041053, 0810162041054, 0810162041055, 0810162041056, 0810162041059, 0810162041060, 0810162041061, 0810162041067, 0810162041068, 0810162041069, 0810162041070, 0810162041085, 0810162041086, 0810162041087, 0810162051000, 0810162051001, 0810162051002, 0810162052000, 0810162052001, 0810162052002, 0810162052003, 0810162052004, 0810162052005, 0810162052006, 0810162052010, 0810162052011, 0810162052012, 0810162052013, 0810162052014, 0810162052015, 0810162052016, 0810162052017.

District 28: Guilford County: VTD CG1, VTD CG2, VTD CG3A, VTD CG3B, VTD FEN1, VTD G01, VTD G02, VTD G03, VTD G04, VTD G05, VTD G06, VTD G07, VTD G08, VTD G09, VTD G10, VTD G11, VTD G12, VTD G18, VTD G19, VTD G20, VTD G21, VTD G22, VTD G23, VTD G24, VTD G25, VTD G26, VTD G27, VTD G28, VTD G29, VTD G44, VTD G45, VTD G46, VTD G47, VTD G50, VTD G51, VTD G52, VTD G53, VTD G54, VTD G55, VTD G56, VTD G57, VTD G58, VTD G59, VTD G60, VTD G61, VTD G67, VTD G68, VTD G69, VTD G70, VTD G71, VTD G72, VTD G73, VTD G74, VTD G75, VTD JEF1, VTD JEF2, VTD JEF3, VTD MON1, VTD MON2A, VTD MON2B, VTD SUM1.
District 29: Anson County, Montgomery County, Randolph County: VTD AE, VTD AN, VTD AR, VTD AS, VTD AW, VTD BC, VTD GR, VTD NM, VTD RN: Block(s) 1510303014000, 1510303014006, 1510303014007, 1510303014008, 1510314021009, 1510314021025, 1510314021027, 1510314021031, 1510314021032, 1510314021033, 1510314021034, 1510314021037, 1510314021041, 1510314021042, 1510314021044, 1510314022000, 1510314022001, 1510314022002, 1510314022003, 1510314022004, 1510314022005, 1510314022006, 1510314022007, 1510314022008, 1510314022009, 1510314022013, 1510314022014, 1510314022018, 1510314022019, 1510314022020, 1510314022021, 1510314022022, 1510314022023, 1510314022024, 1510314022025, 1510314022026, 1510314022027, 1510314022028, 1510314022029, 1510314022030, 1510314022031, 1510314022032, 1510314022033, 1510314022035, 1510314022036, 1510314022037, 1510314022038, 1510314022039, 1510314022040, 1510314022041, 1510314022042, 1510314022043, 1510314022044, 1510314022045, 1510314022046, 1510314022047, 1510314022048, 1510314022049, 1510314022050, 1510314022051, 1510314022052, 1510314022053, 1510314022060, 1510314022061 ; VTD SW, VTD TB, VTD TR, VTD TT, VTD UG; Richmond County, Union County: VTD 008, VTD 009, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 024, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 036.
District 30: Davidson County, Davie County.
District 31: Forsyth County: VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 021, VTD 031, VTD 032, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 051, VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 054, VTD 055, VTD 061, VTD 062, VTD 063, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD 066, VTD 067, VTD 068, VTD 071, VTD 072, VTD 073, VTD 074, VTD 075, VTD 081, VTD 082, VTD 083, VTD 091, VTD 092, VTD 101, VTD 111, VTD 112, VTD 131, VTD 132, VTD 133, VTD 807; Stokes County.
District 32: Forsyth County: VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 122, VTD 123, VTD 201, VTD 203, VTD 204, VTD 205, VTD 206, VTD 207, VTD 301, VTD 302, VTD 303, VTD 304, VTD 305, VTD 306, VTD 401, VTD 402, VTD 403, VTD 404, VTD 405, VTD 501, VTD 502, VTD 503, VTD 504, VTD 505, VTD 506, VTD 507, VTD 601, VTD 602, VTD 603, VTD

604, VTD 605, VTD 606, VTD 607, VTD 701, VTD 702, VTD 703, VTD 704, VTD 705, VTD 706, VTD 707, VTD 708, VTD 709, VTD 801, VTD 802, VTD 803, VTD 804, VTD 805, VTD 806, VTD 808, VTD 809, VTD 901, VTD 902, VTD 903, VTD 904, VTD 905, VTD 906, VTD 907, VTD 908, VTD 909.
District 33: Rowan County, Stanly County.
District 34: Cabarrus County: VTD 01-02: Block(s) 0250415031058, 0250415031059, $0250415031072, ~ 0250415031086, ~ 0250415031088, ~ 0250415071015, ~ 0250415071016$, 0250415071017, 0250415071018, 0250415071019, 0250415071020, 0250415071021, 0250415071022, 0250415071023, 0250415071024, 0250415072000, 0250415072001, 0250415072002, 0250415072003, 0250415072004, 0250415072005, 0250415072006, 0250415072007, 0250415072008, 0250415072009, 0250415072010, 0250415072011, 0250415072012, 0250415072013, 0250415072014, 0250416032010, 0250416032011, 0250416032012, 0250416032013, 0250416032014, 0250416032015, 0250416032049, $0250416032055, ~ 0250416032056, ~ 0250416032057, ~ 0250416032058$, 0250416032059, 0250416032062, 0250416032063, 0250416032064, 0250416032074, 0250416032075, 0250416032076 ; VTD 01-04, VTD 01-07, VTD 01-08, VTD 01-10, VTD 01-11, VTD 02-01, VTD 02-02, VTD 02-03, VTD 02-05, VTD 02-06, VTD 02-07, VTD 02-08, VTD 02-09, VTD 03-00, VTD 04-01, VTD 04-03, VTD 04-08, VTD 04-09, VTD 04-11, VTD 04-12, VTD 04-13, VTD 05-00, VTD 06-00, VTD 07-00, VTD 08-00, VTD 09-00, VTD 10-00: Block(s) 0250416041002, 0250416041007, 0250416041030, 0250416041032, $0250416041033,0250416041034,0250416041035,0250416041038,0250416042002$, 0250416042003, 0250416042008, 0250416044000, 0250416044001, 0250416044002, $0250416044003,0250416044004,0250416044005,0250416044006,0250416044007$, 0250416044010,0250416044011 ; VTD 11-01, VTD 11-02, VTD 12-03, VTD 12-04, VTD 12-05, VTD 12-06, VTD 12-08, VTD 12-09, VTD 12-10, VTD 12-11, VTD 12-12, VTD 12-13.
District 35: Cabarrus County: VTD 01-02: Block(s) 0250415031087; VTD 10-00: Block(s) 0250416031000, 0250416031001, 0250416031002, 0250416031003, 0250416031004, 0250416031005, 0250416031006, 0250416031007, 0250416031008, 0250416031009, 0250416031010, 0250416031011, 0250416031012, 0250416031013, 0250416031014, 0250416031015, 0250416031016, 0250416031017, 0250416031018, 0250416031019, 0250416031020, 0250416031021, 0250416031022, 0250416031023, 0250416031024, 0250416031025, 0250416031026, 0250416031027, 0250416031028, 0250416031029, 0250416031030, 0250416031031, 0250416031032, 0250416031033, 0250416031034, 0250416031035, 0250416031036, 0250416031037, 0250416031038, 0250416031039, 0250416031040, 0250416031041, 0250416031042, 0250416031043, 0250416031044, 0250416031045, 0250416031046, 0250416031047, 0250416031048, 0250416031049, 0250416031050, 0250416031051, 0250416031052, 0250416031053, 0250416031054, 0250416031055, 0250416031056, 0250416031057, 0250416031058, 0250416031059, 0250416031060 , $0250416031061, ~ 0250416031062$, 0250416032000 , 0250416032001, $0250416032002, ~ 0250416032003, ~ 0250416032004, ~ 0250416032005, ~ 0250416032006$, 0250416032007, 0250416032008, 0250416032009, 0250416032016, 0250416032017, 0250416032018, 0250416032019, 0250416032020, 0250416032021, 0250416032022, $0250416032023,0250416032024,0250416032025,0250416032026,0250416032027$, 0250416032028, 0250416032029, 0250416032030, 0250416032031, 0250416032032, 0250416032033, 0250416032034, 0250416032035, 0250416032036, 0250416032037, 0250416032038, 0250416032039, 0250416032040, 0250416032041, 0250416032042, 0250416032043, 0250416032044, 0250416032045, 0250416032046, 0250416032047, 0250416032048, 0250416032050, 0250416032051, 0250416032052, 0250416032053, $0250416032054, ~ 0250416032060$, $0250416032061, ~ 0250416032065, ~ 0250416032066$, 0250416032067, 0250416032068, 0250416032069, 0250416032070, 0250416032071,

0250416032072, 0250416032073, 0250416032077, 0250416032078, 0250416032079, 0250416032080, 0250416032081, 0250416041015, 0250416041016, 0250416041017, $0250416041018, ~ 0250416041019, ~ 0250416041020, ~ 0250416041021, ~ 0250416041022$, $0250416041023,0250416041024,0250416041025,0250416041026,0250416041027$, $0250416041028,0250416041029, \quad 0250416041036,0250416041037,0250416041039$, $0250416041040, ~ 0250416041041, ~ 0250416041042, ~ 0250416041043,0250416041044$, $0250416041045, ~ 0250416041046, ~ 0250416041047, ~ 0250416041048$, 0250416041049, 0250416041050, 0250416041051, 0250416041052, 0250416041053, 0250416041054, 0250416042000, 0250416042001, 0250416042004, 0250416042005, 0250416042006, 0250416042007, 0250416042009, 0250416042010, 0250416042011, 0250416042012, 0250416042013, 0250416042014, 0250416043000, 0250416043001, 0250416043002, 0250416043003, 0250416043004, 0250416043005, 0250416043006, 0250416043007, $0250416043008, ~ 0250416043009, ~ 0250416043010, ~ 0250416043011, ~ 0250416043012$, $0250416043013, ~ 0250416043014, ~ 0250416043015, ~ 0250416043016, ~ 0250416043017$, $0250416043018, ~ 0250416043019, ~ 0250416043020, ~ 0250416043021, ~ 0250416043022$, $0250416043023,0250416043024,0250416043025, ~ 0250416043026, ~ 0250416043027$, 0250416043028, 0250416043029, 0250416044008, 0250416044009, 0250416044012; Union County: VTD 001, VTD 002, VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 010, VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 016, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 023, VTD 025, VTD 030, VTD 031, VTD 032, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 035, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 17A, VTD 17B, VTD 20A, VTD 20B, VTD 28A, VTD 28B, VTD 28C, VTD 28D, VTD 29A, VTD 29B, VTD 29C, VTD 37A, VTD 37B, VTD 38A, VTD 38B.
District 36: Alexander County, Surry County, Wilkes County, Yadkin County.
District 37: Iredell County, Mecklenburg County: VTD 127, VTD 206, VTD 208, VTD 242.
District 38: Mecklenburg County: VTD 128, VTD 133, VTD 134, VTD 135, VTD 141, VTD 142, VTD 143, VTD 145, VTD 151, VTD 202, VTD 207, VTD 209, VTD 210, VTD 211, VTD 212, VTD 214, VTD 222, VTD 237, VTD 238.1, VTD 239, VTD 240, VTD 241.
District 39: Mecklenburg County: VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 031, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 077, VTD 079, VTD 080, VTD 081, VTD 089, VTD 098, VTD 122, VTD 129, VTD 138, VTD 147, VTD 150, VTD 200, VTD 223.1, VTD 224, VTD 225, VTD 228, VTD 229, VTD 230, VTD 231, VTD 243, VTD 78.1.

District 40: Mecklenburg County: VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 016, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 030, VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 044, VTD 045, VTD 054, VTD 055, VTD 056, VTD 060, VTD 061, VTD 082, VTD 083, VTD 084, VTD 095, VTD 104, VTD 105, VTD 107.1, VTD 108, VTD 116, VTD 123, VTD 124, VTD 126, VTD 132, VTD 146, VTD 149, VTD 201, VTD 203, VTD 204.1, VTD 205, VTD 213.

District 41: Mecklenburg County: VTD 069, VTD 070, VTD 072, VTD 073, VTD 075, VTD 086, VTD 087, VTD 088, VTD 090, VTD 091, VTD 092, VTD 093, VTD 100, VTD 101, VTD 110, VTD 111, VTD 112, VTD 113, VTD 114, VTD 119, VTD 121, VTD 131, VTD 136, VTD 137, VTD 139.1, VTD 140, VTD 144, VTD 148, VTD 215, VTD 216, VTD 217, VTD 218, VTD 219, VTD 220, VTD 221, VTD 226, VTD 227, VTD 232, VTD 233, VTD 234, VTD 235, VTD 236.
District 42: Mecklenburg County: VTD 001, VTD 002, VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 008, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 017, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 032, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 035, VTD 036, VTD 037, VTD 038, VTD 046, VTD 047, VTD 048, VTD 049, VTD 050, VTD 051, VTD 057, VTD 058, VTD 059, VTD 062, VTD 063, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD 066, VTD 067, VTD 068, VTD 071, VTD 074, VTD 076, VTD 085, VTD 094, VTD 096, VTD 097, VTD 099, VTD 102, VTD 103, VTD 106, VTD 109, VTD 115, VTD 117, VTD 118, VTD 120, VTD 125, VTD 130.

District 43: Gaston County: VTD 001, VTD 002, VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 005, VTD 006, VTD 007, VTD 008, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 011, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 015, VTD 016, VTD 017, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 029, VTD 030, VTD 031, VTD 032, VTD 038, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 042, VTD 043, VTD 044, VTD 045, VTD 046.
District 44: Cleveland County, Gaston County: VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 035, VTD 036, VTD 037; Lincoln County.
District 45: Caldwell County: VTD PR01, VTD PR02, VTD PR13, VTD PR14, VTD PR21, VTD PR22, VTD PR24, VTD PR25, VTD PR29: Block(s) 0270303003005, 0270303003006, 0270303003007, 0270303003013, 0270303003015, 0270303003034, 0270303003035; VTD PR33: Block(s) 0270304001022, 0270304001023, 0270304001024, 0270304001025, 0270304001026, 0270304001027, 0270304001028, 0270304004000, 0270304004001, 0270304004002, 0270304004003, 0270304004004, 0270304004005, 0270304004010, 0270304004011, 0270304004012, 0270304004014, 0270304004015, 0270304004016, 0270304004017, 0270304004020, 0270304004021, 0270304004024, 0270304004027, 0270304004028, 0270304004029, 0270304004030, 0270304004031, 0270304004032, 0270304004033, 0270304004034, 0270304004037, 0270304004038, 0270304004039, 0270306001000 , $0270306001001, ~ 0270306001002$, 0270306001003 , 0270306001004, 0270306001005, 0270306001006, 0270306001007, 0270306001008, 0270306001009, 0270306001010, 0270306001011, 0270306001012, 0270306001013, 0270306001014, 0270306001015, 0270306001016, 0270306001017, 0270306001018, 0270306001019, 0270306001020, 0270306001021, 0270306001022, 0270306001023, 0270306001024, 0270306001025, 0270306001026, 0270306001027, 0270306001030, 0270306002001, 0270306002002, 0270306002003, 0270306002004, 0270306002005, 0270306002006, 0270306002007, 0270306002008, 0270306002009, 0270306002010, 0270306002011, 0270306002012, 0270306002013, 0270306002014, 0270306002015, 0270306002016, 0270306002017, 0270306002018, 0270306002019, 0270306002020, 0270306002021, 0270306002022, 0270306002023, 0270306002024, 0270306002025, 0270306002026, 0270306002027, 0270306002028, 0270306002029, 0270306002030, 0270306002031, $0270306003018,0270306003019,0270306003020,0270306003023,0270306003024$, 0270307001000, 0270307001003, 0270307001016, 0270307001017, 0270307001018, 0270307001019, 0270307001020, 0270307001021, 0270307001022, 0270307001024, 0270307001026, 0270307002000, 0270307002001, 0270307002002, 0270307002003, 0270307002004, 0270307002005, 0270307002006, 0270307002007, 0270307002008, 0270307002009, 0270307002010, 0270307002011, 0270307002012, 0270307002013, 0270307002014, 0270307002015, 0270307002016, 0270307002017, 0270307002018, 0270307002019, 0270307002020, 0270307002021, 0270307002022, 0270307002023, 0270307002024, 0270307002025, 0270307002026, 0270307002027, 0270307002028, 0270307002029, 0270307002030, 0270307002031, 0270307002032, 0270307002033, 0270307002034, 0270307002035, 0270307002036, 0270307002037, 0270307002038, 0270307002039, 0270307002040, 0270307003000, 0270307003001, 0270307003002, 0270307003003, 0270307003004, 0270307003005, 0270307003006, 0270307003007, 0270307003008, 0270307003009, 0270307003010, 0270307003011, 0270307003012, $0270307003013,0270307003014, ~ 0270307003015, ~ 0270307003016, ~ 0270307003017$, 0270307003018, 0270307003021, 0270307003022, 0270307003044, 0270307003045, 0270307003047, 0270307003049, 0270307004009, 0270307004010, 0270307004012, 0270307004013, 0270307004014, 0270307004015, 0270307004016, 0270307004017, 0270307004034, 0270307004035, 0270307004036, 0270307004037, 0270307004038, 0270307005015, 0270312021022, 0270312021023, 0270312021024, 0270312021026,

0270312021027, 0270312021029, 0270312021045, 0270312022012, 0270312022013, 0270312022023, 0270312022024; VTD PR34, VTD PR35; Catawba County.
District 46: Buncombe County: VTD 32.1, VTD 33.2, VTD 33.3, VTD 34.1, VTD 35.1, VTD 36.1, VTD 37.1, VTD 38.2, VTD 38.3, VTD 39.2, VTD 39.3, VTD 40.2, VTD 41.1: Block(s) $0210026042000, ~ 0210026042001, ~ 0210026042002, ~ 0210026042003, ~ 0210026042004$, $0210026042005, ~ 0210026042006, ~ 0210026042007, ~ 0210026042008, ~ 0210026042009$, 0210026042010, 0210026042011, 0210026042012, 0210026042013, 0210026042014, 0210026042015, 0210026042016, 0210026042017, 0210026042018, 0210026042019, $0210026042022,0210026042025,0210026043000,0210026043005,0210026044005$, 0210026044011, 0210026044012, 0210027023023, 0210027023024, 0210028031005, 0210028031006, 0210028031007, 0210028031008, 0210028031009, 0210028031010, 0210028031016, 0210028031017, 0210028031019, 0210028032002, 0210028032003, 0210028032008, 0210028032009, 0210028032010, 0210028032011, 0210028032012, $0210028032013, ~ 0210028032014, ~ 0210028032015, ~ 0210028032016, ~ 0210028032017$, $0210028032018, ~ 0210028032019, ~ 0210028032020, ~ 0210028033000, ~ 0210028033001$, 0210028033002, 0210028033003, 0210028033004, 0210028033005, 0210028033006, 0210028033007, 0210028033008, 0210028033009, 0210028033010, 0210028033011, 0210028033012, 0210028033013, 0210028033014, 0210028033015, 0210028033016, 0210028033017, 0210028033018, 0210028033019, 0210028033020, 0210028033021, 0210028033022, 0210028033023, 0210028033024, 0210028033025, 0210028033026, 0210028033027, 0210028033028, 0210028033029, 0210028033030; VTD 50.1, VTD 51.2, VTD 52.1, VTD 53.1, VTD 57.1, VTD 63.1, VTD 64.1, VTD 65.1, VTD 66.1; Burke County, McDowell County.
District 47: Alleghany County, Ashe County, Avery County, Caldwell County: VTD PR07, VTD PR08, VTD PR16, VTD PR17, VTD PR18, VTD PR29: Block(s) 0270301004011, 0270301004012, 0270301004013, 0270301004014, 0270301004015, 0270301004016, 0270301004017, 0270301004018, 0270301004019, 0270301004020, 0270301004021, 0270301004022, 0270301004023, 0270301004024, 0270301004025, 0270301004026, 0270301004027, 0270301004028, 0270301004029, 0270301004030, 0270301004031, 0270301004032, 0270301004033, 0270301004035, 0270301004036, 0270301006000, 0270301006001, 0270301006002, 0270301006003, 0270301006004, 0270301006005, 0270301006006, 0270301006007, 0270301006008, 0270301006009, 0270301006010, $0270301006011, ~ 0270301006012, ~ 0270301006013, ~ 0270301006014, ~ 0270301006015$, 0270301006016, 0270301006017, 0270301006018, 0270301006019, 0270301006020, 0270301006021, 0270301006022, 0270302004029, 0270303001005, 0270303001006, 0270303001007, 0270303001008, 0270303001009, 0270303001012, 0270303001013, 0270303001014, 0270303001015, 0270303001016, 0270303001017, 0270303001018, 0270303001019, 0270303001020, 0270303001021, 0270303002000, 0270303002001, 0270303002002, 0270303002003, 0270303002004, 0270303002005, 0270303002006, 0270303002007, 0270303002008, 0270303002012, 0270303002013, 0270303002014, 0270303002015, 0270303002016, 0270303002017, 0270303002018, 0270303002019, $0270303002020, ~ 0270303002021, ~ 0270303002022, ~ 0270303002023, ~ 0270303002024$, 0270303002025, 0270303002026, 0270303002027, 0270303002028, 0270303002029, $0270303002030, ~ 0270303002034, ~ 0270303002035, ~ 0270303002036, ~ 0270303002037$, $0270303002041, ~ 0270303002042, ~ 0270303002043, ~ 0270303003000, ~ 0270303003001$, 0270303003002, 0270303003003, 0270303003004, 0270303003008, 0270303003009, 0270303003010, 0270303003014, 0270303003016, 0270303003017, 0270303003018, 0270303003027, 0270303004000, 0270303004001, 0270303004002, 0270303004003, 0270303004005, 0270303004006, 0270303004007, 0270303004014, 0270303004016, 0270304002000, 0270304002001, 0270304002002, 0270304002003, 0270304002004, 0270304002005, 0270304002006, 0270304002007, 0270304003000, 0270304003001,
$0270304003002, ~ 0270304003003, ~ 0270304003004, ~ 0270304003005, ~ 0270304003006$,
$0270304003007, ~ 0270304003008, ~ 0270304003009, ~ 0270304003010, ~ 0270304003011$,
$0270304003012,0270304003013, ~ 0270304003014, ~ 0270304003015,0270304003024$,
$0270304003025, ~ 0270304003026, ~ 0270304003027, ~ 0270304003028, ~ 0270304003029$,
$0270304003034 ;$ VTD PR30, VTD PR31, VTD PR32, VTD PR33: Block(s) 0270304004006 ,
0270304004007, 0270304004008, 0270304004009, 0270304004013, 0270304004035,
$0270304004036,0270306002000, ~ 0270306003015, ~ 0270306003016, ~ 0270306003017$,
0270312021025,0270312021035 ; Haywood County: VTD BE-1, VTD BE-2, VTD BE-3,
VTD BE-4, VTD BE-7, VTD BE56, VTD CL-N, VTD CL-S, VTD CR, VTD FC-1, VTD
FC-2, VTD WO; Madison County, Mitchell County, Watauga County, Yancey County.
District 48: Henderson County, Polk County, Rutherford County.
District 49: Buncombe County: VTD 1.1, VTD 10.1, VTD 11.1, VTD 12.1, VTD 13.1, VTD 14.2, VTD 14.3, VTD 15.1, VTD 16.2, VTD 17.1, VTD 18.2, VTD 19.1, VTD 2.1, VTD 20.1, VTD 21.1, VTD 22.2, VTD 23.2, VTD 23.3, VTD 24.1, VTD 25.1, VTD 26.1, VTD 27.2, VTD 28.1, VTD 29.2, VTD 3.1, VTD 30.2, VTD 30.3, VTD 31.1, VTD 4.1, VTD 41.1: Block(s) 0210026042026, 0210026042027; VTD 42.1, VTD 43.2, VTD 44.1, VTD 45.1, VTD 46.1, VTD 47.1, VTD 48.1, VTD 49.1, VTD 5.1, VTD 54.2, VTD 55.1, VTD 56.2, VTD 58.1, VTD 59.1, VTD 6.1, VTD 60.2, VTD 60.4, VTD 61.1, VTD 62.1, VTD 67.1, VTD 68.1, VTD 69.1, VTD 7.1, VTD 70.1, VTD 71.1, VTD 8.2, VTD 8.3, VTD 9.1.
District 50: Cherokee County, Clay County, Graham County, Haywood County: VTD AC, VTD BC, VTD CE, VTD EF, VTD HA, VTD ID, VTD IH, VTD JC, VTD LJ, VTD P, VTD PC, VTD SA, VTD WC, VTD WE, VTD WS-1, VTD WS-2, VTD WW; Jackson County, Macon County, Swain County, Transylvania County.
(b) The names and boundaries of voting tabulation districts and blocks specified in this section are as shown on the Census Redistricting Data P.L. 94-171 TIGER/Line Shapefiles associated with the most recent federal decennial census.
(c) If any voting tabulation district boundary is changed, that change shall not change the boundary of a Senate district, which shall remain the same as it is depicted by the Census Redistricting Data P.L. 94-171 TIGER/Line Shapefiles associated with the most recent federal decennial census."

SECTION 2. This act is effective when it becomes law and applies to elections held on or after January 1, 2022.

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1473 - Video of Oct. 8, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Station 04 (544) (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1474 - Video of Oct. 7, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Station 04 (544) (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1475 - Video of Oct. 11, 2021 House Map Drawing Station 04 (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1476 - Video of Oct. 14, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Station 04 (544) (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1477 - Video of Oct. 14, 2021 House Map Drawing Station 01 (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1478 - Video of Oct. 18, 2021 House Map Drawing Station 03 (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1479 - Video of Oct. 28, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Station 04 (544) (submitted in native format)

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
21 CVS 015426

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC., et al.,

REBECCA HARPER, et al., COMMON CAUSE,

Plaintiffs,
v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.

## Defendants.

3. As Executive Director of CCNC, I manage a diverse staff of eight people who work in the Triangle, Triad and Charlotte regions. I help design and implement policy and program priorities for Common Cause NC. I represent CCNC before the public, the media, decisionmakers, and donors. I am also a registered lobbyist for Common Cause at the North Carolina General Assembly, and have worked with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle on matters related to redistricting reform.
4. I am authorized to speak for Common Cause in this case.

## Common Cause Background

5. Since its founding in 1970, Common Cause has been dedicated to fair elections and making government at all levels more representative, open, and responsive to the interests of ordinary people. Common Cause regularly assists voters in understanding and navigating the election process, provides resources to help voters determine their districts and polling locations, and mobilizes voters to engage in political advocacy.
6. Common Cause has been one of the leading proponents of redistricting reform, conducting public education, advocacy, legislative lobbying, and participating in litigation in order to secure fair maps for all North Carolinians. Common Cause has been particularly active in efforts to curb partisan gerrymandering, working on legislative advocacy with both Democrats and Republicans in North Carolina for the past 20 years. Common Cause has also served as the lead plaintiff in multiple partisan gerrymandering lawsuits, including Common Cause v. Rucho in federal court and Common Cause v. Lewis in state court.
7. Partisan gerrymandering frustrates Common Cause's organizational mission of increasing democratic engagement and voter participation by insulating elected officials from the democratic process. When election results are preordained by partisan gerrymanders, voters are much less likely to contact their representatives, vote in elections, or engage in the democratic process. All of these effects directly impede Common Cause's organizational purpose.

## Common Cause North Carolina Membership

8. As part of my Executive Director responsibilities, I oversee the maintenance of CCNC's statewide membership, supporter, and staff lists, records and information. Common Cause currently has over 25,000 members, staff, and supporters in North Carolina.
9. Based on my review and comparison of the Common Cause member database and with publicly available information in the North Carolina voter registration database, I am personally aware that Common Cause has members in the following counties as of October 2021 in the numbers indicated below, and do not have reason to believe these figures have changed appreciably since then:
a. 310 members in Alamance County;
b. 441 members in Brunswick County;
c. 2,005 members in Buncombe County;
d. 411 members in Cumberland County;
e. 136 members in Davidson County;
f. 1,717 members in Durham County;
g. 972 members in Forsyth County;
h. 1,540 members in Guilford County;
i. 198 members in Johnston County;
j. 2,441 members in Mecklenburg County;
k. 109 members in Nash County;
10. 743 members in New Hanover County;
m. 162 members in Onslow County;
n. 62 members in Robeson County;
o. 259 members in Union County;
p. 4,166 members in Wake County;
q. 79 members in Wayne County;
11. Common Cause members include voters who self-identify as Black throughout North Carolina. Based on my review of the Common Cause member database and of publicly available information in the North Carolina voter registration database, I am personally aware that we have members who have self-identified as Black in at least the following areas:
a. Bertie County;
b. Gates County;
c. Hertford County;
d. Hoke County;
e. Nash County;
f. Northampton County;
g. Pasquotank County;

## h. Scotland County;

i. Wake County;
j. Wayne County; and
k. Wilson County.
11. CCNC's strength as an organization comes from our members and supporters. All across North Carolina, our members drive our efforts to hold those in power accountable, and to create public mechanisms and institutions that ensure that the people are the ones in charge. Our members staff our volunteer campaigns, call other North Carolinians and legislators alike to advocate for democracy-enabling policies, and power our movement forward. Nothing we do would be possible without our members.
12. Our members also help drive our efforts to assist voters in North Carolina to increase civic engagement. For example, the mission of CCNC's HBCU Student Action Alliance, launched in 2006, is to raise civic engagement among students of color at each of North Carolina's ten Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). Additionally, we identify and nurture student leadership by selecting campus ambassadors whom we identify as our Democracy Fellows. Each Fellow receives a semester stipend for being our civic leader on their campus. Much of the HBCU campus work revolves around encouraging civic engagement, which includes registering to vote and voting in every election. Moreover, we strive to help every student understand that participating in democracy is more than just voting. We engage students to help us with our public education efforts and civic outreach activities, along with holding local elected officials accountable through contacts with their representatives.

## The 2021 Redistricting Process

13. As part of my role as Executive Director of CCNC, I closely monitored the 2021 North Carolina redistricting process. My monitoring activities included physically attending meetings of the House Redistricting Committee and the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee, attending public hearings, and watching livestreamed legislative meetings, as specified below, from August 2021 until the final maps were enacted in November 2021. This work was part of CCNC's initiative to amplify the transparency and accessibility of the redistricting process by educating our members and the public about the process and notifying them of opportunities to engage and provide input, such as the time(s) and location(s) of scheduled public hearings, the topics to be discussed at those hearings and the availability of draft maps for their review.
14. I am aware that the Legislative Defendants in this matter have insisted, both in public statements during the redistricting process and in litigation about this process, that the 2021 redistricting process was the most open and transparent process in North Carolina's history. Having worked in an advocacy role through three prior redistricting cycles and the remedial redistrictings this past decade, this assertion does not accurately reflect the process I personally experienced this year, both as a member of the public and as a nonpartisan advocate for voters.
15. From the beginning of this redistricting process, Common Cause advocated for a fair, transparent, timely, and inclusive redistricting process that would allow for meaningful public input. We understood that the delay in decennial census data (which is usually issued in the spring but was delayed until August this year) might require accommodations to the redistricting process, but given our experience in past redistricting cycles, we were confident that with adequate planning, it was still feasible to provide the public with a fulsome opportunity to provide input both before and after draft maps were publicly available. This would have enabled legislators to hear from the public on what types of maps would best serve their communities, as well as to hear feedback on proposed maps and, based on that feedback, make any changes necessary to ensure that communities across the state were adequately represented. Unfortunately, this is not the process that occurred.
16. The 2021 redistricting process was so riddled with obstacles to monitoring and engagement that I found myself - an experienced advocate who has followed many past iterations of redistricting - struggling to follow the process. These obstacles included late, inaccurate, and conflicting notices of scheduled public hearings from the House and Senate Committees on Redistricting, fewer public hearings than were provided in the 2011 redistricting process, and uncertainty as to whether/when the public would be given an opportunity to review and provide feedback on draft maps. Overall, it felt extremely chaotic and left advocates like those of us at Common Cause rushing last-minute to notify members of the public of when, where, and how they could provide input.
17. When public hearings were first proposed on August 18, 2021, legislative leaders announced that there would only be 10 public hearings before any draft maps were released. ${ }^{1}$ This is in stark contrast to the dozens of public hearings held during the 2011 cycle. ${ }^{2}$ After public pushback, the legislature announced a slightly expanded schedule of 13 public hearings on September 1, 2021, to be held from September $8-30 .{ }^{3}$ This gave advocates and members of the public less than a week to prepare for the first hearing, with no indication of whether remote participation would be possible in light of COVID considerations. There was also no public information as to whether or not there would be any draft maps available during these hearings.
18. These obstacles caused unnecessary confusion and presented burdens to advocates like myself, as well as voters and other members of the public, many of whom expressed their eagerness to participate in these hearings to me directly. For example, the hearing location for the first public hearing on September 8, 2021, in Caldwell County was announced as the Caldwell Community College and Technical Institute. ${ }^{4}$ But the actual location was at the J.E. Broyhill Civic Center Auditorium, which is in downtown Lenoir County and two miles from the college campus. I observed that this created great confusion amongst the

[^33]public who planned to attend. I showed up at the wrong location at Caldwell Community College, where I could not identify anyone who knew where the hearing would be. Signage directing people to the new site was so sparse that it took me 15 minutes of searching for information before I finally found it. In fact, I arrived to the community college campus at the same time Mecklenburg County House Representative Becky Carney did who was planning on being one of the lawmakers presiding over the hearing. She too had no idea at the time where the meeting was. After I finally made it to the J.E. Broyhill Civic Center Auditorium, I observed that a number of people who were called out to provide public comment did not appear to be present when their names were called to provide public comment. In fact, the first four people called upon were no shows, and I became the first speaker at number five. I could not help but wonder how many of the no shows were folks who, like me, did not have the correct location for the hearing.
19. This was not the only issue with the public hearing notices in September. The public hearing in Forsyth County on September 14 was also noticed with the wrong location. The legislature's schedule advertised this hearing's location as the Strickland Auditorium when in fact the hearing took place at the Dewitt Rhoades Conference Center in Winston Salem.
20. On another occasion, there was conflicting information about the same hearing posted by the House and Senate Committees. The legislature posted conflicting schedules on the House Redistricting Committee and Senate Redistricting Committee websites in midSeptember 2021. These different schedules indicated different times for the same Robeson County hearing scheduled for September 28, 2021. It was only after community follow up that the correct time for the Robeson hearing was clarified.
21. The public hearing process concluded on September 28, 2021 with no indication of what would come next. Two days later, on September 30, 2021, the legislature noticed meetings of the House and Senate Redistricting Committees for the following week without a specific agenda. These are just a few examples of the obstacles that advocates and other members of the public were confronted with in their efforts to provide public comment before maps were drawn.
22. During the public comment period before there were any draft maps, I observed firsthand the passion many people expressed as they pleaded with lawmakers to draw fair maps, often making specific suggestions based on local knowledge of their community in these public hearings. But since the Chairs chose to limit public hearings to the period before there were any draft maps that citizens could examine and review, they were unable to provide any such comments specifically in response to actual proposed maps and how those maps would impact their communities. I believe this process significantly undermined citizens' ability to access their right to participate in the redistricting process. I also question whether the location and time choices deliberately excluded three of the largest metropolitan areas - including Raleigh, Greensboro, and Asheville - which I understand were directly impacted by the lines struck down as unlawful last cycle. Finally, these meetings were held in September, at a time when the Delta COVID-19 variant was rampant in North Carolina, and I knew many of the North Carolinians we engage in our work were eager to engage in the redistricting process without deviating from the CDC's advisory regarding the increased health risk associated with attending public gatherings in indoor
spaces. Yet lawmakers made no provisions to livestream a single public hearing in this series of meetings. There was no way for a citizen to watch or participate in real time from the safety of their home - yet "virtual participation" was provided at public meetings on the maps in late October.

## Map-Drawing Process

23. On October 5, 2021, the House and Senate Redistricting Committees met separately, and I watched these on livestream. In both meetings, the respective Chairs announced the process legislators would have to use in drawing proposed state Legislative and Congressional maps. This included leaving specific committee rooms with four map-drawing computer stations open during business hours and allowing members to come in and, with the assistance of staff, draw maps at the stations. The Chairs did not indicate how long these stations would be available or how long the map-drawing process would extend, and did not provide lawmakers with any set deadline for when they had to draw and propose maps.
24. CCNC devoted multiple staff members to monitor the map drawing process in the General Assembly. This was part of our effort to provide some substantive transparency out of the surface-level transparency that the Chairs' redistricting process offered. However, the way in which the map-drawing was set up, with 10 live-stream cameras running more than 40 hours per week with no public information as to when legislators would be drawing maps, was daunting for our organization. We had to dedicate staff to monitoring these cameras at the expense of other use of this staff time and resources. Despite our best efforts and the increased resources we had to dedicate to this issue, we fell far short of being able to fully monitor and educate the public on the map-drawing process while it was happening.
25. These efforts were made all the more difficult by the various obstacles to in-person observation. Citizens were relegated to sitting in the back of the room in both committee meeting rooms where map-drawing occurred, where they had no ability to actually hear lawmakers or other individuals involved in the map drawing at work, or see what information they had brought with them to the map drawing computer stations. There was also no indication of who was seated at the work stations. I did not see anyone - lawmakers, nonpartisan staff, or partisan staff - make any effort to identify who they were or who was participating in the map-drawing. Additionally, watching the screens of each work station was also more confusing than it was informative, as maps would randomly appear, with lines shifting and various visual filters all changing rapidly without any context or explanation. In short, it felt like a waste of time to attend these sessions in person, and the times that I did go (early on in the process) I saw few if any members of the public in the room.
26. For these reasons, I strongly disagree that this process was transparent, given that members of the public did not know who was involved in drawing the maps, what information was being taken into the room or used while in the room, or the reasons certain lines were being drawn or altered at any particular time. Finally, while I was on-site during the map-drawing process, I observed lawmakers and others participating in the map-drawing process freely entering and exiting the committee rooms with papers and communications devices, including cell phones, and I saw nothing that would have hindered them from viewing
partisan or other data outside the committee room between map-drawing session, or from bringing in draft maps and materials with them from outside the room to the computer work station.

## Limited public hearings on draft maps

25. Late on Wednesday, October 20, 2021, the General Assembly noticed two hearings for public comment: one on Monday, October 25, 2021 for the Congressional maps and one on Tuesday, October 26, 2021 for the Senate and House maps. The hearing notices did not specify which maps specifically would be discussed. This last-minute timing and lack of specifics gave members of the public very little opportunity to review, analyze, and prepare their public comment on the draft maps that had been publicly released, and made it very difficult for us at CCNC to notify the public about their ability to weigh in on map proposals. It also left exceedingly little time for that public comment to be incorporated into the maps that were passed shortly thereafter in the first week of November.
26. As in September, I observed that the North Carolinians attending the October public hearings were well-informed and passionate about conveying to lawmakers their desire to have fair maps, but I also observed confusion and frustration for members of the public who were unable to clearly identify which maps lawmakers were actually considering and would be voting on so they could provide comment on them. The sign-up process was also unnecessarily limited to less than 300 public speaking slots total across the two hearings in a state of more than 10 million - to comment on legislative and Congressional maps that will be in place for the next decade. There was also no opportunity for citizens to sign up in the room of the in-person hearings. I believe this process failed to provide a meaningful opportunity for members of the public who wanted to speak to be able to do so.

## RPV Analysis and NC NAACP v. Berger suit

27. During the process, my colleagues at CCNC and I grew increasingly concerned about the criteria prohibiting any use of racial data during redistricting, particularly as it prevented legislators from formally using data needed to protect voters of color in redistricting. This was especially concerning given the state's long history of targeting and discriminating against these voters in past redistricting cycles. When we saw the draft member-submitted map "SST-4" posted online, and particularly two of the proposed Senate Districts (marked Districts 1 and 9 on that map) we became concerned that Black voters in these areas would be deprived of the chance to re-elect their candidates of choice. We obtained a preliminary racially polarized voting analysis showing that Black voters would likely be unable to elect their candidates of choice as the result of racially polarized voting in these areas, and I sent this analysis via email to the legislative leaders, as well as the House and Senate Redistricting Committee members.
28. My hope was that the legislators would use this information to remedy these issues in the map, and to undertake additional analysis of racially polarized voting in North Carolina before enacting final maps. I sent this in part because the Chairs had indicated they would be open to viewing this type of information in committee meetings. This email is appended to this affidavit as Exhibit A. My understanding is that the legislators did not follow-up on
these issues even after receiving my email, or conduct any other analysis of racial data to mitigate the destruction of districts that perform for Black voters in the House and Senate maps.
29. We had serious concerns about this process, and therefore filed a complaint on October 29, 2021, asking for judicial review of this process and alleging that it would harm voters of color and specifically Black voters, including our own members and the voters we served. See N.C. NAACP v. Berger, No. 21 CVS 014776 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cty.). We voluntarily withdrew our appeal of the dismissal of that complaint before asking to intervene in this matter after the maps were passed.

## Vote on Final Maps

30. As the redistricting process wound toward a vote on final maps, the legislature's process continued to be wrought with obstacles to transparency. For example, the version of the state House bill filed on October 28, 2021 was just a placeholder that did not include any specific district lines. The proposed state House map was not posted on the General Assembly's website under "member-submitted maps" as would have been expected. In the November 1, 2021 House Redistricting Committee meeting, Chair Hall spoke at length about the transparency of the legislature's redistricting process. While he was making those comments, the proposed House map was not publicly available anywhere, including on the "Member Submitted Maps" page designated for posting the maps under consideration.
31. The final maps were passed very quickly over just a few days in early November. Overall, I found the entire process confusing and frustrating for its lack of context and transparency. My observation as an advocate who works with members of the public on civic engagement is that the average North Carolinian could not meaningfully have a voice in this process.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on December 23, 2021.


Sworn and subscribed before me this $23^{\text {rd }}$ day of December, 2021.


My commission expires: $11-6-2024$

## PHILLIPS AFFIDAVIT EXHIBIT A

From: Bob Phillips [bphillips@commoncause.org](mailto:bphillips@commoncause.org)
Subject: RPV Analysis for proposed SD9 and SD1 in member submitted map "SST-4"
Date: October 26, 2021 at 11:54:06 AM EDT
To: "Tim.Moore@ncleg.gov" [Tim.Moore@ncleg.gov](mailto:Tim.Moore@ncleg.gov), "Grace.Irvin@ncleg.gov" < Grace.Irvin@ncleg.gov>, "Phil.Berger@ncleg.gov'"
[Phil.Berger@ncleg.gov](mailto:Phil.Berger@ncleg.gov), "Robin.Braswell@ncleg.gov" [Robin.Braswell@ncleg.gov](mailto:Robin.Braswell@ncleg.gov), "Warren.Daniel@ncleg.gov" [Warren.Daniel@ncleg.gov](mailto:Warren.Daniel@ncleg.gov),
"Andy.Perrigo@ncleg.gov" [Andy.Perrigo@ncleg.gov](mailto:Andy.Perrigo@ncleg.gov), "Ralph.Hise@ncleg.gov" [Ralph.Hise@ncleg.gov](mailto:Ralph.Hise@ncleg.gov), "Susan.Fanning@ncleg.gov" [Susan.Fanning@ncleg.gov](mailto:Susan.Fanning@ncleg.gov), "Paul.Newton@ncleg.gov" [Paul.Newton@ncleg.gov](mailto:Paul.Newton@ncleg.gov), "Andrew.Stiffel@ncleg.gov" [Andrew.Stiffel@ncleg.gov](mailto:Andrew.Stiffel@ncleg.gov),
"Destin.Hall@ncleg.gov" < Destin.Hall@ncleg.gov>, "Lucy.Harrill@ncleg.gov" [Lucy.Harrill@ncleg.gov](mailto:Lucy.Harrill@ncleg.gov), "Dan.Blue@ncleg.gov"
[Dan.Blue@ncleg.gov](mailto:Dan.Blue@ncleg.gov), "Bonnie.McNeil@ncleg.gov" [Bonnie.McNeil@ncleg.gov](mailto:Bonnie.McNeil@ncleg.gov), "Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov" [Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov](mailto:Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov)
"Veronica.Green@ncleg.gov" < Veronica.Green@ncleg.gov>, "Ben.Clark@ncleg.gov" [Ben.Clark@ncleg.gov](mailto:Ben.Clark@ncleg.gov), "Michael.Johnson@ncleg.gov"
[Michael.Johnson@ncleg.gov](mailto:Michael.Johnson@ncleg.gov), "Don.Davis@ncleg.gov" [Don.Davis@ncleg.gov](mailto:Don.Davis@ncleg.gov), "Edwin.Woodard@ncleg.gov" [Edwin.Woodard@ncleg.gov](mailto:Edwin.Woodard@ncleg.gov),
"Chuck.Edwards@ncleg.gov" [Chuck.Edwards@ncleg.gov](mailto:Chuck.Edwards@ncleg.gov), "Heather.Millett@ncleg.gov" < Heather.Millett@ncleg.gov>, "Carl.Ford@ncleg.gov" [Carl.Ford@ncleg.gov](mailto:Carl.Ford@ncleg.gov), "Angela.Ford@ncleg.gov" [Angela.Ford@ncleg.gov](mailto:Angela.Ford@ncleg.gov), "Kathy.Harrington@ncleg.gov" [Kathy.Harrington@ncleg.gov](mailto:Kathy.Harrington@ncleg.gov),
"Lorie.Byrd@ncleg.gov" [Lorie.Byrd@ncleg.gov](mailto:Lorie.Byrd@ncleg.gov), "Brent.Jackson@ncleg.gov" [Brent.Jackson@ncleg.gov](mailto:Brent.Jackson@ncleg.gov), "William.Kirkley@ncleg.gov"
[William.Kirkley@ncleg.gov](mailto:William.Kirkley@ncleg.gov), "Joyce.Krawiec@ncleg.gov" < Joyce.Krawiec@ncleg.gov>, "Debbie.Lown@ncleg.gov" [Debbie.Lown@ncleg.gov](mailto:Debbie.Lown@ncleg.gov),
"Paul.Lowe@ncleg.gov" [Paul.Lowe@ncleg.gov](mailto:Paul.Lowe@ncleg.gov), "Corneisha.Mitchell@ncleg.gov" [Corneisha.Mitchell@ncleg.gov](mailto:Corneisha.Mitchell@ncleg.gov),
"Natasha.Marcus@ncleg.gov" < Natasha.Marcus@ncleg.gov>, "Jessica.Bolin@ncleg.gov" < Jessica.Bolin@ncleg.gov>, "Wiley.Nickel@ncleg.gov"
[Wilev.Nickel@ncleg.gov](mailto:Wilev.Nickel@ncleg.gov), "Michael.Cullen@ncleg.gov" [Michael.Cullen@ncleg.gov](mailto:Michael.Cullen@ncleg.gov), "Jim.Perry@ncleg.gov" < Jim.Perry@ncleg.gov>,
"LeighAnn.Biddix@ncleg.gov" [LeighAnn.Biddix@ncleg.gov](mailto:LeighAnn.Biddix@ncleg.gov), "Bill.Rabon@ncleg.gov" [Bill.Rabon@ncleg.gov](mailto:Bill.Rabon@ncleg.gov), "Paula.Fields@ncleg.gov"
[Paula.Fields@ncleg.gov](mailto:Paula.Fields@ncleg.gov), "William.Richardson@ncleg.gov" [William.Richardson@ncleg.gov](mailto:William.Richardson@ncleg.gov), "Leigh.Lawrence@ncleg.gov"
[Leigh.Lawrence@ncleg.gov](mailto:Leigh.Lawrence@ncleg.gov), "Jason.Saine@ncleg.gov" [Jason.Saine@ncleg.gov](mailto:Jason.Saine@ncleg.gov), "MaryStuart.Sloan@ncleg.gov"
[MaryStuart.Sloan@ncleg.gov](mailto:MaryStuart.Sloan@ncleg.gov), "John.Torbett@ncleg.gov" < John.Torbett@ncleg.gov>, "Viddia.Torbett@ncleg.gov" [Viddia.Torbett@ncleg.gov](mailto:Viddia.Torbett@ncleg.gov), "Cecil.Brockman@ncleg.gov" [Cecil.Brockman@ncleg.gov](mailto:Cecil.Brockman@ncleg.gov), "Matthew.Barley@ncleg.gov" [Matthew.Barley@ncleg.gov](mailto:Matthew.Barley@ncleg.gov),
"Becky.Carney@ncleg.gov" [Becky.Carney@ncleg.gov](mailto:Becky.Carney@ncleg.gov), "Beth.LeGrande@ncleg.gov" [Beth.LeGrande@ncleg.gov](mailto:Beth.LeGrande@ncleg.gov), "Linda.Cooper-
Suggs@ncleg.gov" [Linda.Cooper-Suggs@ncleg.gov](mailto:Linda.Cooper-Suggs@ncleg.gov), "Caroline.Enloe@ncleg.gov" [Caroline.Enloe@ncleg.gov](mailto:Caroline.Enloe@ncleg.gov), "Jimmy.Dixon@ncleg.gov"
< Jimmy.Dixon@ncleg.gov>, "Michael.Wiggins@ncleg.gov" [Michael.Wiggins@ncleg.gov](mailto:Michael.Wiggins@ncleg.gov), "Jon.Hardister@ncleg.gov" < Jon.Hardister@ncleg.gov>,
"Jayne.Nelson@ncleg.gov" [Jayne.Nelson@ncleg.gov](mailto:Jayne.Nelson@ncleg.gov), "Pricey.Harrison@ncleg.gov" [Pricey.Harrison@ncleg.gov](mailto:Pricey.Harrison@ncleg.gov), "Mary.Lee@ncleg.gov" [Mary.Lee@ncleg.gov](mailto:Mary.Lee@ncleg.gov), "Kelly.Hastings@ncleg.gov" [Kelly.Hastings@ncleg.gov](mailto:Kelly.Hastings@ncleg.gov), "Sophia.Hastings@ncleg.gov" [Sophia.Hastings@ncleg.gov](mailto:Sophia.Hastings@ncleg.gov) "Zack.Hawkins@ncleg.gov" [Zack.Hawkins@ncleg.gov](mailto:Zack.Hawkins@ncleg.gov), "Anita.Wilder@ncleg.gov" [Anita.Wilder@ncleg.gov](mailto:Anita.Wilder@ncleg.gov), "Brenden.Jones@ncleg.gov" [Brenden.Jones@ncleg.gov](mailto:Brenden.Jones@ncleg.gov), "Jeff.Hauser@ncleg.gov" [Jeff.Hauser@ncleg.gov](mailto:Jeff.Hauser@ncleg.gov), "Grey.Mills@ncleg.gov" [Grey.Mills@ncleg.gov](mailto:Grey.Mills@ncleg.gov),
"Mason.Barefoot@ncleg.gov" [Mason.Barefoot@ncleg.gov](mailto:Mason.Barefoot@ncleg.gov), "David.Rogers@ncleg.gov" [David.Rogers@ncleg.gov](mailto:David.Rogers@ncleg.gov), "Misty.Rogers@ncleg.gov" [Misty.Rogers@ncleg.gov](mailto:Misty.Rogers@ncleg.gov), "John.Szoka@ncleg.gov" [John.Szoka@ncleg.gov](mailto:John.Szoka@ncleg.gov), "Beverly.Slagle@ncleg.gov" [Beverly.Slagle@ncleg.gov](mailto:Beverly.Slagle@ncleg.gov),
"Harry.Warren@ncleg.gov" < Harry.Warren@ncleg.gov>, "Cristy.Yates@ncleg.gov" [Cristy.Yates@ncleg.gov](mailto:Cristy.Yates@ncleg.gov), "Lee.Zachary@ncleg.gov"
[Lee.Zachary@ncleg.gov](mailto:Lee.Zachary@ncleg.gov), "Martha.Jenkins@ncleg.gov" [Martha.Jenkins@ncleg.gov](mailto:Martha.Jenkins@ncleg.gov)
Subject: RPV Analysis for proposed SD9 and SD1 in member submitted map "SST-4"

Dear Senators and Representatives,
Attached are analyses of recent state-wide election results in the proposed SD9 and SD1 as drawn in the member submitted map "SST-4" that we believe are indicative of racially polarized voting in these jurisdictions. We strongly urge the House and Senate Redistricting Committees to consider this information, and to take care this redistricting cycle to ensure that House and Senate maps do not dilute the voting power of voters of color, particularly for voters in Northeast North Carolina.

RPV in SD1 in SST4 Bertie-Camden-Currituck-Dare-Gates-Hertford-Northampton-Pasquotank-Perquimans-Tyrrell (Ernestine Bazemore)

|  | Beasley vs. Newby - NC Supreme Court 2020GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous <br> Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate Ecological Regression |  | King's Iterative EI |  | RxC El |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \geq 90 \% \text { Black } \\ & \text { Precincts (0) } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \geq 90 \% \text { White } \\ & \text { Precincts (18) } \end{aligned}$ | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Beasley |  | 34.58\% | 90.74\% | 27.00\% | 98.71\% | 21.02\% | 95.80\% | 23.69\% | 46.55\% |
| Newby |  | 65.42\% | 9.26\% | 73.00\% | 1.86\% | 78.94\% | 4.20\% | 76.31\% | 53.45\% |


|  | Holmes vs. Dobson - NC Commissioner of Labor 2020GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate Ecological Regression |  | King'sIterative EI |  | RxC EI |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\geq 90 \%$ Black <br> Precincts (0) | $\geq 90 \%$ White <br> Precincts (18) | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Holmes |  | 33.59\% | 91.96\% | 26.15\% | 98.61\% | 20.31\% | 96.41\% | 22.50\% | 46.40\% |
| Dobson |  | 66.41\% | 8.04\% | 73.85\% | 0.98\% | 79.73\% | 3.59\% | 77.50\% | 53.60\% |


|  | Blue vs. Folwell - NC Treasurer 2016GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate Ecological Regression |  | King's Iterative EI |  | RxC EI |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \geq 90 \% \text { Black } \\ & \text { Precincts (1) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \geq 90 \% \text { White } \\ & \text { Precincts (25) } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Blue | 93.86\% | 34.11\% | 93.41\% | 26.70\% | 98.79\% | 24.05\% | 97.19\% | 25.73\% | 48.07\% |
| Folwell | 6.14\% | 65.89\% | 6.59\% | 73.31\% | 0.79\% | 75.90\% | 2.81\% | 74.27\% | 51.93\% |


|  | Coleman vs. Forest vs. Cole - Lt. Governor 2016GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous <br> Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate Ecological Regression |  | King'sIterative EI |  | RxC El |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \geq 90 \% \text { Black } \\ & \text { Precincts (1) } \end{aligned}$ | $\geq 90 \%$ White <br> Precincts (25) | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Coleman | 93.69\% | 33.83\% | 91.15\% | 25.49\% | 98.16\% | 22.79\% | 90.05\% | 27.98\% | 46.58\% |
| Forest | 5.74\% | 62.71\% |  |  | 1.16\% | 74.73\% | 9.13\% | 70.36\% | 50.98\% |
| Cole | 0.56\% | 3.47\% |  |  | 0.57\% | 3.42\% | 0.82\% | 1.66\% | 2.44\% |


|  | Beasley vs. Newby - NC Supreme Court 2020GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate <br> Regression |  | King's Iterative El |  | RxC EI |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \geq 90 \% \text { Black } \\ & \text { Precincts (1) } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\geq 90 \%$ White Precincts (0) | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Beasley | 94.90\% |  | 99.31\% | 18.74\% | 98.69\% | 8.57\% | 97.28\% | 10.60\% | 48.28\% |
| Newby | 5.10\% |  | 0.69\% | 81.26\% | 1.13\% | 91.40\% | 2.72\% | 89.40\% | 51.72\% |


|  | Holmes vs. Dobson - NC Commissioner of Labor 2020GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate <br> Regression |  | King's Iterative EI |  | RxC EI |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\geq 90 \%$ Black <br> Precincts (1) | $\geq 90 \%$ White <br> Precincts (0) | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Holmes | 95.87\% |  | 100.00\% | 16.96\% | 99.11\% | 7.29\% | 97.89\% | 8.67\% | 47.68\% |
| Dobson | 4.13\% |  | 0.00\% | 83.04\% | 0.02\% | 92.70\% | 2.11\% | 91.33\% | 52.32\% |


|  | Blue vs. Folwell - NC Treasurer 2016GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate Regression |  | King's Iterative EI |  | RxC El |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \geq 90 \% \text { Black } \\ & \text { Precincts (2) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \geq 90 \% \text { White } \\ & \text { Precincts (1) } \end{aligned}$ | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Blue | 96.55\% | 15.82\% | 100.00\% | 17.62\% | 99.02\% | 13.55\% | 97.40\% | 15.83\% | 48.71\% |
| Folwell | 3.45\% | 84.18\% | 0.00\% | 82.38\% | 0.84\% | 86.28\% | 2.60\% | 84.17\% | 51.29\% |


|  | Coleman vs. Forest vs. Cole - Lt. Governor 2016GEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Homogeneous Precinct Analysis |  | Bivariate Regression |  | King's Iterative El |  | RxC EI |  | Percent Vote |
|  | $\geq 90 \%$ Black <br> Precincts (2) | $\geq 90 \%$ White <br> Precincts (1) | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters | Support from Black Voters | Support from White Voters |  |
| Coleman | 96.76\% | 13.79\% | 99.86\% | 14.28\% | 99.19\% | 9.91\% | 83.13\% | 22.97\% | 46.32\% |
| Forest | 2.19\% | 84.90\% |  |  | 0.90\% | 87.47\% | 16.19\% | 76.55\% | 51.96\% |
| Cole | 1.05\% | 1.31\% |  |  | 1.68\% | 1.80\% | 0.67\% | 0.48\% | 1.72\% |

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

21 CVS 015426

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC., et al., REBECCA HARPER, et al., COMMON CAUSE,

Plaintiffs,
v.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.

Defendants.

## AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER DALTON KETCHIE

I, Christopher Dalton Ketchie, swear under penalty of perjury, that the following information is true to the best of my knowledge and state as follows:

1. I am over 18 years of age, legally competent to give this Affidavit, and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit.
2. I am a graduate of North Carolina State University with a master's degree in Forestry and Environmental Resources and a concentration in Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Additionally, I have over 11 years of professional GIS experience.
3. I am employed by the Southern Coalition for Social Justice in Durham, North Carolina as a Demographer and Data Analyst, which includes the frequent use of GIS.
4. I have attached as Exhibit 1 to this affidavit, a table containing 2010 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) and election data as described further herein from the North Carolina Congressional Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2019 (Session Law 2019-249).
5. I have attached as Exhibit 2 to this affidavit, a table containing 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) and election data as described further herein from the North Carolina Congressional Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2021 (Session Law 2021-174).
6. I have attached as Exhibit 3 to this affidavit, a table containing 2010 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) and election data as described further herein from the North Carolina Senate Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2019 (Session Law 2019-219).
7. I have attached as Exhibit 4 to this affidavit, a table containing 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) and election data as described further herein from the North Carolina Senate Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2021 (Session Law 2021-173).
8. I have attached as Exhibit 5 to this affidavit, a table containing 2010 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) and election data as described further herein from the North Carolina House Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2019 (Session Law 2019-220).
9. I have attached as Exhibit 6 to this affidavit, a table containing 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) and election data as described further herein from the

North Carolina House Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2021 (Session Law 2021-175).
10. Exhibits 1 to 6 each contain the following fields of information concerning the district plan that is indicated: the district number [District]; the name of the incumbent representative [Representative]; the race [Race] and party [Party] of the incumbent representative; the Non-Hispanic White Voting Age Population by Percentage [\% NH18+_Wht]; the Any Part Black Voting Age Population by Percentage [\% 18+_AP_Blk]; the Hispanic Voting Age Population by Percentage [\% H18+_Pop]; the Any Part American Indian and Alaska Native by Percentage [\% 18+_AP_Ind]; the Democratic Candidate Election Composite Percentage [\% Dem]; and the Republican Candidate Election Composite Percentage [\% Rep].
11. Race and partisan affiliation information for the incumbent representatives were retrieved manually using the Voter Search Tool provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections at https://vt.ncsbe.gov/RegLkup/.
12. The racial demographic data used in my preparation of Exhibits 1 to 6 was provided by the Caliper Corporation for use with Maptitude for Redistricting software, which utilizes the full set of Public Law 94-171 data needed for redistricting. ${ }^{1}$ I identified the racial demographic data associated with each of the redistricting plans named above by (1) loading in Maptitude the block assignment file for each plan as made available by the North Carolina State Legislature at https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting, (2) selecting the racial demographic categories [NH18+_Wht]; [18+_AP_Blk]; [H18+_Pop]; and [18+_AP_Ind] - within the Plan Settings Summary Fields window and setting the Denominator as Voting Age Population ([18+_Pop]), and (3) exporting the resulting data from the District Dataview.

[^34]13. The partisan demographic data used in preparation of Exhibits 1 to 6 was provided by Dave's Redistricting App software. For partisan demographic data, Dave's Redistricting App software utilizes election data for a range of elections, varying by state. For North Carolina, the Election Composite uses data from 2016 President, 2016 Senator, 2020 Attorney General, 2020 Senator, 2020 President, and 2020 Governor. ${ }^{2}$ I identified the partisan demographic data associated with each of the redistricting plans named above by (1) navigating to the "Official North Carolina Plans in DRA 2020" at https://davesredistricting.org/maps\#list::OfficialMaps,filter::state:NC\ and\ plan:2020, (2) selecting an individual plan and toggling to the plan's Statistics tab, and (3) exporting the resulting data from the Statistics page.
14. I have attached as Exhibit 7 to this affidavit, a true and correct copy of the raw 2020 VTD-level election data file used to create the North Carolina Election Composite utilized by Dave's Redistricting App software. This file, which contains VTD election data for each separate election within the composite, is available at https://github.com/dra2020/vtd_data/blob/master/2020_VTD/NC/2020_election_NC.csv.

## <remainder of page intentionally left blank>

[^35]I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this the $23^{\text {rd }}$ day of December, 2021.


Christopher Dalton Ketchie

Sworn and subscribed before me this the $23^{\text {rd }}$ day of December, 2021.


## Exhibit 1

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | G.K. Butterfield | Black | Democratic | $51.03 \%$ | $42.38 \%$ | $4.89 \%$ | $1.25 \%$ | $54.65 \%$ | $43.76 \%$ |
| 2 | Deborah Ross | White | Democratic | $64.24 \%$ | $20.97 \%$ | $8.40 \%$ | $1.02 \%$ | $62.36 \%$ | $34.97 \%$ |
| 3 | Gregory Murphy | White | Republican | $70.98 \%$ | $20.77 \%$ | $6.11 \%$ | $1.05 \%$ | $37.75 \%$ | $60.01 \%$ |
| 4 | David Price | White | Democratic | $60.85 \%$ | $26.11 \%$ | $8.50 \%$ | $1.02 \%$ | $65.70 \%$ | $32.13 \%$ |
| 5 | Virginia Foxx | White | Republican | $84.80 \%$ | $9.61 \%$ | $3.83 \%$ | $0.76 \%$ | $32.22 \%$ | $65.47 \%$ |
| 6 | Kathy Manning | White | Democratic | $57.42 \%$ | $31.76 \%$ | $7.29 \%$ | $1.04 \%$ | $60.49 \%$ | $37.22 \%$ |
| 7 | David Rouzer | White | Republican | $73.63 \%$ | $17.75 \%$ | $6.68 \%$ | $1.51 \%$ | $40.68 \%$ | $57.00 \%$ |
| 8 | Richard Hudson | White | Republican | $63.48 \%$ | $25.29 \%$ | $8.06 \%$ | $1.77 \%$ | $45.92 \%$ | $51.59 \%$ |
| 9 | Dan Bishop | White | Republican | $63.85 \%$ | $18.68 \%$ | $6.45 \%$ | $8.88 \%$ | $44.57 \%$ | $53.18 \%$ |
| 10 | Patrick McHenry | White | Republican | $82.20 \%$ | $10.09 \%$ | $5.78 \%$ | $0.74 \%$ | $31.58 \%$ | $66.08 \%$ |
| 11 | Madison Cawthorn | White | Republican | $89.18 \%$ | $3.90 \%$ | $4.24 \%$ | $2.00 \%$ | $43.01 \%$ | $54.61 \%$ |
| 12 | Alma Adams | Black | Democratic | $47.73 \%$ | $35.77 \%$ | $11.77 \%$ | $1.11 \%$ | $68.00 \%$ | $29.33 \%$ |
| 13 | Tedd Budd | White | Republican | $78.09 \%$ | $13.64 \%$ | $6.61 \%$ | $0.96 \%$ | $32.60 \%$ | $65.25 \%$ |

## Exhibit 2

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Gregory Murphy | White | Republican | 65.57\% | 23.31\% | 6.90\% | 2.13\% | 41.76\% | 56.04\% |
| 2 | G.K. Butterfield | Black | Democratic | 50.61\% | 39.99\% | 6.72\% | 2.25\% | 51.99\% | 46.38\% |
| 3 | David Rouzer | White | Republican | 67.31\% | 16.44\% | 6.90\% | 8.16\% | 41.39\% | 56.29\% |
| 4 | None |  |  | 53.99\% | 29.19\% | 11.95\% | 3.35\% | 46.21\% | 51.43\% |
| 5 | Deborah Ross | White | Democratic | 58.31\% | 24.47\% | 10.89\% | 1.90\% | 62.23\% | 35.19\% |
| 6 | David Price | White | Democratic | 54.50\% | 21.42\% | 10.01\% | 1.80\% | 71.60\% | 26.12\% |
| 7 | None |  |  | 69.34\% | 16.02\% | 10.37\% | 2.45\% | 41.27\% | 56.54\% |
| 8 | None |  |  | 66.72\% | 17.22\% | 8.29\% | 3.33\% | 40.63\% | 57.08\% |
| 9 | Alma Adams | Black | Democratic | 40.09\% | 37.95\% | 14.87\% | 1.95\% | 71.61\% | 25.72\% |
|  | Dan Bishop | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | Ted Budd | White | Republican | 68.88\% | 16.97\% | 8.02\% | 2.22\% | 38.26\% | 59.29\% |
|  | Richard Hudson | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | Virginia Foxx | White | Republican | 69.11\% | 19.97\% | 6.67\% | 2.06\% | 42.83\% | 54.92\% |
|  | Kathy Manning | White | Democratic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 | Patrick McHenry | White | Republican | 67.88\% | 17.86\% | 9.80\% | 2.25\% | 42.47\% | 55.16\% |
| 13 | None |  |  | 72.62\% | 15.43\% | 7.08\% | 2.29\% | 38.67\% | 59.04\% |
| 14 | Madison Cawthorn | White | Republican | 84.49\% | 3.96\% | 6.29\% | 3.46\% | 45.10\% | 52.44\% |

- Ex. 6432 -

Exhibit 3

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bob Steinburg | White | Republican | 66.87\% | 28.44\% | 3.15\% | 1.01\% | 42.77\% | 55.35\% |
| 2 | Norman W. Sanderson | White | Republican | 77.75\% | 15.83\% | 3.96\% | 1.04\% | 34.77\% | 63.02\% |
| 3 | Ernestine Bazemore | Black | Democratic | 51.04\% | 44.36\% | 3.43\% | 1.33\% | 52.88\% | 45.55\% |
| 4 | Milton F. 'Toby' Fitch Jr. | Black | Democratic | 46.15\% | 47.46\% | 4.53\% | 1.62\% | 58.31\% | 40.27\% |
| 5 | Don Davis | Black | Democratic | 59.81\% | 32.94\% | 5.17\% | 0.80\% | 52.72\% | 45.22\% |
| 6 | Michael A. Lazzara | Two or More Races | Republican | 71.18\% | 16.88\% | 8.55\% | 1.53\% | 33.93\% | 62.77\% |
| 7 | Jim Perry | White | Republican | 57.44\% | 33.93\% | 7.04\% | 0.83\% | 45.47\% | 52.81\% |
| 8 | Bill Rabon | White | Republican | 76.89\% | 16.91\% | 4.52\% | 1.45\% | 37.89\% | 60.00\% |
| 9 | Michael V. Lee | White | Republican | 79.69\% | 13.85\% | 4.35\% | 1.00\% | 48.71\% | 48.28\% |
| 10 | Brent Jackson | White | Republican | 64.14\% | 21.85\% | 12.50\% | 1.53\% | 36.12\% | 62.26\% |
| 11 | Lisa S. Barnes | White | Republican | 62.30\% | 28.04\% | 8.36\% | 1.02\% | 45.90\% | 52.09\% |
| 12 | Jim Burgin | White | Republican | 67.67\% | 19.67\% | 10.60\% | 1.63\% | 39.05\% | 58.61\% |
| 13 | Danny Earl Britt Jr. | White | Republican | 40.43\% | 26.37\% | 5.73\% | 27.42\% | 42.30\% | 56.20\% |
| 14 | Dan Blue | Black | Democratic | 49.07\% | 37.19\% | 9.69\% | 1.17\% | 72.87\% | 24.50\% |
| 15 | Jay J. Chaudhuri | Asian | Democratic | 67.14\% | 19.39\% | 9.62\% | 0.90\% | 59.66\% | 37.87\% |
| 16 | Wiley Nickel | White | Democratic | 69.12\% | 13.14\% | 7.60\% | 0.97\% | 64.24\% | 33.04\% |
| 17 | Sydney Batch | Black | Democratic | 76.71\% | 10.03\% | 5.62\% | 0.88\% | 53.48\% | 43.78\% |
| 18 | Sarah Crawford | Undesignated | Democratic | 65.34\% | 24.47\% | 7.94\% | 1.16\% | 51.32\% | 46.23\% |
| 19 | Kirk deViere | White | Democratic | 57.08\% | 31.69\% | 6.52\% | 3.19\% | 50.32\% | 47.24\% |
| 20 | Natalie S. Murdock | Black | Democratic | 41.30\% | 40.35\% | 12.10\% | 1.15\% | 82.11\% | 15.80\% |
| 21 | Ben Clark | Black | Democratic | 41.92\% | 42.15\% | 10.14\% | 4.12\% | 65.70\% | 31.47\% |
| 22 | Mike Woodard | White | Democratic | 59.74\% | 30.80\% | 7.13\% | 0.98\% | 58.50\% | 39.45\% |
| 23 | Valerie P. Foushee | Black | Democratic | 73.73\% | 12.81\% | 7.81\% | 0.99\% | 67.12\% | 30.89\% |
| 24 | Amy S. Galey | White | Republican | 71.30\% | 19.63\% | 7.27\% | 1.07\% | 45.73\% | 52.29\% |
| 25 | Tom McInnis | White | Republican | 66.34\% | 25.89\% | 3.79\% | 3.35\% | 41.45\% | 56.68\% |
| 26 | David W. Craven Jr. | White | Republican | 76.55\% | 12.19\% | 8.24\% | 1.17\% | 29.99\% | 67.86\% |
| 27 | Michael Garrett | White | Democratic | 68.44\% | 22.39\% | 4.78\% | 0.87\% | 52.01\% | 45.69\% |
| 28 | Gladys A. Robinson | Black | Democratic | 45.63\% | 43.64\% | 6.58\% | 1.24\% | 74.06\% | 23.69\% |
| 29 | Steve Jarvis | White | Republican | 82.13\% | 10.24\% | 5.64\% | 0.87\% | 27.86\% | 69.99\% |
| 30 | Phil Berger | White | Republican | 80.13\% | 15.22\% | 3.55\% | 0.82\% | 31.59\% | 66.27\% |
| 31 | Joyce Krawiec | White | Republican | 67.38\% | 22.08\% | 9.19\% | 0.91\% | 45.18\% | 52.50\% |
| 32 | Paul A. Lowe Jr. | Black | Democratic | 63.69\% | 25.50\% | 8.26\% | 0.82\% | 57.93\% | 39.60\% |
| 33 | Carl Ford | White | Republican | 79.12\% | 14.25\% | 4.90\% | 0.76\% | 29.98\% | 67.62\% |
| 34 | Vickie Sawyer | White | Republican | 82.06\% | 10.12\% | 5.86\% | 0.72\% | 30.57\% | 66.94\% |
| 35 | Todd Johnson | White | Republican | 76.06\% | 12.31\% | 9.29\% | 0.87\% | 36.36\% | 61.28\% |
| 36 | Paul Newton | White | Republican | 76.38\% | 14.10\% | 7.19\% | 0.75\% | 41.80\% | 55.62\% |
| 37 | Jeff Jackson | White | Democratic | 74.43\% | 14.09\% | 6.96\% | 0.72\% | 55.66\% | 41.68\% |
| 38 | Mujtaba A. Mohammed | Asian | Democratic | 36.74\% | 50.03\% | 7.42\% | 1.07\% | 77.85\% | 19.47\% |
| 39 | DeAndrea Salvador | Black | Democratic | 58.05\% | 20.38\% | 14.26\% | 0.92\% | 60.28\% | 37.01\% |
| 40 | Joyce Waddell | Black | Democratic | 37.68\% | 40.34\% | 18.27\% | 1.40\% | 71.06\% | 26.31\% |

Exhibit 3

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 41 | Natasha R. Marcus | White | Democratic | 63.55\% | 25.90\% | 6.39\% | 0.96\% | 59.99\% | 37.43\% |
| 42 | Dean Proctor | White | Republican | 82.98\% | 8.03\% | 5.95\% | 0.68\% | 29.45\% | 68.18\% |
| 43 | Kathy Harrington | White | Republican | 78.37\% | 14.75\% | 4.93\% | 0.89\% | 35.58\% | 62.12\% |
| 44 | W. Ted Alexander | White | Republican | 81.82\% | 13.30\% | 3.62\% | 0.66\% | 30.64\% | 67.28\% |
| 45 | Deanna Ballard | White | Republican | 91.31\% | 2.64\% | 4.87\% | 0.68\% | 32.49\% | 65.06\% |
| 46 | Warren Daniel | White | Republican | 88.12\% | 5.82\% | 3.78\% | 0.79\% | 27.57\% | 70.15\% |
| 47 | Ralph Hise | White | Republican | 90.41\% | 5.33\% | 3.08\% | 0.83\% | 30.14\% | 67.81\% |
| 48 | Chuck Edwards | White | Republican | 89.65\% | 3.16\% | 5.43\% | 0.99\% | 41.36\% | 56.30\% |
| 49 | Julie Mayfield | White | Democratic | 85.57\% | 7.12\% | 5.15\% | 1.04\% | 61.00\% | 36.31\% |
| 50 | Kevin Corbin | White | Republican | 90.20\% | 1.38\% | 3.15\% | 4.87\% | 34.28\% | 63.43\% |

- Ex. 6434 -

Exhibit 4

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Ernestine Bazemore | Black | Democratic | 63.29\% | 29.49\% | 3.97\% | 2.16\% | 45.48\% | 52.72\% |
| 2 | Norman W. Sanderson | White | Republican | 63.13\% | 30.01\% | 3.14\% | 2.99\% | 44.73\% | 53.53\% |
|  | Bob Steinburg | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | Jim Perry | White | Republican | 63.59\% | 26.66\% | 6.00\% | 1.86\% | 41.36\% | 56.65\% |
| 4 | Milton F. 'Toby' Fitch Jr. | Black | Democratic | 52.04\% | 35.02\% | 10.02\% | 2.04\% | 47.24\% | 51.11\% |
| 5 | Don Davis | Black | Democratic | 50.59\% | 40.35\% | 6.02\% | 1.66\% | 56.05\% | 41.97\% |
| 6 | Michael A. Lazzara | Two or More Races | Republican | 65.71\% | 15.33\% | 12.50\% | 3.11\% | 33.38\% | 63.19\% |
| 7 | Michael V. Lee | White | Republican | 77.33\% | 12.19\% | 6.13\% | 1.97\% | 49.06\% | 47.94\% |
| 8 | Bill Rabon | White | Republican | 77.25\% | 14.38\% | 4.41\% | 2.87\% | 37.77\% | 60.24\% |
| 9 | Brent Jackson | White | Republican | 61.22\% | 23.76\% | 11.97\% | 3.03\% | 39.16\% | 59.10\% |
| 10 | None |  |  | 66.76\% | 16.73\% | 13.18\% | 2.47\% | 36.94\% | 60.71\% |
| 11 | Lisa S. Barnes | White | Republican | 53.77\% | 36.65\% | 7.05\% | 2.02\% | 50.30\% | 47.96\% |
| 12 | Jim Burgin | White | Republican | 62.08\% | 20.74\% | 13.25\% | 2.97\% | 39.93\% | 57.77\% |
| 13 | None |  |  | 66.35\% | 21.29\% | 7.78\% | 1.89\% | 47.75\% | 49.95\% |
| 14 | Dan Blue | Black | Democratic | 37.44\% | 43.25\% | 15.41\% | 2.26\% | 72.04\% | 25.61\% |
| 15 | Jay J. Chaudhuri | Asian | Democratic | 67.68\% | 14.91\% | 7.55\% | 1.59\% | 67.19\% | 30.04\% |
| 16 | Wiley Nickel | White | Democratic | 55.90\% | 8.82\% | 7.00\% | 1.34\% | 62.24\% | 35.15\% |
| 17 | Sydney Batch | Black | Democratic | 72.99\% | 10.86\% | 8.55\% | 1.93\% | 48.81\% | 48.38\% |
| 18 | Sarah Crawford | White | Democratic | 58.66\% | 22.83\% | 11.94\% | 1.90\% | 63.57\% | 33.74\% |
| 19 | Kirk deViere | White | Democratic | 35.69\% | 48.07\% | 10.23\% | 3.73\% | 64.71\% | 32.66\% |
| 20 | Natalie S. Murdock | Black | Democratic | 54.99\% | 27.34\% | 10.32\% | 1.91\% | 70.77\% | 27.18\% |
| 21 | None |  |  | 66.07\% | 19.56\% | 8.60\% | 3.47\% | 39.03\% | 58.79\% |
| 22 | Mike Woodard | White | Democratic | 44.71\% | 34.45\% | 14.37\% | 2.18\% | 77.50\% | 20.47\% |
| 23 | Valerie P. Foushee | Black | Democratic | 66.84\% | 16.73\% | 7.51\% | 2.02\% | 64.73\% | 33.26\% |
| 24 | Danny Earl Britt Jr. | White | Republican | 33.85\% | 29.63\% | 8.35\% | 28.23\% | 48.56\% | 49.56\% |
|  | Ben Clark | Black | Democratic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 | Amy S. Galey | White | Republican | 67.42\% | 17.93\% | 10.89\% | 2.59\% | 39.84\% | 58.17\% |
| 26 | Phil Berger | White | Republican | 73.04\% | 17.44\% | 5.13\% | 2.10\% | 36.73\% | 61.13\% |
| 27 | Michael Garrett | White | Democratic | 56.15\% | 27.32\% | 7.84\% | 1.95\% | 59.36\% | 38.25\% |
| 28 | Gladys A. Robinson | Black | Democratic | 33.55\% | 51.45\% | 9.72\% | 2.17\% | 75.05\% | 22.81\% |
| 29 | David W. Craven Jr. | White | Republican | 68.82\% | 17.86\% | 9.20\% | 2.80\% | 32.72\% | 65.17\% |
|  | Tom McInnis | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 | Steve Jarvis | White | Republican | 80.42\% | 9.21\% | 6.44\% | 2.43\% | 26.69\% | 71.12\% |
| 31 | Joyce Krawiec | White | Republican | 76.75\% | 12.11\% | 6.74\% | 2.27\% | 36.92\% | 60.72\% |
| 32 | Paul A. Lowe Jr. | Black | Democratic | 46.63\% | 35.30\% | 14.28\% | 2.22\% | 68.06\% | 29.49\% |
| 33 | Carl Ford | White | Republican | 74.09\% | 14.88\% | 7.18\% | 2.44\% | 29.98\% | 67.62\% |
| 34 | Paul Newton | White | Republican | 62.84\% | 20.02\% | 10.20\% | 2.24\% | 43.47\% | 53.88\% |
| 35 | Todd Johnson | White | Republican | 70.65\% | 11.79\% | 11.05\% | 2.00\% | 36.09\% | 61.58\% |
| 36 | None |  |  | 85.61\% | 4.48\% | 7.17\% | 2.05\% | 23.26\% | 74.60\% |

Exhibit 4

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 37 | Natasha R. Marcus | White | Democratic | 77.15\% | 11.19\% | 6.72\% | 1.88\% | 34.88\% | 62.62\% |
|  | Vickie Sawyer | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 38 | Mujtaba A. Mohammed | Asian | Democratic | 47.38\% | 34.95\% | 9.72\% | 1.75\% | 63.84\% | 33.48\% |
| 39 | DeAndrea Salvador | Black | Democratic | 34.02\% | 40.75\% | 17.55\% | 2.22\% | 71.02\% | 26.31\% |
| 40 | Joyce Waddell | Black | Democratic | 25.47\% | 49.54\% | 18.92\% | 2.14\% | 81.07\% | 16.36\% |
| 41 | Jeff Jackson | White | Democratic | 69.65\% | 10.79\% | 8.12\% | 1.54\% | 49.50\% | 47.92\% |
| 42 | None |  |  | 58.43\% | 21.59\% | 13.02\% | 1.81\% | 63.91\% | 33.24\% |
| 43 | Kathy Harrington | White | Republican | 69.62\% | 18.57\% | 7.59\% | 2.43\% | 36.50\% | 61.19\% |
| 44 | W. Ted Alexander | White | Republican | 78.82\% | 13.14\% | 4.64\% | 2.15\% | 29.87\% | 68.05\% |
| 45 | Dean Proctor | White | Republican | 79.30\% | 7.49\% | 7.59\% | 2.46\% | 28.82\% | 68.83\% |
| 46 | Warren Daniel | White | Republican | 84.64\% | 4.85\% | 5.61\% | 2.84\% | 35.35\% | 62.24\% |
| 47 | Deanna Ballard | White | Republican | 87.62\% | 3.63\% | 5.10\% | 2.17\% | 36.05\% | 61.47\% |
|  | Ralph Hise | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 48 | Chuck Edwards | White | Republican | 83.02\% | 5.51\% | 7.88\% | 2.20\% | 35.09\% | 62.81\% |
| 49 | Julie Mayfield | White | Democratic | 80.61\% | 7.29\% | 7.20\% | 2.37\% | 63.19\% | 34.09\% |
| 50 | Kevin Corbin | White | Republican | 85.96\% | 1.98\% | 4.67\% | 6.31\% | 35.39\% | 62.35\% |

- Ex. 6436 -

Exhibit 5

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Edward C. Goodwin | White | Republican | 57.23\% | 39.71\% | 1.93\% | 0.76\% | 45.25\% | 53.12\% |
| 2 | Larry Yarborough | White | Republican | 65.76\% | 27.79\% | 5.28\% | 1.12\% | 41.27\% | 56.64\% |
| 3 | Steve Tyson | White | Republican | 69.92\% | 21.24\% | 5.41\% | 1.02\% | 40.95\% | 56.55\% |
| 4 | Jimmy Dixon | White | Republican | 62.43\% | 22.93\% | 13.63\% | 0.99\% | 35.16\% | 63.12\% |
| 5 | Howard J. Hunter III | Native American | Democratic | 51.26\% | 44.32\% | 2.75\% | 1.21\% | 54.09\% | 44.35\% |
| 6 | Bobby Hanig | White | Republican | 85.20\% | 9.20\% | 4.02\% | 1.01\% | 35.06\% | 62.80\% |
| 7 | Matthew Winslow | White | Republican | 65.95\% | 25.47\% | 7.65\% | 1.05\% | 41.58\% | 56.23\% |
| 8 | Kandie D. Smith | Black | Democratic | 51.89\% | 41.37\% | 4.63\% | 0.79\% | 59.32\% | 38.67\% |
| 9 | Brian Farkas | White | Democratic | 68.66\% | 24.69\% | 4.05\% | 0.70\% | 49.66\% | 48.12\% |
| 10 | John R. Bell IV | White | Republican | 68.98\% | 21.44\% | 7.95\% | 0.88\% | 32.32\% | 66.02\% |
| 11 | Allison A. Dahle | White | Democratic | 65.00\% | 16.51\% | 9.87\% | 1.21\% | 68.43\% | 28.15\% |
| 12 | Chris Humphrey | White | Republican | 56.88\% | 36.98\% | 5.23\% | 0.73\% | 47.21\% | 51.13\% |
| 13 | Pat McElraft | White | Republican | 85.84\% | 9.41\% | 2.75\% | 1.08\% | 30.17\% | 67.74\% |
| 14 | George G. Cleveland | White | Republican | 68.84\% | 17.78\% | 9.03\% | 1.56\% | 38.07\% | 58.35\% |
| 15 | Phil Shepard | White | Republican | 72.63\% | 14.93\% | 9.38\% | 1.58\% | 30.59\% | 66.00\% |
| 16 | Carson Smith | White | Republican | 70.37\% | 22.22\% | 4.58\% | 2.78\% | 36.49\% | 61.30\% |
| 17 | Frank Iler | White | Republican | 80.58\% | 13.16\% | 4.62\% | 1.27\% | 38.86\% | 59.00\% |
| 18 | Deb Butler | White | Democratic | 66.81\% | 25.97\% | 5.26\% | 1.20\% | 56.33\% | 40.30\% |
| 19 | Charles W. Miller | White | Republican | 86.81\% | 7.79\% | 3.69\% | 1.09\% | 40.55\% | 57.02\% |
| 20 | Ted Davis Jr. | White | Republican | 89.50\% | 4.73\% | 3.36\% | 0.76\% | 44.45\% | 52.76\% |
| 21 | Raymond E. Smith Jr. | Black | Democratic | 48.86\% | 39.00\% | 10.08\% | 1.41\% | 54.57\% | 43.66\% |
| 22 | William D. Brisson | White | Republican | 56.85\% | 31.49\% | 9.30\% | 2.42\% | 41.42\% | 57.01\% |
| 23 | Shelly Willingham | Black | Democratic | 44.85\% | 51.83\% | 2.78\% | 0.64\% | 59.44\% | 39.06\% |
| 24 | Linda Cooper-Suggs | Black | Democratic | 53.16\% | 38.11\% | 7.60\% | 0.64\% | 52.08\% | 46.45\% |
| 25 | James D. Gailliard | Black | Democratic | 55.05\% | 39.96\% | 3.32\% | 1.19\% | 53.90\% | 44.68\% |
| 26 | Donna McDowell White | White | Republican | 75.15\% | 14.79\% | 8.67\% | 0.92\% | 40.54\% | 56.81\% |
| 27 | Michael H. Wray | White | Democratic | 41.54\% | 53.71\% | 1.53\% | 3.11\% | 61.70\% | 37.02\% |
| 28 | Larry C. Strickland | White | Republican | 69.28\% | 16.52\% | 13.16\% | 1.09\% | 33.75\% | 64.23\% |
| 29 | Vernetta Alston | Black | Democratic | 42.28\% | 37.49\% | 12.41\% | 1.12\% | 85.98\% | 12.02\% |
| 30 | Marcia Morey | White | Democratic | 59.09\% | 28.74\% | 8.24\% | 0.88\% | 71.81\% | 26.13\% |
| 31 | Zack Hawkins | Black | Democratic | 31.89\% | 49.56\% | 14.99\% | 1.27\% | 80.31\% | 17.54\% |
| 32 | Terry E. Garrison | Black | Democratic | 44.97\% | 49.12\% | 4.13\% | 1.96\% | 61.75\% | 36.75\% |
| 33 | Rosa U. Gill | Black | Democratic | 41.61\% | 45.10\% | 12.01\% | 1.18\% | 72.93\% | 24.63\% |
| 34 | Grier Martin | White | Democratic | 76.66\% | 13.14\% | 7.03\% | 0.73\% | 57.89\% | 39.56\% |
| 35 | Terence Everitt | White | Democratic | 74.58\% | 16.24\% | 5.26\% | 0.80\% | 51.52\% | 46.06\% |
| 36 | Julie von Haefen | White | Democratic | 81.01\% | 7.74\% | 5.99\% | 0.93\% | 53.53\% | 43.73\% |
| 37 | Erin Paré | White | Republican | 76.16\% | 13.83\% | 6.76\% | 1.11\% | 47.85\% | 49.22\% |
| 38 | Abe Jones | Black | Democratic | 31.82\% | 48.30\% | 16.24\% | 1.39\% | 79.47\% | 18.14\% |
| 39 | James Roberson | Black | Republican | 49.29\% | 35.45\% | 12.40\% | 1.37\% | 65.66\% | 31.93\% |
| 40 | Joe John | White | Democratic | 76.23\% | 9.76\% | 3.99\% | 0.76\% | 55.14\% | 42.29\% |

- Ex. 6437 -

Exhibit 5

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 41 | Gale Adcock | White | Democratic | 69.66\% | 7.40\% | 4.09\% | 0.69\% | 60.51\% | 37.09\% |
| 42 | Marvin W. Lucas | Black | Democratic | 46.66\% | 39.67\% | 9.69\% | 2.05\% | 66.11\% | 30.90\% |
| 43 | Diane Wheatley | White | Republican | 57.73\% | 34.34\% | 4.25\% | 2.78\% | 48.04\% | 49.69\% |
| 44 | William O. Richardson | White | Democratic | 38.65\% | 45.91\% | 10.59\% | 2.13\% | 70.31\% | 26.98\% |
| 45 | John Szoka | White | Republican | 59.67\% | 27.44\% | 7.50\% | 3.96\% | 49.67\% | 47.88\% |
| 46 | Brenden H. Jones | White | Republican | 38.99\% | 27.01\% | 6.96\% | 27.31\% | 41.53\% | 57.15\% |
| 47 | Charles Graham | Native American | Democratic | 33.92\% | 24.48\% | 5.13\% | 36.00\% | 43.97\% | 54.46\% |
| 48 | Garland E. Pierce | Black | Democratic | 46.39\% | 36.13\% | 6.42\% | 10.62\% | 53.35\% | 44.34\% |
| 49 | Cynthia Ball | White | Democratic | 75.00\% | 13.29\% | 6.49\% | 0.93\% | 65.82\% | 31.52\% |
| 50 | Graig R. Meyer | White | Democratic | 71.28\% | 21.15\% | 4.96\% | 1.12\% | 56.45\% | 41.64\% |
| 51 | John Sauls | White | Republican | 64.51\% | 20.54\% | 12.94\% | 1.43\% | 42.99\% | 54.46\% |
| 52 | James L. Boles Jr. | White | Republican | 80.41\% | 12.96\% | 4.57\% | 1.23\% | 36.46\% | 61.58\% |
| 53 | Howard Penny Jr. | White | Republican | 68.96\% | 20.79\% | 7.97\% | 1.91\% | 37.42\% | 60.51\% |
| 54 | Robert T. Reives II | Black | Democratic | 71.96\% | 15.74\% | 8.79\% | 0.93\% | 60.23\% | 37.82\% |
| 55 | Mark Brody | White | Republican | 62.17\% | 28.64\% | 7.82\% | 0.94\% | 41.10\% | 56.83\% |
| 56 | Verla Insko | White | Democratic | 71.95\% | 10.30\% | 7.37\% | 0.90\% | 84.08\% | 13.81\% |
| 57 | Ashton Wheeler Clemmons | White | Democratic | 51.31\% | 38.36\% | 5.98\% | 1.09\% | 67.53\% | 30.29\% |
| 58 | Amos L. Quick III | Black | Democratic | 43.28\% | 39.97\% | 10.31\% | 1.41\% | 73.69\% | 23.86\% |
| 59 | Jon Hardister | White | Republican | 69.17\% | 25.17\% | 3.77\% | 1.08\% | 47.76\% | 50.26\% |
| 60 | Cecil Brockman | Black | Democratic | 50.25\% | 36.53\% | 6.99\% | 1.17\% | 63.05\% | 34.68\% |
| 61 | Pricey Harrison | White | Democratic | 54.10\% | 40.33\% | 3.39\% | 1.03\% | 72.57\% | 25.19\% |
| 62 | John Faircloth | White | Republican | 79.53\% | 11.45\% | 4.38\% | 0.77\% | 43.36\% | 54.26\% |
| 63 | Ricky Hurtado | Undesignated | Democratic | 62.96\% | 23.90\% | 11.49\% | 1.36\% | 50.02\% | 47.93\% |
| 64 | Dennis Riddell | White | Republican | 78.67\% | 13.98\% | 5.38\% | 0.81\% | 40.41\% | 57.69\% |
| 65 | Armor Pyrtle | White | Republican | 74.93\% | 19.63\% | 4.29\% | 0.86\% | 35.22\% | 62.68\% |
| 66 | Ben T. Moss Jr. | White | Republican | 66.01\% | 24.86\% | 6.19\% | 2.09\% | 40.30\% | 57.55\% |
| 67 | Wayne Sasser | White | Republican | 88.92\% | 6.91\% | 2.36\% | 0.68\% | 21.90\% | 75.81\% |
| 68 | David Willis | White | Republican | 84.13\% | 7.94\% | 4.62\% | 0.70\% | 36.47\% | 61.18\% |
| 69 | Dean Arp | White | Republican | 74.90\% | 11.45\% | 11.51\% | 0.93\% | 34.82\% | 62.83\% |
| 70 | Pat B. Hurley | White | Republican | 82.13\% | 6.30\% | 9.36\% | 1.06\% | 24.46\% | 73.34\% |
| 71 | Evelyn Terry | Black | Democratic | 41.53\% | 42.12\% | 15.29\% | 1.08\% | 70.03\% | 27.62\% |
| 72 | Amber M. Baker | Black | Democratic | 50.86\% | 39.02\% | 7.96\% | 0.91\% | 70.86\% | 26.75\% |
| 73 | Lee Zachary | White | Republican | 76.36\% | 13.23\% | 9.15\% | 0.72\% | 35.68\% | 61.93\% |
| 74 | Jeff Zenger | White | Republican | 81.38\% | 10.66\% | 4.56\% | 0.62\% | 46.62\% | 50.95\% |
| 75 | Donny Lambeth | White | Republican | 76.68\% | 13.13\% | 8.44\% | 0.94\% | 38.59\% | 59.04\% |
| 76 | Harry Warren | White | Republican | 69.45\% | 22.26\% | 6.46\% | 0.86\% | 39.97\% | 57.51\% |
| 77 | Julia C. Howard | White | Republican | 86.25\% | 7.29\% | 5.35\% | 0.73\% | 25.14\% | 72.58\% |
| 78 | Allen McNeill | White | Republican | 86.19\% | 6.51\% | 5.97\% | 1.10\% | 21.31\% | 76.67\% |
| 79 | Keith Kidwell | White | Republican | 70.17\% | 24.26\% | 4.64\% | 0.88\% | 36.03\% | 62.08\% |
| 80 | Sam Watford | White | Republican | 84.92\% | 8.41\% | 5.12\% | 0.92\% | 25.11\% | 72.73\% |

- Ex. 6438 -

Exhibit 5

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 81 | Larry W. Potts | White | Republican | 83.73\% | 9.14\% | 4.75\% | 0.86\% | 28.16\% | 69.65\% |
| 82 | Kristin Baker | White | Republican | 71.05\% | 17.78\% | 8.59\% | 0.75\% | 46.43\% | 50.98\% |
| 83 | Larry G. Pittman | White | Republican | 75.88\% | 14.05\% | 7.70\% | 0.80\% | 43.97\% | 53.28\% |
| 84 | Jeffrey C. McNeely | White | Republican | 78.43\% | 13.85\% | 6.11\% | 0.67\% | 31.15\% | 66.41\% |
| 85 | Dudley Greene | White | Republican | 91.46\% | 3.50\% | 3.70\% | 0.85\% | 24.66\% | 73.35\% |
| 86 | Hugh Blackwell | White | Republican | 85.67\% | 6.27\% | 4.43\% | 0.82\% | 31.82\% | 65.77\% |
| 87 | Destin Hall | White | Republican | 90.58\% | 4.87\% | 3.45\% | 0.73\% | 25.20\% | 72.50\% |
| 88 | Mary Belk | White | Democratic | 60.09\% | 21.98\% | 13.42\% | 0.86\% | 61.91\% | 35.33\% |
| 89 | Mitchell S. Setzer | White | Republican | 82.80\% | 8.61\% | 5.47\% | 0.70\% | 27.45\% | 70.33\% |
| 90 | Sarah Stevens | White | Republican | 90.02\% | 3.43\% | 5.54\% | 0.68\% | 25.08\% | 72.88\% |
| 91 | Kyle Hall | White | Republican | 90.10\% | 5.07\% | 3.88\% | 0.74\% | 23.53\% | 74.20\% |
| 92 | Terry M. Brown Jr. | Black | Democratic | 38.62\% | 43.03\% | 12.41\% | 1.12\% | 70.56\% | 26.72\% |
| 93 | Ray Pickett | White | Republican | 93.55\% | 1.59\% | 3.27\% | 0.77\% | 43.80\% | 53.25\% |
| 94 | Jeffrey Elmore | White | Republican | 88.84\% | 5.74\% | 4.15\% | 0.63\% | 23.60\% | 74.03\% |
| 95 | Grey Mills | White | Republican | 82.22\% | 9.85\% | 4.97\% | 0.84\% | 33.81\% | 63.53\% |
| 96 | Jay Adams | White | Republican | 80.04\% | 8.42\% | 7.83\% | 0.64\% | 35.16\% | 62.41\% |
| 97 | Jason Saine | White | Republican | 87.67\% | 5.67\% | 5.50\% | 0.68\% | 26.85\% | 70.83\% |
| 98 | John R. Bradford III | White | Republican | 83.37\% | 7.83\% | 5.53\% | 0.63\% | 47.66\% | 49.74\% |
| 99 | Nasif Majeed | Black | Democratic | 48.51\% | 35.59\% | 12.80\% | 1.27\% | 63.75\% | 33.65\% |
| 100 | John Autry | White | Democratic | 40.26\% | 34.70\% | 20.67\% | 1.34\% | 71.56\% | 25.49\% |
| 101 | Carolyn G. Logan | Black | Democratic | 40.71\% | 47.63\% | 7.48\% | 1.47\% | 71.84\% | 25.59\% |
| 102 | Becky Carney | White | Democratic | 40.46\% | 45.49\% | 10.75\% | 1.11\% | 77.54\% | 19.61\% |
| 103 | Rachel Hunt | White | Democratic | 74.36\% | 13.23\% | 7.08\% | 0.78\% | 52.58\% | 44.81\% |
| 104 | Brandon Lofton | White | Democratic | 74.55\% | 12.62\% | 8.80\% | 0.75\% | 53.53\% | 43.91\% |
| 105 | Wesley Harris | White | Democratic | 71.57\% | 11.67\% | 8.24\% | 0.73\% | 54.21\% | 43.15\% |
| 106 | Carla D. Cunningham | Black | Democratic | 35.68\% | 42.17\% | 12.13\% | 1.11\% | 81.71\% | 15.65\% |
| 107 | Kelly M. Alexander Jr. | Black | Democratic | 38.54\% | 49.04\% | 7.74\% | 1.04\% | 77.87\% | 19.69\% |
| 108 | John A. Torbett | White | Republican | 77.29\% | 16.47\% | 4.48\% | 0.91\% | 37.04\% | 60.60\% |
| 109 | Dana Bumgardner | White | Republican | 79.46\% | 12.76\% | 5.14\% | 0.84\% | 37.68\% | 59.92\% |
| 110 | Kelly E. Hastings | White | Republican | 81.74\% | 13.02\% | 4.04\% | 0.82\% | 27.31\% | 70.71\% |
| 111 | Tim Moore | White | Republican | 73.84\% | 22.55\% | 2.26\% | 0.67\% | 37.44\% | 60.71\% |
| 112 | David Rogers | White | Republican | 85.76\% | 10.23\% | 2.58\% | 0.79\% | 26.89\% | 71.17\% |
| 113 | Jake Johnson | White | Republican | 91.85\% | 3.20\% | 3.71\% | 0.86\% | 38.34\% | 59.62\% |
| 114 | Susan C. Fisher | White | Democratic | 89.34\% | 3.48\% | 5.18\% | 1.08\% | 57.75\% | 39.64\% |
| 115 | John Ager | White | Democratic | 86.81\% | 7.47\% | 3.67\% | 1.11\% | 59.71\% | 37.64\% |
| 116 | Brian Turner | White | Democratic | 84.53\% | 8.05\% | 5.24\% | 0.98\% | 58.38\% | 38.89\% |
| 117 | Timothy D. Moffitt | White | Republican | 85.91\% | 3.62\% | 8.35\% | 1.00\% | 39.43\% | 58.18\% |
| 118 | Mark Pless | White | Republican | 95.36\% | 1.12\% | 2.33\% | 0.92\% | 35.31\% | 62.41\% |
| 119 | Mike Clampitt | White | Republican | 84.59\% | 1.80\% | 3.51\% | 9.70\% | 43.80\% | 53.43\% |
| 120 | Karl E. Gillespie | White | Republican | 93.13\% | 1.12\% | 3.21\% | 2.11\% | 26.43\% | 71.63\% |

- Ex. 6439 -

Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Edward C. Goodwin | White | Republican | 75.07\% | 18.16\% | 3.28\% | 2.03\% | 37.28\% | 60.76\% |
|  | Bobby Hanig | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | Larry Yarborough | White | Republican | 64.34\% | 24.39\% | 7.03\% | 2.09\% | 51.86\% | 46.07\% |
| 3 | Steve Tyson | White | Republican | 69.04\% | 20.18\% | 5.47\% | 1.97\% | 39.48\% | 58.25\% |
| 4 | Jimmy Dixon | White | Republican | 54.09\% | 25.59\% | 18.46\% | 2.15\% | 40.06\% | 58.63\% |
| 5 | Howard J. Hunter III | Native American | Democratic | 53.43\% | 38.59\% | 4.81\% | 2.31\% | 50.22\% | 48.09\% |
| 6 | None |  |  | 61.63\% | 20.71\% | 12.83\% | 3.43\% | 38.77\% | 58.54\% |
| 7 | Matthew Winslow | White | Republican | 66.08\% | 22.94\% | 7.86\% | 2.38\% | 42.48\% | 55.16\% |
| 8 | Kandie D. Smith | Black | Democratic | 44.26\% | 45.45\% | 7.21\% | 1.62\% | 62.87\% | 34.97\% |
| 9 | Brian Farkas | White | Democratic | 64.56\% | 25.63\% | 5.69\% | 1.86\% | 45.55\% | 52.34\% |
| 10 | John R. Bell IV | White | Republican | 55.16\% | 34.27\% | 6.78\% | 1.90\% | 45.31\% | 52.74\% |
|  | Raymond E. Smith Jr. | Black | Democratic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | Allison A. Dahle | White | Democratic | 60.32\% | 15.24\% | 11.19\% | 1.95\% | 67.68\% | 28.98\% |
| 12 | Chris Humphrey | White | Republican | 52.41\% | 38.48\% | 7.19\% | 1.72\% | 46.58\% | 51.94\% |
| 13 | Pat McElraft | White | Republican | 82.02\% | 8.84\% | 4.50\% | 2.48\% | 30.00\% | 67.76\% |
| 14 | George G. Cleveland | White | Republican | 62.04\% | 19.93\% | 11.16\% | 3.38\% | 38.07\% | 58.35\% |
| 15 | Phil Shepard | White | Republican | 66.85\% | 11.77\% | 14.95\% | 2.74\% | 31.02\% | 65.55\% |
| 16 | Carson Smith | White | Republican | 74.94\% | 13.84\% | 7.08\% | 2.90\% | 32.17\% | 65.25\% |
| 17 | Frank Iler | White | Republican | 80.52\% | 10.72\% | 5.15\% | 2.27\% | 38.32\% | 59.60\% |
| 18 | Deb Butler | White | Democratic | 65.36\% | 22.53\% | 7.80\% | 2.41\% | 58.01\% | 38.64\% |
| 19 | Charles W. Miller | White | Republican | 86.42\% | 5.45\% | 4.09\% | 2.31\% | 38.02\% | 59.61\% |
| 20 | Ted Davis Jr. | White | Republican | 85.16\% | 5.67\% | 4.80\% | 1.42\% | 44.29\% | 52.91\% |
| 21 | None |  |  | 71.64\% | 11.58\% | 8.52\% | 1.72\% | 52.74\% | 44.63\% |
| 22 | William D. Brisson | White | Republican | 54.65\% | 28.47\% | 13.31\% | 3.90\% | 41.51\% | 56.96\% |
| 23 | Shelly Willingham | Black | Democratic | 41.67\% | 53.41\% | 3.57\% | 1.39\% | 59.82\% | 38.77\% |
| 24 | Linda Cooper-Suggs | Black | Democratic | 50.09\% | 37.52\% | 9.84\% | 2.14\% | 50.72\% | 47.84\% |
| 25 | James D. Gailliard | Black | Democratic | 50.87\% | 41.00\% | 5.39\% | 2.04\% | 51.56\% | 46.97\% |
| 26 | Donna McDowell White | White | Republican | 67.10\% | 17.78\% | 11.36\% | 2.39\% | 40.99\% | 56.36\% |
| 27 | Michael H. Wray | White | Democratic | 41.39\% | 51.88\% | 2.36\% | 4.45\% | 62.25\% | 36.39\% |
| 28 | Larry C. Strickland | White | Republican | 64.29\% | 16.99\% | 16.18\% | 2.39\% | 33.19\% | 64.97\% |
| 29 | Vernetta Alston | Black | Democratic | 41.70\% | 39.58\% | 12.24\% | 1.91\% | 84.62\% | 13.38\% |
| 30 | Marcia Morey | White | Democratic | 43.50\% | 34.44\% | 13.38\% | 1.99\% | 85.71\% | 12.34\% |
| 31 | Zack Hawkins | Black | Democratic | 37.01\% | 39.72\% | 14.91\% | 2.33\% | 79.96\% | 17.73\% |
| 32 | Terry E. Garrison | Black | Democratic | 47.09\% | 43.24\% | 7.91\% | 1.70\% | 56.19\% | 42.19\% |
| 33 | Rosa U. Gill | Black | Democratic | 53.35\% | 30.91\% | 9.78\% | 1.61\% | 81.27\% | 16.35\% |
| 34 | Grier Martin | White | Democratic | 64.95\% | 19.18\% | 10.87\% | 1.53\% | 64.63\% | 32.70\% |
| 35 | Terence Everitt | White | Democratic | 71.79\% | 15.68\% | 6.52\% | 1.65\% | 47.12\% | 50.35\% |
| 36 | Julie von Haefen | White | Democratic | 68.95\% | 8.78\% | 7.58\% | 1.76\% | 54.76\% | 42.51\% |
| 37 | Erin Paré | White | Republican | 73.42\% | 12.62\% | 9.28\% | 2.16\% | 45.06\% | 52.05\% |
| 38 | Abe Jones | Black | Democratic | 33.91\% | 45.44\% | 16.56\% | 2.18\% | 73.92\% | 23.73\% |

- Ex. 6440 -

Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 39 | James Roberson | Black | Democratic | 47.76\% | 33.04\% | 15.03\% | 2.63\% | 58.86\% | 38.73\% |
| 40 | Joe John | White | Democratic | 75.44\% | 11.53\% | 5.61\% | 1.52\% | 56.32\% | 41.04\% |
| 41 | Gale Adcock | White | Democratic | 47.61\% | 8.60\% | 5.15\% | 1.12\% | 64.28\% | 33.24\% |
| 42 | Marvin W. Lucas | Black | Democratic | 39.90\% | 40.97\% | 13.54\% | 2.90\% | 65.74\% | 31.29\% |
| 43 | Diane Wheatley | White | Republican | 50.84\% | 36.68\% | 6.42\% | 4.31\% | 49.28\% | 48.41\% |
| 44 | William O. Richardson | White | Democratic | 29.79\% | 51.68\% | 12.44\% | 3.49\% | 70.35\% | 26.92\% |
| 45 | John Szoka | White | Republican | 50.27\% | 32.44\% | 9.50\% | 5.25\% | 48.37\% | 49.22\% |
| 46 | Brenden H. Jones | White | Republican | 51.15\% | 29.31\% | 3.72\% | 16.09\% | 40.08\% | 58.49\% |
| 47 | Charles Graham | Native American | Democratic | 25.08\% | 22.60\% | 10.16\% | 42.65\% | 45.18\% | 53.23\% |
| 48 | Garland E. Pierce | Black | Democratic | 42.04\% | 37.09\% | 8.59\% | 11.61\% | 53.35\% | 44.34\% |
| 49 | Cynthia Ball | White | Democratic | 61.81\% | 13.91\% | 6.43\% | 1.36\% | 64.93\% | 32.54\% |
| 50 | Graig R. Meyer | White | Democratic | 69.09\% | 18.48\% | 8.24\% | 2.39\% | 56.45\% | 41.64\% |
| 51 | John Sauls | White | Republican | 65.34\% | 16.73\% | 14.43\% | 2.67\% | 39.81\% | 58.01\% |
| 52 | James L. Boles Jr. | White | Republican | 66.24\% | 23.07\% | 5.44\% | 3.83\% | 42.53\% | 55.21\% |
|  | Ben T. Moss Jr. | White | Republican | 66.24\% | 23.07\% |  |  | 42.53\% | 55.21\% |
| 53 | Howard Penny Jr. | White | Republican | 66.69\% | 19.65\% | 10.01\% | 2.74\% | 36.71\% | 61.09\% |
| 54 | Robert T. Reives II | Black | Democratic | 73.26\% | 11.60\% | 10.60\% | 2.14\% | 52.79\% | 45.36\% |
| 55 | Mark Brody | White | Republican | 62.10\% | 24.68\% | 10.02\% | 2.03\% | 39.86\% | 58.03\% |
| 56 | Verla Insko | White | Democratic | 64.80\% | 10.94\% | 8.11\% | 1.51\% | 84.08\% | 13.81\% |
| 57 | Ashton Wheeler Clemmons | White | Democratic | 44.28\% | 41.34\% | 7.35\% | 2.10\% | 67.53\% | 30.29\% |
| 58 | Amos L. Quick III | Black | Democratic | 34.62\% | 44.65\% | 13.03\% | 2.53\% | 72.95\% | 24.60\% |
| 59 | Jon Hardister | White | Republican | 63.07\% | 27.68\% | 5.44\% | 2.38\% | 45.99\% | 52.03\% |
| 60 | Cecil Brockman | Black | Democratic | 44.53\% | 36.15\% | 9.99\% | 2.12\% | 63.59\% | 34.16\% |
| 61 | Pricey Harrison | White | Democratic | 47.33\% | 42.32\% | 6.53\% | 1.66\% | 73.00\% | 24.78\% |
| 62 | John Faircloth | White | Republican | 70.84\% | 14.00\% | 5.86\% | 1.73\% | 43.22\% | 54.40\% |
| 63 | Ricky Hurtado | Undesignated | Democratic | 56.53\% | 25.45\% | 14.40\% | 2.99\% | 49.38\% | 48.58\% |
| 64 | Dennis Riddell | White | Republican | 70.80\% | 16.21\% | 8.96\% | 2.09\% | 40.81\% | 57.28\% |
| 65 | Armor Pyrtle | White | Republican | 72.79\% | 19.45\% | 5.16\% | 2.02\% | 34.98\% | 62.85\% |
| 66 | None |  |  | 49.35\% | 28.89\% | 14.47\% | 2.19\% | 64.52\% | 33.05\% |
| 67 | Wayne Sasser | White | Republican | 76.62\% | 13.37\% | 6.16\% | 2.13\% | 28.21\% | 69.54\% |
| 68 | David Willis | White | Republican | 75.17\% | 8.70\% | 6.57\% | 1.67\% | 36.86\% | 60.78\% |
| 69 | Dean Arp | White | Republican | 69.02\% | 12.24\% | 13.60\% | 2.24\% | 34.82\% | 62.83\% |
| 70 | Pat B. Hurley | White | Republican | 76.35\% | 7.38\% | 11.65\% | 2.68\% | 24.02\% | 73.79\% |
| 71 | Evelyn Terry | Black | Democratic | 38.42\% | 41.19\% | 17.77\% | 2.52\% | 69.65\% | 27.99\% |
| 72 | Amber M. Baker | Black | Democratic | 51.06\% | 34.96\% | 10.12\% | 1.88\% | 68.98\% | 28.63\% |
| 73 | None |  |  | 66.47\% | 18.13\% | 8.99\% | 2.22\% | 40.09\% | 57.22\% |
| 74 | Jeff Zenger | White | Republican | 74.60\% | 12.01\% | 6.66\% | 1.95\% | 44.91\% | 52.65\% |
| 75 | Donny Lambeth | White | Republican | 69.54\% | 16.11\% | 10.67\% | 2.62\% | 38.59\% | 59.04\% |
| 76 | Harry Warren | White | Republican | 66.95\% | 20.99\% | 8.38\% | 2.43\% | 38.23\% | 59.28\% |

- Ex. 6441 -

Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 77 | Julia C. Howard | White | Republican | 83.70\% | 5.80\% | 7.49\% | 2.31\% | 24.14\% | 73.63\% |
|  | Lee Zachary | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 78 | Allen McNeill | White | Republican | 83.21\% | 5.77\% | 7.56\% | 2.21\% | 25.78\% | 72.41\% |
| 79 | Keith Kidwell | White | Republican | 74.67\% | 17.35\% | 5.51\% | 1.76\% | 37.95\% | 60.11\% |
| 80 | Sam Watford | White | Republican | 79.55\% | 9.84\% | 6.87\% | 2.39\% | 25.05\% | 72.75\% |
| 81 | Larry W. Potts | White | Republican | 79.40\% | 10.00\% | 6.15\% | 2.49\% | 28.27\% | 69.58\% |
| 82 | Kristin Baker | White | Republican | 61.54\% | 22.14\% | 12.85\% | 2.58\% | 44.20\% | 53.10\% |
|  | Larry G. Pittman | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 83 | None |  |  | 70.28\% | 12.55\% | 7.96\% | 2.17\% | 34.20\% | 63.45\% |
| 84 | Jeffrey C. McNeely | White | Republican | 71.29\% | 16.59\% | 8.53\% | 2.07\% | 33.00\% | 64.56\% |
| 85 | Dudley Greene | White | Republican | 88.52\% | 3.46\% | 4.70\% | 2.35\% | 26.86\% | 71.13\% |
| 86 | Hugh Blackwell | White | Republican | 81.24\% | 6.41\% | 6.38\% | 3.25\% | 30.75\% | 66.86\% |
| 87 | Destin Hall | White | Republican | 86.79\% | 5.23\% | 4.71\% | 2.34\% | 26.75\% | 70.92\% |
| 88 | Mary Belk | White | Democratic | 63.64\% | 24.25\% | 5.96\% | 1.36\% | 64.26\% | 33.13\% |
| 89 | Mitchell S. Setzer | White | Republican | 81.61\% | 7.02\% | 5.99\% | 2.20\% | 25.41\% | 72.30\% |
| 90 | Sarah Stevens | White | Republican | 85.10\% | 3.84\% | 8.51\% | 2.07\% | 24.45\% | 73.56\% |
| 91 | Kyle Hall | White | Republican | 74.02\% | 14.74\% | 7.63\% | 2.28\% | 36.80\% | 60.77\% |
| 92 | Terry M. Brown Jr. | Black | Democratic | 34.49\% | 40.82\% | 15.95\% | 2.07\% | 68.85\% | 28.46\% |
| 93 | Ray Pickett | White | Republican | 86.10\% | 3.53\% | 6.30\% | 1.81\% | 41.66\% | 55.40\% |
| 94 | Jeffrey Elmore | White | Republican | 86.43\% | 5.52\% | 5.15\% | 1.98\% | 23.43\% | 74.30\% |
| 95 | Grey Mills | White | Republican | 79.26\% | 8.11\% | 6.16\% | 1.90\% | 33.66\% | 63.66\% |
| 96 | Jay Adams | White | Republican | 72.17\% | 10.47\% | 10.56\% | 2.59\% | 36.24\% | 61.36\% |
| 97 | Jason Saine | White | Republican | 84.41\% | 5.81\% | 6.23\% | 2.17\% | 26.85\% | 70.83\% |
| 98 | John R. Bradford III | White | Republican | 79.61\% | 8.06\% | 6.74\% | 1.44\% | 46.78\% | 50.68\% |
| 99 | Nasif Majeed | Black | Democratic | 24.43\% | 48.91\% | 20.76\% | 2.31\% | 76.84\% | 20.63\% |
| 100 | John Autry | White | Democratic | 38.50\% | 32.80\% | 20.67\% | 2.23\% | 71.72\% | 25.28\% |
| 101 | Carolyn G. Logan | Black | Democratic | 32.65\% | 48.79\% | 13.15\% | 2.20\% | 70.99\% | 26.42\% |
| 102 | Becky Carney | White | Democratic | 39.67\% | 39.09\% | 16.31\% | 1.92\% | 80.17\% | 17.07\% |
| 103 | Rachel Hunt | White | Democratic | 70.19\% | 12.65\% | 8.80\% | 1.79\% | 46.92\% | 50.50\% |
| 104 | Brandon Lofton | White | Democratic | 77.64\% | 9.10\% | 6.16\% | 1.33\% | 51.97\% | 45.47\% |
| 105 | Wesley Harris | White | Democratic | 58.69\% | 13.17\% | 10.81\% | 1.66\% | 53.84\% | 43.54\% |
| 106 | Carla D. Cunningham | Black | Democratic | 29.84\% | 45.47\% | 11.10\% | 1.93\% | 78.96\% | 18.30\% |
| 107 | Kelly M. Alexander Jr. | Black | Democratic | 34.27\% | 49.16\% | 11.36\% | 1.60\% | 73.22\% | 24.27\% |
| 108 | John A. Torbett | White | Republican | 68.24\% | 20.01\% | 7.52\% | 2.58\% | 37.31\% | 60.26\% |
| 109 | Dana Bumgardner | White | Republican | 70.08\% | 17.41\% | 7.85\% | 2.26\% | 38.07\% | 59.60\% |
| 110 | Kelly E. Hastings | White | Republican | 75.79\% | 16.19\% | 4.87\% | 2.35\% | 29.42\% | 68.62\% |
| 111 | Tim Moore | White | Republican | 76.40\% | 16.90\% | 3.53\% | 2.07\% | 30.73\% | 67.44\% |
| 112 | None |  |  | 37.95\% | 29.58\% | 25.20\% | 2.59\% | 70.11\% | 26.91\% |
| 113 | Jake Johnson | White | Republican | 83.23\% | 7.19\% | 6.13\% | 2.36\% | 33.83\% | 64.24\% |
|  | David Rogers | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 114 | Susan C. Fisher | White | Democratic | $80.61 \%$ | $8.00 \%$ | $6.55 \%$ | $2.38 \%$ | $70.43 \%$ | $26.80 \%$ |
| 115 | John Ager | White | Democratic | $83.57 \%$ | $6.62 \%$ | $5.26 \%$ | $2.36 \%$ | $59.06 \%$ | $38.31 \%$ |
| 116 | Brian Turner | White | Democratic | $82.96 \%$ | $3.95 \%$ | $8.15 \%$ | $2.55 \%$ | $44.94 \%$ | $52.47 \%$ |
| 117 | Timothy D. Moffitt | White | Republican | $81.75 \%$ | $3.77 \%$ | $10.50 \%$ | $2.05 \%$ | $39.69 \%$ | $57.95 \%$ |
| 118 | Mark Pless | White | Republican | $91.24 \%$ | $1.54 \%$ | $3.50 \%$ | $2.58 \%$ | $37.62 \%$ | $60.00 \%$ |
| 119 | Mike Clampitt | White | Republican | $80.68 \%$ | $2.95 \%$ | $5.10 \%$ | $10.25 \%$ | $42.79 \%$ | $54.59 \%$ |
| 120 | Karl E. Gillespie | White | Republican | $89.02 \%$ | $1.31 \%$ | $4.63 \%$ | $3.95 \%$ | $26.43 \%$ | $71.63 \%$ |

## Exhibit 7

File named "2020_election_NC.csv"
to be produced in native format.

# An Evaluation of North Carolina's Congressional, State Senate, and State House District Maps 

Daniel B. Magleby, Ph.D

## Contents

1 Introduction ..... 3
1.1 Data ..... 3
2 Methods and Data ..... 4
2.1 Computer-Drawn Maps ..... 5
2.2 Measuring Gerrymanders ..... 7
3 Findings: Partisan Bias ..... 10
3.1 State House Districts ..... 10
3.2 State Senate Districts ..... 15
3.3 Congressional Districts ..... 20
4 Conclusion ..... 24
A A Description of the Magleby-Mosesson Algorithm ..... 25

## 1 Introduction

I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University, SUNY where I also hold a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. At Binghamton, I am also the director of the Center for the Analysis of Voting and Elections at Binghamton University. In 2007, I received an M.S. in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences from Northwestern University. I hold an M.A. in political science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor where I also received a Ph.D in political science in 2011. I have published academic papers on legislative districting and political geography in several political science journals, including Political Analysis, the Election Law Journal, American Politics Research, and Social Science Quarterly. My academic areas of expertise include legislative elections, geographic information systems (GIS) data, redistricting, voting rights, legislatures, and political geography. I have expertise in analyzing political geography, elections, and redistricting using computer simulations and other techniques. I have been retained by plaintiff Common Cause to perform the analysis described below at a rate of $\$ 250$ an hour. My compensation is not predicated on arriving at any particular opinion.

### 1.1 Data

My opinions follow from analysis of the following data:

- VTD boundaries provided as ESRI Shapefiles by the US Census Bureau available on at the following URL
- Census block boundaries and population data provided by the US Census Bureau. These are collected as part of the constitutionally mandated decennial census that most recently concluded in 2020.
- County boundaries as reported by the US Census Bureau.
- County clusterings provided Christopher Cooper, Blake Esselstyn, Gregory Herschlag,

Jonathan Mattingly, and Rebecca Tippett in a report that may be accessed at the following URL. https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/ 08/countyClusters2020.pdf

- Election returns as reported by the Voting and Election Science Team ${ }^{1}$ group and aggregated to Census-provided VTD boundaries and provided on the Redistricting Data $\mathrm{Hub}^{2}$ website. I aggregate statewide elections returns from 2016 and 2020 to set of legislature drawn districts and to the districts in each of the hypothetical alternative maps. In my analysis, I set aside election returns from 2018 because the only statewide races held that year were judicial elections which follow very different patterns compared to elections for other offices.
- 1,000 alternative, hypothetical maps of North Carolina's congressional, Senate, and House districts generated by a neutral, partisan-blind computer algorithm. The redistricting algorithm I use in my analysis was developed by me and a collaborator, Daniel Mosesson (consultant in private practice), in a paper that is forthcoming in Political Analysis. In our published work, we show that the algorithm produces a large number of unique maps of legislative districts without any indication of bias.
- Legislature-drawn boundaries of districts intended to elect representatives to Congress, the North Carolina Senate, and the North Carolina House of Representatives. These data are available on the North Carolina General Assembly website and may be accessed at the following URLs. https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting


## 2 Methods and Data

In this section I inform my analysis of North Carolina's map using computer-simulated redistricting methods. I discuss the data I use to analyze the maps, and describe the methods

[^36]for measuring partisan bias in electoral maps. The purpose of these methods is to assess and describe potential biases that arise from the legislature-drawn electoral maps. In particular, I will describe how computer simulations may be used to evaluate alternative, hypothetical scenarios that are free of bias that human mapmakers may incorporate into a system of electoral districts. For the purposes of this report, I will define bias to mean a party receiving more representation that it should given underlying patterns of partisan support. Critically, I will not measure bias as an absolute deviation from proportionality, but rather as deviation from patterns of representation we would expect if an electoral map were drawn in a neutral manner.

### 2.1 Computer-Drawn Maps

The purpose of my analysis is to determine if the legislature intended to discriminate against a particular group in North Carolina, or if the dilution of one group's influence arises for other more benign reasons. For example, political scientists have observed that even in systems that award representation in an unbiased manner, political parties receive a representational "bonus" for votes they receive over the majoritarian threshold of $50 \%$. That is, a $1 \%$ increase in votes produces an increase of more than $1 \%$ in representation. As a result, parties that receive a little more than a majority of the votes may receive much more than a majority of seats in a legislature (see Edgeworth 1898; Butler 1952, 1951; Niemi and Deegan 1978 ). Likewise, electoral advantages may arise out of the geographic distribution of voters. For example, one group of voters may be evenly distributed across a jurisdiction that must be divided into multiple districts. If the distribution is even enough, it may be that it is impossible for a neutral process to draw a single-member district in which that group constitutes a majority. Alternatively, it may be that voters of one particular type are concentrated in an area or region. If that is the case, even a neutral process may collect those voters into a district in which they form a large majority leaving likeminded voters in neighboring districts in which they form a modest minority. My academic work focuses on developing
tools to account for natural sources of bias through dilution and over-concentration of voters as a result of residential geography (Magleby and Mosesson 2018).

One way to evaluate a districting plan's bias is to compare a set of districts to an alternative set that we know to be unbiased. If the enacted plan is similar to the unbiased alternative, we may conclude that the enacted plan is also unbiased. Alternatively, if the enacted plan differs significantly from the alternative we know to be unbiased, we may conclude that the enacted plan is unbiased.

For this report, I used a computer algorithm I developed as part of my academic research to generate a large set of fair, hypothetical alternatives against which we may compare the North Carolina's legislature drawn maps. The algorithm has been subject to peer review (see Magleby and Mosesson 2018) and has formed an important part of the analysis for several other peer reviewed articles (see e.g. Best et al. 2017; Krasno et al. 2018). The algorithm simulates a redistricting process constrained to draw districts that are contiguous and contain roughly equal population. ${ }^{3}$ For the purposes of this report, I have constrained the algorithm to prioritize maintaining VTDs, roughly voting precincts, in North Carolina whole. The algorithm builds districts using data provided by the US Census Bureau. Census data include information about the number of people who reside within a geographic units and the geographies to which blocks are adjacent. Critically, the algorithm is blind to partisanship and race, so it does not consider the political preferences or race of residents as it constructs various hypothetical districts.

I use the algorithm to generate large sets (between 20,000 and 100,000) of maps from which I take a random sample of 1,000 maps that meet the set of redistricting criteria announced by the North Carolina legislature in advance of the last round of redistricting there. Each iteration of the computer algorithm combines geographies in different ways, so the result is 1,000 maps that contain unique combinations of contiguous districts that meet the legislature's announced criteria. This large set of maps constitutes a sample of the larger

[^37]set of possible maps that mapmakers could have drawn. Each map represents a distinct, hypothetical example of a map of North Carolina's congressional, Senate, or House districts that was produced by a neutral process.

The maps generated by the computer are examples of outcomes we would expect if mapmakers were not motivated by partisan goals. Since each map is slightly different, the set of maps represents a range of possible outcomes from a neutral redistricting process. If the partisan characteristics of the enacted plan of congressional, Senate, and House districts in North Carolina falls outside the normal range of neutral outcomes generated by the algorithm, we can conclude that the map represents a significant deviation from a fair outcome.

This approach to evaluating districting plans is common in academic settings. Advances in computers made it possible for scholars to implement methods for developing a neutral, unbiased counterfactual of a jurisdiction's legislative districts (see Chen and Cottrell 2014; Chen and Rodden 2013; Tam Cho and Liu 2016; Cirincione, Darling and O'Rourke 2000; Engstrom and Wildgen 1977; Fifield et al. 2015; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2009; O'Loughlin and Taylor 1982 ). Recently, courts have also relied upon maps generated by computer algorithms to determine the presence of dilution in enacted plans of legislative districts.

### 2.2 Measuring Gerrymanders

## Measuring Partisanship in the Simulated Districts

To assess the partisanship of the maps produced by the computer algorithm, I use election returns from the 2016 and 2020 general election in North Carolina aggregated to the VTDlevel. For each hypothetical map, I determine which simulated district a precinct would fall, and assign the votes cast in that precinct to that district. If a precinct falls in more than one simulated district, I assign the the votes in that precinct to a simulated district according to the proportion of the precinct's population that falls inside that district.

I use statewide races (as opposed to congressional races) because scholars have shown
those data to be reliable predictors of future behavior (Meier 1975). Moreover, a focus on statewide races serves to avoid problems of endogeneity that could be a problem with data from congressional elections. That is, differences in partisan performance in congressional elections can arise for many reasons besides the location of district boundaries. For example, incumbency, quality of challengers, campaign contributions, and campaign organization have all been shown to influence election outcomes, and those can vary widely across districts. By contrast, all those factors are held constant in statewide elections.

Statewide races have an additional advantage: the candidates on the ballot in statewide races appear in every precinct across the state. For this reason, returns from statewide contests are imperative when analyzing the computer generated, hypothetical maps. The computer frequently assigns precincts that fall in different districts in North Carolina's legislature-drawn map to the same district in a hypothetical map. In such a scenario, voters considered different candidates for Congress, and comparing a vote for Democratic candidate for Congress in one district to a Democrat running for Congress in another district requires that we assume away possible differences between contests and candidates. On the other hand, these factors are held constant when if we consider statewide contests.

For robustness, I use returns from multiple statewide contests. For each district in the legislature-drawn map and algorithm drawn maps I calculate a composite partisan score based the election results from the 2016 and 2020 election cycles. In those elections North Carolina held statewide contests for President, US Senate, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Treasurer, Secretary of State, Auditor, Agriculture Commissioner, Insurance Commissioner, Labor Commissioner, and Superintendent of Public Instruction. To calculate the composite score, I take the sum the votes cast for Republican candidates for statewide office in 2016. I likewise sum the votes cast for Democratic candidates for statewide office. Then I determine the proportion of votes cast for the Democratic candidates by dividing the total votes cast for the Democratic candidates by the sum of the total votes cast for Republicans and total votes cast for Democrats. The result, the Democratic
proportion of total votes cast in that district, is a composite measure of underlying support of for Democrats for voters living that district.

Using precinct-level returns for statewide races, I can determine the partisanship of the hypothetical districts drawn by the computer algorithm. The vast majority of VTDs are wholly contained within one district; however, I allow the computer algorithm to "break" VTDs into census blocks. It is therefore possible for the districts drawn by the algorithm to split existing VTDs. When that happens, I presume that the votes are distributed across blocks according to the proportion of a VTD's voting age population (VAP) that resides within a block. For example, suppose a precinct has a VAP of 100, and that voters cast 20 votes for a Republican candidate and 30 votes for a Democratic candidate. If a block within that precinct has a VAP of 10 people, I calculate that 2 votes for the Republican and 3 votes for the Democrat came from that block.

## Districts Carried

I use the composite partisanship to calculate the number of districts carried in each map. I presume that districts in which the Democratic proportion of the composite votes exceeds 0.5 is a district that is more likely than to elect a Democrat than a Republican. Conversely, if the Democratic proportion of the composite vote falls below 0.5 , I presume that that Republicans carried the district. For example, suppose Democrats received proportions of the composite vote equaling $0.47,0.58$, and 0.52 in a three-district jurisdiction. In such a scenario, I say that Democrats "carried" the second and third district and failed to carry the first. In this analysis I consider three jurisdictions, a 14-district congressional map, a 50-district Senate map, and a 120-district House map.

## Median-Mean Difference

I also use the proportion of the composite partisan vote to calculate the median-mean difference metric. Consider the same example districts in which Democrats received proportions of the voted equaling $0.47,0.58$, and 0.52 . To find the mean, we divide the sum of the Democratic proportions by the number of districts. In this case, $(0.47+0.58+0.52) / 3$
$=1.57 / 3=0.52$. To find the median we sort the Democratic proportions so that they are ordered from smallest to largest. The median is the proportion for which number of proportions that are larger is equal to the number of proportions that are smaller. In this example, we would order $0.47,0.52,0.58$. Here, the median is 0.52 because there is one proportion that is larger and one that is smaller. Of course, in my analysis in this report, I take the number of districts in the map as the denominator in each map I analyze.

## 3 Findings: Partisan Bias

In this section, I describe the results of 1000 simulations of the redistricting process for North Carolina's congressional districts, Senate districts, and House districts. I show that the legislature drawn map of electoral districts for Congress, the Senate, and the House show significant bias against Democratic voters and that bias goes beyond anything we would expect based on the patterns of electoral geography in North Carolina. I begin by discussing the results of my simulations of the House map and comparing those results to the characteristics of the map drawn by the legislature. Next, I present the results of computer simulated redistricting for the North Carolina Senate electoral map and show that the legislature-drawn map exhibits more bias than we would expect based on chance alone. Finally, I repeat the analysis focused on the electoral map used to elected North Carolina's congressional delegation. I show that, as with the other maps, the legislature-drawn map shows bias above and beyond what we would expect had the legislature used a neutral process, free from an intent to produce a partisan bias, to determine district boundaries.

### 3.1 State House Districts

To draw a set neutral and partisan-blind maps of North Carolina's House districts, I take the following steps.

1. Build a map consisting of VTDs that are appropriate to the electoral map.
2. Divide that map into House-specific clusters as described by Cooper et. al.
3. Determine which VTDs are adjacent to each other in the cluster by cluster maps.
4. Run simulations for up to 40,000 maps per cluster.
5. For each cluster, I aggregate the characteristics of each VTD to the district to which it is assigned in each hypothetical map.
6. Aggregate the characteristics of each hypothetical map to ascertain its demographic and partisan characteristics. At this point, I subset the resulting maps to remove any maps in which the population of each district does not fall within $1.5 \%$ of constitutional requirements that districts contain equal population. ${ }^{4}$ For the purposes of exposition, I randomly sample remaining maps and focus my analysis on 1000 of those randomly sampled.
7. Finally, I combine the data from each of the clusters and describe the partisan characteristics of the full set of maps.

The result of this process is a set of maps that approximate the legislatures announced districting criteria. Each systemwide map is a unique combination of North Carolina's geography. At no point in developing the sample of 1000 maps upon which I base my analysis do I consider any factors besides population and the geographic characteristics of units of geography upon which the maps are base. Thus, taken together, the maps represent the distribution of outcomes we might expect from a neutral redistricting process.

[^38]

Figure 1: Distribution of outcomes from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process used to draw North Carolina's House districts. The x -axis represents the number of districts carried (out of 120) by Democrats using the partisan composite score. The vertical red line corresponds to the number of districts carried by Democrats in the legislature-drawn map. Democrats carried in 48/120 districts in the legislature-drawn map. Democrats carried just one of the 1000 sampled algorithm-drawn maps $(p=0.001)$.

Figure 1 summarizes the partisan characteristics of set of algorithm-drawn maps and compares the distribution of those characteristics to the characteristics of the Legislature-drawn map of House districts. Here, I summarize the number of districts carried by Democrats. Recall that I say a Democrats carry a district if Democrats received more votes in that district in statewide contests during the 2016 and 2020 elections. Along the $x$-axis, numbers correspond to the number of districts favoring Democrats in a particular map. The $y$-axis describes the frequency with which I observe maps that exhibit a particular set of partisan characteristics. Thus, the relative height of the bars corresponds to the relative frequency with which I observe maps with particular characteristics in the set of Algorithm-drawn maps I analyzed.

In the sample of maps represented here, Democrats carried as few as 48 (out of 120) and as many as 56 . In the sample, the most common outcome was one in which Democrats carried in 52/120 districts. By contrast, Democrats carried just 48 of the legislature-drawn districts. The algorithm drew just one map in which Democrats carried so few districts. Thus, based on this sample of maps, I may say that there is about a 1 in 1000 chance of drawing a map in which Democrats carried as few or fewer districts. In short, it is highly unlikely that the legislature-drawn map was developed though a process that treated partisanship of voters neutrally.


Figure 2: Distribution of outcomes from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process used to draw North Carolina's House districts. The x-axis represents the difference in the median Democratic vote share and the mean Democratic vote share calculated using the partisan composite score. The vertical red line corresponds to the difference in the median Democratic vote share and mean of Democratic vote share in the legislature-drawn map. The legislature drawn map has a median-mean difference of -0.04 . None of the algorithm-drawn maps had a median-mean difference that extreme $(p=0.0)$.

The degree to which Democrats are disadvantaged by the legislature drawn map is even more stark when I consider the median-mean difference. Figure 4 summarizes the partisan characteristics of set of algorithm-drawn maps and compares the distribution of those characteristics to the characteristics of the Legislature-drawn map. Here, I summarize the median-mean difference in the algorithm-drawn map and the legislature-drawn map. Recall that the median-mean difference is found by taking the map-level median and the map-level mean of Democratic share of the two-party vote. If the difference takes a negative number, the map is biased against Democrats. If the difference takes a positive value, the map is biased in favor of Democrats. If the difference equals 0 , then the map is neither biased in
favor nor biased against Democrats. Along the $x$-axis, numbers correspond to the number of districts carried by Democrats in a particular map. Maps are sorted into bins depending on whether the median-mean difference exhibited in the map falls into the interval the bar covers on the $x$-axis. The $y$-axis describes the frequency with which I observe maps that exhibit a particular set of partisan characteristics. Thus, the relative size of the bars corresponds to the relative frequency with which I observe maps with particular characteristics in the set of algorithm-drawn maps I analyzed.

In the sample of maps represented in my analysis, the most common median-mean difference in Democratic vote share fell between -0.0225 and -0.025 . The lowest median-mean difference in the sample of maps I analyze here was -0.034 , and the highest median-mean difference was -0.005 . By contrast, the legislature-drawn map has a median-mean difference of -0.04 . No map in the sample of algorithm drawn maps showed a degree of bias as extreme as the bias I observe in the legislature-drawn map. The data indicate that there is less than a 1 in 1000 chance that we would observe a map as extreme as the map drawn by the legislature if the legislature was following a neutral, party-blind process.

### 3.2 State Senate Districts

To draw a set neutral and partisan-blind maps of North Carolina's House districts, I take follow the same steps I took to develop maps for the House.

1. Build a map consisting of VTDs that are appropriate to the electoral map.
2. Divide that map into Senate-specific clusters as described by Cooper et. al.
3. Determine which VTDs are adjacent to each other in the cluster by cluster maps
4. Run simulations for up to 40,000 maps per cluster
5. For each cluster, I aggregate the characteristics of each VTD to the district to which it is assigned in each hypothetical map.
6. Aggregate the characteristics of each hypothetical map to ascertain its demographic and partisan characteristics. At this point, I subset the resulting maps to remove any maps in which the population of each district does not fall within $1.5 \%$ of constitutional requirements that districts contain equal population. ${ }^{5}$ For the purposes of exposition, I randomly sample remaining maps and focus my analysis on the 1000 randomly sampled maps.
7. Finally, I combine the data from each of the clusters and describe the partisan characteristics of the full set of maps.

The result of this process is a set of maps that approximate the legislatures announced districting criteria. Each systemwide map is a unique combination of North Carolinas geography. At no point in developing the sample of 1000 maps upon which I base my analysis do I consider any factors besides population and the geographic characteristics of units of geography upon which the maps are base. Thus, taken together, the maps represent the distribution of outcomes we might expect from a neutral redistricting process.

[^39]
## Senate



Figure 3: Distribution of outcomes from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process used to draw North Carolina's Senate districts. The x-axis represents the number of districts carried (out of 50) by Democrats using the partisan composite score. The vertical red line corresponds to the number of districts carried by Democrats in the legislature-drawn map. Democrats carried 19/50 districts in the legislature-drawn map. Just 15 out of 1000 of the algorithm-drawn maps had so few districts carried by Democrats $(p=0.015)$.

Figure 3 summarizes the partisan characteristics of set of algorithm-drawn maps and compares the distribution of those characteristics to the characteristics of the Legislature-drawn map of Senate districts. Here, I summarize the number of districts carried by Democrats. Recall that I say Democrats carry a district if Democrats received more votes in that district in statewide contests during the 2016 and 2020 elections. Along the $x$-axis, numbers correspond to the number of districts carried by Democrats in a particular map. The $y$-axis describes the frequency with which I observe maps that exhibit a particular set of partisan characteristics. Thus, the relative size of the bars corresponds to the relative frequency with which I observe maps with particular characteristics in the set of Algorithm-drawn maps I analyzed.

In the sample of maps represented here, Democrats carried as few as 19 (out of 50) and as many as 25. In the sample, the most common outcome was one in which Democrats carried 22/50 districts. By contrast, Democrats carried just 18 of the legislature-drawn districts. The algorithm drew 15 maps in which Democrats carried so few districts. Thus, based on this sample of maps, I may say that there is about a 1.5 in 100 chance of drawing a map in which Democrats carried as few or fewer districts. In short, it is highly improbable that the legislature-drawn map was developed though a process that treated partisanship of voters neutrally.

Senate


Figure 4: Distribution of outcomes from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process used to draw North Carolina's Senate districts. The x-axis represents the difference in the median Democratic vote share and the mean Democratic vote share calculated using the partisan composite score. The vertical red line corresponds to the difference in the median Democratic vote share and mean of Democratic vote share in the legislature-drawn map. The legislature drawn map has a median-mean difference of -0.0204 . None of the algorithm-drawn maps had a median-mean difference that extreme $(p=0.0)$.

The degree to which Democrats are disadvantaged by the legislature drawn map is even more stark when I consider the median-mean difference. Figure 4 summarizes the partisan characteristics of set of algorithm-drawn maps of Senate districts and compares the distribution of those characteristics to the characteristics of the Legislature-drawn map in terms of median-mean difference. Recall that the median-mean difference is found by taking the map-level median and the map-level mean of Democratic share of the two-party vote. If the difference takes a negative number, the map is biased against Democrats. If the difference takes a positive value, the map is biased in favor of Democrats. If the difference equals 0 , then the map is neither biased in favor nor biased against Democrats. Along the $x$-axis, numbers correspond to the number of districts carried by Democrats in a particular map. Maps are sorted into bins depending on whether the median-mean difference exhibited in the map falls into the interval the bar covers on the $x$-axis. The $y$-axis describes the frequency with which I observe maps that exhibit a particular set of partisan characteristics. Thus, the relative size of the bars corresponds to the relative frequency with which I observe maps with particular characteristics in the set of algorithm-drawn maps I analyzed.

In the sample of maps represented in my analysis, the most common median-mean difference in Democratic vote share fell between -0.0075 and -0.01 . The lowest median-mean difference in the sample of maps I analyze here was -0.0201 , and the highest median-mean difference was -0.005 . By contrast, the legislature-drawn map has a median-mean difference of -0.009 . No map in the sample of algorithm drawn maps showed a degree of bias as extreme as the bias I observe in the legislature-drawn map. The data indicate that there is less than a 1 in 1000 chance that the legislature would arrive a map as biased as their map of Senate districts if they followed a neutral, party-blind process.

### 3.3 Congressional Districts

To draw a set neutral and partisan-blind maps of North Carolina's House districts, I take follow the same steps I took to develop maps for the House.

1. Build a map consisting of VTDs that are appropriate to the electoral map. In the case of the congressional map, I maintained whole all counties that the legislature did not break in their map.
2. Divide that map into Senate-specific clusters as described by Cooper et. al.
3. Determine which VTDs are adjacent to each other in the cluster by cluster maps.
4. Run simulations for 100,000 maps.
5. For each cluster, I aggregate the characteristics of each VTD to the district to which it is assigned in each hypothetical map.
6. Aggregate the characteristics of each hypothetical map to ascertain its demographic and partisan characteristics. At this point, I subset the resulting maps to remove any maps in which the population of each district does not fall within 0.01 of constitutional requirements that districts contain equal population. For the purposes of exposition, I randomly sample remaining maps and focus my analysis on 1000 .
7. Finally, I combine the data from each of the clusters and describe the partisan characteristics of the full set of maps.

The result of this process is a set of maps that approximate the legislature's announced districting criteria. Each systemwide map is a unique combination of North Carolinas geography. At no point in developing the sample of 1000 maps upon which I base my analysis do I consider any factors besides population and the geographic characteristics of units of geography upon which the maps are based. Thus, taken together, the maps represent the distribution of outcomes we might expect from a neutral redistricting process.

Figure 5 presents histogram summarizing findings from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process in North Carolina. The x-axis corresponds the possible number of districts that Democrats could carry by the composite partisan vote. The y-axis corresponds to the

## Congress



Figure 5: Distribution of outcomes from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process used to draw North Carolina's congressional districts. The x-axis represents the number of districts carried (out of 14) by Democrats using the partisan composite score. The vertical red line corresponds to the number of districts carried by Democrats in the legislature-drawn map.
frequency with which maps with a particular count of districts carried appear in the set of simulated maps. Higher bars correspond do outcomes that occurred more often in the set of simulated maps. The simulations produced maps with as few as 3 and as many as 8 districts that would favor a Democratic candidate. The most common outcome, occurring in $374 / 1000$ simulations, in the simulation was Democrats carrying $5 / 14$ districts based on the composite partisan score. Democrats carried $6 / 14$ districts in nearly as many districts (349/1000 simulations). Democrats carried 7/10 and 8/10 districts in 150/1000 and 19/1000 maps respectively. In the enacted map, we would expect Democrats to carry 4 districts by the composite partisan index. In 108/1000, Democrats carried 4 or fewer districts. Thus the legislature drawn map shares characteristics with roughly $1 / 10$ of the maps drawn by the algorithm.


Figure 6: Distribution of outcomes from 1000 simulations of the redistricting process used to draw North Carolina's congressional districts. The x-axis represents the difference in the median Democratic vote share and the mean Democratic vote share calculated using the partisan composite score. The vertical red line corresponds to the difference in the median Democratic vote share and mean of Democratic vote share in the legislature-drawn map.

Figure 6 presents a histogram that summarizes the difference in median composite partisan vote share and mean composite partisan vote share for 1000 simulated maps of North Carolina's Congressional districts. Here the x-axis corresponds to possible values that the median-mean difference may take. The y-axis corresponds to frequency with which particular values appear in the algorithm-drawn map. As before, the vertical red line corresponds to the median-mean difference in the legislature-drawn map.

In the simulated maps, the median-mean difference ranged from -0.042 to 0.025 . the distribution is bimodal with two peaks at just greater than -0.02 and another peak at a little above 0.0. The fact that simulations regularly median-mean difference of greater than 0.0 which corresponds to no votes being weight roughly equally in the system of districts.

In fact, $326 / 1000$, just shy of a third of the simulations, corresponds to maps that were not skewed against Democrats. The legislature drawn map showed a median-mean score of -0.055. Not a single algorithm-drawn map was more extreme than the map drawn by the legislature. By contrast, the minimum median-mean difference observed in the simulated maps was just -0.041 .

## 4 Conclusion

Each legislature-drawn map represents a significant deviation from unbiased alternatives produced by the computer algorithm I describe here. Based on the simulations, there is less than a 1 in 1000 chance that a neutral process produced the House map. There is less than a 2 in 100 chance that a neutral process led to the Senate map. The odds of arriving at the a congressional map as biased as the legislature-drawn map are similarly long.

As independent events, the emergence of these three maps would be cause for concern that partisan biased actions were taken in the construction. Taken together, concern compounds. The computer simulations that I described in this report suggest that the legislature drew three maps that represent gerrymanders in favor of Republicans.

## A A Description of the Magleby-Mosesson Algorithm

The process we use to develop a large set of neutral counterfactuals draws maps in a four-step process. For a more technical representation along with evaluations of the authors' claims of neutrality (see Magleby and Mosesson 2018).

## Step 1: Convert map into a graph

We reduce the map to a connected graph where each geographic unit, a VTD in this setting, is a vertex of the graph. Two vertices are connected by edges if the units of geography share more than a single point of their boundary (thus, the resulting districts will be "rook" contiguous).

## Step 2: Divide the graph randomly

The algorithm randomly collects connected vertices into groups and joins them into a new vertex that aggregates the demography of each of its constituent vertices and preserves the connectedness with any vertex with which a constituent vertex was adjacent. It continues to randomly join groups of vertices until the number of groups is equal to the number of districts in the state.

## Step 3: Refine the divided graph

In order to achieve balance (population parity between districts), Magleby and Mosesson use an algorithm proposed by Kernigan and Lin to switch constituent vertices between groups of vertices. If it is not possible to achieve balance with a moderate number of switches, then we discard the map and start over. If balance is possible after a fixed number of switches, then we record the map for future analysis.

## Step 4: Repeat

Repeat steps 1,2 , and 3 until we find a large sample maps that contain roughly equal district populations.

## References

Best, Robin E, Shawn J Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, Daniel B Magleby and Michael D McDonald. 2017. "Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymandering Standard." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy .

Butler, David E. 1951. Appendix. In The British General Election of 1950, ed. H.G. Nicholas. London, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 306-333.

Butler, David E. 1952. The British General Election of 1951. London, UK: Oxford University Press.

Chen, Jowei and David Cottrell. 2014. "Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the US House.".

Chen, Jowei and Jonathan Rodden. 2013. "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8(3):239269.

Cirincione, Carmen, Thomas A. Darling and Timothy G. O'Rourke. 2000. "Assessing South Carolina's 1990s congressional districting." Political Geography 19(2):189-211.

Edgeworth, F. Y. 1898. "Miscellaneous Applications of the Calculus of Probabilities." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 61(3):534-544.

Engstrom, Richard L. and John K. Wildgen. 1977. "Pruning Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering." Legislative Studies Quarterly 2(4):465-479.

Fifield, Benjamin, Michael Higgins, Kosuke Imai and Alexander Tarr. 2015. "A New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo.".

Krasno, Jonathan, Daniel B. Magleby, Michael D. McDonald, Shawn Donahue and Robin E. Best. 2018. "Can Gerrymanders Be Detected? An Examination of Wisconsin's State Assembly." American Politics Research 0(0).

Magleby, Daniel B. and Daniel B. Mosesson. 2018. "A New Approach for Developing Neutral Redistricting Plans." Political Analysis 26(2):147-167.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2009. "Does gerrymandering cause polarization?" American Journal of Political Science 53(3):666-680.

Niemi, Richard G and John Deegan. 1978. "A theory of political districting." American Political Science Review 72(4):1304-1323.

O'Loughlin, John and Anne-Marie Taylor. 1982. "Choices in redistricting and electoral outcomes: the case of Mobile, Alabama." Political Geography Quarterly 1(4):317-339.

Tam Cho, Wendy K and Yan Y Liu. 2016. "Toward a talismanic redistricting tool: A computational method for identifying extreme redistricting plans." Election Law Journal 15(4):351-366.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of NC that the foregoing is true and correct


Date:


# Expert Report on the North Carolina State Legislature and Congressional Redistrictings 

Jonathan C. Mattingly

December 23, 2021

## Contents

1 Introduction ..... 2
2 General Overview ..... 2
3 Discussion on Interpreting The Ensemble Method ..... 3
3.1 The Political Geography ..... 3
3.2 Different Elections have Different Voting Patterns ..... 4
3.3 Collected Seat Histograms and Uniform Swing Analysis ..... 4
3.4 Structure of Maps and Rank-Ordered Marginal Boxplots and Histograms ..... 5
4 State Legislature ..... 5
4.1 State Legislature: Overview of Findings ..... 5
4.2 State Legislature: Overview of Method ..... 5
4.3 County Clusters for State Legislature ..... 6
4.4 State Legislature: Ensemble Overview ..... 9
4.5 Construction of Statewide Ensembles for State Legislature ..... 9
4.6 Election Data Used in Analysis ..... 10
5 State Legislature: Main Statewide Analysis ..... 10
5.1 NC State House ..... 10
5.2 NC State Senate ..... 21
6 State Legislature: Selected Cluster by Cluster Analysis ..... 29
6.1 NC State House ..... 29
6.2 NC State Senate ..... 54
$7 \quad$ State Legislature: Additional Details ..... 65
7.1 State Legislature: Details on the Sampling Method ..... 65
7.2 State Legislature: Mathematical Description of Ensemble Distribution ..... 66
7.3 State Legislature: Additional Ensemble Statistics ..... 68
7.4 State Legislature: Convergence Tests ..... 70
8 Congressional Plan ..... 72
8.1 Congressional: Ensemble Overview ..... 72
8.2 Congressional Plan: Sampling Method ..... 72
8.3 Election Data Used in Analysis PLAINTIFFS'73
9 Congressional Plan: Main Analysis
10 Congressional: Additional Details ..... 77
10.1 Congressional Plan: Mathematical Description of Ensemble Distribution ..... 77
10.2 Congressional Plan: Additional Ensemble Statistics ..... 78
10.3 Congressional Plan: Convergence Tests ..... 78
A NC House: Ranked-Ordered Marginal Boxplots ..... 79
B NC Senate: Ranked-Ordered Marginal Boxplots ..... 86
C NC House: Additional Plots ..... 93
D NC Senate: Additional Plots ..... 94
E NC Congressional: Ranked-Ordered Marginal Boxplots ..... 94
F Cluster-by-cluster outlier analysis ..... 98

## 1 Introduction

I am a Professor of Mathematics and Statistical Science at Duke University. My degrees are from the North Carolina School of Science and Math (High School Diploma), Yale University (B.S.), and Princeton University (Ph.D.). I grew up in Charlotte, North Carolina and currently live in Durham, North Carolina.

I lead a group at Duke University which conducts non-partisan research to understand and quantify gerrymandering. This report grows out of aspects of our group's work around the current North Carolina legislative districts which are relevant to the case being filed.

I previously submitted an expert report in Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 18-CV-1026 (M.D.N.C.), Diamond v. Torres, No. 17-CV-5054 (E.D. Pa.), Common Cause v. Lewis (N.C. Sup. Ct No. 18-cvs-014001), and Harper v. Lewis (No. 19-cv-012667) and was an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Common Cause v Rucho and Common Cause v. Lewis. I am being paid at a rate of $\$ 400 /$ per hour for the work on this case. Much of the work derives from an independent research effort, unrelated to this lawsuit, to understand gerrymandering nationally and in North Carolina specifically. Much of the core analysis described in this report was previously released publicly as part of a non-partisan effort to inform the discussion around the redistricting process.

## 2 General Overview

I was asked in this case to analyze whether the enacted Congressional, state House, and state Senate redistricting plans for North Carolina were drawn intentionally for partisan advantage. In summary, to conduct our analysis, we used historic voting data to compare election results under the enacted plans with elections results under a collection of non-partisan maps generated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, referred to throughout this report as an "ensemble." No partisan information is used to construct this ensemble of maps; only the generally accepted districting criteria of approximately equal population per district, contiguous and relatively compact districts, reducing traversals, and keeping counties, precincts, and possibly municipalities whole. One strength of the ensemble method is that it makes no assumptions in advance about what structure an election should have such as a relation to proportional representation or some type of symmetry considerations. Rather it shows what results would naturally occur, and the structure of those results, because of political geography of the state when non-partisan maps are used. We examine both the number of seats that would have been won under these vote counts, along with the expected margins of victory.

We see that each of the enacted plans is an extreme outlier with respect to its partisan properties in comparison to the ensemble. The Congressional, House, and Senate plans each systematically favor the Republican Party to an extent which is rarely, if ever, seen in the non-partisan collection of maps. Under many historic elections considered, each of the enacted maps elects significantly fewer Democrats than the typical number of Democrats found in the collection of maps. Specifically, the enacted Congressional plan produces 10 Republican seats and 4 Democratic seats across a wide range of historic elections, spanning roughly a 6-point differential in the statewide two-party vote share. In other words, Republicans win 10 congressional seats despite large shifts in the statewide vote fraction and across a variety of election structures. Over
the statewide vote Democratic partisan vote range of $46.59 \%$ to $52.32 \%$, the enacted map only twice changes the number of Republicans elected. The outcome of the election is largely stuck at 4 Democrats. Our non-partisan ensemble plans, by contrast, are far more responsive to changes in the election structure and the statewide vote fraction.

Under the enacted Senate and House plans, at times the Democratic Party is either denied a majority of seats or denied breaking a Republican supermajority when the overwhelming majority of maps in our ensemble would have resulted in either a Democratic majority or a simple Republican majority. In the Senate, we find instances in which the Republicans would have gained a supermajority under the enacted plan, but would have lost a supermajority in nearly every map in our collection. In the House, we find instances in which the Republicans won the supermajority of seats under the enacted plan but they would have not won the supermajority in the majority of maps in our collection.

In the House and Senate plans, the extreme statewide tilt towards the Republican Party is the result of a significant number of truly independent choices at the level of the county-clusters into which the state is divided. The chance of making so many independent choices which bias the results towards the Republican Party unintentionally, without corresponding choices favoring the Democratic party, is astronomically small.

In addition to this systematic bias towards the Republican Party which when aggregated produces highly atypical results, the enacted House and Senate plans also have highly atypical results in a number of county clusters even when viewed alone. Beyond often creating atypical results in terms of the number of seats won in a given cluster, our results also show a durability in the results in certain clusters under the enacted plans. By durable, we mean that the results remain atypically unchanged over a wide range of elections. This unresponsiveness to changes in vote counts is another problematic feature revealed by our analysis of the enacted plans.

Our analyses show that each of the three enacted plans is an extreme gerrymander over a range of voter behavior seen historically in North Carolina. The effect of these extreme gerrymanders is to prevent the Democrats from winning as many seats in Congress, the House, and the Senate as they would have had the maps been drawn in a neutral way without political considerations. In many cases, the enacted maps reduce the extent to which the results of an election respond to the changing options of the electorate as expressed at the ballot box.

## 3 Discussion on Interpreting The Ensemble Method

### 3.1 The Political Geography

In redistricting conversations, there are often discussions of the urban versus rural divide and natural packing. These points demonstrate the need for a methodology that accounts for this political geography; ensemble methods precisely capture it. The distribution on redistricting plans can distinguish between typical plans and atypical plans. This determination is fundamentally informed by the geometry of the state, its political geography, and the spatial structure of the elections used to probe the redistricting plan.

The fundamental power of the ensemble method is that it begins with a clear set of redistricting criteria as an input. It then creates a representative ensemble of redistricting plans which accounts for the geometry of the state and the geography of where people live and how they vote. Any collection of voting data can then be applied to this ensemble of restricting plans to obtain a collection of election results. The election results give a benchmark against which a particular redistricting may be compared under the same set of voting data. It is only the relative difference between the ensemble and the enacted plan which matters. Our ensemble of restricting plans naturally incorporates how nonpartisan redistricting criteria interact with the political geography and geometry of the state. It naturally adapts to natural packing in urban areas and other effects. It is capable of separating these natural effects from those of partisan gerrymandering. Because of this, this mode of analysis can separate bias that natural packing might induce from other effects.

Additionally, none of these analyses rely on any forms of partisan symmetry or ideas of proportional representation. The ensemble method does not impose any idea of fairness nor does it select for a particular seats-to-votes curve. Rather it illuminates what the result would have typically been had only the stated redistricting criteria been utilized. It is quite possible, and often happens, that the results from the ensemble method do not yield proportional representation and one party has a natural advantage relative to the statewide vote fraction. One can then use this natural advantage as a benchmark to detect when a particular plan is biased beyond the neutral standard the ensemble establishes.

### 3.2 Different Elections have Different Voting Patterns

Elections differ both in the statewide partisan vote fraction and the spatial patterns of voting across the state. Hence, it is not at all surprising that a given map can act differently under different voting patterns; even those that share the same statewide partisan vote fractions. For instance, a map could be designed to neutralize the effectiveness of a particular set of coalitions, and hence would only be a statistical outlier in elections when those coalitions are active.

On a number of occasions, we have seen maps that particularly show the effect of the Gerrymander when there is a danger that the majority or supermajority are lost. To better understand why this is natural, consider the following example. Let us assume that a region has three varieties of people who always vote as a block and are spatially contiguous. For definiteness, let us call them red, purple, and blue people. We will assume that red always vote for the red candidate and blue for the blue candidate. Sometimes the purple vote for the red candidate and sometimes for the blue candidate. Hence, sometimes red wins two seats, and sometimes three seats, depending on how the purple people vote. Let us assume that most redistricting plans that one would naturally draw (without knowing where the red, purple, and blue people lived) would produce 2 majority red districts, 2 majority blue districts, and one majority purple district. We will call these neutral plans. Now let us consider a plan which is carefully drawn so that the purple people are never a majority but rather the purple people are split such that there are three majority blue districts and two majority red. We will call this the gerrymandered plan.

Under the gerrymandered plan the red candidates always win two of the five seats, but never more. This is typical of elections where the purple people vote with the blue people. It is typical because the majority purple district in the neutral plans would vote for the blue candidate to elect three blue candidates. On the other hand, in elections where the purple people vote with the red people, the outcome would be highly atypical as the neutral maps would have always produced three red winners but the gerrymandered plan only produces two red winners. In summary, atypical maps may lead to a typical split of elected officials under some vote counts, but not under others. It is not unusual for gerrymandered maps to sometimes produce typical results.

### 3.3 Collected Seat Histograms and Uniform Swing Analysis

It is a misconception that a gerrymandered map will behave atypically under all different types of elections. Gerrymandered maps can behave atypically under some types of elections and typically under other types of elections. For example, a map may only become atypical when a party is in danger of losing the majority. We demonstrate this through a type of plot we call Collected Seat Histograms. The election data use can either be historical elections or data generated using a uniform swing hypothesis. ${ }^{1}$

In both cases, we plot the histograms tabulating the fraction of the ensemble maps which produce a particular number of Democratic seats under a particular choice of statewide votes (tabulated at the precinct level). We then collect these histograms on a single plot where they are arranged on the vertical axis according to their statewide vote fractions, with the most Republican at the bottom and the most Democratic at the top. On each of the individual histograms, we also place a mark corresponding to the number of seats the enacted map would produce using those votes. Using these plots, one can identify trends and types of elections were the enacted maps products outlier results. When considering the NC State House and Senate, we also place vertical lines on each plot to mark where the supermajorities are in effect and where the simple majority in the chamber changes hand.

In addition to using historical statewide votes to produce our Collected Seat Histograms, we also create a collection of Collected Seat Histograms built from a single historical vote which is shifted using the Uniform Swing Hypothesis to produce a collection of votes which preserve the relative voting pattern across the state while seeing the effect of shifting the partisan tilt of the election.

Both kinds of Collected Seat Histograms are effective at identifying maps that are non-responsive to changing voter opinions or under-respond to those changes. A district map that results in different representation when the number of votes for a particular party changes sufficiently is a minimal requirement of a democratic process that is responsive to the changing will of the people. The Collected Seat Histograms can be used to determine the level of responsiveness to changes in the votes one should expect of the maps that were drawn without a partisan bias. The Rank Ordered Boxplots in the next section can help illuminate the structure of the map which is responsible for any systematic bias or lack of responsiveness relative to the nonpartisan benchmark embodied in the ensemble.

[^40]
### 3.4 Structure of Maps and Rank-Ordered Marginal Boxplots and Histograms

While the partisan seat count is clearly a quantity of interest, it can be less effective at illuminating the structure of a map that also explores how the elections are won. To this end, we introduce the Rank-Ordered Marginal Boxplots and Histograms. These are formed by considering the partisan vote fraction for one of the political parties (say the Democrats, or equally the Republicans) in each of the districts for a given redistricting plan. These marginal vote fractions are then ordered from smallest to largest, that is to say; from most Republican district to most Democratic district. These ordered numbers are then tabulated over all of the plans in the ensemble.

The Rank-Ordered Marginal Boxplots plot the typical range of the most Republican district to most Democratic district. Ranges are represented by box-plots. In these box-plots, $50 \%$ of all plans have corresponding ranked districts that lie within the box; the median is given by the line within the box; the ticks mark the $2.5 \%, 10 \%, 90 \%$ and $97.5 \%$ quartiles; the extent of the lines outside of the boxes represent the range of results observed in the ensemble. The number of boxes is the same as the number of seats. That is 120 seats for the NC House, 50 seats for the NC Senate, and 14 seats for the NC Congressional Delegation. Any box that lies above the $50 \%$ line on the vertical axis will elect (or typically elect) a Democrat; any box that lies below the $50 \%$ line will elect (or typically elect) a Republican.

We take the enacted plan with each set of votes and plot the ordered district returns over the box plots. If the districts of an enacted plan lie either far above or far below the ensemble at a particular ranking, this can indicate that the district was either packed or cracked to provide an atypical result.

## 4 State Legislature

Using historic voting data, we compare election results under the enacted districting plans for the North Carolina House and North Carolina Senate with election results under a collection of non-partisan maps. One strength of this method is that it makes no assumptions in advance about what structure an election should have such as a relation to proportional representation or some type of symmetry considerations. We examine both the number of seats that would have been won under these vote counts, along with the expected margins of victory.

### 4.1 State Legislature: Overview of Findings

### 4.2 State Legislature: Overview of Method

We generate a collection of alternative restricting maps using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, and used this collection to characterize what would be expected if only non-partisan redistricting criteria where used. We have described this method in detail in our academic work. See $[7,3,8,10,1,2]$. (References in this report to numbers in brackets are to articles cited in a numbered bibliography at the end of this report). No partisan information is used to construct this ensemble of maps; only the generally accepted districting criteria of approximately equal population per district, contiguous and relatively compact districts, reducing traversals, and keeping counties, precincts, and municipalities whole.

For both the NC House and NC Senate, we generate a Primary Ensemble whose non-partisan properties are close to those of the enacted plan. Because of this, we sometimes label this plan as the Matched Ensemble. For both the NC Senate and NC House, we produce a Secondary Ensemble which makes different policy choices concerning the preservation of municipalities. In a third ensemble built, we also consider the pairing of incumbents.

The ensembles are generated by using the Metropolis-Hasting Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm in a parallel tempering framework which employs proposal from the Multiscale Forest RECOM algorithm [2, 1] and the single-node flip algorithm [7]. Using these proposals, the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm is then used to produce samples from the desired policyinformed, non-partisan distribution on redistrictings; such algorithms are widely accepted for sampling high-dimensional distributions. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo and Metropolis-Hasting algorithms are a cornerstone of modern computational statistics, protein folding and drug discovery, and weather prediction. They date back to at least the Manhattan Project in Los Alamos are used in a huge range of mathematical and statistical applications.

The distributions we use are defined to be concentrated on districting plans that contain districts near the ideal district population based on the one-person-one-vote principle (including the $5 \%$ population deviation acceptable for legislative districts). They are also designed to produce contiguous districts that are relatively compact and to reduce the number of counties and, in some cases, the number of people split out of a municipality. For the Primary Ensemble, the distribution on redistricting plans is tuned so that these non-partisan qualities, including the number of counties, municipalities, and precincts which are split, are similar to the enacted plan. We also respect the county-clustering requirement for State Legislative maps.

We will see that the enacted NC Senate preserves municipalities to a high degree; in a way consistent with the most municipality preserving distributions we could produce. Hence, we also provide a Secondary Ensemble for the NC Senate which does not explicitly preserve municipalities (thought compactness and the county preservation lead to a degree of municipality preservation.) It coincides with the primary ensemble properties in other resects.

For the NC house, we will see that the enacted plan is not as stringent in its municipality preservation, and that respecting the other criteria could naturally create many plans that better preserve municipalities than the enacted plan. Since we have tuned our primary ensemble to match the level of municipality preservation in the enacted plan, which include a Secondary Ensemble for the NC house we is better at preserving municipalities.

As the guidance from the legislature at the start of the redistricting process stated that one "may consider municipality preservation" (in contrast to other directives which were not optional), all four of these ensembles meet the guidance given by the legislature. As already mentioned, we also provide a third ensemble for both the NC house and NC Senate which is derived from the primary ensemble, but considers the double-bunking of incumbents.

In all cases using the Metropolis-Hasting Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm, we can produce a mathematically representative sample of the redistricting plans that comply with the criteria described.

### 4.3 County Clusters for State Legislature

In Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 2002), the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that North Carolina's state legislative districts should be clustered into groups of counties and that no district should cross between two of the "county clusters." As part of our non-partisan work concerning redistricting, we implemented the algorithmic part of the Stephenson Ruling in a publicly available open-source piece of software [4]. We used this computer software to produce the county clusterings used in this report. The resulting clusterings were described in our publicly released report which can be found here [5]. We understand that the NC Legislature also used this report to determine the possible clusterings. In any case, the clusterings we found coincide with those discussed by the legislature.

There is not a unique choice of statewide clustering. Rather there are parts of the state which can only be clustered in one way, while there are two ways to cluster the counties in other regions. In the state Senate, there are 17 clusters containing 36 of the 50 districts that are fixed based on determining optimal county clusters. These are represented by the color county groupings in Figure 4.3.1. The white numbers annotating each county clustering give the number of districts that the county cluster should contain. Ten of these clusters contain one district, meaning that ten of the 50 senate districts are fixed by the county clusters. The remaining county clusters must be further subdivided into legislative districts. The remaining 14 counties, shown in gray on the map in Figure 4.3.1 are distributed among four groups, each containing two clustering options. Following the nomenclature in [5], we will label the cluster groups by the letters A, B, C, and D. Each group consists of two different possible clusterings which we will label with the numbers 1 and 2 . Thus, the first choice in cluster A is labeled A1, and the second choice A2. A complete choice of county clusters then consists of one choice from the A group, the B group, the C group, and the D group.

Similarly, in the NC State House, there are 33 clusters containing 107 of the 120 districts that are fixed based on determining optimal county clusters. These are represented by the color county groupings in Figure 4.3.2. Again, the white numbers annotating each county clustering give the number of districts that the county cluster should contain. Eleven of these clusters contain one district, meaning that eleven of the 120 house districts are fixed by the clustering process. The remaining clusters (shown in gray) are separated into three groups each containing two clustering options. As before, the groups will be demoted by the letters A, B, and C with each of the two options in each group labeled with the numbers 1 or 2.

More details can be found in [5] and [4]. It should be noted that the algorithm used to produce these clusterings only implements the algorithmic portion of the Stephenson v. Bartlett. In particular, it does not address any compliance with the Voting Rights Act.


Figure 4.3.1: Senate


Figure 4.3.2: House

### 4.4 State Legislature: Ensemble Overview

We now give more details on the different distributions already sketched in Section 4.2. They represent different distributions that emphasize different policies consistent with the Legislature's guidance and historical presidents. All the distributions from which we build our ensembles respect the county clusters we derived in [6] by algorithmically implementing the ruling Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 2002). That is to say in both the State House and State Senate, the state is segmented into groups of counties referred to as county clusters so that the population of each county cluster can be divided into a number of districts each with a population within $5 \%$ of the ideal district population. The county clusters are different for the State House and State Senate as the number of districts, and hence the ideal district populations, are different. Each district is constrained to lay entirely within one county cluster.

Beyond the county cluster requirement all of our primary and secondary ensembles for both chambers also satisfy the following constraints:

- The maps minimize the number of split counties. The 2021 redistricting criteria state that "Within county groupings, county lines shall not be traversed except as authorized by Stephenson I, Stephenson II, Dickson I, and Dickson II."
- Districts traverse counties as few times as possible.
- All districts are required to consist of one contiguous region.
- Except for two exceptions, the deviation of the total population in any district is within $5 \%$ of the ideal district population. The two special cases are explained in Section 10.1.
- Voting tabulation districts (i.e. VTDs or precincts) are not split (see again the two exceptions with population deviation in Section 10.1)
- Compactness: The distributions on redistricting plans are constructed so that a plan with a larger total isoperimetric ratio is less likely than those with a lower total isoperimetric ratio. (See Section 10.1 for a definition of the isoperimetric ratio.) The total isoperimetric ratio of a redistricting plan is simply the sum of the isoperimetric ratios over each district. The isoperimetric ratio is the reciprocal of the Polsby-Poper score; hence, smaller isoperimetric ratio corresponds to larger Polsby-Poper scores. The General Assembly stated in its guidance that the plans should be compact according to the Polsby-Popper score or the Reock score [9]. We have found that while the Reock is useful when comparing two districts. However, the Polsby-Popper/isoperimetric score is a better measure when generating district computationally. In our previous work, we have seen that this choice did not qualitatively change our conclusions (see [7] and the expert report in Common Cause v. Rucho).
We tuned our primary ensemble so that compactness scores of the ensemble were comparable to those of the enacted plan. See Section 7, for plots showing the compactness scores.

Municipality Preservation: We now come to the property which distinguishes the Primary and Secondary ensembles. In both chambers of the NC Legislature, we tune the primary ensemble to match the level of municipalities preservation to those seen in the enacted plan. Since municipality preservation is concerned with keeping the voters of a particular municipality together as a block, we concentrate on the number of ousted voters. Ousted voters are those who have been removed from the districts which primarily contain the other members of the municipalities. We construct the ensemble to control the total number of ousted voters across the entire state. More details are given in Section 10.1. As already mentioned, we tune the Secondary ensembles differently for the two chambers. Since the Enacted Senate plan was at the lowest end of municipality splitting we observed, we have included a secondary ensemble in the Senate which did not explicitly consider municipality reservation. In the NC House, since the enacted plan did not preserve municipalities to the level we found possible, we included a secondary ensemble which better preserved municipalities.

Incumbency: The effect of incumbency are addressed in a subsequent section of this report.

### 4.5 Construction of Statewide Ensembles for State Legislature

Statewide ensembles are created by drawing samples from a number of "sub-ensembles." Because of the county cluster structure, we can sample each county cluster independently of the other county clusters. In the house, we sample the Wake and Mecklenburg county cluster groups separately from the rest of the state as they have many more precincts and districts. In the Senate, we sample the Wake county cluster independently since it must split precincts to achieve the 5\% population
balance. There are several regions of the state that have multiple options for county clusters and we sample each of the county clustering options separately. We then sample the remainder of the state together.

We combine these sub-ensembles by first choosing which of the county clustering options will be used, treating all options equally. With these fixed, we then choose a map from each of the other sub-ensembles and combine them to produce a statewide map. We used this procedure to create an ensemble of 100,000 maps. These ensembles of statewide maps were used to generate the various figures. This number was chosen as it proved to be sufficient for the statistics of the quantities of interest to have converged. That is to say that adding additional maps to the ensemble did not change the results. See Section 7.1 for more details on the sampling method.

### 4.6 Election Data Used in Analysis

The historic elections we consider are from the year 2016 and 2020. We only consider statewide elections. We will use the following abbreviations: AG for Attorney General, USS for United States Senate, CI for Commissioner of Insurance, LG for Lieutenant Governor, GV for Governor, TR for State Treasure, SST for Secretary of State, AD for State Auditor, CA for Commissioner of Agriculture, and PR for United States President. We add to these abbreviations the last two digits of the year of the election. Hence CI16 is the vote data from the Commissioner of Insurance election in 2016.

## 5 State Legislature: Main Statewide Analysis

Our analyzes shows that the enacted plan for the NC State House is an extreme gerrymander over a wide range of voter behavior seen historically in NC. The effect of this extreme gerrymander is to prevent the Democrats from winning as many seat as they would have had the maps been drawn in a neutral way without political considerations. This gerrymander is achieved by packing Democrats in a number of the most Democratic districts while depleting them from those districts which typically change hands when the public changes its expressed political opinon through the vote. The effect is particularly strong in situations where the Democrats would typically reduce a Republican supermajority to a a simple majority. The enacted map often denies this transition. Similarly the enacted map again behaves in an anomalous fashion by under electing democrats when the typical maps would almost always give the Democrats the majority in the House. This extreme outlier behavior is reflected in the behavior we see at the individual cluster level.

The effect in the Senate is less pronounced. At the cluster level there are a number of strong and extreme outliers signaling extreme partisan gerrymandering. At the statewide level, the structure of the map shows it to be an extreme outlier in the fashion in which Democrats are packed in certain districts and depleted from others. The effect at the statewide level is mostly seen when the Republicans are in danger of losing the supermajority in the Senate. Over this range the anomalous packing and cracking of Democrats leads to a number of extreme outlier behaviors which result in the Republicans maintaining the supermajority when they typically would have lost it under a non-partisan map from the ensemble.

Additionally we see that the reason that the Senate map is typical in many situations stems from the choice to highly conserve municipalities. The municipality preservation is at the extreme end of what we have observed. In contrast, the municipality preservation in the house is less extreme as we can easily create an ensemble which preserves municipalities to a higher degree. For the Senate plan, relaxing the requirement to preserve municipalities leads to an ensemble that is more favorable to the Democrats, meaning that the enacted plan would be an extreme outlier in more situations. Put differently, prioritizing municipality preservation in the Senate plan appears to enable more maps that favor Republicans. By contrast, for the House plan, where the enacted map does not prioritize preserving municipalities, my analysis finds that such a prioritization would not have favored the Republican party.

### 5.1 NC State House

Figure 5.1.1 shows the distribution of Democratic seats elected under a number of historical elections which capture plausible voting patterns in North Carolina elections. The elections are arranged vertically by the statewide Democratic vote share, from most Republican at the bottom to the most Democratic at the top. The Democratic seats elected under each election by the enacted plan is marked with a yellow dot.

It is important to remember that the single number of statewide vote fraction is not sufficient to categorize an election. Elections with similar statewide vote fractions can have dramatically different seat counts since the votes can be concentrated differently geographically. An example of this is shown in Figure 5.1.8 which shows the Collected Seat Histograms for an ensemble that places more weight on preserving municipalities that the enacted plan or the primary ensemble. Notice that
the AG20 votes produce more democratic seats typically than either AG16 or GV16 even though the statewide vote fraction of AG20 is sandwiched between AG16 and GV16. (Recall the definitions of these abbreviations given in Section 4.6.)

Returning to Figure 5.1.1, we see that the enacted map is atypical in its favoring of the Republican party in every one of the elections considered and an outlier or extreme outlier in the vast majority of the elections. Additionally, the enacted plan is an extreme outlier when the Republicans are likely to lose either the Super-majority or control of the chamber. Observe that in the vast majority of plans in the primary ensemble (Figure 5.1.1) the votes in PR16, LG20 and CL20 produce a simple majority for the Republican party in the NC State House (and not a supermajority). Yet under the enacted plan, the Republican Party maintains the supermajority in all three cases.

Similarly, in a large number of the ensemble plans the Democrats hold the majority in the chamber under the voting patterns given by AD20, SST20, and GV20. (Under GV20 the Democrats have the majority most of the time, under AD20 roughly half the time and under SST roughly $75 \%$ of the time.) Yet, under the enacted plan the results are extreme outliers, giving the Republicans the majority with a safety margin of a few seats in all cases.


Figure 5.1.1: The Collected Seat Histogram for the Primary Ensemble on the NC House. The individual histograms give the frequency of the Democratic seat count for each of the statewide elections considered from the years 2016 and 2020. The histograms are organized vertically based on the statewide partisan vote fraction for each election. The more Republican elections are placed lower on the plot while more Democratic elections are placed higher. Three dotted lines denote the boundary between where the supermajorites and simple majorities are in force. The yellow dot represents the enacted plan.

As already observed, Figure 5.1.1 helps to identify the properties of the Enacted Map under different electoral environments. There is a clear trend as one moves to more Democratic elections, the atypical results (already tilted to toward

| - Ex. $6484-$ |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\%$ Dem | Election | $\%$ Outlier | \# Outlier | \# Samples |
| $52.32 \%$ | GV20 | $0.118 \%$ | 118 | 100000 |
| $51.21 \%$ | SST20 | $0.000 \%$ | 0 | 100000 |
| $50.88 \%$ | AD20 | $0.007 \%$ | 7 | 100000 |
| $50.20 \%$ | AG16 | $0.451 \%$ | 451 | 100000 |
| $50.13 \%$ | AG20 | $0.005 \%$ | 5 | 100000 |
| $50.05 \%$ | GV16 | $0.399 \%$ | 399 | 100000 |
| $49.36 \%$ | PR20 | $0.007 \%$ | 7 | 100000 |
| $49.22 \%$ | CL20 | $0.759 \%$ | 759 | 100000 |
| $49.14 \%$ | USS20 | $0.012 \%$ | 12 | 100000 |
| $48.40 \%$ | LG20 | $0.009 \%$ | 9 | 100000 |
| $48.27 \%$ | CI20 | $0.461 \%$ | 461 | 100000 |
| $47.47 \%$ | TR20 | $5.569 \%$ | 5569 | 100000 |
| $46.98 \%$ | USS16 | $3.066 \%$ | 3066 | 100000 |
| $46.59 \%$ | LG16 | $11.778 \%$ | 11778 | 100000 |
| $46.15 \%$ | CA20 | $0.094 \%$ | 94 | 100000 |

Table 1: NC House Collected Seat Histogram Outlier Data. Starting from the left, the first column gives the stateide partisan makeup of the of the election under consideration whose abbreviation is given in the second column from the left. The right most collum gives the total number of plans in the ensemble considered which is 100,000 . The second column from the right gives the number of those 100,000 plans which elect the same or less Democrats under the given election. These are the plans which are as much or more of an outlier than the enacted map. The middle column is the percentage of plans which are more or equal of an outlier. (It is calculated by dividing the 2 nd column from the right by 100,000 and multiplying by 100 to make a percentage.) The extremely low percentages in the middle column shows that the enacted plan is an extreme outlier across many different electoral settings.
the Republican party) in the more Republican elections in Figure 5.1.1 trend into extreme outliers as we shift to the more Democratic leaning elections.

To make the above table more quantitative, in Table 1 we tabulated the number of maps which produced the same or fewer seats for the Democrats in each of the elections we consider. We see that the enacted map is an extreme outlier. Across the vast majority of elections, the house map behaves as an extreme outlier in favor of the Republican party.

In the three elections where the results are not an extreme outlier (TR20, USS16, and LG16), the enacted plan is still atypically tilted to favor the Republican party. These three elections have a strong statewide Republican vote fraction. Hence, there is no need for a gerrymander as the Republicans have the needed votes to often keep a supermajority under even a typical map.

We will see in Figure? ? and 5.1.3 below that when these three elections are shifted (using the uniform swing hypothesis) to produce plausible voting fractions at a larger statewide Democratic vote fraction, then the results are also extreme outliers.

It is also worth noting that the bias in the enacted plan from what non-partisan map would produce systematically is the favor of the Republican party. Not once is the tilt even mildly in the favor of the Democrats.

To better control for other variation, we now include a number of Collected Seat Histograms built from a single election which has been shifted to create a sequence of elections with different statewide partisan vote fractions but the same spatial voting patern.

In Figures 5.1.2 and ??, we see that the same phenomena from Figure 5.1.1 is repeated again and again. As the vote share increases to the point where the primary ensemble for the NC House would typically break the Republicans supermajority, the enacted plan under elects Democrats to an extent which makes it an extreme outlier. This exceptional under-electing of Democrates persists past the point where almost all of the ensemble maps would have given the majority to the Democrats. In many cases the enacted map fails to respond to the shifting will of the electorate, leaving the control in the Republican hands. In addition to presenting these figures, we have also animated this affect with movies that have been submitted.

To better undersand the structures responsible at the district level for the extreme outlier behavior seen in Table 2 and Figures5.2.1 to 5.2.2, we now turn to the rank-order-boxplots as described in Section 3.4. It is easy to see the abnormal structures of the enacted plan which are responsible for its extreme outlier behavior. The pattern revealed is one often seen in gerrymandered maps; namely packing and cracking. This refers to the depleting of one party from districts which typically would be competitive but often elect a representative from their party and instead place them in districts which were already overwhelmingly safe for either party. In Figures 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6, a version of this pattern is repeated. The number of Democrats seen in the districts which usually would be moderate in their partisan makeup has been decreased with a corresponding increase in the number of Democrats in the more Democratic districts where their presence has little effect

- Ex. 6485 -
on the election outcome. We give the specifics in the captions of each figure. We will see that this type of structure will be repeated in many of the individual clusters which are analyzed in Section 6.1. In addition to presenting these figures, we have also animated this affect with movies that have been submitted.


Figure 5.1.2: The individual histograms give the frequency of the Democratic seat count in the ensemble for each of the shown statewide elections, with a uniform swing. The histograms are organized vertically based on the statewide partisan vote fraction. The more Republican swings are placed lower on the plot while more Democratic swings are placed higher. Three dotted lines denote the boundary between where the supermajorites and simple majorities are in force. The yellow dot is the enacted plan.


Figure 5.1.3: The individual histograms give the frequency of the Democratic seat count in the ensemble for each of the shown statewide elections, with a uniform swing. The histograms are organized vertically based on the statewide partisan vote fraction. The more Republican swings are placed lower on the plot while more Democratic swings are placed higher. Three dotted lines denote the boundary between where the supermajorites and simple majorities are in force. The yellow dot is the enacted plan.


Figure 5.1.4: The yellow dots represent the democratic vote fraction of the enacted map under the PR20 vote count when the district are ordered from most Republican on the left to most Democratic in vote share on the right. The box-plots show the range of the same statistic plotted over the primary ensemble. From around the 60 th to 80th district the yellow dots all well below the boxplots of the ensemble. This result is that many dots fall well below the dotted $50 \%$ line than usually would; and hence more Republicans are elected than typical. To achieve this effect, the fraction of Democrats is increased in the already strongly democratic district ranging from the 90 th to 105 th most Democratic districts. This structure does not exist in the non-partisan ensemble and is responsible for the maps extreme outlier behavior.


Figure 5.1.5: A similar structure to that seen in Figure 5.1.4 is repeated here. The low 50 s to the high 70 s have had the number of democrats depleted while the districts from the high80s to around 105 have an excess of Democrats.


Figure 5.1.6: Mirroring what was seen in Figure 5.1.4 and Figure 5.1.5, we have abnormally few Democrats from around the 60 th to the 80 th most Republican and abnormally many Democrats pact in the districts in the low 90s to the just below 110 .

## NC House: Primary Ensemble considering Incumbency.

Figure 5.1.7 shows the Collected Seat Histogram analogous to Figure 5.1.1, but for an ensemble which pairs the same or fewer incumbents than the enacted plan. The other considerations are left unchanged from the Primary ensemble. Comparing the two figures, we see no qualitative change in the behavior of the ensemble. Hence the previous conclusions continue to hold. In particular, a desire to prevent the pairing of incumbents cannot explain the extreme outlier behavior of the enacted plan.


Figure 5.1.7: The Collected Seat Histogram for the Primary Ensemble on the NC House with incumbency considerations added. See Figure 5.1.1 for full description.

## NC House: Secondary Distribution

The ensemble used to produce Figure 5.1.8, put more weight on preserving municipalities than either the enacted plan or the Primary Ensemble, which is tuned to match the enacted plan. This enacted plan is still an extreme outlier with respect to this secondary ensemble. We still see that the enacted map resists relinquishing the supermajority under PR16, CI20 and LG20 when this secondary ensemble almost always does. Similarly as the elections become more Democratic in AD20, SST20 and GV20 and the ensemble regularly would give the majority to the Democrats the enacted map dramatically under elects Democrats. In other words, we find that if the mapmakers had made an effort to prioritize preservation of municipalities in the House, that effort would not have led to a map that was more likely to favor Republicans.


Figure 5.1.8: The Collected Seat Histogram for the Secondary Ensemble on the NC House. The Secondary Ensemble for the NC House is centered on distributions which better preserve municipalities than the enacted plan. See Figure 5.1.1 for full description.

| - Ex. 6493 - |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\%$ Dem | Election | $\%$ Outlier | \# Outlier | \# Samples |
| $52.32 \%$ | GV20 | $16.343 \%$ | 16343 | 100000 |
| $51.21 \%$ | SST20 | $35.184 \%$ | 35184 | 100000 |
| $50.88 \%$ | AD20 | $42.880 \%$ | 42880 | 100000 |
| $50.20 \%$ | AG16 | $12.129 \%$ | 12129 | 100000 |
| $50.13 \%$ | AG20 | $4.332 \%$ | 4332 | 100000 |
| $50.05 \%$ | GV16 | $0.075 \%$ | 75 | 100000 |
| $49.36 \%$ | PR20 | $6.220 \%$ | 6220 | 100000 |
| $49.22 \%$ | CL20 | $5.365 \%$ | 5365 | 100000 |
| $49.14 \%$ | USS20 | $14.052 \%$ | 14052 | 100000 |
| $48.40 \%$ | LG20 | $0.000 \%$ | 0 | 100000 |
| $48.27 \%$ | CI20 | $0.322 \%$ | 322 | 100000 |
| $47.47 \%$ | TR20 | $5.726 \%$ | 5726 | 100000 |
| $46.98 \%$ | USS16 | $43.176 \%$ | 43176 | 100000 |
| $46.59 \%$ | LG16 | $44.943 \%$ | 44943 | 100000 |
| $46.15 \%$ | CA20 | $1.123 \%$ | 1123 | 100000 |

Table 2: NC Senate Collected Seat Histogram Outlier Data. Starting from the left, the first column gives the stateide partisan makeup of the of the election under consideration whose abbreviation is given in the second column from the left. The right most collum gives the total number of plans in the ensemble considered which is 100,000 . The second column from the right gives the number of those 100,000 plans which elect the same or less Democrats under the given election. These are the plans which are as much or more of an outlier than the enacted map. The middle column is the percentage of plans which are more or equal of an outlier. (It is calculated by dividing the 2 nd column from the right by 100,000 and multiplying by 100 to make a percentage.) The number of fairly small to extremely small percentage in the middle column between $50.13 \%$ (AG20) and $47.47 \%$ (TR20) are another signature of the anomalous behavior seen visually in Figure 5.2 .1 over the same range of vote percentages.

### 5.2 NC State Senate

We will see in our cluster-by-cluster analysis that the NC Senate map has a number of clusters that are outliers. Their structures are systematically in favor of the Republican party. As discussed in Section 3.2, we often see maps that express their outlier status under a specific voting climate; often when one party is in danger of losing the majority or super-majority. The enacted map for the NC Senate shows this behavior.

Figure 5.2.1 is the plot for the NC Senate analogous to Figure 5.1.1, which was for the NC House. Most of the outlier behavior at the state level for the enacted NC Senate map is concentrated in the interval between $47.5 \%$ statewide Democratic vote share and around $50.5 \%$ statewide Democratic vote share. In this range, the enacted map is always an outlier and often an extreme outlier under the votes considered. This range is significant for a number of reasons. First, this is a range of statewide vote fraction where many North Carolina elections occur. Secondly, looking at Figure 5.2.1 we see that over this range the ensemble shows that one should expect the Republican super-majority (less than 21 Democratic Seats) to switch to a simple Republican majority (between 21 and 24 Democratic Seats). Yet the enacted map often resists this switch, breaking the supermajority only when the PR20 and CL20 votes are considered. In both of these elections, the ensemble places the typical number of Democratic seats well away from the supermajority line and centered between it and the simple majority line.

To make Figure 5.2.1 more quantitative, we have included Table 2 which shows the number of maps where the primary ensemble elects less democrates in that election than the enacted map.

Looking at Table 2 we see that a number of the elections in the critical partisan range of around $47.5 \%$ to $50 \%$ are extreme outliers (GV16, LG20, and CI20) while other (AG20, PR20, and TR20) show atypical behavior all favoring the Republican candidates. It is again important to notice that the enacted plan is never seen to favor the Democratic party relative to what is expected from the Primary non-partisan ensemble. The enacted map ranges between tilted to the Republican party to being an extreme partisan outlier. The importance of the range of statwide Democratic between $47.5 \%$ to $50 \%$ by looking at Figure 5.2.1. The primary ensemble showes that is with in this range that one expect a Republican supermajority to become a simple majority. The effect of the enacted plan is to suppress this by under electing Democrats.

We will in the cluster-by-cluster analysis in Section 6.2 that a number of individual cluster are extreme outlier in their partisen structure.

To better control for other variation we now include a number of Collected Seat Histograms built from a single election which has been shifted to create a sequence of elections with different statewide partisan vote fractions but the same spatial voting pattern.


Figure 5.2.1: The Collected Seat Histogram for the Primary Ensemble on the NC Senate. The individual histograms give the frequency of the Democratic seat count for each of the statewide elections considered from the years 2016 and 2020. The histograms are organized vertically based on the statewide partisan vote fraction for each election. The more Republican elections are placed lower on the plot while more Democratic elections are placed higher. Three dotted lines denote the boundary between where the supermajorites and simple majorities are in force.

The large jump that we see in 5.2.3 to 5.2.5 the 33nd most Republican district and the 35th most Republican district means of over a large range of swings in the partisan character of the election the outcome will change at most by one seat.


Figure 5.2.2: The Collected Seat Histograms for the Primary Ensemble on the NC House built from a collection of voting data generated via uniform swing.


Figure 5.2.3: The yellow dots represent the democratic vote fraction of the enacted map under the USS20 vote count when the district are ordered from most Republican on the left to most Democratic in vote share on the right. The box-plots show the range of the same statistic plotted over the primary ensemble. Essentially all of the distircts between the 15th most Republican and the 33rd most Republican have abnormally few Democrats. This is compensated by packing abnormally many Democrats the 35th to the 47th most Republican districts. This structure is an extreme outlier and done not occur in the ensemble.


Figure 5.2.4: A similar structure to that seen in Figure 5.2.3 is repeated here over a nearly identical range of districts.

- Ex. 6498 -


Figure 5.2.5: A similar structure to that seen in Figure 5.2.3 is repeated here.

## NC Senate: Primary Ensemble considering Incumbency.

Preserving inclemency has little qualitative effect on the observations we have made. Looking at 5.2.6, we see that the election between and including GV16 and TR20 in the Figure 5.2.6 are all extreme outliers. This is in fact more extreme that the enacted map was under the Primary ensemble. It reinforces that this gerrymander seems to be most efective at the statewide level when the Republican supermajority is possible but in question.


Figure 5.2.6: The Collected Seat Histogram for the Primary Ensemble on the NC House with incumbency considerations added. See Figure 5.1.1 for full description.

## NC Senate: Secondary Distribution

When municipal preservation is not prioritized, the enacted plan becomes an outlier in all but the two most Republican elections as shown in Figure 5.2.7. Additionally, in most cases it was an extreme outlier when municipal preservation is not considered.

In other words, when municipal preservation is not prioritized, the ensemble produced is more favorable to the Democrats, meaning that the enacted plan appears as an extreme outlier in more situations than in the ensemble that matched the enacted map in prioritizing municipality. Put differently, the decision to prioritize municipality preservation in the Senate plan appears to have enabled more maps that favor Republicans.


Figure 5.2.7: The Collected Seat Histogram for the Secondary Ensemble on the NC House. The Secondary Ensemble for the NC House is centered on distributions which do not explicitly consider municipality preservation. See Figure 5.1.1 for full description.

## 6 State Legislature: Selected Cluster by Cluster Analysis

Using the same tools, we now turn our analysis to the individual cluster. We find that a number of cluster demonstrate significate cracking and packing. In some cases this leads to changes in the partisan make of the representative typically elected from the region. In other cases, it makes the districts insensitive to changes in the in the voters political outlook as expressed in their votes.

### 6.1 NC State House

### 6.1.1 Mecklenburg

The ranked ordered histogram for the Mecklenburg cluster using the primary ensemble (which matches the number of people displaced from municipalities) is given in Figure 6.1.1. Across all of the voting patterns considered, we see that the two most Republican Districts (districts 98 and 103) have exceptionally few Democrats. This has the effect of making them more likely to elect a Republican when many (and often almost all) ensemble plans elect a Democrat in those districts. Specifically, that is the case under LG20, AG20, USS20, CL20, AD20 and SST20. Under GV20 and PR20, the two most Republican districts barely elect Democrats even though the majority of the ensemble plans safely elect Democrats. Under CA20 and TR20, the enacted plan safely elects two Republicans while under the ensemble the races are much closer, swinging in both directions under different plans. In these two elections, the enacted map elects a third Republican (in District 104) when the ensemble of maps typically would not. All of this is achieved by packing exceptionally many Democrats into the 6th through 9th most Democrat district, as shown in Figure 6.1.1 where the enacted plan is consistently at the extreme top of the range seen in the ensemble. All of these facts make the plan an extreme outlier in this cluster.

In fact, ranging over all of the elections considered, the Democratic fraction in the four most republican districts in the ensemble is greater than that in the enacted plan in less than $1.7 \%$ of the plans with it dipping as low as around $0.5 \%$ in a few cases. More dramatically, the percentage of plans in the ensemble where the fraction of Democrats, in the four most Democratic districts, is always less than $0.11 \%$ with it often dipping as low as $0.02 \%$ or lower.

As already discussed, it was possible to oust many less people from municipalities than the enacted plan does. Figure 6.1 .2 shows the secondary ensemble which constrains municipalities much more strongly. We seen that structures highlighted above persist in this ensemble; again making the enacted map an extreme outlier.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: In Figure 6.1.3, we see that the enacted plan ousts people from municipalities at a number that is comparable to the primary ensemble but typically more than the Secondary House ensemble.


Figure 6.1.1: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The "-" on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.2: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.3: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.2 Wake

In the Wake cluster, we again see the depleting of Democrats from the two most Republican districts (Districts 37 and 35) while packing Democrats into the next several districts, as in the Mecklenburg cluster. The effect is to swing the two most Republican districts into play in elections where they would not be under the ensemble. Furthermore, the enacted plan makes them safer for Republicans in situations when the ensemble maps would typically have it as a toss-up.

Across all of the elections considered, the number of maps in the ensemble which have a lower Democratic vote fraction in the two most Republican districts than in the enacted plan is less than $0.42 \%$ except for the CA20 election where it is $1.2 \%$.


Figure 6.1.4: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

As shown in Figure 6.1.5, the trend continues under the secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:

In Wake we see from Figure 6.1 .6 that the enacted plan consistently ousts more people than the primary ensemble and significantly more than the secondary ensemble.


Figure 6.1.5: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.6: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.3 Forsyth-Stokes

Again in Figure 6.1.7, showing the primary ensemble in the Forsyth-Stokes cluster, we see the most Republican districts depleted of Democrats while excess Democrats are packed in safe democratic districts and in the safest Republican district are moved to competitive districts. The effect is apparent in all of the elections, but varies slightly across different voting patterns. In all cases, we see the Democratic makeup of the 3rd most Republican district pulled below the range typically seen in the ensemble often resulting in this district electing a Republican when it would not typically. In the three elections where the 3rd-most Republican district still elects a Democrat (GV20), the map's depletion of Democrats from the second most Republican district is enough to reliably elect a Republican in that district when typically the election would vary between being close and strongly favoring the Democrats.

Ranging over all of the elections considered, less than $0.02 \%$ of the plans in the ensemble have a lower Democratic fraction in the three most Republican districts than the enacted plan signaling extreme cracking. Additionally, less than $1.3 \%$ of the plans in the ensemble have a larger Democratic in the two most Democratic districts than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.7: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

As shown in Figure 6.1.8, the trend continues under the secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities. Some of the effects are more extreme and in this cluster, this ensemble leads to more partisan districts. Nonetheless, the enacted map still regularly elects a Republican in the third most Republican district even thought it is typically more firmly Democratic under this ensemble.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:

From Figure 6.1.9, we see that in Forsyth-Stokes the enacted plan ousts a number of people comparable to the primary ensemble but consistently more than the secondary ensemble.


Figure 6.1.8: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.9: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.4 Guilford

The pattern seen previously is again repeated in an extreme fashion in the Guilford County. The two most Republican Districts (districts 59 and 62) have abnormally few Democrats when compared to what is seen in the primary ensemble and the more Democratic districts (numbered 57, 58, 60, and 61) have exceptionally many Democrats packed into them. The effect is that the enacted plan regularly (and often safely) elects two Republicans under election climates which would rarely or never do so.

Over all of the elections considered and all of the around 80,000 plans in the ensemble, none of the plans have a higher Democratic fraction in the four most Democratic districts or a lower Democratic fraction in the two most Republican districts, in comparison to the enacted plan. . In other words, this cluster shows more cracking and packing of Democrats than every single plan in the nonpartisan ensemble.


Figure 6.1.10: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the "-". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

In Figure 6.1.11, we see the effect of considering the the ensemble that more strongly preserves municipalities than the enacted plan. The ensemble reliably has four democratic districts and a 5 th which typically leans Republican but sometimes is competitive. Yet, the enacted plan gives one clearly Republican district and one which is often safely Republican and at times competitive.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: From Figure 6.1.12, we see that in Guilford the enacted plan ousts a number of people comparable to the primary ensemble but constantly more than the secondary ensemble.


Figure 6.1.11: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.12: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.5 Buncombe

As seen in Figure 6.1.13, the primary ensemble shows two Democratic districts with a third typically leaning Democratic but sometimes in play. However, the enacted map produces one district which is typically Republican. This is achieved by packing unusually many Democratic in the most Democratic district (district 114) leaving abnormally few Democrats for the most Republican district (district 116).

Ranging over the elections considered, at most $1.2 \%$ of the plans in the ensemble have a lower democratic fraction in the most Republican district in the ensemble than the enacted plan does. The percentage of plans with a larger Democratic fraction in the most Democratic district in the ensemble fluctuates around 5\%.


Figure 6.1.13: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The "-" on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

The same pattern of depleting Democrats from the most republican district so that it often elects a Republican when it typically would not under the ensemble is again seen in Figure 6.1 .14 which shows the results under the secondary ensemble.

Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: From Figure 6.1.15, we see that there is not a lot of difference between the two ensembles in the number of ousted people. Both are comparable to the enacted map.


Figure 6.1.14: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.15: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.6 Pitt

Pitt County only has two districts. The enacted places atypically many Democrats in the most Democratic district (district 8) while placing atypically few in the most Republican district (district 9). This maximizes the chance that the second district will elect a republican. In many cases, it does when many of the ensemble maps would not. By maximizing the difference in the partisan makeup of the two districts, the enacted map minimized the degree to which the enacted map responds to the shifting opinions of the electorate.

Across the elections considered, the percentage of plans in the ensemble which have a higher fraction of Democrats in the most Democratic district than the enacted plan fluctuates between $1.1 \%$ and $5.3 \%$.


Figure 6.1.16: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

The same pattern is repeated in Figure 6.1 .17 which uses the secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted map.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: From Figure 6.1.18, we the number of ousted people in the primary ensemble is comparable to the enacted plan but more than the secondary ensemble.


Figure 6.1.17: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.18: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.7 Duplin-Wayne

In the Duplin-Wayne county cluster the two districts are safely Republican under the elections considered. The enacted map is typical, falling in the middle of the observed democratic fraction on the Histograms.


Figure 6.1.19: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The "-" on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

As seen in Figure 6.1.20, the distribution has extremely small variance when municipalities are better preserved. Here there seem to be a little less Democrats in the most Democratic district than typical, but this has little effect as the two districts are firmly Republican and the distribution is highly concentrated.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: From Figure 6.1.21, we seen that the number of people ousted by the enacted plan is at the lower end of the typical amounts seen in the Primary ensemble or the secondary ensemble.


Figure 6.1.20: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.21: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.8 Durham-Person

As seen in Figure 6.1.22, under the primary ensemble Durham-Person cluster typically has three exceedingly Democratic districts and one more moderately Democratic district. The enacted plan places abnormally few Democrats in the most Republican district (district 2). This is accomplished by packing more Democrats in the most Democratic districts (districts 29 and 30). The effect is sufficient to pick up a Republican seat in a few elections where the seat typically would have remained democratic according to the non-partisan primary ensemble.

Not a single map in the non-partisan ensemble across any of the elections considered has a smaller fraction of Democrats in the most Republican district than the enacted plan does. This signals extreme cracking. In all but two elections the fraction of plans which have a higher Democratic vote fraction than the enacted plan is less than $0.62 \%$. The two exceptions are LG16 (3.5\%) and CA20 (1.2\%).


Figure 6.1.22: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

A similar effect is seen in 6.1.23, for the ensemble which better preserves municipalities.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:



Figure 6.1.23: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.24: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.9 Alamance

From Figure 6.1.25, we see that thought the enacted map tends have more Democrats in the more Democratic district and less in the less democratic district it not an outlier on its own.


Figure 6.1.25: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

Figure 6.1.26 tells a similar story to Figure 6.1.25,

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:



Figure 6.1.26: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.27: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.10 Cumberland

Looking at Figure 6.1.28, we again see outlier behavior in Cumberland County. We see that the districts in the enacted plan have been constructed so that the two most Republican districts (district 43 and 45) have a similar partisan makeup. Typically, one is more Democratic and one is more Republican. This is achieved by removing republicans from the most republican district and Democrats from the most democratic two districts. While the effect on the most Republican district individually is within the typical range, the combined effect creates an enacted cluster which is an strong outlier.

For each of the elections considered, the number of plans in the ensemble with smaller fraction of democrats in the second most republican district is typically around $1 \%$ with, for a few elections, the percentage reaching as high as $7 \%$ or as low as $0.4 \%$.


Figure 6.1.28: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - "on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

Looking at Figure 6.1.29, we see that the structure of the enacted map is a more extreme outlier for the secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities. In an ensemble that better preserves municipalities, the most Republican district is typically more republican and the second most Republican district more Democratic. This makes the enacted plan which squeezes the two together with an large outlier.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:



Figure 6.1.29: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.30: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.11 Cabarrus-Davie-Rowan-Yadkin

In the Cabarrus-Davie-Rowan-Yadkin county cluster, there are abnormally few Democrats in the most Democratic district (district 82). This is accomplished by placing abnormally many Democrats in the next three most democratic districts (districts 73, 76, and 83 - all of which are safe Republican districts). The effect is to make the most Democratic district a relatively reliable Republican seat (being won by the Republicans in all of the elections considered). Under the ensemble, it would switch parties in a number of the elections and regularly be a close contest.


Figure 6.1.31: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The "-" on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

Looking at Figure 6.1.32, we see that the same pattern persists under the secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:


Figure 6.1.32: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.33: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.1.12 Brunswick-New Hanover

In the Brunswick-New Hanover county cluster, Figure 6.1 .34 shows that the most Democratic district (district 18) has had abnormally many Democrats packed into it and the most Republican has had abnormally few Republicans placed in it, while the second-most Democratic district (district 20) has been depleted of Democrats. This makes the enacted plan much less responsive to changes in the the enacted plan preferences of the voters. The Republican party typically wins the second most democratic district in the enacted plan even though it would go to the Democrats under a number of elections when the neutral maps in the primary ensemble are used. Over each of the elections considered, the fraction of plans in the ensemble


Figure 6.1.34: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.
when a lower Democratic vote fraction in the second and third most Republican districts in the ensemble compared to the enacted plan map is always less than $0.5 \%$ and often much smaller.

Under the secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities shown in Figure 6.1.35, we see that the same structure persists. The enacted map becomes a more extreme outlier since this ensemble reduced the variance of the marginals and aligns the outcome gradual progression which ensures the map is fairly responsive to changes in the voter's preference, a property not shared by the enacted map.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:



Figure 6.1.35: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Secondary ensemble which better preserves municipalities than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.1.36: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.2 NC State Senate

Though the principal Senate ensemble, which prioritizes municipality preservation in line with the enacted plan, does not have as dramatic a shift towards the Republicans at the statewide level in comparison to the House, we still see a number of cases of extreme packing and cracking at the individual cluster level. Without exceptions, the effect is to minimize the effect of the Democratic votes and make the outcome of the election insensitive to a wide range of swings in the partisan vote fraction.

In the NC Senate, we again see the effect of prioritizing municipal preservation in our ensemble. When municipal preservation was not prioritized, there are two major effects. First, the enacted maps become extreme outliers, as the typical results swings are much less tilted to the Republican Party. Second, the two parties are much less separated. Requiring a high level of municipal preservation often leads the separation of the two political parties between disjoint districts. This in turn produces maps that are much less responsive to swinging public opinion. In other words, the results of the elections do not change over a wider range of statewide vote ranges.

### 6.2.1 Iredell-Mecklenburg

In this cluster, the second most Republican district (District 41 in the enacted plan) is the principal district whose outcome varies from election to election. In the enacted plan, unusually few democrats have been placed in this district to maximize the chance that the district elects a Republican. See Figure 6.2.1. In many elections, this means that the Republican wins this district under the enacted plan, whereas a Democrat would win the district under the a majority of ensemble plans.


Figure 6.2.1: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

For each of the 2020 and 2016 elections we have consider, we found that none of approximately 80,000 plans in our ensemble had as low a fraction of Democrats in the two most Republican districts in the Iredell-Mecklenburg cluster as the enacted plan. Similarly, in the vast majority of the elections the ensemble had no plans with a higher fraction of democrats packed in the four most Democratic districts. In two elections $0.01 \%$ of the plans had a higher fraction of Democrats packed in the four most Democratic districts.

The effect discussed above is essentially the same when the municipality preservation is not prioritized. See Figure 6.2.2.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:

We see that in the Iredell-Mecklenburg cluster, the number of ousted people in the enacted plan is comparable the number of ousted people in the ensemble prioritizing municipalities. The enacted plan splits two municipalities which coincides with the most typical number split by the ensemble prioritizing municipalities. Though this ensemble sometimes splits a number more municipalities, it typically displaces a comparable number of people to the enacted plan.


Figure 6.2.2: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the NC Senate Secondary ensemble which does not explicitly preserves municipalities.


Figure 6.2.3: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.2.2 Granville-Wake

The enacted plan is chosen to be at the extreme edge of the ensemble. It maximizes the chance of the Republicans winning Districts 17 and 18 by packing a larger than typical number of Democrats in districts $14,15,16$, and 18 . The effect is shown in Figure 6.2.4 across the 12 elections. For each of the 2020 and 2016 elections we have consider, we found that none of


Figure 6.2.4: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.
approximately 40,000 plans in our ensemble had as low a fraction of Democrats in the two most Republican districts in the Granville-Wake cluster as the enacted plan. Similarly, in six of the elections, the ensemble has no plans with more democrats packed in the four most Democratic districts. In six elections at most $0.022 \%$ of the plans had a higher fraction of Democrats packed in the four most Democratic districts than the enacted plan.

In this cluster, the prioritization of municipal preservation has a dramatic effect of packing Democrates in four districts and Republicans into two districts. The effect is show in Figure 6.2.5 across the 12 elections.

## Municipal Splits and Ousted Population:

We see that in the Granville-Wake cluster, the number of ousted people in the enacted plan is significantly more than the number of ousted people in the ensemble prioritizing municipalities. The enacted plan splits three municipalities which coincides with the most typical number split by the ensemble prioritizing municipalities. Though this ensemble sometimes splits a number more municipalities, it typically displaces significantly fewer people than the enacted plan. From the perspective of the number of people ousted, the enacted plan is situated squarely between our ensemble prioritizing municipal preservation and that which does not.


Figure 6.2.5: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the NC Senate Secondary ensemble which does not explicitly preserves municipalities.


Figure 6.2.6: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.2.3 Forsyth-Stokes

There are only two districts in this cluster. The districts in the enacted plan are chosen to maximize the number of Democrats in the more democratic district and the number of republicans in the most Republican district. The map is an extreme outlier in both of these regards. The effect is a maximally non-responsive map. The effect is shown in Figure 6.2.7 across the 12 elections. Of the almost 80,000 maps in the ensemble, less than $1 \%$ had as low a fraction of Democrats in the most


Figure 6.2.7: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The "-" on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.

Republican district under the 2020 and 2016 elections considered. And between 1\% and 5\% of the plans had such a high Democratic fraction in the most Republican District.

When municipal preservation is not prioritized, the enacted map becomes an even more extreme outlier; showing an extreme level of packing of Democrats into one district and Republicans into the other. The effect is shown in Figure 6.2.8 across the 12 elections.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: In the Forsyth-Stokes Cluster we see that the number of people ousted from municipalities is comparable between the enacted plan and the municipality prioritizing ensemble. Additionally, the enacted plan splits one municipality which is the most common number of splits in the municipality prioritizing ensemble.


Figure 6.2.8: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the NC Senate Secondary ensemble which does not explicitly preserves municipalities.


Figure 6.2.9: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.2.4 Cumberland-Moore

There are only two districts in this cluster. The districts in the enacted are chosen to maximize the number of Democrats in the more democratic district and the number of republicans in the most Republican district. The map is an extreme outlier in both of these regards. The effect is a maximally non-responsive map. The effect is shown in Figure ?? across the 12 elections. In each of the elections considered, no more than $0.06 \%$ of the ensemble plans have a lower fraction of Democrats


Figure 6.2.10: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The "-" on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.
in the most Republican districts. Also no more than $0.06 \%$ of the ensemble plans have a higher fraction of Democrats in the most Democratic districts.

The prioritization of municipal preservation leads a dramatically less responsive pair of districts. When municipalities are less prioritized, both district have politically more centrist make up. Additionally, the more Republican district would regularly lean democratic without the prioritization of municipal preservation. The effect is show in Figure 6.2.11 across the 12 elections.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: In the Cumberland-Moore cluster, the enacted plan ousts a number of people close to the minimum number of ousted people seen in the ensemble prioritization municipal preservation. The enacted plan splits two municipalities which is the most common number of splits found in the ensemble prioritization municipal preservation.


Figure 6.2.11: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the NC Senate Secondary ensemble which does not explicitly preserves municipalities.


Figure 6.2.12: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.2.5 Guilford-Rockingham

The three districts in the Guilford-Rockingham cluster are constructed to pack an exceptional number of democrats in the most democratic district (district 28) and exceptionally few Democrats in the most Republican district (district 26). The effect is to ensure a Republican victory in the district 26, when in some elections the most republican district would be at risk of going to the Democratic Party. The effect is shown in Figure 6.2.13 across the 12 elections. In the Guilford-Rockingham


Figure 6.2.13: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the Primary ensemble which was tuned to match the municipal preservation of the enacted plan.
across all of the elections considered, none of the plans have lower fraction of Democrats in the most Republican district than the enacted plan. Conversely, in none of the elections considered do more than $0.08 \%$ of the plans have more Democrats packed in the most Democratic district than the enacted plan.

When municipalities are prioritized less, the effect is even more dramatic. In that setting, the extreme number of Democrats packed into the most democratic district and Republicans into the most Republican distinct is even more extreme. The effect is shown in Figure 6.2.14 across the 12 elections.
Municipal Splits and Ousted Population: In the Guilford-Rockingham cluster, the enacted plan splits one municipality and ousts a number of people which is typically found in the ensemble prioritizing municipality preservation which has an average ousted population which is slightly higher than the enacted plan.


Figure 6.2.14: Shown are the distributions of the Democratic vote fraction of the districts in the plan when ordered from most Republican (on the left) to most Democrat (on the right). The " - " on each marginal histogram denotes the vote fraction of the corresponding district in the enacted plan. The numbers along the horizontal axis give the district numbers in the enacted plan corresponding to the " - ". This plot uses the NC Senate Secondary ensemble which does not explicitly preserves municipalities.


Figure 6.2.15: Plots showing the distribution of the number of people ousted from municipalities in this cluster under the primary and secondary ensemble. The amount of people ousted by the enacted map is also shown.

### 6.2.6 Northeastern County Cluster

In the NC Senate, there is more than one possible group of county clusters in the northeast corner of the state. As described in Figure 4.3.1 from Section 4.3, there is a choice between two different groups of county clusters. Each group consists of two different county clusters. Based on their population, each of these clusters has only one district. Thus, there is no choice on how to redistrict this region once the county grouping is set. We now explore partisan implications of choosing one county grouping over the other. As shown in the table below, under the enacted county groupings, Republicans win both districts in every election we consider. By contrast, under the alternative county grouping, each party won one of the two districts under every election we consider.

|  | Enacted Cluster 1 | Enacted Cluster 2 | Alternative Cluster 1 | Alternative Cluster 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| County Clusters | Martin, Warren, Halifax, Hyde, Pamlico, Chowan, Washington, Carteret | Gates Currituck <br> Pasquotank Dare <br> Bertie Cam- <br> den Perquimans <br> Hertford Tyrrell <br> Northampton  | Pasquotank, Dare, Perquimans, <br> Hyde, Pamlico, Chowan, Washington, Carteret | Gates, Currituck, <br> Camden, Bertie, <br> Warren, Halifax, <br> Herfford, Tyrrell, <br> Northampton,  <br> Martin  |
| Democratic Vote \%(LG16) | 46.07\% | 47.74\% | 38.51\% | 55.42\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (PR16) | 45.60\% | 46.70\% | 37.83\% | 54.59\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (CA20) | 42.28\% | 44.47\% | 36.48\% | 50.75\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (USS20) | 45.31\% | 45.36\% | 38.45\% | 52.75\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (TR20) | 44.12\% | 44.58\% | 37.61\% | 51.59\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (GV20) | 46.79\% | 47.56\% | 40.75\% | 54.12\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (AD20) | 47.79\% | 47.72\% | 41.02\% | 54.99\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (SST20) | 47.56\% | 47.85\% | 41.03\% | 54.89\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (AG20) | 45.88\% | 46.11\% | 39.15\% | 53.40\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (PR20) | 44.09\% | 45.54\% | 38.30\% | 51.84\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (LG20) | 43.80\% | 45.12\% | 37.74\% | 51.69\% |
| Democratic Vote \% (CL20) | 45.23\% | 46.42\% | 39.12\% | 52.00\% |

Table 3: Voting History for the two different choices of county grouping northeast corner in the NC Sente.

## 7 State Legislature: Additional Details

### 7.1 State Legislature: Details on the Sampling Method

To effectively generate a representative ensemble of maps from the desired non-partisan distributions, we use the wellestablished method of parallel tempering. It allows one to effectively sample from a possibly difficult to sample distribution by connecting it to an easy to sample distribution through a sequence of intermediate "interpolating" distributions.

We connect our desired distributions to a distribution on redistricting plans that favors plans with a larger number of spanning trees. This alternative distribution satisfies the same constraints, however, it does not consider compactness nor municipal preservation. We make this choice because it can be effectively sampled using a variation on the Metropolized Multiscale Forest RECOM sampling algorithm outlined in [1, 2] coupled with the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. Using Parallel Tempering, we interpolate between the desired distribution on redistricting and a distribution which is chosen so that the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm converges to its target distribution quickly.

In sampling the interpolating ladder of distributions between the easier-to-sample distribution and our target distribution with the needed policy considerations, we use parallel tempering with a classical Metropolis-Hasting sampling scheme to sample each level of the interpolating ladder of distributions. As proposals in the Metropolis-Hasting sampling scheme, we use a mixture of the Multiscale Forest RECOM proposals and single node flip proposals, depending on what is appropriate for the distribution associated with the given level in the interpolation. The Multiscale Forest RECOM has a number of advantages. Its multiscale nature seems to provide improvements in computational efficiency and the global moves of RECOM lead empirically to faster mixing. Additionally, it can efficiently preserve counties and other groupings. Lastly, it can be effectively combined with the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to produce an algorithm that samples from the specified
distribution.
To facilitate mixing and for computational practicality, we often split the interpolating groups of manageable size, typically between 10 and 30 interpolating levels. Each grouping is then run to produce an ensemble at the top level which approaches; which is closer to the desired ensemble. This ensemble is then used as an independent sample reservoir to generate independent samples for the next group of interpolating levels. This process is repeated until the desired level is reached. We typically use between 60 and 100 interpolating levels in our sampling schemes. The number of plans sampled differs from cluster to cluster. We also sometimes group clusters together for sampling. Usually the number of samples in around 80,000 but in all cases we have check various empirical measure to evaluate if the sampling has converged and is well mixed.

### 7.2 State Legislature: Mathematical Description of Ensemble Distribution

In designing our distributions, we have chosen to define explicit distributions and then use an implementation of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate the ensemble. We feel this choice promotes transparency because an explicit distribution can better be discussed and critiqued. It also allows us to more explicitly translate the policy considerations into the ensemble.

In order to formally define our distributions, we consider the labeling $\xi$ of the precincts of the map of NC with the number $\{1, \ldots, d\}$, where $d$ is the total number of districts. So for the $i$-th precinct, $\xi(i)$ gives the district to which the precinct belongs. If we let $A_{j}(\xi)$ and $B_{j}(\xi)$ be respectively the surface area and perimeter (or length of the boundary) of the $j$-district then our compactness score is

$$
J_{\text {compact }}(\xi)=\sum_{j=1}^{d} \frac{A_{j}(\xi)}{B_{j}^{2}(\xi)} .
$$

Then the probability of drawing the redistricting $\xi$ is

$$
\operatorname{Prob}(\xi)= \begin{cases}\frac{1}{Z} e^{-w_{\text {compact }} J_{\text {compate }}(\xi)} & \text { for } \xi \text { which is allowable } \\ 0 & \text { for } \xi \text { which is not allowable }\end{cases}
$$

Here $Z$ is a number that makes the sum of $\operatorname{Prob}(\xi)$ over all redistricting plans are equal to one.
The collection of allowable redistricting plans $\xi$ is defined to be all redistricting plans which satisfy the following conditions:

1. all districts are connected
2. the populations of each district is within $\% 5$ of the ideal district population unless the district in the wake county cluster in the senate or the Craven-Carteret county cluster in the house. ${ }^{2}$
3. The number of split counties is minimized.
4. We minimize the occurrence of districts traversing county boundaries.

The second distribution includes a municipality score, $J_{M C D}(\xi)$. This score describes the number of people who have been displaced from a district that could have preserved the voters within their municipality, and is defined as

$$
J_{M C D}(\xi)=\sum_{m \in M} \operatorname{pop}_{\text {oust }}(\xi, m),
$$

where $M$ is the set of all MCDs, and $\operatorname{pop}_{\text {oust }}(\xi, m)$ is the number of displaced people from the municipality $m$ under the redistricting plan $\xi$. We define pop $_{\text {oust }}$ in one way if the population of the municipality is less than the size of a district and another if it is greater.

[^41]If $m$ has a population that is less than the population of a district, we consider the district that holds the most people from the municipality $m$ as the representative district for that municipality. Any person within municipality $m$, but not within the representative district is considered to have been displaced.

If $m$ has a population that is greater than the population of a district, we consider the number of districts that could fit within $m$ to be $d(m)=\left\lfloor\operatorname{pop}(m) / \operatorname{pop}_{\text {ideal }}\right\rfloor$, where $\operatorname{pop}(m)$ is the population of the MCD $m$ and pop $_{\text {ideal }}$ is the ideal district population. We also consider the remaining population in the municipality that cannot fit within a whole district to be $r(m)=\operatorname{pop}(m)-d(m) \times \operatorname{pop}_{\text {ideal }}$. To determine the displaced population, we look at the $d(m)$ districts that contain the largest populations from the municipality $m$. Hypothetically, everyone in these districts could live in the municipality $m$. Therefore, anyone who is in one of these districts and that does not live in the municipality $m$ could be replaced by someone who does live in the municipality. Thus, we sum the number of people not in $m$ in the $d(m)$ districts that contain the largest populations of $m$. We also note that the remaining population $r(m)$ could hypothetically be kept intact when drawing a $(d(m)+1)$ th district. We, therefore, look at the number of people in the municipality $m$ who are living in the district with the $(d(m)+1)$ th most population of the municipality. If the number of people in $m$ is less than $r(m)$, then we add this difference to the number of ousted people (since each of these people in the municipality could have conceivably been placed in the district).

Formally, we let the $|M| \times d$ matrix, $M C D(\xi)_{m, j}$ represent the number of people who are in the municipality $m$ and the district $\xi_{j}$. Then

$$
\operatorname{pop}_{\text {oust }}(\xi, m)\left\{\begin{array}{cc}
\sum_{j} M C D(\xi)_{m, j}-\max _{j}\left(M C D(\xi)_{m, j}\right) & \operatorname{pop}(m)<\operatorname{pop}_{\text {ideal }} \\
\sum_{j \in D(m)}\left(\operatorname{pop}\left(\xi_{j}\right)-M C D(\xi)_{m, j}(\xi)\right) & \operatorname{pop}(m) \geq \operatorname{pop}_{\text {ideal }} \\
+\max \left(0, M C D(\xi)_{m, N(m)}-r(m)\right) &
\end{array}\right.
$$

where $\operatorname{pop}\left(\xi_{j}\right)$ is the population of district $\xi_{j}, D(m)$ is the set of district indices that represent the $d(m)$ districts with the largest populations of municipality $m$, and $N(m)$ represents the district index with the $d(m)+1$ most population of municipality $m$.

- Ex. 6540 -


### 7.3 State Legislature: Additional Ensemble Statistics

- Ex. 6541 -


Figure 7.3.1: These plots compare the Polsby-Popper Score of the enacted maps (shown we the yellow dots) with the marginal histograms of the primary and secondary ensembles.



Figure 7.4.1: We compare a subset of the threads to the remaining threads. Each thread represents a different initial condition, and thus takes a different trajectory through the phase space. We compare our standard observables, such as the ranked ordered marginal distributions and confirm that they yield equivalent results. On the left we show an example of comparing one thread with all threads in a parallel tempering run; on the right we show an example of comparing half of the thread with the other half of the threads in a parallel tempering run.


Figure 7.4.2: We examine how each of the parallel tempering threads swaps as a function of the proposal number. The vertical axis represents different measures and the horizontal axis represents the proposal in the Markov Chain. When the thread (or redistricting) is near the bottom of the vertical axis it mixes quickly when drawing from the reservoir; when it is at the top of the vertical axis it is at the desired measure which is either the desired measure we are sampling from or an intermediate measure that will act as a subsequent reservoir.

### 7.4 State Legislature: Convergence Tests

We performed a number of tests to assess if our sampling of the desired distribution was sufficient to provide an accurate representation of the desired distribution. Sometimes many samples are needed, yet in other cases a much smaller number is sufficient. We use a number of different methods to assess convergence.

Many of our runs were generated with an implementation of the parallel tempering algorithm with an independent sample reservoir. The use of parallel tempering provides a number of different threads that can be grouped and then compared against each other. As each thread starts from a different initial condition, if the distributions look similar then there is evidence that the system is mixing. Similarly, if a subset of the threads has a similar distribution to all of the threads, then there is evidence that enough samples were used.

The following plots show representative ranked ordered histograms for some NC House and NC Senate runs where different threads in a parallel tempering run are compared.

Each time a thread exchanges its state with the independent sample reservoir, it receives a new configuration that is independent of the previous state of the system. Additionally, if the thread then progresses up to the parameter level of interest, then we have strong evidence that we are producing decorated samples. The following plots show the current level of each for the different threads in a parallel tempering run. Switching regularly from the highest level (the desired sample distribution) to the lowest level (the level with the independent sample reservoir) is a strong indication that the system will be well mixed and converged.

In some cases, we run two or more complete sampling runs for the same target distribution. If the ensembles generated are close then we have strong evidence that the ensembles are converged as each run started from different initial conditions and used different randomness.


Figure 7.4.3: We compare the ranked ordered marginals on two independent parallel tempering runs.

## 8 Congressional Plan

As with the NC House and NC Senate plans, we place a probability distribution on Congressional plans for North Carolina. The distributions embody different policy choices. With each distribution, we produce representative ensembles of maps to serve as benchmarks against which to compare specific maps. The ensembles are generated by using the Metropolis-Hasting Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm in a parallel tempering framework which employs the proposal from the Multiscale Forest RECOM algorithm [2, 1].

This analysis parallels the analysis already presented for the NC House and NC Senate with the simplification that we no longer need to consider County Clusters and that some of the criteria are modified. The details are given in Sections 8.1 and 10.1.

### 8.1 Congressional: Ensemble Overview

Similarly to the distribution placed on the NC Legislative redistricting plans in Section 4.4, we consider a distribution (and hence an ensemble) satisfying the following constraints:

- The maps split no more than 14 counties.
- The maps split no county into more than two districts.
- Districts traverse counties as few times as possible.
- All districts are required to consist of one contiguous region.
- The deviation of the total population in any district is within $1 \%$ of the ideal district population. We have verified in previous work in related settings that the small changes needed to make the districting plan have perfectly balanced populations do not change the results. (See [7] and the expert report in Common Cause v. Rucho).
- Compactness: The distributions on redistricting plans are constructed so that a plan with a larger total isoperimetric ratio is less likely than those with a lower total isoperimetric ratio. The total isoperimetric ratio of a redistricting plan is simply the sum of the isoperimetric ratios over each district. The isoperimetric ratio is the reciprocal of the Polsby-Poper score; hence, smaller isoperimetric ratio corresponds to larger Polsby-Poper scores. As the General Assembly stated in its guidance that the plans should be compact according to the Polsby-Popper score [9], we tuned the distribution so that it yields plans of a similar compactness to those of the legislature. (See Figure 10.2.1 in Section 10.2. ) We further limited our distribution only to include those with an Isoparametric score less than 80.
The legislature also listed the Reock score as another measure of compactness which one could consider. However, we have found Polsby-Popper/isoperimetric score to be a better measure when generating districts computationally. In our previous work, we have seen that this choice did not qualitatively change our conclusions (see [7] and the expert report in Common Cause v. Rucho).


### 8.2 Congressional Plan: Sampling Method

We have chosen the distribution from which to draw our ensemble to comply with the desired policy and legal considerations. It is well accepted that not all distributions on possible redistricting plans are equally easy to sample from.

As discussed in Section 7.1 to effectively generate a representative ensemble of maps from these distributions, we use the well-established method of parallel tempering. It allows one to effectively sample from a possibly difficult to sample distribution by connecting it to an easy to sample distribution through a sequence of intermediate "interpolating" distributions.

We connect our desired distributions, which includes a compactness score, to a measure on redistricting plans which is uniform on spanning forests which satisfy the population and county constants. Furthermore, the enacted plan can be effectively sampled using a variation on the Metropolized Multiscale Forest RECOM sampling algorithm outlined in [1, 2].

In sampling the interpolating ladder of distributions between the easier-to-sample measure and our target measure which includes a compactness score, we use parallel tempering with a classical Metropolis-Hasting sampling scheme to sample each level of the interpolating ladder of distributions. As proposals in the Metropolis-Hasting sampling scheme, we use Multiscale Forest RECOM proposals. We sample around 80,000 plans have confirmed that the distribution seems well mixed and than it has been sufficiently sampled to provide stable statistics.

### 8.3 Election Data Used in Analysis

The same historic elections and abbreviations were use to analyze the congressional plan and ensemble as were used for the NC legislative maps and ensemble. See Section 4.6.


Figure 9.0.1: Each histogram represents the range and distribution of possible Democratic seats won in the ensemble of plans; the height is the relative probability of observing the result. The yellow dots represent the results from the enacted congressional plan under the various historic votes.

## 9 Congressional Plan: Main Analysis

Figure 9.0.1 gives the Collected Seat Histograms for the ensemble sampled from the distribution. This figure also shows how many Democrats the enacted congressional plan would have elected under the votes from a variety of historic elections.

Without reference to a particular ensemble, a primary message of this plot is that the enacted congressional plan is largely stuck electing 4 of 14 Democrats despite large shifts in the statewide vote fraction and across a variety of election structures. Over the statewide vote Democratic partisan vote range of $46.59 \%$ to $52.32 \%$, the enacted map only twice changes the number of Republicans elected. The outcome of the election is largely stuck at 4 Democrats. This shows the enacted map to be highly non-responsive to the changing opinion of the electorate. Without holding the election one largely knows that the result will be 10 Republicans and 4 Democrates.

This non-responsiveness is not observed in the ensemble. The ensemle shows that a typical map drawn without political considerations gradually shift from 4-5 Democrats typically being elected at one end of this regime to 7-8 being elected at the other end. Hence, under historic elections in which Democrats win $46 \%$ to $53 \%$ of the statewide vote, a typical map would gradually shift from around 4 Democrats in the NC congressional delegation to around 8 Democrats as the electorate changed is vote. This does not happen under the enacted plan with the elections considered. Instead, as described above, the
enacted map sticks at only 4 Democrats in North Carolina's congressional delegation under nearly all of these elections.
To better illuminate the structure responsible for making the enacted map an extreme outlier, we turn to the Rank Ordered Box plots already discussed in general in Section 3.4 and in the context of the state legislative maps in the previous sections. The plots show extreme packing of Democrats in the three most Democratic districts and depletion of Democrats from the


Figure 9.0.2: The Ranked Marginal Box-plots for the NC Congressional Plan. The ranked ordered marginals for the enacted map are shown in yellow. 50\% of the ensemble is contained within the box. Inside the first pair of tick marks is $80 \%$ of the data and inside the second set is $95 \%$ of the points.
next 7 to 9 most Democratic districts. The effect of this cracking and packing is the non-responsiveness seen in Figure 9.0.1.
Motivated by the cracking and packing of Democrats shown in Figure 9.0.1, we ask how common is such a highly polarized districts in our non-partisen ensemble of maps. The results are summarized in Table 4. They show that the Congressional map is not only non-responsive to the changing prefernces of the electorate but it is also an extreme partisan gerrymander. Maps which lock in such an extreme partisan outcome do not occur in our ensemble.

| Election | Plans with the same <br> or more Dem (1-2) | Plans with the same <br> or more Rep (5-11) | Plans with the same <br> or more Dem (12-14) | Total Plans |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| CA20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| TR20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| LG20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| USS20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| CL20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| PR20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| AG20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| AD20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| GV20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| CI20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| USS16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| GV16 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 79997 |
| AG16 | 15 | 0 | 79997 |  |

Table 4: Over the approximately 80,000 plans in our ensemble, we ask how many plans have (1) as high Democratic fraction in the two most Republican districts, (2) as small a fraction of Democrats in the 5th through 11th most Republican districts, and (3) have as high a Democratic fraction in the 12th through 14th most Republican districts. The answer is given in this table along with the total number of plans in our ensemble.

## 10 Congressional: Additional Details

### 10.1 Congressional Plan: Mathematical Description of Ensemble Distribution

In specifying our distribution, we have chosen to define explicit distributions and then use an implementation of the MetropolisHastings algorithm to generate the ensemble. We feel this choice promotes transparency because an explicit distribution can better be discussed and critiqued. It also allows us to more explicitly translate the policy considerations into the ensemble.

In order to formally define our distributions, the partition of the precinct adjacency graph into a spanning forest $\mathcal{T}$ with 14 district trees $\left\{\mathcal{T}_{1}, \cdots, \mathcal{T}_{14}\right\}$ corresponding to each district. Hence $\mathcal{T}=\left\{\mathcal{T}_{1}, \cdots, \mathcal{T}_{14}\right\}$ completely specifies the redistricting.

If we let $A_{j}(\mathcal{T})$ and $B_{j}(\mathcal{T})$ be respectively the surface area and perimeter (or length of the boundary) of the $j$-district then our compactness score is

$$
J_{\text {compact }}(\mathcal{T})=\sum_{j=1}^{14} \frac{A_{j}(\mathcal{T})}{B_{j}^{2}(\mathcal{T})}
$$

Then the probability of drawing the spanning forest $\mathcal{T}$ is

$$
\operatorname{Prob}(\mathcal{T})= \begin{cases}\frac{1}{Z} e^{-w_{\text {compact }} J_{\text {compact }}(\mathcal{T})} & \text { for } \mathcal{T} \text { which is allowable } \\ 0 & \text { for } \mathcal{T} \text { which is not allowable }\end{cases}
$$

Here $Z$ is a number which makes the sum $\operatorname{of~} \operatorname{Prob}(\mathcal{T})$ over all spanning forests with 14 trees equal to one.
The collection of allowable spanning forests $\mathcal{T}$ is defined as those which produce redistricting plans which satisfy the following conditions:

1. all districts are connected
2. the populations of each district is within $\% 1$ of the ideal district population.
3. No more than 14 counties are split with no county split more once.
4. We minimize the occurrence of districts traversing county boundaries.


Figure 10.2.1: The yellow dots display the ordered Polsby-Popper score of the 14 districts in the enacted plan.

### 10.2 Congressional Plan: Additional Ensemble Statistics

In Figure 10.2.1, we give the box-plots for the ranked ordered marginal distribution for the compactness score, namely the Polsby-Popper score (see companion methods document). We compare the ensemble of plans with the enacted plan.

### 10.3 Congressional Plan: Convergence Tests

## A NC House: Ranked-Ordered Marginal Boxplots




- Ex. 6552 -


- Ex. 6553 -


- Ex. 6554 -


- Ex. 6555 -


- Ex. 6556 -


- Ex. 6557 -



## B NC Senate: Ranked-Ordered Marginal Boxplots




- Ex. 6559 -


- Ex. 6560 -


- Ex. 6561 -


- Ex. 6562 -


- Ex. 6563 -


- Ex. 6564 -



## C NC House: Additional Plots



Figure C.0.1: The Collected Seat Histograms for the Primary Ensemble on the NC House built from a collection of voting data generated via uniform swing.


Figure C.0.2: The Collected Seat Histograms for the Primary Ensemble on the NC House built from a collection of voting data generated via uniform swing.

## D NC Senate: Additional Plots



Figure D.0.1: The Collected Seat Histograms for the Primary Ensemble on the NC Senate built from a collection of voting data generated via uniform swing.

## E NC Congressional: Ranked-Ordered Marginal Boxplots



Figure D.0.2: The Collected Seat Histograms for the Primary Ensemble on the NC Senate built from a collection of voting data generated via uniform swing.


Figure E.0.1: something


Figure E.0.2: something


Figure E.0.3: something

| Election | - Ex. 6570 - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ $\leq$ Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \end{array} & \text { of } \\ \geq & \text { d } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second Cluster |
| LG16 | 13507 | 16.9 | 16380 | 20.5 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR16 | 23688 | 29.6 | 25268 | 31.6 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AD20 | 7579 | 9.47 | 13561 | 17.0 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AG20 | 8831 | 11.0 | 14968 | 18.7 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CA20 | 7818 | 9.77 | 12779 | 16.0 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CL20 | 8308 | 10.4 | 14272 | 17.8 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| GV20 | 14684 | 18.4 | 19730 | 24.7 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| LG20 | 10040 | 12.6 | 15902 | 19.9 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR20 | 15099 | 18.9 | 19674 | 24.6 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| SST20 | 9265 | 11.6 | 15681 | 19.6 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| TR20 | 10164 | 12.7 | 16049 | 20.1 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| USS20 | 11197 | 14.0 | 16428 | 20.5 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |

Table 5: Alamance; house

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | \% $\quad$ of <br> plans $\quad$ w/ <br> $\leq \quad$ Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (Second } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 384 | 0.48 | 2281 | 2.85 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| PR16 | 288 | 0.36 | 4743 | 5.93 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| AD20 | 72 | 0.09 | 5122 | 6.4 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| AG20 | 64 | 0.08 | 5154 | 6.44 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| CA20 | 48 | 0.06 | 4227 | 5.28 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| CL20 | 56 | 0.07 | 4995 | 6.24 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| GV20 | 200 | 0.25 | 6254 | 7.82 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| LG20 | 80 | 0.1 | 5107 | 6.38 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| PR20 | 128 | 0.16 | 5842 | 7.3 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| SST20 | 72 | 0.09 | 5418 | 6.77 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| TR20 | 80 | 0.1 | 4755 | 5.94 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |
| USS20 | 56 | 0.07 | 4334 | 5.42 | 79997 | 23 | 4 |

Table 6: Brunswick-New Hanover; house

## F Cluster-by-cluster outlier analysis

We quantify the visual trends seen in the cluster-by-cluster ordered marginal vote distributions. Similar to the analysis in Table 4, we group ranked districts and inquire how many plans in the ensemble have an average Democratic vote fraction that is more toward the extremes than the enacted plan. In general, lower numbers in the tables below signify more atypical clusters.

- Ex. 6571 -

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems (First Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ <br> $\leq$ Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\quad \geq$ <br> Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \% & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total Plans | First Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 288 | 0.36 | 2406 | 3.01 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| PR16 | 848 | 1.06 | 3910 | 4.89 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| AD20 | 578 | 0.723 | 3738 | 4.67 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| AG20 | 657 | 0.821 | 3711 | 4.64 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| CA20 | 506 | 0.633 | 3072 | 3.84 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| CL20 | 573 | 0.716 | 3578 | 4.47 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| GV20 | 892 | 1.12 | 4803 | 6.0 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| LG20 | 642 | 0.803 | 3699 | 4.62 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| PR20 | 960 | 1.2 | 4790 | 5.99 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| SST20 | 546 | 0.683 | 3305 | 4.13 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| TR20 | 555 | 0.694 | 3295 | 4.12 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| USS20 | 541 | 0.676 | 3404 | 4.26 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |

Table 7: Buncombe; house

| Election | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \text { \% } & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } & \text { w/ } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (First } \\ \text { Cluster) } \end{array}$ | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \leq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (Second } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 12935 | 16.2 | 12183 | 15.2 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| PR16 | 13057 | 16.3 | 5371 | 6.71 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| AD20 | 12585 | 15.7 | 1657 | 2.07 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| AG20 | 12230 | 15.3 | 2081 | 2.6 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| CA20 | 12445 | 15.6 | 1573 | 1.97 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| CL20 | 12411 | 15.5 | 1785 | 2.23 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| GV20 | 12167 | 15.2 | 1489 | 1.86 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| LG20 | 12312 | 15.4 | 1789 | 2.24 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| PR20 | 12320 | 15.4 | 921 | 1.15 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| SST20 | 12059 | 15.1 | 1709 | 2.14 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| TR20 | 12102 | 15.1 | 1537 | 1.92 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |
| USS20 | 11901 | 14.9 | 1669 | 2.09 | 79997 | 34 | 5 |

Table 8: Cabarrus-Davie-Rowan-Yadkin; house

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | \% of plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \% & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } & \text { w/ } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \hline \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total Plans | First Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 3767 | 4.71 | 13593 | 17.0 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| PR16 | 5414 | 6.77 | 13064 | 16.3 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| AD20 | 970 | 1.21 | 11880 | 14.9 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| AG20 | 899 | 1.12 | 11149 | 13.9 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| CA20 | 833 | 1.04 | 11167 | 14.0 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| CL20 | 341 | 0.426 | 10790 | 13.5 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| GV20 | 517 | 0.646 | 11339 | 14.2 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| LG20 | 346 | 0.433 | 10829 | 13.5 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| PR20 | 579 | 0.724 | 11315 | 14.1 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| SST20 | 1206 | 1.51 | 12333 | 15.4 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| TR20 | 587 | 0.734 | 10981 | 13.7 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |
| USS20 | 360 | 0.45 | 10674 | 13.3 | 79997 | 2 | 34 |

Table 9: Cumberland; house

- Ex. 6572 -

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems (First Cluster) | \% of plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\quad \geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | \% of plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | Total <br> Plans | First Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 46063 | 57.6 | 46238 | 57.8 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR16 | 43010 | 53.8 | 43894 | 54.9 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AD20 | 41097 | 51.4 | 41193 | 51.5 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AG20 | 38601 | 48.3 | 38516 | 48.1 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CA20 | 39051 | 48.8 | 39158 | 48.9 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CL20 | 38891 | 48.6 | 39038 | 48.8 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| GV20 | 38179 | 47.7 | 38073 | 47.6 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| LG20 | 38313 | 47.9 | 38392 | 48.0 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR20 | 38660 | 48.3 | 38492 | 48.1 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| SST20 | 41059 | 51.3 | 40686 | 50.9 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| TR20 | 38891 | 48.6 | 39342 | 49.2 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| USS20 | 38430 | 48.0 | 38734 | 48.4 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |


| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \leq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (First } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems <br> (Second <br> Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (Second } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 0 | 0.0 | 2768 | 3.46 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0.0 | 409 | 0.511 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| AD20 | 0 | 0.0 | 274 | 0.343 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| AG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 312 | 0.39 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| CA20 | 0 | 0.0 | 929 | 1.16 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| CL20 | 0 | 0.0 | 417 | 0.521 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| GV20 | 0 | 0.0 | 232 | 0.29 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| LG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 328 | 0.41 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| PR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 96 | 0.12 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0.0 | 296 | 0.37 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| TR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 280 | 0.35 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |
| USS20 | 0 | 0.0 | 497 | 0.621 | 79997 | 1 | 34 |

Table 11: Durham-Person; house

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \text { \% } & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ \leq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (First } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems <br> (Second <br> Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \% & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } & \text { w/ } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total <br> Plans | First Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 1 | 0.00125 | 659 | 0.824 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0.0 | 543 | 0.679 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| AD20 | 8 | 0.01 | 952 | 1.19 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| AG20 | 11 | 0.0138 | 1025 | 1.28 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| CA20 | 11 | 0.0138 | 1032 | 1.29 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| CL20 | 9 | 0.0113 | 995 | 1.24 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| GV20 | 8 | 0.01 | 982 | 1.23 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| LG20 | 8 | 0.01 | 980 | 1.23 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| PR20 | 8 | 0.01 | 893 | 1.12 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0.0 | 912 | 1.14 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| TR20 | 9 | 0.0113 | 944 | 1.18 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |
| USS20 | 16 | 0.02 | 1106 | 1.38 | 79997 | 123 | 45 |


| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \% & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } & \text { w/ } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \end{array}$ | Total <br> Plans | First Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| AD20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| AG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| CA20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| CL20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| GV20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| LG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| PR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| TR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| USS20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |


| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \end{array} & \text { of } \\ \geq \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \hline \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 661 | 0.826 | 2 | 0.0025 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| PR16 | 168 | 0.21 | 6 | 0.0075 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| AD20 | 569 | 0.711 | 32 | 0.04 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| AG20 | 763 | 0.954 | 35 | 0.0438 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| CA20 | 1363 | 1.7 | 84 | 0.105 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| CL20 | 1146 | 1.43 | 72 | 0.09 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| GV20 | 396 | 0.495 | 40 | 0.05 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| LG20 | 700 | 0.875 | 36 | 0.045 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| PR20 | 202 | 0.253 | 19 | 0.0238 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| SST20 | 496 | 0.62 | 29 | 0.0363 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| TR20 | 975 | 1.22 | 88 | 0.11 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |
| USS20 | 1082 | 1.35 | 69 | 0.0863 | 79997 | 1234 | 5678 |

Table 14: Mecklenburg; house

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | \% of plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems (Second Cluster) | \% of plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | Total <br> Plans | First Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 1194 | 1.49 | 899 | 1.12 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR16 | 2115 | 2.64 | 1829 | 2.29 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AD20 | 8230 | 10.3 | 4317 | 5.4 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AG20 | 4434 | 5.54 | 2326 | 2.91 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CA20 | 2295 | 2.87 | 1334 | 1.67 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CL20 | 4069 | 5.09 | 2163 | 2.7 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| GV20 | 6311 | 7.89 | 3379 | 4.22 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| LG20 | 4123 | 5.15 | 2222 | 2.78 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR20 | 6573 | 8.22 | 3564 | 4.46 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| SST20 | 5386 | 6.73 | 2656 | 3.32 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| TR20 | 4243 | 5.3 | 2177 | 2.72 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| USS20 | 3799 | 4.75 | 2074 | 2.59 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |

- Ex. 6574 -

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems <br> (Second Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \\ \geq \end{array} \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (Second } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | Total Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 209 | 0.261 | 6107 | 7.63 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| PR16 | 160 | 0.2 | 4317 | 5.4 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| AD20 | 240 | 0.3 | 4968 | 6.21 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| AG20 | 230 | 0.288 | 4728 | 5.91 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| CA20 | 1151 | 1.44 | 15113 | 18.9 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| CL20 | 337 | 0.421 | 6643 | 8.3 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| GV20 | 225 | 0.281 | 3777 | 4.72 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| LG20 | 298 | 0.373 | 5552 | 6.94 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| PR20 | 241 | 0.301 | 4462 | 5.58 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| SST20 | 291 | 0.364 | 4572 | 5.72 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| TR20 | 377 | 0.471 | 7229 | 9.04 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| USS20 | 354 | 0.443 | 6912 | 8.64 | 79997 | 12 | $\begin{aligned} & 345678 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ |

Table 16: Wake; house

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \\ \text { of } \\ \geq \quad \text { wems } \\ \hline \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \end{array} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 48 | 0.06 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR16 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AD20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AG20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CA20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CL20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| GV20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| LG20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| SST20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| TR20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| USS20 | 48 | 0.06 | 48 | 0.06 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |


| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \end{array} & \text { of } \\ \geq \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total Plans | First Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 855 | 1.07 | 3472 | 4.34 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR16 | 600 | 0.75 | 1822 | 2.28 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AD20 | 506 | 0.633 | 1745 | 2.18 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| AG20 | 595 | 0.744 | 2455 | 3.07 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CA20 | 570 | 0.713 | 2521 | 3.15 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| CL20 | 550 | 0.688 | 2191 | 2.74 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| GV20 | 471 | 0.589 | 1496 | 1.87 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| LG20 | 485 | 0.606 | 1967 | 2.46 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| PR20 | 447 | 0.559 | 1392 | 1.74 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| SST20 | 515 | 0.644 | 1827 | 2.28 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| TR20 | 646 | 0.808 | 2696 | 3.37 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |
| USS20 | 498 | 0.623 | 2174 | 2.72 | 79997 | 1 | 2 |

Table 18: Forsyth-Stokes; senate

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ <br> Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \leq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (First } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | No. plans w/ $\geq$ <br> Dems <br> (Second <br> Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { plans } \quad \text { w/ } \\ & \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \text { (Second } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 0 | 0.0 | 6 | 0.015 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 0.0075 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| AD20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| AG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| CA20 | 0 | 0.0 | 9 | 0.0225 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| CL20 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.01 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| GV20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| LG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| PR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| TR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 5 | 0.0125 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |
| USS20 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.01 | 39991 | 12 | 3456 |

Table 19: Granville-Wake; senate

| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \text { \% } & \text { of } \\ \text { plans } & \text { w/ } \\ \leq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (First } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | No. plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{array}{lr} \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \end{array} & \text { wf } \\ \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ \text { (Second } \\ \text { Cluster) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Total <br> Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second <br> Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 0 | 0.0 | 13 | 0.0163 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0.0 | 13 | 0.0163 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| AD20 | 0 | 0.0 | 54 | 0.0675 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| AG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 33 | 0.0413 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| CA20 | 0 | 0.0 | 15 | 0.0188 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| CL20 | 0 | 0.0 | 23 | 0.0288 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| GV20 | 0 | 0.0 | 56 | 0.07 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| LG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 22 | 0.0275 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| PR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 59 | 0.0738 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0.0 | 32 | 0.04 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| TR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 20 | 0.025 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |
| USS20 | 0 | 0.0 | 23 | 0.0288 | 79997 | 1 | 3 |


| Election | No. plans w/ $\leq$ Dems (First Cluster) | \% of <br> plans w/ <br> $\leq$ Dems <br> (First <br> Cluster) | No. plans w/ $\geq$ Dems (Second Cluster) | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{l} \% \\ \text { plans } \end{array} \quad \text { of } \\ & \geq \quad \text { Dems } \\ & \hline \text { (Second } \\ & \text { Cluster) } \end{aligned}$ | Total Plans | First <br> Cluster | Second Cluster |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LG16 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| PR16 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| AD20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| AG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| CA20 | 0 | 0.0 | 8 | 0.01 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| CL20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| GV20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| LG20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| PR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| SST20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| TR20 | 0 | 0.0 | 8 | 0.01 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |
| USS20 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 79997 | 12 | 3456 |

## References

[1] Eric Autrey, Daniel Carter, Gregory Herschlag, Zach Hunter, and Jonathan C. Mattingly. Metropolized forest recombination for monte carlo sampling of graph partitions, 2021.
[2] Eric A. Autry, Daniel Carter, Gregory Herschlag, Zach Hunter, and Jonathan C. Mattingly. Multi-scale merge-split markov chain monte carlo for redistricting, 2020.
[3] Daniel Carter, Gregory Herschlag, Zach Hunter, and Jonathan Mattingly. A merge-split proposal for reversible monte carlo markov chain sampling of redistricting plans. CoRR, abs/1911.01503, 2019.
[4] Daniel Carter, Zach Hunter, Dan Teague, Gregory Herschlag, and Jonathan Mattingly. Optimal legislative county clustering in north carolina. Statistics and Public Policy, 7(1):19-29, 2020.
[5] Christopher Cooper, Blake Esselstyn, Gregory Herschlag, Jonathan Mattingly, and Rebecca Tippett. NC general assembly county clusterings from the 2020 census. Technical report, Duke University, August 2020. Quantyfing Gerrymandering Blog.
[6] Christopher Cooper, Blake Esselstyn, Gregory Herschlag, Jonathan Mattingly, and Rebecca Tippett. Nc general assembly county clusterings from the 2020 census. https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf, 2021.
[7] Gregory Herschlag, Han Sung Kang, Justin Luo, Christy Vaughn Graves, Sachet Bangia, Robert Ravier, and Jonathan C. Mattingly. Quantifying gerrymandering in north carolina. Statistics and Public Policy, 7(1):30-38, 2020.
[8] Gregory Herschlag, Robert Ravier, and Jonathan C. Mattingly. Evaluating Partisan Gerrymandering in Wisconsin. arXiv e-prints, page arXiv:1709.01596, Sep 2017.
[9] NC Legislature. 2021 joint redistricting committee adopted criteria. https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-12-2021/Criteria.adopted.8.12.pdf, 2021.
[10] J. C. Mattingly and C. Vaughn. Redistricting and the Will of the People. ArXiv e-prints, October 2014.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of North Carolina that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.


Jonathan Mattingly, 12/23/2021

# Addendum to Primary Expert Report of Jonathan C. Mattingly, Ph.D. 

I am a Professor of Mathematics and Statistical Science at Duke University. My degrees are from the North Carolina School of Science and Math (High School Diploma), Yale University (B.S.), and Princeton University (Ph.D.). I grew up in Charlotte, North Carolina and currently live in Durham, North Carolina.

I lead a group at Duke University which conducts non-partisan research to understand and quantify gerrymandering. This report grows out of aspects of our group's work around the current North Carolina legislative districts which are relevant to the case
being filed.
I previously submitted an expert report in Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 18-CV-1026
(M.D.N.C.), Diamond v. Torres, No. 17-CV-5054 (E.D. Pa.), Common Cause v. Lewis (N.C. Sup. Ct No. 18-cvs-014001), and Harper v. Lewis (No. 19-cv-012667) and was an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Common Cause v. Rucho and Common Cause v. Lewis. I am being paid at a rate of $\$ 400 /$ per hour for the work on this case. This note is a companion to the main expert report. It has been requested by a subset of plaintiffs' counsel.

## Addendum Analysis

We examine the correlation between the fraction of the black voting age population and the partisan make up of (i) the North Eastern cluster choices in the North Carolina State Senate, and (ii) the districts within the Duplin-Wayne county cluster in the North Carolina State House.

North Eastern Cluster Options

|  | Enacted Clusters |  | Alternative Option |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| County Clusters (1 <br> district per cluster) | MARTIN WARREN <br> HALIFAX HYDE <br> PAMLICO CHOWAN <br> WASHINGTON <br> CARTERET | GATES CURRITUCK <br> PASQUOTANK DARE <br> BERTIE CAMDEN <br> PERQUIMANS <br> HERTFORD <br> TYRRELL <br> NORTHAMPTON | PASQUOTANK DARE <br> PERQUIMANS HYDE <br> PAMLICO CHOWAN <br> CAMDEN BERTIE <br> WASHINGTON <br> CARTERET |  |



The Northeastern corner of the North Carolina State Senate has two possible county clusterings; each clustering is made of two clusters each with one district. We compare the enacted plan with the other possible districting option. We find that the enacted plan splits the Black voters roughly in half, whereas the other potential clustering would have concentrated Black voters in one of the two resulting districts. Furthermore, we find that the enacted plan leads to two stable Republican districts when measured across a range of historic voting patterns. In contrast, the alternative clustering would have allowed the district with the larger BVAP ( $42.33 \%$ BVAP) to reliably elect a Democratic candidate. Thus, the chosen cluster is the choice that favors the Republican party andsignificantly fractures Black voters in the area.

Next, we examine the correlation between BVAP fraction and Democratic vote fraction in the Duplin-Wayne cluster. We elect to use the 2020 Governor votes and plot the relationship between the BVAP and the vote fraction in (i) our ensemble and (ii) the enacted plan. We demonstrate that (i) it is possible to draw districts with significantly higher BVAPs and that (ii) according to the examined historic votes, raising the BVAP would likely raise the Democratic vote fraction.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of North Carolina that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my Knowledge.


Jonathan C Mattingly
Dec 23, 2021.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

21 CVS 015426

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC., et al.,

REBECCA HARPER, et al., COMMON CAUSE,

## Plaintiffs,

EXPERT REPORT OF
JAMES L. LELOUDIS II

## Race and Voting Rights in North Carolina, 1860-2021

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Summary of Opinions ..... 3
II. Background and Qualifications .....  4
III. Materials Reviewed ..... 5
IV. Scope ..... 5
V. Introduction - Democracy, Racial Equality, and Voting Rights ..... 5
VI. War, Emancipation, and Reconstruction ..... 7
VII. Fusion Politics and a New Campaign for White Supremacy ..... 12
VIII. Jim Crow ..... 21
IX. Black Advance and White Reaction in the Forgotten 1950s ..... 31
X. Civil Rights at Last ..... 44
XI. Judicial Intervention and a More Inclusive Democracy ..... 52
XII. Retrenchment ..... 59
XIII. Conclusion ..... 79
Bibliography ..... 80
Appendix - Curriculum Vitae ..... 96

## I. Summary of Opinions

My name is James L. Leloudis II. I have taught history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for thirty-one years, with a focus on North Carolina and the American South. I have published extensively on the history of the state and region, and my scholarship has won awards from the nation's leading professional associations in my field.

I was retained by the Plaintiffs in this case to assess whether there is a history of racial discrimination in North Carolina, specifically with respect to the regulation of elections and legislative redistricting. Based on my forty years of researching, writing, and teaching in this field, and having reviewed published works by historians of race and politics in the American South, newspapers from the time period covered by this declaration, the public laws of North Carolina, archival sources for individuals and institutions, and reports from various federal and state agencies, it is my opinion that:

- North Carolina has a long and cyclical history of struggle over minority voting rights and political participation, from the time of Reconstruction to the present day.
- When minority rights have been constrained, North Carolina's state government has been decidedly unresponsive to minority concerns and interests related to social and economic policy. That lack of responsiveness to Blacks and, in recent years, a rapidly growing population of Hispanics, has perpetuated minority disadvantages in employment and education, further hindering the ability of minority populations to participate fully and freely in the political process. ${ }^{1}$
- Over the last century and a half, North Carolina lawmakers have employed a variety of measures to limit the rights of racial and ethnic minorities to register, to vote, and to participate in the democratic process. These measures have included vigilante violence, a literacy test and poll tax, and a host of other regulations regarding the preparation of ballots, procedures for challenging electors' right to register and to vote, and election monitoring by partisan poll watchers.
- During the late 1950s and 1960s, lawmakers acted to limit the political participation of newly enfranchised Black voters by switching from ward to at-large representation in county and municipal governments, increasing the number of multi-member districts in the state legislature, introducing numbered-seat plans for legislative elections, and outlawing single-shot voting. After the federal courts began to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and limited those practices, extreme partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution became the tactics of choice for limiting minority voting rights and political participation.
- Actions by the North Carolina legislature in the current redistricting cycle fit the pattern of conservative backlash to minority gains. With a rising minority electorate, lawmakers have created district maps that they claim are colorblind; but in fact, the maps reproduce

[^42]familiar forms of racial discrimination. The legislature is acting with no fear of repercussion in part because this is the first redistricting cycle without the preclearance protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

- In the context of North Carolina's political history, race and politics overlap, to the extent that partisan gerrymandering many times acts as a cover for racial discrimination in redistricting.
Each of these opinions is explained and supported in detail below.


## II. Background and Qualifications

I am employed as Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I received a B.A., with highest honors, from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1977), an M.A. from Northwestern University (1979), and a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1989). My primary training was in the history of the United States, with specialization in the history of race, politics, labor, and reform in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century American South. For the past thirty-one years I have taught undergraduate and graduate courses in my area of specialization. I have published four books, nine articles, and numerous book reviews. I have also made more than fifty presentations to academic and lay audiences.

My scholarship has won a number of prestigious awards, including the Louis Pelzer Prize for the best essay by a graduate student (1982, Organization for American Historians), the Philip Taft Labor History Award for the best book on the history of labor (1988, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University), the Merle Curti Award for the best book on American social history (1988, Organization of American Historians), the Albert J. Beveridge Award for the best book on the history of the United States, Latin America, or Canada (1988, American Historical Association), the Mayflower Cup for the best non-fiction work on North Carolina (1996, North Carolina Literary and Historical Association), and the North Caroliniana Society Award for the best work on North Carolina history (2010).

In 1982, as a graduate student in history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, I conducted research that became part of the expert testimony provided by Professor Harry Watson in Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (1984). ${ }^{2}$ In 2014-2016, I provided expert testimony for the plaintiffs in North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D.N.C. 2016), and North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). In 2017, I was retained as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Hall v. Jones County Board of Commissioners, 4:17-cv-00018 (E.D.N.C. July 5, 2017), but the case was settled before I submitted a report. I recently served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Holmes $v$. Moore, 270 N.C. App. 7 (Wake Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2019), and I am currently an expert witness for the plaintiffs in North Carolina State Conference of the NCAAP v. Cooper, 1:18-cv-01034 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2021).

I produced this report under contract with the Southern Coalition for Social Justice and Hogan Lovells, representing Common Cause. My billing rate is $\$ 300$ /hour, with total payment not
${ }^{2}$ Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
to exceed $\$ 20,000$, unless approved by counsel. Payment is not contingent on reaching specific conclusions as a result or my research, or on the outcome of my findings.

A detailed record of my professional qualifications and publications is set forth in the curriculum vitae appended to this report, which I prepared and know to be accurate.

## III. Materials Reviewed

I have conducted qualitative research on the history of race, voting rights, voter suppression, and redistricting in North Carolina, from the end of the Civil War to the present. Sources that I have consulted include published works by historians of race and politics in the American South, newspapers from the time period covered by this declaration, the public laws of North Carolina, archival sources for individuals and institutions, court cases, and reports from various federal and state agencies. All of the sources relied upon for this report are footnoted and fully cited herein, and also listed in my bibliography.

## IV. Scope

This report examines the historical context for recent attempts to limit minority citizens' voting rights and ability to elect candidates of their choice. It details more than a century and a half of fierce conflict between efforts to expand access to the ballot box for all citizens, especially Blacks, and campaigns to impose restrictions on the franchise and minority participation in democratic governance. The report begins with the Civil War and Reconstruction era and concludes with today's battles over the regulation of elections and both legislative and municipal redistricting.

## V. Introduction - Democracy, Racial Equality, and the Rights of Citizenship

Today, Americans are sharply divided over questions of voting rights and minority political participation. To understand how we came to this impasse, we must look back to 1865 and the end of America's Civil War. The Union had been preserved and the Confederacy was in ashes, but the sacrifice of nearly three quarters of a million lives had not decided the republic's future. Would there be a "new birth of freedom," as Abraham Lincoln had imagined in his Gettysburg Address, or would the nation be reconstituted as a "white man's government," the outcome preferred by his successor, Andrew Johnson? Between 1865 and 1870, self-styled "radicals" in Lincoln's Republican Party answered that question with three constitutional amendments that historians have described as America's "Second Founding." ${ }^{3}$

The Thirteenth Amendment (1865) abolished slavery and guaranteed the liberty of four million Black men, women, and children who had been enslaved in the South. The Fourteenth (1868) granted them citizenship by birthright and established the principle of "equal protection of the laws." And the Fifteenth (1870) forbade the states from denying or abridging male citizens' right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

These constitutional guarantees tied the fate of American democracy to the citizenship rights of a newly emancipated Black minority and their descendants. For one hundred and fifty

[^43]years, the exercise of those rights and the connection between racial justice and democratic governance have been the centermost issues in American politics. This has been particularly true for the right to vote.

In North Carolina, battles over the political rights of citizenship have played out through cycles of emancipatory politics and conservative retrenchment. In a pattern repeated multiple times, Blacks and their allies have formed political movements to end racial exploitation and claim their rights as equal citizens. They have done so not only to advance their own interests but to promote participatory democracy more generally and to make government responsive to the needs of all its people. Invariably, these efforts have met resistance from conservative lawmakers who erected safeguards - or what advocates of enfranchisement called barriers - around the ballot box. Conservatives have been remarkably creative in that work. When one restriction was struck down in the courts or through protest and political mobilization, they quickly invented another. Sometimes, they spoke in overtly racial terms and implemented reforms through violent means. At other times, they cast franchise restrictions in the more euphemistic language of fraud and corruption. Consistently, they presented strict regulation of the right to vote as a means of ensuring "good order" and "good government."

Some pundits have suggested that the fight over ballots and democratic governance represents little more than competition between Democrats and Republicans to reshape the electorate and gain partisan advantage. No doubt the contest has been intensely partisan, but the ideological realignment of the Democratic and Republican parties reminds us that something far more significant has been at stake. In the decades immediately after the Civil War, Conservatives called themselves Democrats, campaigned for limited social provision, and took the vote from Black men, while Republicans identified as social progressives, championed an expansive and generous state, and fought for equality at the ballot box and in the halls of government. Beginning in the mid twentieth century, these positions flipped. Grassroots activists and national leaders reshaped the Democratic Party to support the advancement of civil rights, while the Republican Party became overwhelmingly white, sought to limit federal involvement in state and local affairs, and adopted a restrictive stance toward citizenship and its attendant rights.

Through all these changes, one fact has remained constant. Discrimination on the basis of color has been white conservatives' primary means of securing both political advantage over minority citizens and their progressive white allies. That was glaringly obvious in 1900, when Democrats amended North Carolina's constitution in order to disenfranchise Black men. It is also evident today in Republicans' attempts to restrict minority citizens' voting rights and in their use of racially discriminatory redistricting practices and partisan gerrymandering to consolidate control over state government and public policy. This politics of race threatens the fundamental principles of our democracy. When racial equality has been denied, and when the consideration of race has been used for partisan gain and the exclusion of minority electors from the democratic polity, the result has been a society in which vast numbers of citizens - not only racial minorities - have had their right to fair and effective representation compromised.

Understood in this historical context, today's conflicts over minority political rights are reminders that we live in a time every bit as consequential as the flush of reform that followed the Civil War. Then, as now, democracy was imperiled by divisive racial appeals, violent expressions of white supremacy, and efforts to roll back newly won citizenship. In such a moment, history has clarifying power.

## VI. War, Emancipation, and Reconstruction

## A. Civil War to the Black Code

On the eve of the Civil War, North Carolina's government was an oligarchy, not a democracy. The state constitution gave political advantage to a slaveholding elite concentrated in the eastern counties of the coastal plain. Seats in the state Senate were apportioned among fifty districts defined by the value of the taxes that residents paid into state coffers; in the House of Representatives, apportionment was governed by the "federal ratio," which counted slaves as threefifths of a person. These provisions, together with property requirements for election to high state office, effectively removed a large majority of middling and poor whites from governance of the state and their local communities. Free Black men with property had been entitled to vote under the state constitution of 1776 , but that right was rescinded in 1835 by a constitutional amendment. This was the first time in the state's history that the franchise was restricted on the basis of race. Political leaders framed Black disenfranchisement as a necessary response to Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831 and the founding of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833. They saw it as protection against the threat of slave insurrections encouraged by white abolitionists and their perceived agents, free Black men exercising the rights of citizenship. ${ }^{4}$

By 1860 more than 85 percent of lawmakers in the North Carolina General Assembly were slaveholders, a higher percentage than in any other southern state. Wealth was closely held by this elite, who constituted roughly seven percent of the state's population of one million and resided primarily in the east. These men also maintained a firm grip on political power. Indeed, the principles of oligarchy were written into the state's constitution. At the local level, voters elected only two county officials: a sheriff and a clerk of court. The power to govern rested in the hands of justices of the peace who were nominated by members of the state House of Representatives and commissioned for life terms by the governor. ${ }^{5}$

North Carolina's antebellum oligarchs did not rule with unchallenged authority. In the 1850s, they faced political revolt by white yeoman farmers in the central Piedmont and the western mountain region who called for removal of property requirements for the right to vote for state senators and demanded an ad valorem tax on slaveholders' human property - more than three hundred and thirty thousand Black men, women, and children. Dissenters won the first contest by popular referendum on free suffrage in 1856, and they prevailed in the second when delegates to the state secession convention gave ground on taxation for fear that in war with the North, ordinary whites "would not lift a finger to protect rich men's negroes." 6

Most of North Carolina remained behind Confederate lines until the final days of the Civil War, and for that reason the state bore a Herculean share of hardship and deprivation. By 1863, North Carolina troops were deserting by the thousands. Many did so with support from the Order of the Heroes of America, an underground network of Unionists and Quaker pacifists. Food riots broke out in the state's largest towns, and in the 1864 gubernatorial election, William Woods Holden, a self-made newspaper publisher, ran on a peace platform, arguing that a negotiated return

[^44]to the Union offered North Carolina's only chance to "save human life" and "prevent the impoverishment and ruin of our people." Holden lost to incumbent governor Zebulon B. Vance by 58,070 to 14,491 votes, but his candidacy exposed a deep rift between the state's wealthy rulers and a significant minority of whites - twenty percent of the electorate - who had "tired of the rich man's war \& poor man's fight."7

As defeat grew imminent, Calvin H. Wiley, a distinguished educator and publicist, warned of the insurrection that collapse of the Confederacy and the end of slavery would unleash. "The negroes [and] the meanest class of white people would constitute a majority," he warned, and those "who were once socially \& politically degraded" would make common cause and rise up in rebellion. To forestall this political realignment, self-styled Conservatives took advantage of President Andrew Johnson's desire for a quick reconstruction of the South by acting decisively to retain political power and dominion over Black labor through legislative action. ${ }^{8}$

In the spring of 1866, Conservatives in the General Assembly passed an Act Concerning Negroes and Persons of Color, known informally as the Black Code. The act sought to keep Blacks subjugated and to "fix their status permanently" by attaching to them the same "burthen and disabilities" imposed on free persons of color by antebellum law. ${ }^{9}$

Under the Black Code, freedmen could not vote, carry weapons without a license, migrate into the state, return to the state after more than ninety days' absence, or give testimony against a white person in a court of law, except by consent of the white defendant. The law also gave sheriffs broad authority to prosecute freedmen for vagrancy, a crime punishable by hiring out to "service and labor." ${ }^{10}$

## B. A New State Constitution and Expansion of the Franchise

The Republican majority in the U.S. Congress watched developments in North Carolina and elsewhere in the South with growing concern, particularly for the rights of freedmen. Thaddeus Stevens, congressman from Pennsylvania, warned North Carolina Conservatives that they would "have no peace until a negro is free as a white man . . . and is treated as a white man!" To that end, Congress approved the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution in June 1866 and tendered it for ratification by the states. The amendment gave citizenship to freedmen and struck directly at the Black Code by guaranteeing all citizens equal protection under the law and forbidding the states to deprive any citizen of life, liberty, or property without due process. ${ }^{11}$

In North Carolina, as in all other southern states except Tennessee, Conservative lawmakers stood firm. They refused to ratify an amendment that, in their view, turned "the slave, master, and the master, slave." Congress answered that defiance by asserting its authority once more, this time through passage of the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867. The act ordered the continued military occupation of the South, instructed army commanders to organize conventions that would

[^45]rewrite the southern states' constitutions, and granted all adult male citizens - "of whatever race, or color, or previous condition" - the right to vote for convention delegates. ${ }^{12}$

This extension of a limited franchise to Black men radically rearranged the political landscape in North Carolina. It was now possible that an alliance between freedmen and dissenting whites could constitute a political majority. With that end in view, opponents of Conservative rule gathered in Raleigh in March 1867 to establish a biracial state Republican Party. William Holden, the Confederate peace candidate who had served briefly as North Carolina's provisional governor after the South's surrender, stood at the party's head and directed efforts to build a statewide organization using networks established during wartime by the Heroes of America and by the Union League in its campaigns to mobilize freedmen.

When voters went to the polls to elect delegates to the constitutional convention, leaders of the old elite were stunned: Republicans won 107 of the convention's 120 seats. Of that majority, fifteen were Black, including religious and political leader James W. Hood, who had presided over the first political convention of Blacks in North Carolina in late 1865. At that gathering, 117 delegates, most of them former slaves, met in Raleigh to petition white leaders for "adequate compensation for our labor . . . education for our children . . . [and abolition of] all the oppressive laws which make unjust discriminations on account of race or color." ${ }^{13}$

During the winter of 1867-68, delegates to the constitutional convention crafted a document that defined a thoroughly democratic polity. The proposed constitution guaranteed universal manhood suffrage, removed all property qualifications for election to high state office, and at the county level put local government in the hands of elected commissioners rather than appointed justices of the peace. North Carolina would no longer be "a republic erected on race and property." The constitution of 1868 also expanded the role of the state in advancing the welfare of its citizens by levying a capitation tax to fund education and "support of the poor," mandating for the first time in North Carolina history a state system of free public schools, and establishing a state board of public charities to make "beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate and orphan."14

Black delegates to the convention knew that the success of these reforms would depend on safeguarding broad access to the franchise and appealed for the forceful defense of voting rights. The convention passed an ordinance to criminalize efforts to intimidate "any qualified elector of this State . . . by violence or bribery, or by threats of violence or injury to his person or property." 15

In May 1868, voters ratified the constitution, elected William Holden governor, and gave the biracial Republican Party six of North Carolina's seven Congressional seats and control of more than two-thirds of the seats in the state legislature. The scale of the Republicans' victory reflected the fact that in North Carolina the percentage of whites who crossed the color line and made common cause with former bondsmen was larger than in any other southern state. ${ }^{16}$

[^46]That alliance and the democratic society it envisioned were startling, even by today's standards. In 1869, twenty Black political leaders from North Carolina traveled to Washington, D.C. to attend the Colored National Labor Convention, where they joined nearly two hundred other delegates from points across the South and throughout the nation. James H. Harris, a Black lawmaker and one of the founders of the North Carolina Republican Party, was elected president of the convention. Over the next five days, the delegates drafted a manifesto for a future built upon racial cooperation, labor solidarity, and respect for the rights of women and immigrants. The document called for unions organized "without regard to color"; extended a "welcome hand to the free immigration of labor of all nationalities"; and implored the states to fund "free school system[s] that know no distinction . . . on account of race, color, sex, creed or previous condition." These things, the manifesto proclaimed, would make the "whole people of this land the wealthiest and happiest on the face of the globe." ${ }^{17}$

## C. Klan Violence and "Redemption"

Historian Paul Escott writes that North Carolina's Republican Party "offered a new and vibrant democracy. It seemed inspired with a mission: to open up North Carolina's . . . politics and social system." But as he observes, the party's Conservative rivals were determined to make race, not democracy, the "central question." They described Republicans as a "mongrel mob" spawned by "negro suffrage and social disorder," and they warned non-elite whites of the loss of racial privilege. "IT IS IN THE POOR MAN'S HOUSE," the editor of the Wilmington Journal railed, "THAT THE NEGRO WILL ENFORCE HIS EQUALITY." ${ }^{18}$

Such provocations struck deep chords of sentiment in a society that had been organized around racial division for more than two hundred years. But in the new order, words alone could not loosen the Republicans' hold on power. To strike the crippling blow, Conservatives turned to the Ku Klux Klan and vigilante violence. The Klan was first organized in Tennessee in 1868 and subsequently spread across the South. In North Carolina, its leader was one of the Conservatives' own: William L. Saunders, a former Confederate colonel and later a trustee of the state university and secretary of state.

The Klan's masked nightriders committed "every degree of atrocity; burning houses, whipping men and women, beating with clubs, shooting, cutting, and other methods of injuring and insult." In Graham, the seat of Alamance County, they murdered Wyatt Outlaw, a Black town commissioner and constable, and hung his body from a tree in the public square; and in Caswell County, Klansmen lured state senator John W. Stephens, a white Republican, into the basement of the county courthouse, where they beat and stabbed him to death. ${ }^{19}$

Violence occurred in all parts of the state, but as the murders of Outlaw and Stephens attest, backlash against Black political power was especially fierce in the central Piedmont, where the Klan aimed to intimidate not only Black voters, but also the large number of dissenting whites who had crossed the race line. As one Klan leader explained, he and his compatriots aimed not to

[^47]restore "a white man's government only, but - mark the phrase - an intelligent white man's government." ${ }^{20}$

On July 8, 1870, Governor Holden declared Alamance and Caswell Counties to be in open insurrection and ordered the state militia to suppress the Klan and arrest its leaders. That move quelled the worst violence but gave Holden's Conservative opponents the issue they needed to win back control of the General Assembly in the fall election. In 1871, Conservatives successfully impeached and removed Holden from office on charges of unlawfully suspending the prisoners' right of habeas corpus. ${ }^{21}$

From there, the democratic experiment of Reconstruction rapidly unwound. White northerners, weary of a decade of struggle with the South, had little will to continue a states' rights battle with their neighbors. Slavery had been abolished and secession, punished. That was enough for most whites, who found it perfectly consistent to hate the institution of slavery and to despise the slave with equal passion. For a majority, racial equality had never been a part of the Civil War's purpose. The last federal troops left North Carolina in 1877, a year after Conservatives - now calling themselves Democrats - elected Zebulon B. Vance Governor, a post that he had held for two terms during the Civil War. Across the state, Democrats celebrated "redemption" from what they had long described as the "unwise . . . doctrine of universal equality."22

In an effort to secure their victory, white Democrats abolished elected county government, returned authority to appointed justices of the peace, and limited appointed offices to whites only. But continued Black political participation at the state level sustained a competitive two-party system. White Democrats never polled more than 54 percent of the gubernatorial vote, and between 1877 and 1900, forty-three Black lawmakers served in the state House of Representatives, eleven served in the state Senate, and four served in the U.S. House of Representatives. ${ }^{23}$

## D. New Forms of Economic Subjugation

Economic change swept through rural North Carolina in the decades after Reconstruction as an emerging merchant class pressed freedmen and white yeoman farmers into commercial production. The result was the notorious system of sharecropping that turned once-independent whites into debtors and locked Blacks in virtual peonage. Each spring, sharecroppers took out loans in the form of the seeds, tools, and supplies they needed in order to plant the year's crop. To ensure repayment - often at interest rates as high as 50 percent - merchants demanded that their clients grow cotton or tobacco, which could be sold readily for cash. As farmers produced more of these cash crops, prices fell and rural families spiraled downward into debt. Whites who owned their land sometimes managed to escape this trap, but Blacks - the vast majority of whom were landless and had to pay rent to landlords as well as interest to merchants - had no recourse. Black sharecroppers often ended the agricultural year with no profit and were unable to accumulate wealth. This process of immiseration repeated itself from generation to generation and produced enduring poverty. In eastern North Carolina, where sharecropping had dominated the agricultural economy,

[^48]the effects could still be seen a century later, when Blacks' per capita income in the region was as low as 22 percent of that of whites. ${ }^{24}$

Desperation and resentment over a new economic order that rewarded manipulators of credit more than cultivators of the land led farmers into revolt. Whites joined the Southern Farmers Alliance, first organized in Texas and then spread throughout the South by means of local chapters, and Blacks affiliated with a parallel organization, the Colored Farmers Alliance. In 1892, these groups sought redress through the political process. Blacks remained true to the Republican Party, while whites, calling themselves Populists, bolted from the Democratic Party - controlled by the state's economic elite - to the new national People's Party. The results were disastrous for the Populists. In the governor's race, the Democratic candidate won 48.3 percent of the vote, while the Republican candidate received 33.8 percent and the Populist candidate trailed with 17.04 percent. These numbers contained a lesson that was obvious to voters who were less than a generation removed from the biracial politics of Reconstruction. Divided, the dissidents were all but certain to lose; united, they could challenge Democratic power. ${ }^{25}$

## VII. Fusion Politics and a New Campaign for White Supremacy

## A. Biracial Alliance, Electoral Reform, and Investment in Social Provision

In 1894, white Populists and Black Republicans in North Carolina forged a political partnership under the banner of "Fusion" and ran a historic joint slate of candidates. The logic of that move was clear and compelling. As one Populist explained, "We can join with others who agree with us and win a great victory." This sentiment also appealed to skilled artisans and factory laborers, Black and white, who during the 1880s had rallied to the Knights of Labor and embraced the organization's call for interracial cooperation and class solidarity. On Election Day, Fusion candidates won 116 of the 170 seats in the North Carolina legislature. On the local level, in 1894 and 1896, they also elected more than one thousand Black officials, including county commissioners, deputy sheriffs, school committeemen, and magistrates. ${ }^{26}$

A commitment to fair play and democracy animated the Fusion legislature. Lawmakers capped interest rates at 6 percent, a godsend for cash-strapped farmers who relied on credit to survive; shifted the weight of taxation from individuals to corporations; and restored elected local government, a postwar reform that Democrats had reversed after their return to power in the 1870s. In addition, the legislature made new investments in public services that Democrats had starved for resources, including the state penitentiary, state schools for deaf and blind children, a statesupported home for Black orphans, and state mental asylums. ${ }^{27}$

Most important, Fusion legislators also revised state election law with the aim of guaranteeing full and fair access to the franchise:

[^49]- The revised law required that the clerk of the superior court in every county lay out compact precincts "so as to provide, as near as may be, one separate place of voting for every three hundred and fifty electors." The clerks were also instructed to publish the details of precinct boundaries and polling places in local newspapers and to post that information in public places. In a rural state in which population was widely dispersed, these provisions ensured that neither travel nor lack of public notice would be an impediment to voting. Legislators revisited the law in 1897 to provide additional protection for the opportunity as well as the right to cast a ballot. They stipulated that every elector was "entitled," without penalty, "to absent himself from service or employment" for sufficient time to register and to vote. ${ }^{28}$
- To safeguard impartiality in voter registration and the supervision of elections, the law gave clerks of court - who were elected officials, and therefore accountable to voters - the authority to appoint in every precinct one registrar and one election judge from "each political party of the state." Prior to this time, that responsibility had belonged to county officers who owed their appointment and their loyalty to the majority party in the legislature. ${ }^{29}$
- The law also criminalized various forms of physical and economic intimidation. It specified that "no regimental, battalion or company muster shall be called or directed on election day, nor shall armed men assemble on the day of election." In addition, any person who attempted "by force and violence" to "break up or stay any election" was guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment and a fine of up to one hundred dollars. Similar penalties applied to "any person who shall discharge from employment, withdraw patronage from, or otherwise injure, threaten, oppress, or attempt to intimidate, any qualified voter." ${ }^{30}$
- The law sought to limit frivolous and obstructive challenges to voter eligibility and the legality of ballots cast by presuming the truthfulness of citizens' declarations. Challenges were allowed only on a specified day prior to an election, at which time registration books were opened for public review, and challengers were required to present proof that an elector had withheld or provided false information at the time of registration. Otherwise, the law treated "entry of the name, age, residence, and date of registration of any person by the registrar, upon the registration book of a precinct, [as] presumptive evidence of the regularity of such registration, the truth of the facts stated, and the right of such person to register and to vote at such precinct. "31
- The law accommodated illiterate voters - 23 percent of whites and 60 percent of Blacks by authorizing political parties to print ballots on colored paper and to mark them with party insignia, an old practice that Democrats had abolished. In this period, before the introduction of official, non-partisan ballots and secret voting, electors received ballots from the party, or parties, they favored, marked through the names of any candidates they did not support, and handed their ballots to an election judge for deposit in boxes labeled with the office or group of offices for which they were voting. The use of color coding and party

[^50]insignia helped illiterate voters correctly identify and cast the ballot of the party they favored. To protect voters from fraudulent handling of their ballots, the law also specified that "any ballot found in the wrong box shall be presumed to have been deposited there by mistake of the officers of election, and unless such presumption shall be rebutted, the ballot shall be counted." This was important, because there could be as many as six boxes at each polling place, and apart from their labels, they all looked alike. ${ }^{32}$

- Finally, the law required public disclosure of campaign financing. Every candidate had to provide, within ten days after an election, "an itemized statement, showing in detail all the moneys contributed or expended by him, directly or indirectly, by himself or through any other person in aid of his election." Those reports also were to "give the names of the various persons who received the moneys, the specific nature of each item, and the purpose for which it was expended or contributed. ${ }^{133}$

These changes produced momentous results in the 1896 election. Republican registration overall increased by 25 percent, and turnout among registered Black voters rose from 60 to nearly 90 percent. Fusionists won more than three-fourths of the seats in the legislature and elected a white Republican, Daniel L. Russell Jr., as governor. Fusion insurgencies arose in other southern states, but only in North Carolina did a biracial alliance take control of both the legislative and executive branches of government. ${ }^{34}$

Fusion lawmakers used their political strength to redress two decades of Democrats' underinvestment in education. This was a particularly important issue for Black Republicans, whose predecessors had led the campaign to include a mandate for public schools in the 1868 state constitution and whose constituents were profoundly disadvantaged in their day-to-day interactions with landlords, merchants, and employers by an inability to read and do basic arithmetic. In an Act to Encourage Local Taxation for Public Schools, lawmakers instructed county commissioners to hold elections in every school district under their supervision on the question of "levying a special district tax" for public education. Districts that voted in favor of taxation were entitled to apply for matching funds from the state. To pressure those that refused, legislators ordered an election every two years until a special tax was approved. ${ }^{35}$

In separate legislation, Black lawmakers used their influence in the Fusion alliance to ensure equitable provision for students in their communities. A revised school law abolished separate white and Black committees appointed at the township level to manage schools for each race and replaced them with consolidated committees made up of five appointees, no more than three of whom could come from the same political party. The law charged the new committees with managing the schools in their districts as a single enterprise. They were to appropriate funds on a strict per capita basis and to apportion "school money . . . so as to give each school in their district, white

[^51]and colored, the same length of school term." Districts were also required to limit enrollments to no more than 65 students per school, so as to ensure a rough measure of equity in school facilities. ${ }^{36}$

The election and education reforms enacted in 1895 and 1897 affirmed the values that Black and white reformers had written into the state constitution in 1868. That document, the core of which remains in force today, opened by invoking the Declaration of Independence and connecting the ideals of the American republic to the economic and political struggles set in motion by Confederate defeat and the abolition of slavery. Italics highlight language added by the framers of 1868: "We do declare . . . that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness. . . . That all political power is vested in, and derived from the people; all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. ${ }^{17}$ Fusion lawmakers in North Carolina, historian Morgan Kousser has observed, created "the most democratic" political system "in the late nine-teenth-century South."38

## B. Resurgent White Supremacy and the Wilmington Coup

As they approached the election of 1898, Democrats once again made white supremacy their rallying cry and vigilante violence their most potent political weapon. Responsibility for orchestrating the party's return to power fell to former congressman Furnifold M. Simmons. Simmons lived in eastern North Carolina, in the Second Congressional District, which was known as the "Black Second" because of its large and politically active Black population. Counties in the district sent more than fifty Black representatives to the General Assembly in Raleigh and elected all four of the state's 19th-century Black congressmen, including Henry P. Cheatham, who had deprived Simmons of his seat in the 1888 election. Simmons and other Democratic leaders dodged the economic and class issues that held the Fusion coalition together and appealed instead to the specter of "negro domination."39

Democratic newspapers took the lead in whipping up race hatred. None was more influential than the Raleigh News and Observer, published by Josephus Daniels. Day after day, in the weeks leading up to the election, Daniels ran political cartoons on the front page of the paper to illustrate the evils unleashed by Black political participation. The cartoons depicted Black men as overlords and sexual predators who were intent on emasculating white men, turning them into supplicants and ravaging their wives and daughters. Across scores of images, the News and Observer's message was clear: in an inversion of the racial order, Blacks had lifted themselves by pressing white men down.

[^52]
"The New Slavery,"
Raleigh News and Observer, October 15, 1898.

"The Vampire that Hovers Over North Carolina,"
Raleigh News and Observer, September 27, 1898.

Democrats wielded racial appeals as a wrecking ball, much as they had done during Reconstruction. Some white Populists buckled. They gave in to the deeply entrenched ways that race shaped political and social perception and began arguing that they, not Democrats, were the most ardent defenders of white supremacy. Even so, the political battle would not be won by words alone.

In the closing days of the 1898 campaign, leaders of the Democratic Party turned once more to violence. They organized local White Government Unions and encouraged the party faithful to don the paramilitary uniform known as the "red shirt," a symbol of the blood sacrifice of the Confederacy and the late-nineteenth-century equivalent of the hooded robes worn by Klansmen in an earlier era. Democrats engaged in open intimidation of voters at registration and polling places across the state. Former congressman Alfred M. Waddell called white men to war. "You are AngloSaxons," he exclaimed. "You are armed and prepared, and you will do your duty. Be ready at a moment's notice. Go to the polls tomorrow, and if you find the negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if he refuses, kill him. Shoot him down in his tracks." The effect was terrifying. In Winston, a Republican newspaper reported that "there were crowds of men who gathered around the polls in each ward and . . . boldly drove a large percent of the colored Republican voters and a good many white voters away from the polls." ${ }^{40}$


Armed Red Shirts in Laurinburg and their uniform. Courtesy of the North Carolina State Archives and the North Carolina Museum of History.

Democrats' determination to defeat their challengers at any cost was revealed most starkly in the majority-Black coastal city of Wilmington. Revisions to the city charter made by the Fusion legislatures of 1895 and 1897 had undone Democratic gerrymandering and produced a Republican majority - including three Blacks - on the board of aldermen. Democrats were enraged by that

[^53]development and the fact that they would not be able to challenge local Republican rule at the polls until the next municipal election in 1899. ${ }^{41}$

On November 9, the day after the 1898 election, Democratic leaders drew up a declaration of independence that called for the restoration of white rule in Wilmington. They acted on belief "that the Constitution of the United States contemplated a government to be carried on by an enlightened people; [belief] that its framers did not anticipate the enfranchisement of an ignorant population of African origin, and [belief] that those men of the State of North Carolina, who joined in forming the Union, did not contemplate for their descendants a subjection to an inferior race." "The negro [has] antagonized our interest in every way, and especially by his ballot," the Wilmington Morning Star exclaimed. "We will no longer be ruled, and will never again be ruled, by men of African origin." ${ }^{42}$

The next day, armed white men under the command of Alfred Waddell staged the only municipal coup d'état in the nation's history. They marauded through Wilmington's Black district, set ablaze the print shop of the city's only Black newspaper, murdered as many as thirty Black citizens in the streets, and drove the sitting board of alderman from office in order to make room for a new, self-appointed city government with Waddell at its head.


A souvenir postcard produced by a local photographer documented destruction of Love and Charity Hall, which housed the Daily Record, Wilmington's Black newspaper. Courtesy of the New Hanover County Public Library, Robert M. Fales Collection.

[^54]Democrats won the 1898 election statewide by a narrow margin. They claimed only 52.8 percent of the vote, but that was enough to oust most Fusionists from the legislature. The victors moved immediately to "rid themselves . . . of the rule of Negroes and the lower classes of whites."43

## C. The 1899 Act to Regulate Elections and Black Disenfranchisement

In the 1899 legislative session, Democrats drafted an amendment to the state constitution that aimed to end biracial politics once and for all by stripping Black men of the most fundamental privilege of citizenship: the right to vote. The Fifteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, adopted during Reconstruction, forbade the states from denying the ballot to citizens on the basis of race. North Carolina Democrats, like their counterparts elsewhere in the South, circumvented that prohibition by adopting a literacy test.

In order to vote, citizens first had to demonstrate to local election officials that they could "read and write any section of the Constitution in the English language." That gave Democratic registrars wide latitude to exclude Black men from the polls. Democrats also included a grandfather clause in the amendment that exempted from the literacy test adult males who had been eligible to vote or were lineal descendants of men who had been eligible to vote on or before January 1,1867 . That was a magic date, because it preceded the limited right to vote given to Black men under the Military Reconstruction Act, passed in March of that year. The literacy test was thus designed to achieve the very thing the federal Fifteenth Amendment expressly outlawed - voter exclusion based on race. ${ }^{44}$

Male citizens could also be denied access to the franchise if they failed to pay the capitation $\operatorname{tax}$ (poll tax) levied in accordance with Article V, Section 1, of the 1868 State Constitution. ${ }^{45}$ This link between payment of the capitation tax and the right to vote was a new impediment put in place by the disenfranchisement amendment. The amendment required that electors pay the tax before the first day of May, prior to the election in which they intended to vote. At that time of year, before the fall harvest, Black sharecroppers were unlikely to have cash on hand for such a payment.

Democrats rewrote state election law to boost the odds that the amendment would win approval. In the 1899 Act to Regulate Elections, they repealed reforms made by the Fusion legislatures of 1895 and 1897, and they put in place new provisions that were crafted to deliver "a good Democratic majority."46

- With the aim of purging as many Fusion voters as possible, lawmakers ordered an "entirely new registration" in advance of the next election. In that process, registrars could, at their discretion, require an applicant to "prove his identity or age and residence by the testimony of at least two electors under oath." The law also gave "any by stander" the right to challenge a registrant's truthfulness and force a lengthy examination. ${ }^{47}$
- In a reversal of provisions made in the 1895 election law, information recorded in a registration book no longer stood as presumptive evidence of an individual's right to

[^55]vote. On polling day, "any elector [could] challenge the vote of any person" on suspicion of fraud. In such cases, election officials were to question the suspect voter and compel him to swear an oath of truthfulness. But even that might not be proof enough. The law stipulated that after an oath was sworn, "the registrar and judges may, nevertheless, refuse to permit such a person to vote. ${ }^{48}$

- The law loosened safeguards against partisanship in the management of elections. Lawmakers took the authority to appoint local election officials from the county clerks of superior court, who were directly accountable to voters, and gave it to a seven-member state board of elections that was appointed by the Democratic majority in the legislature. That board's power was expansive. For instance, it had the authority to remove county election officials from office "for any satisfactory cause."49
- The law also put an end to practices that accommodated illiterate voters. All ballots were now to be "printed upon white paper, without ornament, symbol, or device." And if a voter or election official placed a ballot in the wrong box (there were six), it was declared void and was discarded. ${ }^{50}$


[^56]With these new rules in place, Democrats approached the 1900 election confident of victory. Democratic gubernatorial candidate Charles B. Aycock made disenfranchisement the centerpiece of his campaign. On the stump, he offered the white electorate a new "era of good feeling" in exchange for racial loyalty. Aycock argued that the presence of Blacks in politics was the source of bitterness among whites, and that only their removal would heal the white body politic. "We must disenfranchise the negro," he explained to white voters. "Then we shall have . . . peace everywhere. . . We shall forget the asperities of past years and . . . go forward into the twentieth century a united people." ${ }^{51}$

To whites who were unconvinced and Blacks who were determined to resist, Aycock issued veiled threats. "There are three ways in which we may rule," he told a white audience in eastern North Carolina. "We have ruled by force, we can rule by fraud, but we want to rule by law." To reinforce the point, bands of armed Red Shirts again paraded through towns and cities in the Piedmont and the east, cheered Aycock at campaign rallies, and loitered around polling places on Election Day. The beleaguered Populist and Republican opposition could not withstand that Democratic onslaught. With a turnout of 75 percent of the electors allowed to register under the revised election law of 1899 , Aycock and disenfranchisement won by a 59 to 41 percent margin. ${ }^{52}$

Democrats cast that result as a victory of white over Black, but in truth what they feared most and worked hardest to defeat was the interracial coalition that emerged from the calamity of the Civil War and reappeared in the form of Fusion. In a moment of candor, the Charlotte Daily Observer admitted as much. It characterized the 1900 campaign as "the struggle of the white people to rid themselves of the danger of the rule of Negroes and the lower classes of whites." The fight in 1900 was not only to establish white supremacy but also to settle the question of which white men would rule supreme. ${ }^{53}$

When the legislature convened in 1901, Democrats secured their victory by passing a law to implement the white-supremacy amendment to the state constitution. The legislation stipulated that in order to register to vote, male citizens would be required to demonstrate their ability to read and write "to the satisfaction" (emphasis added) of a county registrar. In effect, that provision gave local election officials limitless authority to decide who would pass a literacy test and be granted - or denied - the right to vote. ${ }^{54}$

## VIII. Jim Crow

## A. Racial Segregation and Economic Exploitation

The Democrats' triumph in 1900 cleared the way for a new order characterized by oneparty government, segregation, and cheap labor. With the removal of Black men from politics, North Carolina's Republican Party became little more than an expression of regional differences among whites that set the western mountain region, the party's surviving stronghold, against the central Piedmont and eastern Coastal Plain.

[^57]Leaders of the Democratic Party controlled the selection of candidates through a tightly managed state convention. That arrangement, combined with the fact that no Republican had a realistic chance of winning election to a statewide office, convinced most electors that there was little reason to cast a ballot. Only 50 percent of the newly constrained pool of eligible voters turned out for the 1904 gubernatorial election, and by 1912 the number had declined to less than 30 percent. ${ }^{55}$

Having regained control of the machinery of government, Democrats began implementing public policies that secured what one scholar has termed their "reactionary revolution." Black subjugation was at the head of their agenda. Over time, they developed an elaborate regime of law and custom that they called Jim Crow, a name taken from the Blackface characters in nineteenthcentury minstrel shows. Most Americans - certainly most white Americans - think of Jim Crow as an expression of prejudice and discrimination. But it was much more than that: Jim Crow was a system of power and plunder that concentrated wealth and opportunity in the hands of the few and mobilized racial animosity in defense of that accumulation. ${ }^{56}$

Lawmakers passed North Carolina's first Jim Crow law in 1899, during the same session in which they crafted the disenfranchisement amendment to the state constitution. The law required separate seating for Blacks and whites on trains and steamboats. The aim of that and other such regulations - including the segregation of streetcars in 1907, legislation in 1921 that made miscegenation a felony, and a host of local ordinances that segregated drinking fountains, toilets, and cemeteries - was to mark Blacks as a people apart and make it psychologically difficult for whites to imagine interracial cooperation. Segregation also divided most forms of civic space - courthouses, neighborhoods, and public squares - that might otherwise have been sites for interaction across the color line. ${ }^{57}$

In Charlotte, soon to be North Carolina's largest city and the hub of its new textile economy, neighborhoods in 1870 had been surprisingly undifferentiated. As historian Thomas Hanchett has noted, on any given street "business owners and hired hands, manual laborers and white-collared clerks . . . Black people and white people all lived side by side." By 1910, that heterogeneity had been thoroughly "sorted" along lines of race and class. In communities large and small across the state, this process played out a thousand times over. White supremacy denied Blacks access to economic and political power and erected a nearly insurmountable wall between Blacks and poor whites who had risen in the mid 1890s to challenge Democrats' rule by asserting their shared grievances and claim to the franchise. ${ }^{58}$

Hardening racial segregation relegated the majority of Black North Carolinians to the countryside and created, in effect, a bound agricultural labor force. In the 1910s, Clarence Poe, editor of the Progressive Farmer, led a movement to perfect that arrangement by proposing "territorial segregation" in rural areas and an amendment to the state constitution that would have allowed white communities to prohibit the sale of land to Blacks. He modeled the idea on policies implemented in the new Union of South Africa that laid the foundation for the system of apartheid established in 1948.

[^58]Poe believed that his reforms would lock Blacks into permanent status as tenants and sharecroppers and would make way for a "great rural civilization" to flourish among whites. He understood that the scheme might run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment but brushed that concern aside. "If our people make up their minds that segregation is a good and necessary thing," Poe argued, "they will find a way to put it into effect - just as they did in the case of Negro disenfranchisement despite an iron-bound Amendment specifically designed to prevent it." Poe's proposal ultimately failed in the state legislature, but it had broad backing among small-scale white farmers. It also revealed how tightly Poe and North Carolina were connected to a global movement to assert white dominion over peoples of color. ${ }^{59}$

Blacks who lived in cities and small towns had opportunities that were only modestly better than those available in rural areas. Most Black women worked in white households as maids, cooks, and laundresses. In Durham and Winston, both tobacco manufacturing centers, and in tobacco market towns in the eastern part of the state, Black women and men labored in stemmeries where they processed the leaf before it was made into cigarettes and chewing plugs. The work was dirty and undesirable - the kind of labor that whites expected Blacks to perform. ${ }^{60}$

Jim Crow held most Black North Carolinians' earnings to near-subsistence levels. That, in turn, depressed the market value of all labor and dragged white wages downward. In textiles North Carolina's leading industry - men, women, and children worked for some of the lowest wages in the country. Prior to the implementation of a national minimum wage in the 1930s, they earned on average 40 percent less than workers in comparable jobs in the North. Even so, textile manufacturers often boasted that they had built their mills to save poor whites from destitution. That, they said, was also their reason for restricting textile employment, with few exceptions, to whites only. The message to white laborers was clear: mill owners would make up for slim pay envelopes by safeguarding what W. E. B. Du Bois called the "psychological wages" of whiteness. ${ }^{61}$

Such insistence on maintaining the color line denied Black North Carolinians something they had prized since the time of Emancipation: quality education for their children. In the 1880s, the state spent roughly equal amounts per capita on white and Black students in the public schools, but by 1920 spending on white students outpaced that for Blacks by a margin of three-to-one. The state spent ten times as much on white school buildings as it did on Black schools, and Black teachers made only half of the $\$ 252$ a year paid to whites. The results were predictable: in 1920, 24.5 percent of Blacks over the age of ten were illiterate, as compared to 8.2 percent of whites. Racial disadvantage was also persistent. ${ }^{62}$

Added to all of this, Black North Carolinians were plagued by "sickness, misery, and death." In 1940, the annual mortality rate for Blacks was 11.6 per thousand, compared to 7.6 per

[^59]thousand for whites. Blacks were one-and-a-half times more likely than whites to die from tuberculosis and malaria, and Black infant mortality exceeded that for whites by the same margin. ${ }^{63}$

## B. World War I and the Great Migration

A casual observer of the Jim Crow South could have been forgiven for concluding that white supremacy's victory was complete, its hold of the region unassailable. Josephus Daniels, one of the regime's architects, suggested as much shortly after the 1900 election. "When Governor Aycock was elected," Daniels explained to a friend, "I said to him that I was very glad that we had settled the Negro question for all times." Aycock replied, "Joe, you are badly mistaken. . . . Every generation will have the problem on their hands, and they will have to settle it for themselves." The governor was more prescient than he might have imagined. Even at the height of Jim Crow's power, Black Americans refused to surrender their claim on equal citizenship and a fair share of social resources and economic opportunities. Over half a century - through two world wars and a global economic crisis - they clawed their way back into politics. Progress was slow and small gains often met fierce white resistance, but by the late 1950s Blacks had built a new freedom movement and prepared the way for a second Reconstruction. ${ }^{64}$

World War I put the first chinks in Jim Crow's armor. When fighting broke out in Europe in 1914, it cut off the supply of European immigrant laborers on which the factories of the Midwest and Northeast relied. Industrial recruiters ventured southward to entice sharecroppers off the land. By 1919, nearly 440,000 Blacks had left the South in what came to be called the Great Migration. They made new homes in Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Detroit. Another 708,000 migrants followed during the 1920s. In the absence of poll taxes and literacy tests, these refugees gained access to the ballot box and influence in city politics. They also created large enclaves from which a vibrant urban Black culture emerged. Literature, art, and music gave voice to the "New Negro" - a figure dignified and defiant, determined to hold the nation accountable to its democratic promise. ${ }^{65}$

## C. The Great Depression, a New Deal, and Good-Bye to the Party of Lincoln

During the 1930s, newly enfranchised Black voters reshaped national politics by abandoning the party of Lincoln in favor of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal. Many were at first wary of Roosevelt, a Democrat whose party stood for white supremacy in the South. But Blacks were especially hard hit by the Great Depression, and Roosevelt's New Deal delivered muchneeded relief. The largest federal jobs programs employed Blacks in proportion to their representation in the general population and, with mixed results, attempted to prohibit discrimination in job placement and wages. Black appointees in New Deal agencies also served President Roosevelt as a shadow cabinet, and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt publicly supported the NAACP's civil rights agenda. America remained a Jim Crow nation, but at no time since Reconstruction had the federal

[^60]government held out such hope for redressing racial injustice. In his 1936 bid for re-election, Roosevelt won 71 percent of the Black vote in a landslide victory over Republican challenger Alf Landon. ${ }^{66}$

The effects were felt in North Carolina. In 1932, newspaperman Louis E. Austin helped to organize a political conference in Durham that attracted more than five hundred Black business, civic, and religious leaders from across the state. Austin was editor of the city's Carolina Times, a paper widely regarded as an exemplar of "new Negro journalism." Like others at the conference, he believed that southern Blacks needed a new strategy for advancing civil rights. Since Emancipation, Blacks had cast their lot with the Republican Party, but Republican leaders largely abandoned them in the early twentieth century. In North Carolina, the party was controlled by men who rejected its biracial heritage, and at the national level, Republican president Herbert Hoover showed little concern for Blacks' disproportionate suffering in the Great Depression. The times seemed to call for a radical change of direction, one that would challenge white supremacy at its root by mounting a political assault from within the Democratic Party. ${ }^{67}$

That is what participants in the Durham conference had in mind when they made plans for a statewide voter registration drive. Their aim was "to become a factor in the party that has the power" by adding Black voters to the registration rolls as Democrats, not Republicans. Success came slowly, but by the mid-1930s upwards of forty thousand Black men and women had managed to pass the state's literacy test and affiliate themselves with the Democratic Party. In Durham, these new voters elected Louis Austin and Black theater owner Frederick K. Watkins as justices of the peace on the Democratic ticket. The Pittsburgh Courier, one of the nation's leading Black newspapers, pronounced that win "the beginning of the 'New Deal' in the South."68

Incremental Black gains and the temerity of men like Austin angered the keepers of white rule. When Blacks registered as Democrats in Raleigh, Josephus Daniels used the News and Observer to warn that they were part of a plot "to destroy the great victory" won in 1900 under his leadership and that of Charles Aycock. "The Democratic Party in North Carolina is a white man's party," he exclaimed. "It came through blood and fire in allegiance to that principle." At his urging, election officials in Raleigh attempted to disqualify every Black registrant - Democrat and Republican alike - but Black citizens sued and won a court order to have the names of two hundred and ten restored to the voter rolls. They also taunted white Democrats. "Why," they wondered, "is it a crime for the Negro to seek to vote the triumphant ticket of the major party of the section in which he lives?" ${ }^{69}$

Josiah Bailey, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, shared Daniels' fear of Black claims on the rights of citizenship. In 1937, shortly after President Roosevelt's election to a second term, he threatened a Congressional revolt against the New Deal. Bailey recruited southern Democrats and a number of Republicans to endorse a Conservative Manifesto, which, had it been implemented, would have given local officials control over federal jobs programs for the unemployed. That was

[^61]key to maintaining the Black-white wage differential and Jim Crow's promise to ordinary whites that Blacks would always be beneath them. The manifesto affirmed the value of small government; called for reduced taxation of private and corporate wealth; and insisted on the primacy of "states' rights, home rule, [and] local self-government." On the Senate floor and in private exchanges, Bailey criticized President Roosevelt for pandering to the "Negro vote," caricatured the New Deal as "a gift enterprise [conducted] at the expense of those who work and earn and save," and warned that he and his allies were prepared to defend white supremacy, whatever the cost. "Keep your nose out of the South's business," he advised Roosevelt, or "be assured that a [new] white man's party [will] arise" to claim the region's loyalty. ${ }^{70}$

That threat was more than empty bluster. From the outset, southern Democrats had worked to blunt the New Deal. In North Carolina, Democratic officials backed tobacco manufacturers who resisted the National Recovery Administration's efforts to raise wages for Black workers. They also managed the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's price support programs in ways that allowed white landlords to dismiss thousands of Black tenants and keep government crop subsidies for themselves. At the national level, southern Democrats led the effort to exclude agricultural and domestic workers - the vast majority of whom were Black - from the old-age pensions established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and the minimum-wage protection afforded by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. ${ }^{71}$

University of North Carolina sociologist Guy Johnson recognized in all of this "a tendency to perpetuate . . . existing inequalities." Blacks had made important gains, but they still lacked the means "to command" an adequate wage and a "decent share of the services and benefits of government." The consequences were tragic - for Blacks, most obviously, and for poor whites in ways that Jim Crow obscured. Johnson urged politicians to confront these truths, surrender white rule, and substitute "fairness and justice" for a "policy of repression." Doing so would make possible "better homes, better health, better living, cultural development, and human adequacy for both races." White southerners had "all to gain and nothing to lose," Johnson declared." "Self-interest, simple justice, and common-sense demand that [they] give the Negro a new deal." That was not going to happen in North Carolina, at least not without a fight. ${ }^{72}$

## D. World War II and Civil Rights Unionism

World War II lifted the nation out of economic depression and further eroded white southerners' capacity to hold the line on civil rights. Millions more Blacks left the land. Some moved along familiar paths to work in northern war industries; others found employment in southern cities or on the sprawling military bases that were scattered across the region. They expanded their influence in Democratic Party politics, swelled the national ranks of the NAACP from fifty thousand to four hundred and fifty thousand members, and through the militant unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) gained new bargaining power on the factory floor. The federal

[^62]government, concerned that racial tensions not impede the war effort, acted to limit employment discrimination and to restrain white violence. ${ }^{73}$

All of this played into what civil rights activists came to call a Double V strategy that encouraged Black mobilization - in the military and on the home front - to defeat the twin evils of fascism and white supremacy. The potential for making change at home was apparent even before a formal declaration of war. In early 1941, A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, proposed a march on Washington to pressure President Roosevelt to desegregate the military and guarantee equal employment opportunities in war industries. Noting the strength of grassroots support for the march, some observers predicted that more than one hundred thousand people would participate. In June, months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt handed the organizers a partial victory. He issued Executive Order 8802, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal job training programs and defense industry employment. With that, Randolph canceled the march. ${ }^{74}$

This positioning of the federal government as a civil rights ally gave courage to the nearly eight thousand Black women and men who labored in the R.J. Reynolds tobacco factories in Win-ston-Salem. In 1943, they began organizing with assistance from the CIO's Food, Tobacco, and Allied Workers union (FTA). Under ordinary circumstances, Reynolds would have easily crushed the effort, but the war years were anything but ordinary.

When workers staged a sit-down strike, the federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened to negotiate a temporary settlement. Months later, the National Labor Relations Board - a New Deal agency established in 1935 by the Wagner Act - set the ground rules for a fair election in which Black workers and a significant minority of whites voted to establish a union local. Despite that result, Reynolds managers refused to sign a contract until forced by the National War Labor Board to pay higher wages and improve working conditions. Stemmery worker Ruby Jones said of that victory, "It was just like being reconstructed." ${ }^{75}$

Jones and others understood that winning in the workplace was but one step toward equal citizenship. Dethroning Jim Crow required that they also organize politically. "If you are going to defeat these people," union leader Robert Black explained, "not only do you do it across the negotiating table in the R.J. Reynolds Building, but you go to city hall, you elect people down there that's going to be favorable and sympathetic and represent the best interest of the working class." To that end, the union sponsored citizenship and literacy classes and launched a city-wide voter registration drive. Those efforts paid off in 1947, when Black voters elected Reverend Kenneth R. Williams to the Winston-Salem board of aldermen. He was the first Black politician in the South to defeat a white opponent at the state or local level since the Fusion era of the 1890s. ${ }^{76}$

The unionists in Winston-Salem and ten thousand members of a sister FTA local in eastern North Carolina's tobacco warehouses and stemmeries were in the vanguard of a statewide campaign for more inclusive politics. They provided local support for the Progressive Party, formed in 1947 by breakaway Democrats to back the presidential candidacy of Henry A. Wallace.

[^63]Wallace had served in Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal administration as vice president, secretary of agriculture, and secretary of commerce. He established a reputation as a full-throated critic of Jim Crow and, during the early years of the Cold War, opposed hardline anticommunism as a threat to democratic values at home and abroad. In 1948, Wallace challenged Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, with demands for peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union and an immediate end to racial segregation. ${ }^{77}$

In North Carolina, the Progressive Party nominated a slate of candidates that represented an extraordinary commitment to equal citizenship. Of the nineteen nominees, five were white women, including journalist and civil rights activist Mary Watkins Price, who was the first woman to run for governor in the state. Black candidates included Reverend William T. Brown from Maxton, who opposed former governor J. Melville Broughton for a seat in the U.S. Senate; Robert E. Brown, also from Maxton, who sought election in the Eighth Congressional District; Robert Latham, an FTA organizer in Rocky Mount, who ran in the Second Congressional District; Durham civil rights lawyer Conrad O. Pearson, who stood for state attorney general; Gertrude Green, a tobacco worker from Kinston, and Randolph Blackwell, a student at the Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina in Greensboro (now North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University), who sought election to the state house of representatives; and Leila B. Michael, a teacher and NAACP leader from Buncombe County, who vied for a place on her local board of education. These men and women ran on a platform that demanded repeal of North Carolina's antiunion labor laws and regressive sales tax, "civil rights for all people, improved schools, higher teacher pay, [and] increased aid to needy people." These priorities were not so different from those of Reconstruction-era Republicans and the Fusion politicians of the 1890s. ${ }^{78}$

When Wallace stumped the state for the Progressive ticket in August 1948, bands of white hecklers, sometimes numbering in the thousands and waving Confederate flags, followed his entourage from town to town and pelted them with eggs and tomatoes. Shouts of "nigger lover" filled the air and were echoed in more genteel terms by the state's newspapers. The editors of the Charlotte Observer suggested that Wallace and his compatriots had brought the trouble upon themselves by announcing in advance that the candidate "would speak to none but unsegregated audiences."79

Wallace gave his detractors no quarter. In a 1947 speech, he had declared that "Jim Crow in America has simply got to go." His reasoning echoed a long tradition of dissent within the South: "The cancerous disease of race hate, which bears so heavily upon Negro citizens . . . at the same time drags the masses of southern white citizens into the common quagmire of poverty and ignorance and political servitude . . . Jim Crow divides white and Negro for the profit of the few. It is a very profitable system indeed."

[^64]

Henry A. Wallace campaign poster. Courtesy of Georgia State University Library Digital Collections, M. H. Ross Papers.

The price exacted by Jim Crow was measured not just in dollars, but in lives as well. Wallace made that point with a "single grim fact": "a Negro child born this day has a life expectancy ten years less than that of a white child born a few miles away." "Those ten years," he explained, "are what we are fighting for. I say that those who stand in the way of the health, education, housing, and social security programs which would erase that gap commit murder. I say that those who perpetuate Jim Crow are criminals. I pledge you that I shall fight them with everything I have." Wallace understood the fury his words would provoke. "Every uttered truth," he observed, "produces a tremor in those who live by lies." ${ }^{80}$

Wallace's prospects, and those of the Progressive Party in North Carolina, were hamstrung from the start. He faced the problem that has plagued every third-party candidate in American politics: a concern among potential supporters that to cast a ballot for him was to waste a vote. His strong stand against racism and opposition to Cold War anticommunism also meant that he drew most of his support from the Left, including the Communist Party USA, which endorsed his candidacy. On Election Day, Wallace and his North Carolina running mates garnered only a fraction of the vote. But the issues they raised were far from settled. That became evident two years later in the Democratic primary election for the U.S. Senate.

[^65]
## E. The Senate Campaign of 1950 and Reassertion of White Rule

The story of the 1950 election began a year before, when Senator J. Melville Broughton died in office. Governor W. Kerr Scott appointed University of North Carolina president Frank Porter Graham to fill the post until the next general election. Graham's liberal views were well known. He was an outspoken supporter of labor unions; he had served as a member of the White House advisory council that helped establish Social Security in 1935; he chaired Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Economic Conditions in the South, which documented widespread poverty in the region; and in 1938 he was founding president of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, an interracial organization devoted "equal and exact justice to all" (a phrase borrowed from President Thomas Jefferson's 1801 inaugural address). ${ }^{81}$

In the 1950 Democratic primary, Graham faced a field of challengers that included Willis Smith, a respected Raleigh attorney and former president of the American Bar Association. On the first ballot, Graham defeated Smith and the other candidates by winning a plurality, but not a majority, of votes. As runner-up, Smith was entitled to call for a runoff, but he hesitated. He was unsure that he could raise the necessary money or that he had the stamina for another contest. Then, on June 5, just days before the deadline for Smith's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down rulings that affirmed Black students' right to equal access to publicly funded graduate education and banned segregation on railroads. The court's actions galvanized Smith's supporters. On the afternoon of June 6, Jesse Helms, a young news director for WRAL Radio in Raleigh, made arrangements to air at fifteen-minute intervals a plea for Smith backers to rally at his home and urge him to demand a runoff. The crowd that gathered on Smith's lawn was persuasive. The next morning, Smith called for a second primary. ${ }^{82}$

The political battle that followed was the rawest since the white supremacy campaigns of 1898 and 1900. Smith's backers brought race front and center. They focused particularly on Frank Graham's service in 1946-47 on President Harry Truman's Committee on Civil Rights, which issued the first federal report on race relations and laid the groundwork for Truman's desegregation of the military a year later. The report, titled To Secure These Rights, a phrase taken from the Declaration of Independence, called unequivocally for "the elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life." ${ }^{83}$

The Smith campaign directed its harshest criticism at the committee's recommendation that Truman establish a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee to monitor and eliminate racial discrimination in the workplace. Frank Graham - who preferred moral suasion over government intervention as an instrument of social change - had dissented from that part of the committee report, but Smith and his lieutenants paid no mind. In campaign press releases, they warned that Graham supported reforms that would allow Blacks to steal white jobs. Handbills distributed in rural communities and white working-class neighborhoods raised the alarm even more shrilly. "White People Wake Up Before It's Too Late," one exclaimed. "Frank Graham Favors Mingling of the Races. ${ }^{84}$

[^66]

Smith and Graham campaign handbills. Courtesy of the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Daniel Augustus Powell Papers.

These attacks were powerful in the simplicity of their message: Graham posed a threat to white privilege and the racial division of labor from which it was derived. Graham's campaign countered by warning white working people that Smith would roll back the hard-won economic gains of the New Deal, but on Election Day race trumped class. Smith won the second primary by more than nineteen thousand votes. He traveled to Washington to take his Senate seat in 1951 and carried Jesse Helms with him as a member of his staff. Twenty-two years later, Helms returned as a Republican Senator and leader of the conservative movement that came to be known as the New Right.

## IX. Black Advance and White Reaction in the Forgotten 1950s

## A. Challenging Jim Crow at the Ballot Box

In the aftermath of the election, Graham's supporters were distraught. "I weep for the people of North Carolina," one woman wrote, "because they [were] swayed by prejudices [and] lies." But Black newspaper editor Louis Austin found cause for hope, even as he mourned Graham's defeat. He reminded readers of the Carolina Times that more than two hundred and sixty thousand voters - the vast majority of them white - had cast their ballots for Graham, and in doing so had refused to bow to "race hatred." Despite obvious similarities, Graham's loss was not a calamity on the same scale as the defeat of Fusion half a century before. Appeals to justice and decency had loosened Jim Crow's grasp and created new room for Blacks to maneuver. Austin urged his readers
to seize that opportunity, to light a "torch of freedom" that would "send bright rays into the dark corners of [a] benighted State." 85

Leaders and ordinary folk in Black communities across North Carolina took up that challenge. In 1951, a "rush" of thirteen Black candidates stood for election in eleven cities, from Rocky Mount in the east to Winston-Salem in the central Piedmont. Three of them won seats on their municipal councils. ${ }^{86}$ Two years later, twenty-four Black candidates ran in nineteen cities, and six bested their white opponents. ${ }^{87}$

The victories in 1953 were, in many respects, predictable. With one exception, they occurred in Piedmont cities with substantial Black populations and active Black civic organizations. In Winston-Salem, unionized tobacco workers had spurred voter registration and created a political movement that continued to elect a Black candidate to the city's board of aldermen. Black business leaders in Durham had similar success. Under the auspices of their Committee on Negro Affairs, they had been registering voters and sponsoring candidates for the better part of two decades. In 1953, they broke through with the election of Rencher N. Harris, a real estate appraiser, to the city council. Harris also had the backing of a short-lived interracial alliance of progressive whites and unionized textile and tobacco workers. ${ }^{88}$

More surprising, and ultimately more threatening to white rule, was the fact that seven Black candidates had the courage to seek office in eastern North Carolina, where Jim Crow was most deeply entrenched, and that in Wilson, a small tobacco market town located in that section of the state, George K. Butterfield Sr. won election to the board of commissioners. Through the end of the decade, this spread of civil rights activism beyond the cities of the Piedmont tested white politicians' ability to deflect Black claims on equal citizenship.

The story of George Butterfield's political career in Wilson epitomized the contest between white men in power and their Black challengers in the east. Butterfield was a dentist and a veteran of World War I, born in Bermuda and educated at Meharry Dental College in Nashville, Tennessee. He moved to Wilson in 1928 and quickly established himself as a leader in the city's Black community. George K. Butterfield Jr., who currently represents North Carolina's First Congressional District, remembers that his father "was always a thorn in the side of the white establishment." In the 1940s, the elder Butterfield and his brother-in-law, Fred Davis Jr., directed a number of voter registration drives. They recruited brave volunteers and "sat up the night with them" to

[^67]memorize and "rehearse the Constitution." When those aspiring voters took the literacy test, "some would pass and some would not," because the outcome was "just the whim of the registrar." Progress was slow, but over time, the effort paid off. By 1953, more than five hundred of Wilson's Black citizens had qualified to vote. ${ }^{89}$

That figure was large enough to convince Butterfield to stand for election as a town commissioner representing Wilson's third ward. Although Blacks constituted a majority in the ward, whites outnumbered them among registered voters. Butterfield's supporters overcame that disadvantage by turning out at a much higher rate than their white neighbors. When ballots were counted, Butterfield and his opponent each received three hundred and eighty-two votes. As stipulated in Wilson's town charter, election officials decided the winner by drawing lots. A blindfolded child pulled Butterfield's name from a hat. ${ }^{90}$

Butterfield used his political office to press for improved municipal services in Wilson's Black neighborhoods, additional funds for Black schools, and the desegregation of recreational facilities, including the town's minor-league baseball stadium. After he won re-election in 1955, Wilson's white commissioners moved to be rid of him. Shortly before the 1957 election, they approved a surprise resolution to change from a ward system to an at-large form of municipal government in which a full slate of commissioners would be elected in a single, multi-candidate contest. Under that arrangement, a Black candidate would face not one but many white opponents. ${ }^{91}$

The state legislature quickly approved the change and added a provision to Wilson's charter that prohibited single-shot, or as it was sometimes called, bullet voting. That was the practice of marking a ballot for only one candidate in at-large, multi-candidate contests in which the top vote getters won election to a set number of open seats. In simple mathematical terms, single-shot voting offered Black voters - always a minority - their best chance at electing representatives from their communities. The new prohibition undercut that prospect by requiring that election officials discard single-shot ballots. ${ }^{92}$

These changes in Wilson's town government denied Butterfield a third term. In the 1957 election, he placed eighth in a field of sixteen candidates who vied for six seats on the town commission. Four years later, Reverend Talmadge A. Watkins, Butterfield's pastor and political ally, ran for a place on the town commission and, after losing, challenged the anti-single-shot rule in a lawsuit. North Carolina's Supreme Court ultimately decided the case, Watkins v. City of Wilson, in favor of the defendants. The justices wrote: "It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public." Watkins did not meet that standard, because "even if credited with all

[^68]rejected ballots, he would not have enough votes to change the [election] result." In 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case on appeal. ${ }^{93}$

Watkin's defeat in court validated the work of white politicians who had been busy restructuring local governments across eastern North Carolina. Between 1955 and 1961, the state legislature approved a flurry of new laws that mandated at-large voting in a shifting mix of elections for county boards of commissioners and town councils in twenty-three eastern counties. In each of those places, lawmakers also prohibited single-shot voting. As a reporter for the News and Observer later noted, the purpose of these measures was "to slow the growth of Black political power. ${ }^{94}$

## 1955, 1957 1959 \& 1961 Anti-Single-Shot <br> Counties \& Municipalities

1955: Added to §163-175
1957: Outside of $\S 163-175$
1957: Added to § 163 -175
1959: Outside of $\S 163-175$
1959: Added to §163-175
[1959 \& 1961: Removed from §163-175


1 Alexander
1 Alexander
2 Washington 2 Washington 4 Northampton 5 Hertford 6 Camden 7 Currituck 8 Chowan 9 Perquimans 10 Pasquotank

Anti-single shot counties and municipalities, 1955-1961. The western counties were places where Republicans exerted some influence in local government.

With no sense of irony, white politicians defended these measures as protection against the corrupting influence of "bloc" interests, particularly those defined by race. That was a well-worn rationale. For instance, a group of Willis Smith's supporters had charged in 1950 that "bloc voting by any group is a menace to democracy." In an advertisement published in the News and Observer, they turned to Charles Aycock - one of the original architects of white supremacy - as their authority on the matter. Looking back on his election as governor in 1900, Aycock had justified his party's use of political violence by pointing to heavily Black counties in the east, where, he claimed, " 120,000 Negro votes cast as the vote of one man" threatened the "security of life, liberty, and property."95

[^69]
## Bloc Voting By ANY Group Is A

 MENACE TO DEMOCRACYQoverner Charles B. Ayeoek said in his Inaugural Address, Ianuary, 1901:

> "When we came to power (1898), we desired morely the security of life, liberty and prosperity. We had soen all thase menaced by 120,000 Negro vates cast as the vote of one man."


# WILLIS SMITH Represents ALL The People 

Willis Smith campaign advertisement, Raleigh News and Observer, June 20, 1950.

The hypocrisy of such historical claims infuriated Carolina Times editor Louis Austin. He noted that since the end of slavery, Blacks had found the "biggest 'bloc' of . . . all . . . arrayed against them." It included "leaders of the Ku Klux Klan," politicians who "continuously fanned the flames of race hatred," and the "mass of white voters" who elected them. Together, these enemies of democracy barred Blacks from political office and denied them both "equal education [and] equal employment opportunities." Such actions left Blacks no alternative but to vote their group interests, or as Austin put it, to "look principally to [their] own tents for whatever advancements" might be made. ${ }^{96}$

## B. Challenging Jim Crow in Court

The guardians of white rule were shrewd adversaries who displayed their resourcefulness not only at polling places but also in courts of law. That was perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the adjudication of a series of lawsuits brought by James R. Walker Jr., a young Black attorney from eastern North Carolina. Walker grew up in Hertford County, located in the historic Second Congressional District, where Black political strength had been concentrated in the decades after

[^70]Emancipation. His parents, James and Ethel, were teachers who instilled in their son a determination to "fight social injustice." After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II, the younger Walker set out to become a civil rights lawyer. ${ }^{97}$

In 1949, Walker applied for admission to the school of law at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill but was rejected on account of his race. With no other option, he enrolled at the North Carolina College for Negroes (now North Carolina Central University), where state lawmakers had established a separate and decidedly unequal law school to protect the white university from desegregation. But within a year, the U.S. Supreme Court changed the game. The court ruled in a Texas case, Sweatt v. Painter, that racially segregated programs of graduate and professional education were acceptable only if they exhibited "substantive equality." On the basis of that judgment, Walker and four other Black plaintiffs - Harvey Beech, James Lassiter, J. Kenneth Lee, and Floyd McKissick - sued in federal court and won admission to the law school in Chapel Hill. They began their studies during the summer of 1951. Lee and Walker took their degrees a year later and became the University of North Carolina's first Black graduates. ${ }^{98}$

In 1955, Black community leaders in Halifax County persuaded Walker to return to eastern North Carolina and join their struggle for political rights. When he opened his law office in Weldon, he was the only Black attorney in a six-county area where sharecropping still bound Black families to the land and racial violence was a fearsome fact of life. Walker was unafraid. "I was an Army man," he remembered. "Had been to the front. . . . I wasn't scared of nothing."99

Walker drew financial and professional support from a small community of Black lawyers in North Carolina's Piedmont cities. He also built a loose network of Black preachers, teachers, businessmen, and club women from twenty-five eastern counties. He called the group the Eastern Council on Community Affairs. Its members gathered news of voter infringement, mobilized to confront hostile white election officials, and helped Walker identify plaintiffs who were prepared to challenge Jim Crow in court. ${ }^{100}$

Walker began filing lawsuits in 1956. In one of his first cases, he sued on his own behalf to challenge the prohibition of single-shot voting in an at-large election for seats on the Halifax County Board of Education. Officials had discarded his ballot because he cast a single vote for the one Black candidate rather than comply with instructions to choose seven of eight contenders.

The case eventually made its way to the North Carolina Supreme Court, where Walker ran afoul of state lawmakers' efforts to stall school desegregation. In 1955, quick on the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court's Brown decision, they extended their influence over policy at the local level by making seats on county school boards appointed rather than elected positions. Under the new arrangement, political parties continued to hold primary elections, but the results were no longer binding. County boards of elections reported the winners to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, who in turn sent their names to the legislature in the form of nominations. Lawmakers then appointed school board members as they saw fit. By time the high court heard Walker's appeal, lawmakers had already exercised their authority to appoint members of the Halifax County

[^71]Board of Education. In light of that fact, the court ruled that "questions raised by plaintiff are now moot" and dismissed Walker's case. ${ }^{101}$

While litigating his personal complaint in Halifax County, Walker filed another lawsuit on behalf of Louise Lassiter, a resident of nearby Northampton County who had been denied the right to register after failing to prove that she was literate. At the time, registrars enjoyed broad authority to administer literacy tests in whatever form they imagined. They often framed the tests as civics exams that reached well beyond a simple assessment of an applicant's ability to read and write. Observers documented a "bewildering variety" of questions. Can you "name the signers of the Declaration of Independence?" a registrar might ask. "What is habeas corpus?" "If the NAACP attacked the U.S. government, on which side would you fight?" "Explain how a person [can] be imprisoned for debt in North Carolina, who created the world, and what 'create' mean[s]." Louise Lassiter failed her test because she mispronounced words from the state constitution, including the term 'indictment.' ${ }^{102}$

Lassiter's case set off alarm bells in Raleigh, where state officials worried that she might prevail in federal court. Her complaint coincided with passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first national legislation of its kind since Reconstruction. That law established the U.S. Civil Rights Commission to investigate allegations of voter suppression and authorized the Department of Justice to institute civil action against any person who interfered with the right of another "to vote or to vote as he may choose." ${ }^{103}$

Just days before Lassiter's case was scheduled to be heard in U.S. district court, legislators revised state election law to make the literacy test less arbitrary. They struck the requirement that literacy be proven "to the satisfaction" of registrars and created an appeal process for citizens who failed the test - though complaints would be heard only if filed "by 5:00 p.m. on the day following denial." These changes were enough to satisfy the federal court, which declined to proceed with Lassiter's case until she had petitioned for a local remedy. ${ }^{104}$

Soon after the court's decision, Lassiter made another attempt to register. But this time, at Walker's instruction, she refused examination on grounds that the literacy test violated her right to vote. That focused Lassiter's legal complaint on the constitutionality of the test itself rather than the method of its administration. When the case reached the North Carolina Supreme Court, lawyers for the Northampton County Board of Elections argued in circles. They denied that the literacy test was discriminatory on account of race and then defended it as a political necessity adopted to correct the "outrages perpetrated upon the people of this State during the Tragic Era of Reconstruction," when the ballot was "placed in the hands of illiterate people" - that is, former slaves "supported by the armed might of the Federal Government." Convinced by such reasoning, the

[^72]court rejected Lassiter's constitutional claims. It found no evidence of "discrimination in favor, or against any [person] by reason of race, creed, or color." ${ }^{105}$

On appeal in 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that ruling. Writing for the court, Justice William O. Douglas acknowledged that when arbitrary authority was vested in registrars, a literacy requirement could "make racial discrimination easy." But he found no evidence of that intent in North Carolina's election law as amended in 1957. He instead read literacy tests as an expression of the state's desire "to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot." Ignoring the effects of a century of school discrimination in the South and the core reasoning of the 1954 Brown decision, Douglas insisted that "literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show." 106

Black certainly had no natural inclination to illiteracy, but the connection between illiteracy and race as a social category and lived experience was undeniable. Had Justice Douglas examined conditions in Northampton County, that harsh reality would have been readily apparent. In 1950, Black adults in the county had completed, on average, 5 years of schooling. That compared to 5.6 years for Black adults and 8.6 years for white adults statewide. These figures meant that a considerable portion of voting-age Blacks, in Northampton County and across the state, had completed fewer than the three years of education that demographers assumed was required to develop basic literacy skills. Jim Crow's shadow remained long and deep. ${ }^{107}$

In 1960, Walker returned to court with a new client. Having failed to win a judgment that the literacy test was unconstitutional per se, he revisited the question of how it was administered. His client, Bertie County resident Nancy Bazemore, had been denied by a registrar who required that she write down passages from the state constitution as he read them aloud. Bazemore failed because of spelling errors. When the case reached the State Supreme Court, the justices ruled in Bazemore's favor and issued guidelines that sharply limited registrars' discretion in determining the form and content of the literacy test. They instructed those officials to evaluate "nothing more" than applicants' ability to "utter aloud" a section of the state constitution and to write it out "in a reasonably legible hand." Furthermore, the test was to be based on a printed copy of the constitution - not dictation - and there were to be no penalties for "the occasional misspelling and mispronouncing of more difficult words." ${ }^{108}$

The Bazemore decision represented what many observers came to view as the North Carolina way in managing Black demands for equal rights. It rejected naked discrimination and insisted on "fair and impartial" enforcement of the law, but also left room for sorting citizens into racial categories. Across North Carolina, most whites registered and voted without a literacy test. They "took it for granted" that they were entitled to do so because of the color of their skin. In Nancy Bazemore's home county, one registrar was forthright. When asked if any whites had failed the literacy test, he replied, "No. I mean I didn't have any to try it." Though the State Supreme

[^73]Court did not address this issue directly, it validated the underlying assumption by ruling that there was no legal requirement that every registrant be examined. "It would be unrealistic to say that the test must be administered to all applicants," the justices wrote. "The statute only requires that the applicant have the ability" to read and write (emphasis in original). "If the registrar in good faith knows that [the] applicant has the requisite ability, no test is necessary." 109

This reading of state election law suggested that registrars still possessed the authority to group citizens into two classes: whites who were assumed to be literate and Blacks who had to prove it. The law did not require that the literacy test be administered to all citizens on an equal basis, but only that it "be administered, where uncertainty of ability exists, to all alike." That was a notably pernicious doctrine in a white man's society long habituated to the idea that Blacks, by their very nature, lacked the intellectual and moral capacity to function as citizens. ${ }^{110}$

North Carolina's response to Black demands for political rights was adaptive, not reactionary. It stood apart from what became known as "massive resistance" elsewhere in the South. As one contemporary observed, it was a "subtle strategy" for preventing "the Black vote from being effective." White political leaders were willing to tolerate the registration of a limited number of Black voters and even the occasional election of a Black officeholder, but they conceded nothing on the foundational principles of Jim Crow: Black inferiority and second-class citizenship. This was their way of maintaining what Charles Aycock had called "good order" and of warding off federal intervention, an existential threat since the days of slavery. ${ }^{111}$

## C. Challenging Jim Crow at School

A willingness to concede change at the margins shaped not only the battle over the ballot box but also the racial contest at the schoolhouse door. In the early 1930s, Black educators, organized through the North Carolina Teachers Association (NCTA), collaborated with the NAACP in a campaign to equalize Black and white teachers' pay. They were emboldened by the New Deal's support for organized labor and the minimum wage standards set by the National Recovery Administration. In October 1933, more than 2500 teachers filled the streets in Raleigh to press their demands. Weeks later, their representatives issued a bold indictment of Jim Crow:

We are disenfranchised and told to acquire learning and fitness for citizenship. We undertake the preparation in our inadequate, wretchedly equipped schools. Our children drag through the mud while others ride in busses, we pass the courses required by the state and in most places when we present ourselves for registration, we are denied that right and lose our votes. Our teachers, disadvantaged by disenfranchisement, by lack of the means to prepare themselves, nevertheless do meet the high and exacting standards of the best white institutions of the country, and then armed with the state's highest certificate go into the employment of a commonwealth which reduces their wages to the level of janitors and hod carriers.

[^74]The NCTA urged its members to register to vote and to "unite their forces at the polls." "We are informed that it is best for us if we stay out of politics," the Black educators declared, but "we have stayed out and this is what we have." ${ }^{112}$

That effort at political mobilization produced one of the South's earliest lawsuits to challenge the constitutionality of the literacy test. In 1934, two Iredell County teachers, T. E. Allison and Robert W. Dockery, appeared before a white registrar who instructed them to read and write passages from the state constitution. When they were done, he declared his judgment: "You do not satisfy me." Allison and Dockery subsequently sued the registrar and the county and state boards of election. ${ }^{113}$

The North Carolina Supreme Court heard their case on appeal in 1936 and ruled for the defendants. Associate Justice R. Heriot Clarkson - a Confederate veteran and leader of the white supremacy campaigns of 1898 and 1900 - wrote for the court. He affirmed the constitutionality of the literacy test and said of the plaintiffs, they "just do not like the law of their State." Clarkson closed with a history lesson: "It would not be amiss to say that [the] constitutional amendment providing for an educational test . . . brought light out of darkness as to education for all the people of the State. Religious, educational, and material uplift went forward by leaps and bounds. . . . The rich and poor, the white and colored, alike have an equal opportunity for an elementary and high school education." ${ }^{114}$

Given the difficulties of voter registration, the NCTA had limited ability to bring direct pressure to bear on state and local politicians, but its continued agitation of the salary equalization issue, the ongoing involvement of the NAACP, and a growing number of lawsuits filed elsewhere across the South convinced the state legislature in 1939 to allocate $\$ 250,000$ to raise Black teachers' pay. Still, the average Black teacher earned only three-quarters of what the average white teacher was paid. ${ }^{115}$

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit put southern lawmakers on notice in 1940, when it ruled in a Norfolk, Virginia case that racial disparities in teacher pay violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge panel affirmed Black teachers' "civil right . . . to pursue their profession without being subjected to discriminatory legislation on account of race or color." America's entry into World War II then provided the final impetus to close the gap. In 1942, James W. Seabrook, president of both the NCTA and Fayetteville State Teachers College, appealed to white politicians' sense of fair play and their not-so-secret fears for Black loyalty in the war effort. He urged them to "give the Negro confidence that the principles of democracy for which he is being called upon to fight in the four corners of the earth will be applied to him here at home." Two years later, the General Assembly appropriated funds to equalize Black and white teachers' salaries. ${ }^{116}$

[^75]During the war years, Black educators' demand for equal pay expanded into a call for equal facilities. Children led the way. In October 1946, more than four hundred students, organized in a local NAACP Youth Council, filled the streets in Lumberton, a small town in southeastern North Carolina. They carried placards that cheered the triumph of democracy in World War II and set that achievement against the wretched condition of Black schools: "inadequate and unhealthy . . . overcrowded . . . and dilapidated." "D-Day," and "V for Victory," the signs exclaimed. "How Can I Learn When I'm Cold?" "It Rains on Me." "Down with Our Schools." 117

Protests spread across eastern and central North Carolina, accompanied by lawsuits that challenged the constitutionality of unequal school funding. In 1950, plaintiffs in Durham won a breakthrough case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Judge Johnson Jay Hayes ruled that city school officials had a legal obligation to provide "negro school children substantially equal facilities to those furnished white children." He found no "excuse or justification" for failing to meet that standard and ordered an end to discriminatory school spending. ${ }^{118}$

Anyone who read Judge Hayes's ruling closely would have spotted a single sentence that was even more prescient in its implications. "The burdens inherent in segregation," he wrote, "must be met by the state which maintains them." Had Hayes pronounced a death sentence for Jim Crow? In 1951, a group of fifty-five Black parents filed suit in Pamlico County to test that question. They demanded that their children be assigned to white schools unless adequate Black facilities were provided. As historian Sarah Thuesen noted, this was "the first lawsuit filed in the federal courts from North Carolina - and only the second in the South - to raise the possibility of integration." The plaintiffs dropped their complaint when county officials agreed to build a new Black high school, but they had made their point. As the editor of the Kinston Free Press noted, "If we want to keep segregation, we must bend over backward to see that facilities are equal."119

To that end, state leaders put a $\$ 50$ million school bond on the ballot in late 1953, as the U.S. Supreme Court prepared to hear final arguments in Brown v. Board. One observer noted that many white voters supported the measure in hope that it "might tend to influence" a judgment favorable to the white South. They could not have been more mistaken. On May 17, 1954, the Court ruled that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that . . . segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." In the aftermath of that decision, state and local officials scrambled once more to invent means of defending the substance, if not the letter, of Jim Crow statutes. ${ }^{120}$

## D. Brown v. Board and the Pearsall Committees

Two gubernatorial advisory committees, popularly known by the name of their chairman, wealthy eastern landowner and Democratic power-broker Thomas J. Pearsall, set the course for opposition to Brown. They worked from the principle "that members of each race prefer to associate with other members of their race and that they will do so naturally unless they are prodded and inflamed and controlled by outside pressure."(emphasis in the original). ${ }^{121}$ To that end, the

[^76]committees proposed "the building of a new school system on a new foundation - a foundation of no racial segregation by law, but assignment according to natural racial preferences and the administrative determination of what is best for the child." ${ }^{122}$

The first Pearsall committee recommended that the state cede authority over school assignments to local districts. That proposal informed the Pupil Assignment Act of 1955, passed in the same legislative session as the prohibition of single-shot voting. Lawmakers removed references to race from state school assignment policy and gave parents "freedom of choice" in selecting the schools their children would attend. But there was a catch. The law required that Black parents petition individually to have their children assigned to white schools. Doing so demanded great courage. Parents faced the prospect of retribution by angry employers and landlords, and they had to accept the risk that their children might stand alone to face white resistance. The law also gave local school boards broad discretionary authority in ruling on parents' requests. They could reject an application if they believed that it did not serve a child's "best interests," or that it would compromise "proper administration," "proper instruction," or "health and safety" in a target school. ${ }^{123}$

A year later, the second Pearsall committee proposed an amendment to the state constitution that would authorize the legislature to provide private school vouchers for "any child assigned against the wishes of his parents to a school in which the races are mixed." Local school boards would also be permitted to call for public referenda to close schools in case of "enforced mixing of the races." The committee presented the amendment as a balm for racial conflict stirred up by outsiders, most notably the NAACP and the federal courts. They looked forward to a day "when sanity returns," and to re-establishment of "the harmonious relations which the races have enjoyed in North Carolina for more than fifty years" - that is, from the time of white redemption and Black disenfranchisement. In September 1956, voters approved the amendment by a margin of more than four to one. Though no schools were ever closed and only one private school voucher was issued, the amendment effectively undermined any notion that desegregation might be achieved more quickly. ${ }^{124}$

These policies won North Carolina praise as a "moderate" southern state but produced one of the lowest desegregation rates in the region. At the beginning of the 1958-59 school year, only ten of the state's roughly 322,000 Black students were enrolled in formerly white schools. That result impressed officials in Little Rock, Arkansas, where in 1957 white resistance to desegregation had prompted President Dwight Eisenhower to use federal troops to restore order. They complimented their North Carolina colleagues: "You . . . have devised one of the cleverest techniques of perpetuating segregation that we have seen. . . . If we could be half as successful as you have been, we could keep this thing to a minimum for the next fifty years." ${ }^{125}$

The Little Rock admirer put his finger on a lesson that is as true today as it was in the 1950s. White supremacy, often violent and inflexible, can also be subtle and adaptive. A tobacco

[^77]worker from eastern North Carolina said it best: "My experience . . . is that if you beat the white man at one trick, he will try another." ${ }^{126}$

## E. Stalled Revolution

When most Americans think about the history of civil rights, they tend to view the past through a rearview mirror. They see a series of struggles that led inevitably to the demise of Jim Crow in the mid-1960s. But for an observer on the ground at the beginning of that decade, the future seemed far less certain. The U.S. Supreme Court had effectively embraced the North Carolina way. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, the court affirmed the constitutionality of the literacy test, and in Brown II, its ruling on the enforcement of school desegregation, the court embraced the go-slow approach proposed in an amicus curiae brief filed by North Carolina's attorney general.

North Carolina State Assistant Attorney General I. Beverly Lake Sr. drafted the brief and presented it along with oral arguments in April 1955. He urged the court to "allow the greatest possible latitude to . . . District Judges in drafting final [desegregation] decrees." It stood to reason, he explained, that "only a court conversant with local conditions and granted wide discretion [could] tailor [a] decree to fit the local variations." Lake also offered a dire warning against any "attempt to compel the intermixture of the races." Such action would result in "violent opposition" and place the public schools in "grave danger of destruction." In its ruling in Brown II, the high Court heeded Lake's advice. The Justices left it to lower courts to determine the pace and process of desegregation, guided by "their proximity to local conditions" and understanding of the need for "practical flexibility in shaping remedies." That was the essence of Brown II's vague directive that desegregation proceed "with all deliberate speed." 127

Congress was even less inclined to effect sweeping change, thanks in significant measure to the outsized influence wielded by southern lawmakers. In the decades after Black disenfranchisement, national leaders ignored Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a reduction in representation for states that deny voting rights on the basis of race. Political scientist Richard Valelly estimates that had Section 2 been enforced, the Jim Crow South would have lost as many as twenty-five seats in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1903 and 1953. But the disenfranchisers never paid that penalty; instead, they expanded their influence in national politics. "That itself," Valelly writes, "was a major if silent constitutional change, a tacit, extraconstitutional [revision] of the Fourteenth Amendment." ${ }^{128}$

The denial of Black voting rights and the systematic suppression of two-party politics in the South also limited dissent and ensured that Democratic incumbents in Congress would be reelected term after term. Over time, southern politicians accrued seniority and gained control of key committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Their power was obvious in contests over civil rights issues, but much of it was otherwise out of view. As the chairmen of committees charged with administrative oversight, they permitted unchecked racial discrimination by government agencies, from the Federal Housing Administration's use of red lining to enforce

[^78]racial segregation in America's cities and suburbs to the Veterans Administration's biased allocation of resources under the G.I. Bill and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's denial of subsidized loans and other resources to Black farmers. Examples abound. In every instance, willful neglect helped to entrench Jim Crow not only in the life of the South, but in that of the nation as well. ${ }^{129}$

## X. Civil Rights at Last

## A. Sit-Ins and Direct Action

By the late 1950s, most white southerners understood that the world they had built over the last half century would not last forever, but they were determined to preserve it as long as they could. They had reason to be confident and optimistic. The Brown decision had not integrated public schools, Martin Luther King Jr.'s Montgomery movement had accomplished little more than the desegregation of city buses, and despite increases in voter registration, Black political power was still negligible. On top of that, most whites outside the South were content with the racial status quo.

Then a civil insurrection broke out. The uprising drew strength from Black moral anger and frustration with white recalcitrance, and it was given form and direction by years of preparation and social learning in Black communities across the South. Clear in hindsight, but less so at the time, the signal event took place on February 1, 1960, when four students at the Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina - Ezell Blair Jr., David Richmond, Franklin McCain, and Joseph McNeil - demanded service at a Woolworth's lunch counter in Greensboro. Sit-ins quickly spread across the state and throughout the South. Two months later, college students, Black and white, gathered at Shaw University in Raleigh - North Carolina's oldest Black institution of higher learning - to organize the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). ${ }^{130}$

Inspired by North Carolina native and Shaw graduate Ella Baker, SNCC embraced a grassroots strategy for mobilizing ordinary citizens as leaders in the struggle for civil rights. Volunteers from every corner of the nation fanned out across the South to register voters, to build alternative schools for Black children, and to press for the desegregation of public facilities. Other civil rights organizations - including King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), and the NAACP - adopted similar strategies of direct action. What these groups set in motion was a second Reconstruction in which Black people reached up not to receive but to seize their freedom. ${ }^{131}$

In the years between 1960 and 1965, Black protests forced issues of race and democracy to the center of national attention. As in the first Reconstruction, whites responded with statesanctioned and extra-legal violence, which were not always distinguishable. The stories that filled columns of newsprint and the images that flooded television screens have become iconic: the firebombing and brutal beating of Freedom Riders; the assassination of Medgar Evers; the death of four little girls in the Klan bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham; the exhumation of the bodies of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner, CORE organizers murdered by Klansmen and law offers in Neshoba County, Mississippi; and the police attack on protestors attempting to cross Selma's Edmund Pettis Bridge. These and other outrages

[^79]ultimately swayed public opinion and shamed majorities in Congress to pass the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

## B. A Second Emancipation

Each state has its own history of dealing with the moral and civic crisis brought on by the mass mobilization for democratic rights and equal citizenship. Though it had the largest Klan organization in the South, North Carolina did not experience the widespread violence that beset the Deep South. In large part, that was because of a critical gubernatorial election in 1960, won by moderate Democrat Terry Sanford. Throughout his administration, Sanford, a protégé of Frank Graham, preached a message of opportunity for all and used the police power of the state to surveil and restrain the Klan. ${ }^{132}$

Sanford won the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in a bitter primary contest with former Assistant Attorney General I. Beverly Lake Sr., a respected jurist who had taught law at Wake Forest College and was widely admired for his defense of Jim Crow. After his appearance before the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown II, Lake had proposed an amendment to the state constitution that would have made desegregation a moot issue by removing the Reconstruction-era mandate for publicly funded schools. In his campaign for governor, Lake assured supporters that "The PRINCIPLES for which we fight are ETERNAL!" 133

"The mixing of our two great races in the classroom and then in the home is not inevitable and is not to be tolerated."
I. Beverly Lake campaign ad, Perquimans Weekly, May 27, 1960, and campaign card. Courtesy of the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[^80]Sanford was a different breed of politician. He belonged to the generation who had fought in World War II and had seen horrifying reflections of American racism in German concentration camps and in the concepts of common blood and ethnic nationalism that shaped Japan's imperial project in Asia. Veterans like Sanford came home full of confidence in their ability to make the world a better place, and they were convinced that the South had to change - as a matter of what was just and right, and as an economic imperative if the region was to lift itself out of the misery that had long defined it as the most impoverished section of the nation. ${ }^{134}$

When Lake challenged his allegiance to Jim Crow, Sanford refused to be race baited. He pivoted to the "bright look of the future" and invited voters to join him in building for a "New Day" in North Carolina. That required improving public schools, not excising them from the state constitution. "We are going to continue to go forward," Sanford declared, "to give our children a better chance, to build a better state through better schools." That appeal was persuasive and reassuring. Sanford bested Lake and went on to win the general election. ${ }^{135}$

Soon after taking office, Sanford embarked on a tour of schools across the state. When he visited students - particularly at Black schools - he began to question his faith in education as a corrective for the damage wrought by Jim Crow. "I had a sickening feeling," he later recalled, "that I was talking about opportunities that I knew, and I feared [the children] knew, didn't exist, no matter how hard they might work in school." The "improvement of schools wasn't enough," he concluded. "Not nearly enough." ${ }^{136}$

By his own account, the governor was learning hard lessons - from school-aged children and from their older siblings who filled the streets with urgent demands for equal rights. He began to comprehend the connections between poverty and racial injustice that tobacco workers in Win-ston-Salem had exposed in the 1940s, that the biracial Fusion alliance had grasped during the 1890s, and that Black and white Republicans had identified as a central concern of Reconstruction. "We must move forward as one people or we will not move forward at all," Sanford told Black college students in Greensboro. "We cannot move forward as whites or Negroes . . . We can only move forward as North Carolinians." ${ }^{137}$

Sanford's words were a direct refutation of the foundational principle of Jim Crow, which Charles Aycock had explained in 1901 to an audience at the Negro State Fair in Raleigh. "It is absolutely necessary that each race should remain distinct," he said, "and have a society of its own. . . . The law which separates you from the white people of the State . . . always has been and always will be inexorable." ${ }^{138}$

In the winter of 1962-63, as the nation marked the centenary of Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Sanford shared a "bold dream for the future." He startled white educators at a meeting in Dallas, Texas when he declared, "We need our own . . . emancipation proclamation which will set us free to grow and build, set us free . . . from hate, from demagoguery." Back home, he urged members of the North Carolina Press Association to join him in a campaign to make good on the unfulfilled promise of freedom and equality. "We can do this," Sanford declared.

[^81]"We should do this. We will do it because we are concerned with the problems and the welfare of our neighbors. We will do it because our economy cannot afford to have so many people fully and partially unproductive. We will do it because it is honest and fair for us to give all men and women their best chance in life." ${ }^{139}$

As he spoke to the journalists, and through them the citizens of North Carolina, Sanford must have been mindful of another southern governor who had been in the headlines just days before. In his inaugural address, delivered from the steps of the state capitol in Montgomery, Alabama, George C. Wallace exclaimed, "Segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." ${ }^{140}$

## C. Lifting the Economic Burden of Jim Crow

Six months later, Sanford called on his friends in the press once again, this time to publicize the launch the North Carolina Fund, a non-governmental organization that would use private resources - from the Ford Foundation and North Carolina's own Z. Smith Reynolds and Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundations - to attack the state's "poverty-segregation complex." That plan was audacious. Nearly 40 percent of North Carolinians lived below the poverty line, and in eastern counties where slavery and later sharecropping dominated the economy, Black poverty was so deep and pervasive that outsiders referred to the region as "North Carolina's 'little Mississippi."' As the Fund took on this challenge, it became a model for the national war on poverty, which President Lyndon Johnson and Congress launched with the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, and the expansion of multiple programs that sought to educate, feed, clothe, and house the poor. In subsequent years, the Fund was an important conduit for millions of dollars in federal aid that flowed into North Carolina. ${ }^{141}$

From the beginning, the Fund modeled a future built on equal citizenship. Its staff and board of directors were remarkable for the number of women and Blacks who served in leadership roles, and its headquarters was located in Durham's Black business district, an intentional sign of the organization's guiding principles. The Fund also adopted the direct-action techniques of the civil rights movement. Its community partners led boycotts of businesses that refused to hire Black workers, staged rent strikes to demand that landlords repair sub-standard housing, registered voters, and taught poor people how to pressure politicians and government officials for a fair share of social provision: more and better public housing; job training; paved streets, clean water, and sewer lines for neighborhoods that had been denied those services on account of race; and low-interest mortgages and community development grants from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other federal agencies. ${ }^{142}$

[^82]Through these efforts, the Fund attempted to create an interracial movement of the poor, but it had only limited success. By time the organization closed its doors in 1968, national politics had begun to take a sharp conservative turn. For many whites, civil rights victories amplified Jim Crow dogma, which insisted that Blacks could advance only at white expense.

Fund staff often pointed to the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina as evidence of that tragic worldview. For more than half a century, Jim Crow had all but quashed the possibility of interracial cooperation and one-party government had denied poor and working-class whites a say in politics. Similarly, fierce antiunionism, defended by lawmakers and employers as a means of protecting white jobs, left working-class whites without a collective voice. Throughout the 20th century, North Carolina was one of the least unionized states in the nation and ranked near the bottom for manufacturing wages. These circumstances, in ways that echoed the past, made it easy for firebrands to channel economic grievances into racial animosity. ${ }^{143}$

## D. Rise of a New Republican Party

The North Carolina Fund - and more particularly, the challenge it posed to the economic and political structures of Jim Crow - became the social irritant around which a new conservative movement took shape. Republican Congressman James C. Gardner, who represented eastern North Carolina's Fourth District, pointed the way. His election in 1966 marked the beginning of a party realignment that over the next two decades profoundly altered the state's political landscape.

In the summer of 1967, Gardner launched a public assault on the North Carolina Fund. He charged that it had become "a political action machine" and called for an investigation of its "meddling in the affairs of local communities." Gardner also played on racial fears that dated back to the era of Reconstruction and the white supremacy politics of the late 1890s. In a press release, he shared reports from eastern North Carolina that Fund staff were promoting "'revolutionary . . . attitudes'" by speaking openly of the need for a "coalition . . . between poor whites and Negroes to give political power to the disadvantaged." ${ }^{144}$

A subsequent audit by federal authorities cleared the Fund of any wrongdoing, but Gardner had achieved his purpose. He positioned himself on the national stage as a leading critic of social welfare programs, and he made the war on poverty and its connections to Black political participation a wedge issue that could draw disaffected white Democrats into an insurgent Republican movement.

Republican Party elders in North Carolina recognized the promise of Gardner's leadership and the shrewdness of his strategy. They had named him party chairman a year before his congressional bid. Sim A. DeLapp, the party's general counsel and himself a former chairman, wrote to encourage Gardner. "From the standpoint of voter sentiment," he advised, "we are in the best shape that we have ever been [in] during my lifetime. People are permanently angry at the so-called Democratic Party. . . . They are mad because [Lyndon] Johnson has become the President of the negro race and of all the left wingers." I. Beverly Lake Sr., who was now a Justice on the North Carolina Supreme Court, expressed the depth of white anger. "The apostles of appeasement

[^83]must be removed from positions of public trust," he advised Gardner. "We must clean up the whole foul mess and fumigate the premises. ${ }^{145}$

In 1968, Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon tapped this racial animosity to flip the once solidly Democratic South. He secured an endorsement from Strom Thurmond, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, who had led the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt in defense of states' rights and had left the Democratic Party in 1964 to become a Republican. Nixon also cast his campaign in racially coded language. He offered himself as a spokesman for the "great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans, the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators" who played by the rules, worked hard, saved, and paid their taxes. This strategy won Nixon the keys to the White House and marked the beginning of the Republican Party's new reliance on the white South as a base of support. ${ }^{146}$

Four years later, Nixon made a clean sweep of the region by winning the states that thirdparty segregationist candidate George Wallace carried in 1968: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. This was the "white uprising" predicted by one of Congressman Gardner's constituents. Like her, most of the white voters who turned out for Nixon in North Carolina were still registered as Democrats, but they elected James E. Holshouser Jr. governor - the first Republican to win the office since Fusion candidate Daniel Russell in 1896 - and sent Jesse Helms to the U.S. Senate. Helms, who served for six terms, quickly rose to prominence as a national leader of what came to be called the New Right. ${ }^{147}$

## E. Conservative Democrats Hold the Line on Black Voting Rights

Conservatives in the state Democratic Party held on through the 1970s and fought a rearguard battle against civil rights advocates who used the courts to challenge suppression of the Black vote. In late 1965, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ruled that the system for apportioning seats in both houses of the state legislature on the basis of geography rather than population violated the principle of "one man, one vote." That standard, derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, holds that all votes cast in an election should carry roughly equal weight. ${ }^{148}$

The state constitution guaranteed each of North Carolina's one hundred counties a seat in the state House of Representatives. That privileged small rural counties, where whites were most firmly in control, and diluted Black votes in urban areas. The largest legislative district had nearly twenty times more residents than the smallest. That meant that a majority in the House "could be assembled from members who represented only 27.09 percent of the state's population." The state Senate was apportioned more evenly. The constitution required that Senate districts contain equal populations, though a separate provision that no county was to be divided created some imbalance. The largest Senate districts had nearly three times more residents than the smallest. The court

[^84]ordered that both chambers be redistricted immediately, and that the populations of the largest new districts not exceed those of the smallest by more than a factor of 1.3. ${ }^{149}$

Lawmakers convened in special session in 1966 to draw new district maps. They reduced population ratios as directed by the court but did so by creating a large number of multimember districts - fifteen of thirty-three in the Senate, which previously had thirty-six districts, eleven of which were multimember; and forty-one of forty-nine in the House, which previously had one hundred districts, twelve of which were multimember. Initially, seats in all of the multimember districts were to be filled through at-large elections. This was a familiar means of disadvantaging Black candidates. Lawmakers had used it effectively in the 1950s when they changed county and municipal governments from ward to at-large systems of representation. ${ }^{150}$

In 1967, lawmakers did two things that further walled off the General Assembly. First, they approved a constitutional amendment, ratified by voters in the next election, that required that counties be kept whole in the creation of state House as well as Senate districts. This effectively made multimember districts a permanent feature of legislative apportionment, since it was mathematically difficult to base house and senate seats on equal measures of population without resorting to such a solution. ${ }^{151}$
Second, lawmakers added a numbered-seat plan in twenty of the forty-one multimember House districts and three of the fifteen multimember districts in the Senate. Taken together, these districts covered nearly all of the heavily Black counties in the eastern section of the state. The apportionment law directed that in multimember districts each seat would be treated as a separate office. When citizens went to the polls, they would no longer vote for a set number of candidates out of a larger field of contenders - for instance, three out of five. Instead, their ballots would list separate races within the district, and they would vote for only one candidate in each race. ${ }^{152}$ This enabled election officials to place individual minority candidates in direct, one-to-one competition with the strongest white candidates.

Proponents explained that the numbered-seat scheme was designed to "cure the problem of 'single-shot' voting," which was still legal in legislative elections. With conservative Democrats' critique of Black bloc voting clearly in mind, one lawmaker explained that in a numbered-seat election, "you are running against a man and not a group." Another added that numbered seats all but guaranteed "that no Negro could be elected to the General Assembly." The numbered-seat plan was, indeed, so effective that in 1971 the General Assembly had only two Black members: Henry E. Frye, a lawyer from Guilford County, who was elected to his first term in 1968 through a singleshot campaign, and Joy J. Johnson, a minister from Robeson County, who ran in one of the few eastern districts without numbered seats. Frye was the first Black lawmaker to serve in the General Assembly since 1898. ${ }^{153}$

[^85]Conservative Democrats attempted to expand the scope of the numbered-seat plan in 1971. They reapportioned the state House to have forty-five districts. Thirty-five were multimember, and of those, twenty-three had numbered seats. In the Senate, there were twenty-seven districts. Eighteen were multimember, and within that group, eleven districts had numbered seats. Had these changes been implemented, the numbered-seat plan would have covered all North Carolina counties with populations that were 30 percent or more Black. But the U.S. Department of Justice blocked the move. It did so under authority of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which stipulated that in affected jurisdictions, changes to voting and representation had to be precleared by either the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to ensure that they would not discriminate against protected minorities. In 1972, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina affirmed the Justice Department's decision. Ruling in Dunston v. Scott, the court struck down both the numbered-seat plan and the anti-single-shot laws that regulated elections in certain counties and municipalities. A three-judge panel concluded that "selective and arbitrary application" of both provisions "in some districts and not in others, denies to the voters of North Carolina the equal protection of the laws and is unconstitutional."154

Though not a basis for their decision, the judges also suggested that the single-shot prohibition violated the U.S. Constitution by constraining voters' choice in use of the ballot. They wrote, "We are inclined to believe that the right to vote includes the right of the voter to refuse to vote for someone he does not know, may not agree with, or may believe to be a fool, and under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, we doubt that the state may constitutionally compel a voter to vote for a candidate of another race or political philosophy in order to get his vote counted."155

In subsequent elections, Black representation in the General Assembly grew from two members in 1970 to a high of six in both 1974 and 1976. The number then fell back to five in 1978 and to four in 1980. Numbered seats or not, Black candidates were still hard-pressed to win in multimember districts. ${ }^{156}$

## XI. Judicial Intervention and Battles Over a More Inclusive Democracy

## A. Gingles v. Edmisten and Black Electoral Gains

In 1981, four Black voters filed suit in Gingles v. Edmisten to challenge the legislative redistricting plan that the General Assembly had crafted after the 1980 Census and the 1968 constitutional provision that counties not be divided when apportioning state House and Senate seats. Lawmakers had not submitted the plan or the amendment for preclearance by the U.S. Department of Justice; when they did so after the plaintiffs' filing, both were denied approval. ${ }^{157}$

[^86]Lawmakers reacted quickly by drafting a new plan that included five majority-Black House districts and one majority-Black Senate district. The creation of those districts aided the election of eight new Black members of the House, raising the total from three to eleven. As the court later noted, however, the legislature's change of heart was in some measure cynical. "The pendency of this very legislation," the court observed, "worked a one-time advantage for Black candidates in the form of unusual organized political support by white leaders concerned to forestall singlemember districting." The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled for the plaintiffs in April 1984. Acting in an extra session, the General Assembly subsequently divided a number of multimember districts into new single-member districts that improved the prospects of Black candidates. In November balloting, two additional Black lawmakers were elected to the General Assembly, bringing the total to thirteen. ${ }^{158}$

By 1989, nineteen Black lawmakers served in the General Assembly, more than were elected during either Reconstruction or the Fusion era. Two years later, members elected state Representative Dan Blue Speaker of the House, at that time the highest state office held by a Black politician in North Carolina. Blacks also made substantial gains at the local level, largely as a result of legal challenges to at-large elections and multimember districts that followed the Gingles decision. At the end of the decade, more than four hundred Black elected officials served in county and municipal governments across the state. ${ }^{159}$

Growing Black political influence was also evident in 1991, when the General Assembly redrew North Carolina's congressional districts on the basis of the 1990 census. Under pressure from the U.S. Department of Justice and Black leaders in the Democratic Party, legislators created two districts with slim Black majorities. They explained that had they not done so, the state would have been vulnerable to legal challenge for violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The issue was dilution of the Black vote. In most parts of the state, the geographical scope of congressional districts submerged Black voters in sizable white majorities. Statewide, whites also had a long, welldocumented history of refusing to support Black candidates. As a result, it was difficult for Black voters to make their voices heard in federal elections. To remedy this marginalization, lawmakers created a new First Congressional District in the heavily Black northeastern corner of the state and a new Twelfth District that snaked along a narrow, 160 -mile path from Durham to Charlotte. In 1992, voters in these districts elected Eva Clayton and Mel Watt, the first Black North Carolinians to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives since George Henry White, who ended his second term in 1901. ${ }^{160}$

## B. Jesse Helms and Racial Polarization

By the mid-1980s, North Carolina once again had a tightly contested two-party political system. A visitor from a similar time a century before would have been confounded by the way that party labels had flipped. Democrats now resembled the party of Lincoln, and Republicans looked like Democrats of old. But the visitor would easily have recognized the competing social visions the parties offered voters. One party stressed the importance of balancing individual rights

[^87]against social responsibility, contended that government had an indispensable role to play in promoting the general welfare, and viewed the prerogatives of citizenship as the birthright of every American. The other party was wary of government infringement on personal choice and thought of equal citizenship as a privilege to be earned rather than an entitlement. In a society that for most of its history had stood on a foundation of slavery and Jim Crow, contests over these competing ideals were centered, more often than not, on the question of racial equality. Conservatives - whatever their party label - took a narrow view on that issue, partly out of racial animus but also because they understood that Black enfranchisement led to progressive social policies.

This was at no time more obvious than in 1984 and 1990, when U.S. Senator Jesse Helms faced two Democratic challengers: Governor James B. (Jim) Hunt Jr. in the first contest, and, in the second, former Charlotte mayor Harvey B. Gantt.

After his first-term election in 1972, Helms had quickly established himself as a leading spokesman of the new Republican Party that was ascendant in North Carolina and across the nation. He did so by holding true to what I. Beverly Lake Sr. had described as the "eternal principles" of white southern conservatism. Helms championed individualism and free enterprise; he opposed labor unions and attributed inequality to the values and behaviors of people who lived on society's margins; and he characterized social welfare programs as instruments of theft that rewarded the takers rather than the makers of wealth. "A lot of human beings have been born bums," Helms famously declared at the height of the civil rights movement and war on poverty. "Most of them until fairly recently - were kept from behaving like bums because work was necessary for all who wished to eat. The more we remove penalties for being a bum, the more bumism is going to blossom."161

Helms had a talent for capturing the anger of white Americans who felt aggrieved by their fellow citizens' demands for rights and respect. He was also an innovative campaigner. His North Carolina Congressional Club, founded in 1978, was a fund-raising juggernaut that pioneered targeted political advertising of the sort that began with mass mailing in Helms's era and today is conducted via the internet and social media. Added to all of that, Helms was unwavering in his convictions. Supporters and adversaries alike knew him as "Senator No." He was, in the words of one sympathetic biographer, "an uncompromising ideologue."162

Jim Hunt, Helms's opponent in 1984, was cut from different cloth. Born in 1937, he belonged to a new generation of Democrats whose politics had been shaped by the progressive currents of the post-World War II era. Hunt followed in the footsteps of his parents, who had been devout New Dealers and supporters of Frank Graham. In 1960, while studying at North Carolina State University, he managed Terry Sanford's gubernatorial campaign on campuses statewide. As Sanford's protégé, he also learned to appreciate the ways that Jim Crow blighted North Carolina with illiteracy, hunger, sickness, and want. During two terms as governor - from 1977 to 1985 Hunt put those lessons to work. He established a reputation as one of the South's most progressive leaders by persuading lawmakers to appropriate $\$ 281$ million in new spending on public education. He also recruited high-wage industries to shift North Carolina away from its traditional cheap-

[^88]labor economy, appointed former Chapel Hill mayor Howard Lee as the first Black cabinet secretary in state history, and named pioneering Black lawmaker Henry Frye to the North Carolina Supreme Court. ${ }^{163}$

As Hunt began his campaign to unseat Senator Helms in the 1984 election, he had reason to expect victory. Polls conducted in early 1983 showed him leading Helms by more than twenty percentage points. Hunt enjoyed particularly enthusiastic support among low-income whites earning less than $\$ 15,000$ a year. They preferred him over Helms by a margin of 64 to 21 percent. That was a testament to the popularity of Hunt's policies on education and economic development. ${ }^{164}$

Events later in the year warned how quickly that lead could be undone. In early October, Helms led a four-day filibuster against legislation that eventually created a national Martin Luther King Jr. holiday. He revived a line of attack on King that he had honed during the 1960s as a nightly editorialist on Raleigh's WRAL-TV. King, he charged, was a communist revolutionary, not a peacemaker, and his actions and ideals were "not compatible with the concepts of this country." When President Ronald Reagan signed the King holiday bill into law a month later, many in the press reported a humiliating defeat for Helms. But the senator knew his audience back home. Even negative headlines helped him solidify his image as an uncompromising defender of conservative values. The effectiveness of that ploy showed in the polls. At the beginning of the race, Hunt had led Helms by 30 percentage points in counties where Blacks made up less than 10 percent of the population and whites were inclined to worry more about economic opportunities than civil rights. In the months after the filibuster, that deficit turned into a ten-point lead for Helms. ${ }^{165}$

As one senior adviser acknowledged, the Helms campaign knew that they "couldn't beat Jim Hunt on issues," so they came out guns blazing on race. The campaign ran thousands of newspaper and radio ads that linked Hunt to the threat of a "bloc vote" being organized by Black Democratic presidential candidate Jesse Jackson and other civil rights leaders. One print ad showed Hunt and Jackson sitting together in the governor's residence and warned, "Gov. James B. Hunt Jr. wants the State Board of Elections to boost minority voter registration in North Carolina. . . . Ask yourself: Is this a proper use of taxpayer funds?" ${ }^{166}$

As a means of courting evangelical Christian voters, Helms and his allies focused similar attacks on the emerging gay rights movement. The Landmark, a right-wing paper supported largely by advertising income from the Helms campaign, charged that Hunt was a closeted homosexual and had accepted contributions from "faggots, perverts, [and] sexual deviates." In a move reminiscent of the 1950 contest between Frank Graham and Willis Smith, Helms distanced himself from the specifics of those charges but reminded voters at every turn that his enemies were "the atheists, the homosexuals, the militant women's groups, the union bosses, the bloc voters, and so on." This enemies list endeared Helms to enough North Carolinians to best Hunt with 52 percent of the vote. ${ }^{167}$

[^89]Six years later, race became an issue by default when Harvey Gantt won the Democratic senatorial nomination. His very presence on the ticket testified to the gains that Blacks had made in access to the ballot box and political influence. Gantt was born in 1943 in the South Carolina Lowcountry, where cotton and rice barons had built their fortunes from the labor of his enslaved forebears. His parents moved the family to Charleston when he was still an infant. There his father found a job in the city's shipyard, thanks to Roosevelt's executive order opening war industries to Black workers. Gantt grew up in public housing and was educated in the city's segregated public schools. He traced his fascination with politics to his father's membership in the NAACP and to dinner table conversations about civil rights. As a high school student, Gantt joined his local NAACP Youth Council, and in April 1960, shortly after sit-in demonstrations began in North Carolina, he led similar protests in downtown Charleston. ${ }^{168}$

When Gantt thought about college, an obvious option was to attend a historically Black institution, such as Howard University or the Tuskegee Institute. But he believed that America's future was going to be "all about" integration, so he headed off to Iowa State University, where he expected to get "an integrated education." Iowa State turned out to be as white as Howard was Black. Disappointed, Gantt returned home to create the future he longed for. He tried three times to gain admission to Clemson Agricultural College (now Clemson University) but was denied. With support from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Gantt sued, and in 1963 he won a federal court order that he be admitted as the school's first Black student. He graduated with a degree in architecture and then earned an M.A. in city planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Gantt made his way to Charlotte in 1971, opened an architectural firm, and quickly became involved in politics. He served on the city council from 1974 to 1983 and won election as mayor for two terms, from 1983 to 1987. When he challenged Helms in 1990, Gantt was the first Black Democrat in the nation's history to run for the U.S. Senate. ${ }^{169}$

Helms's campaign against Gantt echoed his attacks on Hunt. When Gantt raised issues of education, health, and the environment, Helms pointed to Gantt's financial ties to "militant homosexuals." One newspaper ad asked, why are "homosexuals buying this election?" The answer: "Because Harvey Gantt will support their demands for mandatory gay rights." At a campaign rally, Helms echoed the "White People Wake Up" warning from Willis Smith's campaign against Frank Graham. "Think about it," he said. "Homosexuals and lesbians, disgusting people marching in our streets demanding all sorts of things, including the right to marry each other. How do you like them apples? ${ }^{170}$

Still, that only got Helms so far. In mid-October, some polls had him trailing Gantt by as many as 8 percentage points. It was time to play what one of Helms's advisers called "the race card." In the run-up to Election Day, the Helms campaign aired a television ad that played on white anxiety over Black access to desegregated workplaces. The ad showed a white man's hands crumpling a rejection letter. He wore a wedding band and presumably had a family to support. And he was dressed in a flannel shirt, not a button-down and tie. He obviously worked with those hands. The voice-over lamented, "You needed that job and you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is. Harvey Gantt supports . . . [a] racial quota law that makes the color of your skin more important than your

[^90]qualifications. You'll vote on this issue next Tuesday. For racial quotas, Harvey Gantt. Against racial quotas, Jesse Helms." The reference to quotas arose from debate over the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990. Conservatives charged that it included such strict antidiscrimination rules that employers would feel compelled to adopt minority hiring goals in order to preempt potential lawsuits. President George H. W. Bush vetoed the law on October 22, days before the Helms ad ran on television. There was in all of this striking irony for anyone who cared to notice it. The ad attacked the very thing that Helms and his supporters sought to protect - economic privilege based on skin color. ${ }^{171}$

At the same time, the state Republican Party attempted to suppress Black voter turnout by mailing postcards to one hundred and twenty-five thousand voters in heavily Black precincts, warning recipients incorrectly that they would not be allowed to cast a ballot if they had moved within thirty days, and that if they attempted to vote, they would be subject to prosecution and imprisonment. Helms subsequently won the election with 65 percent of the white vote and 53 percent of the vote overall. When Gantt challenged him again in 1996, the results were the same. ${ }^{172}$

These battles over Helms's seat in the U.S. Senate made it clear that the political realignment that had begun in the mid-1960s was all but complete. White conservatives now identified as Republicans, and a coalition of minority voters and liberal whites constituted the Democratic Party's base. Contests between the two camps were often decided by slim margins. That was evidence of how closely divided North Carolinians were in the ways that they imagined the state's future. It also revealed the profound difference that racially prejudicial appeals could make in the outcome of elections and the character of governance.

## C. Progressive Democrats and Expansion of the Franchise

Despite his loss to Jesse Helms in 1984, Jim Hunt remained popular with North Carolina voters. They knew him as a reformer and modernizer who had improved the public schools and recruited new jobs that offset the loss of employment in the state's traditional manufacturing sector - textiles, tobacco, and furniture. In 1992, Hunt presented himself for an encore in the governor's office. On the campaign trail, Hunt spoke in optimistic terms. He told voters that he wanted "to change North Carolina," to "build a state that would be America's model." Hunt bested his Republican opponent, Lieutenant Governor Jim Gardner, by 10 percentage points. In 1996, he went on to win a fourth term by an even larger margin. ${ }^{173}$

Over the course of eight years, Hunt and fellow Democrats in the General Assembly built on the accomplishments of his first administration. They established Smart Start, a program that pumped $\$ 240$ million into local communities to provide preschool education and improved health care to young children; raised teacher salaries by a third and increased state spending on public education from 76 to 86 percent of the national average; launched Health Choice, a state program for uninsured children who were ineligible for Medicaid or other forms of federal assistance; and created a new Department of Juvenile Justice to address the underlying causes of youth crime.

[^91]Hunt also continued to champion inclusive governance. When he left office in 2001, 22 percent of his appointees to state agencies and commissions were minorities, a figure that matched the state's demography. ${ }^{174}$

Between 1992 and 2009, Democratic lawmakers worked to sustain these achievements by expanding minority citizens' access to the franchise. Many of their reforms echoed the Fusion election law of 1895. Key legislation created an option for early voting; allowed voters who went to the wrong precinct on Election Day to cast a provisional ballot; permitted same-day registration during early voting; and created a system for preregistering sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, so that their names would be placed on the voter rolls automatically when they turned eighteen. The net effect of these reforms was a steady increase in voter participation. In 1996, North Carolina ranked forty-third among the states for voter turnout; it rose to thirty-seventh place by 2000 and to eleventh place in 2012. ${ }^{175}$

Most of the increase was driven by higher rates of Black political participation. Between 2000 and 2012, Black voter registration surged by 51.1 percent, as compared to 15.8 percent among whites. Black turnout followed apace. Between 2000 and 2008, it jumped from 41.9 to 71.5 percent. In the 2008 and 2012 elections, Blacks registered and voted at higher rates than whites for the first time in North Carolina's history. That level of participation was critically important in the 2008 presidential contest, when Barack Obama won North Carolina with a slim margin of 14,171 votes out of $4,271,125$ ballots cast. He was the first Democrat running for President to carry the state since Jimmy Carter in 1976. ${ }^{176}$

## D. Emergence of a New Multiracial Majority

The history of North Carolina and the South has been marked so profoundly by race that it is tempting to read the politics of the early twenty-first century solely in terms of Black and white. But there is, in fact, a new multiracial majority emerging. It bears resemblance to the biracial alliances of the Reconstruction and Fusion eras but has been shaped by the arrival of a new, rapidly expanding population of Hispanic citizens and immigrants.

Close observers of North Carolina politics noted that Hispanic voters were also "indispensable" to Obama's victory. The state's Hispanic population grew more than tenfold, from just over 75,000 to roughly 800,000 , between 1990 and 2010. By 2018, that number exceeded 996,000 , just shy of 10 percent of the state's total population. That expansion was driven by the economic boom of the 1990s and early 2000s, when immigrants poured into North Carolina to work jobs in pork and poultry processing, construction, building maintenance, and hospitality. By 2010, Hispanics represented 8.5 percent of the state's total population and 1.3 percent of registered voters. In a tight election, even that small number could change the outcome. North Carolina's Hispanic voters,

[^92]most of whom favored Democrats, cast 20,468 ballots in 2008, a figure larger than Obama's winning margin. ${ }^{177}$

Hispanic voters' influence in state politics is likely to increase dramatically in the coming decade. Today the population stands at 997,000 , roughly 10 percent of the state total, and the annual growth rate, at 24.6 percent, is a third higher than in the United States overall. Moreover, nearly 40 percent of North Carolina's current Hispanic residents are children or young teenagers who - unlike many of their parents' generation - were born in this country. Under the terms of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified during Reconstruction, and the Twenty-Sixth, ratified in 1971, they will be entitled to vote when they reach the age of eighteen. Taken together, these figures point to the potential for a new multiracial alliance of Hispanic, Black, and progressive white voters. ${ }^{178}$

## XII. Retrenchment

## A. Polarized Politics of Race and Ethnicity

By the early 2000s, North Carolina voters had become as racially polarized as they were at the end of the nineteenth century. Whites, by a wide margin, associated with the party that favored a restricted franchise, limited government, tax cuts, and reduced spending on education and social services. For their part, the majority of Blacks and Hispanics gave their allegiance to the party that advocated for enlarged access to the franchise, education, and healthcare; equal job opportunities; and a broad social safety net that offers protection from poverty and misfortune. National polling data on registered voters' party affiliation, collected by Gallup in 2012, tell the story:

|  | White | Black | Hispanic | Asian | Other | Undesignated |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Republicans | $89 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Democrats | $60 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $2 \%$ |

Republican and Democratic Party demographics. Newport, "Democrats Racially Diverse; Republicans Mostly White." Gallup, 2012.
In tight elections, this polarization heightened the importance of two related factors: newly enfranchised voters' access to the ballot box and the effectiveness of racial strategies for limiting turnout. ${ }^{179}$

How had this happened? As historian Carol Anderson argues, the 2008 election was the tipping point. At the national level, Barack Obama attracted a larger share of the white vote than Democrat John Kerry in 2004. He also won substantial majorities among Hispanic, Asian, youth, and women voters, along with 95 percent of Blacks. This loose coalition had gone to the polls to

[^93]voice support for an expansive vision of government that Republicans had opposed since the days of the New Deal. They rallied to Obama's hopeful slogan, "Yes We Can," and his belief that Washington could improve people's lives with achievable reforms, such as raising the minimum wage, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, protecting the rights of labor, investing in public education, and guaranteeing universal access to affordable health care. Looking back on the election, Republican U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham identified the problem: his party was "not generating enough angry white guys to stay in business for the long term." ${ }^{180}$

An economy in crisis offered the makings of a solution. When Obama took the oath of office in January 2009, a near collapse of the banking system was threatening to plunge America and the rest of the world into a second Great Depression. North Carolina was one of the states hit hardest. Within a year, the unemployment rate soared to 10.9 percent. That caused pain in every corner of the labor market, but the situation in manufacturing and construction became particularly grim. Between 2007 and 2012, those sectors experienced job losses of 18 and 32 percent, respectively. The banking crisis had begun with the implosion of the market for subprime mortgages. As more people lost their jobs, they fell behind on payments that under the best of circumstances had strained their budgets. Between 2006 and 2014, nine million American families lost their homes; in 2008 alone, the number in North Carolina was 53,995. ${ }^{181}$

Voters grew angry, particularly at politicians they felt had let the crisis happen and now sought to fix it with bailouts for financial institutions and corporations that were ostensibly "too big to fail." That fury fueled the Tea Party revolt that erupted in 2009. The movement was overwhelmingly white, and its supporters' grievances echoed principles that had defined a century of conservative thought and politics. Tea Partiers rallied against big government; denounced the 2010 Affordable Care Act as a socialist violation of individual liberty; criticized social welfare programs as a waste of taxpayers' money; and launched a xenophobic attack on immigrants who they claimed were stealing American jobs, dealing in illicit drugs, and perpetrating violent crime. The Tea Party sprang from the grassroots, but soon many of its rallies were financed and orchestrated by Americans for Prosperity, a conservative political action group backed by billionaire brothers Charles G. and David A. Koch and a national network of wealthy donors and like-minded organizations. ${ }^{182}$

Tea Partiers channeled much of their anger through racial invective. They hailed President Obama as "primate in chief"; they donned T-shirts that demanded, "Put the White Back in White House"; and at rallies in Washington, D.C., they carried placards that exclaimed, "We came unarmed [this time]." In North Carolina, a member of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education argued against increases in school spending on grounds that costs had been inflated by what he called "Obama Bucks" - a pejorative term initially applied to food stamps but soon attached to a wide variety of federal social welfare programs. Three years later, when Charlotte hosted the Democratic National Convention, V. R. Phipps, a self-styled "patriot" from eastern North Carolina, captured headlines when he parked his truck and a trailer near delegates' downtown hotels. The trailer contained effigies of the president and state political figures, each strung up lynching-style

[^94]in a hangman's noose. Phipps later took his display on tour in the Midwest and up and down the East Coast. ${ }^{183}$

Republican leaders embraced white voters' anger and presented themselves as the party that would defy the Black president and his supporters. Shortly before the 2010 midterm elections, in which Republicans won control of the U.S. House of Representatives, Mitch McConnell, the Republican majority leader in the Senate, pledged to voters, "The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president. . . . You need to go out and help us finish the job." Writing a year later, Ron Unz, publisher of the American Conservative, an influential online political forum, described that racial logic in approving terms: "As whites become a smaller and smaller portion of the local population in more and more regions, they will naturally become ripe for political polarization based on appeals to their interests as whites. And if Republicans focus their campaigning on racially charged issues such as immigration and affirmative action, they will promote this polarization, gradually transforming the two national political parties into crude proxies for direct racial interests, effectively becoming the 'white party' and the 'non-white party.'" Unz predicted that since white voters constituted a majority of the national electorate, "the 'white party' - the Republicans - will end up controlling almost all political power and could enact whatever policies they desired, on both racial and non-racial issues."184

Unz's assessment read like a script for the future of North Carolina politics. Voter discontent offered Republicans an opportunity to extend their success in presidential and senatorial elections downward into campaigns for seats in the state legislature.

Racial appeals figured prominently in the 2010 election. Take, for example, the effort to unseat John J. Snow Jr., a state senator from western North Carolina, and L. Hugh Holliman, Democratic majority leader in the state House of Representatives. Both had voted for the 2009 Racial Justice Act, which Democrats passed after decades of effort to reform or abolish capital punishment. The law gave inmates the right to challenge imposition of the death penalty by using statistical evidence to prove that race was a factor in their sentencing. In the closing weeks of the campaign, the executive committee of the state Republican Party produced a mass mailing that attacked the law and its backers. An oversized postcard featured a photograph of Henry L. McCollum, who had been convicted of raping and killing an eleven-year-old girl. It played to the same ugly stereotypes of Black men's bestial sexuality that had been front-and-center in the white supremacy campaigns of 1898 and 1900, warning that "thanks to ultra-liberal lawmakers" like Holliman and Snow, McCollum might "be moving out of jail and into Your neighborhood (emphasis in the original) sometime soon." The not-so-subtle message was that recipients who cared

[^95]for their families' safety would vote to "get rid of criminal coddler[s]" and keep predators like McCollum "where they belong." 185


Republicans used this postcard and a similar mailing to target Democrats Hugh Holliman and John Snow for their support of the 2009 Racial Justice Act. Courtesy of WRAL.com.

There was a double layer of tragedy in this racial appeal. Holliman, a staunch defender of the death penalty, had lost a sixteen-year-old daughter to murder decades earlier. He and many of the public found the postcard so offensive that they demanded an apology from Tom Fetzer, state chairman of the Republican Party. Fetzer obliged but also took the opportunity to criticize Holliman's vote for the racial justice law. Then, in 2014, McCollum was exonerated and released from prison. The New York Times reported that the case against him, "always weak, fell apart after DNA evidence implicated another man" who "lived only a block from where the victim's body was found" and "had admitted to committing a similar rape and murder around the same time."186

Conservative activists disparaged North Carolina's growing Hispanic population in comparable ways. In 2009, Jeff Mixon, legislative director in the Raleigh office of Americans for Prosperity, attacked Hispanic immigrants as deadbeats and thugs. He described North Carolina as a "magnet for illegals" who came to America to "take advantage [of a] vast array of benefits . . . from food stamps and free medical care to in-state tuition at our community colleges." He also played on historically familiar prejudices that associate dark skin with criminality. "Poor illegal aliens" deserved no sympathy, he argued, because they provided cover for "wolves among the sheep" - members of Mexican "narco gangs" who threatened to "ruin our communities."187

A year later, the executive committee of the North Carolina Republican Party played on such anti-immigrant sentiments in a mailer it distributed to support candidate Thomas O. Murray, who was running against sitting Democrat John Christopher Heagarty for the District 41

[^96]House seat in the General Assembly. With a sombrero atop his head and his skin darkened by clever photo editing, "Señor" Heagarty exclaims, "Mucho taxo" - a reference to policies that Republicans charged were driving away jobs. ${ }^{188}$


It's Time to Say Adios to Señor Chris Heagarty and His Job Killing Policies
Republicans produced this postcard to insinuate that Democrat Chris Heagerty's stance on tax issues was connected to the interests of Hispanic immigrants. Courtesy of IndyWeek.

On Election Day, Snow, Holliman, Heagarty, and fifteen of the other Democrats lost their seats, giving Republicans a majority in both houses of the state legislature. Republican lawmakers subsequently consolidated their hold on power. The timing of Republican gains in North Carolina was fortuitous. The nation's decennial census was complete, and lawmakers would now take up the job of redistricting the state.

## B. 2011 Redistricting

In 2011, Republican lawmakers redrew state legislative districts in a way that exposed the centrality of race in their strategy for extending and securing their partisan advantage. Managers of the process claimed - falsely - that in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the General Assembly was required to create majority-minority legislative districts in equal proportion to North Carolina's Black population. They instructed an outside consultant, Republican Party strategist Thomas Hofeller, to create such districts wherever geographically possible, and to complete that task before drawing other district lines. The plan that Hofeller designed, and the General Assembly ultimately approved, included thirty-six districts - twenty-four in the House and twelve in the Senate - in which Blacks constituted more than fifty percent of the voting age adults. These districts accounted for twenty-one percent of seats in the General Assembly, a figure that matched the percentage of Blacks in the state's population. ${ }^{189}$

Republican leaders presented the redistricting plan as evidence of their commitment to civil rights, but that was a sleight of hand. The new majority-minority districts were bizarrely shaped; they sprawled across county lines, divided municipalities, and split precincts - all for the purpose

[^97]of packing Black voters together as tightly as possible. These configurations dismissed "traditional race-neutral districting principles" established by the U.S. Supreme Court, including "compactness contiguity, and respect for . . . communities defined by actual shared interests." The effect was to separate many Black voters from the interracial alliances that the Democratic Party had been building since the mid 1980s. In the 2012 election, Black candidates gained seven seats in the General Assembly, but nineteen of their white allies suffered defeat. ${ }^{190}$ This gave Republicans a super majority in both chambers of the legislature, which, along with the election of Republican governor Patrick L. (Pat) McCrory, sharply diminished Black North Carolinians' ability to influence public policies that mattered to their communities. ${ }^{191}$

## B. Shelby County v. Holder and House Bill 589

The severity of that setback quickly became apparent when the new Republican-controlled legislature convened. For more than a year, party leaders had been gathering information that might help them roll back Democratic reforms that had expanded access to the ballot box. As early as January 2012, a member of the Republican legislative staff had asked the State Board of Elections, "Is there any way to get a breakdown of the 2008 voter turnout, by race (white and Black) and type of vote (early and Election Day)?" A year later, a Republican lawmaker wondered, "Is there no category for 'Hispanic' voter?" Another questioned University of North Carolina officials "about the number of Student ID cards that [were] created and the percentage of those who [were] African American," and in April 2013, an aide to the Speaker of the House requested "a breakdown, by race, of those registered voters [who] do not have a driver's license number."192

Two months later, the U.S. Supreme Court gave white conservatives an opening to make wholesale changes to state elections law. In Shelby County v. Holder, a 5-4 majority of justices struck down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which had required that the U.S. Department of Justice preclear changes in voting procedures in portions of North Carolina and other affected jurisdictions to ensure that they would not disadvantage protected minorities. Within hours of the ruling, Republican leaders in North Carolina announced that they planned to introduce an omnibus bill that would dramatically modify the ways that citizens registered to vote and cast their ballots. ${ }^{193}$

What eventually emerged was House Bill 589, legislation that targeted the electoral clout of the alliance of Black, Hispanic, and progressive white voters within the Democratic Party. Like

[^98]the Act to Regulate Elections that opponents of Fusion crafted in 1899, House Bill 589 made no explicit reference to race or ethnicity; nevertheless, it threatened to limit political participation by non-white minorities. The law included a number of provisions that would have made voting harder for Black and Hispanic electors.

- House Bill 589 required that in-person voters provide one of eight approved forms of photo identification in order to cast a ballot. Blacks constituted 22 percent of North Carolina's population, but according to an analysis of State Board of Elections data by political science and election scholars Michael Herron and Daniel Smith, they represented more than a third of the registered voters who at the time did not possess the two most common forms of photo identification: a valid driver's license or a state-issued nonoperator's ID card. ${ }^{194}$
- The law also eliminated the first week of early voting, same-day registration, and straightticket voting. Statistics from the 2008 election in North Carolina suggested that these changes would have a disproportionately negative effect on Black voter participation. In the run-up to Election Day, 71 percent of Black voters cast their ballots early, including 23 percent who did so within the first week of the early voting period. That compared, respectively, to 51 and 14 percent of whites. Thirty-five percent of same-day voter registrants were Black, a figure 50 percent higher than what might have been predicted on the basis of population statistics, and Democrats voted straight-ticket by a two-to-one ratio over Republicans. ${ }^{195}$
- House Bill 589 targeted young future voters in similar fashion. It ended a program that permitted sixteen and seventeen-year-olds to pre-register at their high schools and other public sites. That opportunity had been particularly popular among Black teenagers. Blacks constituted 27 percent of the pool of pre-registered youth, once again a figure that was significantly higher than Black representation in the general population. ${ }^{196}$
Many observers at the time noted this potentially disproportionate effect on Black electors, but most missed something equally important. The elimination of pre-registration for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds was remarkably forward looking: it stood to diminish the impact of rapid growth in the number of Hispanic voters - growth that observers identified as the "future of Progressive strength in America." 197

A report from the University of North Carolina's Population Center explained the details. In 2012, as illustrated in the graph below, most of the state's Hispanic residents were noncitizens and only one if four was eligible to vote, but just over the horizon, Republicans faced a large population of young Hispanics who had been born in the United States, who would soon cast a ballot, and data showed were inclined to support Democrats. Of the

[^99]Hispanics who had or would turn eighteen between 2012 and 2015, 72 percent were citizens. That figure rose to 84 percent of those who would turn eighteen between 2015 and 2010, and to 98 percent of those who would do so between 2020 and 2030. For Republicans politically, there was little to be gained and much to be risked by pre-registering these future voters. ${ }^{198}$


Blue bars represent voting-age Hispanics, with dark shading for citizens and light shading for non-citizens. Green bars represent Hispanics under age eighteen, again with dark shading for citizens and light shading for non-citizens. Courtesy of Carolina Demography, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

- Finally, House Bill 589 changed the rules for challenging voters' eligibility to cast a ballot and, by doing so, heightened the potential for intimidation. Three revisions were important in this regard. First, residents throughout the state were now allowed to inspect and challenge registration records in any of North Carolina's one hundred counties. In the past, challengers were permitted to act only in the counties in which they resided. Second, residents of a county were permitted to challenge voters' eligibility to cast a ballot at polling sites countywide, not just in the precincts where they themselves were registered. Third, the chair of each political party in a county were permitted to appoint ten at-large observers to monitor voting at any polling place they believed warranted close supervision. These poll watchers would be appointed in addition to the election judges assigned to specific voting sites.

[^100]Worry that these provisions would encourage frivolous challenges and voter intimidation was based on more than speculation. During the 2012 election, a loose confederation of conservative activists mobilized by True the Vote, state-level Voter Integrity Projects, and the Madison Project launched a campaign they called Code Red USA. Their aim was to marshal a "cavalry" of volunteer poll watchers to police alleged voter fraud in battleground states, including North Carolina. In one incident, self-appointed watchdogs in Wake County petitioned to have more than five hundred voters, most of them people of color, removed from the registration rolls.

Though the attempt failed, it echoed in disturbing ways a similar episode during Reconstruction, when a group of whites in the same county challenged one hundred and fifty Black voters on grounds that they had registered fraudulently. As a researcher from the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law observed, the 1872 challenge was "one of the first organized attempts by private citizens . . . to systematically undermine Black political participation in North Carolina - a practice that would continue throughout the Jim Crow era." The mechanism to allow and facilitate this practice was reintroduced by the enactment of House Bill 589. ${ }^{199}$
When pressed on these issues, Republican lawmakers insisted that their intent was not to infringe on voting rights. Thom Tillis, Speaker of the House, encouraged the public to think of House Bill 589 instead as a means of "restoring confidence in government."200

## C. Rolling Back Reform, Restricting Social Provision

The new Republican-led North Carolina Legislature wanted to roll back reforms that previous Democratic-led legislatures had fought so hard for, reforms that brought equity back into electoral politics. Shelby County and the nullification of the Federal Government's preclearance regime gave the new legislature the impetus to put forth discriminatory laws such as HB 589 and its successor SB 824, but also set up a decade of fights over the suppression of Black voters in various ways and has ultimately led to this lawsuit over the new 2021 district maps.

The Republicans' sweeping revision of state election law was a key element in a broader legislative agenda designed to roll back decades of reform that had made state government more responsive to the economic and social needs of minority populations who had been politically and economically marginalized throughout much of the state's history.

One of Republicans' top priorities was to repeal the 2009 Racial Justice Act. Democrats defended the law by pointing to a simple set of numbers: between 1977 and 2010, North Carolina courts had sent three hundred and ninety-two people to death row, 49 percent of whom were Black - a figure more than double Blacks' representation in the general population. Opponents were not impressed. Thomas Goolsby, a Republican in the state Senate, insisted that the Racial Justice Act was unnecessary because inmates on death row already had "multiple avenues of appeal." Governor Pat McCrory seconded that claim, arguing that the law did nothing more than create a new "judicial loophole to avoid the death penalty and not a path to justice." Timothy K.

[^101](Tim) Moore, who later became the state's Speaker of the House, heaped ridicule atop McCrory's scorn. "The Racial Justice Act tries to put a carte blanche solution on the problem," he said. "A white supremacist who murdered an African American could argue he was a victim of racism if Blacks were on the jury." There was, of course, no evidence that Blacks had systematically persecuted white supremacists in the past, or that prosecutors were eager to empanel Black jurors. In fact, district attorneys in North Carolina struck eligible Black jurors at roughly 2.5 times the rate they excluded
all others. In early June 2013, lawmakers voted largely along party lines to rescind the Racial Justice Act, and Governor McCrory quickly signed the repeal into law. ${ }^{201}$

North Carolina's minority schoolchildren also ran afoul of Republican lawmakers, who mounted a stepwise campaign to weaken public education and expand private alternatives. The starting point was an issue that had been front and center in the 2012 election: a projected $\$ 3$ billion shortfall in the state budget. There were obvious ways to address that problem - raise taxes, cut spending, or do some of both. The Republican majority in the General Assembly chose austerity, and because expenditures on education accounted for nearly 40 percent of North Carolina's annual budget, public schools were in the bullseye. For fiscal year 2014, the total appropriation for K-12 education, when adjusted for inflation, fell $\$ 563$ million short of school spending in fiscal year 2008. Included in that figure were deep cuts in funding for pre-K programs, transportation, textbooks, and construction. The reductions hit teachers particularly hard. Their pay effectively stagnated as compensation in North Carolina fell from twenty-second to forty-seventh place in the nation. Soon teachers were fleeing the state's public schools; some dropped out of the profession, and others were lured away by better pay in neighboring states. ${ }^{202}$

Spending cuts and teacher attrition created a public perception of crisis, which was amplified by changes in the way that state officials had begun to report school performance. In 2012, the General Assembly created a simplified system that distilled a variety of measurements into letter grades that ranged from A to F. A year later, seven hundred and seven public schools received a grade of D or F. Parents and educators were shocked, in part because officials failed to tell them that nearly all of the underperforming schools were also high-poverty, majority-minority schools, where children needed more, not less, funding for supplemental instruction, pre-K and after-school programs, lower student-teacher ratios, and reduced class size. ${ }^{203}$

Republican lawmakers ignored those needs and instead used the low grades to argue for increased public support for charter schools and implementation of a new freedom-of-choice

[^102]voucher program for private and religious academies. These policy decisions threatened to accelerate school re-segregation, which had been gathering speed since 2000, when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its earlier decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. The Swann ruling, issued in 1971, had made busing a preferred means of desegregation and, in Charlotte, led to the creation of one of the nation's most integrated school systems. But behind that success lay deep racial anxiety, which led a group of white parents to initiate the court challenge to Swann in 1997 and, more broadly, informed the creation of North Carolina's charter school program a year later. A Duke University study of charter schools in the period between 1998 and 2012 offered insight into these developments and their role in re-segregation. The Duke researchers found that white parents preferred schools that were no more than 20 percent Black. Beyond that tipping point, they began to look for alternatives. The results showed in the demography of North Carolina schools. In 2012, only about 30 percent of students in the traditional public education system attended highly segregated schools that were more than 80 percent or less than 20 percent Black. In charter schools, the figures were reversed; more than two-thirds of students were enrolled in schools that were overwhelmingly white or Black. The Duke team concluded from these numbers that "North Carolina's charter schools have become a way for white parents to secede from the public school system, as they once did to escape racial integration orders."204

North Carolina's voucher program also undermined confidence in public schools and encouraged re-segregation. The program used public school funds to offer Opportunity Scholarships to low-income families that earned less than 133 percent of the federal poverty line. The State Department of Public Instruction marketed the vouchers, valued at up to \$4,200 a year, as assistance for parents who wished to remove their students from high-poverty, under resourced schools - that is, underperforming schools created by state policies. Today, 93 percent of voucher recipients attend religious schools, which, on average, do not serve them particularly well. North Carolina accountability standards for voucher-eligible schools are among the most lenient in the nation. Those schools are not required to seek accreditation, employ licensed teachers, comply with state curriculum standards, or administer end-of-year evaluations of student learning. Given that lax oversight, it is not surprising that in the small number of voucher-eligible schools that do report results from standardized reading and math tests, 54 percent of students score below national averages. Enrollment data for voucher-eligible schools is not readily available, but information from disparate sources suggests that they are an increasingly attractive choice for white families who are looking for an alternative to integrated public schools. Between the 2014-15 and 2016-17 academic years, the share of vouchers claimed by Black students fell from 49 to 35 percent, while the share used by whites increased from 27 to 41 percent. One fact provides at least a partial explanation of that shift: in large religious schools with more than eighty voucher students, average enrollment was 89 percent white. ${ }^{205}$

Restoring "blindfolded" justice that dismissed four centuries of racial inequity in American jurisprudence and defaulting on North Carolina's constitutional obligation to provide all children equal opportunities in school - this was the agenda that Republicans enacted after their sweep of

[^103]the General Assembly and governor's office in 2012. On election night in 2016, as he celebrated Donald J. Trump's presidential victory, Tim Moore, the state Speaker of the House, looked back on his party's handiwork and declared, "We've had a great four years since we took the majority." But even in that moment, Moore and other party leaders surely knew that candidates with different priorities might prevail in future elections and sweep away Republicans' accomplishments. How, then, to make the conservative revolution permanent? One answer - the answer that Charles Aycock and white-rule Democrats had imposed in 1900 - was to disenfranchise dissenting voters. That was the threat posed by House Bill 589, which a federal court would later describe as "the most restrictive voting law North Carolina has seen since the era of Jim Crow."206

## D. House Bill 589 in the Federal Courts

In 2016, the North Carolina NAACP, League of Women Voters, and U.S. Department of Justice lost their challenge to House Bill 589 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. But on appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs and reversed the district court's decision. A three-judge panel found compelling evidence of discriminatory intent in the Republican election law. Among other considerations, the court pointed to "the inextricable link between race and politics in North Carolina," Republican lawmakers' consideration and use of race-specific data on voting practices, and the bill's timing. In addition to following closely on the heels of the Shelby County decision, House Bill 589 was also situated at a critical juncture in North Carolina politics. The appellate court judges noted that "after years of preclearance and expansion of voting access, by 2013 African American registration and turnout rates had finally reached nearparity with white registration and turnout rates. African Americans were poised to act as a major electoral force." Republican lawmakers "took away that opportunity because [Blacks] were about to exercise it," and they did so, the judges added, "with almost surgical precision." 207

From this and other evidence, the Fourth Circuit panel concluded "that, because of race, the legislature enacted one of the largest restrictions of the franchise in modern North Carolina." They did not directly cite North Carolina's 1900 disenfranchisement amendment to the state constitution, but that was the obvious historical reference point. No other change to election law had been so sweeping in its effect. The judges remanded the House Bill 589 case to the district court, with instructions to enjoin the voter ID requirement and changes made to early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and teen preregistration. ${ }^{208}$

Republican leaders quickly regrouped after the Fourth Circuit ruling. They began to prepare an appeal to the Supreme Court and, in the interim, attempted to salvage some of the advantage that House Bill 589 would have given them in the upcoming 2016 general election. In mid-August, Republican governor Pat McCrory petitioned Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. to reinstate the law's photo ID requirement, which had been implemented months earlier in the spring primaries. Roberts declined. At the same time, Dallas Woodhouse, executive director of the state

[^104]Republican Party, encouraged county election boards to press ahead with what he called "party line changes" to early voting. The boards no longer had legal authority to shorten the early-voting period, but they could achieve much the same effect by reducing the number of early-voting sites and cutting the hours they would be open. ${ }^{209}$

Seventeen county boards, mostly in the east, did just that. Had Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act still been in place, the changes would have required preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice, but that was no longer a hurdle. In the affected counties, Black voter turnout sagged significantly through much of the early voting period and caught up to 2012 levels only after a Herculean get-out-the-vote effort. Tellingly, state Republican Party officials reported that news in explicitly racial terms. The "North Carolina Obama coalition" was "crumbling," they reported in a news release. "As a share of Early Voters, African Americans are down 6.0\%, (2012: $28.9 \%$, 2016: 22.9\%) and Caucasians are up 4.2\%, (2012: 65.8\%, 2016: 70.0\%)."210

On appeal in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Fourth Circuit's ruling on House Bill 589. ${ }^{211}$

## E. Redistricting in Federal and State Courts

As House Bill 589 wound its way through the federal courts, plaintiffs raised related objections to the redistricting plan enacted by Republican lawmakers in 2011. In Covington v. North Carolina, twenty-eight plaintiffs contested the configuration of the same number of new, majorityminority districts in the General Assembly. They charged that those districts had been created "through the predominant and unjustified use of race." State defendants answered the complaint by insisting that "race was not the primary factor used in the redistricting, and that even if it was, their use of race was necessary to serve a compelling state interest - namely, compliance with Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act."212

In August 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina rejected that defense. The court ruled against the Section 2 claim, noting that Republican lawmakers presented no evidence that they had created majority-minority districts to remedy situations in which "vote dilution" - as in at-large elections, or as a consequence of white bloc voting - restricted minority citizens' "opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." In fact, the court observed, Black legislators had a strong record of electoral success in "non-majority-Black" districts. It noted that "in three election cycles preceding the 2011 redistricting, African-American candidates for the North Carolina House won thirty-nine general elections in districts without a majority [Black voting age population] . . . and African-American candidates for the North Carolina Senate won twenty-four such elections." The court took a similarly jaundiced view of Republican lawmakers' Section 5 claim. It pointed out that "eleven of the

[^105][twenty-eight] challenged districts [did] not include any county, in whole or in part, that was covered by Section 5 in 2011, and therefore those districts could not have been drawn to remedy a Section 5 violation." 213

The court concluded that Republican lawmakers could point to "no strong basis in evidence" that they had acted to correct voting practices or procedures that limited racial minorities' "effective exercise of the electoral franchise." ${ }^{214}$ In fact, the 2011 redistricting plan appeared to have been designed to do just the opposite. In Guilford County, for example, the Republican map split forty-six precincts in order to cram 88.39 percent of Greensboro's Black voting-age residents into three majority-minority state House districts. Similarly, Senate district 28 split Greensboro and neighboring High Point along racial lines, and by doing so captured 82.45 percent of the Black voting age population in Greensboro, along with 60 percent of that population in High Point. ${ }^{215}$

Based on these observations, the court ruled that the 2011 redistricting plan "constitute[d] racial gerrymandering in violation of the [Fourteenth Amendment's] Equal Protection Clause." North Carolina "citizens have the right to vote in districts that accord with the Constitution," the court declared. "We therefore order that new maps be drawn that comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. ${ }^{216}$ In 2017, the General Assembly adopted a new redistricting plan that included 116 revised districts. Covington plaintiffs objected that twelve of the new districts failed to remedy original instances of racial gerrymandering, or were otherwise unconstitutional. The district court found that nine of those complaints had merit and appointed a Special Master to make additional revisions. On appeal in 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld four of the Special Master's revised maps. ${ }^{217}$

As the Covington case came to closure in the federal courts, Common Cause and twentythree individual plaintiffs sued in state court to block the 2017 redistricting plan. They charged that despite revisions intended to correct racial gerrymandering, redrawn legislative districts still advantaged Republicans over the Democratic challengers that most Black and progressive white voters preferred. In their court filing, the plaintiffs explained how this was done:

To maximize the number of Republican seats in the General Assembly, the 2017 Plan meticulously 'pack[ed] and crack[ed]' Democratic voters. Packing and cracking are the two primary means by which mapmakers carry out a partisan gerrymander. 'Packing' involves concentrating one party's backers in a few districts that they will win by overwhelming margins to minimize the party's votes elsewhere. 'Cracking' involves dividing a party's supporters among multiple districts so that they fall comfortably short of a majority in each district. ${ }^{218}$

The configuration of legislative districts in Charlotte and Mecklenburg County offered a striking example of these practices in action. The 2017 plan broke Mecklenburg County into twelve House

[^106]districts. Democratic voters were packed into eight of the districts, seven of which included no Republican-leaning precincts. Conversely, Charlotte's Republican voters were packed into three districts in southern Mecklenburg County, and the last remaining district, in north Mecklenburg, was drawn to give Republicans an advantage by dodging adjacent Democratic-leaning precincts. Senate districts followed a similar pattern. All of Charlotte's Republican-leaning precincts were packed into two districts that overlapped the southern House districts, and Democrat-leaning precincts were concentrated in three districts that included heavily minority, inner city neighborhoods. ${ }^{219}$ Given the sharp racial polarization in political party membership, this configuration worked to disadvantage minority citizens, the overwhelming majority of whom affiliate as Democrats.

The effectiveness of packing and cracking was apparent in the 2018 statewide election results. In contests for "both the state House and state Senate . . . Democratic candidates won a majority of the statewide vote." Even so, Republicans secured "a substantial majority of seats in each chamber": 29 of 50 in the Senate and 65 of 120 in the House. ${ }^{220}$ "The [electoral] maps," Common Cause and its allies complained, "are impervious to the will of the voters." So was policy making. "In today's state legislatures-and particularly in North Carolina," the Common Cause plaintiffs observed, "Republican representatives are simply not responsive to the views and interests of Democratic voters. Regardless of whether gerrymandering has caused this increased partisanship, such extreme partisanship magnifies the effects of partisan gerrymandering. When Democratic voters lose the ability to elect representatives of their party as a result of partisan gerrymandering, those voters lose not only electoral power, but also the ability to influence legislative outcomes - because Republican representatives pay no heed to these voters' views and interests once in office. ${ }^{221}$

In September 2019, a three-judge panel of the Wake County Superior Court affirmed these claims. They ruled that the 2017 redistricting plan violated the North Carolina state constitution on three counts. "First, the court wrote that partisan gerrymandering 'strikes at the heart' of the Free Elections Clause, a provision of the North Carolina Constitution stating that 'all elections shall be free.' Second, the court held that partisan gerrymandering violated the North Carolina Equal Protection Clause, which [state] courts have interpreted to include the fundamental 'right to vote on equal terms.' . . . Finally, the court declared that under the North Carolina Constitution, partisan gerrymandering unconstitutionally burdens the free speech and assembly rights of those who vote for the disfavored party by diluting their votes and their ability to effectively organize. ${ }^{, 222}$ Based

[^107]on these findings, the court ordered that legislative maps be redrawn once more. The General Assembly complied, without legal objection, in October 2019.223

Taken together, these judicial rulings underscore the fact that in North Carolina politics, extreme partisan gerrymandering is a highly effective means of discriminating against racial minorities. It works to restrict minority voting power, and, by doing so, weakens the influence of interracial and multiethnic coalitions, particularly within the Democratic Party. The ultimate effect is to entrench white conservatives' control of the General Assembly and public policy.

## F. Constitutional Amendment - A New Old Strategy

Republican leaders - including party chairman Robin Hayes, Senate President Pro Tempore Phil Berger, and Speaker of the House Tim Moore - answered these defeats with public declarations that they would "continue to fight." Having failed to secure a comprehensive revision of election law with House Bill 589, they narrowed their focus to voter ID and shifted the battle to the state constitution, where similar struggles over voting rights, race, and democracy had been waged in 1868 and again in 1900. In 2018, Republican lawmakers drafted a constitutional amendment that would require photographic identification of all electors "offering to vote in person." They placed it on the ballot for ratification in the upcoming November election. ${ }^{224}$

That was a shrewd tactical move. As Gerry Cohen, retired special counsel to the General Assembly, observed, Republicans viewed the amendment as a means of "immuniz[ing] voter ID, specifically photo voter ID, from [court challenges on] state constitutional grounds." A future legislature dominated by Democrats would also find it far more difficult to reverse a constitutional amendment than to repeal an election law like House Bill 589. These were live concerns for Republicans who faced a Democratic majority on the North Carolina Supreme Court and, if opinion polls in advance of Election Day had any predictive power, were at risk of losing their supermajority in the state House of Representatives. ${ }^{225}$

Over the course of the campaign, Republicans argued for the voter ID amendment as a reasonable, necessary, and common-sense reform. It was reasonable, they said, because the state had made adequate provision for its citizens to acquire a photo ID. The amendment was necessary,

[^108]proponents claimed, because widespread voter fraud threatened the integrity of elections. And requiring a photo ID to vote made sense because similar proof of identity was required to "board an airplane, see an R-rated movie, cash a check, or use a credit card."226


Voter ID campaign card, Republican John Bell, Raleigh News and Observer, November 1, 2018.

These arguments for the amendment did not stand up to close scrutiny. On the point of reasonableness, the fact remained that Blacks made up 23 percent of registered voters but accounted for 34 percent of voters without photo ID. And widespread voter fraud was simply a myth. In April 2017, the State Board of Elections released an audit of the previous year's general election in which it reported that questionable ballots accounted for just over 0.01 percent of the 4.8 million total votes cast. Of the five hundred and eight cases of fraudulent voting that the board identified, only one involved the kind of in-person deception that a photo ID requirement was designed to expose and prevent. In that instance, a voter impersonated her recently deceased mother, whom she described to election officials as "a tremendous Donald Trump fan." Of the remaining ineligible ballots, four hundred and forty-one were cast by people with felony records whose right to vote had not been restored; forty-one were cast by non-citizens; twenty-four were cast by people who double voted; and one was cast by mail. ${ }^{227}$

The notion of common sense was equally misleading. Theaters have no legal obligation to check moviegoers' photo IDs; the Transportation Safety Administration routinely allows passengers to board planes without a photo ID, so long as they can present other forms of identification; the American Express merchant guide imposes no photo ID requirement on authorized credit card

[^109]customers; and Visa and Mastercard require a photo ID only for face-to-face cash disbursements, not purchases. ${ }^{228}$

These points of fact notwithstanding, voters approved the constitutional amendment in November 2018 by a margin of 55.49 to 44.51 percent. Republicans carried the day, in part because they had effectively undermined faith in the electoral process by convincing voters that fraud was widespread but remained invisible because there were no laws to expose it. Dallas Woodhouse put it this way: "Millions of North Carolinians believe that there is voter fraud. Now, somebody can disagree with them, but they believe it. So, adding confidence into the system is a very important thing."229

Republican leaders had also broken with the General Assembly's well-established practice of appointing study commissions to evaluate the impact of constitutional changes and of drafting legislation to make the details of implementation public and transparent. The bill that authorized the photo ID amendment stipulated that it would be presented as a single declarative sentence on which voters were to decide 'yes' or 'no.' Under pressure from critics, the North Carolina Constitutional Amendments Publication Commission, provided a lengthier explanation:

This amendment requires you to show photographic identification to a pollworker before you can vote in person. It does not apply to absentee voting.

The Legislature would make laws providing the details of acceptable and unacceptable forms of photographic identification after passage of the proposed amendment. The Legislature would be authorized to establish exceptions to the requirement to present photographic identification before voting. However, it is not required to make any exceptions.

There are no further details at this time on how voters could acquire valid photographic identification for the purposes of voting. There is no official estimate of how much this proposal would cost if it is approved.
Even though it still lacked specifics, and did not change what voters saw on the ballot itself, this description weakened voter support for photo ID. Shortly before the election, an Elon University poll found that "based upon that language," voter approval dropped from 63 to 59 percent. Had the General Assembly followed past practice and offered a draft of enabling legislation, support might have eroded further. ${ }^{230}$

[^110]Shortly after Thanksgiving, Republican leaders convened a special session of the General Assembly to pass Senate Bill 824, legislation crafted to implement the photo ID amendment. They were in a hurry, because in the 2018 general election they had lost their super-majority in the state House of Representatives and would soon be unable to counter Democratic Governor Roy Cooper's opposition. When Cooper vetoed the bill, the lame duck legislature quickly overrode him and made it into law. ${ }^{231}$

In December 2018, plaintiffs in Holmes v. Moore challenged Senate Bill 824 in state Superior Court. They noted that the new law had been shepherded through the legislature by the same Republican leaders who crafted House Bill 589 five years earlier. Thus, there was no surprise that Senate Bill 824 "retain[ed] many of the harmful provisions" from the voter photo ID section of the prior legislation, and, by doing so, "reproduced the . . . racially discriminatory intent" identified by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. More specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Senate Bill 824 violated the North Carolina Constitution's equal protection and free elections clauses, its property qualification clause, and its protection of free speech and the right of assembly and petition. ${ }^{232}$

A three-judge panel ruled, two to one, for the plaintiffs in September 2021. Senate Bill 824, they wrote, "was enacted in part for a discriminatory purpose and would not have been enacted in its current form but for its tendency to discriminate against African American voters." The legislation therefore violated Article 1, section 19, of the North Carolina State Constitution, which affords all citizens "equal protection of the laws" and specifies that no person "shall . . . be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin." In reaching this conclusion, authors of the majority opinion pointed to a "totality of circumstances" that included North Carolina's "history of voting and election laws." That history, they observed, "shows a recurring pattern in which the expansion of voting rights and ballot access to African Americans is followed by periods of backlash and retrenchment that roll back those gains for African American voters." In the judges' view, this "historical context" supported plaintiffs' claims the Republican legislature "intended to discriminate against African American voters."233

## G. Redistricting Redux

Over the course of a decade, Republican legislators have largely failed in their efforts to use the power of the law to restrict minority political participation and influence in shaping public policy. But the fight is hardly over. As noted above, Shelby v. Holder gave conservatives new freedom to rewrite election law, and by nullifying the federal preclearance regime, has significantly disadvantaged voting rights advocates, who must now contest discriminatory practices after the fact and on a case-by-case basis. In that respect, the voting rights landscape in North Carolina today bears a troubling resemblance to that of the 1950s.

Republicans retained control of the General Assembly in the 2020 election, and in the subsequent legislative session used the decennial redistricting process to make another run at partisan gerrymandering. In early November of this year, they released maps of new Congressional and

[^111]legislative districts that, in the view of critics and partisans alike, will give Republicans a wide advantage over Democratic challengers. Pundits predict that in the 2022 election, Republicans are likely to win ten or eleven of North Carolina's congressional seats and may re-establish a vetoproof super majority in the state legislature. ${ }^{234}$

In court challenges to the new district maps, plaintiffs charge that Republican lawmakers have once again manipulated the redistricting process in order suppress minority political participation and deny political influence to Black and Hispanic voters, who constitute fifty percent of the Democratic electorate. Republican leaders answer that charge by insisting that they "did not look at race" while drawing new district maps. ${ }^{235}$

That claim to colorblindness is cynical and pernicious. It asks us to believe that history has ended; that in a society deeply scarred by slavery and Jim Crow, race no longer matters; and that politicians vying for public office in the racially polarized America of the twenty-first century lack an intimate knowledge of where people live and how they vote.

As historian Morgan Kousser has observed, redistricting will always be informed by race - "formally or informally, precisely or approximately" - because racial divisions "are the single most salient social and political facts in contemporary America, as they have been in much of the nation's past. Redistricting cannot be race-unconscious until the country ceases to be, and pretending that society or politics has become colorblind can only allow discrimination to go unchecked." That is particularly true in North Carolina, where conservatives have long relied on racial discrimination to secure partisan advantage. As the state Superior Court judges noted in Holmes v. Moore, "this history of restricting African American voting rights . . . is not ancient; it is a twenty-firstcentury phenomenon."236

## XIII. Conclusion

Today's contests over access to the ballot box and representation in government are the latest chapters in North Carolina's long and cyclical history of suppressing minority political participation. Over the last century and a half, white conservatives have employed a variety of measures to limit the rights of racial and ethnic minorities. In the process, they have imposed a heavy burden of injustice. Historically, when minority rights have been constrained, North Carolina's government has been decidedly unresponsive to minority concerns and interests related to social and economic policy. This lack of accountability has perpetuated stark racial disparities in education, employment, health, and general well-being. These circumstances undermine the principles enshrined in North Carolina's constitution by newly emancipated slaves and their white al-

[^112]lies of good conscience. "All political power is vested in, and derived from the people," that document still proclaims, and "all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole."237

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of North Carolina that the foregoing is true and correct.


James L. Leloudis II
December 23, 2021

[^113]
## Bibliography

## Manuscripts

Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Wilson Library, University of North Carolina
North Carolina Collection
Jesse Helms Viewpoint editorial transcripts, C384.5 H48v nos. 1001-1750
Southern Historical Collection
James Carson Gardner Congressional and Political Papers \#3829
North Carolina Fund Records \#4710
Terry Sanford Papers \#3531
Junius Irving Scales Papers \#4879
Durham, North Carolina
David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University
Joshua William Bailey Papers
Sim A. DeLapp Papers
Records and Papers of Terry Sanford
Madison, Wisconsin
Wisconsin Historical Society, University of Wisconsin
Hunter Gray (John R. Salter) Papers

## Government Documents

Constitution of the State of North Carolina, 1868. Raleigh: Joseph W. Holden, 1868.
Eure, Thad. Public School Laws of North Carolina. (Issued by Thad Eure, Secretary of State, 1955).

Laws and Resolutions of the State of North Carolina, Session of 1900. Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton, and F. M. Uzzell, 1899.

President's Committee on Civil Rights. To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).
Public Laws of the State of North Carolina, Sessions of 1865-66, and 1861, 62, 63, and 1864. Raleigh: Robt. W. Best, 1866.
Public Laws and Resolutions of the State of North Carolina, Session of 1895. Winston: M. I. and J. C. Stewart, 1895.

Public Laws and Resolutions of the State of North Carolina, Session of 1897. Winston: M. I. and J. C. Stewart, 1897.

Public Laws and Resolutions of the State of North Carolina, Session of 1899. Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton, and E. M. Uzzell, 1899.

Public Laws and Resolutions of the State of North Carolina, Session of 1901. Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton, and E. M. Uzzell, 1901.
Report of Population of the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897.

Revised Code of North Carolina, 1854. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1855.
Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, 1955. Winston-Salem: Winston Printing Company, 1955.
Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Extra Session of 1956, and Regular Session, 1957. Winston-Salem: Winston Printing Company, 1957.
Session Laws of the State of North Carolina, Regular Session, 1965. Winston-Salem: Winston Printing Company, n.d.
Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Extra Session, 1966. Winston-Salem: Winston Printing Company, n.d.
Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Regular Session, 1967. Winston-Salem: Winston Printing Company, n.d.

Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, 1971. Winston-Salem: Winston Printing Company, 1971.
Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America from December 1865 to March 1867. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1868.
U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office. Report on Population of the United Sates, 1890 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895).

## Court Cases

Allison v. Sharp, 184 S.E. 27 (N.C. 1936)
Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940)
Bazemore v. Bertie County Board of Elections, 119 S.E.2d 637 (N.C. 1961)
Blue v. Durham Public School District, 95 F. Supp. 441 (M.D.N.C. 1951)

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Common Cause v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56 (Wake Cnty. Sup. Ct.)
Covington v. the State of North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877 (M.D.N.C. 1965)
Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972)
Gantt v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina, 320 F.2d 611 (4 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1963)
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984)
Holmes v. Moore, 270 N.C. App. 7 (Wake Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2019)
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 102 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. 1958)
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.C. 1957)
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, Civ No. 1:13-cv-658, August 12, 2013

North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, No. 16-1468 (4th Cir. 2016)
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D.N.C. 2016)

North Carolina v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017)

North Carolina v. Covington, 137 S. Ct. 1624 (2017)
North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018)
United States v. North Carolina, 1:13CV861 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2014)
Walker v. Moss, 97 S. E.2d 836 (N.C. 1957)
Watkins v. City of Wilson, 121 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. 1961)
Watkins v. Wilson, 370 U.S. 46 (1962)

## Newspapers and Periodicals

Atlanta Constitution
Atlanta Daily World
Carolina Times
Charlotte Daily Observer
Charlotte Observer
Chicago Defender
Greensboro Daily News

New York Times
Norfolk Journal and Guide
Outlook
Pittsburgh Courier
Raleigh Morning Post
Raleigh News and Observer
Triad Business Journal
Washington Post
Wilmington Messenger
Wilmington Morning Star
Winston Salem-Journal

## Books, Articles, Pamphlets, and Theses

Anderson, Carol. White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide. New York: Bloomsbury, 2016.
Anderson, Eric. Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1872-1901: The "Black Second" Congressional District. Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1978.

Ashby, Warren. Frank Porter Graham, a Southern Liberal. Winston-Salem: J. F. Blair, 1980.
Barksdale, Marcellus Chandler. "The Indigenous Civil Rights Movement and Cultural Change in North Carolina: Weldon, Chapel Hill, and Monroe, 1946-1965." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1977).

Batchelor, John E. Race and Education in North Carolina: From Segregation to Desegregation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015.

Beckel, Deborah. Radical Reform: Interracial Politics in Post-Emancipation North Carolina. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011.
Beeby, James M. Revolt of the Tar Heels: The North Carolina Populist Movement, 1890-1901. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008.

Berman, Ari. Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2015).

Bernstein, Leonard. "The Participation of Negro Delegates in the Constitutional Convention of 1868 in North Carolina." Journal of Negro History 34 (October 1949): 391-409.
Browning, James B. "The North Carolina Black Code." Journal of Negro History 15 (October 1930): 461-73.

Carlton, David L., and Peter A. Coclanis. Confronting Southern Poverty in the Great Depression: The Report on Economic Conditions of the South with Related Documents. Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Carmichael, Orton H. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (New York: Abingdon Press, [1917]).
Carter, Dan T. The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Chafe, William H. Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, "Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the U.S." Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (November 2014), 1553-162.

Christensen, Rob. The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics: The Personalities, Elections, and Events That Shaped Modern North Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

Connor, Robert D. W., and Clarence H. Poe, eds. The Life and Speeches of Charles Brantley Aycock. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Page and Co., 1912.
Covington, Howard E, and Marion A Ellis. Terry Sanford: Politics, Progress, and Outrageous Ambitions. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.

Crow, Jeffrey J. "Cracking the Solid South: Populism and the Fusionist Interlude." In The North Carolina Experience, edited by Lindsey Butler and Alan Watson, 333-54. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1984.

Culver, John C., and John Hyde. American Dreamer: A Life of Henry A. Wallace (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

Cunningham, David. Klansville, U.S.A.: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights Era Ku Klux Klan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Dalfiume, Richard M. "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution." Journal of American History 55 (June 1968): 90-106.
Daniel, Pete. Dispossession: Discrimination Against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil Rights (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
Devine, Thomas W. Henry Wallace's 1948 Presidential Campaign and the Future of Postwar Liberalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
Douglas, Davison M. Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
Drescher, John. Triumph of Good Will: How Terry Sanford Beat a Champion of Segregation and Reshaped the South (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000).
Du Bois, W.E. Burghardt. Black Reconstruction in America: Toward a History of the Part Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1935).
Dunn, Susan. Roosevelt's Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Durrill, Wayne K. War of Another Kind: A Southern Community in the Great Rebellion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Earls, Anita S., Emily Wynes, and LeeAnne Quatrucci. "Voting Rights in North Carolina, 19822006," Southern California Review of Law and Social Justice. 17 (no. 2, 2008). http://goo.gl/zlMYEf.
Escott, Paul D. Many Excellent People: Power and Privilege in North Carolina, 1850-1900. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.
$\qquad$ . Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution (New York: W.W. Norton, 2019).
Gershenhorn, Jerry. Louis Austin and the Carolina Times: A Life in the Long Black Freedom Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018).
."The Rise and Fall of Fusion Politics in North Carolina, 1880-1900." Unpublished paper in author's possession.
Goldfield, David. Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002.
Graf, Leroy P. and Ralph W. Haskins, eds. The Papers of Andrew Johnson, Vol. 6, 1862-1864 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983.

Gregory, James M. "The Second Great Migration: A Historical Overview, in Joe W. Trotter Jr. and Kenneth L. Kusmer, eds, African-American Urban History: The Dynamics of Race, Class, and Gender Since World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1938.

Grosso, Catherine M., and Barbara O’Brien. "A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Appeals." Iowa Law Review 97 (July 2012): 1531-59.

Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd, James Leloudis, Robert Korstad, Mary Murphy, Lu Ann Jones, and Christopher B. Daly. Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
Hanchett, Thomas W. Sorting Out the New South City: Race, Class, and Urban Development in Charlotte, 1875-1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Hamilton, Joseph Greégoire de Roulhac, ed. The Papers of Randolph Abbott Shotwell, vol. 2 (Raleigh: North Carolina Historical Commission, 1931).
$\qquad$ . Reconstruction in North Carolina. New York: Columbia University, 1914.

Heberling, Eric S., Peter L. Francia, and Steven H. Greene. "The Conditional Party Teams of the 2008 North Carolina Federal Elections." In Change Election: Money, Mobilization, and Persuasion in the 2008 Federal Elections, edited by David Magleby, 108-39. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010.

Herbin-Triant, Elizabeth A. "Southern Segregation South Africa-Style: Maurice Evans, Clarence Poe, and the Ideology of Rural Segregation. Agricultural History 87 (Spring 2013): 17093.

Herron, Michael C., and Daniel A. Smith. "Race, Shelby County, and the Voter Information Verification Act in North Carolina." Florida State University Law Review 43, no. 2 (Winter 2016): 465-506.

Hogan, Wesley C. Many Minds One Heart: SNCC's Dream of a New America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

Johnson, Guy B. "Does the South Owe the Negro a New Deal?" Social Forces 13 (October 1934): 100-103.

Jones, William P. The March on Washington: Jobs, Freedom, and the Forgotten History of Civil Rights (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013).
Justesen, Benjamin R. George Henry White: An Even Chance in the Race of Life. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.

Katznelson, Ira. Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013).
. When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twen-tieth-Century America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).

Keech, William R., and Michael P. Sistrom. "Implementation of the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina." Pasadena, California: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 1992.
Kellam, James Patrick. "Helms, Hunt, and Whiteness: The 1984 Senate Campaign in North Carolina." MA thesis, Appalachian State University, 2017.
Korstad, Robert Rodgers. Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth-Century South. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Korstad, Robert R., and James L. Leloudis. To Right These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
Kotch, Seth, and Robert P. Mosteller. "The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina." North Carolina Law Review 88, no. 6 (2010): 2031-2131.
Kousser, J. Morgan. Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
$\qquad$ . The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
Ladd, Everett Carll Jr., with Charles D. Hadley. Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).

Larkins, John R. The Negro Population of North Carolina: Social and Economic. Raleigh, N.C: North Carolina State Board of Charities and Public Welfare, 1944.
Leloudis, Jim and Robert Korstad, Fragile Democracy: The Struggle Over Race and Voting Rights in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).
Link, William A. Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008.
McKinney Jr., Charles W. Greater Freedom: The Evolution of the Civil Rights Struggle in Wilson, North Carolina (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010).

Manderson, Marge. "Review of the Patterns and Practices of Racial Discrimination." Manuscript in author's possession.

Mitchell, Memory F., ed. Message, Addresses, and Public Papers of Terry Sanford (Raleigh: Council of State, State of North Carolina, 1966).
Moore, John Robert. "Senator Josiah W. Bailey and the 'Conservative Manifesto' of 1937." Journal of Southern History 31 (February 1965): 21-39.

Morris, Charles Edward. "Panic and Reprisal: Reaction in North Carolina to the Nat Turner Rebellion, 1831," North Carolina Historical Review 62 (January 1985): 29-52.
National Roster of Black Elected Officials. Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1971.

Nixon, Donna L. "The Integration of UNC-Chapel Hill - Law School First," North Carolina Law Review 97 (No. 6): 1741-1793.

North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Protection of the Laws in North Carolina (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [1962]).
. "Voting and Voter Registration in North Carolina, 1960," (Bound typescript report, North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
O'Connor, Paul T. "Reapportionment and Redistricting: Redrawing the Political Landscape," North Carolina Insight (December 1990): 30-49.
Okun, Tema. The Emperor Has No Clothes: Teaching about Race and Racism to People Who Don't Want to Know. Charlotte: Information Age, 2010.
Orth, John V. "North Carolina Constitutional History." North Carolina Law Review 70 (19911992: 1759-1802.

Paschal, Richard A. Jim Crow in North Carolina: The Legislative Program from 1865 to 1920. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2020).
Patterson, James T. "The Failure of Party Realignment in the South, 1937-1939. The Journal of Politics 27 (August 1965): 602-17.

Pearce, Gary. Jim Hunt: A Biography. Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair, Publisher, 2010.
Perlstein, Rick. Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008).

Petty, Adrienne Monteith. Standing Their Ground: Small Farmers in North Carolina Since the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Pleasants, Julian M, and Augustus M. Burns. Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race in North Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.
Prather, H. Leon Jr. "The Red Shirt Movement in North Carolina, 1898-1900." North Carolina Historical Review 62 (April 1977): 174-84.
Prominent People of North Carolina: Brief Biographies of Leading People for Ready Reference Purposes (Asheville, N.C.: Evening News Publishing Company, 1906).

Proceedings of the Colored National Labor Convention Held in Washington, D.C., December $6^{\text {th }}, 7^{\text {th }}, 8^{\text {th }}, 9^{\text {th }}$, and $10^{\text {th }}, 1869$. (Washington, D.C.: The New Era, 1870).

Raper, Horace W. William W. Holden: North Carolina's Political Enigma. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

Roth, Zachary. The Great Suppression: Voting Rights, Corporate Cash, and the Conservative Assault on Democracy. New York: Crown, 2016.
Sharpless, Rebecca. Cooking in Other Women's Kitchens: Domestic Workers in the South, 18651960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
Shin, Eui Hang. "Black-White Differentials in Infant Mortality in the South, 1940-1970," Demography 12, 1 (February 1975): 1-19.

Thuesen, Sarah C. Greater Than Equal: African American Struggles for Schools and Citizenship in North Carolina, 1919-1965. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.

Towe, William H. Barriers to Black Political Participation in North Carolina. Atlanta: Voter Education Project, 1972.
Trelease, Alan W. "The Fusion Legislatures of 1895 and 1897: A Roll-Call Analysis of the North Carolina House of Representatives." North Carolina Historical Review LVII (July 1980): 280-309.

Uesugi, Sayoko. "Gender, Race, and the Cold War: Mary Price and the Progressive Party in North Carolina, 1945-1948, North Carolina Historical Review 77 (July 2000): 269-311.
Valelly, Richard M. The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

Ward, Jason Morgan. Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
Watson, Harry L. "North Carolina Redistricting Process, 1965-1966." Manuscript in author's possession.

Wertheimer, John W. Law and Society in the South: A History of North Carolina Court Cases (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2015).

Wettach, Robert H. "North Carolina School Legislation, 1956," North Carolina Law Review 35 (Number 1): 1-16.

Whalan, Mark. The Great War and the Culture of the New Negro (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008).
Widestrom, Amy M. "Impoverished Democracy: Economic Inequality, Residential Segregation, and the Decline of Political Participation." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 2008).

Williamson, Joel. Crucible of Race: Black-White Relations in the American South Since Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Winquist, Thomas R. "Civil Rights: Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Michigan Law Review 56 (February 1958) 619-630.

Woodward, C. Vann. Origins of the New South, 1877-1913. Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1971.
Zieger, Robert. The CIO: 1935-1955. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
Zoltan, Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay Nielson, "Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes," Journal of Politics 79 (April 2017), 363-79.

## Online Sources

1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report. 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission, May 31, 2006. [http://bit.ly/2HOWsgJ](http://bit.ly/2HOWsgJ), September 5, 2019.
2008 Democratic Party Platform. American Presidency Project. [http://bit.ly/2ti7IhI](http://bit.ly/2ti7IhI), November 29, 2020.

2013-14 School Performance Grades (A-F) for North Carolina Public Schools. North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, February 5, 2015. [http://bit.ly/2Ruw7Ki](http://bit.ly/2Ruw7Ki), November 29, 2020.
2013-2015 North Carolina Budget Short-Changes Students, Teachers, and Public Education. North Carolina Justice Center, August 2013. [http://bit.ly/2RTBUrA](http://bit.ly/2RTBUrA), November 29, 2020.

American Express Merchant Reference Guide - U.S. [https://amex.co/2HKPqtq](https://amex.co/2HKPqtq), September 5, 2019.

Act to Amend the North Carolina Constitution to Require Photo Identification to Vote in Person, S.L. 2018-128, House Bill 1092. [http://bit.ly/2LRAE5p](http://bit.ly/2LRAE5p), September 5, 2019.
"Anti-Heagerty Ads: We Just Threw Up in Our Mouths." Indy Week, November 1, 2010. [http://bit.ly/2tmNfZ3](http://bit.ly/2tmNfZ3), November 29, 2020.

Atkeson, Lonna Rae, Lisa A. Bryant, Thad E. Hall, Kyle Saunders, and Michael R. Alvarez. "New Barriers to Participation: Application of New Mexico's Voter Identification Law." Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. [http://bit.ly/2LSocT6](http://bit.ly/2LSocT6), September 5, 2019.

Blake, John. "What Black America Won't Miss about Obama." CNN, July 1, 2016. [https://cnn.it/2tXfX2E](https://cnn.it/2tXfX2E), November 29, 2020.

Brenneman, Ross. "Teacher Attrition Continues to Plague North Carolina." Education Week, October 13, 2015. [http://bit.ly/2uuLBVu](http://bit.ly/2uuLBVu), November 29, 2020.
Brief of Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Gale, The Making of Modern Law, U.S. Supreme Court Records, 1832-1978. [http://bit.ly/36PHJfd](http://bit.ly/36PHJfd), November 29, 2020.
Broockman, David, and Ethan Roeder. "Hispanics are the Future of Progressive Strength in America." New Organizing Institute. [http://bit.ly/2HPJ3Fn](http://bit.ly/2HPJ3Fn), September 5, 2019.
Butterfield, George Kenneth Jr. Interview. Behind the Veil: Documenting African American Life in the Jim Crow South Digital Collection. John Hope Franklin Research Center, Duke University Libraries. [http://bit.ly/2RMrziw](http://bit.ly/2RMrziw), November 29, 2020.
Car access. National Equity Atlas. [https://bit.ly/2KOX628](https://bit.ly/2KOX628), November 29, 2020.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, meeting minutes, September 8, 2009. [http://bit.ly/2LQCjYX](http://bit.ly/2LQCjYX), September 5, 2019.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Opportunity Task Force, Opportunity Task Force Report. [https://bit.ly/3msnwF3](https://bit.ly/3msnwF3), November 29, 2020.

Citizens Without Proof. Brennan Center for Justice. [http://bit.ly/34QpHtJ](http://bit.ly/34QpHtJ), September 5, 2019.
Civitas Statement on Overriding Governor Cooper's Voter ID Veto. Civitas Institute, December 19, 2018. [https://bit.ly/33Fc5RH](https://bit.ly/33Fc5RH), November 20, 2020.
Cohen, Gerry Interview. N.C. Policy Watch, August 19, 2018. [http://bit.ly/34VsjXc](http://bit.ly/34VsjXc), September 5, 2019.

Collins, William J., and Robert A. Margo. "Historical Perspectives on Racial Differences in Schooling in the United States," Working Paper No. 03-W13. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, June 2003. [http://bit.ly/2UMbN7e](http://bit.ly/2UMbN7e), September 5, 2019.
Corasaniti, Nick \& Reid J. Epstein, "Map by Map, GOP Chips Away at Black Democrats' Power," New York Times, December 18, 2021, available at https://www.ny-times.com/2021/12/18/us/politics/gop-gerrymandering-Black-democrats.html.
"County-by-County Data Reveal Dramatic Impact of Proposed Election Changes on Voters." Democracy North Carolina. [https://bit.ly/3nj4fpK](https://bit.ly/3nj4fpK), November 29, 2020.
DMV Office Locations. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles. [https://bit.ly/36q8Dxc](https://bit.ly/36q8Dxc), November 29, 2020.

Florsheim, "Four Inmates Might Return to Death Row." New Republic, May 9, 2014. [http://bit.ly/37qiEss](http://bit.ly/37qiEss), September 5, 2019.
Gantt, Harvey B. Interview C-0008. Southern Oral History Program Collection \#4007, Documenting the American South, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Libraries. [https://unc.live/31hWV3N](https://unc.live/31hWV3N), November 29, 2020.
Gerhardt, Deborah R. "Pay Our Teachers or Lose Your Job." Slate, January 4, 2014. [http://bit.ly/2ROO19t](http://bit.ly/2ROO19t), November 29, 2020.
Gitterman, Daniel P., Peter A. Coclanis, and John Quinterno. "Recession and Recovery in North

Carolina: A Data Snapshot, 2007-12." Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. [https://unc.live/2HSb8vw](https://unc.live/2HSb8vw), September 5, 2019.

Goldsmith, Thomas. "Thomas Farr, Jesse Helms, and the Return of the Segregationists." Indy Week, January 3, 2018. [http://bit.ly/36QLq4c](http://bit.ly/36QLq4c), November 29, 2020.
"GOP Featured McCollum in 2010 Attack Ad." WRAL.com, September 4, 2014. [http://bit.ly/37SalWG](http://bit.ly/37SalWG), September 5, 2019.
"GOP Mailing Depicts Obama On Food Stamps, Not Dollar Bill." NPR, October 16, 2008. [https://n.pr/34GHrHT](https://n.pr/34GHrHT), September 5, 2019.
"The GOP's No-Compromise Pledge." Politico, October 28, 1910. [https://politi.co/2IyrixL](https://politi.co/2IyrixL), November 29, 2020.
"'Hanging Obama' Truck Makes Way into Charlotte." WBTV, September 6, 2012. [http://bit.ly/32sZJu4](http://bit.ly/32sZJu4), September 5, 2019.
Harris, Logan Rockefeller. " 2020 Poverty Report: Persistent Poverty Demands a Just Recovery for North Carolinians." North Carolina Justice Center. [https://bit.ly/37NcFzb](https://bit.ly/37NcFzb), November 29,2020.
Helms hands ad. <http://bit.ly/2Q5zJnr >, September 5, 2019.
"High Price of Mandatory Auto Insurance in Predominantly African American Communities." Consumer Federation of America, November 2015. [https://bit.ly/3fX8Efl](https://bit.ly/3fX8Efl), November 29, 2020.
"House Enacts Voter ID with Veto Override." N.C. House District 117, Legislative News from Representative Chuck McGrady, December 19, 2018. [http://bit.ly/2HNXXf0](http://bit.ly/2HNXXf0), November 29, 2020.
"Immigration is Changing the Political Landscape in Key States." Center for American Progress. [https://ampr.gs/32wwPsW](https://ampr.gs/32wwPsW), September 5, 2019.

Johnson, Cedric, and Matthew Ellinwood. Smart Money: Investing in Student Achievement. North Carolina Justice Center. [http://bit.ly/37tcCqO](http://bit.ly/37tcCqO), November 29, 2020.
Ladd, Helen F., Charles T. Clotfelter, and John B. Holbein. "The Growing Segmentation of the Charter School Sector in North Carolina." National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2015. [http://bit.ly/36P2cRw](http://bit.ly/36P2cRw), November 29, 2019.
"Latinos in the 2016 Election: North Carolina." Pew Research Center. [https://pewrsr.ch/2HOyFNV](https://pewrsr.ch/2HOyFNV), September 5, 2019.
"The Madison Project Launches the Code Red USA Project." Madison Project, August 24, 2012. [http://goo.gl/yC9oDz](http://goo.gl/yC9oDz), September 5, 2019.

Mastercard Transaction Processing Rules. [http://bit.ly/32w1ial](http://bit.ly/32w1ial), September 5, 2019.
Mayer, Jane. "Covert Operations." The New Yorker, August 23, 2010, [http://bit.ly/30m6w8Z](http://bit.ly/30m6w8Z), November 29, 2020.
. "State for Sale: A Conservative Multimillionaire Has Taken Control in North Carolina, One of 2012's Top Battlegrounds." The New Yorker, October 10, 2011.
[http://bit.ly/37VMm96](http://bit.ly/37VMm96), November 29, 2020.
Millhiser, Ian. "The Cracks in the GOP's Gerrymandering Firewall." Vox, September 11, 2019. [http://bit.ly/35Tq1qL](http://bit.ly/35Tq1qL), November 29, 2020.
Mixon, Jeff. "Just Look at the Results." Red Clay Citizen, March 27, 2009. [http://bit.ly/32tZmj1](http://bit.ly/32tZmj1), September 5, 2019.
$\qquad$ . "Narco Gangs in North Carolina." Civitas Review Online, April 1, 2009. [http://bit.ly/2HNmPnq](http://bit.ly/2HNmPnq), September 5, 2019.
. "Who Benefits from Illegal Immigration?" Civitas Review Online, October 14, 2009. [http://bit.ly/2I3fLTV](http://bit.ly/2I3fLTV), September 5, 2019.
National Research Inc. Generic Ballot, General Assembly. Longleaf Politics. [http://bit.ly/34Gp8CB](http://bit.ly/34Gp8CB), September 5, 2019. The link to this site is no longer active.
Newkirk, Van R. II. "What Early Voting in North Carolina Actually Reveals." The Atlantic, November 8, 2016. [http://bit.ly/2ULBchm](http://bit.ly/2ULBchm), September 5, 2016.
Newport, Frank. "Democrats Diverse, Republicans Mostly White: Democrats and Independent Grow More Diverse Since 2008." Gallup. [http://bit.ly/2HOkDvH](http://bit.ly/2HOkDvH), September 5, 2019.
Nixon, Richard. Nomination Acceptance Address, August 8, 1968. Presidential Rhetoric, [http://bit.ly/2HPCoel](http://bit.ly/2HPCoel), September 5, 2019.
"N.C. Voter ID Law Overturned." Raleigh News and Observer, February 9, 2018. [http://bit.ly/32oS3cm](http://bit.ly/32oS3cm), September 5, 2019.
"N.C. Voters Know Little About Proposed Constitutional Amendments." Elon University Poll, September 6, 2018. [http://bit.ly/34VCcnM](http://bit.ly/34VCcnM), September 5, 2019.
stit"North Carolina African American Legislators, 1969-2019." North Carolina General Assembly, January 7, 2019. [http://bit.ly/38KWF0u](http://bit.ly/38KWF0u), November 29, 2020.
North Carolina Constitutional Amendments Publication Commission. Official Explanation of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Require Photographic Identification to Vote, S.L. 2018-128. [http://bit.ly/34PG5KX](http://bit.ly/34PG5KX), September 5, 2019.
North Carolina Governor, 1896. Our Campaigns. [http://bit.ly/32oUHPk](http://bit.ly/32oUHPk), September 5, 2019.
North Carolina Republican Party. "NCGOP Sees Encouraging Early Voting, Obama/Clinton Coalition Tired/Fail to Resonate in North Carolina," November 7, 2017. [http://bit.ly/2HS9B8J](http://bit.ly/2HS9B8J), September 5, 2019.
"North Carolina Voter ID Amendment (2018)." Ballotopedia. [http://bit.ly/32tAIIZ](http://bit.ly/32tAIIZ), September 5, 2019.
"North Carolina Voter ID Amendment Debate Features Misleading Claims." Politifact. [http://bit.ly/32A2tpJ](http://bit.ly/32A2tpJ), September 5, 2019.
"North Carolina's Hispanic Community: 2019 Snapshot." Carolina Demography. [http://bit.ly/2SY8Rpd](http://bit.ly/2SY8Rpd), November 29, 2020.
"North Carolina’s ‘Racial Justice Act.’" Civitas Institute, November 16, 2010. [http://bit.ly/38K467o](http://bit.ly/38K467o), November 29, 2029.
"North Carolina Passes New Maps Giving GOP and Edge in Congress, State Legislature," News and Observer, November 4, 2021. https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article255542776.html
"North Carolina Passes New Maps Giving GOP and Edge in Congress, State Legislature," News and Observer, November 4, 2021. https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article255542776.html

North Carolina General Assembly, 149th Session 2011-2012: House of Representatives, https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2011-2012\ Session/2011\ Demographics.pdf

North Carolina General Assembly 2011 Senate Demographics, https://www.ncleg.gov/Docu-mentSites/SenateDocuments/2011-2012\ Session/2011\ Demographics.pdf
North Carolina General Assembly, 150th Session 2013-2014: House of Representatives, https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2013-2014\ Session/2013\ Demographics.pdf.

North Carolina General Assembly 2013 Senate Demographics, https://www.ncleg.gov/Docu-mentSites/SenateDocuments/2013-2014\ Session/2013\ Senate\ Demographics.pdf.
"North Carolina General Assembly 2019 Senate Demographics", https://www.ncleg.gov/Docu-mentSites/SenateDocuments/2019-2020\ Session/2019\ Senate\ Demographics.pdf
"North Carolina Election Results 2012: McCrory Wins Governor’s Race; Hudson Tops Kissell for House Seat; Romney Gets Narrow Victory," Washington Post, November 7, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/north-carolina-election-results-2012-mccrory-wins-governors-race-hudson-tops-kissell-for-house-seat-romney-gets-nar-row-victory/2012/11/07/201e8c1c-23a8-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_story.html.
Opportunity Scholarship Program, 2019-20 School Year, recipients by nonpublic school. North
Carolina Education Assistance Authority. [http://bit.ly/2GoFFzZ](http://bit.ly/2GoFFzZ), November 29, 2020.
"Politics of Financial Insecurity." Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics \& Policy, January 8, 2015. [https://pewrsr.ch/2HQQJXI](https://pewrsr.ch/2HQQJXI), September 5, 2019.

Post-election Audit Report: General Election 2016. North Carolina State Board of Elections, April 21, 2017. [http://bit.ly/2LQ3TFP](http://bit.ly/2LQ3TFP), November 29, 2020.

Poverty Guidelines. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. [https://bit.ly/33YACmh](https://bit.ly/33YACmh), November 29, 2020.

Private School Minority Statistics in North Carolina. Private School Review. [http://bit.ly/3aJN8I4](http://bit.ly/3aJN8I4), November 29, 2020.

Public Law 85-315: An Act to Provide Means of Further Securing and Protecting the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, 637. (71 Stat. 634; Date: September 9,1957; Enacted H.R. 6127). [http://bit.ly/2UGEvGA](http://bit.ly/2UGEvGA), September 5, 2019.
"Racial Disparities in Auto Loan Mark Ups, State-by-State Data, June 2015," National Consumer Law Center. [https://bit.ly/2KYffuD](https://bit.ly/2KYffuD), November 29, 2020.
"Racial Resentment Adds to GOP Enthusiasm." MSNBC, October 15, 2012.
<https://on.msnbc.com/378OX1r >, November 29, 2020.
Report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, April 5, 1956." [http://bit.ly/2LTNQXw](http://bit.ly/2LTNQXw), September 5, 2019.
"Reported Voting and Registration of Family Members, by Age and Family Income: November 2008." U.S. Census Bureau. [http://bit.ly/2ZyyOAc](http://bit.ly/2ZyyOAc), September 5, 2019.

Riley, Nicolas. "A Lesson from North Carolina on Challengers." Brennan Center for Justice, July 2, 2012. [http://bit.ly/32uhGbN](http://bit.ly/32uhGbN), September 5, 2019.

Robertston, Gary, "N.C. Redistricting Suits Challenges Lack of Race Data for Maps," WFAE 90.7, October 30, 2021, < https://cutt.ly/YUyjoDF>

Ross, Janell. "Number of Latino Registered Voters Doubles In North Carolina Creating Potential Long-Term Swing State." Huffington Post - Latino Voices, May 25, 2012. [http://bit.ly/2I31GID](http://bit.ly/2I31GID), September 5, 2019.
Samuels, Alana. "The Never-Ending Foreclosures." The Atlantic, December 1, 2017. [http://bit.ly/35X96mZ](http://bit.ly/35X96mZ), November 29, 2020.
Schofield, Rob. "Former Legislative Counsel Gerry Cohen on N.C.'s Six Proposed Constitutional Amendments." N.C. Policy Watch, August 8, 2018. [http://bit.ly/34NR8Ea](http://bit.ly/34NR8Ea), September 5, 2019.

School Vouchers in North Carolina: The First Three Years. Children's Law Clinic, Duke University School of Law. [http://bit.ly/2Sbg03j](http://bit.ly/2Sbg03j), November 29, 2020.

Sirota, Alexandra F. "2019 Poverty Report: Fight Poverty, Promote Prosperity for North Carolina." North Carolina Justice Center. [https://bit.ly/2HX6gbO](https://bit.ly/2HX6gbO), November 29, 2020.
Sobel, Richard. "The High Cost of 'Free' Voter Photo Identification Cards." Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School. [https://bit.ly/36pMXBu](https://bit.ly/36pMXBu), November 29, 2020.
"Support Voter ID Today." Civitas Institute. [http://bit.ly/33mJf8x](http://bit.ly/33mJf8x), November 29, 2020.
Tippett, Rebecca. "North Carolina Hispanics and the Electorate." Carolina Demography, October 9, 2014. [http://bit.ly/2UDvIVC](http://bit.ly/2UDvIVC), September 5, 2019.
__ . "Potential Voters Are Fastest-Growing Segment of N.C. Hispanic Population." Carolina Demography. [http://bit.ly/2QRRpQh](http://bit.ly/2QRRpQh), November 29, 2020.

The Unraveling: Poorly-Crafted Education Policies Are Failing North Carolina's Children. Education and Law Project, North Carolina Justice Center. [http://bit.ly/2TYTpcG](http://bit.ly/2TYTpcG), November 29, 2020.
Unz, Ron. "Immigration, the Republicans, and the End of White America." The American Conservative, September 19, 2011. [http://bit.ly/32sEyYY](http://bit.ly/32sEyYY), September 5, 2019.
Visa Core Rules and Visa Product and Services Rules. <https://vi.sa/2HKJGzJ 336>, September 5, 2019.
"Voter ID: A Form of Suppression or Necessary Protection?" Civitas Institute, June 28, 2018.
[http://bit.ly/2IR8wOL](http://bit.ly/2IR8wOL), November 29, 2020.
"Voter ID to Go on N.C. Ballots." Tribune Papers, July 12, 2018. [http://bit.ly/2LVTh8c](http://bit.ly/2LVTh8c), September 5, 2019.

Wagner, Lindsay. "North Carolina Once Again Toward the Bottom in National Rankings on Teacher Pay." N.C. Policy Watch, March 18, 2015. [http://bit.ly/2TZHA67](http://bit.ly/2TZHA67), November 29, 2020.
Wallace, Henry A. "Ten Extra Years." Sphinx 34 (February 1948), 13-14, 34-37. [http://bit.ly/31hRDVR](http://bit.ly/31hRDVR), November 29, 2020.
Wan, William, "Inside the Republican Creation of the Norther Carolina Voting Bill Dubbed the 'Monster' Law", Washington Post, September 2, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts law/inside-the-republican-creation-of-the-north-carolina-vot-ing-bill-dubbed-the-monster-law/2016/09/01/79162398-6adf-11e6-8225fbb8a6fc65bc story.html.
"When Debt Takes the Wheel." North Carolina Equal Access to Justice Commission. [https://bit.ly/2HY8E21](https://bit.ly/2HY8E21), November 29, 29020.

Widestrom, Amy M. "Impoverished Democracy." American Political Science Association, August 31-September 4, 2006. [http://bit.ly/2HODy9J](http://bit.ly/2HODy9J), September 5, 2019.

## Appendix

## Curriculum Vitae

James L. Leloudis II

## ADDRESSES

121 Cardiff Place
(919) 967-8015

Chapel Hill, NC 27516
Honors Carolina
(919) 966-5110

CB\# 3510, Graham Memorial
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3510
E-mail: leloudis@unc.edu

## EDUCATION

Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, May 15, 1989
M.A., Northwestern University, June 16, 1979
B.A., with highest honors, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, May 14, 1977

## ACADEMIC APPOINTMENT

Professor, Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS (in reverse chronological order)
Co-Chair, University Commission on History, Race, and a Way Forward, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, January 2020 to present.
Peter T. Grauer Associate Dean for Honors Carolina and founding Director, The James M. Johnston Center for Undergraduate Excellence, College of Arts and Sciences, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Appointed July 1, 1999-June 30, 2004; reappointed July 1, 2004-June 30, 2009, appointment revised and extended July 1, 2007-June 30, 2012; reappointed July 1, 2012-June 30, 2017; appointment revised and extended July 1, 2014-June 30, 2019; reappointed July 1, 2019-June 30, 2024.

Interim Director, Center for the Study of the American South, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, July 1, 1998-June 30, 1999.

Associate Chair, Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, July 1, 1996-June 30, 1998.

## SCHOLARSHIP

Books
Co-author, Fragile Democracy: The Struggle Over Race and Voting Rights in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

Co-author, To Right These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

Schooling the New South: Pedagogy, Self, and Society in North Carolina, 1880-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
Co-author, Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987 and 2000; New York: W.W. Norton, 1989).
Historical Exhibits
"Fragile Democracy: The Struggle Over Race and Voting Rights in North Carolina," https://adobe.ly/3c8WJsL.
"Silent Sam: The Confederate Monument at the University of North Carolina," https://silentsam.online and https://adobe.ly/3dT3XRe.
"The Carolina Hall Story," a permanent exhibit on race, politics, and historical memory at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, installed in Carolina Hall, November, 2016.
"Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World," Teaching and Learning in the Digital Age, American Historical Association, 2001 (no longer available online).
Articles
Co-author, "Citizen Soldiers: The North Carolina Volunteers and the South's War on Poverty," in Elna C. Green, ed., The New Deal and Beyond: Social Welfare in the South since 1930 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), pp. 138-62.
"A Classroom Revolution: Graded School Pedagogy and the Making of the New South," in Czeslaw Majorek and Erwin V. Johanningmeier, eds., Educational Reform in International Perspective: Past, Present, and Future (Krakow: Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000), pp. 245-60.
Co-author, "Citizen Soldiers: The North Carolina Volunteers and the War On Poverty," Law and Contemporary Problems 62 (No. 4, Autumn 1999): 178-96.
"Schooling the New South: Pedagogy, Self, and Society in North Carolina, 1880-1920," Historical Studies in Education/Revue d'histoire de l'éducation 5 (Fall 1993): 203229.
"Oral History and Piedmont Mill Villages, 1880-1940," International Journal of Oral History 7 (November 1986): 163-80.
"Cotton Mill People: Work, Community, and Protest in the Textile South, 1880-1940," (with Jacquelyn Hall and Robert Korstad) American Historical Review 91 (April 1986): 245-86.
"School Reform in the New South: The Woman's Association for the Betterment of Public School Houses in North Carolina, 1902-1919," Journal of American History 69 (March 1983): 886-909.
"Subversion of the Feminine Ideal: The Southern Lady's Companion and White Male Morality in the Antebellum South, 1847-1854," in Rosemary S. Keller, Louise L. Queen, and Hilah F. Thomas, eds., Women in New Worlds: Historical Perspectives on the Wesleyan Tradition, vol. 2 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1982), pp. 60-75.

## Legal Consulting

Plaintiffs' expert witness, Holmes v. Moore. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison LLP, New York, N.Y., and Southern Coalition for Social Justice, representing Jabari Holmes, Fred Culp, Daniel E. Smith, Brendon Jayden Peay, and Paul Kearney Sr. 2020 and ongoing.
Plaintiff's expert witness. North Carolina State Conference of the NCAAP v. Cooper, 1:18-cv-01034, U.S. District Court, Middle District of North Carolina. Arnold and Porter LLP, Washington, D.C., and Forward Justice. 2019 and ongoing.
Plaintiffs' expert witness, Hall v. Jones County Board of Commissioners, 4:17-cv-00018, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of North Carolina. Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP, New York, N.Y., representing John Hall, Elaine Robinson-Strayhorn, Lindora Toudle, and Thomas Jerkins. 2018.
Plaintiff's expert witness. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D.N.C. 2016), and North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, No. 16-1468 (4th Cir. 2016). Kirkland and Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C., and North Carolina State Chapter of the NAACP.

## TEACHING

Courses
U.S. Since 1865 North Carolina Since 1865 The New South (1865-present)

History of Poverty Slavery and the University Oral History Methodology
Recent Doctoral Advisees
R. Joshua Sipe, "Evolving Jim Crow: An Analysis of the Consolidation Movement on the Virginia Peninsula, 1940-1958," M.A. thesis, 2019.

Elizabeth Lundeen, "Brick and Mortar: Historically Black Colleges and the Struggle for Equality, 1930-1960," Ph.D. dissertation, 2018.
Evan Faulkenbury, "Poll Power: The Voter Education Project and the Financing of the Civil Rights Movement, 1961-1992," Ph.D. dissertation, 2016. Published as Poll Power: The Voter Education Project and the Movement for the Ballot in the American South (University of North Carolina Press, 2019).
Willie J. Griffin, "Courier of Crisis, Messenger of Hope: Trezzvant W. Anderson and the Black Freedom Struggle for Economic Justice," Ph.D. dissertation, 2016. Forthcoming, Vanderbilt University Press, 2021.

Brandon K. Winford, "'The Battle for Freedom Begins Every Morning': John Hervey Wheeler, Civil Rights, and New South Prosperity," Ph.D. dissertation, 2014. Published as John Hervey Wheeler: Black Banking and the Economic Struggle for Civil

Rights (University Press of Kentucky, 2020). Winner of the Lillian Smith Award, 2020.

## PROFESSIONAL AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Faculty Service Award, General Alumni Association, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2019.

Engaged Scholarship Award, Office of the Provost, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011.

Senior Fellow, Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University, "Moral Challenges of Poverty and Inequality," 2010-2011.

North Caroliniana Society Book Award, 2010. Awarded for To Right These Wrongs.
Academic Leadership Fellow, Institute for the Arts and Humanities, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2003. Included participation in the Leadership Development Program, Center for Creative Leadership, San Diego, California.

Commencement Speaker, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, December 2003 (selected by Senior Class officers and marshals).

Chapman Family Fellowship, Institute for the Arts and Humanities, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1997.
Fellow of the Academy of Distinguished Teaching Scholars, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, inducted in 1996.

Mayflower Cup, awarded by the North Carolina Literary and Historical Association for the year's best work in non-fiction, 1996. Awarded for Schooling the New South.

Ruth and Phillip Hettleman Award for Outstanding Scholarly or Artistic Accomplishment by Young Faculty, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995.
Fellow of the Institute for the Arts and Humanities, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992.

Students' Undergraduate Teaching Award, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1991.

Claude A. Eggertsen History of Education Dissertation Award, 1989, presented by the Rackham School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan, for the best dissertation on the history of education.
Albert J. Beveridge Award, 1988, presented by the American Historical Association for Like a Family.

Merle Curti Social History Award, 1988, presented by the Organization of American Historians for Like a Family.
Philip Taft Labor History Award, 1988, presented by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University for Like a Family.

Honorable mention, John Hope Franklin Award, 1988, presented by the American Studies Association for Like a Family.

Honorable mention, Research on Women in Education Award, 1984, presented by Women Educators, American Educational Research Association, for "School Reform in the New South."

Louis Pelzer Memorial Award, 1982, presented by the Organization of American Historians for "School Reform in the New South."

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1488 - Video of Oct. 25, 2021 Joint Committee Public Hearing (Wake, Caldwell, New Hanover) (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1489 - Video of Oct. 6, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1491 - Video of Oct. 7, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1492 - Video of Oct. 7, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1493 - Video of Oct. 8, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1495 - Video of Oct. 11, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1496 - Video of Oct. 11, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1497 - Video of Oct. 12, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1498 - Video of Oct. 12, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1499 - Video of Oct. 13, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1500 - Video of Oct. 13, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1501 - Video of Oct. 14, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1502 - Video of Oct. 14, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1503 - Video of Oct. 15, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1504 - Video of Oct. 15, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1505 - Video of Oct. 18, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1506 - Video of Oct. 18, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1507 - Video of Oct. 19, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1508 - Video of Oct. 19, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1509 - Video of Oct. 20, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1510 - Video of Oct. 20, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1511 - Video of Oct. 21, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1512 - Video of Oct. 21, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1513 - Video of Oct. 22, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1514 - Video of Oct. 25, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1515 - Video of Oct. 25, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1516 - Video of Oct. 26, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1517 - Video of Oct. 26, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1518 - Video of Oct. 27, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1519 - Video of Oct. 27, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1520 - Video of Oct. 28, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1521 - Video of Oct. 28, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1522 - Video of Oct. 29, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1523 - Video of Oct. 29, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1524 - Video of Oct. 30, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1525 - Video of Nov. 1, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1526 - Video of Nov. 1, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1527 - Video of Nov. 2, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1528 - Video of Nov. 2, 2021 Senate Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1529 - Video of Nov. 3, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1530 - Video of Nov. 4, 2021 House Map Drawing Session (submitted in native format)

## FIRST LOOK AND ANALYSIS: STATE HOUSE AND SENATE COUNTY GROUPINGS

Yesterday the Census Bureau released the population data North Carolina needed to begin the redistricting process for everything from Congressional to town council districts across the state.

While we may revisit other aspects of redistricting in future analysis, this post will focus on the State House and State Senate districts and, specifically, how the court-mandated Stephenson Criteria will cause North Carolina's counties to be grouped when state legislators begin redrawing legislative districts this fall.

Developing a solid grasp of the county "grouping" requirement is the most valuable insight you need to understand North Carolina's legislative redistricting process. Two important notes: first, Democrats generally refer to a county "grouping" or "group" as "clustering" or a "cluster" (more on why in a future post). Second, the grouping requirement does not apply to drawing Congressional Districts in North Carolina.

First, some background on what the Stephenson Criteria are and how they became the governing principle in legislative redistricting in North Carolina:

In 2001, the Democratic majorities in the General Assembly began drawing the State House and State Senate districts intent on maintaining their majorities. The House and Senate plans went to great lengths to construct districts that favored the party drawing the maps. For example: the 2001 State Senate map - known as N.C. Senate Plan 1C - divided 51 of North Carolina's 100 counties:

NC Senate Plan 1C


The 2001 State House map - Sutton House Plan 3 - split 68 counties, over two-thirds of the state's 100 counties.

## Sutton House Plan 3



[^114] Before 1982, state legislators kept counties whole when drawing General Assembly districts because, dating back to the original 1776 version, North Carolina's Constitution prohibited dividing counties. This
requirement is generally known as the "Whole County Provision" and can be found in Article II, Sections 3 and 5:

Section 3: "No county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district;"

Section 5: "No county shall be divided in the formation of a representative district;"

After the General Assembly adopted the 2001 State House and Senate redistricting plans that split a majority of the state's counties, a man named Ashley Stephenson from Washington, North Carolina filed a lawsuit asking state courts to enforce the constitutional provision requiring legislative maps to keep counties whole.

Stephenson's litigation ultimately prevailed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court imposed a series of criteria that govern how legislators draw General Assembly districts in North Carolina.

The most important was a requirement that the General Assembly comply with the North Carolina Constitution's Whole County Provision when drawing legislative districts.

Let's focus on the key pieces of the Stephenson Criteria that dictate how the state's counties are grouped to form the foundation of State House and Senate district maps:

1. Determine the perfect population for each legislative district by dividing the state's total census population by the number of districts. This decade, the ideal population is 86,995 for a State House district and 208,788 for a State Senate district.
2. Each district is allowed a population deviation of $+/-5 \%$ from the ideal population.
3. County groupings are permitted to contain more than one legislative district, so map drawers must determine the allowable population variance for multi-district county groupings. This chart uses the allowed $5 \%$ variance to calculate the permissible population ranges of county groupings with more than one member.

| House |  |  |  |  | Senate |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $5 \%$ under | Ideal Population | $5 \%$ over | Districts | 5\% under | Ideal Population | $\mathbf{5 \%}$ over |  |
| 82,645 | 86,995 | 91,345 | $\mathbf{1}$ | 198,348 | 208,788 | 219,227 |  |
| 165,290 | 173,990 | 182,689 | $\mathbf{2}$ | 396,697 | 417,576 | 438,454 |  |
| 247,935 | 260,985 | 274,034 | $\mathbf{3}$ | 595,045 | 626,363 | 657,681 |  |
| 330,581 | 347,980 | 365,379 | $\mathbf{4}$ | 793,393 | 835,151 | 876,909 |  |
| 413,226 | 434,975 | 456,723 | $\mathbf{5}$ | 991,742 | $1,043,939$ | $1,096,136$ |  |
| 495,871 | 521,969 | 548,068 | $\mathbf{6}$ | $1,190,090$ | $1,252,727$ | $1,315,363$ |  |
| 578,516 | 608,964 | 639,413 | $\mathbf{7}$ | $1,388,439$ | $1,461,514$ | $1,534,590$ |  |
| 661,161 | 695,959 | 730,757 | $\mathbf{8}$ |  |  |  |  |
| 743,806 | 782,954 | 822,102 | $\mathbf{9}$ |  |  |  |  |
| 826,452 | 869,949 | 913,446 | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |  | North Carolina |  |  |
| 909,097 | 956,944 | $1,004,791$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ |  |  |  |  |
| 991,742 | $1,043,939$ | $1,096,136$ | $\mathbf{1 2}$ |  | Population |  |  |
| $1,074,387$ | $1,130,934$ | $1,187,480$ | 13 |  | $10,439,388$ |  |  |
| $1,157,032$ | $1,217,929$ | $1,278,825$ | $\mathbf{1 4}$ |  |  |  |  |

4. When constructing the county groupings, counties that are grouped together must be contiguous and the contiguity cannot be a shared single point.

- The Stephenson Criteria use a simple methodology for determining the optimal, highest-scoring map that complies with the state Constitution's whole county requirement. The constitutional map is the map containing:
- The most 1-county groupings
- If tied on 1-county groupings, the most 2-county groupings
- If tied on 1 and 2-county groupings, the most 3-county groupings
- If tied on 1, 2 and 3-county groupings, the most 4-county groupings
- And so on.....

We have independently verified an algorithm a team of Duke data scientists created to determine the county grouping arrangement that best complies with Stephenson criteria.

One of the quantitative analytics experts our firm works with processed the recently-released census data through the algorithm to determine the new County grouping maps for the State House and State Senate.

In both the House and Senate redistricting plans, there are portions of the maps where legislators will have choices about how to configure the counties. Those options are inset in the maps below. Because the General Assembly's redistricting committees adopted compactness as one of the criteria for assessing plans, we have chosen to evaluate the most compact district configuration. It is important to note legislators could opt for a different configuration if they determine it better complies with the totality of their redistricting criteria.

Interestingly, we project the different options in both the State House and Senate maps to produce virtually the same political outcomes, though if the House and Senate chose the less compact option in both maps for Northeastern North Carolina it would give Republicans a chance to pick up an additional seat.

Below are the optimal grouping options for the General Assembly redistricting plans. There are more detailed notes in these linked House and Senate charts. The charts include data on the political performance of the county groupings, double-bunkings, the projected number of seats that are likely to favor each party and the number of toss up seats. We generally consider a district to be competitive if the winning party won less than $55 \%$ of the vote.

The bottom line in the State House is these groupings could not have come together much better for Republicans. The Republicans almost certainly will retain a majority in the House and have a very good chance at winning a supermajority. Democrats' only realistic pathway to a majority is an extreme gerrymander of the large urban counties like Mecklenburg, Wake and Guilford that shuts out Republicans entirely. While these counties favor Democrats, Republicans win around $35 \%$ of the countywide vote and a fair map should make about one-third of the districts competitive for the GOP.


State House County Groupings
The optimal grouping maps for the State Senate redistricting plan worked out much better for Democrats than the House plan. Republicans are still favored to maintain a majority in the Senate and have a narrow pathway to a supermajority in a favorable election environment. But Democrats have opportunities for a majority too, if they can implement a gerrymander that maximizes their advantage in urban counties and slightly improve their performance in suburban districts.


State Senate County Groupings







时

甶 8




2021－10－08 Redistricting Map Drawing（Senate）
33 views－Oct 10， 2021
M 0 碞 DISLIKE

$\Rightarrow$ SHARE
三＋SAVE


Undergraduate Fall 2021
Commencement Ceremony－




| 三 | －YouTlube | Search | Q | 0 | 状 | ： | （8）SIGN IN |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |





$\equiv \sim$ YouTuluc















2021-10-14 Redistricting Map Drawing (House)

| STATE OF NORTH CAROUINA. $-\infty$ COUNTY OF WAKE | IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 21 CVS 015426 |
| :---: | :---: |
| COMMON CAUSE, <br> Plaintiff, <br> v. |  |
| PHILIP E, BERGER in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate; TIMOTHY K. MOORE in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; RALPH E. HISE, JR., WARREN DANIEL, PAUL NEWTON, in their official capacities as Co-Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections; DESTIN HALL, in his official capacity as Chairman of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; DAMON CIRCOSTA, in his official capacity as Chair of the State Board of Elections; STELLA ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Secretary of the State Board of Elections; STACY EGGERS IV, in his official capacity as Member of the State Board of Elections; JEFF CARMON III, in his official capacity as Member of the State Board of Elections; TOMMY TUCKER, in his official capacity as Member of the State Board of Elections; KAREN BRINSON BELL, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, <br> Defendants | VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF <br> (Three-Judge Court Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-267.1) |

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-253 et seq., and Rules 8, 24, and 57 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Common Cause, through counsel, hereby files this Complaint for declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief.

## I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. After drawing one unconstitutional redistricting plan after another in the last decade, ${ }^{1}$ the North Carolina General Assembly has acted in an unlawful and unconstitutional manner by defiantly ignoring clear direction from the North Carolina Supreme Court on how to draw constitutional maps and once again engaging in extreme partisan gerrymandering. North Carolina state Legislative and Congressional districts are once again extreme outliers, do not reflect or allow to be reflected the will of North Carolina voters, and entrench the power of the current Legislative majority in a manner that will be certain to withstand even high turnout elections where voters widely prefer Democratic candidates. At core, North Carolina's democracy is critically subverted by these actions, and they are inconsistent with the North Carolina Constitution.

[^115]2. But the harm does not end here. The incontrovertible evidence of bad actions and bad faith by the current Legislative majority will harm voters of color too. By categorically prohibiting the formal consideration of any racial data in drawing or evaluating districts that would allow legislators to prevent dilution, but acknowledging the obvious familiarity that legislators have with the state's demography that would still allow them to target these voters, the North Carolina General Assembly knowingly destroyed functioning crossover districts that enabled the election of candidates of choice of voters of color. While such districts may not always be compelled by the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), the destruction of those districts violates North Carolina's equal protection guarantees. To be clear, this case is not a Voting Rights Act case. Plaintiff Common Cause solely brings state law claims under the North Carolina Constitution. This case is one of intentional racial discrimination in violation of the North Carolina Constitution, unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering in violation of the North Carolina Constitution, and the legal need for a reckoning with a General Assembly that has no respect for the rule of law, the rulings of the North Carolina Supreme Court, or co-equal judicial institutions at all.
3. Common Cause files this action to challenge the state House, Senate, and federal Congressional maps ("2021 Enacted Maps") as unconstitutional and invalid, and calls upon this Court to enjoin the 2021 Enacted Maps and to establish new constitutional plans if the General Assembly fails to do so.
4. From the beginning of this process, the Defendant Chairs of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections and the House Committee on Redistricting (the "Redistricting Chairs" of the "Redistricting Committees") have, despite warnings from citizens and legislators of color, stated their intention to contravene the North Carolina Constitution, as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court Stephenson v. Bartlett, by prohibiting the formal consideration of
racial data and failing to undertake any racially polarized voting analyses to understand how district lines would affect minority voting strength and representation. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354 (2002) (Stephenson I) and Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301 (2003) (Stephenson II). They did this while acknowledging it would be infeasible to prevent legislators from applying their pre-existing knowledge of North Carolina's demographic and political make-up (and by extension doing so in a way that would harm voters of color) when devising districts. The Redistricting Committees have approved redistricting criteria formally prohibiting any use of racial data, and the Redistricting Chairs have stated that they disallowed consideration of any maps drawn that formally, lawfully and properly utilize racial data, despite their legal obligations to do so. These actions directly contravene the North Carolina Constitution, including: (1) the requirements of the North Carolina Constitution, which affirms the supremacy of federal law under Sections 3 and 5 of Article I; and (2) the requirement that legislators first consider the data necessary to ensure satisfaction of the requirements of federal law in drawing state legislative districts, as explained in Stephenson I and II. They did so in an unnecessarily chaotic process that stifled public comment in an apparent effort to capitalize on the delay in 2020 Census data and evade judicial review as they did last cycle, which allowed the party currently in power to obtain and maintain a veto-proof supermajority for most of the last decade due to unlawful racial gerrymanders. ${ }^{2}$ These tactics should not be tolerated again.
5. Plaintiff Common Cause brings this Declaratory Judgment action seeking a judicial determination that their members and voters they serve are entitled to a redistricting process that adheres to the requirements of Article II, Sections 3 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution and

[^116]that the use of purportedly "race-blind" redistricting criteria violates North Carolina law and unlawfully harms voters of color. Defendants Berger, Moore, Hise, Daniel, and Hall ("Legislative Defendants") intentionally orchestrated an unlawful redistricting process that contravened the requirements of the state Constitution as set forth in Stephenson I and II. The use of purportedly "race-blind" redistricting criteria in defiance of these requirements, and Legislative Defendants' failure to conduct any analysis that would prevent vote dilution for voters of color, violates the Equal Protection Clause, Article I, Section 19, of the North Carolina Constitution.
6. Finally, Legislative Defendants have once again persisted in drawing and enacting state Legislative and Congressional maps that are extreme partisan gerrymanders, which intentionally and harmfully dilute the votes of North Carolina's Democratic voters, in violation of the Free Elections Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Assembly Clauses guaranteed under Article I, Sections 10, 12, 14, and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. The political analysis of the 2021 Enacted Maps reveal that the purported nonpartisan drafting of these maps is implausible given expert analysis of millions of simulated maps that do not use partisan data. Such ensembles of non-partisan maps do not produce the extreme partisan outcomes seen in the 2021 Enacted Maps, and analysis performed by Professor Jonathan Mattingly of Duke University demonstrates that the 2021 Enacted Maps are astonishingly durable and non-responsive to political waves (changes in the state partisan vote shares). Legislative Defendants' plans will heavily and consistently favor Republican candidates and the Republican Party even if the will of North Carolina's voters does not.
7. Without judicial intervention, Legislative Defendants' actions will cause irreparable harm to the rights of Plaintiff Common Cause, its members and the voters it serves, as well as the rights of all North Carolina voters to participate in free elections. The process pursued
by the Redistricting Chairs as described above cannot, as a matter of law, comply with the North Carolina Constitution. The 2021 Enacted Maps are undeniably extremely skewed in favor of the Legislative Defendants' party. North Carolinians are entitled to have their rights enforced by the courts of this State, and should not have to endure yet another set of elections under unconstitutional maps.

## II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-253 et seq. ("Declaratory Judgment Act"), N.C.G.S. § 7A-245(a)(4), and Article 26A of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes.
9. This Court has the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. See N.C.G.S. § 1-253.
10. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.
11. An action under the Declaratory Judgment Act may be used to declare rights of persons. N.C.G.S. § 1-253.
12. The Declaratory Judgment Act is to be liberally construed and administered. N.C.G.S. § 1-264.
13. Under N.C.G.S. § 1-81.1, the exclusive venue for this action is the Wake County Superior Court.
14. Under N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1, a three-judge court must be convened because this action challenges the validity of redistricting plans enacted by the General Assembly.
15. Removal to federal court is not proper in this matter because all of Plaintiff's causes of action challenge Defendants' enacted maps based upon North Carolina Constitutional law, the
matters in dispute do not arise under or require resolution of federal law, and there is no diversity of jurisdiction. This is a suit involving challenging the enactment of state redistricting law, properly brought in this Court.
16. An actual, justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants at present.

## III. PARTIES

## Plaintiff

17. Plaintiff Common Cause is a non-profit nonpartisan democracy organization with over 1.5 million members and local organizations in 30 states, including North Carolina. Common Cause has over 25,000 members, staff and supporters in every district challenged herein of the 2021 Enacted Maps. Since its founding by John Gardner in 1970, Common Cause has been dedicated to fair elections and making government at all levels more representative, open, and responsive to the interests of ordinary people. "For the past twenty-five years, Common Cause has been one of the leading proponents of redistricting reform. ${ }^{3}$ Common Cause also assists voters in navigating the elections process, provides resources for voters to determine their districts and their polling locations, and mobilizes voters to engage in political advocacy. Some of the voters assisted by Common Cause identify as voters of color and/or habitually vote for candidates of the Democratic Party. Unfair and discriminatory redistricting directly frustrates and impedes Common Cause's core missions of making government more responsive to the interests of communities by diminishing the voices of the voters Common Cause works to engage and forces Common Cause to divert resources toward directly combatting the ill effects of unlawful redistricting. Common

3 Jonathan Winburn, The Realities of Redistricting: Following the Rules and Limiting Gerrymandering in State Legislative Redistricting 205 (2008)..

Cause has long advocated for redistricting reform, whether executed by Republicans or Democrats, and for an end to partisan gerrymandering in North Carolina. Partisan gerrymandering frustrates and impedes Common Cause's core mission of increasing voter engagement and making government officials accountable to voters because this practice preordains election results, making voters less likely or willing to engage and government officials less responsive to constituents. It also frustrates and impedes Common Cause's goal of advocating for redistricting reform because the beneficiaries of gerrymandered plans are unlikely to adopt meaningful redistricting reform. Common Cause brings this action on its own behalf and on behalf of its members and supporters who are registered voters in North Carolina. These members and supporters include registered voters in every county in North Carolina, registered Democrats and/or voters who support Democratic candidates in each of the districts alleged to be partisan gerrymanders herein, and voters who identify as Black in each of the effective districts for voters of color that were intentionally and unlawfully dismantled by the 2021 Enacted Maps as alleged herein. Each of these members and supporters have a right to representation in the State Legislature that complies with the North Carolina Constitution, a right to be free of intentional discrimination, and a right to free association.

## Defendants

18. Defendant Philip E. Berger is a member of the North Carolina Senate, having been elected to that office by the voters residing in District 30. Mr. Berger serves as the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate. Mr. Berger is sued in his official capacity.
19. Defendant Timothy K. Moore is member of the North Carolina House of Representatives, having been elected to that office by the voters residing in District 111. Mr. Moore
serves as the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives. Mr. Moore is sued in his official capacity.
20. Defendant Ralph E. Hise, Jr. is a member of the North Carolina Senate, having been elected to that office by the voters residing in Senate District 47. Mr. Hise serves as the Senate Deputy President Pro Tempore and the Chairman of the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee. Mr. Hise is sued in his official capacity.
21. Defendant Warren Daniel is a member of the North Carolina Senate, having been elected to that office by the voters residing in District 46. Mr. Daniel serves as the Chairman of the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee. Mr. Daniel is sued in his official capacity.
22. Defendant Paul Newton is a member of the North Carolina Senate, having been elected to that office by the voters residing in District 36. Mr. Newton serves as the Chairman of the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee. Mr. Newton is sued in his official capacity.
23. Defendant Destin Hall is a member of the North Carolina House of Representatives, having been elected to that office by voters residing in District 87. Mr. Hall serves as the Chairman of the House Redistricting Committee. Mr. Hall is sued in his official capacity.
24. Defendants Hise, Daniel, Newton, and Hall together herein shall be referred to as the "Redistricting Chairs" and, together with Defendants Moore and Berger, the "Legislative Defendants."
25. Defendant State of North Carolina is one of the fifty sovereign states in the United States of America. Article I of the State's Constitution establishes, "principles of liberty and free government," which the General Assembly and its members must honor in enacting legislation for the State and its citizens.
26. Defendant North Carolina State Board of Elections is the agency responsible for the administration of North Carolina elections, including issuing rules and regulations for the conduct of all elections in the State.
27. Defendant Damon Circosta is the Chairman and a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Mr. Circosta is sued in his official capacity.
28. Defendant Stella Anderson is the Secretary and a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Ms. Anderson is sued in her official capacity.
29. Defendant Stacy Eggers IV is a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Mr. Eggers is sued in his official capacity.
30. Defendant Jeff Carmon II is a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Mr. Carmon is sued in his official capacity.
31. Defendant Tommy Tucker is a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Mr. Tucker is sued in his official capacity.
32. Defendant Karen Brinson Bell is the Executive Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Ms. Brinson Bell is sued in her official capacity.
33. Defendants the North Carolina State Board of Elections, Circosta, Anderson, Eggers, Carmon, Tucker, and Brinson Bell shall together herein be referred to as the "SBE Defendants," and, together with the State of North Carolina, the "State Defendants."

## IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

## A. North Carolina Constitutional Requirements in Redistricting.

34. The North Carolina Constitution provides that "the General Assembly, at the first regular session convening after the return of every decennial census of population taken by order of Congress, shall revise the senate districts and the apportionment of Senators among those
districts" and "shall revise the representative districts and the apportionment of Representatives among those districts." N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 5.
35. The State Constitution specifically enumerates four limitations upon the redistricting and reapportionment authority of the General Assembly, including that:
a. each Senator and Representative shall represent, as nearly as possible, an equal number of inhabitants;
b. each senate and representative district shall at all times consist of contiguous territory;
c. no county shall be divided in the formation of senate or representative districts (the "Whole County Provision"); and
d. once established, the senate and representative districts and the apportionment of Senators and Representatives shall remain unaltered until the next decennial census of population taken by order of Congress.

See N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 5.
36. In addition to these requirements, Article I, Section 3 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that the rights of the people of North Carolina "shall be exercised in pursuance of law and consistently with the Constitution of the United States," and Article I, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits a law or ordinance in North Carolina from contravening the federal Constitution. Collectively, these provisions "delineate[] the interplay between federal and state law[.]" Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 370. Finally, Article I, Section 19 guarantees North Carolinians equal protection of the laws and freedom from discrimination by the State on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, and Article I, Section 10 provides that "All elections shall be free."
37. Among the federal requirements applicable to redistricting is compliance with the federal one-person one-vote requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), as amended and as proscribed under the Fifteenth Amendment. Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 363-64. Accordingly, North Carolina law prohibits any voting qualification or prerequisite that impairs or dilutes, on account of race or color, a citizen's opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. Id. This requirement does not command a state to adopt any particular legislative reapportionment plan, but rather prevents the enforcement of redistricting plans having the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of legally protected minority groups. Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 364.
38. In Stephenson v. Bartlett, the North Carolina Supreme Court sought to harmonize the different North Carolina Constitutional requirements imposed on the redistricting process. 355 N.C. 354; see also Stephenson II, 357 N.C. 301. The court developed a methodology for grouping counties together into "clusters" that it held would minimize the splitting of counties, in recognition of the Whole County Provision, while satisfying one-person, one-vote requirements.
39. Importantly, Stephenson expressly mandates that "to ensure full compliance with federal law, legislative districts required by the VRA shall be formed prior to the creation of nonVRA districts." Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383. In other words, first, any and all districts that are required under the VRA (which requires that districts be drawn without the intent or effect of depriving protected voters of an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice) must be drawn. ${ }^{4}$ Only after an analysis is performed to ascertain what districts are compelled by the VRA,

[^117]and those districts are drawn, may any work be done to draw clustered districts that harmonize and maximize compliance with North Carolina's Whole County Provision and equal protection guarantees of population equality. "Thus, the process established by [the North Carolina Supreme] Court in Stephenson I and its progeny requires that, in establishing legislative districts, the General Assembly first must create all necessary VRA districts, single-county districts, and single counties containing multiple districts." Dickson v. Rucho, 368 N.C. 481, 532 (2015), vacated on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 2186 (2017).
40. The trial court in Stephenson also instructed that VRA districts should be formed where, "due to demographic changes in population there exists the required [Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)] preconditions," a finding that was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. Stephenson II, 357 N.C. at 307. Accordingly, to comply with Stephenson, the Legislature must evaluate demographic changes to determine whether there exist the required Gingles preconditions. This includes, at the least, considering racial data and, where legislators and members of the public have indicated that there may be VRA concerns, conducting a regionally-focused Racially Polarized Voting ("RPV") study to determine if there is legally significant racially polarized voting. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55-58 (1986). Again, to be clear, there are no allegations or causes of action in this case of any specific districts compelled by the VRA. Plaintiff need not allege a Section 2 claim to show that the Legislature admittedly and unapologetically flouted the North Carolina Supreme Court's instruction by failing
to consider any racial data or conduct any RPV analysis, even when made aware of harmful effects on Black voters.
41. In North Carolina, "[a]ll political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole." N.C. Const. art. I, § 2. Here, "the object of all elections is to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people - the qualified voters," and "the machinery provided by the law to aid in attaining the main object - the will of the voters . . . should not be used to defeat the object which they were intended to aid." Hill v Skinner, 169 N.C. 405, 415 (1915) (quoting R.R. v. Comrs., 116 N.C. 563, 568 (1895)). The Free Elections Clause in Article I, Section 10 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that "[a]ll elections shall be free," and thus requires that elections be conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people. See Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *337 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
42. Partisan gerrymandering at its most basic level involves drawing legislative districts "to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power," with the effect of dismantling the fundamental precept of democracy that "voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around." Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 791, 824 (2015). It does so by systematically "packing" and "cracking" voters likely to support the disfavored party to dilute their voting power overall. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1935-41 (Kagan, J., concurring). Extreme partisan gerrymandering entrenches the political party in power, serving the interest of that political party over the public good, and systematically diluting and devaluing the votes of some citizens compared to others based on political affiliation. See Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super.

LEXIS 56, at *339. Overall, extreme partisan gerrymandering prevents elections from ascertaining, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people, and thus violates the Free Elections Clause. Id.
43. And even more insidiously, in a state like North Carolina, where the Southern Strategy has been effective, and it is widely known that Black voters overwhelmingly prefer Democratic candidates, partisan gerrymandering is an act of racial discrimination in violation of the State Constitution. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222-24. Race and politics are inextricably intertwined in this State, and that is all the more reason for courts to reign in extreme partisan gerrymandering.

## B. The Legislative Defendants Orchestrated a Redistricting Process that Contravenes Applicable Law, Causing an Inevitable Deprivation of Voters' Rights.

1. The Redistricting Committees' Adopted Criteria Contravene State Constitutional Requirements.
2. On Thursday, August 5, 2021, the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections convened a Joint Meeting of the Redistricting Committees to begin discussions about the redistricting process. ${ }^{5}$ Following this meeting, staff member Erika Churchill distributed to joint committee members the legislative redistricting criteria ordered by the North Carolina Superior Court for Wake County in its September 3, 2019 Judgment in the matter Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56 (the " 2019 Criteria"). ${ }^{6}$
3. The 2019 Criteria set forth by the court specifically required that new maps comply with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts, and

[^118]required within 14 days of the order that the parties to submit briefing and expert analysis on whether VRA districts were required, including consideration of whether the minimum Black Voting Age Population "BVAP" thresholds were met to implicate the VRA. Id. at *417.
46. On Monday, August 9, 2021 the Redistricting Chairs released the " 2021 Joint Redistricting Committee Proposed Criteria. ${ }^{,{ }^{7}}$ Contrary to the requirements of Article I, Sections 3 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution, and the aforementioned court orders in Stephenson $v$. Bartlett and Common Cause v. Lewis, these criteria outright prohibited all formal use of racial data in redistricting, with no exceptions permitting the use of racial data to prevent vote dilution or comply with the VRA:

Racial Data. Data identifying the race of individuals or voters shall not be used in the construction or consideration of districts in the 2021 Congressional, House and Senate plans. ${ }^{8}$
47. The Redistricting Committees received public comment on the proposed criteria on Tuesday, August 10, 2021. Among those providing public comment were Plaintiff's Counsel Allison J. Riggs, who described how the criteria prohibiting use of racial data was contrary to applicable law:

It is neither appropriate nor required to draw districts race-blind. As long as redistricting has occurred, it has been a tool used to harm voters of color. Beyond compliance with the VRA, it is entirely appropriate to advance race-equity to consider race in the drawing of districts, to ensure voters of color are not being packed or cracked. Additionally, in Covington v. North Carolina, this legislative body tried the same thing with respect to race-blind redistricting. A three-judge panel, including republican and democratic appointees, and a unanimous supreme court, rejected your race-blind remedial drawing of two senate districts and two

[^119]house districts. In fact there is apparently not a federal judge out there who agrees with this approach and we urge you to abandon that criteria. ${ }^{9}$
48. On Thursday, August 12, 2021, the Redistricting Committees met to consider the proposed redistricting criteria and any amendments thereto. During debate on the proposed criteria, Senator Dan Blue stated that the court in Stephenson held that the first step of redistricting is determining whether districts are required to comport with the VRA and queried how this would be accomplished without the consideration of racial data. The Redistricting Chairs reiterated the view that consideration of racial data to evaluate whether VRA districts were necessary was not required but failed to explain how VRA compliance would be assessed absent that data.
49. Defendant Newton indicated that if any members presented evidence or new studies of RPV in North Carolina, the Chairs would be willing to examine that evidence. ${ }^{10}$
50. Defendant Daniel then proposed an amendment providing that " $[t]$ he Committee will draw districts that comply with the Voting Rights Act," ${ }^{11}$ again failing to explain how this would or could be done without racial data or any analysis of racially polarized voting patterns. This amendment was adopted into the final criteria.
51. Senator Blue then proposed an amendment titled "Voting Rights Act," adding the following criteria:

[^120]As condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. Harris and Covington v. State of North Carolina, African-Americans shall not be packed into any grouping or district to give partisan advantage to any political party. ${ }^{12}$
52. During debate on this amendment, Senator Blue again queried how it would be possible to comply with the VRA without consideration racial data. Senator Clark also repeated these concerns. In response, Defendant Daniel erroneously advised that prior case law, including a 2019 decision, in North Carolina did not require the use of racial data. ${ }^{13}$ The amendment offered by Senator Blue failed.
53. Upon information and belief, Defendant Daniel referenced the September 3, 2019 Judgment of the North Carolina Superior Court for Wake County in the matter Common Cause v. Lewis, Case No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, to contend that racial data is not required to ensure compliance with the VRA this redistricting cycle. The court held no such thing. In Common Cause v. Lewis, the Superior Court struck down 2017 state Legislative plans as unlawful partisan gerrymanders that violated the Free Elections Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 10. Id. at *333. In its analysis, the court explicitly held that "[a]ny Remedial Maps must comply with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts," and afforded the parties the opportunity to "submit briefing . . . on whether the Gingles factors are met in particular counties and county groupings and/or the minimum BVAP needed in particular counties and county groupings for African-Americans to be able to elect candidates of their choice . . . ." Id. at *407-08. In other words, the court in Common

[^121]Cause v. Lewis explicitly required the same analysis that Legislative Defendants are unlawfully chose to skip this cycle.
54. Furthermore, in subsequent orders addressing the remedial maps enacted in Common Cause v. Lewis, the court noted that the "need for such localized [RPV] analysis is particularly acute in North Carolina because . . . the existence and extent of white bloc voting varies widely across different county groupings." Order Supplementing Court Order of October 28, 2019 with Findings and Conclusions Regarding Compliance of Remedial Maps with Federal Voting Rights Act at 4, Common Cause v. Lewis, Case No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56. Accordingly, any assertions that courts have definitely held there is no racially polarized voting in North Carolina, and that no RPV analyses are therefore necessary, are both factually and legally incorrect.
55. Hypothetically, it could be that that no districts were compelled by the effects test under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but the Legislature's process would still be problematic for two reasons:
a. First, willful ignorance of racial data invites the destruction of effective crossover districts, and such willful exclusion of racial data suggests the consequences are intended - undermining Black voting strength. The intentional destruction of effective crossover districts, even though such districts are not compelled by the VRA, violates equal protection guarantees such as those in Article I, Section 19. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24 (2009).
b. Second, regardless of whether any districts are actually compelled by the effects test of the VRA, the North Carolina Supreme Court implicitly
demands that the Legislature ascertain whether such districts are compelled and draw the ones compelled. But the only way to know whether there are districts compelled by the effects test of the VRA is to conduct analysis of large populations of minority voters and whether there is racially polarized voting. The Legislature's failure to even conduct any such analysis makes a mockery of the Supreme Court's authority and precedent.
56. The final criteria adopted by the Redistricting Committees prohibited the use of any racial data in the 2021 redistricting process. ${ }^{14}$
2. The Legislative Defendants Mandate the Use of County Clusters That Contravene the North Carolina Constitution.
57. On August 12, 2021, the United States Census Data released block-level data showing North Carolina's population increased from 9,535,483 residents in $2010^{15}$ to $10,439,388$ residents in 2020. ${ }^{16}$ This 9.5 percent increase gave North Carolina an additional Congressional seat, raising its delegation from 13 members of the House of Representatives to 14 members, and thereby requiring the addition of one Congressional district. ${ }^{17}$
58. The North Carolina population increase reflected in the Census data was not evenly distributed throughout the state, with the vast majority of population increase occurring in urban

[^122]and suburban areas. ${ }^{18}$ Without updating the district lines during the decennial redistricting process, North Carolina's existing districts for the North Carolina House of Representatives and North Carolina Senate would be substantially unequal in population size and deviation. ${ }^{19}$
59. On Tuesday, October 5, 2021, the House Committee on Redistricting and the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections convened separately. In both meetings, the Redistricting Chairs announced in both chambers that they would be limiting the consideration of Senate and House maps to those drawn using county clusters described in the academic paper N.C. General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census (the "Duke Academic Paper"), published on the Duke University website "Quantifying Gerrymandering." ${ }^{20}$
60. The Duke Academic Paper states: "The one part of Stephenson v. Bartlett which this analysis does not reflect is compliance with the Voting Rights Act." ${ }^{י 21}$
61. In the meeting of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections, Defendant Hise provided the set of sixteen possible Senate cluster options, based upon the Duke Academic Paper, that would be required for any map to be considered for enactment (the "Duke Senate Clusters"). See "Duke Senate Groupings Maps 11x17.,"22

[^123]62. Senator Blue repeatedly asked how leadership had ensured compliance with the VRA, as required under the North Carolina Constitution, in the mandated clusters without any demographic analysis. Senator Marcus stated the committee needed to conduct an RPV study to ensure legal compliance. Defendant Hise confirmed the Chairs' views that no demographic data was legally required, and that there was no directive to staff to order any RPV analysis or provide racial data to members drawing maps. ${ }^{23}$
63. In the meeting of the House Committee on Redistricting, Defendant Hall provided the set of eight possible House cluster options, based upon the Duke Academic Paper, that constituted the set of options eligible for adoption (the "Duke House Clusters"). See "Duke House Groupings Maps 11x17.pdf., ${ }^{24}$ Defendant Hall stated that no maps that used cluster options other than the Duke House Clusters would be considered.
64. Representative Harrison questioned how the committee would comply with the VRA as the Duke Academic Paper stated its analysis did not reflect compliance with the VRA as required by Stephenson. Representative Reives inquired about the obligations under the VRA and how to comply with them. Defendant Hall stated the committees made a decision not to use racial data, contrary to redistricting criteria used in the previous two sessions, which Defendant Hall alleged to be "the best way" to ensure compliance with the VRA as well as other state and federal law. ${ }^{25}$

[^124]
## 3. The Legislature Is Notified that the Mandated County Clusters Violate North Carolina Law.

65. Three days after the proposed County Cluster Maps were publicly released, on Friday, October 8, 2021, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter to Legislative Defendants informing them that the purportedly "race-blind" redistricting criteria adopted and the mandated county clusters violated well-established redistricting law (the "October 8 Letter"). ${ }^{26}$ The October 8 Letter also informed Legislative Defendants of specific areas in the North Carolina Senate and House cluster maps that required examination for VRA Compliance, including:
a. the Greene/Wayne/Wilson cluster "Q1" mandated by all 16 of the Senate Duke Cluster options;
b. the Sampson/Wayne cluster "LL2" mandated in some of the House Duke Cluster options;
c. the Camden/Gates/Hertford/Pasquotank cluster "NN1" mandated in some of the House Duke Cluster options.
66. Legislative Defendants failed to take any action in response to this letter and the highlighted harm to Black voters. This inaction is strong evidence of the Legislature's racially discriminatory intent and its violation of the process requirements imposed by the Stephenson cases.
67. After draft Senate map, "SST-4", was made publicly available on the North Carolina Legislature's website (ncleg.gov), ${ }^{27}$ counsel for Plaintiff sent a second letter to
[^125]Legislative Defendants on Monday, October 25, 2021, ${ }^{28}$ expressing concern that the cluster "Z1" chosen for this map from Duke Senate Clusters map "Duke_Senate 02 " would obstruct the ability of Black voters to continue electing their candidate of choice. On Tuesday, October 26, 2021, Plaintiff Common Cause sent a letter to Legislative Defendants providing RPV analysis for Senate Districts 1 and 9 in map SST-4 that showed legally significant racially polarized voting in these proposed districts.
68. The Legislature hastily enacted the 2021 Enacted Maps shortly thereafter and with almost unprecedented speed, despite failing to announce any public deadline for the proposal or consideration of maps or timeline for enactment. Specifically:
a. A proposed version of the state Senate map ("SST-13") was filed on Friday, October 29, 2021 as Senate Bill 739 ("SB739") and received its first reading in the Senate that day. It was then referred to the Senate Redistricting Committee on November 1 where the Redistricting Committee adopted a substitute along party lines ("SBK-7"). It then passed its second and third readings in the Senate by November 3 along party lines, and passed all three readings and the House Redistricting Committee without any alteration on November 3 - 4, 2021. SB739 was ratified into law on November 4 as S.L. 2021-173.
b. A placeholder, blank version of the state House Map was filed on Thursday, October 28, 2021 as House Bill 976 ("HB976") where it passed its first reading. A committee substitute ("HBK-14") received a favorable review

[^126]and, after one amendment, passed its second and third readings on the House and its first reading in the Senate on November 2, 2021. It received a favorable report from the Senate Redistricting Committee on November 3, 2021 without alteration and passed its second and third readings on November 4, 2021. HB976 was ratified into law on November 4, 2021 as S.L. 2021-175.
c. A proposed Congressional map ("CST-13") was filed on October 29, 2021 as Senate Bill 740 ("SB740") and passed its first reading and received a favorable report from the Senate Redistricting Committee on November 1, 2021. It proceeded unaltered through its second and third readings in the Senate and its first reading in the House on November 2, received a favorable report from the House Redistricting Committee on November 3, and proceeded unaltered through its second and third readings in the House on November 4, 2021. SB740 was ratified into law on November 4, 2021 as S.L. 2021-174.
69. In the rush to finalize maps, Legislative Defendants rejected or tabled multiple amendments offered by other Senate and House legislators intended to require assessment and, as appropriate, to ameliorate the harm that would result to voters of color from the Legislative Defendants' redistricting process. Legislative Defendants also continued to defend the adopted criteria with inaccurate recitations of applicable law and mischaracterizations of fact. For example, in the meeting of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections on November 2, Defendant Newton stated that "some have asked whether the Stephenson cases require that race be used in redistricting," and then sought to justify the Legislative Defendants' choice to prohibit use of racial
data by asserting that (1) subsequent case law held that use of racial data or analysis was not legally required, (2) Stephenson did not apply because Section 5 of the VRA is not currently enforceable, and (3) it was the duty of other members to propose plans with majority-minority districts (despite unequivocal direction from the Redistricting Chairs that no plan would be considered if racial data had been used).
70. Legislative Defendants' flagrant disregard for the redistricting requirements set forth in Stephenson certainly confirms that their destruction of crossover districts that were providing Black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidate of choice was a willful and intentional act of racial discrimination in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. These bad acts are not merely abstract but will in fact cause harm to Black voters by reducing the number of districts in which they are effectively able to elect their candidate of choice, in violation of their rights to equal protection, and will frustrate the core missions of Plaintiff Common Cause to make government at all levels more representative, open, and responsive to the interests of ordinary people, including voters of color. Plaintiff forecast to Legislative Defendants that their members and other voters of color would specifically be harmed in at least the following areas, and this harm is still ensured given the districts drawn in the final maps proposed by Legislative Defendants and enacted in SB739 and HB976: ${ }^{29}$
a. Choice of Senate cluster "Zl". The Duke Senate Clusters provided two potential cluster options for the "Z1" cluster in northeast North Carolina. The proposed Senate map "SST-4" (an early draft of the enacted SB739)

[^127]was drafted using the Duke Senate Cluster "Duke_Senate 02," which eliminates an effective crossover district, thus obliterating the voting power of Black voters in this area of North Carolina, specifically in Senate District 1. The Legislature had the option to adopt a cluster comprised of Warren, Halifax, Martin, Bertie, Northampton, Hertford, Gates, Camden, Currituck, and Tyrell counties, with a BVAP of $42.33 \%$, and were advised of this by Plaintiff's counsel on October 25, 2021. While there is racially polarized voting in these counties, collectively and using reconstituted election results, this one-district cluster would have elected the Black-preferred candidate in recent statewide racially contested elections. However, the "Z1" cluster ultimately selected for inclusion in SB739 is comprised of Northampton, Hertford, Bertie, Gates, Perquimans, Pasquotank, Camden, Currituck, Tyrell, and Dare Counties, and dilutes the ability of Black voters to elect their candidates of choice. The BVAP in District 1 of SB739 using this cluster is only $29.49 \%$. There is racially polarized voting in these counties which, collectively and using reconstituted election results, would not have elected the Black-preferred candidate in recent statewide, racially contested elections. Even without explicitly viewing racial data during drafting, any individual with passing familiarity with this area of North Carolina would understand that the choice of this "Z1" cluster in SB739 would destroy Black voters' ability to continue electing their candidate of choice in a crossover district.
b. House Cluster "KK2". The Duke House Clusters provided two configurations for the group of six counties in southeast North Carolina (Wayne, Sampson, Duplin, Onslow, Pender, and Bladen). The 2019 House Remedial Map formed House District 21 from portions of Wayne and Sampson counties, which provided Black voters the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice at $39 \%$ BVAP. On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff's counsel notified Legislative Defendants that House District 21 was providing Black voters the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice, and that it would be possible to create two House districts from the Wayne and Sampson County Cluster. Plaintiff's counsel also notified Legislative Defendants that voting in Sampson and Wayne Counties was highly racially polarized and thus there was substantial evidence of legally significant racially polarized voting in this cluster. However, the enacted HB976 intentionally dismantled an effective cross-over district that allowed Black voters to elect their candidate of choice.
71. As illustrated above, each of these examples of Senate and House clusters required by the Committee Chairs, and enacted in SB739 and HB976, would deprive Black voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Under the purportedly "race-blind" criteria adopted by the Legislative Defendants, however, the deleterious consequences on BVAP has not, and in fact cannot, be directly and appropriately considered by the Redistricting Committees.
72. The racially discriminatory impact of this purportedly "race-blind" approach, in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, has a well-understood detrimental effect on Black representation. Overall, Legislative Defendants' intentional racially
discriminatory actions will cause a drastic decrease in representation for Black voters in the North Carolina House and Senate, as well as Congress. Of the 12 Senate districts that currently provide a genuine and equitable opportunity for voters of color to elect their candidate of choice (who also identify as Black), ${ }^{30}$ four - the districts electing Senator Ernestine Bazemore, Senator Toby Fitch, Senator Ben Clark, and Senator Sydney Batch - are unlikely or certain not to elect candidates of choice for voters of color under SB739. ${ }^{31}$ Of the 23 House districts that currently perform and provide a genuine and equitable opportunity for voters of color to elect their candidate of choice (who also identify as Black), ${ }^{32}$ five - the districts electing Representative Raymond Smith, Representative James Gailliard, Representative Linda Cooper-Suggs, Representative Howard Hunter II, and Represented Garland Pierce - are unlikely or certain not to elect candidates of choice for voters of color under HB976. ${ }^{33}$ Of the two Congressional districts that currently perform and provide a genuine and equitable opportunity for voters of color to elect their candidate of

[^128]choice (who also identify as Black), ${ }^{34}$ one - the district electing Congressman G.K. Butterfield is unlikely to elect candidates of choice for voters of color under SB740. This result could have been avoided had the General Assembly not flagrantly violated the redistricting process mandates issued by the North Carolina Supreme Court. Instead, functioning crossover districts were intentionally destroyed in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
73. Significantly, while Legislative Defendants have tried to justify their actions by a purported and erroneous view that it will lower the risk of violations of federal law, they have not expressed the belief that undertaking the first step of Stephenson would automatically violate federal law. To the contrary, they have affirmed their belief that it is possible to comply with the requirements of both state and federal law, as set forth in Stephenson. For example, in a meeting of the Senate Redistricting Committee on Tuesday, October 5, 2021, Defendant Hise stated that "It is our position that you can comply with both laws at the same time" when asked about compliance with the VRA and the county clusters required by the Whole County Provision under Stephenson.
74. Relatedly, Legislative Defendants have also expressed the view that using race to draw maps is not a per se violation of federal law, but rather only impermissible if they did not first ensure the Gingles preconditions were satisfied before using race (as they failed to do last cycle and as determined by the court in Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 176-78 (M.D.N.C. 2016), summarily aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017)). For example, in a meeting of the Senate Committee on Tuesday, November 2, 2021, Defendant Newton stated "if we draw districts using race, and we do not satisfy the Gingles preconditions, we risk violating the Equal Protections

[^129]Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." This statement acknowledges that, if the Gingles preconditions were satisfied, the use of race to draw districts would not violate the Equal Protections Clause and thus use of race in redistricting is not prohibited by federal law.
75. These views were reinforced by statements from counsel for Legislative Defendants during oral argument in the matter North Carolina NAACP v. Berger, in which counsel for Legislative Defendants asserted that Legislative Defendant were not required under law to ascertain what VRA districts are required nor to do any analysis of racial demographic data. See Transcript of 30 November 2021 Oral Argument, NC NAACP v. Berger, No. 21CVS014476 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2021) at p. 51 lines 15-17 ("There’s no affirmative duty on the Legislature to engage in any particular process to get a complaint VRA map."), p. 49, lines 18-19 ("There's no requirement that we [the Legislature] inform ourselves of that data to comply with the VRA."), p. 50, lines 11-13 ("There's been no formal [analysis to determine whether the maps are VRA compliant] . . . the Legislature hasn't had a hearing or done anything like that. They're not required to.").
76. Accordingly, Legislative Defendants' role in orchestrating a redistricting process that defiantly ignored the unequivocal directions of the highest court in this state is not based upon the belief that doing so would be inconsistent with federal law, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it is based upon an erroneous legal view that the first step of Stephenson is not required at all.

## C. The Legislative Defendants Have Continued to Partisan Gerrymander State Legislative and Congressional Maps to Further Entrench Their Party in Power.

1. The North Carolina Republican Party Has a Long History of Passing Redistricting and Election-Related Laws to Ensure Political Entrenchment and Frustration of the Ability of North Carolina Voters to Elect Their Candidates of Choice.
2. While the mechanics, justifications, and legal arguments have all shifted as strategies and tactics have changed, one dynamic has remained constant: the North Carolina Republican Party's relentless efforts to insulate their political power from the will of the people of North Carolina.
3. In 2010, the North Carolina Republican Party took unified control of the North Carolina General Assembly for the first time since 1870. No sooner were their newfound majorities sworn in than they started working to entrench those majorities, using discriminatory redistricting processes and changes in election laws to place their political power beyond the reach of North Carolina voters. Many of these efforts have been challenged in both state and federal court, and many of these efforts have been struck down by those same courts. While the specific claims at issue have shifted over time, the overall thrust of these cases is clear: the North Carolina Republican Party attempting to entrench its power, by any means necessary, in violation of applicable law. Plaintiff Common Cause's claims in this case are only the latest episode in this saga.
4. The majorities that precipitated the North Carolina Republican Party's unlawful political entrenchment were rooted in partisan machinations from the beginning. In 2010, the North Carolina Republican Party, in coordination with the Republican National Committee, targeted the North Carolina General Assembly via their "REDistricting Majority Project," or "REDMAP." REDMAP sought to identify opportunities to take control of state legislatures throughout the
country ahead of the 2011 decennial redistricting process, in order to use that newfound control to gerrymander maps in favor of Republican candidates.
5. REDMAP was wildly successful, with Republicans winning 18 of the 22 North Carolina House and Senate races targeted in 2010, and giving Republicans control of the both chambers of the General Assembly for the first time since 1870.
6. Republican leadership in the General Assembly immediately put these REDMAPpowered majorities to work in the 2011 redistricting process. Working out of the basement of the North Carolina Republican Party headquarters, a team led by Tom Hofeller drew legislative maps in secret. The goal was clear: to ensure durable Republican majorities in each legislative delegation, regardless of the desires of North Carolina voters.
7. The REDMAP-derived Republican majorities passed the Hofeller-drawn plans without a single Democrat in support, with the express goal of entrenching Republican legislative dominance. The 2011 plans did exactly that. In elections in 2012, 2014, and 2016, the percentage of seats won by Republicans in the House, Senate, and Congressional delegations greatly exceeded the Republican vote share statewide. The 2011 state Legislative plans were struck down as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. at 176-78. The Covington court found that the Legislature's proffered explanation for the maps as necessary for Voting Rights Act compliance was unjustified. Id. at 168-69. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision. 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). A similar finding was made concerning two Congressional districts in Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 604 (M.D.N.C. 2016), and was also affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017).
8. In the immediate aftermath of the Covington decision, before remedial maps undoing the unconstitutional gerrymanders could be passed, the Republican-dominated General

Assembly reached for alternate means to entrench their political power. The day after the Supreme Court affirmed the Covington decision, the General Assembly placed a constitutional amendment on the ballot to authorize a voter ID law in North Carolina. The amendment was rife with procedural irregularities, including complete silence as to implementation of the amendment. After the amendment referendum narrowly passed, the outgoing legislature (and its soon-to-disappear Republican supermajority) passed racially discriminatory legislation implementing the amendment. This legislation was vetoed by the Governor, but the Governor's veto was subsequently overridden in a last act of the Republican supermajority in a lame duck session just before a legislature elected under remedial maps would enter office. The amendment was later struck down as intentionally discriminatory on the basis of race. Final Judgment and Order, Holmes v. Moore, No. 18-CVS-15292 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2021).

## 2. After the 2011 Plans Were Struck Down, the Legislature Drew Remedial Maps in 2017 and Again Attempted to Entrench Their Political Power.

84. The Legislature sought to defend the subsequently enacted 2017 Plans exclusively as partisan gerrymanders. Republican leaders made repeated public statements about their partisan intentions, and grounded their legal defense of the maps in the theory that partisan gerrymandering was explicitly allowable under both the U.S. and North Carolina Constitutions. After a two-week trial, a three-judge panel struck down the 2017 state Legislative maps as unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. Common Cause v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *404-05. Shortly thereafter, the 2017 Congressional maps were also enjoined as unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. Harper v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 122, at *24-25 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019).

## 3. The Legislative Defendants Have Continued This Cycle of Gerrymandering By Enacting Partisan Gerrymandered State Legislative and Congressional Maps.

85. The 2021 Enacted Maps all passed along party lines. The State House map, HB976, passed the House on a strict party line vote, with 67 Republican Representatives in favor and 49 Democratic Representatives opposed. HB976 also passed the Senate on a strict party line vote, with 25 Republican Senators in favor and 21 Democratic Senators opposed.
86. The State Senate map, SB739, passed the Senate on a strict party line vote, with 26 Republican Senators in favor and 19 Democratic Senators opposed. SB739 also passed the House on a strict party line vote, with 65 Republican Representatives in favor and 49 Democratic Representatives opposed.
87. The Congressional map, SB740, passed the Senate on a strict party line vote, with 27 Republican Senators in favor and 22 Democratic Senators opposed. SB740 also passed the House on a strict party line vote, with 65 Republican Representatives in favor and 49 Democratic Representatives opposed.
88. Each of the maps were enacted with the intent to dilute the vote of and impede voters who support candidates not in the majority party in the General Assembly from electing their candidate of choice.
89. Each of the enacted maps will have an extreme and durable discriminatory effect on voters who prefer Democratic candidates.
90. The extreme partisan outcomes produced by each of the challenged maps cannot be explained by any neutral reason.

## D. The Three Challenged Maps Were Enacted with the Intent to Discriminate Against Voters Who Support Democratic Candidates.

91. Legislative Defendants' claims that they did not use political data are belied by the fact that simulations demonstrate that plans produced without partisan data almost never produce the outcomes seen in the enacted plans.
92. Moreover, Legislative Defendants acknowledged they would not be enforcing the "rule" that partisan and racial data not be used. Upon information and belief, numerous Republican legislators brought with them into the map-drawing room papers upon which they relied in drawing district lines on the public terminals, and the poor audio quality of the livestream made it impossible for the public to hear many of the conversations held between Republican legislators and their staffers.
93. Given the Legislative Defendants' defiant rejection of the rules the North Carolina Supreme Court has imposed on redistricting; the inconsistency between their claims of a transparent process with the opacity of the process that actually occurred; and their failure to meaningfully exclude members from using political data, an inference of improper intent is supported by the circumstantial evidence.

## Congressional Districts at Issue

94. The Congressional map (SB740) demonstrates cracking and packing of Democratic-performing areas that would not be possible without utilizing political data (or a deep familiarity with the politics of certain areas, which belies the claims of not using any partisan data).
95. While the entire design of the Congressional map is necessary to effectuating the unconstitutional and discriminatory effect orchestrated by Legislative Defendants, the following districts exemplify the packing and cracking strategies used - strategies that highlight the intentional manipulation of district lines in order to achieve unconstitutional goals.
96. In Congressional District 2, the Legislature purposefully excluded Greenville in Pitt County - despite splitting Pitt County to include a microscopic portion of the county in District 2 - in order to undermine Democratic and Black voting strength in this Congressional District. Substantial portions of Greenville, a heavily Black and Democratic city widely known as such to anyone with a passing familiarity of the state's political geography, have historically been included in that Congressional district, long represented by the candidate of choice of Black voters even though it has, for years, never needed to achieve majority-Black status in order to provide Black voters the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.
97. Instead of including Greenville, as has historically been done, the Legislature instead chose to add Caswell and Person Counties to Congressional District 2, counties that are overwhelmingly White and overwhelmingly Republican. Again, to believe that map drawers would not be aware of the racial and political implications of this significant change would require abandonment of all common sense and logic, and an assumption that North Carolina legislators do not understand the state's political geography at all.
98. These changes to Congressional District 2 dramatically reduce the BVAP in the district, from $42.38 \%$ to $39.99 \%$, likely destroying a functioning crossover district and dramatically decreasing the Black political performance of the district, leading the Cook Political Report to list this district as a "Toss Up."35
99. Likewise, in Congressional District 4, the Sandhills counties of Cumberland and Sampson Counties are joined with non-Sandhill counties of Harnett and Johnston Counties, which are Triangle suburb counties, and a heavily Republican portion of Wayne County. This decision

[^130]effectively frustrates the ability of Democratic and Black voters in Fayetteville (Cumberland County), widely known to be such, by submerging those voters within a district of heavily White and conservative areas. In court-ordered remedial districts in 2016 and 2019, Cumberland County was never joined with Harnett or Johnston Counties.
100. The Triangle region was subject to extreme packing and cracking in order to effectuate partisan gerrymandering in that region. Wake County, which is overwhelmingly Democratic, is split into 3 different districts in order to prevent the natural emergence of a third Democratic leaning district in the county.
101. The image below demonstrates that Democratic voters are packed into Congressional District 5. The remainder of Democratic voters in the county are cracked, with half being assigned to the already heavily Democratic district (Congressional District 6) based in Orange and Durham County and the rest being stranded in a Republican-leaning, Triad-based district (Congressional District 7). Such surgical packing and cracking would not be possible without partisan data and an intense familiarity with the political characteristics of the precincts in Wake County - familiarity that Legislative Defendants had.

102. The Triad region saw some of the most egregious cracking strategies and gross disregard for communities of interest. As the image below demonstrates, the heavily Black and heavily Democratic Guilford County was cracked into 3 districts - Congressional District 11, Congressional District 7 and Congressional District 10.

[REST OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
103. The cracking of Black voters in Guilford County was also done with near surgical precision and presents strong evidence of the Legislative Defendants' intentional racial discrimination in violation Article I, Section 19. ${ }^{36}$

104. Black and Democratic voters are stranded in Republican districts reaching, to the west, out to Watauga County and, to the east, into Wake County - regions that have nothing in common with Guilford County. This cracking also belies the expected defense that maps that favor Republicans are caused by the fact that Democrats choose to congregate in urban areas. If those areas are egregiously cracked, as seen above, that plainly cannot be a plausible, non-discriminatory reason for the extreme partisan outcomes produced by the enacted Congressional maps.
105. In Mecklenburg County, a pattern of cracking and packing emerges as Democratic voters were packed into Congressional District 9 and cracked between the remaining two Republican leaning Congressional Districts 8 and 13. Such surgical packing and cracking would

[^131]not be possible without partisan data and an intense familiarity with the political characteristics of the precincts in Mecklenburg County - familiarity that Legislative Defendants had.

106. Plaintiff Common Cause has members who are voters who identify as Black in each of the above districts.
107. Plaintiff Common Cause has members who are voters who prefer Democratic Congressional candidates in each of the above districts.

## Senate Districts at Issue

108. The Senate Map demonstrates cracking and packing of Democratic-performing areas that would not be possible without political data (or a deep familiarity with the politics of certain areas, which belies the claims of not using any partisan data).
109. While the entire design of the Senate map is necessary to effectuating the unconstitutional and discriminatory effect orchestrated by Legislative Defendants, the following districts exemplify the packing and strategies used - strategies that highlight the intentional manipulation of district lines in order to achieve the unconstitutional goals. They likewise demonstrate the racially discriminatory efforts at play.
110. The Legislature was presented with two possible clusters for a district in Northeast North Carolina (for a seat currently held by Sen. Ernestine Bazemore). The two cluster options are represented below:

111. Legislative Defendants asserted that both cluster options were legal. The cluster at the top (D1, which includes Carteret, Pamlico, Washington, Chowan, Hyde, Dare, Perquimans, and Pasquotank counties) would have maintained a performing crossover district that allowed

Black voters to elect their candidate of choice in eastern North Carolina. The cluster below (D2, which includes Carteret, Pamlico, Washington, Chowan, Hyde, Martin, Halifax, and Warren counties) would destroy the ability of Black voters to elect their candidate of choice and ensure the defeat of their current preferred representative, Senator Bazemore. Legislative Defendants were warned that the selecting the second cluster would dramatically reduce the BVAP in the district and would destroy an effective crossover district. They destroyed it anyway, and offered no other justification.
112. Cumberland County presents another example where heavily Black and heavily Democratic areas were packed and cracked with near-surgical precision to create Senate Districts 19 and 21.

113. The correlation of these lines to the make-up of BVAP also presents strong evidence of intentional racial discrimination in violation of Article I, Section 19.

[REST OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
114. In Wake County, the Legislature drew Senate districts that cracked Democratic voters into various senate districts (SD $15,16,17$ ) within the county, while packing them into others (SD 14). This would only be possible with the utilization of political data or a deep familiarity with the political makeup of Wake County, either of which belies the Legislative Defendants' claims that partisan data was not used to draw districts.

[REST OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
115. The Legislature also drew maps that explicitly followed the contours of the Black electorate in Wake County, especially in Senate District 14 and Senate District 18. The precise way that these districts were drawn is only possible by looking at racial data.

[REST OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
116. In Guilford County, the Legislature also surgically cracked Democratic voters into various Senate districts (SD 27 and 28) in a manner that is not possible without looking at political data.

117. In Mecklenburg/Iredell Counties, map drawers intentionally double-bunked Senator Marcus in Senate District 37, which leadership later unsuccessfully attempted to use as a bargaining chip to garner Democratic support for their gerrymanders. Map drawers also purposefully drew two Republican-influence districts in the north and south of Mecklenburg County first, and then proceeded to pack all remaining Democratic areas together, in order to increase the influence of Republican voters overall.


## State House Districts at Issue

118. The State House Map demonstrates cracking and packing of Democraticperforming areas that would not be possible without political data (or a deep familiarity with the politics of certain areas, which belies the claims of not using any partisan data).
119. While the entire design of the State House map is necessary to effectuating the unconstitutional and discriminatory effect orchestrated by Legislative Defendants, the following districts exemplify the packing and strategies used - strategies that highlight the intentional manipulation of district lines in order to achieve the unconstitutional goals. They likewise demonstrate the racially discriminatory efforts at play.
120. The Legislature was presented with two possible clusters for a House district based in Wayne County (for a seat currently held by Rep. Raymond Smith). The two cluster options are represented below:

121. Legislative Defendants asserted that both cluster options were legal. The cluster to the right (B2) would have had a better chance of maintaining a performing crossover district that allowed Black voters to elect their candidate of choice and would have better respected communities of interest. The cluster to the left (B1) would destroy the ability of Black voters to elect their candidate of choice and ensure the defeat of their current preferred representative, Representative Smith. Legislative Defendants were warned that the selecting the cluster on the left would reduce the BVAP in the district and would destroy an effective crossover district. They destroyed it anyway.
[REST OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
122. In Wake County, House District 35 also demonstrates all the hallmarks of a partisan gerrymander. While the district is still anchored in Wake Forest, the district shifted substantially to capture the most conservative VTDs in this part of Wake County. It is simply not plausible that such a district, presenting one of the few configurations of VTDs that would enable a Republican to win in north Wake County, was created without relying on partisan data.

123. In Buncombe County, Legislative Defendants drew House Districts 114, 115, and 116 along precise partisan lines to give Republicans an opportunity to win one of the county's three districts. In order to achieve this, House District 116 loops around the perimeter of the county, staying out of Asheville in order to sweep up the most Republican-leaning areas. The degree to
which House District 116 steers clear of predominantly Democratic VTDs would not be possible without considering partisan data.

124. In Mecklenburg County, the House district lines closely mirror the partisan breakdowns of the county, particularly at the northern and southern ends of the county. House District 98 in the northern part of the county skirts around Democratic VTDs to keep the district as Republican as possible; House District 103 does the same along the southern border of the county. House District 104 also weaves through southern Mecklenburg County, picking up as many Republican-leaning VTDs as possible to give Republicans a chance to win the district. None of these configurations would be possible without considering partisan data.

[REST OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
125. In a similar vein, the Legislature drew House districts within Mecklenburg County that cracked Black voters into a myriad of different districts, breaking apart communities of interest.

126. In Forsyth County, the Legislature drew maps that cracked Democratic voters into various House districts, some that break apart communities of interest, specifically House Districts 72 and 91 . This cracking is only possible if political data was utilized in drawing these districts.

127. Similar to the partisan cracking described above, the Legislature also cracked Black voters in Forsyth County between Districts 71 and 72, drawing district lines in a manner that followed the contours of the Black electorate in northwest Forsyth.

128. Similar to Forsyth County, the Legislature also cracked Guilford County Democratic voters, specifically in the western part of the county.

129. In a similar vein, the Legislature also cracked the Black electorate in Guilford

County splitting communities of interest in the eastern part of the county.

130. In Cumberland County, the Legislature also cracked Democratic voters in a similar manner to Forsyth and Guilford Counties. Democratic voters on the eastern side of the county are split into four different districts in order to dilute the power of Democratic voters in the eastern part of the county overall.

131. The Legislature also cracked the Black electorate between House Districts 42 and 43, but packed Black voters into District 44. The only way that these lines could be drawn was by looking at racial data.


## E. The Challenged Maps Will Have a Durable and Extreme Discriminatory Effect.

132. The enacted maps produce political outcomes that are extreme statistical outliers and political outcomes of the elections are unlikely to change even in swing election years - that is, they are very effective partisan gerrymanders.
133. The Congressional Map is likely to elect 10 Republicans and 4 Democrats, although Congressional District 2 has now been rated a Toss Up district, so it is entirely possible that the map will elect 11 Republicans and 3 Democrats. This is a $71.4 \%-78.6 \%$ Republican control of the Congressional delegation in a state where most statewide elections are very close to 50-50.
134. Likewise, in the Senate, the districts are drawn to ensure that Republicans cannot lose a majority in the Senate, and should they pick up just a few seats (in the small number of competitive seats to begin with), they could likely restore their supermajority. That is, again, in a 50-50 state, Republicans would be poised to control at least three-fifths or more of the Senate.
135. Similarly, in the State House, the district lines are drawn so that it is essentially impossible for Democrats to obtain a majority in that chamber, despite the fact that North Carolina is an evenly divided state. The number of Republicans elected to the State House would, through the entire decade of use of this map, be expected to greatly exceed and outperform their statewide vote share.

## F. No Other Neutral Reason Explains the Extreme Partisan Discrimination.

136. No purported reason that might be offered to explain the extreme partisan gerrymander is plausible or factual.
137. To the extent that Democratic voters are concentrated in urban areas, that did not require Legislative Defendants to crack Democratic and Black voters in Guilford County or to crack Democratic voters in Wake County congressional districts, as an example.
138. The Whole County Provision likewise does not require or produce the extreme partisan outcomes observed in the three challenged maps. Repeatedly, when Legislative Defendants chose between county clusters that they said were legal, they consistently chose the clusters that would perform better for Republicans and worse for Democrats (and often the clusters that would perform worse for Black voters). Moreover, within the clusters, the line-drawing was designed to maximize Republican advantage.
139. And even if, hypothetically, the leadership of the North Carolina General Assembly had not chosen to intentionally destroy a number of performing crossover districts in violation of Art. 1, Section 19 as they did, these maps would still be extreme partisan gerrymanders.

## G. Legislative Defendants Timed their Redistricting Process to Evade Judicial Review and Stifle Public Input.

140. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.
141. On February 12, 2021, the U.S. Census Bureau announced that its release of P.L. 94-171 redistricting data would be delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and would not be released until the fall of 2021. ${ }^{37}$ On February 24, 2021, the North Carolina State Board of Elections Executive Director Karen Brinson Bell advised the House Elections Law and Campaign Finance Reform Committee that this delay would require an election schedule change in light of the time required to prepare for candidate filing and ballot styles. Director Brinson Bell advised the Committee to move the 2022 primary to a May 3 primary, July 12 second primary, and November 8 general election. ${ }^{38}$
142. The North Carolina General Assembly did not respond to Director Brinson Bell's recommendation to postpone the March 2022 primaries to May 3. The General Assembly did, however, extend the schedule for municipal elections for those municipalities similarly impacted by the Census delay. See S.B. 722, S.L. 2021-56 (2021).
143. The Legislative Defendants thereafter unnecessarily and intentionally narrowed the window for public engagement in redistricting by waiting until the last moment to plan and begin the redistricting process. This delay caused avoidable confusion and obstructed the opportunity for meaningful public comment.

[^132]144. Despite having received notice in February 2021 from the U.S. Census Bureau about the delays in releasing Census data, and the resulting impact on election schedules, the Redistricting Chairs failed to convene any meetings of the Redistricting Committees to plan for the 2021 redistricting until the eve of Census data's release in August of 2021. The Redistricting Chairs and Redistricting Committees failed to propose any schedule for the redistricting process or notice of public comment related to the redistricting process, and failed to publicly propose or consider redistricting criteria, until the first meeting on August 5, 2021. Any and all of these steps could have been taken at any point after the Long Session was convened in January 2021.
145. When the Redistricting Committees finally met on August 5, 2021, the Redistricting Chairs initiated an unnecessarily rushed and disorganized redistricting process that has stifled public comment and lent uncertainty to what could have been an organized and predictable process. For example:
a. The Redistricting Chairs released proposed redistricting criteria on August 9, 2021, and provided the public less than 24-hours-notice to attend an 8:30am, in-person only hearing on a weekday (August 10, 2021) for public comment on the proposed redistricting criteria. ${ }^{39}$ The Redistricting Committees then voted to accept that criteria barely three days (August 12) after it was first proposed.
b. The Redistricting Chairs waited until September 1 to announce a schedule for public hearings, held from September 8 through September 30, 2021.

[^133]These hearings were ineffectively noticed, including errors in location that caused confusion and obstructed public comment. For example, the Redistricting Chairs provided the wrong location information in the notice for the September 8, 2021 hearing in Caldwell County, telling the public it was to be held at Caldwell County Community College when it was actually being held miles away at the JE Broyhill Civic Center. There was low turnout at this hearing, and several individuals who had signed up to speak at this hearing did not appear when called.
c. As compared to prior redistricting cycles, the Redistricting Committees provided materially less opportunities for public comment and involvement by holding only 13 public hearings as compared to over 60 hearings held in the 2011 cycle.
d. The Redistricting Chairs announced the aforementioned required county groupings from the Duke Academic Paper on October 5, 2021, without any prior discussion or opportunity for public input.
e. The Redistricting Chairs failed to provide the public or Legislatures with any schedule for drawing maps, or even a deadline by which maps would need to be proposed, lending uncertainty and unnecessary delay in the mapdrawing process. As of noon on October 29, 2021, Legislators were still drawing proposed maps and no deadline or schedule for the submission or vote on proposed maps had been announced by the Redistricting Chairs. Upon information and belief, Defendant Hise was revising a proposed

Senate map on October 28 in a meeting for which there was no prior public notice.
f. The Redistricting Chairs provided less than three business days' notice of two public hearings on proposed maps on October 25 and 26, 2021, failing to make all the maps that would be considered available for public view when available. For example, Senate map "SST-4" was, upon information and belief, drafted by October 14, but was not publicly available until October 19 and was published without any public announcement. House map "HBK-1" was not public until the afternoon of Friday, October 22, with no public announcement. Overall, Legislative Defendants provided the public with just three days to review and analyze a total of ten maps.
g. The House Redistricting Committee continued to schedule map drawing sessions up until November 3, 2021, even though on October 28, notice was provided - and later rescinded by - the House Committee on Rules, Calendar, and Operations for House Bill 976 ("HB976") titled House Redistricting Plan 2021 without a corresponding map. Later that day, the House Redistricting committee gave notice that HB976 would be heard on November 1 still with no corresponding map. In the afternoon of October 29, the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections provided notice to hear three proposed redistricting bills: Senate Bill 737 ("SB737") titled Congressional Redistricting Plan 2021-CCH-6, Senate Bill 738 ("SB737") titled Congressional Redistricting Plan 2021-CST-8, and Senate Bill 740 ("SB740") titled Congressional Redistricting Plan 2021/CST-13, for

November 1 at 9:00am. On October 29, the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections sent notice to hear Senate Bill ("SB739") titled Senate Redistricting 2021-SST-13 for November 2.
h. On November 1, the Redistricting Chairs asked committee members to vote no on SB738 and SB740, the two Congressional maps drawn by Democrat members, the two Congressional maps drawn by Democrat members.
i. The Redistricting Chairs continued the pattern of providing the public or Legislatures with confusing and inadequate notice on November 1 when the House Redistricting committee postponed hearing HB976 three times in less than three hours.
146. By designing a process that stifled public comment and caused uncertainty and unnecessary chaos to the redistricting process, the delay caused by Legislative Defendants will have severe consequences for voters' ability to elect candidates of their choice.
147. Pursuant to Sections 6 and 7 of Article II of the North Carolina Constitution, candidates for North Carolina House and Senate must have resided in the district for one year immediately prior to the General Election. The General Election occurs on November 8, 2022, and thus candidates must reside in their district starting on November 8, 2021. Due to Legislative Defendants' unjustified delay in convening the Redistricting Committees until August, the implementation of a confusing and uncertain public comment process, and the late adoption of final redistricting maps, potential candidates had insufficient time to change their residency if required by changes in the final maps. The inability of potential candidates to meet residency requirements due to late-adopted maps will impede the ability for voters of color, including the voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause, to elect candidates of their choice.
148. Upon information and belief, Legislative Defendants acted to ensure that members of their political party would not be mal-impacted by the one-year residency requirement, and gave forewarning to Legislators of their political party who they anticipated would be impacted by district lines long before the Redistricting Committees were convened in August 2021. Upon information and belief, Senator McInnis moved residencies in mid-2021, before the Redistricting Committees were convened, in order to avoid double bunking when a new Senate map would be enacted. ${ }^{40}$
149. Legislative Defendants also deliberately misrepresented public testimony offered during the public hearings held in September 2021, before draft maps had been released, in an attempt to justify their maps when they were voted on in November. Member of the public that provided comment consistently asked for an end to gerrymandering, and further requested that lawmakers adhere to state and federal law, including those such as the VRA meant to protect voters of color. However, Legislative Defendants cherry picked and misrepresented testimony, and specifically testimony of Black residents, in order to justify their unlawful districts. For example, in a November 1, 2021 Senate Redistricting Committee meeting, Defendant Daniel asserted that public input from Moore County resident Maurice Holland Jr. informed the formation of a "Sandhills" district in the Congressional map. However, Mr. Holland spoke specifically in favor of proposed Congressional map CBK-4 which grouped Moore, Hoke, Cumberland, Scotland, Robeson, and parts of Harnett and Richmond counties together, ${ }^{41}$ while SB740 trisects this county

[^134]grouping through the middle between Congressional Districts 3, 4 and $8 .{ }^{42}$ Mr. Holland also spoke against proposed Senate Map SST- $4,{ }^{43}$ calling districts 21 and 22 in Moore and Cumberland county "extreme," and against proposed House Map HBK-11 (dividing Moore County into 3 districts). ${ }^{44}$ But the Enacted maps drawn and proposed by Legislative Defendants directly contradict Mr. Holland's expressed wishes; the Senate Map largely retains the "extreme" districts in SD 21 and SD19, and the House map still trisects Moore County between HD 51, HD 78, and HD 52. This misrepresentation of public testimony gives rise to an inference of bad faith.
150. Overall, the actions of Legislative Defendants, or lack thereof, have caused significant uncertainty for potential candidates running for legislative office to the detriment of the candidates of choice for voters of color, and while acting to insulate members of their own party. Upon information and belief, Legislative Defendants' unnecessarily delay and chaotic process will prevent voters of color from electing candidates of their choice due to the burden and uncertainty currently facing new candidates. Upon information and belief, Legislative Defendants' delay will also restrain Plaintiff from educating their members and voters on who is running for legislative office in a timely manner.

## CLAIM I

## DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

151. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs.

[^135]152. The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment statutes, N.C.G.S. Chapter 1, Article 26, expressly allows for the determination of legal rights, and must be liberally construed and administered to afford "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." N.C.G.S. §§ 1-254, 1-264. Where a declaratory judgment claim is premised on "issues of great public interest," the court should "adopt and apply the broadened parameters of a declaratory judgment action." Hoke Cty Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 615-16 (2004).
153. Article I, Section 3 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that the rights of the people of North Carolina "shall be exercised in pursuance of law and consistently with the Constitution of the United States." Article I, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits a law or ordinance in North Carolina from contravening the federal Constitution. Together, these provisions "delineate[] the interplay between federal and state law." Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 370. As applied to redistricting, "the State retains significant discretion when formulating legislative districts so long as the 'effect' of districts created pursuant to the 'whole county' criterion or other constitutional requirement does not dilute minority voting strength in violation of federal law." Id.
154. Legislative Defendants have adopted redistricting criteria that prohibit the use of racial data, and have repeatedly asserted - incorrectly - that applicable law does not require the consideration of racial data to ensure compliance with the North Carolina Constitution or other applicable law.
155. Legislative Defendants have further mandated the use of designated county clusters for state Senate and House maps that destroyed effective crossover districts, in violation of Article I, Section 19, without ensuring compliance with North Carolina Constitutional requirements and following the unequivocal instructions for the redistricting process articulated in Stephenson $v$. Bartlett. Legislative Defendants have asserted themselves, and through counsel, that state law does
not require them to undertake the first step in Stephenson by making the analysis of racial data necessary to ascertain what districts are required by the VRA (including prohibiting intentional racial discrimination, also required by Article I, Section 19) before drawing all others.
156. The intentional action, and inaction, by Legislative Defendants has created insecurity and uncertainty as to the rights of the members and voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause that will result in, and which indicate an intent to cause, violations of their fundamental right to fair representation and freedom from intentional discrimination.
157. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory ruling that Plaintiff and its members and the voters it serves are entitled to, and Legislative Defendants have a duty to undertake, a redistricting process that adheres the requirements of Article II, Sections 3 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution as set forth in Stephenson v. Bartlett, including a requirement to undertake the analysis of racial data necessary to ascertain what districts are required by the VRA.
158. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides for further relief "whenever necessary or proper." N.C.G.S. § 1-259.
159. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring the North Carolina General Assembly to adhere to the requirements of Article II, Sections 3 and 5, as set forth in Stephenson v. Bartlett, and specifically to perform a meaningful attempt to determine whether there are any districts compelled by the VRA, which, at a minimum, requires the consideration of racial data to understand changing demographics and performing a racially polarized voting analysis where the racial demographics indicate potential VRA problems before designating county clusters required in Senate and House legislative maps.
160. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive relief enjoining SBE Defendants from administering any election utilizing the districts set forth in SB739 and HB976 and/or enjoining
the SBE Defendants from administering the Statewide Primary elections until Legislative Defendants or the General Assembly have fulfilled their duty under Stephenson.

## CLAIM II

## INTENTIONAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 19 OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION

161. Plaintiff relies herein upon all of the paragraphs of this Complaint.
162. The Equal Protection Clause, Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, states that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin." This provision prevents a state and its officials from discriminatorily or arbitrarily treating qualified voters differently on account of their race or skin color.
163. North Carolina's Equal Protection Clause affords broader protections to its citizens in the voting rights context than the U.S. Constitution's equal protection provisions. See Stephenson v. I, 355 N.C. at 376-80, 381 n.6; Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 523 (2009).
164. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that " $[\mathrm{i}] \mathrm{t}$ is well settled in [North Carolina] that the right to vote on equal terms is a fundamental right." Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. To that end, North Carolina's Equal Protection Clause protects the right to "substantially equal voting power." Id. at 379 .
166. Legislative Defendants' intentional discrimination against Plaintiff's members of color and the voters of color that Plaintiff serves in devising state Legislative maps is plain: Legislative Defendants' deliberately and intentionally orchestrated a redistricting process that unlawfully and blatantly disregarded express direction from the North Carolina Supreme Court in

Stephenson v. Bartlett, with the intent and effect of preventing lawmakers from protecting voters of color from harm in the redistricting process.
167. Any reasonable legislature, including the Legislative Defendants, could have surmised that prohibiting any formal use of racial data in the drawing or consideration of maps and that failing to undertake the analysis of racial data set forth under Stephenson would lead to and have the clear and unavoidable effect of - the intentional destruction of functioning crossover districts for voters of color and reduce their ability to elect candidates of their choice, thus disproportionately limiting their ability to elect candidates of choice as compared to White voters. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 227-28 ("[T]he removal of public assistance IDs in particular was suspect, because a reasonable legislator would be aware of the socioeconomic disparities endured by African Americans and could have surmised that African Americans would be more likely to possess this form of ID" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Upon information and belief, Legislative Defendants intentionally orchestrated an unlawful redistricting process that prohibited any other member from formally considering or using the data needed to prevent the destruction of effective districts for voters of color or the drawing of district lines that would disproportionately reduce the ability of voters of color to elect their candidates of choice.
168. Furthermore, by enacting and implementing SB740, SB739, and HB976, Defendants have purposefully discriminated against Black voters as alleged in the above paragraphs. A motivating purpose behind SB740, SB739, and HB976 was to undermine the voting power of Black voters and reduce Black representation in the Legislature. At the time these laws were enacted, the General Assembly had before it evidence that Black voters would be harmed by these laws due to packing and cracking in certain areas within these maps. The Legislature enacted SB740, SB739, and HB976 with minimal public debate and on an extremely and unnecessarily
compressed legislative schedule, with the bills passing both houses of the Legislature only days after their submission.
169. Racially polarized voting exists in North Carolina, both historically and today, such that the race of voters correlates with the selection of certain candidate or candidates. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 225-26 (noting African American voters overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates). Any reasonable legislator, including Legislative Defendants, would understand this correlation. Upon information and believe, Legislative Defendants sought to target and discriminate against voters of color in order to receive the "political payoff" that would result from the racially polarized voting. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 222.
170. Both the discriminatory effect of these statutes and their legislative history are relevant factors in analyzing them for discriminatory intent. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
171. A motivating purpose behind Legislative Defendants' intent to orchestrate their unlawful redistricting process, and in the Legislature's drawing and enactment of SB740, SB739, and HB976, was to draw districts that will not provide Black voters, including the members and voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause, an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, will dilute the voting power of Black voters, and will make it more difficult for these voters to elect their candidates of choice across the state.
172. Legislative Defendants' unlawful redistricting process and the enacted maps SB740, SB730, and HB976 will undermine and/or prevent the ability of Black voters, including the members and voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause, to elect their candidates of choice as they are able to under current benchmark state Legislative districts, as specified in the above paragraphs.
173. Legislative Defendants' designated county clusters for state Legislative maps, and the enacted maps in SB740, SB739, and HB976 intentionally and impermissibly discriminate against the members and voters of color served by Plaintiff, and Defendants advance no legitimate or compelling government interest to justify this discrimination.

## CLAIM III

## PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING VIOLATION OF FREE ELECTIONS CLAUSE OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION

174. Plaintiff relies herein upon all of the paragraphs of this Complaint.
175. The Free Elections Clause in Article I, Section 10 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that "All elections shall be free."
176. The will of the people plays a fundamental role in North Carolina's democratic government. See People ex re. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198, 220 (1875) ("Our government is founded on the will of the people. Their will is expressed by the ballot."). North Carolina's "is a government of the people, in which the will of the people - the majority - legally expressed, must govern." State ex rel. Quinn v. Lattimore, 120 N.C. 426, 428 (1897) (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 2). Furthermore, there is a "compelling interest" of the state "in having fair, honest elections." State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 184 (1993).
177. Accordingly, the Free Elections Clause requires that elections be conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people. This is a fundamental right of the citizens enshrined in the North Carolina Declaration of Rights, a compelling governmental interest, and a cornerstone of North Carolina's democratic form of government. Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *337-38.
178. Partisan gerrymandering is the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power. Ariz. State Legislature v. Indep.

Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015). It operates through vote dilution, i.e., the devaluation of one citizen's vote as compared to others, because they are likely to vote for the other party.
179. Partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution because such claims fall within the broad, default category of constitutional cases the North Carolina courts are empowered and obliged to decide on the merits, and not within the narrow category of exceptional cases covered by the political question doctrine. Furthermore, partisan gerrymandering does not involve a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 717 (2001). Furthermore, there are satisfactory and manageable criteria and standards for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims under the North Carolina Constitution. Hoke Cty Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 639 (2004).
180. Extreme partisan gerrymandering that entrenches politicians in power is contrary to the fundamental right of North Carolina citizens to have elections conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people. "Elections are not free when partisan actors have tainted future elections by specifically and systematically designing the contours of the election districts for partisan purposes and a desire to preserve power." Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *344 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
181. SB740, SB739, and HB976 were designed, specifically and systematically, to maintain at least Republican majorities in the state House and Senate and to provide at least a majority of Congressional seats to Republicans. This was achieved by drawing maps in which it was nearly impossible for Democrats to win majorities in either state Legislative chamber or a majority of Congressional seats in any reasonably foreseeable electoral environment.
182. In drawing and enacting SB740, SB739, and HB976, Defendants ensured that it is nearly impossible for the will of the people to be expressed through their votes for State legislators and sought instead to predetermine election outcomes in specific districts and county groupings, as set forth above. Defendants, with the intent to control and predetermine the outcome of state Legislative and Congressional elections for the purpose of retaining partisan power in the General Assembly and to send a majority of Republicans to Congress in North Carolina's Congressional Delegation, manipulated district boundaries resulting in extreme gerrymandering, subordinating traditional redistricting criteria, so that the resulting maps cracked and packed voters to achieve these partisan objectives.
183. Defendants' actions do not serve any legitimate government interest, and are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
184. Accordingly, in drawing and enacting SB740, SB739, and HB976, individually and collectively, Defendants have violated the Free Elections Clause by depriving North Carolina citizens the right to the vote for General Assembly members and Congresspersons in elections that are conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the people.
185. Defendants' actions have also harmed Plaintiff, its members and the voters it serves and other voters in North Carolina, by subverting their right, as guaranteed by the Free Elections Clause and provided for in Article I, § 9 of the North Carolina Constitution, to seek a "redress of grievances and for amending and strengthening the law," as Democratic voters in North Carolina cannot meaningfully seek to redress their grievances or amend the laws consistent with their policy preferences when they cannot obtain a majority of the General Assembly.

## CLAIM IV

## PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 19 OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION

186. Plaintiff relies herein upon all of the paragraphs of this Complaint.
187. The Equal Protection Clause of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees to all North Carolinians that " $[\mathrm{n}] \mathrm{o}$ person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." N.C. Const., art. I, § 19.
188. The Equal Protection Clause protects the right to "substantially equal voting power." Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 379. The right to vote on equal terms is a "fundamental right." Id. at 379.
189. Partisan gerrymandering violates the State's obligation to provide all persons with equal protection of law because, by seeking to diminish the electoral power of supporters of a disfavored party, a partisan gerrymander treats individuals who support candidates of one political party less favorably than individuals who support candidates of another party. Common Cause v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *346; cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) ("The concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially.").
190. In drawing and enacting SB740, SB739, and HB976, Defendants intended to deprive citizens of the right to vote on equal terms based on partisan classification in an invidious manner and/or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective. Defendants intended to hamper, rather than to achieve, fair and effective representation for all citizens in drawing and enacting SB740, SB739, and HB976. Defendants subordinated Democratic voters by devaluing their vote as compared to the votes of Republican voters with at least the partial purpose, and in the alternative the predominant purpose, of entrenching the Republican Party by drawing district lines in individual districts and statewide.
191. Defendants' actions have the effect of silencing the political voice of voters who support Democratic candidates, including members and voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause, by virtue of district lines that crack or pack those voters, as set forth in the paragraphs above, thereby depriving them of substantially equal voting power in an effort to entrench the Republican party in power, in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
192. As a result, voters who prefer Democratic candidates, including the members and voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause, are significantly hindered from meaningfully participating in the decision-making process of government because SB740, SB739, and HB976 were drawn to systematically prevent Democrats from obtaining a majority in either chamber of the General Assembly or sending a majority of Democrats to Congress as part of North Carolina Congressional Delegation.
193. SB740, SB739, and HB976 also deprive Democratic voters in their districts, as alleged above, such that their votes, when compared to the votes of Republican voters, are substantially less likely to ultimately matter in deciding election results. Defendants' partisan gerrymandering further harms voters, including the Common Cause members and voters who support Democratic candidates, by insulating legislators from popular will and rendering them unresponsive to portions of their constituencies.
194. Defendants' actions in partisan gerrymandering are not justified by any legitimate state interest or other neutral factor, nor are they narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. Rather, Defendants acted with intent, unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective, to classify voters and deprive citizens of the right to vote on equal terms by subordinating Democratic voters to Defendants' partisan goals, and this intent was the predominant purpose of drawing the district lines in individual districts and statewide, set forth
above. Defendants' actions have the effect of depriving disfavored voters in North Carolina of substantially equal voting power and the right to vote on equal terms, as well as substantially equal legislative representation.

## CLAIM V

## PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 12, 14 OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION

195. Plaintiff relies herein upon all of the paragraphs of this Complaint.
196. The Freedom of Speech Clause in Article I, Section 14 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that "[f]reedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained." The Freedom of Assembly Clause in Article I, Section 12 provides, in relevant part, that " $[t]$ he people have a right to assemble together to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the General Assembly for redress of grievances." In North Carolina, the right of assembly encompasses the right of association. Feltman v. City of Wilson, 238 N.C. App. 246, 253 (2014).
197. Voting for the candidate of one's choice and associating with the political party of one's choice are core means of political expression protected by the North Carolina Constitution's Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Assembly Clauses. Voting provides citizens a direct means of expressing support for a candidate and his views. See Common Cause v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, at *365; Buckley v. Valeo, 42 U.S. 1 (1976).
198. The Freedom of Assembly Clause independently protects Common Cause members and voters who support Democratic candidates, and their association with the Democratic Party.
199. By partisan gerrymandering, Defendants identified Republican voters as preferred speakers and targeted Democratic voters, including members and voters served by Plaintiff

Common Cause, as disfavored speakers for disfavored treatment because of disagreement with the views they express when they vote. In doing so, they have rendered disfavored speech less effective, and have intentionally engaged in viewpoint discrimination against Democratic voters, including members and voters served by Plaintiff Common Cause.
200. SB740, SB739, and HB976 also burden the ability of Plaintiff's members and the voters it serves who are Democratic voters to associate effectively, as guaranteed under Article I, $\S 12$, by precluding them from instructing their representatives, and reducing their ability to apply to the General Assembly for redress of grievances. As a result of the partisan gerrymanders, Democratic voters across the states will be unlikely to obtain redress from the General Assembly on important policy issues because they will unlikely be able to obtain Democratic majorities in the General Assembly. Plaintiff Common Cause likewise cannot instruct representatives or obtain redress on the issues central to its mission due to the gerrymanders.
201. Defendants' actions do not serve any legitimate government interest, and are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
202. SB740, SB739, and HB976 also impermissibly retaliate against Plaintiff's members and the voters it serves who are Democratic voters by (1) taking adverse action against them by diluting their votes and the votes of the Common Cause members and voters who support Democratic candidates, and (2) being created by Defendants with an intent to retaliate against their protected speech or conduct based on their voting history. Furthermore, Defendants would not have taken this adverse action, specifically cracking and packing Democratic voters to dilute their votes, but for that retaliatory intent.

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following relief:
a. Convene a court of three judges pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1;
b. Declare Plaintiff's and its members and the voters it serves legal right to be free from redistricting that violates the North Carolina Constitution, as set forth in the paragraphs above;
c. Declare Legislative Defendants' duty to undertake a redistricting process that complies with the requirements of Article II, Sections 3 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution, as described in Stephenson v. Bartlett and as set forth in the paragraphs above;
d. Declare that the process orchestrated by Legislative Defendants in 2021, including the use of redistricting criteria that prohibited the formal use of racial data in the construction or consideration of state Legislative districts, requirement to utilize the Duke Senate Clusters and Duke House Clusters, and/or failure to ascertain and draw districts required by the VRA prior to all others violate Article II, Sections 3 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution;
e. Declare that the process orchestrated by Legislative Defendants in 2021, including the use of redistricting criteria that prohibited the formal use of racial data in the construction or consideration of state Legislative districts, requirement to utilize the Duke Senate Clusters and Duke House Clusters, and/or failure to ascertain and draw districts required by the VRA prior to all others violate Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution;
f. Declare that the harms to Black voters from the intentional destruction of effective crossover districts within SB739 and HB976 resulted from an unconstitutional redistricting process and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the North Carolina Constitution;
g. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of districts that harm Black voters by intentionally destroying effective crossover districts within SB739 and HB976, including an injunction barring Defendants from conducting any further elections for the North Carolina General Assembly under these racially discriminatory districts.
h. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of districts that reflect partisan gerrymanders in violation of the North Carolina Constitution in SB739, SB740, and HB976.
i. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from creating any future Legislative districts with the purpose or effect of burdening or penalizing an identifiable group, a political party, or individual voters based on their political beliefs, political party membership, registration, affiliations or political activities, or voting histories;
j. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from using "political data" in any future redistricting process to burden or penalize an identifiable group, a political party, or individual voters based on their political beliefs, political-party membership, registration, affiliations or political activities, or voting histories;
k. Establish new state House, Senate, and federal Congressional districts that comply with the North Carolina Constitution if the North Carolina General Assembly fails to timely enact new plans comporting with the North Carolina Constitution;

1. Issue any further injunctive relief necessary to delay the state Legislative and Congressional primary elections to allow for fulsome judicial review of the allegations herein and prevent irreparable harm to voters, as alleged herein;
m. A prompt hearing and/or expedited pleading schedule;
n. Award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees, if just and proper;
o. Make all further orders as are just, necessary, and proper; and
p. Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted, this the 13th day of December, 2021.


Allison J. Riggs (State Bar No. 40028)
allison@southerncoalition.org
Hilary H. Klein (State Bar No. 53711)
hilaryhklein@scsj.org
$\begin{aligned} & \text { Mitchell Brown (State Bar No. 56122) } \\ & \text { Mitchellbrown@scsj.org } \\ & \text { Katelin Kaiser (State Bar No. 56799) } \\ & \text { Katelin@scsj.org } \\ & \text { Jeffrey Loperfido (State Bar No. 52939) } \\ & \text { jeffloperfido@scsj.org }\end{aligned}$
Southern Coalition for Social Justice
1415 W. Highway 54, Suite 101
Durham, NC 27707
Telephone: 919-323-3909
Facsimile: 919-323-3942
J. Tom Boer* (D.C. Bar No. 469585;

CA Bar. No. 199563)
tom.boer@hoganlovells.com
Olivia T. Molodanof* (CA Bar No.
328554)
olivia.molodanof@hoganlovells.com
*Pro Hac Vice motion filed
contemporaneously with this complaint
Hogan Lovell US LLP
3 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1500
San Francisco, California 94111
Telephone: 415-374-2300
Facsimile: 415-374-2499
Counsel for Plaintiff Common Cause

## VERIFICATION

1, Bob Phillips, serve as Executive Director of Common Cause North Carolina, and hereby state that my organization, Common Cause, is the Proposed Plaintiff Intervenor in the above-titled action, that I have read the contents of the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT, and that the contents therein are true and accurate as they pertain to Common Cause, except to those matters stated on information and belief, which I believe to be true.


Sworn and subscribed before me this the $\qquad$ 12 day of December, 2021.


Name:


My commission expires: $11 / 6 / 2024$

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the undersigned has this day submitted a copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR COMMON CAUSE in the above titled action by mail and/or electronic mail, in the manner requested, to the following parties:

David J. Bradford Jenner \& Block LLP
353 North Clark Street
Chicago, IL 60654
dbradford@jenner.com
Sam Hirsch
Jessica Ring Amunson
Kali Bracey
Zachary C. Schuaf
Karthik P. Reddy
Urja Mittal
Jenner \& Block LLP
1099 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20001
shirsch@jenner.com
zschauf@jenner.com
Stephen D. Feldman
Robinson, Bradshaw \& Hinson, P.A.
434 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1600
Raleigh, NC 27501
sfeldman@robinsonbradshaw.com
Adam K. Doerr
Robinson, Bradshaw \& Hinson, P.A.
101 North Tryon Street, Suite 1900
Charlotte, NC 28246
adoerr@robinsonbradshaw.com
Erik R. Zimmerman
Robinson, Bradshaw \& Hinson, P.A.
1450 Raleigh Road, Suite 100
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
ezimmerman@robinsonbradshaw.com
Counsel for North Carolina League of
Conservation Voters, INC., et al. Plaintiffs

Burton Craige
Narendra K. Ghosh
Paul E. Smith
Patterson Harkavy LLP
100 Europa Dr., Suite 420
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
bcraige@pathlaw.com
nghosh@pathlaw.com
psmith@pathlaw.com
Marc E. Elias
Aria C. Branch
Lalitha D. Madduri
Jacob D. Shelly
Graham W. White
Elias Law Group LLP
10 G. Street NE, Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20002
MElias@elias.law
ABranch@elias.law
LMadduri@elias.law
JShelly@elias.law
GWhite@elias.law
Abha Khanna
Elias Law Group LLP
1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2100
Seattle, Washington 98101
AKhanna@elias.law
Elisabeth S. Theodore
R. Stanton Jones

Samuel F. Callahan
Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
601 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001
elisabeth.theodore@arnoldporter.com
Counsel for Rebecca Harper, et al. Plaintiffs

Phillip J. Strach
Thomas A. Farr
Alyssa M. Riggins
Nelson Mullins Riley \& Scarborough
LLP
4140 Parklake Avenue, Suite 200
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612
phillip.strach@nelsonmullins.com
tom.farr@nelsonmullins.com
alyssa.riggins@nelsonmullins.com
Mark E. Braden
Katherine McKnight
Richard Raile
Baker Hostetler LLP
1050 Connecticut Ave NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20036
mBraden@,bakerlaw.com
kmcknight@bakerlaw.com
rraile@bakerlaw.com
Counsel for Legislative Defendants

This the $15^{\text {th }}$ day of December, 2021.

Terence Steed
Special Deputy Attorney General
Stephanie A. Brennan
Special Deputy Attorney General
Amar Majmundar
Senior Deputy Attorney General
NC Department of Justice
P.O. Box 629

Raleigh, NC 27602
tsteed@ncdoj.gov
sbrennan@ncdoj.gov
amajmundar@ncdoj.gov
Counsel for the State Defendants

Exhibit 1 North Carolina Congressional Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2019 (Session Law 2019-249)

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | G.K. Butterfield | Black | Democratic | $51.03 \%$ | $42.38 \%$ | $4.89 \%$ | $1.25 \%$ | $54.65 \%$ | $43.76 \%$ |
| 2 | Deborah Ross | White | Democratic | $64.24 \%$ | $20.97 \%$ | $8.40 \%$ | $1.02 \%$ | $62.36 \%$ | $34.97 \%$ |
| 3 | Gregory Murphy | White | Republican | $70.98 \%$ | $20.77 \%$ | $6.11 \%$ | $1.05 \%$ | $37.75 \%$ | $60.01 \%$ |
| 4 | David Price | White | Democratic | $60.85 \%$ | $26.11 \%$ | $8.50 \%$ | $1.02 \%$ | $65.70 \%$ | $32.13 \%$ |
| 5 | Virginia Foxx | White | Republican | $84.80 \%$ | $9.61 \%$ | $3.83 \%$ | $0.76 \%$ | $32.22 \%$ | $65.47 \%$ |
| 6 | Kathy Manning | White | Democratic | $57.42 \%$ | $31.76 \%$ | $7.29 \%$ | $1.04 \%$ | $60.49 \%$ | $37.22 \%$ |
| 7 | David Rouzer | White | Republican | $73.63 \%$ | $17.75 \%$ | $6.68 \%$ | $1.51 \%$ | $40.68 \%$ | $57.00 \%$ |
| 8 | Richard Hudson | White | Republican | $63.48 \%$ | $25.29 \%$ | $8.06 \%$ | $1.77 \%$ | $45.92 \%$ | $51.59 \%$ |
| 9 | Dan Bishop | White | Republican | $63.85 \%$ | $18.68 \%$ | $6.45 \%$ | $8.88 \%$ | $44.57 \%$ | $53.18 \%$ |
| 10 | Patrick McHenry | White | Republican | $82.20 \%$ | $10.09 \%$ | $5.78 \%$ | $0.74 \%$ | $31.58 \%$ | $66.08 \%$ |
| 11 | Madison Cawthorn | White | Republican | $89.18 \%$ | $3.90 \%$ | $4.24 \%$ | $2.00 \%$ | $43.01 \%$ | $54.61 \%$ |
| 12 | Alma Adams | Black | Democratic | $47.73 \%$ | $35.77 \%$ | $11.77 \%$ | $1.11 \%$ | $68.00 \%$ | $29.33 \%$ |
| 13 | Tedd Budd | White | Republican | $78.09 \%$ | $13.64 \%$ | $6.61 \%$ | $0.96 \%$ | $32.60 \%$ | $65.25 \%$ |

North Carolina Congressional Districts enacted by the
Exhibit 2 North Carolina Legislature in 2021 (Session Law 2021-174)

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Gregory Murphy | White | Republican | 65.57\% | 23.31\% | 6.90\% | 2.13\% | 41.76\% | 56.04\% |
| 2 | G.K. Butterfield | Black | Democratic | 50.61\% | 39.99\% | 6.72\% | 2.25\% | 51.99\% | 46.38\% |
| 3 | David Rouzer | White | Republican | 67.31\% | 16.44\% | 6.90\% | 8.16\% | 41.39\% | 56.29\% |
| 4 | None |  |  | 53.99\% | 29.19\% | 11.95\% | 3.35\% | 46.21\% | 51.43\% |
| 5 | Deborah Ross | White | Democratic | 58.31\% | 24.47\% | 10.89\% | 1.90\% | 62.23\% | 35.19\% |
| 6 | David Price | White | Democratic | 54.50\% | 21.42\% | 10.01\% | 1.80\% | 71.60\% | 26.12\% |
| 7 | None |  |  | 69.34\% | 16.02\% | 10.37\% | 2.45\% | 41.27\% | 56.54\% |
| 8 | None |  |  | 66.72\% | 17.22\% | 8.29\% | 3.33\% | 40.63\% | 57.08\% |
| 9 | Alma Adams | Black | Democratic | 40.09\% | 37.95\% | 14.87\% | 1.95\% | 71.61\% | 25.72\% |
|  | Dan Bishop | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | Ted Budd | White | Republican | 68.88\% | 16.97\% | 8.02\% | 2.22\% | 38.26\% | 59.29\% |
|  | Richard Hudson | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | Virginia Foxx | White | Republican | 69.11\% | 19.97\% | 6.67\% | 2.06\% | 42.83\% | 54.92\% |
|  | Kathy Manning | White | Democratic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 | Patrick McHenry | White | Republican | 67.88\% | 17.86\% | 9.80\% | 2.25\% | 42.47\% | 55.16\% |
| 13 | None |  |  | 72.62\% | 15.43\% | 7.08\% | 2.29\% | 38.67\% | 59.04\% |
| 14 | Madison Cawthorn | White | Republican | 84.49\% | 3.96\% | 6.29\% | 3.46\% | 45.10\% | 52.44\% |

- Ex. 6842 -

North Carolina Senate Districts enacted by the North
Exhibit 3 Carolina Legislature in 2019 (Session Law 2019-219)

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Bob Steinburg | White | Republican | 66.87\% | 28.44\% | 3.15\% | 1.01\% | 42.77\% | 55.35\% |
| 2 | Norman W. Sanderson | White | Republican | 77.75\% | 15.83\% | 3.96\% | 1.04\% | 34.77\% | 63.02\% |
| 3 | Ernestine Bazemore | Black | Democratic | 51.04\% | 44.36\% | 3.43\% | 1.33\% | 52.88\% | 45.55\% |
| 4 | Milton F. 'Toby' Fitch Jr. | Black | Democratic | 46.15\% | 47.46\% | 4.53\% | 1.62\% | 58.31\% | 40.27\% |
| 5 | Don Davis | Black | Democratic | 59.81\% | 32.94\% | 5.17\% | 0.80\% | 52.72\% | 45.22\% |
| 6 | Michael A. Lazzara | Two or More Races | Republican | 71.18\% | 16.88\% | 8.55\% | 1.53\% | 33.93\% | 62.77\% |
| 7 | Jim Perry | White | Republican | 57.44\% | 33.93\% | 7.04\% | 0.83\% | 45.47\% | 52.81\% |
| 8 | Bill Rabon | White | Republican | 76.89\% | 16.91\% | 4.52\% | 1.45\% | 37.89\% | 60.00\% |
| 9 | Michael V. Lee | White | Republican | 79.69\% | 13.85\% | 4.35\% | 1.00\% | 48.71\% | 48.28\% |
| 10 | Brent Jackson | White | Republican | 64.14\% | 21.85\% | 12.50\% | 1.53\% | 36.12\% | 62.26\% |
| 11 | Lisa S. Barnes | White | Republican | 62.30\% | 28.04\% | 8.36\% | 1.02\% | 45.90\% | 52.09\% |
| 12 | Jim Burgin | White | Republican | 67.67\% | 19.67\% | 10.60\% | 1.63\% | 39.05\% | 58.61\% |
| 13 | Danny Earl Britt Jr. | White | Republican | 40.43\% | 26.37\% | 5.73\% | 27.42\% | 42.30\% | 56.20\% |
| 14 | Dan Blue | Black | Democratic | 49.07\% | 37.19\% | 9.69\% | 1.17\% | 72.87\% | 24.50\% |
| 15 | Jay J. Chaudhuri | Asian | Democratic | 67.14\% | 19.39\% | 9.62\% | 0.90\% | 59.66\% | 37.87\% |
| 16 | Wiley Nickel | White | Democratic | 69.12\% | 13.14\% | 7.60\% | 0.97\% | 64.24\% | 33.04\% |
| 17 | Sydney Batch | Black | Democratic | 76.71\% | 10.03\% | 5.62\% | 0.88\% | 53.48\% | 43.78\% |
| 18 | Sarah Crawford | Undesignated | Democratic | 65.34\% | 24.47\% | 7.94\% | 1.16\% | 51.32\% | 46.23\% |
| 19 | Kirk deViere | White | Democratic | 57.08\% | 31.69\% | 6.52\% | 3.19\% | 50.32\% | 47.24\% |
| 20 | Natalie S. Murdock | Black | Democratic | 41.30\% | 40.35\% | 12.10\% | 1.15\% | 82.11\% | 15.80\% |
| 21 | Ben Clark | Black | Democratic | 41.92\% | 42.15\% | 10.14\% | 4.12\% | 65.70\% | 31.47\% |
| 22 | Mike Woodard | White | Democratic | 59.74\% | 30.80\% | 7.13\% | 0.98\% | 58.50\% | 39.45\% |
| 23 | Valerie P. Foushee | Black | Democratic | 73.73\% | 12.81\% | 7.81\% | 0.99\% | 67.12\% | 30.89\% |
| 24 | Amy S. Galey | White | Republican | 71.30\% | 19.63\% | 7.27\% | 1.07\% | 45.73\% | 52.29\% |
| 25 | Tom McInnis | White | Republican | 66.34\% | 25.89\% | 3.79\% | 3.35\% | 41.45\% | 56.68\% |
| 26 | David W. Craven Jr. | White | Republican | 76.55\% | 12.19\% | 8.24\% | 1.17\% | 29.99\% | 67.86\% |
| 27 | Michael Garrett | White | Democratic | 68.44\% | 22.39\% | 4.78\% | 0.87\% | 52.01\% | 45.69\% |
| 28 | Gladys A. Robinson | Black | Democratic | 45.63\% | 43.64\% | 6.58\% | 1.24\% | 74.06\% | 23.69\% |
| 29 | Steve Jarvis | White | Republican | 82.13\% | 10.24\% | 5.64\% | 0.87\% | 27.86\% | 69.99\% |
| 30 | Phil Berger | White | Republican | 80.13\% | 15.22\% | 3.55\% | 0.82\% | 31.59\% | 66.27\% |
| 31 | Joyce Krawiec | White | Republican | 67.38\% | 22.08\% | 9.19\% | 0.91\% | 45.18\% | 52.50\% |
| 32 | Paul A. Lowe Jr. | Black | Democratic | 63.69\% | 25.50\% | 8.26\% | 0.82\% | 57.93\% | 39.60\% |
| 33 | Carl Ford | White | Republican | 79.12\% | 14.25\% | 4.90\% | 0.76\% | 29.98\% | 67.62\% |
| 34 | Vickie Sawyer | White | Republican | 82.06\% | 10.12\% | 5.86\% | 0.72\% | 30.57\% | 66.94\% |
| 35 | Todd Johnson | White | Republican | 76.06\% | 12.31\% | 9.29\% | 0.87\% | 36.36\% | 61.28\% |
| 36 | Paul Newton | White | Republican | 76.38\% | 14.10\% | 7.19\% | 0.75\% | 41.80\% | 55.62\% |
| 37 | Jeff Jackson | White | Democratic | 74.43\% | 14.09\% | 6.96\% | 0.72\% | 55.66\% | 41.68\% |
| 38 | Mujtaba A. Mohammed | Asian | Democratic | 36.74\% | 50.03\% | 7.42\% | 1.07\% | 77.85\% | 19.47\% |
| 39 | DeAndrea Salvador | Black | Democratic | 58.05\% | 20.38\% | 14.26\% | 0.92\% | 60.28\% | 37.01\% |
| 40 | Joyce Waddell | Black | Democratic | 37.68\% | 40.34\% | 18.27\% | 1.40\% | 71.06\% | 26.31\% |

Exhibit 3

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 41 | Natasha R. Marcus | White | Democratic | 63.55\% | 25.90\% | 6.39\% | 0.96\% | 59.99\% | 37.43\% |
| 42 | Dean Proctor | White | Republican | 82.98\% | 8.03\% | 5.95\% | 0.68\% | 29.45\% | 68.18\% |
| 43 | Kathy Harrington | White | Republican | 78.37\% | 14.75\% | 4.93\% | 0.89\% | 35.58\% | 62.12\% |
| 44 | W. Ted Alexander | White | Republican | 81.82\% | 13.30\% | 3.62\% | 0.66\% | 30.64\% | 67.28\% |
| 45 | Deanna Ballard | White | Republican | 91.31\% | 2.64\% | 4.87\% | 0.68\% | 32.49\% | 65.06\% |
| 46 | Warren Daniel | White | Republican | 88.12\% | 5.82\% | 3.78\% | 0.79\% | 27.57\% | 70.15\% |
| 47 | Ralph Hise | White | Republican | 90.41\% | 5.33\% | 3.08\% | 0.83\% | 30.14\% | 67.81\% |
| 48 | Chuck Edwards | White | Republican | 89.65\% | 3.16\% | 5.43\% | 0.99\% | 41.36\% | 56.30\% |
| 49 | Julie Mayfield | White | Democratic | 85.57\% | 7.12\% | 5.15\% | 1.04\% | 61.00\% | 36.31\% |
| 50 | Kevin Corbin | White | Republican | 90.20\% | 1.38\% | 3.15\% | 4.87\% | 34.28\% | 63.43\% |

- Ex. 6844 -

North Carolina Senate Districts enacted by the North Carolina Legislature in 2021 (Session Law 2021-173)

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Ernestine Bazemore | Black | Democratic | 63.29\% | 29.49\% | 3.97\% | 2.16\% | 45.48\% | 52.72\% |
| 2 | Norman W. Sanderson | White | Republican | 63.13\% | 30.01\% | 3.14\% | 2.99\% | 44.73\% | 53.53\% |
|  | Bob Steinburg | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | Jim Perry | White | Republican | 63.59\% | 26.66\% | 6.00\% | 1.86\% | 41.36\% | 56.65\% |
| 4 | Milton F. 'Toby' Fitch Jr. | Black | Democratic | 52.04\% | 35.02\% | 10.02\% | 2.04\% | 47.24\% | 51.11\% |
| 5 | Don Davis | Black | Democratic | 50.59\% | 40.35\% | 6.02\% | 1.66\% | 56.05\% | 41.97\% |
| 6 | Michael A. Lazzara | Two or More Races | Republican | 65.71\% | 15.33\% | 12.50\% | 3.11\% | 33.38\% | 63.19\% |
| 7 | Michael V. Lee | White | Republican | 77.33\% | 12.19\% | 6.13\% | 1.97\% | 49.06\% | 47.94\% |
| 8 | Bill Rabon | White | Republican | 77.25\% | 14.38\% | 4.41\% | 2.87\% | 37.77\% | 60.24\% |
| 9 | Brent Jackson | White | Republican | 61.22\% | 23.76\% | 11.97\% | 3.03\% | 39.16\% | 59.10\% |
| 10 | None |  |  | 66.76\% | 16.73\% | 13.18\% | 2.47\% | 36.94\% | 60.71\% |
| 11 | Lisa S. Barnes | White | Republican | 53.77\% | 36.65\% | 7.05\% | 2.02\% | 50.30\% | 47.96\% |
| 12 | Jim Burgin | White | Republican | 62.08\% | 20.74\% | 13.25\% | 2.97\% | 39.93\% | 57.77\% |
| 13 | None |  |  | 66.35\% | 21.29\% | 7.78\% | 1.89\% | 47.75\% | 49.95\% |
| 14 | Dan Blue | Black | Democratic | 37.44\% | 43.25\% | 15.41\% | 2.26\% | 72.04\% | 25.61\% |
| 15 | Jay J. Chaudhuri | Asian | Democratic | 67.68\% | 14.91\% | 7.55\% | 1.59\% | 67.19\% | 30.04\% |
| 16 | Wiley Nickel | White | Democratic | 55.90\% | 8.82\% | 7.00\% | 1.34\% | 62.24\% | 35.15\% |
| 17 | Sydney Batch | Black | Democratic | 72.99\% | 10.86\% | 8.55\% | 1.93\% | 48.81\% | 48.38\% |
| 18 | Sarah Crawford | White | Democratic | 58.66\% | 22.83\% | 11.94\% | 1.90\% | 63.57\% | 33.74\% |
| 19 | Kirk deViere | White | Democratic | 35.69\% | 48.07\% | 10.23\% | 3.73\% | 64.71\% | 32.66\% |
| 20 | Natalie S. Murdock | Black | Democratic | 54.99\% | 27.34\% | 10.32\% | 1.91\% | 70.77\% | 27.18\% |
| 21 | None |  |  | 66.07\% | 19.56\% | 8.60\% | 3.47\% | 39.03\% | 58.79\% |
| 22 | Mike Woodard | White | Democratic | 44.71\% | 34.45\% | 14.37\% | 2.18\% | 77.50\% | 20.47\% |
| 23 | Valerie P. Foushee | Black | Democratic | 66.84\% | 16.73\% | 7.51\% | 2.02\% | 64.73\% | 33.26\% |
| 24 | Danny Earl Britt Jr. | White | Republican | 33.85\% | 29.63\% | 8.35\% | 28.23\% | 48.56\% | 49.56\% |
|  | Ben Clark | Black | Democratic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 | Amy S. Galey | White | Republican | 67.42\% | 17.93\% | 10.89\% | 2.59\% | 39.84\% | 58.17\% |
| 26 | Phil Berger | White | Republican | 73.04\% | 17.44\% | 5.13\% | 2.10\% | 36.73\% | 61.13\% |
| 27 | Michael Garrett | White | Democratic | 56.15\% | 27.32\% | 7.84\% | 1.95\% | 59.36\% | 38.25\% |
| 28 | Gladys A. Robinson | Black | Democratic | 33.55\% | 51.45\% | 9.72\% | 2.17\% | 75.05\% | 22.81\% |
| 29 | David W. Craven Jr. | White | Republican | 68.82\% | 17.86\% | 9.20\% | 2.80\% | 32.72\% | 65.17\% |
|  | Tom McInnis | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 | Steve Jarvis | White | Republican | 80.42\% | 9.21\% | 6.44\% | 2.43\% | 26.69\% | 71.12\% |
| 31 | Joyce Krawiec | White | Republican | 76.75\% | 12.11\% | 6.74\% | 2.27\% | 36.92\% | 60.72\% |
| 32 | Paul A. Lowe Jr. | Black | Democratic | 46.63\% | 35.30\% | 14.28\% | 2.22\% | 68.06\% | 29.49\% |
| 33 | Carl Ford | White | Republican | 74.09\% | 14.88\% | 7.18\% | 2.44\% | 29.98\% | 67.62\% |
| 34 | Paul Newton | White | Republican | 62.84\% | 20.02\% | 10.20\% | 2.24\% | 43.47\% | 53.88\% |
| 35 | Todd Johnson | White | Republican | 70.65\% | 11.79\% | 11.05\% | 2.00\% | 36.09\% | 61.58\% |
| 36 | None |  |  | 85.61\% | 4.48\% | 7.17\% | 2.05\% | 23.26\% | 74.60\% |

Exhibit 4

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 37 | Natasha R. Marcus | White | Democratic | 77.15\% | 11.19\% | 6.72\% | 1.88\% | 34.88\% | 62.62\% |
|  | Vickie Sawyer | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 38 | Mujtaba A. Mohammed | Asian | Democratic | 47.38\% | 34.95\% | 9.72\% | 1.75\% | 63.84\% | 33.48\% |
| 39 | DeAndrea Salvador | Black | Democratic | 34.02\% | 40.75\% | 17.55\% | 2.22\% | 71.02\% | 26.31\% |
| 40 | Joyce Waddell | Black | Democratic | 25.47\% | 49.54\% | 18.92\% | 2.14\% | 81.07\% | 16.36\% |
| 41 | Jeff Jackson | White | Democratic | 69.65\% | 10.79\% | 8.12\% | 1.54\% | 49.50\% | 47.92\% |
| 42 | None |  |  | 58.43\% | 21.59\% | 13.02\% | 1.81\% | 63.91\% | 33.24\% |
| 43 | Kathy Harrington | White | Republican | 69.62\% | 18.57\% | 7.59\% | 2.43\% | 36.50\% | 61.19\% |
| 44 | W. Ted Alexander | White | Republican | 78.82\% | 13.14\% | 4.64\% | 2.15\% | 29.87\% | 68.05\% |
| 45 | Dean Proctor | White | Republican | 79.30\% | 7.49\% | 7.59\% | 2.46\% | 28.82\% | 68.83\% |
| 46 | Warren Daniel | White | Republican | 84.64\% | 4.85\% | 5.61\% | 2.84\% | 35.35\% | 62.24\% |
| 47 | Deanna Ballard | White | Republican | 87.62\% | 3.63\% | 5.10\% | 2.17\% | 36.05\% | 61.47\% |
|  | Ralph Hise | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 48 | Chuck Edwards | White | Republican | 83.02\% | 5.51\% | 7.88\% | 2.20\% | 35.09\% | 62.81\% |
| 49 | Julie Mayfield | White | Democratic | 80.61\% | 7.29\% | 7.20\% | 2.37\% | 63.19\% | 34.09\% |
| 50 | Kevin Corbin | White | Republican | 85.96\% | 1.98\% | 4.67\% | 6.31\% | 35.39\% | 62.35\% |

North Carolina House Districts enacted by the North
Exhibit 5 Carolina Legislature in 2019 (Session Law 2019-220)

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Edward C. Goodwin | White | Republican | 57.23\% | 39.71\% | 1.93\% | 0.76\% | 45.25\% | 53.12\% |
| 2 | Larry Yarborough | White | Republican | 65.76\% | 27.79\% | 5.28\% | 1.12\% | 41.27\% | 56.64\% |
| 3 | Steve Tyson | White | Republican | 69.92\% | 21.24\% | 5.41\% | 1.02\% | 40.95\% | 56.55\% |
| 4 | Jimmy Dixon | White | Republican | 62.43\% | 22.93\% | 13.63\% | 0.99\% | 35.16\% | 63.12\% |
| 5 | Howard J. Hunter III | Native American | Democratic | 51.26\% | 44.32\% | 2.75\% | 1.21\% | 54.09\% | 44.35\% |
| 6 | Bobby Hanig | White | Republican | 85.20\% | 9.20\% | 4.02\% | 1.01\% | 35.06\% | 62.80\% |
| 7 | Matthew Winslow | White | Republican | 65.95\% | 25.47\% | 7.65\% | 1.05\% | 41.58\% | 56.23\% |
| 8 | Kandie D. Smith | Black | Democratic | 51.89\% | 41.37\% | 4.63\% | 0.79\% | 59.32\% | 38.67\% |
| 9 | Brian Farkas | White | Democratic | 68.66\% | 24.69\% | 4.05\% | 0.70\% | 49.66\% | 48.12\% |
| 10 | John R. Bell IV | White | Republican | 68.98\% | 21.44\% | 7.95\% | 0.88\% | 32.32\% | 66.02\% |
| 11 | Allison A. Dahle | White | Democratic | 65.00\% | 16.51\% | 9.87\% | 1.21\% | 68.43\% | 28.15\% |
| 12 | Chris Humphrey | White | Republican | 56.88\% | 36.98\% | 5.23\% | 0.73\% | 47.21\% | 51.13\% |
| 13 | Pat McElraft | White | Republican | 85.84\% | 9.41\% | 2.75\% | 1.08\% | 30.17\% | 67.74\% |
| 14 | George G. Cleveland | White | Republican | 68.84\% | 17.78\% | 9.03\% | 1.56\% | 38.07\% | 58.35\% |
| 15 | Phil Shepard | White | Republican | 72.63\% | 14.93\% | 9.38\% | 1.58\% | 30.59\% | 66.00\% |
| 16 | Carson Smith | White | Republican | 70.37\% | 22.22\% | 4.58\% | 2.78\% | 36.49\% | 61.30\% |
| 17 | Frank Iler | White | Republican | 80.58\% | 13.16\% | 4.62\% | 1.27\% | 38.86\% | 59.00\% |
| 18 | Deb Butler | White | Democratic | 66.81\% | 25.97\% | 5.26\% | 1.20\% | 56.33\% | 40.30\% |
| 19 | Charles W. Miller | White | Republican | 86.81\% | 7.79\% | 3.69\% | 1.09\% | 40.55\% | 57.02\% |
| 20 | Ted Davis Jr. | White | Republican | 89.50\% | 4.73\% | 3.36\% | 0.76\% | 44.45\% | 52.76\% |
| 21 | Raymond E. Smith Jr. | Black | Democratic | 48.86\% | 39.00\% | 10.08\% | 1.41\% | 54.57\% | 43.66\% |
| 22 | William D. Brisson | White | Republican | 56.85\% | 31.49\% | 9.30\% | 2.42\% | 41.42\% | 57.01\% |
| 23 | Shelly Willingham | Black | Democratic | 44.85\% | 51.83\% | 2.78\% | 0.64\% | 59.44\% | 39.06\% |
| 24 | Linda Cooper-Suggs | Black | Democratic | 53.16\% | 38.11\% | 7.60\% | 0.64\% | 52.08\% | 46.45\% |
| 25 | James D. Gailliard | Black | Democratic | 55.05\% | 39.96\% | 3.32\% | 1.19\% | 53.90\% | 44.68\% |
| 26 | Donna McDowell White | White | Republican | 75.15\% | 14.79\% | 8.67\% | 0.92\% | 40.54\% | 56.81\% |
| 27 | Michael H. Wray | White | Democratic | 41.54\% | 53.71\% | 1.53\% | 3.11\% | 61.70\% | 37.02\% |
| 28 | Larry C. Strickland | White | Republican | 69.28\% | 16.52\% | 13.16\% | 1.09\% | 33.75\% | 64.23\% |
| 29 | Vernetta Alston | Black | Democratic | 42.28\% | 37.49\% | 12.41\% | 1.12\% | 85.98\% | 12.02\% |
| 30 | Marcia Morey | White | Democratic | 59.09\% | 28.74\% | 8.24\% | 0.88\% | 71.81\% | 26.13\% |
| 31 | Zack Hawkins | Black | Democratic | 31.89\% | 49.56\% | 14.99\% | 1.27\% | 80.31\% | 17.54\% |
| 32 | Terry E. Garrison | Black | Democratic | 44.97\% | 49.12\% | 4.13\% | 1.96\% | 61.75\% | 36.75\% |
| 33 | Rosa U. Gill | Black | Democratic | 41.61\% | 45.10\% | 12.01\% | 1.18\% | 72.93\% | 24.63\% |
| 34 | Grier Martin | White | Democratic | 76.66\% | 13.14\% | 7.03\% | 0.73\% | 57.89\% | 39.56\% |
| 35 | Terence Everitt | White | Democratic | 74.58\% | 16.24\% | 5.26\% | 0.80\% | 51.52\% | 46.06\% |
| 36 | Julie von Haefen | White | Democratic | 81.01\% | 7.74\% | 5.99\% | 0.93\% | 53.53\% | 43.73\% |
| 37 | Erin Paré | White | Republican | 76.16\% | 13.83\% | 6.76\% | 1.11\% | 47.85\% | 49.22\% |
| 38 | Abe Jones | Black | Democratic | 31.82\% | 48.30\% | 16.24\% | 1.39\% | 79.47\% | 18.14\% |
| 39 | James Roberson | Black | Republican | 49.29\% | 35.45\% | 12.40\% | 1.37\% | 65.66\% | 31.93\% |
| 40 | Joe John | White | Democratic | 76.23\% | 9.76\% | 3.99\% | 0.76\% | 55.14\% | 42.29\% |

- Ex. 6847 -

Exhibit 5

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 41 | Gale Adcock | White | Democratic | 69.66\% | 7.40\% | 4.09\% | 0.69\% | 60.51\% | 37.09\% |
| 42 | Marvin W. Lucas | Black | Democratic | 46.66\% | 39.67\% | 9.69\% | 2.05\% | 66.11\% | 30.90\% |
| 43 | Diane Wheatley | White | Republican | 57.73\% | 34.34\% | 4.25\% | 2.78\% | 48.04\% | 49.69\% |
| 44 | William O. Richardson | White | Democratic | 38.65\% | 45.91\% | 10.59\% | 2.13\% | 70.31\% | 26.98\% |
| 45 | John Szoka | White | Republican | 59.67\% | 27.44\% | 7.50\% | 3.96\% | 49.67\% | 47.88\% |
| 46 | Brenden H. Jones | White | Republican | 38.99\% | 27.01\% | 6.96\% | 27.31\% | 41.53\% | 57.15\% |
| 47 | Charles Graham | Native American | Democratic | 33.92\% | 24.48\% | 5.13\% | 36.00\% | 43.97\% | 54.46\% |
| 48 | Garland E. Pierce | Black | Democratic | 46.39\% | 36.13\% | 6.42\% | 10.62\% | 53.35\% | 44.34\% |
| 49 | Cynthia Ball | White | Democratic | 75.00\% | 13.29\% | 6.49\% | 0.93\% | 65.82\% | 31.52\% |
| 50 | Graig R. Meyer | White | Democratic | 71.28\% | 21.15\% | 4.96\% | 1.12\% | 56.45\% | 41.64\% |
| 51 | John Sauls | White | Republican | 64.51\% | 20.54\% | 12.94\% | 1.43\% | 42.99\% | 54.46\% |
| 52 | James L. Boles Jr. | White | Republican | 80.41\% | 12.96\% | 4.57\% | 1.23\% | 36.46\% | 61.58\% |
| 53 | Howard Penny Jr. | White | Republican | 68.96\% | 20.79\% | 7.97\% | 1.91\% | 37.42\% | 60.51\% |
| 54 | Robert T. Reives II | Black | Democratic | 71.96\% | 15.74\% | 8.79\% | 0.93\% | 60.23\% | 37.82\% |
| 55 | Mark Brody | White | Republican | 62.17\% | 28.64\% | 7.82\% | 0.94\% | 41.10\% | 56.83\% |
| 56 | Verla Insko | White | Democratic | 71.95\% | 10.30\% | 7.37\% | 0.90\% | 84.08\% | 13.81\% |
| 57 | Ashton Wheeler Clemmons | White | Democratic | 51.31\% | 38.36\% | 5.98\% | 1.09\% | 67.53\% | 30.29\% |
| 58 | Amos L. Quick III | Black | Democratic | 43.28\% | 39.97\% | 10.31\% | 1.41\% | 73.69\% | 23.86\% |
| 59 | Jon Hardister | White | Republican | 69.17\% | 25.17\% | 3.77\% | 1.08\% | 47.76\% | 50.26\% |
| 60 | Cecil Brockman | Black | Democratic | 50.25\% | 36.53\% | 6.99\% | 1.17\% | 63.05\% | 34.68\% |
| 61 | Pricey Harrison | White | Democratic | 54.10\% | 40.33\% | 3.39\% | 1.03\% | 72.57\% | 25.19\% |
| 62 | John Faircloth | White | Republican | 79.53\% | 11.45\% | 4.38\% | 0.77\% | 43.36\% | 54.26\% |
| 63 | Ricky Hurtado | Undesignated | Democratic | 62.96\% | 23.90\% | 11.49\% | 1.36\% | 50.02\% | 47.93\% |
| 64 | Dennis Riddell | White | Republican | 78.67\% | 13.98\% | 5.38\% | 0.81\% | 40.41\% | 57.69\% |
| 65 | Armor Pyrtle | White | Republican | 74.93\% | 19.63\% | 4.29\% | 0.86\% | 35.22\% | 62.68\% |
| 66 | Ben T. Moss Jr. | White | Republican | 66.01\% | 24.86\% | 6.19\% | 2.09\% | 40.30\% | 57.55\% |
| 67 | Wayne Sasser | White | Republican | 88.92\% | 6.91\% | 2.36\% | 0.68\% | 21.90\% | 75.81\% |
| 68 | David Willis | White | Republican | 84.13\% | 7.94\% | 4.62\% | 0.70\% | 36.47\% | 61.18\% |
| 69 | Dean Arp | White | Republican | 74.90\% | 11.45\% | 11.51\% | 0.93\% | 34.82\% | 62.83\% |
| 70 | Pat B. Hurley | White | Republican | 82.13\% | 6.30\% | 9.36\% | 1.06\% | 24.46\% | 73.34\% |
| 71 | Evelyn Terry | Black | Democratic | 41.53\% | 42.12\% | 15.29\% | 1.08\% | 70.03\% | 27.62\% |
| 72 | Amber M. Baker | Black | Democratic | 50.86\% | 39.02\% | 7.96\% | 0.91\% | 70.86\% | 26.75\% |
| 73 | Lee Zachary | White | Republican | 76.36\% | 13.23\% | 9.15\% | 0.72\% | 35.68\% | 61.93\% |
| 74 | Jeff Zenger | White | Republican | 81.38\% | 10.66\% | 4.56\% | 0.62\% | 46.62\% | 50.95\% |
| 75 | Donny Lambeth | White | Republican | 76.68\% | 13.13\% | 8.44\% | 0.94\% | 38.59\% | 59.04\% |
| 76 | Harry Warren | White | Republican | 69.45\% | 22.26\% | 6.46\% | 0.86\% | 39.97\% | 57.51\% |
| 77 | Julia C. Howard | White | Republican | 86.25\% | 7.29\% | 5.35\% | 0.73\% | 25.14\% | 72.58\% |
| 78 | Allen McNeill | White | Republican | 86.19\% | 6.51\% | 5.97\% | 1.10\% | 21.31\% | 76.67\% |
| 79 | Keith Kidwell | White | Republican | 70.17\% | 24.26\% | 4.64\% | 0.88\% | 36.03\% | 62.08\% |
| 80 | Sam Watford | White | Republican | 84.92\% | 8.41\% | 5.12\% | 0.92\% | 25.11\% | 72.73\% |

- Ex. 6848 -

Exhibit 5

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 81 | Larry W. Potts | White | Republican | 83.73\% | 9.14\% | 4.75\% | 0.86\% | 28.16\% | 69.65\% |
| 82 | Kristin Baker | White | Republican | 71.05\% | 17.78\% | 8.59\% | 0.75\% | 46.43\% | 50.98\% |
| 83 | Larry G. Pittman | White | Republican | 75.88\% | 14.05\% | 7.70\% | 0.80\% | 43.97\% | 53.28\% |
| 84 | Jeffrey C. McNeely | White | Republican | 78.43\% | 13.85\% | 6.11\% | 0.67\% | 31.15\% | 66.41\% |
| 85 | Dudley Greene | White | Republican | 91.46\% | 3.50\% | 3.70\% | 0.85\% | 24.66\% | 73.35\% |
| 86 | Hugh Blackwell | White | Republican | 85.67\% | 6.27\% | 4.43\% | 0.82\% | 31.82\% | 65.77\% |
| 87 | Destin Hall | White | Republican | 90.58\% | 4.87\% | 3.45\% | 0.73\% | 25.20\% | 72.50\% |
| 88 | Mary Belk | White | Democratic | 60.09\% | 21.98\% | 13.42\% | 0.86\% | 61.91\% | 35.33\% |
| 89 | Mitchell S. Setzer | White | Republican | 82.80\% | 8.61\% | 5.47\% | 0.70\% | 27.45\% | 70.33\% |
| 90 | Sarah Stevens | White | Republican | 90.02\% | 3.43\% | 5.54\% | 0.68\% | 25.08\% | 72.88\% |
| 91 | Kyle Hall | White | Republican | 90.10\% | 5.07\% | 3.88\% | 0.74\% | 23.53\% | 74.20\% |
| 92 | Terry M. Brown Jr. | Black | Democratic | 38.62\% | 43.03\% | 12.41\% | 1.12\% | 70.56\% | 26.72\% |
| 93 | Ray Pickett | White | Republican | 93.55\% | 1.59\% | 3.27\% | 0.77\% | 43.80\% | 53.25\% |
| 94 | Jeffrey Elmore | White | Republican | 88.84\% | 5.74\% | 4.15\% | 0.63\% | 23.60\% | 74.03\% |
| 95 | Grey Mills | White | Republican | 82.22\% | 9.85\% | 4.97\% | 0.84\% | 33.81\% | 63.53\% |
| 96 | Jay Adams | White | Republican | 80.04\% | 8.42\% | 7.83\% | 0.64\% | 35.16\% | 62.41\% |
| 97 | Jason Saine | White | Republican | 87.67\% | 5.67\% | 5.50\% | 0.68\% | 26.85\% | 70.83\% |
| 98 | John R. Bradford III | White | Republican | 83.37\% | 7.83\% | 5.53\% | 0.63\% | 47.66\% | 49.74\% |
| 99 | Nasif Majeed | Black | Democratic | 48.51\% | 35.59\% | 12.80\% | 1.27\% | 63.75\% | 33.65\% |
| 100 | John Autry | White | Democratic | 40.26\% | 34.70\% | 20.67\% | 1.34\% | 71.56\% | 25.49\% |
| 101 | Carolyn G. Logan | Black | Democratic | 40.71\% | 47.63\% | 7.48\% | 1.47\% | 71.84\% | 25.59\% |
| 102 | Becky Carney | White | Democratic | 40.46\% | 45.49\% | 10.75\% | 1.11\% | 77.54\% | 19.61\% |
| 103 | Rachel Hunt | White | Democratic | 74.36\% | 13.23\% | 7.08\% | 0.78\% | 52.58\% | 44.81\% |
| 104 | Brandon Lofton | White | Democratic | 74.55\% | 12.62\% | 8.80\% | 0.75\% | 53.53\% | 43.91\% |
| 105 | Wesley Harris | White | Democratic | 71.57\% | 11.67\% | 8.24\% | 0.73\% | 54.21\% | 43.15\% |
| 106 | Carla D. Cunningham | Black | Democratic | 35.68\% | 42.17\% | 12.13\% | 1.11\% | 81.71\% | 15.65\% |
| 107 | Kelly M. Alexander Jr. | Black | Democratic | 38.54\% | 49.04\% | 7.74\% | 1.04\% | 77.87\% | 19.69\% |
| 108 | John A. Torbett | White | Republican | 77.29\% | 16.47\% | 4.48\% | 0.91\% | 37.04\% | 60.60\% |
| 109 | Dana Bumgardner | White | Republican | 79.46\% | 12.76\% | 5.14\% | 0.84\% | 37.68\% | 59.92\% |
| 110 | Kelly E. Hastings | White | Republican | 81.74\% | 13.02\% | 4.04\% | 0.82\% | 27.31\% | 70.71\% |
| 111 | Tim Moore | White | Republican | 73.84\% | 22.55\% | 2.26\% | 0.67\% | 37.44\% | 60.71\% |
| 112 | David Rogers | White | Republican | 85.76\% | 10.23\% | 2.58\% | 0.79\% | 26.89\% | 71.17\% |
| 113 | Jake Johnson | White | Republican | 91.85\% | 3.20\% | 3.71\% | 0.86\% | 38.34\% | 59.62\% |
| 114 | Susan C. Fisher | White | Democratic | 89.34\% | 3.48\% | 5.18\% | 1.08\% | 57.75\% | 39.64\% |
| 115 | John Ager | White | Democratic | 86.81\% | 7.47\% | 3.67\% | 1.11\% | 59.71\% | 37.64\% |
| 116 | Brian Turner | White | Democratic | 84.53\% | 8.05\% | 5.24\% | 0.98\% | 58.38\% | 38.89\% |
| 117 | Timothy D. Moffitt | White | Republican | 85.91\% | 3.62\% | 8.35\% | 1.00\% | 39.43\% | 58.18\% |
| 118 | Mark Pless | White | Republican | 95.36\% | 1.12\% | 2.33\% | 0.92\% | 35.31\% | 62.41\% |
| 119 | Mike Clampitt | White | Republican | 84.59\% | 1.80\% | 3.51\% | 9.70\% | 43.80\% | 53.43\% |
| 120 | Karl E. Gillespie | White | Republican | 93.13\% | 1.12\% | 3.21\% | 2.11\% | 26.43\% | 71.63\% |

North Carolina House Districts enacted by the North
Exhibit 6 Carolina Legislature in 2021 (Session Law 2021-175)

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Edward C. Goodwin | White | Republican | 75.07\% | 18.16\% | 3.28\% | 2.03\% | 37.28\% | 60.76\% |
|  | Bobby Hanig | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | Larry Yarborough | White | Republican | 64.34\% | 24.39\% | 7.03\% | 2.09\% | 51.86\% | 46.07\% |
| 3 | Steve Tyson | White | Republican | 69.04\% | 20.18\% | 5.47\% | 1.97\% | 39.48\% | 58.25\% |
| 4 | Jimmy Dixon | White | Republican | 54.09\% | 25.59\% | 18.46\% | 2.15\% | 40.06\% | 58.63\% |
| 5 | Howard J. Hunter III | Native American | Democratic | 53.43\% | 38.59\% | 4.81\% | 2.31\% | 50.22\% | 48.09\% |
| 6 | None |  |  | 61.63\% | 20.71\% | 12.83\% | 3.43\% | 38.77\% | 58.54\% |
| 7 | Matthew Winslow | White | Republican | 66.08\% | 22.94\% | 7.86\% | 2.38\% | 42.48\% | 55.16\% |
| 8 | Kandie D. Smith | Black | Democratic | 44.26\% | 45.45\% | 7.21\% | 1.62\% | 62.87\% | 34.97\% |
| 9 | Brian Farkas | White | Democratic | 64.56\% | 25.63\% | 5.69\% | 1.86\% | 45.55\% | 52.34\% |
| 10 | John R. Bell IV | White | Republican | 55.16\% | 34.27\% | 6.78\% | 1.90\% | 45.31\% | 52.74\% |
|  | Raymond E. Smith Jr. | Black | Democratic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | Allison A. Dahle | White | Democratic | 60.32\% | 15.24\% | 11.19\% | 1.95\% | 67.68\% | 28.98\% |
| 12 | Chris Humphrey | White | Republican | 52.41\% | 38.48\% | 7.19\% | 1.72\% | 46.58\% | 51.94\% |
| 13 | Pat McElraft | White | Republican | 82.02\% | 8.84\% | 4.50\% | 2.48\% | 30.00\% | 67.76\% |
| 14 | George G. Cleveland | White | Republican | 62.04\% | 19.93\% | 11.16\% | 3.38\% | 38.07\% | 58.35\% |
| 15 | Phil Shepard | White | Republican | 66.85\% | 11.77\% | 14.95\% | 2.74\% | 31.02\% | 65.55\% |
| 16 | Carson Smith | White | Republican | 74.94\% | 13.84\% | 7.08\% | 2.90\% | 32.17\% | 65.25\% |
| 17 | Frank Iler | White | Republican | 80.52\% | 10.72\% | 5.15\% | 2.27\% | 38.32\% | 59.60\% |
| 18 | Deb Butler | White | Democratic | 65.36\% | 22.53\% | 7.80\% | 2.41\% | 58.01\% | 38.64\% |
| 19 | Charles W. Miller | White | Republican | 86.42\% | 5.45\% | 4.09\% | 2.31\% | 38.02\% | 59.61\% |
| 20 | Ted Davis Jr. | White | Republican | 85.16\% | 5.67\% | 4.80\% | 1.42\% | 44.29\% | 52.91\% |
| 21 | None |  |  | 71.64\% | 11.58\% | 8.52\% | 1.72\% | 52.74\% | 44.63\% |
| 22 | William D. Brisson | White | Republican | 54.65\% | 28.47\% | 13.31\% | 3.90\% | 41.51\% | 56.96\% |
| 23 | Shelly Willingham | Black | Democratic | 41.67\% | 53.41\% | 3.57\% | 1.39\% | 59.82\% | 38.77\% |
| 24 | Linda Cooper-Suggs | Black | Democratic | 50.09\% | 37.52\% | 9.84\% | 2.14\% | 50.72\% | 47.84\% |
| 25 | James D. Gailliard | Black | Democratic | 50.87\% | 41.00\% | 5.39\% | 2.04\% | 51.56\% | 46.97\% |
| 26 | Donna McDowell White | White | Republican | 67.10\% | 17.78\% | 11.36\% | 2.39\% | 40.99\% | 56.36\% |
| 27 | Michael H. Wray | White | Democratic | 41.39\% | 51.88\% | 2.36\% | 4.45\% | 62.25\% | 36.39\% |
| 28 | Larry C. Strickland | White | Republican | 64.29\% | 16.99\% | 16.18\% | 2.39\% | 33.19\% | 64.97\% |
| 29 | Vernetta Alston | Black | Democratic | 41.70\% | 39.58\% | 12.24\% | 1.91\% | 84.62\% | 13.38\% |
| 30 | Marcia Morey | White | Democratic | 43.50\% | 34.44\% | 13.38\% | 1.99\% | 85.71\% | 12.34\% |
| 31 | Zack Hawkins | Black | Democratic | 37.01\% | 39.72\% | 14.91\% | 2.33\% | 79.96\% | 17.73\% |
| 32 | Terry E. Garrison | Black | Democratic | 47.09\% | 43.24\% | 7.91\% | 1.70\% | 56.19\% | 42.19\% |
| 33 | Rosa U. Gill | Black | Democratic | 53.35\% | 30.91\% | 9.78\% | 1.61\% | 81.27\% | 16.35\% |
| 34 | Grier Martin | White | Democratic | 64.95\% | 19.18\% | 10.87\% | 1.53\% | 64.63\% | 32.70\% |
| 35 | Terence Everitt | White | Democratic | 71.79\% | 15.68\% | 6.52\% | 1.65\% | 47.12\% | 50.35\% |
| 36 | Julie von Haefen | White | Democratic | 68.95\% | 8.78\% | 7.58\% | 1.76\% | 54.76\% | 42.51\% |
| 37 | Erin Paré | White | Republican | 73.42\% | 12.62\% | 9.28\% | 2.16\% | 45.06\% | 52.05\% |
| 38 | Abe Jones | Black | Democratic | 33.91\% | 45.44\% | 16.56\% | 2.18\% | 73.92\% | 23.73\% |

Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_BIk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 39 | James Roberson | Black | Democratic | 47.76\% | 33.04\% | 15.03\% | 2.63\% | 58.86\% | 38.73\% |
| 40 | Joe John | White | Democratic | 75.44\% | 11.53\% | 5.61\% | 1.52\% | 56.32\% | 41.04\% |
| 41 | Gale Adcock | White | Democratic | 47.61\% | 8.60\% | 5.15\% | 1.12\% | 64.28\% | 33.24\% |
| 42 | Marvin W. Lucas | Black | Democratic | 39.90\% | 40.97\% | 13.54\% | 2.90\% | 65.74\% | 31.29\% |
| 43 | Diane Wheatley | White | Republican | 50.84\% | 36.68\% | 6.42\% | 4.31\% | 49.28\% | 48.41\% |
| 44 | William O. Richardson | White | Democratic | 29.79\% | 51.68\% | 12.44\% | 3.49\% | 70.35\% | 26.92\% |
| 45 | John Szoka | White | Republican | 50.27\% | 32.44\% | 9.50\% | 5.25\% | 48.37\% | 49.22\% |
| 46 | Brenden H. Jones | White | Republican | 51.15\% | 29.31\% | 3.72\% | 16.09\% | 40.08\% | 58.49\% |
| 47 | Charles Graham | Native American | Democratic | 25.08\% | 22.60\% | 10.16\% | 42.65\% | 45.18\% | 53.23\% |
| 48 | Garland E. Pierce | Black | Democratic | 42.04\% | 37.09\% | 8.59\% | 11.61\% | 53.35\% | 44.34\% |
| 49 | Cynthia Ball | White | Democratic | 61.81\% | 13.91\% | 6.43\% | 1.36\% | 64.93\% | 32.54\% |
| 50 | Graig R. Meyer | White | Democratic | 69.09\% | 18.48\% | 8.24\% | 2.39\% | 56.45\% | 41.64\% |
| 51 | John Sauls | White | Republican | 65.34\% | 16.73\% | 14.43\% | 2.67\% | 39.81\% | 58.01\% |
| 52 | James L. Boles Jr. | White | Republican | 66.24\% | 23.07\% | 5.44\% | 3.83\% | 42.53\% | 55.21\% |
|  | Ben T. Moss Jr. | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 53 | Howard Penny Jr. | White | Republican | 66.69\% | 19.65\% | 10.01\% | 2.74\% | 36.71\% | 61.09\% |
| 54 | Robert T. Reives II | Black | Democratic | 73.26\% | 11.60\% | 10.60\% | 2.14\% | 52.79\% | 45.36\% |
| 55 | Mark Brody | White | Republican | 62.10\% | 24.68\% | 10.02\% | 2.03\% | 39.86\% | 58.03\% |
| 56 | Verla Insko | White | Democratic | 64.80\% | 10.94\% | 8.11\% | 1.51\% | 84.08\% | 13.81\% |
| 57 | Ashton Wheeler Clemmons | White | Democratic | 44.28\% | 41.34\% | 7.35\% | 2.10\% | 67.53\% | 30.29\% |
| 58 | Amos L. Quick III | Black | Democratic | 34.62\% | 44.65\% | 13.03\% | 2.53\% | 72.95\% | 24.60\% |
| 59 | Jon Hardister | White | Republican | 63.07\% | 27.68\% | 5.44\% | 2.38\% | 45.99\% | 52.03\% |
| 60 | Cecil Brockman | Black | Democratic | 44.53\% | 36.15\% | 9.99\% | 2.12\% | 63.59\% | 34.16\% |
| 61 | Pricey Harrison | White | Democratic | 47.33\% | 42.32\% | 6.53\% | 1.66\% | 73.00\% | 24.78\% |
| 62 | John Faircloth | White | Republican | 70.84\% | 14.00\% | 5.86\% | 1.73\% | 43.22\% | 54.40\% |
| 63 | Ricky Hurtado | Undesignated | Democratic | 56.53\% | 25.45\% | 14.40\% | 2.99\% | 49.38\% | 48.58\% |
| 64 | Dennis Riddell | White | Republican | 70.80\% | 16.21\% | 8.96\% | 2.09\% | 40.81\% | 57.28\% |
| 65 | Armor Pyrtle | White | Republican | 72.79\% | 19.45\% | 5.16\% | 2.02\% | 34.98\% | 62.85\% |
| 66 | None |  |  | 49.35\% | 28.89\% | 14.47\% | 2.19\% | 64.52\% | 33.05\% |
| 67 | Wayne Sasser | White | Republican | 76.62\% | 13.37\% | 6.16\% | 2.13\% | 28.21\% | 69.54\% |
| 68 | David Willis | White | Republican | 75.17\% | 8.70\% | 6.57\% | 1.67\% | 36.86\% | 60.78\% |
| 69 | Dean Arp | White | Republican | 69.02\% | 12.24\% | 13.60\% | 2.24\% | 34.82\% | 62.83\% |
| 70 | Pat B. Hurley | White | Republican | 76.35\% | 7.38\% | 11.65\% | 2.68\% | 24.02\% | 73.79\% |
| 71 | Evelyn Terry | Black | Democratic | 38.42\% | 41.19\% | 17.77\% | 2.52\% | 69.65\% | 27.99\% |
| 72 | Amber M. Baker | Black | Democratic | 51.06\% | 34.96\% | 10.12\% | 1.88\% | 68.98\% | 28.63\% |
| 73 | None |  |  | 66.47\% | 18.13\% | 8.99\% | 2.22\% | 40.09\% | 57.22\% |
| 74 | Jeff Zenger | White | Republican | 74.60\% | 12.01\% | 6.66\% | 1.95\% | 44.91\% | 52.65\% |
| 75 | Donny Lambeth | White | Republican | 69.54\% | 16.11\% | 10.67\% | 2.62\% | 38.59\% | 59.04\% |
| 76 | Harry Warren | White | Republican | 66.95\% | 20.99\% | 8.38\% | 2.43\% | 38.23\% | 59.28\% |

- Ex. 6851 -

Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 77 | Julia C. Howard | White | Republican | 83.70\% | 5.80\% | 7.49\% | 2.31\% | 24.14\% | 73.63\% |
|  | Lee Zachary | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 78 | Allen McNeill | White | Republican | 83.21\% | 5.77\% | 7.56\% | 2.21\% | 25.78\% | 72.41\% |
| 79 | Keith Kidwell | White | Republican | 74.67\% | 17.35\% | 5.51\% | 1.76\% | 37.95\% | 60.11\% |
| 80 | Sam Watford | White | Republican | 79.55\% | 9.84\% | 6.87\% | 2.39\% | 25.05\% | 72.75\% |
| 81 | Larry W. Potts | White | Republican | 79.40\% | 10.00\% | 6.15\% | 2.49\% | 28.27\% | 69.58\% |
| 82 | Kristin Baker | White | Republican | 61.54\% | 22.14\% | 12.85\% | 2.58\% | 44.20\% | 53.10\% |
|  | Larry G. Pittman | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 83 | None |  |  | 70.28\% | 12.55\% | 7.96\% | 2.17\% | 34.20\% | 63.45\% |
| 84 | Jeffrey C. McNeely | White | Republican | 71.29\% | 16.59\% | 8.53\% | 2.07\% | 33.00\% | 64.56\% |
| 85 | Dudley Greene | White | Republican | 88.52\% | 3.46\% | 4.70\% | 2.35\% | 26.86\% | 71.13\% |
| 86 | Hugh Blackwell | White | Republican | 81.24\% | 6.41\% | 6.38\% | 3.25\% | 30.75\% | 66.86\% |
| 87 | Destin Hall | White | Republican | 86.79\% | 5.23\% | 4.71\% | 2.34\% | 26.75\% | 70.92\% |
| 88 | Mary Belk | White | Democratic | 63.64\% | 24.25\% | 5.96\% | 1.36\% | 64.26\% | 33.13\% |
| 89 | Mitchell S. Setzer | White | Republican | 81.61\% | 7.02\% | 5.99\% | 2.20\% | 25.41\% | 72.30\% |
| 90 | Sarah Stevens | White | Republican | 85.10\% | 3.84\% | 8.51\% | 2.07\% | 24.45\% | 73.56\% |
| 91 | Kyle Hall | White | Republican | 74.02\% | 14.74\% | 7.63\% | 2.28\% | 36.80\% | 60.77\% |
| 92 | Terry M. Brown Jr. | Black | Democratic | 34.49\% | 40.82\% | 15.95\% | 2.07\% | 68.85\% | 28.46\% |
| 93 | Ray Pickett | White | Republican | 86.10\% | 3.53\% | 6.30\% | 1.81\% | 41.66\% | 55.40\% |
| 94 | Jeffrey Elmore | White | Republican | 86.43\% | 5.52\% | 5.15\% | 1.98\% | 23.43\% | 74.30\% |
| 95 | Grey Mills | White | Republican | 79.26\% | 8.11\% | 6.16\% | 1.90\% | 33.66\% | 63.66\% |
| 96 | Jay Adams | White | Republican | 72.17\% | 10.47\% | 10.56\% | 2.59\% | 36.24\% | 61.36\% |
| 97 | Jason Saine | White | Republican | 84.41\% | 5.81\% | 6.23\% | 2.17\% | 26.85\% | 70.83\% |
| 98 | John R. Bradford III | White | Republican | 79.61\% | 8.06\% | 6.74\% | 1.44\% | 46.78\% | 50.68\% |
| 99 | Nasif Majeed | Black | Democratic | 24.43\% | 48.91\% | 20.76\% | 2.31\% | 76.84\% | 20.63\% |
| 100 | John Autry | White | Democratic | 38.50\% | 32.80\% | 20.67\% | 2.23\% | 71.72\% | 25.28\% |
| 101 | Carolyn G. Logan | Black | Democratic | 32.65\% | 48.79\% | 13.15\% | 2.20\% | 70.99\% | 26.42\% |
| 102 | Becky Carney | White | Democratic | 39.67\% | 39.09\% | 16.31\% | 1.92\% | 80.17\% | 17.07\% |
| 103 | Rachel Hunt | White | Democratic | 70.19\% | 12.65\% | 8.80\% | 1.79\% | 46.92\% | 50.50\% |
| 104 | Brandon Lofton | White | Democratic | 77.64\% | 9.10\% | 6.16\% | 1.33\% | 51.97\% | 45.47\% |
| 105 | Wesley Harris | White | Democratic | 58.69\% | 13.17\% | 10.81\% | 1.66\% | 53.84\% | 43.54\% |
| 106 | Carla D. Cunningham | Black | Democratic | 29.84\% | 45.47\% | 11.10\% | 1.93\% | 78.96\% | 18.30\% |
| 107 | Kelly M. Alexander Jr. | Black | Democratic | 34.27\% | 49.16\% | 11.36\% | 1.60\% | 73.22\% | 24.27\% |
| 108 | John A. Torbett | White | Republican | 68.24\% | 20.01\% | 7.52\% | 2.58\% | 37.31\% | 60.26\% |
| 109 | Dana Bumgardner | White | Republican | 70.08\% | 17.41\% | 7.85\% | 2.26\% | 38.07\% | 59.60\% |
| 110 | Kelly E. Hastings | White | Republican | 75.79\% | 16.19\% | 4.87\% | 2.35\% | 29.42\% | 68.62\% |
| 111 | Tim Moore | White | Republican | 76.40\% | 16.90\% | 3.53\% | 2.07\% | 30.73\% | 67.44\% |
| 112 | None |  |  | 37.95\% | 29.58\% | 25.20\% | 2.59\% | 70.11\% | 26.91\% |
| 113 | Jake Johnson | White | Republican | 83.23\% | 7.19\% | 6.13\% | 2.36\% | 33.83\% | 64.24\% |
|  | David Rogers | White | Republican |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Exhibit 6

| District | Representative | Race | Party | \% NH18+_Wht | \% 18+_AP_Blk | \% H18+_Pop | \% 18+_AP_Ind | \% Dem | \% Rep |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 114 | Susan C. Fisher | White | Democratic | $80.61 \%$ | $8.00 \%$ | $6.55 \%$ | $2.38 \%$ | $70.43 \%$ | $26.80 \%$ |
| 115 | John Ager | White | Democratic | $83.57 \%$ | $6.62 \%$ | $5.26 \%$ | $2.36 \%$ | $59.06 \%$ | $38.31 \%$ |
| 116 | Brian Turner | White | Democratic | $82.96 \%$ | $3.95 \%$ | $8.15 \%$ | $2.55 \%$ | $44.94 \%$ | $52.47 \%$ |
| 117 | Timothy D. Moffitt | White | Republican | $81.75 \%$ | $3.77 \%$ | $10.50 \%$ | $2.05 \%$ | $39.69 \%$ | $57.95 \%$ |
| 118 | Mark Pless | White | Republican | $91.24 \%$ | $1.54 \%$ | $3.50 \%$ | $2.58 \%$ | $37.62 \%$ | $60.00 \%$ |
| 119 | Mike Clampitt | White | Republican | $80.68 \%$ | $2.95 \%$ | $5.10 \%$ | $10.25 \%$ | $42.79 \%$ | $54.59 \%$ |
| 120 | Karl E. Gillespie | White | Republican | $89.02 \%$ | $1.31 \%$ | $4.63 \%$ | $3.95 \%$ | $26.43 \%$ | $71.63 \%$ |

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1568 - Affidavit of Christopher Ketchie, Exhibit 7: Raw North Carolina 2020 VTDelection data file (submitted in native format)

| From: | Allison Riggs |
| :---: | :---: |
| To: | Phil.Berger@ncleg.gov; Robin.Braswell@ncleg.gov; Tim.Moore@ncleg.gov; Grace.Irvin@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Warren.Daniel@ncleg.gov; Andy.Perrigo@ncleg.gov; Ralph.Hise@ncleg.gov; Susan.Fanning@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Paul.Newton@ncleg.gov; Andrew.Stiffel@ncleg.gov; Destin.Hall@ncleg.gov; Lucy.Harrill@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Dan.Blue@ncleg.gov; Bonnie.McNeil@ncleg.gov; Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov; Veronica.Green@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Dan.Blue@ncleg.gov; Bonnie.McNeil@ncleg.gov; Ben.Clark@ncleg.gov; Michael.Johnson@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Don.Davis@ncleg.gov; Edwin.Woodard@ncleg.gov; Chuck.Edwards@ncleg.gov; Heather.Millett@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Carl.Ford@ncleg.gov; Angela.Ford@ncleg.gov; Kathy.Harrington@ncleg.gov; Lorie.Byrd@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Brent.Jackson@ncleg.gov; William.Kirkley@ncleg.gov; Loyce.Krawiec@ncleg.gov; Debbie.Lown@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Paul.Lowe@ncleg.gov; Corneisha.Mitchell@ncleg.gov; Natasha.Marcus@ncleg.gov; Lessica.Bolin@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Wilev.Nickel@ncleg.gov; Michael.Cullen@ncleq.gov; $\rfloor \mathrm{m}$.Perry@ncleq.gov; LeighAnn.Biddix@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Bill.Rabon@ncleg.gov; Paula.Fields@ncleg.gov; William.Richardson@ncleg.gov; Leigh.Lawrence@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Lason.Saine@ncleg.gov; MaryStuart.Sloan@ncleg.gov; Цohn.Torbett@ncleg.gov; Viddia.Torbett@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Cecil.Brockman@ncleg.gov; Matthew.Barley@ncleg.gov; Becky.Carnev@ncleg.gov; Beth.LeGrande@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Linda.Cooper-Suggs@ncleg.gov; Caroline.Enloe@ncleg.gov; Цimmy.Dixon@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Michael.Wiggins@ncleq.gov; Цon.Hardister@ncleg.gov; Layne.Nelson@ncleq.gov; Pricey.Harrison@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Mary.Lee@ncleg.gov; Kelly.Hastings@ncleg.gov; Sophia.Hastings@ncleg.gov; Zack.Hawkins@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Anita.Wilder@ncleg.gov; Brenden.Jones@ncleg.gov; Leff.Hauser@ncleg.gov; Grey.Mills@ncleg.gov; |
|  | Mason.Barefoot@ncleg.gov; Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov; Veronica.Green@ncleg.gov; David.Rogers@ncleg.gov; |
|  |  |
|  | Cristy.Yates@ncleg.gov; Lee.Zachary@ncleg.gov; Martha.Jenkins@ncleg.gov |
| Cc: | Hilary Harris Klein; Mitchell D. Brown; Katelin Kaiser |
| Subject: | 2021 North Carolina redistricting - SCSJ correspondence re: process and cluster maps |
| Date: | Friday, October 8, 2021 4:19:23 PM |
| Attachments: | SCSI correspondence NCGA redistricting 2021.10.08.pdf |
| I mportance: | High |

Senators and Representatives and NCGA staff,

Please find attached correspondence from the Southern Coalition for Social Justice regarding the redistricting process and the cluster maps released on Tuesday. Please don't hesitate to reach out to me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Allison Riggs
Co-Executive Director, Programs
Chief Counsel for Voting Rights
Southern Coalition for Social Justice
1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101
Durham, NC 27707
919-323-3380 ext. 117
919-323-3942 (fax)
allison@southerncoalition.org

CONFIDENTIAL \& PRIVILEGED

This communication is intended solely for the addressee. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you believe this message has been sent to you in error, please notify the sender by replying to this transmission and delete the message without disclosing it. Thank you.

October 8, 2021

## VIA EMAIL

To: Sen. Phil Berger<br>President Pro Tempore, North Carolina Senate<br>Rep. Tim Moore<br>Speaker, North Carolina House of Representatives<br>Sen. Daniel, Sen. Hise, and Sen. Newton<br>Co-Chairs, Senate Standing Committee on Redistricting and Elections<br>Rep. D. Hall, Chair<br>House Standing Committee on Redistricting<br>CC: Sen. Dan Blue, Senate Democratic Leader<br>Rep. Robert T. Reives, II, House Democratic Leader<br>Members, Senate Standing Committee on Redistricting and Elections<br>Members, House Standing Committee on Redistricting

Senators and Representatives,

The undersigned respectfully submit this letter to bring to the attention of the legislative leadership, Members of the Senate Standing Committee on Redistricting and Elections, Members of the House Standing Committee on Redistricting, and, indeed, the entire legislative body, certain areas of concern within the county clustering option maps you introduced on Tuesday, October 5, 2021. The Committee Chairs stated that these maps represent the only legally compliant county clustering options in which ultimate district lines will be drawn. We disagree.

In Stephenson v. Bartlett, the North Carolina Supreme Court developed a methodology for how counties should be grouped together to form county clusters. ${ }^{1}$ Under Stephenson, first, districts must be drawn to satisfy Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") to ensure voters of color have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect their candidates of choice. Only after that analysis is performed and those districts are drawn may any work be done to harmonize and maximize compliance with North Carolina's Whole County Provision ("WCP"). ${ }^{2}$

[^136]Although the Stephenson criteria outlines a process for how counties are grouped together to create districts, there is still discretion regarding the choices about how and where to group counties. Consequently, these individual choices can result in different county grouping options that directly affect political opportunities and voting power for voters of color. We will be monitoring your choices with respect to county clusters closely, as well as the impact of those choices. But even now, we can identify serious problems with your judgment being used in this redistricting process, including but not limited to gross mischaracterizations of applicable law.

## I. The North Carolina General Assembly Continues to Flout Well-Established Redistricting Law

At this point, we have only seen draft district lines for the aforementioned clusters presented by your Committees, which create some (but not all) districts and thus do not constitute full maps. As a result, this letter does not and cannot address all potential violations of the North Carolina Constitution, the federal Voting Rights Act, or the North Carolina Supreme Court's instructions in the Stephenson cases. Our intent here is to bring to your attention the potential problems in the county clustering maps from which you have indicated you intend to choose. We also seek to highlight, once again, the erroneous legal interpretation under which you appear to be operating, just as in last decade's redistricting cycle. Absent a material change in direction, we may have further critiques or concerns. However, it is not too late to remedy these issues and embark on a redistricting process that will comply with applicable law.

## 1. The North Carolina Legislature Is Already Violating the Stephenson Instructions

Because this body is erroneously avoiding the use of all racial data, you per se cannot comply with Stephenson. Without that data, you cannot assess what districts are required under the VRA and draw those districts first as required. The failure to consider racial data is deeply problematic for other legal and policy grounds, but in this letter, we focus on the potential county clusters where it is unlikely that a district that will provide voters of color an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates can be produced by the county cluster.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has been unequivocal: Stephenson mandates that "districts required by the VRA be drawn first." ${ }^{3}$ Indeed, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires federal law compliance be prioritized. In order to determine whether it is necessary to draw VRA districts, the Legislature must determine the level of racially polarized voting in the relevant geographical area. ${ }^{4}$ Without any analysis of racial voting data, you are making it impossible to assess whether VRA districts are required and violating the plain rule in Stephenson. Thus, to comply with Stephenson and the VRA, we believe the Legislature must conduct a regionally-focused racially polarized voting ("RPV") study to determine if there is legally significant racially polarized voting. If there is that level of racially polarized voting,

[^137]and if any cluster which you claim is required under strict compliance with Stephenson produces a district in which voters of color would not be able to elect their preferred candidate, then you must draw a VRA district first and only then engage in developing clusters around that district. ${ }^{5}$ As discussed below, your claims that RPV studies done in 2011 and the Covington court's ruling in $2016^{6}$ somehow negate the possibility that any VRA districts may be necessary today, in 2021, is plainly wrong.

## 2. The North Carolina General Assembly Is Grossly Misinterpreting Covington v. North Carolina and Other Precedent from Last Cycle

Sen. Hise and Rep. Hall are factually incorrect in representing that courts last decade ruled that racially polarized voting in North Carolina does not exist. In the most relevant case, Covington v. North Carolina, the federal court that invalidated 28 North Carolina legislative districts as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in fact stated the opposite. ${ }^{7}$ The court acknowledged that there were two reports before the Legislature indicating there was statistically significant racially polarized voting in the state ${ }^{8}$, but the bipartisan panel of federal judges excoriated the Legislature for "failing to evaluate whether there was a strong basis of evidence for the third Gingles factor in any potential VRA district." ${ }^{9}$ That is, the court acknowledged the "general finding regarding the existence of [] racially polarized voting," but said the Legislature had to do a deeper inquiry, which "is exactly what Defendants did not do." ${ }^{10}$ This body seems bound and determined to make the same legal mistake again this redistricting cycle by once again abdicating its responsibility to do the analysis it is required by law to do. If this Legislature declines to meet its obligations under Stephenson to determine and draw districts required by the VRA first, it should be prepared for a court to ultimately draw the maps needed for elections next year.

Second, no case from the last redistricting cycle overturns or otherwise renders null Stephenson's requirement that the Legislature draw VRA districts first. In a meeting of the Joint Redistricting and Elections Committee on August 12, 2021, the Committee Chairs, in response to Senator Clark's question about complying with the VRA, stated that RPV analysis was not necessary due to "the 2019 decisions." ${ }^{11}$ The 2019 Superior Court decision Common Cause v. Lewis found that compliance with the VRA was not a plausible excuse to a charge of partisan

[^138]gerrymandering. ${ }^{12}$ It did not hold that the General Assembly may completely ignore racial voting data when drawing districts following the release of U.S. Census data. As a result, Lewis in no way alters Stephenson's mandate that the Legislature first draw VRA districts with the assistance of racial voting data analysis.

Lastly, no other federal law or Supreme Court decision compels or even allows this body to ignore racial data in drawing district lines. The Supreme Court decision Cooper v. Harris explains that states can use racial data in redistricting to comply with the VRA. ${ }^{13}$ In 2017, the Supreme Court found that the creation of two North Carolina congressional districts violated the federal Constitution because map drawers had used racial data in ways not required by the VRA. ${ }^{14}$ Cooper found that map drawers were using the VRA as an excuse to pack far more Black voters into a district than was necessary for VRA compliance; it did not state that the use of racial data is unconstitutional in every circumstance. ${ }^{15}$ In fact, Cooper demonstrates the very necessity of using racial voting data. It is impossible to determine what demographic configuration is sufficient for VRA compliance without analyzing racial voting data.

With these legal deficiencies in your approach explained, we now turn to areas of concern in the county cluster maps introduced on Tuesday. We note at the outset that the authors of the paper presenting possible county clusters explicitly did not look at the first step in Stephenson - drawing VRA districts. ${ }^{16}$ Thus, while this paper and methodology may be informative, they cannot substitute for the legislative analysis required by North Carolina and federal law. Indeed, it would not be algorithmically possible to do the kind of "intensely local appraisal" ${ }^{17}$ necessary to determine whether a district was required under Section 2 of the VRA.

## II. Certain Areas in the North Carolina Senate Cluster Maps Require Examination for VRA Compliance

a. Cluster in Greene/Wayne/Wilson

One of the Senate county clusters that you designate as required under an "optimal" county grouping map for the Senate districts appears to violate the VRA. Cluster "Q1" is a district comprised of three counties that would likely deprive voters of color of the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. In the current Senate map, Senate District 4 is comprised of Halifax, Edgecombe and Wilson Counties, and the Black voting age population ("BVAP") in

[^139]that district is $47.46 \%$ using benchmark data. Black voters have the ability to elect their candidate of choice in this district.

In a county group analysis where race is not considered at all, we are concerned that you will propose that Senate District 4 be comprised going forward of Green, Wayne, and Wilson Counties. A district comprised of those 3 counties would be only $35.02 \%$ BVAP. If Section 5 were still in place, we are certain that such a change to that district would constitute impermissible retrogression and not be approved. We have done some initial analysis of racially polarized voting in those 3 new counties that would comprise Senate District 4. Examining racially contested statewide elections ${ }^{18}$ in these counties shows two things: using a number of different analytic approaches, the Black candidate is overwhelmingly supported by Black voters and white voters offer very little support for Black candidates. That is, voting is racially polarized. And most importantly, in those counties, were the electoral outcomes to be determined just by voting there, the Black candidates would have been defeated. Thus, the racially polarized voting is legally significant. We urge you to perform a formal RPV analysis in these counties before dictating that the Senate district must be comprised of these 3 counties.

Moreover, knowing as you do (or certainly do now) that there is a concentration of Black voters who, in concert with a small number of non-Black voters in the original configuration of the district (Wilson, Edgecombe and Halifax) are able to elect their candidate of choice, "if there were a showing that a State intentionally drew district lines in order to destroy otherwise effective crossover district[]," you would likely be subjecting the State to liability under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. ${ }^{19}$

## b. Cluster in Hoke/Robeson/Scotland

We are also concerned that in the absence of racial data analysis, the proposed Senate district comprised of Hoke, Robeson, and Scotland Counties may not be in compliance with the Voting Rights Act. This county cluster would create a new District 21 out of what were previously sections of Senate Districts 13, 21, and 25. In North Carolina's current map, District 21 is $42.15 \%$ BVAP using benchmark data, and Black voters in that district have the ability to elect their candidate of choice.

A district composed of Hoke, Robeson, and Scotland counties would be only $29.63 \%$ BVAP. Our initial review of recent racially-contested elections suggests that voting in these counties is highly racially polarized. Drawing a district with such a low BVAP might deprive

[^140]Black voters the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. We urge you to perform a formal RPV analysis for these three counties to determine if a VRA-compliant district is required for the new district in this area.

## III. Certain Areas in the North Carolina House Cluster Maps Require Examination for VRA Compliance

a. Cluster in Sampson/Wayne

Our preliminary data analysis shows that a new House District 21 may be created out of a cluster composed of either Sampson and Wayne counties ("LL2") or Duplin and Wayne counties ("KK2"). Our initial analysis indicates that the LL2 configuration is particularly problematic. Neither Sampson nor Wayne Counties individually have a high enough population to compose a single district under one person, one vote jurisprudence. However, the North Carolina General Assembly could create two House districts from a Wayne and Sampson County cluster.

Current House District 21 is composed of only portions of both Wayne and Sampson Counties. It is $39.00 \%$ BVAP using benchmark data and provides Black voters the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. Our preliminary analysis was fairly conclusive - based on the statewide elections examined, voting in Sampson and Wayne Counties, together, is highly racially polarized and the Black candidates in statewide elections would not have won had the elections been determined in those counties alone. Thus, we believe this presents substantial evidence that there is legally significant racially polarized voting, and there may be a VRA district required to be drawn in this cluster; or if that is not possible under one-person, one-vote principles, this cluster cannot be used - it would not be compliant with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or Stephenson.
b. Cluster in Camden/Gates/Hertford/Pasquotank

One of the proposed multi-county single House districts in your proposed clusters is composed of Camden, Gates, Hertford, and Pasquotank Counties (Cluster "NN1" in "Duke_House_01," "Duke_House_03," "Duke_House_05" and "Duke_House_07"). The current district for this area, House District 5, is $44.32 \%$ BVAP using benchmark data, and Black voters have the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. A House district composed of Camden, Gates, Hertford, and Pasquotank Counties would be only $38.59 \%$ BVAP. Our analysis indicates that white voters are voting in bloc there and may be doing so in a way that would prevent a Black-preferred candidate from winning (and, thus, legally significant). More analysis must be done on this cluster to determine whether there is legally significant racially polarized voting, and, if so, a district composed of this county cluster might eliminate the ability of Black voters to elect a candidate of their choice and thus violate federal and state law.

## IV. Conclusion

To be clear, in this letter, we are raising issues with the clusters you released on Tuesday, October 5, 2021. We can identify potential VRA issues where districts are dictated by groupings of whole counties or where, in a small 2-district cluster, we can observe voting patterns with sufficient certainty to identify a potential problem. However, we do not yet know how district lines will be drawn within counties or within multi-county, multi-district clusters. For example, we suspect that the way district lines are drawn in a Nash/Wilson House county grouping or Granville/Vance/Franklin House county grouping could be problematic. In short, this is a nonexhaustive list of concerns, particularly given the lack of draft maps at this moment. But this body should consider itself on notice for the need to perform RPV analysis in certain regions of the state and the need to examine racial data to ensure VRA compliance.

Importantly, we are not saying conclusively that VRA districts are required in the above county groupings; however, it cannot be ascertained without conducting an intensely local appraisal of voting conditions and a targeted RPV analysis, which you are required by law to undertake. ${ }^{20}$ Without conducting any RPV analysis prior to grouping counties, the Legislature is departing from the requirements of the Stephenson criteria and may ultimately deny voters of color an equal opportunity to participate in North Carolina's elections. Therefore, by allegedly engaging in race-blind drawing, you violate not only the VRA but also Stephenson and our State's case precedent. It is neither appropriate nor required to draw districts race-blind. Rather, your current path ensures redistricting will once again be a tool used to harm voters of color, and we implore you to reconsider this path immediately.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
Allison J. Riggs
Co-Executive Director for Programs and Chief Counsel for Voting Rights
Hilary Harris Klein
Senior Counsel, Voting Rights
Mitchell Brown
Counsel, Voting Rights
Katelin Kaiser
Counsel, Voting Rights
${ }^{20}$ Id.

| From: | Allison Rigas |
| :---: | :---: |
| To: | "Phil.Berger@ncleg.gov"; "Robin.Braswell@ncleg.gov"; "Tim.Moore@ncleg.gov"; "Grace.Irvin@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Warren.Daniel@ncleg.gov"; "Andy.Perrigo@ncleg.gov"; "Ralph.Hise@ncleg.gov"; "Susan.Fanning@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Paul.Newton@ncleg.gov"; "Andrew.Stiffel@ncleg.gov"; "Destin.Hall@ncleg.gov"; "Lucy.Harrill@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Dan.Blue@ncleg.gov"; "Bonnie.McNeil@ncleg.gov"; "Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov"; "Veronica.Green@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Dan.Blue@ncleq.gov"; "Bonnie.McNeil@ncleq.qov"; "Ben.Clark@ncleq.gov"; "Michael.Johnson@ncleq.gov"; |
|  | "Don.Davis@ncleg.gov"; "Edwin.Woodard@ncleg.gov"; "Chuck.Edwards@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Heather.Millett@ncleg.gov"; "Carl.Ford@ncleg.gov"; "Angela.Ford@ncleg.gov"; "Kathy.Harrington@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Lorie.Byrd@ncleg.gov"; "Brent.Jackson@ncleg.gov"; "William.Kirkley@ncleg.gov"; "Joyce.Krawiec@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Debbie.Lown@ncleg.gov"; "Paul.Lowe@ncleg.gov"; "Corneisha.Mitchell@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Natasha.Marcus@ncleq.gov"; "Jessica.Bolin@ncleq.qov"; "Wiley.Nickel@ncleq.gov"; "Michael.Cullen@ncleq.gov"; |
|  | "」im.Perry@ncleg.gov"; "LeighAnn. Biddix@ncleg.gov"; "Bill.Rabon@ncleg.gov"; "Paula.Fields@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "William.Richardson@ncleg.gov"; "Leigh.Lawrence@ncleg.gov"; "Jason.Saine@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "MaryStuart.Sloan@ncleg.gov"; "John.Torbett@ncleg.gov"; "Viddia.Torbett@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Cecil.Brockman@ncleg.gov"; "Matthew.Barlev@ncleg.gov"; "Becky.Carney@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Beth.LeGrande@ncleq.gov"; "Linda.Cooper-Sugqs@ncleq.gov"; "Caroline.Enloe@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "」immy.Dixon@ncleg.gov"; "Michael.Wiggins@ncleg.gov"; "Jon.Hardister@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Jayne.Nelson@ncleg.gov"; "Pricey.Harrison@ncleg.gov"; "Mary.Lee@ncleg.gov"; "Kelly.Hastings@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Sophia.Hastings@ncleg.gov"; "Zack.Hawkins@ncleg.gov"; "Anita.Wilder@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Brenden.Jones@ncleq.gov"; "Jeff.Hauser@ncleq.gov"; "Grey.Mills@ncleq.gov"; "Mason.Barefoot@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Robert.Reives@ncleg.gov"; "Veronica.Green@ncleg.gov"; "David.Rogers@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Misty.Rogers@ncleg.gov"; "John.Szoka@ncleg.gov"; "Beverly.Slagle@ncleg.gov"; "Harry.Warren@ncleg.gov"; |
|  | "Cristy.Yates@ncleg.gov"; "Lee.Zachary@ncleg.gov"; "Martha.Jenkins@ncleg.gov" |
| Cc: | Hilary Harris Klein; Mitchell D. Brown; Katelin Kaiser |
| Subject: | 2021 North Carolina redistricting - SCSJ correspondence re: proposed Senate map |
| Date: | Monday, October 25, 2021 8:14:02 PM |
| Attachments: | SCSI Letter Senate Map 102521 FINAL.pdf |

Senators and Representatives and NCGA staff,

Please find attached correspondence from the Southern Coalition for Social Justice regarding the proposed Senate map that we understand will be the subject of public comment tomorrow. Please don't hesitate to reach out to me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Allison Riggs
Co-Executive Director, Programs
Chief Counsel for Voting Rights
Southern Coalition for Social Justice
1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101
Durham, NC 27707
919-323-3380 ext. 117
919-323-3942 (fax)
allison@southerncoalition.org

CONFIDENTIAL \& PRIVILEGED

This communication is intended solely for the addressee. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you believe this message has been sent to you in error, please notify the sender by replying to this transmission and delete the message without disclosing it. Thank you.

## VIA EMAIL

To: Sen. Phil Berger<br>President Pro Tempore, North Carolina Senate<br>Rep. Tim Moore<br>Speaker, North Carolina House of Representatives<br>Sen. Daniel, Sen. Hise, and Sen. Newton<br>Co-Chairs, Senate Standing Committee on Redistricting and Elections<br>Rep. D. Hall, Chair<br>House Standing Committee on Redistricting<br>CC: Sen. Dan Blue, Senate Democratic Leader<br>Rep. Robert T. Reives, II, House Democratic Leader<br>Members, Senate Standing Committee on Redistricting and Elections<br>Members, House Standing Committee on Redistricting

Senators and Representatives,
It is disappointing that the State Senate map, "SST-4," that has been drafted, and apparently will be offered to the committees, has completely ignored important racial considerations. As we raised in our October 8, 2021 letter, the rejection of all racial data in drafting these maps raises serious legal concerns that are illustrated by SST-4.

The selections from clusters that you offered on October 5, 2021 as legal options for county clustering appear to raise further concerns. There were two cluster options for the Senate district in northeastern North Carolina, both of which you asserted were legal clusters. This body appears to be poised to select the map within SST-4 that is obviously worse for Black voters, the "Z1" cluster "Duke_Senate 02."

Even without considering racial data, it would have been painfully obvious to anyone with a passing familiarity with North Carolina's political geography that excluding Warren, Halifax, and Martin from a cluster where the incumbent is the candidate of choice of Black voters - and herself Black - will be fatal to the ability of Black voters to continue electing their candidate of choice. We will provide you the data to confirm that.

The cluster that obviously does not interfere with the ability of Black voters to elect their candidate of choice is comprised of Warren, Halifax, Martin, Bertie, Northampton, Hertford, Gates, Camden, Currituck, and Tyrell. The Black Voting Age Population ("BVAP") in that

[^141]
district is $42.33 \%$. It is a district where the Democratic candidate, in the last two presidential elections and last two gubernatorial elections, would have won. While there is racially polarized voting in these counties, collectively, using reconstituted election results, this one-district cluster would have elected the Black-preferred candidate in each of the statewide, racially contested elections we mentioned in our October 5 letter. That is, racially polarized voting is not legally significant in this cluster, and therefore, it is the obvious choice unless one wanted to undermine Black voting strength.

The cluster that the committee chair and presumably legislative leadership selected in SST-4 is comprised of Northampton, Hertford, Bertie, Gates, Perquimans, Pasquotank. Camden, Currituck, Tyrell, and Dare, and most certainly destroys the ability of Black voters to elect their candidate of choice. While Senate District 3 is not majority-Black in its current form, it is an effective crossover district that is electing the candidate of choice of Black Voters. The BVAP in District 1 (the analog to SD 3 in the current map) with the cluster you have chosen is only $29.49 \%$. It is a district where the Republican candidate won in the last two presidential elections, the last two gubernatorial elections, and the 2020 state supreme court election. Not only is there racially polarized voting in the counties comprising this district, collectively, using reconstituted election results, this one-district cluster would not have elected the Black-preferred candidate in any of the statewide, racially contested elections we mentioned in our October 5 letter. That is, racially polarized voting is legally significant. The selection of this cluster, therefore, is inexplicable absent discriminatory intent.

This letter is being submitted as an addendum to our October 5 letter. To our understanding, none of the concerns raised in our October 5 letter have been addressed in any capacity. If the North Carolina General Assembly proceeds with the SST-4 proposed map, this body will ensure that two of the three representatives of choice of Black voters in northeastern North Carolina will not be re-elected, nor any candidate of choice of Black voters within those two districts. This extremely discriminatory result-especially in the face of the information being provided to this body-strongly suggests that such a result is intentional. Once again, we urge you to reconsider your actions and to enact a redistricting plan that is legal and fair to all voters of North Carolina.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,

Allison J. Riggs<br>Co-Executive Director for Programs and Chief Counsel for Voting Rights<br>Hilary Harris Klein<br>Senior Counsel, Voting Rights<br>Mitchell Brown<br>Counsel, Voting Rights<br>Katelin Kaiser<br>Counsel, Voting Rights

## HB1029 3rd Edition




- Ex. 6867 -


PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 1573

- Ex. 6868 -



## PLAINTIFFS'

 EXHIBIT1574

- Ex. 6869 -



## PLAINTIFFS'

 EXHIBIT 1575- Ex. 6870 -



## PLAINTIFFS'

EXHIBIT
1576

- Ex. 6871 -



## PLAINTIFFS'

EXHIBIT
1577

## - Ex. 6872 -



## - Ex. 6873 -




List of Video Files referencing "Map Drawing" on https://ncleg.gov/Documents/493\#Video: $]$

1. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station_01
2. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station_03
3. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station_04
4. 2021-10-06_544_Map_Drawing-Station-02
5. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
6. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
7. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
8. 2021-10-06_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
9. 2021-10-06_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
10. 2021-10-06_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
11. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
12. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
13. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
14. 2021-10-07_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
15. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
16. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
17. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
18. 2021-10-07_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
19. 2021-10-07_Redistricting-Map-Drawing_House
20. 2021-10-07_Redistricting-Map-Drawing_Senate
21. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
22. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
23. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
24. 2021-10-08_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
25. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
26. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
27. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
28. 2021-10-08_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
29. 2021-10-08_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
30. 2021-10-08_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
31. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
32. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
33. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
34. 2021-10-11_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
35. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
36. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
37. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
38. 2021-10-11_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
39. 2021-10-11_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
40. 2021-10-11_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
41. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
42. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
43. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
44. 2021-10-12_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
45. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
46. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
47. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
48. 2021-10-12_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
49. 2021-10-12_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
50. 2021-10-12_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
51. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
52. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
53. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
54. 2021-10-13_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
55. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
56. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
57. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
58. 2021-10-13_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
59. 2021-10-13_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
60. 2021-10-13_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
61. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
62. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
63. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
64. 2021-10-14_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
65. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
66. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
67. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
68. 2021-10-14_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
69. 2021-10-14_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
70. 2021-10-14_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
71. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
72. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
73. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
74. 2021-10-15_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
75. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
76. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
77. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
78. 2021-10-15_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
79. 2021-10-15_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
80. 2021-10-15_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
81. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
82. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
83. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
84. 2021-10-18_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
85. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
86. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
87. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
88. 2021-10-18_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
89. 2021-10-18_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
90. 2021-10-18_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
91. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
92. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
93. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
94. 2021-10-19_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
95. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
96. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
97. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
98. 2021-10-19_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
99. 2021-10-19_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
100. 2021-10-19_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
101. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
102. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
103. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
104. 2021-10-20_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
105. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
106. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
107. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
108. 2021-10-20_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
109. 2021-10-20_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
110. 2021-10-20_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
111. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
112. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
113. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
114. 2021-10-21_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
115. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
116. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
117. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
118. 2021-10-21_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
119. 2021-10-21_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
120. 2021-10-21_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
121. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
122. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
123. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
124. 2021-10-22_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
125. 2021-10-22_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
126. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
127. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
128. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
129. 2021-10-25_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
130. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
131. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
132. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
133. 2021-10-25_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
134. 2021-10-25_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
135. 2021-10-25_Public-Hearing-Remote_Joint
136. 2021-10-25_Public-Hearing-Virtual_Joint
137. 2021-10-25_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
138. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
139. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
140. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
141. 2021-10-26_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
142. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
143. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
144. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
145. 2021-10-26_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
146. 2021-10-26_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
147. 2021-10-26_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
148. 2021-10-27_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
149. 2021-10-27-544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
150. 2021-10-27_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
151. 2021-10-27_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
152. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
153. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
154. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
155. 2021-10-27_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
156. 2021-10-27_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
157. 2021-10-27_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing 158. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
158. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
159. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
160. 2021-10-28_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
161. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
162. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
163. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
164. 2021-10-28_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
165. 2021-10-28_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
166. 2021-10-28_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
167. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
168. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
169. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
170. 2021-10-29_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
171. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
172. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
173. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
174. 2021-10-29_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
175. 2021-10-29_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
176. 2021-10-29_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
177. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
178. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
179. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
180. 2021-10-30_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
181. 2021-10-30_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
182. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
183. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
184. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
185. 2021-11-01_544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
186. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
187. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
188. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
189. 2021-11-01_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
190. 2021-11-01_House_Redistricting_Map_D Drawing
191. 2021-11-01_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
192. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01
193. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_01_Part2
194. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_02
195. 2021-11-02_544_Map_Drawing_Station_03
196. 2021-11-02_-544_Map_Drawing_Station_04
197. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
198. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
199. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
200. 2021-11-02_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
201. 2021-11-02_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
202. 2021-11-02_Senate_Redistricting_Map_Drawing
203. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_-Station_01
204. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
205. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
206. 2021-11-03_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
207. 2021-11-03_House_Redistricting_Map_D Drawing
208. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_01
209. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_02
210. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_03
211. 2021-11-04_643_Map_Drawing_Station_04
212. 2021-11-04_House_Redistricting_Map_Drawing

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

## Shapes

DRA 2020 has 2020 Shapes. For most states, maps that use 2020 Shapes allow you to work with Precincts (Voting Districts or VTDs), as the main unit for making redistricting maps. For four states (CA, HI, OR and WV), you use Block Groups instead. For all states, you can shatter a precinct or block group into census blocks, and work with them individually.
DRA 2020 also has 2010 Shapes. These are Precincts for most states, and Block Groups for CA, MT, OR and RI. Census block editing is not available with 2010 Shapes. Maps that use 2010 Shapes can be converted to 2020 Shapes, yielding an approximation of the source map.

Precinct-level demographic and election data can be downloaded from our public repository vtd_data.

## Demographic Data

DRA 2020 has demographic data from the 2020 and 2010 Censuses and from the 2018 and 2019 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. The 2020 and 2010 data include total population and voting age population data (VAP), and was obtained directly from the Census Bureau. The 2018 and 2019 data include total population and citizen voting age population data (CVAP).
For 2020 Shapes, 2010, 2018 and 2019 data was disaggregated using Voting and Election Science Team's method as described here. More detail is in the Disaggregation section below. All data that has been disaggregated contains some margin of error, and should be treated accordingly.

For all years the following ethnic and racial categories are included. Because the categories overlap, their sum will be greater than the total population for the same area. Note that for CVAP data, the racial categories are estimates calculated from other fields, because the Census Bureau does not provide them directly in those datasets, and they tend to underrepresent the Asian and Pacific categories.

- White (alone, not Hispanic)
- Hispanic (all Hispanics regardless of race)
- Black (Black alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)
- Asian (Asian alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)
- Native (American Indian and Alaska Native alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)
- Pacific (Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander alone or in combination with other races, including Hispanic)

For some states we provide additional 2020 VAP data with Non-Hispanic Race Alone categories.

- White (alone, not Hispanic)
- Hispanic (all Hispanics regardless of race)
- Black (Black alone, not Hispanic)
- Asian (Asian alone, not Hispanic)
- Native (American Indian and Alaska Native alone, not Hispanic)
- Pacific (Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander alone, not Hispanic)
- Other (Other race alone, not Hispanic)
- TwoOrMore (Two or more races, not Hispanic)

Some states adjust their 2020 Total Population numbers to count incarcerated individuals in their home precincts, to be used for congressional and/or legislative redistricting. See Reallocating Inmate Data for Redistricting, Prison Gerrymandering Project and state pages for more details. Adjusted data can have negative population values for some blocks.

## Election Data

DRA 2020 has election data for a range of elections, varying by state.
In addition to data for individual elections, we construct an Election Composite of two or more elections. The Composite gives a measure of partisanship over different contests and years, which we prefer, because individual elections can be skewed by various factors. We use the latest available elections, and those not available are simply left out. We also exclude uncontested elections and those that have a significant third-party vote percentage (usually > 10\%). The formula is the following:

Composite $=$ Mean(Pres, Sen, GovAg), where
Pres = Mean(1 or 2 Presidential elections),
Sen = Mean(1 or 2 Senate elections) and
GovAg $=$ Mean(Governor and Attorney General elections)
All of our election data has come from partners who have done the work to obtain the data, marry it to some geography (e.g. precincts), and process necessary changes, such as distributing absentee votes that are not allocated to precincts. We thank them for their valuable work. The following table shows the data we have for each state, along with attributions for each election dataset. We continue to add election data as it becomes available.

- CSDB=California State Database
- MGGG=Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group
- MIT=MIT Election Data Science Lab
- $\mathrm{OP}=$ Open Precincts


## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

- PVI=Cook PVI data from Ryne Rohla/Decision Desk HQ; See also Atlas of Redistricting.
- SA=Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden
- SG=Steve Gerontakis, with John Mifflin
- TC=Tyler Chafee
- $V E=$ Voting and Election Science Team
* This election is part of the Election Composite.


## Election Data By State/Shapes

| State | 2020 Shapes | 2010 Shapes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alabama | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2017 Senator (Special) (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI)* |
| Alaska | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * |
| Arizona | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| Arkansas | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\star}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (OP)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (OP)* |
| California | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (CSDB) * <br> - 2018 Governor (CSDB) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (CSDB) * <br> - 2020 President (CSDB) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (CSDB) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (CSDB) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Colorado | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (TC) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (MGGG,OP)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (MGGG,OP) * |
| Connecticut | - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI)* |
| Delaware | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

| District of Columbia | - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | - 2020 President (VE) |${ }^{*} 2020$ Senator (VE) ${ }^{*} \quad$ - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$


| Florida | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE)* <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Georgia | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (Special) (VE) <br> - 2020 Senator (Runoff) (VE) <br> - 2020 Senator (Special Runoff) (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) |
| Hawaii | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Idaho | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE)* <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| Illinois | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * |
| Indiana | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SA) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (PVI) * |
| lowa | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

| Kansas | - 2012 President (VE) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kentucky | - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2019 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2019 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2019 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2019 Attorney General (VE) * |
| Louisiana | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) <br> - 2016 Senator (Runoff) (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2019 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2019 Governor (Runoff) (VE) <br> - 2019 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE)* <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Maine | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) |
| Maryland | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Massachusetts | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) * <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Michigan | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE)* <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Minnesota | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Attorney General (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG)* <br> - 2014 Governor (MGGG) <br> - 2014 Attorney General (MGGG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

| Mississippi | - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 President (PVI) ${ }^{*}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Missouri | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) |
| Montana | - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * |
| Nebraska | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) |
| Nevada | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (OP)* <br> - 2018 Governor (OP) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (OP) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (OP) |
| New Hampshire | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* |
| New Jersey | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2017 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (PVI) * |
| New Mexico | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SA) <br> - 2012 President (PVI)* <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ |
|  | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ | - 2008 President (SG) |

## About Data

Shapes Demographic Data Election Data Disaggregation

|  | - 2012 President (PVI) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\star}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) |
| New York | - 2020 Senator (VE)* | - 2012 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2018 Governor (VE)* | - 2016 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2018 Attorney General (VE)* |  |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* |  |
| North Carolina | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2014 Senator (MGGG) |  |
|  | - 2016 President (VE)* | - 2008 President (SA) |
|  | - 2016 Senator (VE)* | - 2012 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2016 Governor (VE) | - 2014 Senator (MGGG)* |
|  | - 2016 Attorney General (VE) | - 2016 President (VE)* |
|  | - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2016 Senator (VE)* |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* | - 2016 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ |
|  | - 2020 Senator (VE)* | - 2016 Attorney General (VE)* |
|  | - 2020 Governor (VE)* | - 2016 Lt. Governor (VE) |
|  | - 2020 Attorney General (VE)* |  |
|  | - 2020 Lt. Governor (VE) |  |
| North Dakota | - 2016 President (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) |
|  | - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | - 2016 President (VE)* |
|  | - 2016 Governor (VE) | - 2016 Senator (VE)* |
|  | - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2016 Governor (VE) * |
|  | - 2018 Senator (VE)* | - 2016 Governor (VE) |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* | - 2018 Attorney General (VE) |
|  | - 2020 Governor (VE)* | 2018 Senator (VE) |
| Ohio | - 2012 President (PVI) |  |
|  | - 2016 President (VE)* |  |
|  | - 2016 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) |
|  | - 2018 Senator (VE) * | - 2012 President (PVI)* |
|  | - 2018 Governor (VE)* | - 2016 President (MGGG)* |
|  | - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2016 Senator (MGGG) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ |
|  | - 2020 President (VE)* |  |


| Oklahoma | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (VE)* <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) <br> - 2018 Attorney General (VE) * |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Oregon | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE)* <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2016 Governor (VE) <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE)* <br> - 2018 Governor (MGGG,OP) * |
| Pennsylvania | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2020 President (VE) * <br> - 2020 Attorney General (VE) * | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2016 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2016 Attorney General (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * |
| Rhode Island | - 2012 President (PVI) <br> - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) * <br> - 2018 Governor (VE) * <br> - 2018 Lt. Governor (VE) | - 2008 President (SG) <br> - 2012 President (PVI) * <br> - 2016 President (VE) * <br> - 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ |



## About Data

- 2016 President (VE) *
- 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$ - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 Governor (VE) - 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$
- 2016 Attorney General (VE)
- 2016 President (VE) 2016 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2016 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2016 Governor (VE)
- 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$
- 2016 Attorney General (VE)

Vermont

- 2018 Attorney General (VE)
- 2016 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2018 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$

2018 Lt. Governor (VE)

- 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{\star}$
- 2020 Governor (VE)*
- 2018 Attorney General (VE) *

2020 Attorney (VE) * 2018 Lt. Governor (VE)

- 2020 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2016 President (VE) *
- 2008 President (SG)
- 2017 Governor (VE)* - 2012 President (PVI)*
- 2017 Attorney General (VE)* - 2016 President (VE)*

Virginia

- 2017 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2017 Governor (VE) *
- 2018 Senator (VE) ${ }^{*}$. 2017 Attorney General (VE)
- 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$ - 2017 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2020 Senator (VE)* ${ }^{*} 2018$ Senator (VE)*
- 2012 President (PVI)
- 2016 President (VE)* - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 Senator (VE)*
- 2012 President (PVI)*
- 2016 Governor (VE)
- 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2016 Attorney General (VE)
- 2016 Senator (VE) *

Washington

West Virginia
2016 Lt. Governor (VE)

- 2016 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2018 Senator (MIT,OP) *
- 2016 Attorney General (VE) *
- 2020 President (VE) *
- 2016 Lt. Governor (VE)
- • 2018 Senator (MIT,OP)
- 2020 Lt. Governor (VE)
- 2008 President (SG)
$\square$
- 2012 President (PVI) *
- 2012 President (PVI)*
- 2016 President (PVI)*
- 2012 President (PVI) - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 President (VE)* ${ }^{*} 2012$ President (PVI)*
- 2016 Senator (VE)* ${ }^{*} 2016$ President (VE) ${ }^{*}$

Wisconsin
2018 Ser (VE)*

- 2018 Governor (VE) *
- 2016 Senator (VE)
- 2018 Senator (VE)
- 2018 Attorney General (VE) *
- 2018 Governor (VE)*
- 2020 President (VE) ${ }^{*}$
- 2018 Attorney General (VE) *
- 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\text {* }}$ - 2008 President (SG)
- 2016 President (VE) ${ }^{\star}$
- 2018 Governor (VE)*
- 2018 Senator (VE) *
- 2020 President (VE) *
- 2018 Governor (VE) ${ }^{*}$


## Disaggregation

To map election results and demographic data from a source geography (shape set) to a destination geography (shape set), we disaggregate the data from the source geography to census blocks and then aggregate from those to the destination geography. For example, 2016 election data for many states is presented in terms of each state's 2016 precincts (or voting districts), which typically differ from their 2010 and 2020 precincts. Our algorithm determines the geographic mapping between the source geography and 2010 or 2020 census blocks and then distributes the results for each precinct among the blocks in that precinct, according to the population of each block. (That's disaggregation.) The Census Bureau provides the geographic mapping between 2010 census blocks and 2010 precincts, and between 2020 census blocks and 2020 precincts. Using that we add the results from all the blocks in each precinct. (That's aggregation.)

For 2020 shapes, all demographic data $(2010,2018$ and 2019) has been disaggregated using Voting and Election Science Team's method. All 2020 block population estimates were calculated by VEST using their method. To disaggregate we used these block population numbers and the Hare Quota (Hamilton) largest remainder method.

All election data presented in DRA 2020 has been disaggregated to census blocks, because election results are never reported to the block level. For 2020 shapes, for states having 2020 election data, disaggregation of 2016-2020 data uses VEST's method. For other states our older method was used; when we get 2020 election data, we will update all 2016-2020 election data to use VEST's method. Disaggregation necessarily introduces some error. In addition, ACS/CVAP data are estimates and thus have some error even before disaggregation. All election data and all ACS/CVAP data contain some margin of error at both the census block and precinct levels, and should be treated accordingly.


$2021010-27$ Map Drawing Station 04 （544）
H|O|l|l|l|ling Diatict
$\pm 0$ O County Subdim
$\oplus 0 \approx$ - peirond

$\square$ © $\square$ Censul Thy




PLAINTIFFS＇

Common Cause Trial Exhibit PX1587 - Video of October 7, 2021 Map Drawing Station 01 (544) (submitted in native format)


HB 1020, 2nd Edition - 2019 House Remedial Map



- Ex. 6892 -

- Ex. 6893 -


PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT
1593

- Ex. 6894 -

- Ex. 6895 -

- Ex. 6896 -

- Ex. 6897 -



## PLAINTIFFS'

- Ex. 6898 -




## PLAINTIFFS'

- Ex. 6900 -

- Ex. 6901 -

- Ex. 6902 -

- Ex. 6903 -


PLAINTIFFS'
EXHIBIT
1603

- Ex. 6904 -


PLAINTIFFS'
EXHIBIT
1604

- Ex. 6905 -

- Ex. 6906 -

- Ex. 6907 -

- Ex. 6908 -

- Ex. 6909 -

- Ex. 6910 -

- Ex. 6911 -


Current 2019 Plan



- Ex. 6913 -

- Ex. 6914 -

- Ex. 6915 -

- Ex. 6916 -



## Variable Senate Clusters



# North Eastern Cluster Options 

|  | Enacted Clusters |  | Alternative Option |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| County Clusters (1 district per cluster) | MARTIN WARREN HALIFAX HYDE PAMLICO CHOWAN WASHINGTON CARTERET | GATES CURRITUCK PASQUOTANK DARE BERTIE CAMDEN PERQUIMANS HERTFORD TYRRELL NORTHAMPTON | PASQUOTANK DARE PERQUIMANS HYDE PAMLICO CHOWAN WASHINGTON CARTERET | GATES CURRITUCK CAMDEN BERTIE WARREN HALIFAX HERTFORD TYRRELL NORTHAMPTON MARTIN |
| BVAP(\%) | 30.0\% | 29.49\% | 17.47\% | 42.33\% |
| Dem Vote \% (LG16) | 46.07\% | 47.74\% | 38.51\% | 55.42\% |
| Dem Vote \%(PR16) | 45.60\% | 46.70\% | 37.83\% | 54.59\% |
| Dem Vote \%(CA20) | 42.28\% | 44.47\% | 36.48\% | 50.75\% |
| Dem Vote \%(USS20) | 45.31\% | 45.36\% | 38.45\% | 52.75\% |
| Dem Vote \%(TR20) | 44.12\% | 44.58\% | 37.61\% | 51.59\% |
| Dem Vote \%(GV20) | 46.79\% | 47.56\% | 40.75\% | 54.12\% |
| Dem Vote \%(AD20) | 47.79\% | 47.72\% | 41.02\% | 54.99\% |
| Dem Vote \%(SST20) | 47.56\% | 47.85\% | 41.03\% | 54.89\% |
| Dem Vote \%(AG20) | 45.88\% | 46.11\% | 39.15\% | 53.40\% |
| Dem Vote \%(PR20) | 44.09\% | 45.54\% | 38.30\% | 51.84\% |
| Dem Vote \%(LG20) | 43.80\% | 45.12\% | 37.74\% | 51.69\% |
| Dem Vote \%(CL20) | 45.23\% | 46.42\% | 39.12\% | 52.00\% |

Mattingly Report, p. 65, PX-1484

## Political and Racial Impact on Senate Cluster Choices



Alternative Cluster

| District | Partisan <br> Dem <br> Vote <br> $\%(A G 20)$ | BVAP |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Purple | $53.40 \%$ | $42.33 \%$ |
| Yellow | $39.15 \%$ | $17.47 \%$ |



## Enacted Cluster

| District | Partisan <br> Dem <br> Vote <br> \%(AG20) | BVAP |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Green | $46.11 \%$ | $29.49 \%$ |
| Purple | $45.88 \%$ | $30.0 \%$ |

## Racial and Political Implications of Districts in Wayne/Duplin Cluster




Mattingly Addendum Analysis, p. 2 (PX-1485); H976 - with incumbents (PX-1405)

# A Rebuttal to Michael J. Barber, Ph.D.'s Expert Report 

 Daniel B. Magleby, Ph.D.
## Contents

1 Introduction ..... 3
2 Research Question and Summary of Findings ..... 3
2.1 Data ..... 4
3 Mechanics of Gerrymandering ..... 5
4 County-Based Clusters ..... 8
5 Conclusion ..... 12

## 1 Introduction

I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University, SUNY where I also hold a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. At Binghamton, I am also the director of the Center for the Analysis of Voting and Elections at Binghamton University. In 2007, I received an M.S. in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences from Northwestern University. I hold an M.A. in political science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor where I also received a Ph.D in political science in 2011. I have published academic papers on legislative districting and political geography in several political science journals, including Political Analysis, the Election Law Journal, American Politics Research, and Social Science Quarterly. My academic areas of expertise include legislative elections, geographic information systems (GIS) data, redistricting, voting rights, legislatures, and political geography. I have expertise in analyzing political geography, elections, and redistricting using computer simulations and other techniques. I have been retained by plaintiff Common Cause to perform the analysis described below at a rate of $\$ 250$ an hour. My compensation is not predicated on arriving at any particular opinion.

## 2 Research Question and Summary of Findings

In Dr. Barber's report, he engages in a cluster-by-cluster analysis of the legislature-drawn plan. He compares the legislature's plan to a large set of simulations he conducted using a computer-based redistricting algorithm. He concludes that the deviations he observes are not sufficient to deem the legislature-drawn maps "an extreme partisan gerrymander." In this report, I will explain how Dr. Barber's solely cluster-based analysis and his exclusive focus on seats carried does not provide a sufficient basis to reach the conclusion he makes in his report.

The legislature-drawn maps are partisan gerrymanders because they exhibit significant partisan bias, and the bias is likely to persist when Democrats increase their vote share in

North Carolina. Bias is present in cluster-by-cluster analysis; however, the consequences of the cluster-level bias are more pronounced when we consider the aggregate effect of clusterlevel bias statewide. Finally, because Democrats are capable of carrying a majority of the vote statewide, the legislature drawn map will likely entrench Republicans in power even if only a minority of North Carolina voters support them.

### 2.1 Data

My opinions follow from analysis of the following data:

- Results of computer simulations reported by Michael J. Barber, Ph.D. in his Expert Report dated December 22, 2021.
- VTD boundaries provided as ESRI Shapefiles by the US Census Bureau available on at the following URL. https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/ time-series/geo/tiger-line-file.html
- Census block boundaries and population data provided by the US Census Bureau. These are collected as part of the constitutionally mandated decennial census that most recently concluded in 2020.
- County boundaries as reported by the US Census Bureau.
- County clusterings provided by Christopher Cooper, Blake Esselstyn, Gregory Herschlag, Jonathan Mattingly, and Rebecca Tippett in a report that may be accessed at the following URL. https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/ 2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf
- Election returns as reported by the Voting and Election Science Team ${ }^{1}$ group and aggregated to Census-provided VTD boundaries and provided on the Redistricting

[^142]Data Hub ${ }^{2}$ website. I aggregate statewide elections returns from 2016 and 2020 to the set of legislature drawn districts and to the districts in each of the hypothetical alternative maps. In my analysis, I set aside election returns from 2018 because the only statewide races held that year were judicial elections which follow very different patterns compared to elections for other offices. I prefer to use all statewide elections because it ensures that my analysis captures lower-profile elections in which voters will rely on their partisan preferences rather than the personal appeal of candidates. Thus in all of my analyses, the Democratic two-party vote share is $48.8 \%$ in my composite partisan score. This makes my analysis a more conservative evaluation of the legislature-drawn maps, and adds confidence that when I observe a gerrymander it is in fact a gerrymander.

- 1,000 alternative, hypothetical maps of North Carolina's congressional, Senate, and House districts generated by a neutral, partisan-blind computer algorithm. The redistricting algorithm I use in my analysis was developed by me and a collaborator, Daniel Mosesson (consultant in private practice), and published in Political Analysis in 2018. In our published work, we show that the algorithm produces a large number of unique maps of legislative districts without any indication of bias.
- Legislature-drawn boundaries of districts intended to elect representatives to Congress, the North Carolina Senate, and the North Carolina House of Representatives. These data are available on the North Carolina General Assembly website and may be accessed at the following URLs. https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting


## 3 Mechanics of Gerrymandering

Professor Barber evaluates his simulations relying solely on estimates of the number of seats carried under a composite partisan score that makes the unusual choice to include an election

[^143]from 2014. A deviation from the number of seats carried compared to a neutral counterfactual can be indicative of a gerrymander. It is just one indicator of a gerrymander and by only examining the expected seats carried, Professor Barber misses the dynamics by which the maps drawn by the state legislature effectuate their cumulative and durable gerrymander.


Figure 1: An example of a packing gerrymander in a hypothetical jurisdiction with 25 voters divided into 5 districts.

To understand why it can be problematic to focus exclusively on seats carried, it is helpful to review how gerrymanders work. Consider the example included in Figure 1. For simplicity, suppose each dot corresponds to one voter and that these voters are distributed in "geographic space" as represented in the figure. The voters have preferences that correspond to their voting preference. As I have drawn it, blues constitute a majority and reds are a minority. If a mapmaker was required to divide this space into five districts each with five voters he could do it in a number of ways. Suppose that the mapmaker's goal was to maximize the number of districts carried by red voters. In this instance, a mapmaker might draw a map with district boundaries that look like those in Figure 1 in which there are three districts carried by reds and two blues. We call this a packing gerrymander.

Packing gerrymanders distort representation. In packed systems, one party receives more representation than they should as in the example of the packing gerrymander in Figure 1. In addition, packing gerrymanders can potentially entrench a group in power even when they receive a minority of votes. In the example I provide in Figure 1, the reds are a minority, yet they carry a majority of seats.

The mechanics by which a packing gerrymander accomplishes distortion in representation reveals the shortcomings of relying solely on seats carried as the metric. Observe that in addition to denying representation, packing gerrymanders serve to underweight the votes of one group of voters. In the example I provide here, blues cast more than $50 \%$ of the voters, but they carry fewer than $50 \%$ of the seats. The reverse is true for reds in the example I provide in Figure 1. This contrast in outcomes is significant because it indicates a significant difference in the ways that blue and red votes are weighted, with each red vote effectively counting for more than each blue vote. In practical terms, a packing gerrymander accomplishes this differential vote weighting by over-concentrating one group of voters, the blues in the example I provide in Figure 1. Thus, it is not enough to only consider the seats carried in a plan of legislative districts, but it is necessary to consider the margins by which districts are carried (as I did in my median-mean difference analysis).

One way to conceive of the effect of a packing gerrymander is that it treats parties asymmetrically. That is, for a given proportion of the vote, two parties receive different shares of representation. For example, suppose Republicans receive $52 \%$ of the vote and receive $54 \%$ of the seats. A map treats Democrats symmetrically if Democrats receive $54 \%$ of the seats with $52 \%$ of the vote. Note that symmetry does not require proportionality. Parties can receive more (or less) than $x \%$ of the seats when they receive $x \%$ of the vote so long as the opposing party receives the same number of seats at that voter percentage.

One of the simplest measures of symmetry we can apply to redistricting scenarios is the median-mean difference (see Katz, King and Rosenblatt 2020; McDonald and Best 2015; Best et al. 2017). The median-mean difference is a way of evaluating whether the distribution of
districts in a map is symmetrical. We find it by taking the mean (average) of the districtlevel vote share and comparing it to the median district-level vote-share, the district-level vote share for which there are an equal number of districts with higher vote shares as there are districts with lower vote shares. When the median and mean are equal, the distribution of districts is symmetrical and the map will treat the parties with symmetry. If the medianmean difference is not zero, it means that map will not treat votes cast for the parties equally.

## 4 County-Based Clusters

In order "to minimize the overall number of county splits while maintaining population balance in the redistricting process" the legislature adopted a set of county clusterings described Cooper et al (2021). One effect of the clustering is that each cluster represents a separate redistricting scenario. In effect, it turned North Carolina into a series of smaller "states" that all needed to be redistricted separately. Barber considers each of these clusters separately. He finds the legislature frequently deviates from most common outcomes of the simulations he conducted, but that the deviations most often fall "often within the range of the non-partisan simulated maps" (Barber, 269).

Barber is not always clear in what he means by "range." In many places, he seems to mean that the legislature-drawn map is consistent with at least one of the simulations he produced; however, that is an unusual standard to use in statistical analysis. At one point, in evaluating the Cumberland map, he seems to adopt a new standard arguing that the optimal map "falls outside of the $50 \%$ range of simulation results and is thus classified as a partisan outlier result" (110).

An example from Professor Barber's analysis is illustrative of why the legislature-drawn plan is problematic. For clarity, I provide a copy of a histogram of Professor Barber's results in Figure 2. In Buncombe, $72 \%$ of Dr. Barber's simulations have 3 Democratic leaning


Figure 2: A copy of Dr. Barber's summary of simulations of Buncombe copied from his report dated December 22, 2021 and a summary of 1000 simulations using the algorithm proposed by Magleby and Mosesson (2018).
districts, but the legislature only drew 2 . Here, the outcome is consistent with some of the simulations produced by Dr. Barber, but most of his simulations suggest that Democrats should carry 3 of Buncombe County's districts. In $72 \%$ of the simulated maps, Democrats made up a majority in all 3 of the districts. In contrast to the large majority of Dr. Barber's simulations, the legislature managed to draw a single district carried by Republicans. In order to draw a Republican-majority district, they had to concentrate Democrats in fewer districts than Democrats would naturally carry. As a result, the district carried by Republicans is insulated against any wave in which Democrats might receive more votes than expected based on Dr. Barber's partisan vote index.

Figure 2 also provides a summary of the 1000 cluster-level redistricting simulations I conducted in Buncombe County as part of my analysis of the House map. The patterns are broadly consistent with what Barber found; however, in the set of simulations I conducted
it was more likely that Democrats carry 3 as opposed to 2 districts. Where Dr. Barber finds that there is a $28 \%$ chance that Democrats carry just two districts, I find that Democrats carry 2 districts in $5.3 \%$ of the simulations. A shortage of time does not allow me to explore exactly what drives the difference in Barber's estimates and my estimates, but it is noteworthy that the simulations are broadly similar and show the same outcome is most likely when following a neutral process.

The legislature-drawn map repeats this pattern in several clusters analyzed by Dr. Barber. He finds that in the Forsyth, Stokes cluster, $67 \%$ of his simulated maps have 3 or more Democratic districts. In the Forsyth, Stokes cluster, the legislature drew 2 districts carried by Democrats in Barber's partisan composite. In Guilford County, $99 \%$ of Barber's maps had 5 or more Democratic districts. In Guilford, Democrats carried 4 using Barber's partisan index. In each of those instances, Democrats carry fewer seats, than Dr. Barber's simulations indicate they should. Moreover, the legislature drew extra districts carried by Republicans by packing Democrats into relatively fewer districts than they should have carried based on the analysis presented by Dr. Barber. The consequence of the packing present in each of these clusters is a systematic under-weighting of Democratic votes.

In the Senate map, Barber's analysis again shows that Republicans opted to pack Democratic voters in certain clusters. Consider the distribution represented in Figure 3. On the left side, I provide a copy of the results summarized in Dr. Barber's analysis. Here he finds that $95 \%$ of his simulations yield a map in which Democrats carry more seats than they carry in the legislature drawn map. While that outcome is in the range of outcomes yielded by his simulations, it is not particularly likely and it is far from the most likely outcome. In Figure 3, I also summarize the analysis of Iredell and Mecklenburg County that arises from 1000 simulations using the Magleby-Mosesson Algorithm (2018). As before the patterns are broadly similar. The most likely outcome in Iredell and Mecklenburg counties is that Democrats carry 5 of 6 districts. I find that the algorithm generates maps in which Democrats receive as few as 4 seats, but that only occurs in a minority of simulations


Figure 3: A copy of Dr. Barber's summary of simulations of the Iredell-Mecklenburg cluster copied from his report dated December 22, 2021 and a summary of 1000 simulations using the algorithm proposed by Magleby and Mosesson (2018).
(18.3\%). It is noteworthy again that the simulations yield broadly similar findings and that both Dr. Barber's simulations and those that formed part of my analysis of the Senate map indicate that Democrats should carry more seats than they do in the legislature-drawn map.

The result of this pattern is the same in the Senate as it was in the House. By opting to pack democrats into fewer districts, the legislature underweights Democratic votes in Iredell and Mecklenburg Counties. By considering one cluster at a time, Barber describes the impact as relatively minor - Democrats receive one fewer seat than we would expect if the legislature engaged in a neutral district-drawing process. However, in reality, because this is repeated in other clusters, the resulting difference in vote-weights state-wide makes it extremely unlikely that Democrats will be able to achieve legislative majorities should they secure a majority of votes for legislative office.

## 5 Conclusion

The data presented in Dr. Barber's report are inconsistent with his claim that the legislaturedrawn maps are not a gerrymanders. One issue with Dr. Barber's report is that he relies on a metric, seats carried, that does not allow us to directly consider the way the legislature's maps systematically underweight Democratic votes. Yet in cluster after cluster, he shows that Republicans packed Democrats in ways that would underweight Democratic votes. In my analysis, I calculated the median-mean difference for the legislature-drawn Senate and House maps. I find that both legislature-drawn maps show patterns of treating Democratic and Republican voters asymmetrically with Democratic votes being systematically underweighted. Moreover, the median-mean difference is more extreme in the legislature-drawn maps than what I observe in any of the 1000 simulations of the House and Senate that I analyzed in my report.

The legislature-drawn maps are partisan gerrymanders because they exhibit significant partisan bias, and the bias is likely to persist when Democrats increase their vote share in North Carolina. The consequences of the cluster-level bias are pronounced when we consider the aggregate effect of cluster-level bias statewide.

## References

Best, Robin E, Shawn J Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, Daniel B Magleby and Michael D McDonald. 2017. "Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymandering Standard." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy .

Katz, Jonathan N, Gary King and Elizabeth Rosenblatt. 2020. "Theoretical foundations and empirical evaluations of partisan fairness in district-based democracies." American Political Science Review 114(1):164-178.

McDonald, Michael D. and Robin E. Best. 2015. "Unfair partisan gerrymanders in politics and law: A diagnostic applied to six cases." Election Law Journal 14(4):312-330.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of NC that the foregoing is true and


Daniel B. Magleby, Ph.D.
Date: $12 / 28 / 21$
(Updated December 3, 2021)
Contact Information

| 4400 Vestal Parkway East | Email: dmagleby@binghamton.edu |
| :--- | :--- |
| Binghamton University | Office: (607) 777-6787 |
| Binghamton, NY 13902 | Mobile: (801) 885-5813 |

Academic Appointments

## Binghamton University (SUNY)

Associate Professor, Political Science, 2019-Present
Associate Professor (by courtesy), Economics, 2019-Present
Fellow, Center on Democratic Performance, 2014-Present
Assistant Professor, Political Science, 2013-2019
Duke University
Postdoctoral Fellow, Program in Institutions and Public Choice, 2011-2013
University of Michigan
Visiting Scholar, Center for Political Studies, 2019-2020
Instructor, Political Science, Summer 2011
Education

PhD, Political Science, University of Michigan, 2011
MA, Political Science, University of Michigan, 2008
MS, Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Northwestern University, 2007
BA, Political Science, Brigham Young University, 2005
Publications
"Seats, Votes, and Partisanship." forthcoming. in Partisanship Reconsidered, Jeremy C. Pope and Christopher F. Karpowitz eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
"Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders?" 2021. American Politics Research. with Robin Best, Steve Lem, and Michael D. McDonald.
"Detecting Florida's Gerrymander: A Lesson for Law and Social Science." 2020. Social Science Quarterly, 101(1): 37-52. with Robin Best, Jonathan Krasno, and Michael D. McDonald.
"Making a Case for Two Paths Forward in Light of Gill v. Whitford." 2018. Election Law Journal, 17 (4): 315-327. with Robin Best, Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, and Michael D. McDonald.
"Gerrymandering." 2018 in Challenges of U.S. Electoral Integrity. Pippa Norris, Sarah Cameron and Thomas Wynter eds. New York: Oxford University Press. with Robin Best, Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, and Michael D. McDonald.
"Backward Induction in the Wild? Evidence from Sequential Voting in the U.S. Senate." 2018. The American Economic Review, 108 (July): 1971-2013. with B. Pablo Montagnes and Jörg L. Spenkuch.
"Can Gerrymanders Be Measured? An Examination of Wisconsin's State Assembly." 2018. American Politics Research. Published Online May 14, 2018. with Robin Best, Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, and Michael D. McDonald.
"A New Approach for Developing Neutral Redistricting Plans." 2018. Political Analysis, 26 (2): 147167. with Daniel Mosesson.
"Amendment Politics and Legislative Agenda Setting: A Theory with Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives." 2018. The Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 34(1): 108-131. with Nathan Monroe and Gregory Robinson.
"Values and Validations: Proper Criteria for Comparing Standards of Packing Gerrymandering." 2018. Election Law Journal, 17 (1): 82-84. with Robin Best, Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, and Michael D. McDonald.
"Considering the Prospects for Identifying a Gerrymandering Standard." 2018. Election Law Journal, 17 (1): 1-20. with Robin Best, Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, and Michael D. McDonald.
"Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels: The Politics of Weak Obstruction in the United States Senate." 2017. Congress 8 the Presidency, 44 (3): 344-368. with Molly Reynolds.
"Popularity, Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles." 2014. Public Choice, 159 (3-4): 457-467. with Marek Hanusch.

## Working Papers

"Constituency Size and the Perpetuation of Bias in Single Member Districts." with Gregory Robinson. Under review.
"Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders?" with Robin E. Best, Steve B. Lem, and Michael D. McDonald. Under review.
"Counterfactual Apportionment: The Effects of Malapportionment in Hybrid Regimes with Evidence from Malaysia." with Hilary J. Izatt. Under review.
"Assessing Wasted Votes as an Indicator of Partisan Gerrymandering." with Jonathan Krasno and Gregory Robinson. Under review.
"Polarization as a Function of Constituency Size." with Gregory Robinson and Matt Walz.
"Vote Buying with Endogenous Agenda Setting"
"Why Do Governments Pay for Your Research? The Political Economy of Science Funding Decisions." with Arthur Lupia.

Patents Under Review
"Neutral Redistricting Using a Multi-level Weighted Graph Partition Algorithm." Patent under review: U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/510,529. May 2017. with Daniel B. Mosesson. Filed by the Research Foundation of the State University of New York.

## Additional Education

Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models, Summer Institute, Duke University, 2008
Fellowships and Awards

Dean's Research Semester, Binghamton University, SUNY, 2018
Transdisciplinary Working Group in Data Science seed grant; Binghamton University, SUNY, 2018
CQ Press Award: best paper on legislative studies that was presented at the 2014 annual meeting of APSA, with Pam McCann for "Taking Turns: Separation of Power and the Nature of Compromise in the United States Congress," 2015

National Science Foundation, Dissertation Improvement Grant (SES-1023728), "Explaining the Use and Policy Impact of Conference Committees," 2010-2011

Ford Fellowship (Tuition and Stipend), 2009-2011
Ford Fellowship Research Grant for dissertation research on conference committee frequency and effects, 2008-2011

National Science Foundation, Grant to attend the EITM summer Institute at Duke University, Summer 2008

Northwestern University, Graduate Assistantship, 2006-2007
U.S. Department of Education and the University of Michigan Center for Latin American and Carribean Studies, FLAS, Summer 2006

University of Michigan, Graduate Fellowship, Political Science Department, 2005-2006
Pi Sigma Alpha, (Undergraduate Political Science Honors Society), National Member 2004, 2005

Election Sciences, Reform, and Administration Conference, 2019.
Partisanship Reconsidered Conference, 2019.
University of Michigan, Interdisciplinary Workshop on American Politics, 2019.
Brigham Young University, Romney Institute of Public Service and Ethics, 2018.
University of Utah, Department of Political Science, 2018.
Duke University, SAMSI, Conference on Gerrymandering 2018.
A Better Utah, Roundtable on Redistricting, 2018.
EITM, University of Michigan, MFR Presentation, 2018.
Roundtable on Transdiscplinary Working Groups, Binghamton University Research Days, 2018.
Cornell University, Department of Political Science, 2018.
Binghamton Univesity, Transdisciplinary Working Group in Data Science, Data Salon, 2017.
EIP Workshop on Protecting Electoral Security and Voting Rights, 2017.
PINET: Polinformatics of lawmaking, 2017.
LDS Scholars Workshop, Brigham Young University, 2017.
Binghamton University, Department of Economics, 2017.
University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, 2016.
Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Political Science, 2016.
EITM, University of Michigan, Summer Institute Conference, 2015.
Cornell University, Department of Political Science, 2015.
Binghamton University, SUNY, Department of Political Science, 2012.
University at Buffalo, SUNY, Department of Political Science, 2012.
University of Toronto, Department of Political Science, 2012.
University of Idaho, Department of Political Science, 2012.
Wesleyan University, Department of Government, 2011.
The Ohio State University, Department of Political Science, 2011.
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Department of Political Science, 2011.
Conference on Legislative Elections, Process, and Policy; Vanderbilt University, 2009.

## Conference Presentations

American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2012*, 2010.

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008.
Southern Political Science Association Annual Meetings, 2011.
State Politics and Policy Conference; 2018, 2016.
American Association of Public Opinion Research, 2005.

Professional Service:
Occasional Reviewer for: American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Political Analysis, Election Law Journal
Member, NSF Political Science Panel, 2018-2019
Member, Award Committee, CQ Press Award (APSA, Legislative Studies Section), 2015 - 2016
University and Departmental Service (Binghamton):
Faculty Senator, 2017 - 2019
Department Executive Committee, Political Science, 2016-2019
Graduate Committee, Political Science, 2016 - Present
Award Committee, Hofferbert Award, Political Science, 2014-2017
Harpur College Academic Standards Committee, 2014 - 2016
University and Departmental Service (University of Michigan):
Faculty Search Committee, Political Science, Political Economy, 2009
Graduate Admissions Committee, Department of Political Science, 2008
Teaching

At Binghamton University:
Formal Theory PhD seminar, 2019, 2017, 2016
American Politics PhD core seminar, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014
Congressional Politics senior seminar, 2019, 2017, 2016
Interest Groups senior seminar, 2019, 2014, 2013
Congress and the Presidency, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2013, 2011
Congressional Institutions and Behavior, 2016, 2015
At Duke University:
Campaigns and Elections, 2012
The American Political System, 2012,
Congress and the Presidency, 2013, 2011
At The University of Michigan:
Congressional Institutions and Behavior, 2011
Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models, Summer Institute:
Mentoring Faculty in Residence,
2015, University of Michigan
2016, Duke University
2018, University of Michigan

Dissertation Committee Member:
Giovanni Scaringi, Binghamton University, SUNY; 2017
Eric Walsh, Binghamton University, SUNY; 2018
Eric Moore, Binghamton University, SUNY; 2018
Shawn Donahue, Binghamton University, SUNY; 2019
Allison Bugenis, Binghamton University, SUNY; in process
Matthew Walz, Binghamton University, SUNY; in process
Personal

Languages:
Portuguese: Speaking, reading, and writing
Academic References
Available upon request.

- Ex. 6941 -

- Ex. 6942 -



[^0]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^1]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^2]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^3]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^4]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^5]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^6]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^7]:    District plan definition file: 'CST-8.csv', modified 10/25/2021 9:57 AM

[^8]:    Number of split VTDs: 14

[^9]:    ${ }^{1}$ Rule 1006 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states: "The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 1006.

[^10]:    1 See Dave's Redistricting, https://davesredistricting.org/maps\#home (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
    2 I have observed that Dave's Redistricting App is one of the most used and well-known applications for redistricting that is publicly available and free. For example, I have read an excerpt of the hearing transcript from the November 30, 2021 hearing in the matter N.C. NAACP v. Berger, Case No. 21CVS014476 (Wake Cty Super. Ct ) in which counsel for the Legislative Defendants acknowledged that census data is publicly available through Dave's Redistricting App and would be an acceptable resource for legislators.
    3 Districtr.org, https://districtr.org/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).

[^11]:    4 Available at https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/10-052021/Duke\%20Senate\%20Groupings\%20Maps $\% 2011 \times 17$. pdf\#page $=6$.

[^12]:    5 N.C. Gen. Assembly, https://ncleg.gov/Documents/493\#Video (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).

[^13]:    6 This process can be seen on October 7, in the video "2021-10-07 Map Drawing Station 04," at timestamp 2:19:19, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? $\mathrm{v}=6 \mathrm{CVbWSWL}-\mathrm{I}$. Whenever a staff person assisted Senators in drawing the Senate plan, they would find the most recent version of the plan, copy it, rename it, and begin making changes.
    7 The version sequence on October 7, 2021 is as follows: SCC-1 $\rightarrow$ SCC- $-2 \rightarrow$ SCG- $1 \rightarrow$ SCG- $2 \rightarrow$ SMT-3 $\rightarrow$ SBR3.

[^14]:    8 The version sequence on October 11-14, 2021 is as follows: SBR-3 $\rightarrow$ SCG-3 $\rightarrow$ SCG-4 $\rightarrow$ STU-2 $\rightarrow$ SST-1 $\rightarrow$ SST-2 $\rightarrow$ SST-3 $\rightarrow$ SST-4.
    9 See https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/Member\%20Submitted\%20Maps/SST-4/SST-4\%20-\%20StatPack.pdf ("modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM")
    10 See https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/Member\%20Submitted\%20Maps/SST-4/SST-4 19x36.pdf ("NC General Assembly, October 18, 2021")
    ${ }^{11}$ The version sequence on October 27-28, 2021, is as follows: SST-4 $\rightarrow$ SST- $11 \rightarrow$ SCH-3 $\rightarrow$ SST-13
    12 See https://ncleg.gov/BillLookUp/2021/S739.
    13 https://webservices.ncleg.gov/ViewBillDocument/2021/53320/0/S739-PCS15347-ST-38
    14 According to DRA, the election composite "gives a measure of partisanship over different contests and years, which we prefer, because individual elections can be skewed by various factors. We use the latest available elections, and those not available are simply left out. We also exclude uncontested elections and those that have a significant third-party vote percentage (usually $>10 \%$ ). The formula is the following: Composite $=$ Mean(Pres, Sen, GovAg), where Pres $=$ Mean(1 or 2 Presidential elections), $\operatorname{Sen}=$ Mean( 1 or 2 Senate elections) and GovAg = Mean(Governor and Attorney General elections)." See Exhibit B.

[^15]:    15 This is visible in the video "2021-10-27 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" at timestamp 54:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A44AbmkAkrg.

[^16]:    ${ }^{16}$ The video "2021-10-07 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" displays Senator Hise and the unidentified aide working on Station 4 at approximately timestamp 6:00:24, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1 Re6 J1g8Q. The station feeds and room feed do not always line up exactly because the video streams were live for different lengths of time. This was yet another difficulty with trying to confirm which legislators were working on what maps, and at which times.

[^17]:    17 I believe that the videos for October 13 are mislabeled on YouTube as duplicate October 14 videos. The ncleg.gov website links for the October 13 videos links to a set of videos labeled as October 14, but which show different recordings than the second set of October 14 videos (which are properly labeled on both ncleg.gov and YouTube).
    18 The video "2021-10-14 Redistricting Map Drawing (Senate)" available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpkla8tOka4 (on information and belief, I believe this was mislabeled on YouTube as a duplicate $10 / 14$ entry rather than $10 / 13$ ) displays Senator Newton and the unidentified aide at approximately timestamp 2:42:02.

[^18]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^19]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
    Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina
    Printed 10/14/2021 [G20-CntyDist]

[^20]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^21]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^22]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^23]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^24]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^25]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^26]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^27]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM

[^28]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
    Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
    Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
    [G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

[^29]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
    Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
    Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
    [G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

[^30]:    District plan definition file: 'SST-4.csv', modified 10/14/2021 1:10 PM
    Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.
    Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.
    [G20-MbCD] - Generated 10/14/2021

[^31]:    General Assembly Of North Carolina
    Session 2021
    1830544042003, 1830544042004, 1830544042005, 1830544042006, 1830544042007, 1830544042008, 1830544042009, 1830544042010, 1830544042011, 1830544042012, 1830544042013, 1830544042016, 1830544042019, 1830544043000, 1830544043001, 1830544043003, 1830544043004, 1830544043020, 1830544043021, 1830544043022, 1830544043025, 1830544043032, 1830544043083; VTD 14-01, VTD 14-02, VTD 19-03, VTD 19-05, VTD 19-07, VTD 19-09, VTD 19-11, VTD 19-12, VTD 19-15: Block(s) 1830542031028, 1830542031029, 1830542031030, 1830542121000, 1830542121001, 1830542121002, 1830542121003, 1830542121004, 1830542121005, 1830542121006, 1830542121007, 1830542121008, 1830542121009, 1830542121010, 1830542121011, 1830542121012, 1830542121013, 1830542121014, 1830542121015, 1830542121016, 1830542121017, 1830542121018, 1830542121019, 1830542121020, 1830542121021, 1830542121022, 1830542121023, 1830542121024, 1830542121025, 1830542121026, 1830542122000, 1830542122001, 1830542122002, 1830542122003, 1830542122008, 1830542122009, 1830542122015, 1830542122016, 1830542122017, 1830542122018, 1830542123001, 1830542123002, 1830542123003, 1830542123004, 1830542123008; VTD 19-16, VTD 19-18, VTD 19-19, VTD 19-20, VTD 19-21.
    District 14: Wake County: VTD 01-19, VTD 01-20, VTD 01-22, VTD 01-25, VTD 01-26, VTD 01-28: Block(s) 1830505002000, 1830505002001, 1830505003020, 1830519001000, 1830519001001, 1830519001002, 1830519001003, 1830519001004, 1830519001005, 1830519001006, 1830519001007, 1830519001008, 1830519001009, 1830519001010, 1830519001011, 1830519001012, 1830519001013, 1830519001014, 1830519001015, 1830519001016, 1830519001017, 1830519001018, 1830519001019, 1830519001020, 1830519001021, 1830519001026, 1830519001031, 1830519001036, 1830519002003, 1830519002008, 1830519002013, 1830519002018, 1830519003004, 1830519003009 , 1830519003015, 1830527053021, 1830527061023, 1830527062015 , 1830519001022, 1830519001023, 1830519001027, 1830519001028, 1830519001032, 1830519001033, 1830519001037, 1830519002000, 1830519002004, 1830519002005, 1830519002009, 1830519002010, 1830519002014, 1830519002015, 1830519003000, 1830519003001, 1830519003005, 1830519003006, 1830519003010, 1830519003012, 1830527053017, 1830527053018, 1830527053027, 1830527053029, 1830527061024, 1830527062012, 1830519001024, 1830519001025, 1830519001029, 1830519001030, 1830519001034, 1830519001035, 1830519002001, 1830519002002, 1830519002006, 1830519002007, 1830519002011, 1830519002012, 1830519002016, 1830519002017, 1830519003002, 1830519003003, 1830519003007, 1830519003008, 1830519003013, 1830519003014, 1830527053019, 1830527053020, 1830527061021, 1830527061022, 1830527062015, 1830527062016, 1830527062017, 1830527062018, 1830527062019, 1830541064023; VTD 01-34, VTD 01-35, VTD 01-40, VTD 01-50, VTD 10-01: Block(s) 1830544043038, 1830544043039, 1830544043040, 1830544043062; VTD 10-02: Block(s) 1830544041002, 1830544041003, 1830544041004, 1830544041005, 1830544041006, 1830544041009, 1830544041010, 1830544041011, 1830544041013, 1830544041014, 1830544041015, 1830544041016, 1830544041017, 1830544041018, 1830544041019, 1830544041020, 1830544041021, 1830544041022, 1830544041023, 1830544041024, 1830544041030, 1830544041031, 1830544041032, 1830544041033, 1830544041036, 1830544041037, 1830544041038, 1830544041039, 1830544041040, 1830544041041, 1830544041042, 1830544041043, 1830544041044, 1830544041045, 1830544041050, 1830544041051, 1830544041070, 1830544041071, 1830544041072, 1830544042014, 1830544042015, 1830544042017, 1830544042018, 1830544043005, 1830544043006, 1830544043007, 1830544043008, 1830544043009, 1830544043010, 1830544043011, 1830544043012, 1830544043013, 1830544043014, 1830544043015, 1830544043017, 1830544043018, 1830544043019, 1830544043033, 1830544043034, 1830544043035, 1830544043071, 1830544043072, 1830544043073, 1830544043082; VTD 10-03, VTD

[^32]:    General Assembly Of North Carolina
    1830529063002, 1830529063003, 1830529063004, 1830529063005, 1830529063006, 1830529063007, 1830531101000, 1830531101001, 1830531101002, 1830531101027, 1830531101028, 1830531101029; VTD 15-03, VTD 15-04: Block(s) 1830529031000, 1830529031001, 1830529031002, 1830529031004, 1830529031005, 1830529031007, 1830529031008, 1830529031009, 1830529031010, 1830529031011, 1830529031013, 1830529031014, 1830529032014, 1830529032015, 1830529032016, 1830529032017, 1830529032018, 1830529032019, 1830529032020, 1830529032021, 1830529032022, 1830529032023, 1830529032024, 1830529032025; VTD 18-02, VTD 18-04: Block(s) 1830530071000, 1830530071001, 1830530071002, 1830530071011, 1830530071012, 1830530071013, 1830530072000, 1830530072001, 1830530072002, 1830530072003, 1830530073000 , 1830530073001, 1830530073002, 1830530091000, 1830530091001, 1830530091002, 1830530091003, 1830530091004, 1830530091005, 1830530091007, 1830530091008, 1830530091009, 1830530091013, 1830530091022, 1830530091024, 1830530091025, 1830530091026, 1830530091027, 1830530091028, 1830530091029, 1830530091030, 1830530091031, 1830530091032, 1830530091033, 1830530091034, 1830530091035, 1830530091036, 1830530091037, 1830530093000, 1830530093001, 1830530093002, 1830530093003, 1830530093012, 1830530101012, 1830530101013, 1830530102000, 1830530102001, 1830530102002, 1830530102003, 1830530102004, 1830530102005, 1830530102006, 1830545011023; VTD 18-05, VTD 18-07, VTD 20-01: Block(s) 1830534311014, 1830534311016, 1830534311020, 1830534311021, 1830534311022, 1830534311023, 1830534311024, 1830534311025, 1830534311026, 1830534311027, 1830534311028, 1830534311029, 1830534311030, 1830534311031, 1830534311032, 1830534311033, 1830534311034, 1830534311035, 1830534311036, 1830534311037, 1830534311038, 1830534311039, 1830534311040, 1830534311041, 1830534311042, 1830534311043, 1830534312001, 1830534312002, 1830534312003, 1830534312004, 1830534312005, 1830534312006, 1830534312008, 1830534312009, 1830534312010, 1830534312011, 1830534312012, 1830534312013, 1830534312014, 1830534312015, 1830534312016, 1830534312017, 1830534312018, 1830534312019, 1830534312020, 1830534361049; VTD 20-06A, VTD 20-06B, VTD 20-11.
    District 18: Wake County: VTD 01-15, VTD 01-17, VTD 01-18, VTD 01-30, VTD 01-37, VTD 01-38, VTD 01-39, VTD 01-42, VTD 01-43, VTD 01-44, VTD 01-45, VTD 01-46, VTD 01-47, VTD 01-51, VTD 07-02, VTD 07-03, VTD 07-04, VTD 07-05, VTD 07-06, VTD 07-07, VTD 07-09, VTD 07-11, VTD 07-12, VTD 07-13, VTD 08-02, VTD 08-05, VTD $08-06$, VTD $08-09$, VTD $08-10$, VTD $08-11$, VTD 13-01, VTD 13-02, VTD 13-05, VTD 13-06, VTD 13-07, VTD 13-08, VTD 13-09, VTD 13-10, VTD 13-11, VTD 17-04: Block(s) 1830541212032, 1830541212035, 1830541212041; VTD 17-10, VTD 17-11, VTD 19-13, VTD 19-14, VTD 19-15: Block(s) 1830542122004, 1830542122005, 1830542122006, 1830542122007, 1830542122010, 1830542122011, 1830542122012, 1830542122013, 1830542122014, 1830542122019, 1830542122020, 1830542122021, 1830542122022, 1830542122023, 1830542122024, 1830542122025, 1830542122026, 1830542122027, 1830542122028, 1830542122029, 1830542122030, 1830542123000, 1830542123005, 1830542123006, 1830542123007, 1830542123009, 1830542123010, 1830542123011, 1830542123014, 1830542123015, 1830542133000; VTD 19-17.
    District 19: Cumberland County: VTD AH49, VTD CC01, VTD CC03, VTD CC04, VTD CC05, VTD CC06, VTD CC07, VTD CC08, VTD CC10, VTD CC12, VTD CC13, VTD CC14, VTD CC15, VTD CC16, VTD CC17, VTD CC18, VTD CC19, VTD CC21, VTD CC24, VTD CC25, VTD CC26, VTD CC27, VTD CC29, VTD CC31, VTD CC32, VTD CC33, VTD CC34, VTD CL57-1, VTD CL57-2, VTD CU02, VTD G10A, VTD G1A, VTD G2A, VTD G2B, VTD G2C-1, VTD G2C-2, VTD G2E-1, VTD G2E-2, VTD G3A-1, VTD G3A-2, VTD G3B, VTD G3C, VTD G4A, VTD G4B, VTD G4C, VTD G5A-1, VTD G5A-2,

[^33]:    1 See https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021-182/2021/08-18-
    21/Chairs\%20Potential\%20Sites\%20Handout\%20v1.pdf
    2 See https://www.ncleg.gov/Legislation/SupplementalDocs/2011/publichearings/redistricting
    3 See https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021-
    182/2021/Public\%20Hearing\%20Schedule.pdf
    4 See https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021-
    182/2021/Public\%20Hearing $\%$ 20Schedule.pdf

[^34]:    ${ }^{1}$ See https://www.caliper.com/redistricting/data-included.htm

[^35]:    ${ }^{2}$ See https://davesredistricting.org/maps\#aboutdata

[^36]:    ${ }^{1}$ https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/electionscience
    ${ }^{2}$ https://redistrictingdatahub.org

[^37]:    ${ }^{3}$ For a more technical discussion of the algorithm please see Appendix ??

[^38]:    ${ }^{4}$ Because of the compressed time available, a few counties posed coding problems because the average population deviation within clusters abutted the constitutional limit. Thus I allowed the algorithm slightly more flexibility. The algorithm draws maps randomly, there is no reason to believe this slight deviation from exact population parity should create an advantage for either Democrats or Republicans.

[^39]:    ${ }^{5}$ As described in an earlier footnote, we allow the algorithm more leeway to account for highly constrained average population deviations in some clusters.

[^40]:    ${ }^{1}$ The uniform swing hypothesis takes a single election and then uniformly increases (or decreases) the percentage for a given party across all the predicts. This creates a new set of voting data with the same spatial structure but a different statewide partisan percentage for each party.

[^41]:    ${ }^{2}$ In the two exceptional clusters, it is impossible to draw districts that preserve precincts and also achieve population balance within $5 \%$. For Wake in the senate, we sample with a deviation of $6 \%$ and generate an associated ensemble; past experience has shown that this does not create a partisan effect and we will be confirming this in follow on analyses. In Craven-Carteret, precinct 02 in Craven is the only precinct that connects the bulk of Craven with Carteret and it must be split to achieve population balance between the two districts within this cluster. We have examined the voting patterns when assigning this precinct to the district with the bulk of Craven or with all of Carteret and found minimal effects on the outcome.

[^42]:    ${ }^{1}$ The terms 'Hispanic' and 'Latino' are often used interchangeably to describe immigrants from Mexico, Cuba, and Central and South America. I will use 'Hispanic' throughout this report because that is the term most often employed by the U.S. Census Bureau, the North Carolina State Board of Elections, and other government agencies and researchers to characterize voters who have ties to those regions.

[^43]:    ${ }^{3}$ Carmichael, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, 72, and Foner, Second Founding. Johnson spoke often of a "white man's government"; for the example used here, see Speech on the Restoration of State Government, January 21, 1864, in Graf and Haskins, eds., Papers of Andrew Johnson, vol. 6, 577-78.

[^44]:    ${ }^{4}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 3-31, and Morris, "Panic and Reprisal," 52.
    ${ }^{5}$ On antebellum North Carolina's economic and political structure, see Escott, Many Excellent People, chapt. 1. The figure on slaveholders in the state legislature is from p. 15.
    ${ }^{6}$ Ibid., 28-30, and 34.

[^45]:    ${ }^{7}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 44 and 49, and Raper, William W. Holden, 51. On internal dissent during the Civil War, see also Durrill, Uncivil War.
    ${ }^{8}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 89-90.
    ${ }^{9}$ Ibid., 130, and Public Laws of North Carolina, 1865-66, chapt. 40. For North Carolina law governing slaves and free Blacks before the Civil War, see Revised Code of North Carolina, 1854, chapt. 107. See also Browning, "North Carolina Black Code."
    ${ }^{10}$ Public Laws of North Carolina, 1865-66, chapt. 40.
    ${ }^{11}$ Raper, William W. Holden, 91.

[^46]:    ${ }^{12}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 135, and Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations, 429. Tennessee had been readmitted to the Union in 1866.
    ${ }^{13}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 125 and 142; Bernstein, "Participation of Negro Delegates in the Constitutional Convention of 1868," 391; and Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, 240-46.
    ${ }^{14}$ Constitution of the State of North Carolina, 1868, Article V, sec. 2; Article VI, Sec. 1; Article VII, Sec. 1; and Article XI, sec. 7; and Orth, "North Carolina Constitutional History," 1779.
    ${ }^{15}$ Constitution of North Carolina, 1868, Ordinances, chapt. XXXVI.
    ${ }^{16}$ Raper, William W. Holden, 101, and Foner, Reconstruction, 332.

[^47]:    ${ }^{17}$ Proceedings of the Colored National Labor Convention, 4 and 11-12.
    ${ }^{18}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 145-48 and 151.
    ${ }^{19}$ Raper, William W. Holden, 160.

[^48]:    ${ }^{20}$ Hamilton, ed., Papers of Randolph Abbott Shotwell, vol. 2, 376.
    ${ }^{21}$ Ibid., chapts. 8-9.
    ${ }^{22}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 147.
    ${ }^{23}$ Crow, "Cracking the Solid South," 335, and Escott, Many Excellent People, 181. On North Carolina's Black congressmen, see E. Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1872-1901.

[^49]:    ${ }^{24}$ Petty, Standing Their Ground, and Goldfield, Still Fighting the Civil War, 277-78.
    ${ }^{25}$ Beckel, Radical Reform, 135-77, and North Carolina Governor, 1896, [http://bit.ly/32oHPk](http://bit.ly/32oHPk), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{26}$ On local elections, see Escott, Many Excellent People, 247, and Gershenhorn, "Rise and Fall of Fusion Politics in North Carolina," 4.
    ${ }^{27}$ Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 186, and Public Laws and Resolutions of the State of North Carolina, Session of 1895, chaps. 69, 73, 116, 135, 174, 183, 219, 275, 348.

[^50]:    ${ }^{28}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1895, chapt. 159, sec. 5, and Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1897 , chapt. 185, sec. 72.
    ${ }^{29}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1895, chapt. 159, sec. 7.
    ${ }^{30}$ Ibid., chapt. 159, secs. 38, 39, and 41.
    ${ }^{31}$ Ibid., chapt. 159, secs. 10-12 and 14.

[^51]:    ${ }^{32}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1895, chapt. 159, secs. 19 and 20; Trelease, "Fusion Legislatures of 1895 and 1897," 282; and Beeby, Revolt of the Tar Heels, 40. On illiteracy, see Report of Population of the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890, part 2, xxxv.
    ${ }^{33}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1895, chapt. 159, sec. 72.
    ${ }^{34}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 245-47; Beckel, Radical Reform, 179-80; and Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 182 and 187.
    ${ }^{35}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1897, chapt. 421.

[^52]:    ${ }^{36}$ Ibid., chapt. 108.
    ${ }^{37}$ Constitution of the State of North Carolina, 1868, Article I, secs. 1-2.
    ${ }^{38}$ Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 183.
    ${ }^{39}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 253-58, and Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, 206. On the Black Second, see E. Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1872-190, and Justesen, George Henry White.

[^53]:    40 "The North Carolina Race Conflict," Outlook 60 (November 19, 1898), 708, and Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism, 53.

[^54]:    ${ }^{41}$ For a detailed account of events in Wilmington, see 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report, 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission, May 31, 2006, [http://bit.ly/2HOWsgJ](http://bit.ly/2HOWsgJ), September 5, 2019. The report was commissioned by the state legislature in 2000. In 2007, lawmakers expressed "'profound regret that violence, intimidation and force' were used to overthrow an elected government, force people from their homes and ruin lives." See "Senate Apologizes for Wilmington Race Riot," Raleigh News and Observer, August 2, 2007.
    ${ }^{42}$ Raleigh News and Observer, November 10, 1898; Wilmington Morning Star, November 10, 1898; and Wilmington Messenger, November 10, 1898.

[^55]:    ${ }^{43}$ Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 191, and Escott, Many Excellent People, 258.
    ${ }^{44}$ Laws and Resolutions, 1900, chapt. 2.
    ${ }^{45}$ Ibid.
    ${ }^{46}$ Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 190, and Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1899, chapt. 16.
    ${ }^{47}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1899, chapt. 507, secs. 11 and 18.

[^56]:    ${ }^{48}$ Ibid., chapt. 507, secs. 11, 21, and 22.
    ${ }^{49}$ Ibid., chapt. 507, secs. 4-5 and 8-9.
    ${ }^{50} \mathrm{Ibid}$. , chapt. 507, secs. 27 and 29.

[^57]:    ${ }^{51}$ Connor and Poe, eds., Life and Speeches of Charles Brantley Aycock, 82 and 218-19.
    52 "Aycock at Snow Hill," Raleigh Morning Post, March 1, 1900; Prather, "Red Shirt Movement," 181-83; and Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 193.
    ${ }^{53}$ Untitled item, Charlotte Daily Observer, June 6, 1900, and Woodward, Origins of the New South, 328.
    ${ }^{54}$ Public Laws, Session of 1901, chapt. 89.

[^58]:    ${ }^{55}$ Escott, Many Excellent People, 261, and Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 195.
    ${ }^{56}$ Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 261. The account that follows is adapted from Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, 16-18, and Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism, 54-57.
    ${ }^{58}$ Public Laws and Resolutions, Session of 1899, chapt. 384, and Paschal, Jim Crow in North Carolina.
    ${ }^{58}$ Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City, 187.

[^59]:    ${ }^{59}$ Herbin-Triant, "Southern Segregation South African-Style," 171 and 186.
    ${ }^{60}$ See Sharpless, Cooking in Other Women's Kitchens, and Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism.
    ${ }^{61}$ Hall, Leloudis, Korstad, Murphy, Jones, and Daly, Like a Family, 80; Williamson, Crucible of Race, 430-32; and Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 700.
    ${ }^{62}$ Thuesen, Greater Than Equal, 31, 86, and 268 n. 48.

[^60]:    ${ }^{63}$ Carlton and Coclanis, Confronting Southern Poverty, 33, 42, 54-55, and 59; Larkins, Negro Population of North Carolina, 29; and Shin, "Black-White Differentials in Infant Mortality in the South, 1940-1970," 17. The infant mortality rate for Blacks was 76.6 per 1,000 live births, compared to 50.3 per 1,000 live births for whites.
    ${ }^{64}$ Josephus Daniels to John T. Graves, December 21, 1942, cited in Ward, Defending White Democracy, 2.
    ${ }^{65}$ Estimates of the scale of the Great Migration vary. The figures cited here are from Gregory, "Second Great Migration," 21. On the New Negro, see Whalan, The Great War and the Culture of the New Negro.

[^61]:    ${ }^{66}$ Election data are from Ladd Jr., with Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 59.
    67 "North Carolinians Hold State-wide Political Confab," Pittsburgh Courier, April 12, 1932, and "Durham, Thriving Southern Metropolis of 17,000 Negro Inhabitants," Norfolk Journal and Guide, April 16, 1932.

    68 "Carolina Whites Horrified as Negro Democrats Vote," Atlanta Daily World, June 6, 1932, and "Elect Magistrates on Democratic Ticket in North Carolina," Pittsburgh Courier, November 24, 1934.
    ${ }^{69}$ "Dagger at the Heart," Raleigh News and Observer, May 25, 1932; "More Talk About Negro Situation," Raleigh News and Observer, June 1, 1932; and Gershenhorn, Louis Austin, 49.

[^62]:    ${ }^{70}$ Moore, "Senator Josiah W. Bailey and the 'Conservative Manifesto' of 1937"; Patterson, "Failure of Party Realignment in the South," 603; Bailey to Peter Gerry, October 19, 1937, Senatorial Series, General Correspondence, Bailey Papers; "Roosevelt 'Purge' Rapped by Bailey," Atlanta Constitution, September 11, 1938; and Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge, 237.
    ${ }^{71}$ Katznelson, Fear Itself, chapt. 5.
    ${ }^{72}$ Johnson, "Does the South Owe the Negro a New Deal?"

[^63]:    ${ }^{73}$ On the growth of the NAACP and the CIO, see Dalfiume, "'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," 99100, and Zieger, The CIO.
    ${ }^{74}$ Jones, March on Washington, chapt. 1.
    ${ }^{75}$ Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism, 202.
    ${ }^{76}$ Ibid., 251-52.

[^64]:    ${ }^{77}$ On Wallace's life and career, see Culver and Hyde, American Dreamer.
    78 "Wallace Party Names Picks for N.C. Posts," Norfolk Journal and Guide, September 4, 1948, and Report of the Nominating Committee, Progressive Party of North Carolina, box 2, folder 13, Scales Papers. On Blackwell, see Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 27-28. For more on the Progressive Party and the Wallace campaign in North Carolina, see Uesugi, "Gender, Race, and the Cold War."
    ${ }^{79}$ Devine, Henry Wallace's 1948 Presidential Campaign, p. 245, and "Deplorable Disorders," Charlotte Observer, September 1, 1948.

[^65]:    ${ }^{80}$ Wallace, "Ten Extra Years," [http://bit.ly/31hRDVR](http://bit.ly/31hRDVR), November 29, 2020.

[^66]:    ${ }^{81}$ Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race, 5-30, and Ashby, Frank Porter Graham, 77, 144-45, 151-59.
    ${ }^{82}$ Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race, 196-201.
    ${ }^{83}$ President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, 166.
    ${ }^{84}$ Pleasants and Burns, Frank Porter Graham, 140 and 223.

[^67]:    ${ }^{85}$ Ibid., 247-48, and "Victorious in Defeat," Carolina Times, July 1, 1950.
    ${ }^{86}$ Dr. William Hampton won a seat on the Greensboro city council, Reverend William R. Crawford won a runoff and replaced Kenneth Williams on the Winston-Salem board of aldermen, and Dr. W. P. Devane was re-elected to the Fayetteville city council. Later in 1951, Hampton and Crawford were the first Black city officials to attend meetings of the North Carolina League of Municipalities. See "Rush of Negro Candidates for City Posts in N. Carolina," Atlanta Daily World, May 8, 1951; "Two Win City Council Seats in No. Carolina," Atlanta Daily World, May 17, 1951; and "First Negro to N.C. League of Municipalities," Atlanta Daily World, November 10, 1951.

    87 "Negro Candidates Seek Offices in Twenty North Carolina Cities," Chicago Defender, May 2, 1953. Despite the title, only nineteen cities are listed in this article. For clarification of the number of city council candidates in Concord, see "Candidates Win Three North Carolina Races," Atlanta Daily World, May 7, 1953, and "Primary Vote at Concord Slated Tuesday," Charlotte Observer, April 13, 1953. For the successful candidates, see "They Scored," Chicago Defender, May 23, 1953. William Crawford and William Hampton won re-election in Winston-Salem and Greensboro, respectively; Rencher N. Harris claimed a seat on the Durham city council; Hubert J. Robinson was elected to the Chapel Hill town council; Nathaniel Barber took a seat on the city council in Gastonia; and Dr. George K. Butterfield Sr. was elected to the city council in Wilson.
    ${ }^{88}$ Gershenhorn, Louis Austin, 114, and "They Scored," Chicago Defender, May 23, 1953.

[^68]:    ${ }^{89}$ McKinney, Greater Freedom, 21-22 and 54, and Butterfield interview, [http://bit.ly/2RMrziw](http://bit.ly/2RMrziw), November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{90}$ McKinney, Greater Freedom, 58-59, and Butterfield interview, < http://bit.ly/2RMrziw>, November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{91}$ McKinney, Greater Freedom, 91-96, and Butterfield interview, $<$ http://bit.ly/2RMrziw>, November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{92}$ Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Extra Session of 1956, and Regular Session, 1957, chapt. 13.

[^69]:    ${ }^{93}$ McKinney, Greater Freedom, 96 and 139-44; Butterfield interview, $<$ http://bit.ly/2RMrziw>, November 29, 2020; Watkins v. City of Wilson, 121 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. 1961); and Watkins v. Wilson, 370 U.S. 46 (1962).

    94 "Failure of Singleshot Ban May Strengthen Black Vote," Raleigh News and Observer, January 17, 1972.
    ${ }^{95}$ Raleigh News and Observer, June 20, 1950.

[^70]:    96 "The 'Negro Bloc' and the 'Single Shot,'" Carolina Times, May 22, 1965.

[^71]:    ${ }^{97}$ Wertheimer, Law and Society in the South, 131-32.
    ${ }^{98}$ Ibid., chapt. 7, and Nixon, "Integration of UNC-Chapel Hill - Law School First." The following account of Walker's career and legal challenges to Jim Crow election law draws broadly on Wertheimer (above) and Barksdale, "Indigenous Civil Rights Movement."
    ${ }^{99}$ Wertheimer, Law and Society in the South, 142 and 150.
    ${ }^{100}$ Ibid., 146 and 148.

[^72]:    ${ }^{101}$ Eure, Public School Laws of North Carolina, 13-14; Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Extra Session of 1956, and Regular Session, 1957, chapt. 137; and Walker v. Moss, 97 S. E.2d 836 (N.C. 1957).
    ${ }^{102}$ North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Protection of the Laws in North Carolina, 28 and 33, and Wertheimer, Law and Society, 141 and 151.
    ${ }^{103}$ Public Law 85-315: An Act to Provide Means of Further Securing and Protecting the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, 637, [http://bit.ly/2UGEvGA](http://bit.ly/2UGEvGA), September 5, 2019, and Winquist, "Civil Rights: Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1957."
    ${ }^{104}$ Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Extra Session of 1956, and Regular Session, 1957, chapt. 287, and Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.C. 1957).

[^73]:    105 "Defendant Appellee's Brief," Lassiter v. Northampton Board of Elections, Supreme Court of North Carolina, fall term 1957, no. 172, Sixth District, quoted in Wertheimer, Law and Society in the South, 155, and Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 102 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. 1958).
    ${ }^{106}$ Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
    ${ }^{107}$ North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Protection of the Laws in North Carolina, 144, and Collins and Margo, "Historical Perspectives on Racial Differences in Schooling," [http://bit.ly/2UMbN7e](http://bit.ly/2UMbN7e), September 5, 2019, 4.
    ${ }^{108}$ Bazemore v. Bertie County Board of Elections, 119 S.E.2d 637 (N.C. 1961).

[^74]:    ${ }^{109}$ Ibid.; Wertheimer, Law and Society, 161; and North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, "Voting and Voter Registration in North Carolina, 1960," 22.
    ${ }^{110}$ Bazemore v. Bertie County Board of Elections, 119 S.E.2d 637 (N.C. 1961).
    ${ }^{111}$ Towe, "Barriers to Black Political Participation in North Carolina," 11-12.

[^75]:    ${ }_{112}$ Thuesen, Greater Than Equal, 142-48.
    ${ }^{113}$ Ibid., 147.
    ${ }^{114}$ Allison v. Sharp, 184 S.E. 27 (N.C. 1936). On Justice Clarkson, see Prominent People of North Carolina, 1617. In 1896, Clarkson organized one of the state's first "White Supremacy" clubs. Governor Charles Aycock rewarded his political loyalty with an appointment as solicitor of the state's Twelfth Judicial District.
    ${ }^{115}$ Thuesen, Greater Than Equal, 152.
    ${ }^{116}$ Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940); Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race, 20; and Thuesen, Greater Than Equal, 153-55.

[^76]:    117 Thuesen, Greater Than Equal, 169-70.
    ${ }^{118}$ Blue v. Durham Public School District, 95 F. Supp. 441 (M.D.N.C. 1951).
    ${ }^{119}$ Thuesen, Greater Than Equal, 191.
    ${ }^{120}$ Ibid., 200, and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
    ${ }^{121}$ Leloudis and Korstad, Fragile Democracy, 63.

[^77]:    ${ }^{122}$ Report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, April 5, 1956, 7 and 9, [http://bit.ly/2LTNQXw](http://bit.ly/2LTNQXw), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{123}$ Session Laws and Resolutions, 1955, chapt. 366, 310.
    ${ }^{124}$ Report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, April 6, 1956, 8-10; Wettach, "North Carolina School Legislation, 1956," 7; and Batchelor, Race and Education in North Carolina, 108-9. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina struck down the voucher plan in 1966. See Batchelor, 110.
    ${ }^{125}$ Batchelor, Race and Education in North Carolina, 73, and Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 97 and 106.

[^78]:    ${ }^{126}$ Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism, 384.
    ${ }^{127}$ Brief of Harry McMullen, Attorney General of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae, 3 and 6, [http://bit.ly/36PHJfd](http://bit.ly/36PHJfd), November 29, 2020, and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
    ${ }^{128}$ Valelly, Two Reconstructions, 146-47.

[^79]:    ${ }^{129}$ Ibid. See also Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White, and Daniel, Dispossession.
    ${ }^{130}$ Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 98-141.
    ${ }^{131}$ Hogan, Many Minds One Heart.

[^80]:    ${ }^{132}$ Covington, Terry Sanford, 342-43. Klan membership in North Carolina exceeded that of Alabama and Mississippi combined. See Cunningham, Klansville, U.S.A.

    133 "N.C. Bar Association Award Carries Legacy of Explicit Racism," Raleigh News and Observer, June 28, 2016.

[^81]:    ${ }^{134}$ See Covington, Terry Sanford, chapt. 5.
    ${ }^{135}$ Drescher, Triumph of Good Will, 67, 171, and 175.
    ${ }^{136}$ Manuscript containing notes for an abandoned book on Terry Sanford's term as governor, subseries 3.1, box 174, Records and Papers of Terry Sanford.

    137 "Fraternity's Award Goes to Sanford," Greensboro Daily News, April 28, 1963.
    138 "A Message to the Negro," in Connor and Poe, eds., Life and Speeches of Charles Brantley Aycock, 249-50.

[^82]:    ${ }^{139}$ Address to the Commission on Secondary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, Dallas, Texas, November 28, 1962, in Mitchell, ed., Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers of Terry Sanford, 302; "Observations for a Second Century," subseries 3.1, box 174, Records and Papers of Terry Sanford; and film of Sanford's address to the North Carolina Press Association, series 6.2, VT3531/1a, Terry Sanford Papers.
    ${ }^{140}$ On Wallace's gubernatorial inauguration, see Carter, Politics of Rage, 104-9.
    ${ }^{141}$ Untitled document on the Choanoke Area Development Association, series 4.11, folder 4825, North Carolina Fund Papers, and John Salter to Jim Dombrowski, April 28, 1964, folder 22, Gray (Salter) Papers. On conditions of poverty in North Carolina and the North Carolina Fund's relationship to the national war on poverty, see Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, 57-59, and 115-19.
    ${ }^{142}$ For a detailed account of the North Carolina Fund's antipoverty work, see Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, chapts. 3-5.

[^83]:    ${ }^{143}$ See Salter, "The Economically Deprived Southern White," box 2, folder 7, Gray (Salter) Papers. David Cunningham makes a similar argument in Klansville, U.S.A.
    ${ }^{144}$ Gardner press release, July 25, 1967, series 1.2.2, folder 318, North Carolina Fund Records. For more on Gardner's criticisms of the Fund, see Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, 290-306.

[^84]:    ${ }^{145}$ DeLapp to James Gardner, September 1, 1965, box 9, DeLapp Papers, and Lake to Gardner, August 5, 1967, box 23, Gardner Papers.
    ${ }^{146}$ Perlstein, Nixonland, 283-85, and Nixon, Nomination Acceptance Address, August 8, 1968, [http://bit.ly/2HPCoel](http://bit.ly/2HPCoel), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{147}$ Quotation from Doris Overman to Gardner, undated, box 14, Gardner Papers.
    ${ }^{148}$ Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877 (M.D.N.C. 1965).

[^85]:    ${ }^{149}$ Ibid., and O'Connor, "Reapportionment and Redistricting," 32-33.
    ${ }^{150}$ Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Extra Session, 1966, chaps. 1 and 5, and Session Laws of the State of North Carolina, Regular Session, 1965, 9-11.
    ${ }^{151}$ Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Regular Session, 1967, chap. 640.
    ${ }^{152}$ Ibid., chap. 106.
    153 "Seat Numbering Bill Produced Hot Debate," Raleigh News and Observer, July 8, 1967; "Senate Endorses 'Numbered Seats,'" Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1967; "Numbered Seat Bill Advances," Raleigh News and Observer, June 22, 1967; "Numbered Seats Measure Given House Approval," Raleigh News and Observer, June 13,

[^86]:    1967; Towe, Barriers to Black Political Participation, 28; National Roster of Black Elected Officials; "The Negro Vote," Greensboro Daily News, November 11, 1968; and "Failure of Singleshot Ban May Strengthen Black Vote," Raleigh News and Observer, January 17, 1972.
    ${ }^{154}$ Session Laws and Resolutions, State of North Carolina, Regular Session, 1971, chaps. 483, 1177, 1234, and 1237; Towe, Barriers to Black Political Participation, 61-62; Manderson, "Review of the Patterns and Practices of Racial Discrimination," 31; Watson, "North Carolina Redistricting Process, 1965-1966," 8; and Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
    ${ }^{155}$ Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
    156 "North Carolina African-American Legislators, 1969-2019," < http://bit.ly/38KWF0u>, November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{157}$ Keech and Sistrom, "Implementation of the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina," 14.

[^87]:    ${ }^{158}$ Ibid., 13-14, and Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (1984).
    ${ }^{159}$ Earls, Wynes, and Quatrucci, "Voting Rights in North Carolina," 581; "Two Blacks Join N.C.'s U.S. House Delegation," Raleigh News and Observer, November 4, 1992; and Keech and Sistrom, "Implementation of the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina," 14-17.
    ${ }^{160}$ Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 243-76.

[^88]:    ${ }^{161}$ Viewpoint, December 5, 1966, Jesse Helms Viewpoint editorial transcripts.
    ${ }^{162}$ Link, Righteous Warrior, 9 and 144-46.

[^89]:    ${ }^{163}$ Pearce, Jim Hunt, 11-41, 145-46.
    ${ }^{164}$ Link, Righteous Warrior, 268, and Kellam, "Helms, Hunt, and Whiteness," 53.
    ${ }^{165}$ Kellam, "Helms, Hunt, and Whiteness," 53, and Link, Righteous Warrior, 262-69.
    ${ }^{166}$ Link, Righteous Warrior, 274 and 284, and Goldsmith, "Thomas Farr, Jesse Helms, and the Return of the Segregationists.," [http://bit.ly/36QLq4c](http://bit.ly/36QLq4c), November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{167}$ Link, Righteous Warrior, 290-91 and 304; "Pro-Helms Newspaper Publishes Rumor That Hunt Had a Gay Lover," Raleigh News and Observer, July 6, 1984; and "Article Stirs New Charges in Carolina Senate Race," New York Times, July 7, 1984.

[^90]:    ${ }^{168}$ Gantt interview, [https://unc.live/31hWV3N](https://unc.live/31hWV3N), November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{169}$ Ibid., and Gantt v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina, 320 F.2d 611 ( $4^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1963).
    ${ }^{170}$ Link, Righteous Warrior, 375.

[^91]:    ${ }^{171}$ Goldsmith, "Thomas Farr, Jesse Helms, and the Return of the Segregationists"; Helms, Hands ad, <http://bit.ly/2Q5zJnr >, September 5, 2019; and "President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights, Showdown Is Set," New York Times, October 23, 1990.
    ${ }^{172}$ Link, Righteous Warrior, 380; Earls, Wynes, and Quatrucci, "Voting Rights in North Carolina," 589; and Christensen, Paradox of Tar Heel Politics, 278.
    ${ }^{173}$ Pearce, Jim Hunt, 210, quotations at 217 and 220.

[^92]:    ${ }^{174}$ Ibid., 145-46 and 263-66. In 1977, Hunt appointed Howard Lee, former mayor of Chapel Hill, to serve as Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development. Seven years later, he named Henry E. Frye to the State Supreme Court, and in 1999 elevated Frye to chief justice.
    ${ }^{175}$ Berman, Give Us the Ballot, 290-91.
    ${ }^{176}$ For increases in Black voter registration and turnout, see North Carolina State Conference v. McCrory, No. 16-1468 (4th Cir. 2016), 13, and Berman, Give Us the Ballot, 291.

[^93]:    ${ }^{177}$ Ross, "Number of Latino Registered Voters Doubles in North Carolina," [http://bit.ly/2I31GID](http://bit.ly/2I31GID), September 5, 2019; "North Carolina's Hispanic Community: 2019 Snapshot," [http://bit.ly/2SY8Rpd](http://bit.ly/2SY8Rpd), November 29, 2020; and "Latinos in the 2016 Election: North Carolina," [https://pewrsr.ch/2HOyFNV](https://pewrsr.ch/2HOyFNV), September 5, 2019.

    178 "North Carolina's Hispanic Community: 2019 Snapshot," [http://bit.ly/2SY8Rpd](http://bit.ly/2SY8Rpd), November 29, 2020, and Tippett, "Potential Voters Are Fastest-Growing Segment of N.C. Hispanic Population," [http://bit.ly/2QRRpQh](http://bit.ly/2QRRpQh), November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{179}$ Newport, "Democrats Racially Diverse; Republicans Mostly White," [http://bit.ly/2HOkDvH](http://bit.ly/2HOkDvH), September 5, 2019.

[^94]:    ${ }^{180}$ C. Anderson, White Rage, 138-39; 2008 Democratic Party Platform, [http://bit.ly/2ti7IhI](http://bit.ly/2ti7IhI), November 29, 2020; and "As Republican Convention Emphasizes Diversity, Racial Incidents Intrude," Washington Post, August 29, 2012.
    ${ }^{181}$ Gitterman, Coclanis, and Quinterno, "Recession and Recovery in North Carolina," 7,
    [https://unc.live/2HSb8vw](https://unc.live/2HSb8vw), September 5, 2019; Samuels, "Never-Ending Foreclosures," [http://bit.ly/35X96mZ](http://bit.ly/35X96mZ), November 29, 2020; and "N.C. Foreclosures Jumped 9\% in 2008," Triad Business Journal, January 5, 2009.
    ${ }^{182}$ Mayer, "Covert Operations," [http://bit.ly/30m6w8Z](http://bit.ly/30m6w8Z), November 29, 2020.

[^95]:    ${ }^{183}$ Blake, "What Black America Won't Miss about Obama," [https://cnn.it/2tXfX2E](https://cnn.it/2tXfX2E), November 29, 2020; "Racial Resentment Adds to GOP Enthusiasm," [https://on.msnbc.com/378OX1r](https://on.msnbc.com/378OX1r), November 29, 2020; Okun, Emperor Has No Clothes, 151; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, meeting minutes, September 8, 2009, [http://bit.ly/2LQCjYX](http://bit.ly/2LQCjYX), September 5, 2019; "GOP Mailing Depicts Obama on Food Stamps, Not Dollar Bill," [https://n.pr/34GHrHT](https://n.pr/34GHrHT), September 5, 2019; and "'Hanging Obama' Truck Makes Way into Charlotte," [http://bit.ly/32sZJu4](http://bit.ly/32sZJu4), September 5, 2019.

    184 "GOP's No-Compromise Pledge," [https://politi.co/2IyrixL](https://politi.co/2IyrixL), November 29, 2020, and Unz, "Immigration, the Republicans, and the End of White America," [http://bit.ly/32sEyYY](http://bit.ly/32sEyYY), September 5, 2019.

[^96]:    ${ }^{185}$ Roth, Great Suppression, 96-98, and "GOP Featured McCollum in 2010 Attack Ad," [http://bit.ly/37SalWG](http://bit.ly/37SalWG), September 5, 2019.

    186 "GOP Featured McCollum in 2010 Attack Ad," [http://bit.ly/37SalWG](http://bit.ly/37SalWG), September 5, 2019; Mayer, "State for Sale," [http://bit.ly/37VMm96](http://bit.ly/37VMm96), November 29, 2020; "Flier Opens an Old Wound," Winston-Salem Journal, October 21, 2010; and "DNA Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder," New York Times, September 2, 2014.
    ${ }^{187}$ Mixon, "Just Look at the Results," [http://bit.ly/32tZmj1](http://bit.ly/32tZmj1), September 5, 2019; "Narco Gangs in North Carolina," [http://bit.ly/2HNmPnq](http://bit.ly/2HNmPnq), September 5, 2019; and "Who Benefits from Illegal Immigration?" [http://bit.ly/2I3fLTV](http://bit.ly/2I3fLTV), September 5, 2019.

[^97]:    188 "Anti-Heagerty Ads", [http://bit.ly/2tmNfZ3](http://bit.ly/2tmNfZ3), November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{189}$ Covington v. the State of North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), 2, 4-6; Covington v. North Carolina (M.D.N.C.) 1:15-cv-00399, 3.

[^98]:    ${ }^{190}$ North Carolina General Assembly, 149th Session 2011-2012: House of Representatives, https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2011-2012\%20Session/2011\%20Demographics.pdf; North Carolina General Assembly, 150th Session 2013-2014: House of Representatives, https://www.ncleg.gov/Docu-mentSites/HouseDocuments/2013-2014\%20Session/2013\%20Demographics.pdf. North Carolina General Assembly 2011 Senate Demographics, https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/SenateDocuments/2011-2012\%20Session/2011\%20Demographics.pdf; North Carolina General Assembly 2013 Senate Demographics, https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/SenateDocuments/2013-2014\%20Session/2013\%20Senate\%20Demographics.pdf.

    191 "North Carolina Election Results 2012: McCrory Wins Governor's Race; Hudson Tops Kissell for House Seat; Romney Gets Narrow Victory," Washington Post, November 7, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-tics/decision2012/north-carolina-election-results-2012-mccrory-wins-governors-race-hudson-tops-kissell-for-house-seat-romney-gets-narrow-victory/2012/11/07/201e8c1c-23a8-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_story.html.

    192 "Inside the Republican Creation of the Norther Carolina Voting Bill Dubbed the 'Monster' Law," Washington Post, September 2, 2016.
    ${ }^{193}$ Ibid.

[^99]:    ${ }^{194}$ Herron and Smith, "Race, Shelby County, and the Voter Information Verification Act in North Carolina," 497.

    195 and Heberling and Greene, "Conditional Party Teams," 117.
    ${ }^{196}$ Herron and Smith, "Race, Shelby County, and the Voter Information Verification Act in North Carolina," 505.
    ${ }^{197}$ Broockman and Roeder, "Hispanics Are the Future of Progressive Strength in America, New Organizing Institute, [http://bit.ly/2HPJ3Fn](http://bit.ly/2HPJ3Fn), September 5, 2019; "Republicans Have a Major Demographic Problem, and It's Only Going to Get Worse," Washington Post, April 22, 2014; "The South is Solidly Republican Right Now; It Might Not Be that Way in 10 Years," Washington Post, April 29, 2014; and "Immigration is Changing the Political Landscape in Key States.," [https://ampr.gs/32wwPsW](https://ampr.gs/32wwPsW), September 5, 2019.

[^100]:    ${ }^{198}$ Tippett, "North Carolina Hispanics and the Electorate," [http://bit.ly/2UDvIVC](http://bit.ly/2UDvIVC), September 5, 2019.

[^101]:    199 "Looking, Very Closely, for Voter Fraud," New York Times, September 17, 2012; "The Madison Project Launches the Code Red USA Project"; and Riley, "Lesson from North Carolina on Challengers," [http://bit.ly/32uhGbN](http://bit.ly/32uhGbN), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{200}$ Berman, Give Us the Ballot, 290.

[^102]:    ${ }^{201}$ Kotch and Mosteller, "Racial Justice Act," 2035 and 2088; "North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death Penalty Challenges," New York Times, June 5, 2013; Grosso and O'Brien, "Stubborn Legacy," 1533; Florsheim, "Four Inmates Might Return to Death Row," [http://bit.ly/37qiEss](http://bit.ly/37qiEss), September 5, 2019; and "McCrory Signs Repeal of Racial Justice Act," Winston-Salem Journal, June 20, 2013.

    202 "North Carolina's Step-by-Step War on Public Education," Washington Post, August 7, 2015; Johnson and Ellinwood, Smart Money, < http://bit.ly/37tcCqO>, November 29, 2020; 2013-2015 North Carolina Budget ShortChanges Students, Teachers, and Public Education, [http://bit.ly/2RTBUrA](http://bit.ly/2RTBUrA), November 29, 2020; Gerhardt, "Pay Our Teachers or Lose Your Job," [http://bit.ly/2ROO19t](http://bit.ly/2ROO19t), November 29, 2020; Wagner, "North Carolina Once Again Toward the Bottom in National Rankings on Teacher Pay," [http://bit.ly/2TZHA67](http://bit.ly/2TZHA67), November 29, 2020; and Brenneman, "Teacher Attrition Continues to Plague North Carolina," [http://bit.ly/2uuLBVu](http://bit.ly/2uuLBVu), November 29, 2020.
    ${ }^{203}$ 2013-14 School Performance Grades (A-F) for North Carolina Public Schools. On the grading scheme, see Unraveling, [http://bit.ly/2TYTpcG](http://bit.ly/2TYTpcG), November 29, 2020.

[^103]:    ${ }^{204}$ Ladd, Clotfelter, and Holbein, "Growing Segmentation," 11, 35, [https://ampr.gs/32wwPsW](https://ampr.gs/32wwPsW), September 5, 2019, and "White Parents in North Carolina Are Using Charter Schools to Secede from the Education System," Washington Post, April 15, 2015.
    ${ }^{205}$ School Vouchers, 1-2, 7, 11-13, and 21n2, [http://bit.ly/2Sbg03j](http://bit.ly/2Sbg03j), November 29, 2020; Opportunity Scholarship Program, 2019-20 School Year, [http://bit.ly/2GoFFzZ](http://bit.ly/2GoFFzZ), November 29, 2020; and Private School Minority Statistics in North Carolina, [http://bit.ly/3aJN8I4](http://bit.ly/3aJN8I4), November 29, 2020.

[^104]:    206 "North Carolina's 'Racial Justice Act,'" Civitas Institute, November 16, 2010, [http://bit.ly/38K467o](http://bit.ly/38K467o), November 29, 2029; "Berger and Moore Celebrate Majority Victory in State Legislature," Raleigh News and Observer, (updated online, [http://bit.ly/2tIJPjJ](http://bit.ly/2tIJPjJ), November 29, 2020); North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 229 (4th Cir. 2016).
    ${ }^{207}$ North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214, 215 (4th Cir. 2016); see also North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D.N.C. 2016); North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C 2014).
    ${ }^{208}$ North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 239-241 (4th Cir. 2016).

[^105]:    209 "McCrory Asks Supreme Court to Restore Voter ID Law," Raleigh News and Observer, August 16, 2016, and "N.C. Republican Party Seeks 'Party Line Changes' to Limit Early Voting Hours," Raleigh News and Observer, August 18, 2016.
    ${ }^{210}$ Newkirk, "What Early Voting in North Carolina Actually Reveals," [http://bit.ly/2ULBchm](http://bit.ly/2ULBchm), September 5, 2019, and North Carolina Republican Party, "NCGOP Sees Encouraging Early Voting," [http://bit.ly/2HS9B8J](http://bit.ly/2HS9B8J), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{211}$ North Carolina v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
    ${ }^{212}$ Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 124, 126, 174 (M.D.N.C. 2016).

[^106]:    ${ }^{213}$ Ibid., 125.
    ${ }^{214}$ Ibid., 174.
    ${ }^{215}$ Ibid., 47-48 and 164.
    ${ }^{216}$ Ibid., 178.
    ${ }^{217}$ Order, Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 1:15-cv-399); Memo. Op. and Order, Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C.) (No. 1:15-cv-399); North Carolina v. Covington, 137 S. Ct. 1624 (2017); North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2550, 2555 (2018).
    ${ }^{218}$ Amended Compl., 33, Common Cause v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, 18 CVS 014001 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).

[^107]:    ${ }^{219}$ Common Cause v. Lewis, N. C. General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, 18 CVS 014001, Complaint, November 13, 2018, 1, 28, 109-17, 186-91.
    ${ }^{220}$ Amended Compl. 1, Common Cause v. Lewis, N. 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, 18 CVS 014001 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019); Millhiser, "Cracks in the GOP's Gerrymandering Firewall," [http://bit.ly/35Tq1qL](http://bit.ly/35Tq1qL), November 29, 2020. See also North Carolina General Assembly 2019 Senate Demographics, [https://cutt.ly/IUsQoPw](https://cutt.ly/IUsQoPw).
    ${ }^{221}$ Amended Compl. 64, Common Cause v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 56, 18 CVS 014001 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019); Common Cause v. Lewis, Common Cause North Carolina blog, December 17, 2019, [https://cutt.ly/qUenOvR](https://cutt.ly/qUenOvR).
    ${ }^{222}$ Recent Case: Common Cause v. Lewis, Harvard Law Review Blog, October 15, 2019, [https://cutt.ly/cUem59X](https://cutt.ly/cUem59X).

[^108]:    ${ }^{223}$ Common Cause v. Lewis, N. C. General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, 18 CVS 014001, Judgment, September 3, 2019; Common Cause v. Lewis, Common Cause North Carolina blog, December 17, 2019, < https://cutt.ly/qUenOvR>.

    224 "Supreme Court Won't Rescue N.C. Voter ID Law; GOP Leaders Say They Will Try Again with New Law," Raleigh News and Observer, May 15, 2017; Act to Amend the North Carolina Constitution to Require Photo Identification to Vote in Person, S.L. 2018-128, H.B. 1092, [http://bit.ly/2LRAE5p](http://bit.ly/2LRAE5p), September 5, 2019; and "Voter ID to Go on N.C. Ballots," [http://bit.ly/2LVTh8c](http://bit.ly/2LVTh8c), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{225}$ Cohen interview, [http://bit.ly/34VsjXc](http://bit.ly/34VsjXc), September 5, 2019; Act to Amend the North Carolina Constitution to Require Photo Identification to Vote in Person, S.L. 2018-128, House Bill 1092, [http://bit.ly/2LRAE5p](http://bit.ly/2LRAE5p), September 5, 2019; and "Voter ID to Go on N.C. Ballots," [http://bit.ly/2LVTh8c](http://bit.ly/2LVTh8c), September 5, 2019. In June 2018, National Research Inc. conducted a poll for the conservative Civitas Institute, headquartered in Raleigh. When asked which party they would support if the "election for [the] North Carolina State Legislature were held today," 42 percent of respondents favored Democrats and only 34 percent supported Republicans. That was a dramatic change from February and May, when Democrats and Republicans were locked in a tie. The poll, labeled Generic Ballot, General Assembly, was made public on the Longleaf Politics web site, [http://bit.ly/34Gp8CB](http://bit.ly/34Gp8CB), September 5, 2019. The online link is no longer active.

[^109]:    226 "Voter ID: A Form of Suppression or Necessary Protection?" [http://bit.ly/2IR8wOL](http://bit.ly/2IR8wOL), November 29, 2020; "Support Voter ID Today," [http://bit.ly/33mJf8x](http://bit.ly/33mJf8x), November 29, 2020; "Voter ID Is Back in North Carolina, and the Justifications Are as Lame as Ever," Charlotte Observer, June 7, 2018; and "North Carolina Voter ID Amendment Debate Features Misleading Claims," [http://bit.ly/32A2tpJ](http://bit.ly/32A2tpJ), September 5, 2019.

    227 "County-by-County Data Reveal Dramatic Impact of Proposed Election Changes on Voters," [https://bit.ly/3nj4fpK](https://bit.ly/3nj4fpK), November 29, 2020; and Postelection Audit Report: General Election 2016, 2, appendix 4.2, and appendix 5, [http://bit.ly/2LQ3TFP](http://bit.ly/2LQ3TFP), November 29, 2020. See also Citizens Without Proof, 3, [http://bit.ly/34QpHtJ](http://bit.ly/34QpHtJ), September 5, 2019; Atkeson et. al., "New Barriers to Participation," [http://bit.ly/2LSocT6](http://bit.ly/2LSocT6), September 5, 2019.

[^110]:    228 "Voter ID Is Back in North Carolina, and the Justifications Are as Lame as Ever," Charlotte Observer, June 7, 2018; "North Carolina Voter ID Amendment Debate Features Misleading Claims," [http://bit.ly/32A2tpJ](http://bit.ly/32A2tpJ), September 5, 2019; American Express Merchant Reference Guide - U.S., [https://amex.co/2HKPqtq](https://amex.co/2HKPqtq), September 5, 2019; Visa Core Rules and Visa Product and Services Rules, <https://vi.sa/2HKJGzJ 336>, September 5, 2019; and Mastercard Transaction Processing Rules, 75, [http://bit.ly/32w1ial](http://bit.ly/32w1ial), September 5, 2019.

    229 "North Carolina Voter ID Amendment (2018)," [http://bit.ly/32tAIIZ](http://bit.ly/32tAIIZ), September 5, 2019. Woodhouse’s comments are transcribed from a video recording of a press conference he held on July 29, 2016. See "N.C. Voter ID Law Overturned," Raleigh News and Observer, February 9, 2018, (updated online, [http://bit.ly/32oS3cm](http://bit.ly/32oS3cm)), September 5, 2019.
    ${ }^{230}$ Schofield, "Former Legislative Counsel Gerry Cohen on N.C.'s Six Proposed Constitutional Amendments," [http://bit.ly/34NR8Ea](http://bit.ly/34NR8Ea), September 5, 2019; North Carolina Constitutional Amendments Publication Commission, Official Explanation of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Require Photographic Identification to Vote, S.L. 2018-128, [http://bit.ly/34PG5KX](http://bit.ly/34PG5KX), September 5, 2019; and "N.C. Voters Know Little About Proposed Constitutional Amendments," [http://bit.ly/34VCcnM](http://bit.ly/34VCcnM), September 5, 2019.

[^111]:    231 "House Enacts Voter ID with Veto Override," [http://bit.ly/2HNXXf0](http://bit.ly/2HNXXf0), November 29, 2020, and Civitas Statement on Overriding Governor Cooper's Voter ID Veto, [https://bit.ly/33Fc5RH](https://bit.ly/33Fc5RH), November 20, 2020.
    ${ }^{232}$ Holmes v. Moore, N. C. General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, 18 CVS 15292, Verified Complaint, December 19, 2018, 3, 20-15292, Verified Complaint, December 19, 2018, 3-5.
    ${ }^{233}$ Holmes v. Moore, N. C. General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, 18 CVS 15292, Judgment and Order, September 17, 2021, 76, 78; Constitution of the State of North Carolina, 1868.

[^112]:    234 "North Carolina Passes New Maps Giving GOP and Edge in Congress, State Legislature," News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), November 4, 2021.

    235 "N.C. Redistricting Suits Challenges Lack of Race Data for Maps," WFAE 90.7, October 30, 2021, < https://cutt.ly/YUyjoDF>; "Map by Map, GOP Chips Away at Black Democrats' Power," New York Times, December 18, 2021.
    ${ }^{236}$ J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 270; Holmes v. Moore, N. C. General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, 18 CVS 15292, Judgment and Order, September 17, 2021, 77.

[^113]:    ${ }^{237}$ Constitution of North Carolina, Article I, Section 2.

[^114]:    Dividing counties to form General Assembly districts is a relatively new phenomenon in North Carolina.

[^115]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 124 (M.D.N.C. 2016), summarily aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (per curiam) (finding state legislative districts as enacted in S.L. 2011-402 and S.L. 2011-404 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Covington v. North Carolina, 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 434-35 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (finding state legislative districts as enacted in S.L. 2017-207 and S.L. 2017-208 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); North Carolina State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 002322 , slip op. at 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2018) (finding state legislative districts as enacted in S.L. 2017-207 and S.L. 2017-208 violated Article II, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution); Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super LEXIS 56, at *333, *346, *361-62 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019) (finding state legislative districts as enacted in S.L. 2017-207 and S.L. 2017-208 violated Article I, Section 10, Article I, Section 12, Article I, Section 14, and Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution); Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (finding Congressional districts as enacted in S.L. 2011-403 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Harper v. Lewis, No. 19 CVS 012667, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 122, at *18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019) (order granting preliminary injunction) (finding Congressional districts as drawn in S.L. 2016-1 violated Article I, Section 10, Article I, Section 12, Article I, Section 14, and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution).

[^116]:    2 See Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 124 (M.D.N.C. 2016), summarily aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (per curiam).

[^117]:    4 Importantly, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits intentional vote dilution (or intentional racial discrimination in redistricting). Likewise, Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits intentional racial discrimination, see Holmes v. Moore, 270 N.C. App. 7, 33 (2020), which would prohibit intentional vote dilution in redistricting. Thus, while the Stephenson court referenced the VRA, because part of the VRA is identical in purpose and direction to Article I, Section 19, that part of Stephenson cannot be read logically to not also incorporate the requirements incumbent on the legislature under the State's equal protection guarantees. To put it another way, even if the Section 2 effects test (as opposed to its prohibition on intentional

[^118]:    5 Joint Meeting of the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee and the House Redistricting Committee to Begin Discussion on the Redistricting Process, Aug. 5, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-05-2021/6683.pdf.
    6 E-mail from Erika Churchill, Staff Attorney, Legislative Analysis Division, N.C. General Assembly, to Joint Committee Members (Aug. 5, 2021).

[^119]:    72021 Joint Redistricting Committee Proposed Criteria, North Carolina General Assembly Joint Redistricting Committee, Aug. 9, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-092021/2021\%20Joint\%20Redistricting\%20Committee\%20Plan\%20Proposed\%20Criteria.pdf.

    8 Id. (emphasis in original).

[^120]:    9 NCGA Redistricting, 2021-08-10 Committee (Joint), YouTuBE, https://youtu.be/QFA6QNpqWVk?t=2084 (Aug. 10, 2021).

    10 NCGA Redistricting, 2021-08-12 Committee (Joint), YouTUBE, https://youtu.be/gSm2OhE7Slk?t=10321 (Aug. 12, 2021).

    11 Id. at 2:58:00; Amendment to Proposed Criteria \#4 (Racial Data) Offered by Senator Daniel, North Carolina Joint Redistricting Committee, Aug. 12, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-122021/Adopted\%20Amendments/Racial\%20Data.Daniel.pdf.

[^121]:    12 Amendment to Proposed Criteria (Voting Rights Act) Offered by Senator Blue, North Carolina Joint Redistricting Committee, Aug. 12, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-122021/Proposed\%20Amendments/Voting\%20Rights\%20Act.Amendment.pdf.
    13 NCGA Redistricting, 2021-08-12 Committee (Joint), YouTUBE, https://youtu.be/gSm2OhE7Slk?t=13039, (Aug. 12, 2021).

[^122]:    14 Criteria Adopted by the Committees, North Carolina Joint Redistricting Committee, Aug. 12, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-122021/Criteria.adopted.8.12.pdf.
    15 U.S. Census Bureau, North Carolina: 2010: Population and Housing Unit Census (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-35.pdf.

    16 North Carolina: 2020 Census, U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/north-carolina-population-change-between-censusdecade.html.
    172020 Census: Apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Census Bureau (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2021/dec/2020-apportionment-map.html.

[^123]:    18 Tyler Dukes, How Has Your NC Neighborhood Grown Since 2010? Use This Map of Census Data to Find Out, NEws \& OBSERVER (Aug. 14, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article253375248.html.
    19 Rebecca Tippett, Preview: What Redistricting Means for NC's House, Carolina Demography (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.ncdemography.org/2021/08/02/preview-what-redistricting-means-for-ncs-house/; Rebecca Tippett, Preview: What Redistricting Means for NC's Senate, Carolina Demography (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.ncdemography.org/2021/08/03/preview-what-redistricting-means-for-ncs-senate/.
    20 Christopher Cooper et al., NC General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census, Quantifying GERRYMANDERING (Aug. 17, 2021), https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf.
    21 Id. at 1.
    22 Duke Senate Groupings Maps 11x17, North Carolina Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee, Oct. 5, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/10-052021/Duke\%20Senate\%20Groupings\%20Maps\%2011x17.pdf.

[^124]:    23 NCGA Redistricting, 2021-10-05 Committee (Senate), YouTUBE, https://youtu.be/IphUZPhkqSY?t=2175, (Oct. 5, 2021).

    24 Duke House Groupings Maps 11x17, North Carolina House Redistricting Committee, Oct. 5, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021182/2021/October\%205,\%202021/Duke\%20House\%20Groupings\%20Maps\%2011x17.pdf.

    25 NCGA Redistricting, 2021-10-05 Committee (House), YouTuBE, https://youtu.be/9UsiS 6rlUA?t=7961 (Oct. 6, 2021).

[^125]:    26 Letter from SCSJ Attorneys to Legislative Defendants, Oct. 8, 2021, https://southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SCSJ-correspondence_NCGA-redistricting_2021.10.082.pdf.
    ${ }^{27}$ See SST-4, North Carolina Senate Redistricting Committee, Member Submitted Maps https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/Member\%20Submitted\%20Maps/SST-4/SST-4_19x36.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2021).

[^126]:    28 Letter from SCSJ Attorneys to Legislative Defendants, Oct. 25, 2021, https://southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SCSJ-Letter-Senate-Map-10-25-21-FINAL.pdf.

[^127]:    29 Plaintiff does not concede that there may not be other clusters that raise VRA implications, but those are not the subject of this litigation, which only focuses on the racially discriminatory exclusion of racial data in the select of clusters that the Legislature defined as "legal" and the Legislature's failure to do consider any racial data that is required by the NC Supreme Court in the Stephenson cases.

[^128]:    30 Sen. Sydney Batch, current SD 17; Sen. Ernestine Bazemore, current SD 3; Sen. Dan Blue, current SD 14; Sen. Ben Clark, current SD 21; Sen. Don Davis, current SD 5; Sen. Milton F. "Toby" Fitch, current SD 4; Sen. Valerie Foushee, current SD 23; Sen. Natalie Murdock, current SD 20; Sen. Gladys Robinson, current SD 28; DeAndra Salavador, current SD 39; Sen. Joyce Waddell, current SD 40; and Sen. Paul Lowe, current SD 32. Available at: https://www.ncleg.gov/Members/MemberList/S.

    31 Laura Leslie, Minority Lawmakers Likely to Lose Out Under Partisan NC District Maps, WRAL (November 8, 2021), https://www.wral.com/minority-lawmakers-likely-to-lose-out-under-partisan-nc-districtmaps/19969697/.

    32 Rep. Howard Hunter, current HD 5, Rep. Kandie Smith, current HD 8, Rep. Raymond Smith, current HD 21, Rep. Shelly Willingham, current HD 23, Rep. Linda Cooper-Suggs, current HD 24, Rep. James D. Gaillard, current HD 25, Rep. Vernetta Alston, current HD 29, Rep. Zack Hawkin, current HD 31, Rep. Terry Garrison, current HD 32, Rep. Rosa U. Gill, current HD 33, Rep. Abe Jones, current HD 38, Rep. Marvin W. Lucas, current HD 42, Rep. Garland Pierce, current HD 48, Rep. Robert T. Reives, current HD 54, Rep. Amos L. Quick, III, current HD 58, Rep. Cecil Brockman, current HD 60, Rep. Amber Baker, current HD 72, Rep. Terry M. Brown,, current HD 92, Rep. Nasif Majeed, current HD 99, Rep. Carolyn Logan, current HD 101, Rep. Brandon Lofton, current HD 104, Rep. Carla Cunningham, current HD 106, Rep. Kelly Alexander, current HD 107, Available at https://www.ncleg.gov/Members/MemberList/H.

    33 Laura Leslie, Minority Lawmakers Likely to Lose Out Under Partisan NC District Maps, WRAL (November 8, 2021), https://www.wral.com/minority-lawmakers-likely-to-lose-out-under-partisan-nc-district-maps/19969697/

[^129]:    ${ }^{34}$ Rep. G.K. Butterfield, current CD 1, Rep. Alma Adams, current CD 12. Available at https://www.congress.gov/members?q=\%7B\%22memberstate $\% 22 \% 3 \mathrm{~A} \% 22$ North+Carolina $\% 22 \% 2 \mathrm{C} \% 22$ congress $\% 22 \% 3 \mathrm{~A} 117 \% 7 \mathrm{D}$.

[^130]:    35 Cook Political Report, 2022 House Race Ratings (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).

[^131]:    ${ }^{36}$ Plaintiff does not allege that the VRA compelled the drawing of any district in Guilford County, but that does not give the Legislature free reign to crack Black voting populations in order to frustrate their political voice.

[^132]:    37 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Statement on Redistricting Data Timeline (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/statement-redistricting-data-timeline.html.

    38 North Carolina State Board of Elections, A Look Back at North Carolina’s Historic 2020 Election \& Looking Ahead at 2021, Presentation to House Election Law \& Campaign Finance Reform Committee at p. 14, Feb. 24, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021-21/02-24-21/House\%20Elections\%20Committee\%20Presentation\%202-24-2021\%20FINALv2.pdf.

[^133]:    39 Joint Meeting of the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee and the House Redistricting Committee for Discussion of Schedule for Public Hearings, Aug. 18, 2021, 2021-2022 Session (N.C. 2021), https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-18-2021/Senate\%20Committee\%20on\%20Redistricting\%20and\%20Elections\%20Agenda\%20for\%208-1821\%209 00\%20AM.pdf.

[^134]:    40 See Dallas Woodhouse, "Veteran GOP State Senators Headed for High Profile Primary," Carolina Journal (Nov. 11, 2021) ("McInnis finalized his move late this summer when it became clear that he would be double bunked with another GOP senator from a considerably larger county."), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/veteran-gop-state-senators-headed-for-high-profile-primary/.

    41 See 2021-10-25 Redistricting Public Hearing - Wake, Caldwell, New Hanover at 2:17:02, Youtube (Nov. 1, 2021) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=njisLoqWuT0.

[^135]:    42 See https://www.ncleg.gov/Files/GIS/Plans_Main/Congress_2021/SL\%202021-174\%20Congress\%20\%2011\%20x\%2017\%20Map.pdf.

    43 Available at https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-
    154/2021/Member\%20Submitted\%20Maps/SST-4/SST-4 11x17.pdf
    44 Id.

[^136]:    ${ }^{1}$ Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354 (2002); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301 (2003).
    ${ }^{2}$ We do not concede that your interpretation of the Stephenson criteria after the first step-drawing VRA-required districts-is correct.

    About Us: The Southern Coalition for Social Justice partners with communities of color and economically disadvantaged communities in the South to defend and advance their political, social, and economic rights through the combination of legal advocacy, research, organizing, and communications.

[^137]:    ${ }^{3}$ Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 383 (2002).
    ${ }^{4}$ Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55 (1986).

[^138]:    ${ }^{5}$ Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354 (2002) (holding legislative districts required by the VRA be formed prior to the creation of non-VRA districts to ensure redistricting plans "ha[ve] no retrogressive effect upon minority voters.").
    ${ }^{6}$ Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
    ${ }^{7}$ Id. at 169-170 (finding that Defendants' "reports conclude that there is evidence of racially polarized voting in North Carolina [.]").
    ${ }^{8}$ Id.
    ${ }^{9}$ Id. at 167.
    ${ }^{10}$ Id. at 167-68.
    ${ }^{11}$ NCGA Redistricting, 2021-08-12 Committee (Joint), YouTube (Aug. 13, 201), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSm2OhE7Slk\&t=718s.

[^139]:    ${ }^{12}$ Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, at *345 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
    ${ }^{13}$ Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017).
    ${ }^{14}$ Id. at 1472.
    ${ }^{15}$ Id. at 1470-71.
    ${ }^{16}$ Christopher Cooper, et al., NC General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census, QUANTIFYING GErrymandering (Aug. 17, 2021),
    https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf. (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
    ${ }^{17}$ Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986).

[^140]:    ${ }^{18}$ We examined the 2020 race for Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court involving a Black candidate, Cheri Beasley, and a white candidate, Paul Newby. We examined the 2020 race for Commissioner of Labor involving a Black candidate, Jessica Holmes, and a white candidate, Joshua Dobson. We examined the 2016 race for Treasurer involving a Black candidate, Dan Blue III, and a white candidate, Dale Folwell. And we examined the 2016 race for Lieutenant Governor, involving a Black candidate, Linda Coleman, and two white candidates, Dan Forest and Jacki Cole.
    ${ }^{19}$ Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24 (2009).

[^141]:    About Us: The Southern Coalition for Social Justice partners with communities of color and economically disadvantaged communities in the South to defend and advance their political, social, and economic rights through the combination of legal advocacy, research, organizing, and communications.

[^142]:    ${ }^{1}$ https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/electionscience

[^143]:    ${ }^{2}$ https://redistrictingdatahub.org

