

No. 24-01095

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RODNEY D. PIERCE and MOSES MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ALAN HIRSCH, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, JEFF CARMON III in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, STACY “FOUR” EGGERS IV in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, KEVIN N. LEWIS in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, SIOBHAN O’DUFFY MILLEN in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, PHILIP E. BERGER in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate, and TIMOTHY K. MOORE in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina
Hon. James C. Dever III (No. 4:23-cv-193-D-RN)

**JOINT APPENDIX
(VOLUME I OF II, PAGES JA1–JA482)**

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**U.S. District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA (Eastern Division)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:23-cv-00193-D-RN**

Pierce et al v. The North Carolina State Board of Elections et al

Assigned to: District Judge James C. Dever, III

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II

Case in other court: 23-02317

USCA, 24-01095

Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights

Date Filed: 11/20/2023

Jury Demand: None

Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

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V.

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Defendant

Stacy Four Eggers IV

in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections

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Stacy Four Eggers IV

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Defendant

Kevin N. Lewis

in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections

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Defendant

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Defendant

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#	Docket Text	Date Filed
1	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against All Defendants (Filing fee \$ 402 receipt number ANCEDC-7364767.), filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Proposed Summons directed to the North Carolina State Board of Elections, # 3 Proposed Summons directed to Alan Hirsch, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, # 4 Proposed Summons directed to Jeff Carmon III in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, # 5 Proposed Summons directed to Stacy Four Eggers IV in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, # 6 Proposed Summons directed to Kevin N. Lewis in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, # 7 Proposed Summons directed to Siobhan O'Duffy Millen in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, # 8 Proposed Summons directed to Philip E. Berger in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate, # 9 Proposed Summons directed to Timothy K. Moore in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives) (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
2	Notice of Appearance filed by Edwin M. Speas, Jr on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
3	Financial Disclosure Statement by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
4	REQUEST FOR WAIVER of Service sent to (1) The North Carolina State Board of Elections, (2) Alan Hirsch, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, (3) Jeff Carmon III in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, (4) Stacy Four Eggers IV in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, (5) Kevin N. Lewis in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, (6) Siobhan O'Duffy Millen in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, (7) Philip E. Berger in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate, and (8) Timothy K. Moore in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, on 11/20/2023 by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. Waiver of Service due by 12/20/2023. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
5	Emergency MOTION to Expedite - Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Expedited Briefing and Decision on Forthcoming Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
6	Memorandum in Support regarding 5 Emergency MOTION to Expedite - Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Expedited Briefing and Decision on Forthcoming Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
7	Proposed Order regarding 5 Emergency MOTION to Expedite - Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Expedited Briefing and Decision on Forthcoming Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/20/2023)	11/20/2023
8	Notice of Appearance filed by Phillip J. Strach on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
9	Notice of Appearance filed by Thomas A. Farr on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Farr, Thomas) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
10	Notice of Appearance filed by Alyssa Riggins on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Riggins, Alyssa) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
11	Notice of Appearance filed by Cassie Holt on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Holt, Cassie) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
12	RESPONSE in Opposition regarding 5 Emergency MOTION to Expedite - Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Expedited Briefing and Decision on Forthcoming Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
13	AMENDED COMPLAINT - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against All Defendants, filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
14	Summons Issued as to All Defendants. (*NOTICE: Counsel shall print the attached summons and serve with other case opening documents in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.*) (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
15	Waiver of Service Returned Executed filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. Jeff Carmon III waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024; Stacy Four Eggers IV waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024; Alan Hirsch waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024; Kevin N. Lewis waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024; Siobhan O'Duffy Millen waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024; The North Carolina State Board of Elections waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
16	MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
17	Memorandum in Support regarding 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Expert Report of Blakeman B. Esselstyn, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Expert Report of Dr. Matt Barreto, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Expert Report of Dr. Traci Burch, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Declaration of Rodney D. Pierce, # 5 Exhibit 5 - Declaration of Moses Matthews) (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
18	Notice of Appearance filed by Mary Carla Babb on behalf of Jeff Carmon III, Stacy Four Eggers IV, Alan Hirsch, Kevin N. Lewis, Siobhan O'Duffy Millen, The North Carolina State Board of Elections. (Babb, Mary) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
19	Financial Disclosure Statement by The North Carolina State Board of Elections (Babb, Mary) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023

#	Docket Text	Date Filed
20	REPLY to Response to Motion regarding 5 Emergency MOTION to Expedite - Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Expedited Briefing and Decision on Forthcoming Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - 2019 Expert Report of Lisa Handley) (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/22/2023)	11/22/2023
21	Notice of Appearance filed by Alexandra M Bradley on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Bradley, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/27/2023)	11/27/2023
22	Notice of Appearance filed by Terence Steed on behalf of Jeff Carmon III, Stacy Four Eggers IV, Alan Hirsch, Kevin N. Lewis, Siobhan O'Duffy Millen, The North Carolina State Board of Elections. (Steed, Terence) (Entered: 11/27/2023)	11/27/2023
23	ORDER - The court DENIES as meritless plaintiffs' emergency motion to expedite 5. Defendants may file a response to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in accordance with this court's local rules. Plaintiffs may reply in accordance with this court's local rules. The court will hold a hearing in due course if one is needed to resolve plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 11/27/2023. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 11/27/2023)	11/27/2023
24	Waiver of Service Returned Executed filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. Philip E. Berger waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024; Timothy K. Moore waiver sent on 11/20/2023, answer due 1/19/2024. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 11/30/2023)	11/30/2023
	Case Selected for Mediation - A printable list of certified mediators for the Eastern District of North Carolina is available on the court's Website, www.nced.uscourts.gov/attorney/mediators.aspx . Please serve this list on all parties. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/01/2023)	12/01/2023
25	MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response filed by Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Extension of Time) (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 12/06/2023)	12/06/2023
26	RESPONSE in Opposition regarding 25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 12/07/2023)	12/07/2023
27	REPLY to Response to Motion regarding 25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response filed by Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 12/07/2023)	12/07/2023
	Motion Submitted to District Judge James C. Dever III regarding 25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/07/2023)	12/07/2023
28	ORDER granting 25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response. The Legislative defendants and the North Carolina State Board of Elections defendants shall have until and including December 22, 2023, to respond to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 12/8/2023. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/08/2023)	12/08/2023
29	Notice filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce of Letter to The Honorable Judge Dever. (Speas, Edwin) (Entered: 12/11/2023)	12/11/2023
30	Notice of Appearance filed by Ryan Young Park on behalf of Roy A. Cooper, III, Joshua H Stein. (Park, Ryan) (Entered: 12/12/2023)	12/12/2023
31	MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Roy A. Cooper, III, Joshua H Stein. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief of Amicus Curiae Governor Roy A. Cooper & Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, # 2 Exhibit Proposed Order) (Park, Ryan) (Entered: 12/12/2023)	12/12/2023
32	Memorandum in Support regarding 31 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Roy A. Cooper, III, Joshua H Stein. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C) (Park, Ryan) (Entered: 12/12/2023)	12/12/2023
	Motion Submitted to District Judge James C. Dever III regarding 31 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/13/2023)	12/13/2023
33	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Robert Stanton Jones on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 12/13/2023)	12/13/2023
34	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Sam Ferenc on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Ferenc, Sam) (Entered: 12/13/2023)	12/13/2023
35	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Richard Bryan Raile on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Raile, Richard) (Entered: 12/21/2023)	12/21/2023
36	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Patrick T Lewis on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Lewis, Patrick) (Entered: 12/21/2023)	12/21/2023
37	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Tyler Geoffrey Doyle on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Doyle, Tyler) (Entered: 12/21/2023)	12/21/2023
38	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Rachel Palmer Hooper on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Hooper, Rachel) (Entered: 12/21/2023)	12/21/2023

#	Docket Text	Date Filed
39	RESPONSE in Opposition regarding 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Common Cause v. Lewis Plaintiffs' Brief Regarding the VRA, # 2 Exhibit Common Cause v. Lewis Order Supplementing Facts on the VRA, # 3 Exhibit Common Cause v. Lewis Senate Backup Data of Dr. Lisa Handley, # 4 Exhibit Excerpts from 9/27/23 Public Hearing, # 5 Exhibit Excerpts from 10/19/2023 Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee Meeting, # 6 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. Sean Trende, # 7 Exhibit Expert Report of Dr. John Alford, # 8 Exhibit NCLCV v. Hall Expert Report of Dr. Jeffrey B. Lewis) (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 12/22/2023)	12/22/2023
40	RESPONSE in Opposition regarding 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jeff Carmon III, Stacy Four Eggers IV, Alan Hirsch, Kevin N. Lewis, Siobhan O'Duffy Millen, The North Carolina State Board of Elections. (Babb, Mary) (Entered: 12/22/2023)	12/22/2023
41	Declaration regarding 40 Response in Opposition to Motion, of N.C. State Board of Elections Executive Director Karen Brinson Bell by Jeff Carmon III, Stacy Four Eggers IV, Alan Hirsch, Kevin N. Lewis, Siobhan O'Duffy Millen, The North Carolina State Board of Elections (Babb, Mary) (Entered: 12/22/2023)	12/22/2023
42	REPLY to Response to Motion regarding 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of Senator Dan Blue) (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 12/26/2023)	12/26/2023
	Motion Submitted to District Judge James C. Dever III regarding 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/27/2023)	12/27/2023
43	ORDER Setting Hearing on 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction: Hearing set for 1/10/2024 at 10:00 AM in Raleigh - 7th Floor - Courtroom 1 before District Judge James C. Dever III. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 12/29/2023. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 12/29/2023)	12/29/2023
44	Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. Filing fee, receipt number ANCEDC-7411767. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 12/29/2023)	12/29/2023
45	Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals regarding 44 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. (Hardy, Shari) (Entered: 12/29/2023)	12/29/2023
46	US Court of Appeals Case Number 23-2317 (Kirsten Hancock, Case Manager) as to 44 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Rodney D. Pierce, Moses Matthews. (Hardy, Shari) (Entered: 12/29/2023)	12/29/2023
47	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Katherine McKnight on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (McKnight, Katherine) (Entered: 01/03/2024)	01/03/2024
48	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Trevor M. Stanley on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Stanley, Trevor) (Entered: 01/03/2024)	01/03/2024
49	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by Elisabeth S. Theodore on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Theodore, Elisabeth) (Entered: 01/09/2024)	01/09/2024
50	ORDER of US Court of Appeals granting motion to dismiss appeal as to 44 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Rodney D. Pierce, Moses Matthews. (Foell, S.) (Entered: 01/09/2024)	01/09/2024
51	US Court of Appeals Judgment as to 44 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Rodney D. Pierce, Moses Matthews. (Foell, S.) (Entered: 01/09/2024)	01/09/2024
52	ORDER - The court will proceed with the scheduled hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, January 10, 2024. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 1/9/2024. Counsel should read the order in its entirety for critical deadlines and information. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 01/09/2024)	01/09/2024
53	Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge James C. Dever III: Motion Hearing held on 1/10/2024 regarding 16 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Counsel for parties present in the courtroom and via video conference. The court hears argument by the parties. The matter is taken under advisement. Written order to follow. (Court Reporter Amy Condon) (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 01/10/2024)	01/10/2024
54	Notice of Special Appearance for non-district by E. Mark Braden on behalf of Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Braden, E. Mark) (Entered: 01/12/2024)	01/12/2024
55	Notice of Supplemental Barreto Declaration filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. (Attachments: # 1 Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Matt Barreto) (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 01/12/2024)	01/12/2024
56	MANDATE of US Court of Appeals as to 44 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Rodney D. Pierce, Moses Matthews. (Foell, S.) (Entered: 01/16/2024)	01/16/2024
57	ORDER - The legislative defendants and the Board defendants may file any response to Dr. Barreto's supplemental declaration 55 no later than Monday, January 22, 2024. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 1/17/2024. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 01/17/2024)	01/17/2024
58	ANSWER to 13 Amended Complaint by Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 01/19/2024)	01/19/2024

#	Docket Text	Date Filed
59	ANSWER to 13 Amended Complaint by Jeff Carmon III, Stacy Four Eggers IV, Alan Hirsch, Kevin N. Lewis, Siobhan O'Duffy Millen, The North Carolina State Board of Elections. (Babb, Mary) (Entered: 01/19/2024)	01/19/2024
60	RESPONSE of Legislative Defendants regarding 55 Notice of Supplemental Barreto Declaration filed by Philip E. Berger, Timothy K. Moore. (Strach, Phillip) (Entered: 01/22/2024)	01/22/2024
61	ORDER - The court GRANTS the motion of Governor Roy A. Cooper, ID and Attorney General Joshua H. Stein to file amicus brief 31 and DENIES plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction 16 . The parties SHALL meet and confer. The parties SHALL submit a proposed scheduling order no later than February 16, 2024. If the parties cannot agree on a proposed schedule, the joint submission shall contain the proposed schedule of each party for each topic in the scheduling order. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 1/26/2024. (Mann, Stephanie) (Entered: 01/26/2024)	01/26/2024
62	Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Moses Matthews, Rodney D. Pierce. Filing fee, receipt number ANCEDC-7449582. (Jones, Robert) (Entered: 01/26/2024)	01/26/2024
63	Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals regarding 62 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. (Foell, S.) (Entered: 01/26/2024)	01/26/2024
64	US Court of Appeals Case Number 24-1095 (Jeffrey Neal, Case Manager) as to 62 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Rodney D. Pierce, Moses Matthews. (Foell, S.) (Entered: 01/26/2024)	01/26/2024

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION**

RODNEY D. PIERCE and
MOSES MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ALAN HIRSCH, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, JEFF CARMON III in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, STACY “FOUR” EGGERS IV in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, KEVIN N. LEWIS in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, SIOBHAN O’DUFFY MILLEN in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, PHILIP E. BERGER in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate, and TIMOTHY K. MOORE in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives,

Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs Rodney D. Pierce and Moses Matthews file this First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against the North Carolina State Board of Elections (“NCSBE”), NCSBE Chair Alan Hirsch in his official capacity, NCSBE Secretary Jeff Carmon III in his official capacity, NCSBE members Stacy “Four” Eggers IV, Kevin N. Lewis, and Siobhan O’Duffy Millen, all in their official capacities, Philip E. Berger in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore in his official capacity as Speaker of the

North Carolina House of Representatives, and allege as follows:

1. Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge Senate Bill 758 (2023-2024 Session) (SB 758), Session Law 2023-146, which establishes new state Senate districts for North Carolina, on the ground that it violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301.

2. SB 758 was enacted on October 25, 2023. Despite having ample evidence of racially polarized voting and a history of discrimination in the “Black Belt counties” of northeastern North Carolina, and an obligation under the Voting Rights Act to analyze that evidence before drawing districts, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a Senate plan that unlawfully deprives Black voters of the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.

3. SB 758 is just the most recent episode in North Carolina’s “long history of race discrimination generally and race-based vote suppression in particular.” *N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory*, 831 F.3d 204, 223 (4th Cir. 2016).

4. The Black population in North Carolina’s Black Belt counties is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to form a majority-minority district. Voting in the region is also highly polarized along racial lines—Black voters there are politically cohesive, but white voters vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat minority candidates of choice. Nonetheless, SB 758 “cracks” Black voters in the region across multiple districts, including Senate District 2, which stretches more than 160 miles from the Virginia border to Carteret County on the Atlantic Ocean. When considered against the totality of the circumstances, SB 758’s cracking of Black voters in this region dilutes their voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek an order (1) declaring that SB 758 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) enjoining Defendants from conducting future elections under SB 758; (3) ordering a remedial plan that includes a minority opportunity district in the Black Belt

counties; and (4) providing any such additional relief as is appropriate.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. Plaintiffs bring this action under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

7. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because the matters in controversy arise under the laws of the United States and assert the deprivation of federal statutory rights under color of state law.

8. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events that give rise to Plaintiffs' claims have occurred, and will occur, in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

9. This Court has authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

PARTIES

10. Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and are registered to vote in North Carolina.

11. Plaintiff Rodney D. Pierce is a lifelong resident of Halifax County, North Carolina. He is presently employed as a social studies teacher by Northampton County Schools. Mr. Pierce is Black and registered to vote in Halifax County in 1996 upon reaching his 18th birthday. He has voted in most, if not all, elections in Halifax County since then. Defendants have assigned him and all other Halifax County voters to Senate District 2 in the 2023 enacted map, thereby diluting the weight of his vote compared to the vote of white citizens. Senate District 2 in the 2023 enacted map is a majority-white district in which Black voters like Mr. Pierce do not have an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. A majority-Black district could be drawn incorporating all of Halifax County, including Mr. Pierce's residence.

12. Plaintiff Moses Matthews has resided in Martin County since 1974. He was

employed as a chemist by Weyerhaeuser until his retirement and is now engaged in various projects in Martin and neighboring counties. Mr. Matthews is Black and registered to vote in Martin County in 1976. He has voted in most, if not all elections, since then. Defendants have assigned him and all other Martin County voters to Senate District 2 in the 2023 enacted map, thereby diluting the weight of his vote compared to the vote of white citizens. Senate District 2 in the 2023 enacted map is a majority-white district in which Black voters like Mr. Matthews do not have an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. A majority-Black district could be drawn incorporating all of Martin County, including Mr. Matthews' residence.

13. Defendant NCSBE is a state agency charged with administering the election laws of the State of North Carolina.

14. Defendant Alan Hirsch is the Chair of NCSBE. He is sued in his official capacity only.

15. Defendant Jeff Carmon III is the Secretary of NCSBE. He is sued in his official capacity only.

16. Defendant Stacy "Four" Eggers IV is a Board Member of NCSBE. He is sued in his official capacity only.

17. Defendant Kevin N. Lewis is a Board Member of NCSBE. He is sued in his official capacity only.

18. Defendant Siobhan O'Duffy Millen is a Board Member of NCSBE. She is sued in her official capacity only.

19. Defendant Philip E. Berger is the President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate. He is sued in his official capacity only.

20. Defendant Timothy K. Moore is the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives. He is sued in his official capacity only.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

21. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a), prohibits any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color[.]” Thus, in addition to prohibiting practices that deny outright the exercise of the right to vote, Section 2 prohibits vote dilution. A violation of Section 2 is established if it is shown that “the political processes leading to nomination or election” in the jurisdiction “are not equally open to participation by [Black voters] in that [Black voters] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); *see Allen v. Milligan*, 599 U.S. 1, 24-25 (2023).

22. The dilution of voting strength “may be caused by the dispersal of [members of a racial or ethnic group] into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of [members of that group] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.” *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986).

23. In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, the United States Supreme Court identified three necessary preconditions (the “*Gingles* preconditions”) for a claim of vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: (1) the minority group must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”; (2) the minority group must be “politically cohesive”; and (3) the majority must vote “sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” 478 U.S. at 50-51; *see Allen*, 599 U.S. at 18.

24. Once all three preconditions are established, the statute directs courts to consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, members of a racial group have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). The Senate Judiciary Committee Report

(“Senate Report”) on the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act identifies several non-exclusive factors (“Senate factors”) that courts should consider when determining if, under the totality of the circumstances in a jurisdiction, the operation of the electoral device being challenged results in a violation of Section 2. S. Rep. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).

25. The Senate factors include: (1) the history of official voting-related discrimination in the state or political subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority-vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet-voting; (4) the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; (5) the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; (8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness in the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; and (9) whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

26. Under settled law, “there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or [even] that a majority of them point one way or the other.” *League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina*, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 45). “Instead, courts must undertake ‘a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, [with] a functional view of the political process.’” *Id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 45); *see also*

id. (“Courts must make ‘an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of’ electoral administration ‘in the light of past and present reality.’” (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 78)).

27. In *Stephenson v. Bartlett*, 562 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 2002), the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the interplay between Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the North Carolina Constitution’s Whole-County Provisions, N.C. Const. art. 2, §§ 3(3), 5(3), which express a preference for keeping counties whole in legislative districting plans. The court held that Section 2 preempts the Whole-County Provisions to the extent necessary to comply with federal law. 562 S.E.2d at 396.

28. Accordingly, the North Carolina General Assembly must start each legislative redistricting process by analyzing whether Section 2 requires drawing any districts to give minority voters an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice. *Id.* at 396-97. Only after drawing those “districts required by the [Voting Rights Act]” may the legislature draw “non-VRA districts” based on the Whole-County Provisions and other state redistricting criteria. *Id.* at 396-97.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. North Carolina’s 2023 Redistricting Process

29. In November 2021, following the 2020 decennial census, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted new congressional and state legislative maps. 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 174 (congressional); 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 173 (state Senate); 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 175 (state House). In 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court enjoined those maps as unlawful partisan gerrymanders under the state Constitution. *Harper v. Hall (Harper I)*, 868 S.E.2d 499, 551-52 (N.C. 2022), *overruled on reh’g by Harper v. Hall (Harper III)*, 886 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. 2023); *see Harper v. Hall*, 867 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. 2022) (order preceding issuance of *Harper I*). The state Supreme Court directed the General Assembly to submit new maps and remanded the case to the three-judge trial court to assess their constitutionality. *Harper I*, 868 S.E.2d at 552, 559-60.

30. On February 23, 2022, the trial court issued a remedial order approving the General Assembly's new state House and Senate maps. *See Harper v. Hall (Harper II)*, 881 S.E.2d 156, 162 (N.C. 2022), *withdrawn and superseded on reh'g by Harper III*, 886 S.E.2d 393. The approved state House and Senate maps were used in the 2022 elections. *Harper III*, 886 S.E.2d at 407.

31. On December 16, 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision accepting the remedial state Senate map. *Harper II*, 881 S.E.2d at 181. The North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently granted rehearing of its decision in *Harper II*. *Harper v. Hall*, 882 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 2023) (rehearing order).

32. On April 28, 2023, in *Harper III*, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled *Harper I*, withdrew its decision in *Harper II*, and vacated the trial court's February 23, 2022 order concerning the remedial plans. *Harper III*, 886 S.E.2d at 449. The court authorized the General Assembly to enact new state House and Senate maps. *Id.*

33. In October 2023—approximately six months after *Harper III*—the General Assembly enacted new districting plans. 2023 N.C. Sess. Laws 146 (state Senate) (SB 758); 2023 N.C. Sess. Laws 149 (state House) (HB 898).

34. Under Article II, Section 22 of the North Carolina Constitution, redistricting legislation may not be vetoed by the state governor. N.C. Const. art. II, § 22(5)(b)-(d); *see Harper III*, 886 S.E.2d at 419. Accordingly, the 2023 redistricting bills took effect upon passage.

35. SB 758, the state Senate redistricting bill, was passed and ratified on October 25, 2023. 2023 N.C. Sess. Laws 146.

B. The 2023 State Senate Redistricting Plan

36. Northeastern North Carolina includes a number of counties that are part of the Black Belt—a crescent-shaped region historically stretching from Virginia to Texas that was originally named for its rich black soil, but over time came to be associated with the slave labor

that soil attracted. As Booker T. Washington explained in 1901, the Black Belt was “the part of the South where the slaves were most profitable, and consequently they were taken there in the largest numbers.” Today, the Black Belt refers to the counties with the largest Black populations in a number of Southern states, including North Carolina.

37. Black Belt counties in North Carolina, all located in the northeast part of the state, include Bertie, Hertford, Edgecombe, Northampton, and Halifax Counties, each of which has a greater than 50 percent Black voting age population according to 2020 census data. Nearby Vance, Warren, Martin, and Washington Counties have greater than 40 percent Black voting age populations. Gates and Chowan Counties, located in the same area, have between 31 and 32 percent Black voting age populations. The Black voting age population of the State as a whole is 21 percent.

38. At the time of the 2023 redistricting, the General Assembly had 2020 census data on the racial composition of each county in North Carolina. The General Assembly had also received a letter from the Southern Coalition for Social Justice (SCSJ) that enclosed expert analysis finding evidence of racially polarized voting in the Black Belt counties in recent elections, and that urged the General Assembly to conduct its own examination of racially polarized voting.

39. At the time of the 2023 redistricting, the General Assembly also knew that in the 2022 general election, two Black Senate candidates in districts that encompassed Black Belt counties had been defeated by white candidates: longtime incumbent Toby Fitch in Senate District 4 and Valerie Jordan in Senate District 3.


40. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the General Assembly to draw any districts necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act before applying North Carolina’s Whole-County Provisions and other state redistricting principles. *See Stephenson*, 562 S.E.2d at 396-97.

41. Nonetheless, the General Assembly either failed to conduct or failed to consider any Voting Rights Act analysis with respect to its 2023 state Senate plan.

42. Instead, the General Assembly enacted SB 758, which cracks North Carolina's Black Belt counties across multiple districts, diluting the ability of minority voters in those counties to elect representatives of their choice.

43. Under the map enacted by SB 758 (the "enacted map"), Senate District 1 includes Northampton, Bertie, Hertford, and Gates Counties, while Senate District 2 includes Warren, Halifax, Martin, Washington, and Chowan Counties. Edgecombe and Vance Counties are in Senate Districts 5 and 11, respectively.


44. The demonstrative below illustrates how the enacted map cracks Black voters in the Black Belt counties between Senate Districts 1 and 2:



C. Black North Carolinians in the Black Belt Counties Are Sufficiently Numerous and Geographically Compact To Constitute a Majority-Minority District

45. Rather than crack Black voters across these districts, the General Assembly could have drawn the Black Belt counties into a majority-minority district that would have met the Voting Rights Act's requirements while adhering to North Carolina's redistricting criteria.


46. It was feasible for the General Assembly to create a majority-minority district for the Black Belt counties that was compact, reasonably configured, and made up of whole counties, such as the one shown below:



47. As the demonstrative above shows, it was feasible to create a majority-minority district while leaving fully intact the current minority opportunity district in Pitt and Edgecombe Counties. The Black voting age population in this demonstration district is 51.47%, and the Black citizen voting age population is 53.12%.

48. In fact, it is feasible to create a majority-minority district without altering any

cluster or district in the enacted 2023 Senate map except two, i.e., the two districts that currently crack voters across the Black Belt counties. The following demonstration district (labeled B-1) is compact, reasonably configured, requires the alteration of only SD1 and SD2, preserves the county clusters required by *Stephenson* to the greatest possible extent, preserves the current minority opportunity district in Pitt and Edgecombe counties, and only splits a single county:



49. The Black voting age population for this demonstration district (B-1) is slightly less than 50%, but the Black citizen voting age population is 50.19%.

50. Together, the two districts in this demonstrative (demonstration districts B-1 and B-2) comprise exactly the same area as SD1 and SD2 in the 2023 enacted map.

D. Voting in the Relevant Area Is Racially Polarized

51. As the Fourth Circuit observed in *North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory*, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), there is an “inextricable link between race and politics” in North Carolina. *Id.* at 214. Voting in many areas of the state “is racially polarized.” *Id.* That is,

“the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates.” *Id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 62 (discussing North Carolina)); *see also id.* at 225 (reiterating district court finding and admissions by state defendants at trial that “racially polarized voting between African Americans and whites remains prevalent in North Carolina” and that “African-American race is a better predictor for voting Democratic than party registration”).

52. Voting is highly racially polarized in the region of the Black Belt counties. Black voters there are politically cohesive and overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates. The white majority in the surrounding area is also politically cohesive, overwhelmingly supports Republican candidates, and historically votes as a bloc to defeat Black voters’ candidates of choice.

53. Under the state Senate map enacted in 2022 (i.e., the Senate map used in the 2022 elections), Senate District 3 includes Warren, Halifax, Martin, Bertie, Hertford, and Gates Counties, but also includes two majority-white counties, Currituck and Camden, and omits Vance and Washington Counties. In the 2022 elections, white voters in Senate District 3 voted as a racial bloc to elect their candidate of choice, defeating Black voters’ candidate of choice.

54. Federal courts have repeatedly identified racially polarized voting in the Black Belt counties. For example, in *Hines v. Mayor & Town Council of Ahoskie*, 998 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit found “a history of racially polarized voting” in the town of Ahoskie and the surrounding Hertford County. *Id.* at 1269. Over the twenty-two elections preceding the decision, 93 percent of Black voters voted for Black candidates, while 93.4% of white voters supported white candidates. *Id.* The town defendants in *Hines* stipulated that the town’s system for electing its town council “diluted black voting strength in violation of § 2 of the [Voting Rights] Act.” *Id.*; *see also, e.g., Johnson v. Halifax County*, 594 F. Supp. 161, 165-66 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (crediting expert analysis finding racial polarization in Halifax County between 1968 and 1982).

55. In addition, the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), affirmed the conclusions of a three-judge court in this district that made detailed findings of racially polarized voting in seven North Carolina state legislative districts. *Id.* at 34, 80. The three-judge panel “found that all of the challenged districts,” which included several of North Carolina’s Black Belt counties as well as certain other areas of the state, “exhibit[ed] severe and persistent racially polarized voting.” *Id.* at 35 nn.1-2, 41; *see id.* at 52-54 (“Based on all of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded that each of the districts experienced racially polarized voting in a persistent and severe degree.” (quotation marks omitted)); *see McCrory*, 831 F.3d at 224-25 (discussing *Gingles*).

56. More recently, the district court in *North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Cooper*, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15 (M.D.N.C. 2019), *rev’d on other grounds sub nom. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond*, 981 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2020), examined expert analysis of data post-dating the Fourth Circuit’s 2016 *McCrory* decision and concluded that the state’s electorate remained “extremely polarized” along racial lines. *Id.* at 30.

57. North Carolina’s racially polarized voting is an outgrowth of the State’s “troubled racial history.” *McCrory*, 831 F.3d at 226.

E. The Totality of the Circumstances Establishes That the Enacted Plan Has the Effect of Denying Black Voters an Equal Opportunity To Participate in the Political Process and To Elect Candidates of Their Choice

58. Under the totality of the circumstances, as informed by each the Senate factors, *see supra* ¶¶ 25-26, Black voters in the Black Belt counties have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

1. North Carolina’s History of Racial Discrimination

59. “Unquestionably, North Carolina has a long history of race discrimination generally and race-based vote suppression in particular.” *McCrory*, 831 F.3d at 223; *see also*

Raymond, 981 F.3d at 311 (“there is a long and shameful history of race-based voter suppression in North Carolina”).

60. The district court in *Gingles* found that North Carolina “had officially discriminated against its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing at different times a poll tax, a literacy test, a prohibition against bullet (single-shot) voting and designated seat plans for multimember districts.” 478 U.S. at 38-39 (footnotes omitted). Even after the removal of poll tax, literacy test, and other barriers, Black voter registration “remained relatively depressed” compared to white voter registration, including in the districts challenged in *Gingles*. *Id.* at 39. The district court attributed the discrepancy, “at least in part, to the historical pattern of statewide official discrimination.” *Id.*

61. Picking up where *Gingles* left off, the record in *McCrorry* was “replete with evidence of instances since the 1980s in which the North Carolina legislature ... attempted to suppress and dilute the voting rights of African Americans.” *McCrorry*, 831 F.3d at 223.

62. Before the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in *Shelby County v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), 40 of North Carolina’s 100 counties were subject to Section 5’s preclearance requirement, including nearly all of the Black Belt counties. *McCrorry*, 831 F.3d at 215. Between 1980 and 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice issued “over fifty objection letters to proposed election law changes in North Carolina—including several since 2000—because the State had failed to prove the proposed changes would have no discriminatory purpose or effect.” *McCrorry*, 831 F.3d at 224 (citing Department of Justice records). The Department of Justice or federal courts determined in some of these cases that the General Assembly had acted with discriminatory intent, while other actions produced discriminatory results. *Id.* at 223.

63. “During the same period, private plaintiffs brought fifty-five successful cases under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act” to challenge North Carolina voting practices and restrictions. *Id.* at 224. Ten of those cases “ended in judicial decisions finding that electoral schemes in counties and municipalities across the state had the effect of discriminating against minority voters.” *Id.* (collecting cases). Forty-five other cases “were settled favorably for plaintiffs out of court or through consent [decrees] that altered the challenged voting laws.” *Id.* (collecting additional cases). The United States intervened or filed its own suits “[o]n several occasions.” *Id.*

64. The day after the *Shelby County* decision was issued, however, the Chairman of the North Carolina Senate Rules Committee announced an intention to enact an omnibus election law. *See McCrory*, 831 F.3d at 216. Before introducing the legislation, the General Assembly requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting practices, including early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration by young voters before turning eighteen. *See id.* at 216-18. The data showed that each of these practices were used disproportionately by Black voters. *Id.* at 216-18. The legislature also requested data on possession of identification by North Carolinians, which showed that Black North Carolinians disproportionately lacked photo IDs issued by the state Department of Motor Vehicles. *Id.* at 216.

65. The General Assembly soon enacted Session Law 2013-381, which imposed ID requirements that disproportionately burdened Black voters and restricted each of the voting practices that Black voters disproportionately used—early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration. *Id.* at 214-16. Multiple groups of plaintiffs challenged those restrictions. *See id.* at 218.

66. The Fourth Circuit found that these provisions of the statute were motivated by discriminatory intent to target Black voters and diminish their electoral influence, violating Section

2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. *Id.* at 238.

67. The Fourth Circuit observed that Session Law 2013-381 “target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical precision.” *Id.* at 214.

2. North Carolina’s History of Unlawful Race-Based Redistricting

68. North Carolina has an extensive history of taking unlawful approaches to race in redistricting over the past several decades.

69. In *Gingles*, the Supreme Court rejected a 1982 redistricting plan for state legislative districts because its use of multimember districts caused Black voters to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 487 U.S. at 80.

70. In the 1990s, a pair of U.S. Supreme Court decisions held that the General Assembly’s 1991 congressional redistricting map included a racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996); *see Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (finding plaintiffs stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause).

71. In *Harris v. McCrory*, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285 (2017), a three-judge district court held that a congressional map adopted in 2011 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, ruling for the plaintiffs on claims that the plan packed Black voters into two districts to reduce their influence on other districts. *Id.* at 604, 609-11. The Supreme Court affirmed. *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 322-23.

72. Similarly, in *Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff’d*, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017), a three-judge district court held that twenty-eight state legislative districts were racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at 176-77. The Supreme Court affirmed without argument. 581 U.S. at 1015.

3. Ongoing Effects of North Carolina's History of Discrimination

73. In *Gingles*, the Supreme Court affirmed findings by the district court on circumstances in North Carolina that resulted in Black voters having less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 478 U.S. at 80; *see McCrory*, 831 F.3d at 225.

74. In particular, the *Gingles* district court found that Black North Carolinians' ability to participate equally and elect their chosen candidates was "impair[ed]" by several factors, including "the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services." 478 U.S. at 80; *see id.* at 39.

75. Another district court decision from the same period enjoined the method for electing the county commission in Halifax County based in part on similar considerations. *Johnson*, 594 F. Supp. at 162-63. The court there noted that in Halifax County, "Black political participation is also impaired by the present day socioeconomic effects resulting from racial discrimination in education, employment and other areas." *Id.* at 169; *see also id.* at 169-70 ("Compared to whites in Halifax County, blacks have lower educational, employment and income levels, and dis-proportionately more blacks live in poverty and have less adequate housing.").

76. The *McCrory* litigation demonstrated that these effects continued into the 2010s. The district court in *McCrory* found that Black North Carolinians "currently lag behind whites in several key socioeconomic indicators, including education, employment, income, access to transportation, and residential stability." *League of Women Voters of N.C.*, 769 F.3d at 246. Those effects were attributable to "North Carolina's history of official discrimination" against Black citizens. *Id.* at 235.

77. The ongoing effects continue today. Black North Carolinians, including in the Black Belt counties, are significantly more likely to be impoverished than white North Carolinians.

They likewise face discrimination in education, housing, employment, and healthcare, and are less able to participate effectively in the political process.

4. History of Racial Appeals in North Carolina Political Campaigns

78. The *Gingles* district court also found consistent and ongoing use of “racial appeals” in North Carolina political campaigns, with examples in the record from the 1890s through a 1984 U.S. Senate race. 478 U.S. at 40. The court found that use of racial appeals in North Carolina campaigns, “ranging in style from overt and blatant to subtle and furtive,” had the effect of lessening Black citizens’ opportunity to participate effectively in the political process and elect their chosen candidates. *Id.*

79. The 1984 Senate campaign that *Gingles* discussed included white Republican candidate Jesse Helms charging that his Democratic opponent was colluding with Reverend Jesse Jackson to register hundreds of thousands of Black voters who would vote as a bloc against him.

80. Helms again used racial appeals in his 1990 Senate race to attack his Black opponent, Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt. In one advertisement, Helms accused Gantt of exploiting his position as mayor and his minority status for personal financial gain by obtaining a free television station license and then selling it to a white-owned corporation. The advertisement claimed that the Black community felt betrayed by Gantt’s actions.

81. In the same campaign, Helms ran an infamous advertisement in which a pair of white hands crumples a job rejection letter, with the blame for the rejection placed on a minority candidate.

82. Such tactics have persisted to the present day. Political campaigns in North Carolina have continued to be characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals, including discriminatory campaign tactics and racial appeals in elections deliberately and demonstrably designed to keep Black North Carolinians from registering and turning out to vote. Such tactics continue to affect

the ability of prospective and registered Black voters to participate in the political process.

83. For example, in the 2020 race for a western North Carolina congressional district, then-Representative Madison Cawthorn attacked his Democratic opponent, Moe Davis, for allegedly associating himself with people who wanted to “ruin white males.” In 2022, during the U.S. Senate race between then-Congressman Ted Budd and former North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Cheri Beasley, advertisements blamed Beasley for crimes committed by individuals after early release from prison, echoing the infamous 1988 “Willie Horton” ad that targeted Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis. The advertisements used imagery of white victims and photographs of Black men in custody alongside images of Beasley.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—Vote Dilution 52 U.S.C. § 10301

84. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the count below as though fully set forth herein.

85. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the enforcement of any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or any standard, practice, or procedure that results in the denial or abridgement of the right of any U.S. citizen to vote on account of race or color. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).

86. The district boundaries created by SB 758 crack Black voters in the Black Belt counties in northeastern North Carolina, resulting in the dilution of their electoral strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

87. Black North Carolinians in the Black Belt counties are sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority-minority district.

88. Black voters in the Black Belt counties are politically cohesive, and elections in the region reveal a clear pattern of racially polarized voting that allows blocs of white voters usually to defeat Black-preferred candidates.

89. The totality of the circumstances establishes that the enacted state Senate districting plan has the effect of denying Black voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

90. In enforcing the district boundaries in SB 758, Defendants have acted and, absent relief from this Court, will act to deny Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed to them by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

COUNT II

Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—Vote Dilution 42 U.S.C. § 1983

91. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the count below as though fully set forth herein.

92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressly provides a private cause of action, including for declaratory or injunctive relief, against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

93. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the enforcement of any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or any standard, practice, or procedure that results in the denial or abridgement of the “right” of any U.S. citizen to vote on account of race or color. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Section 2 creates federal rights that are enforceable under § 1983.

94. The district boundaries created by SB 758 crack Black voters in the Black Belt

counties in northeastern North Carolina, resulting in the dilution of their electoral strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

95. Black North Carolinians in the Black Belt counties are sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority-minority district.

96. Black voters in the Black Belt counties are politically cohesive, and elections in the region reveal a clear pattern of racially polarized voting that allows blocs of white voters usually to defeat Black-preferred candidates.

97. The totality of the circumstances establishes that the enacted state Senate districting plan has the effect of denying Black voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

98. In enforcing the district boundaries in SB 758, Defendants have acted and, absent relief from this Court, will act to deny Plaintiffs' rights guaranteed to them by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

- A. Declare that SB 758 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act;
- B. Grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring Defendants, as well as their agents and successors in office, from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 as drawn in SB 758, including barring Defendants from conducting any Senate elections using those district boundaries;
- C. Take actions necessary to order the adoption of a valid state Senate plan that includes a minority opportunity district in northeastern North Carolina, while leaving intact the current district comprised of Pitt and Edgecombe Counties, in time to use the remedial plan in the 2024 Senate elections (and, as part of the

remedial order, waive the one-year residency requirement for candidates under N.C. Const. art. II, § 6, for newly drawn remedial districts);

- D. Grant such other or further relief the Court deems appropriate, including but not limited to an award of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and reasonable costs.

Dated: November 22, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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**Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel and parties registered in said system, and that I served the foregoing via email as follows:

Paul Cox
North Carolina State Board of Elections
paul.cox@ncsbe.gov
*On behalf of Defendants The North Carolina State Board of Elections,
Alan Hirsch, Jeff Carmon III, Stacy "Four" Eggers IV, Kevin N. Lewis,
and Siobhan O'Duffy Millen*

Dated: November 22, 2023

/s/ Edwin M. Speas, Jr.

Edwin M. Speas, Jr.

Exhibit 1

Expert Report of Blakeman B. Esselstyn

Expert Report of Blakeman B. Esselstyn

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Qualifications

1. My name is Blakeman B. Esselstyn. I am the founder and principal of a consultancy called Mapfigure Consulting, which provides expert services in the areas of redistricting, demographics, and geographic information systems (GIS). For more specific information about the qualifications and credentials in the paragraphs below, please see my Curriculum Vitae, provided as **Attachment A**.

2. I have previously served as a testifying expert in one redistricting case, where I presented demonstration plans and analysis in support of Gingles factor one, and three cases in North Carolina related to other topics. I have also served as a consulting expert in four other redistricting cases, two of which were in North Carolina.

3. I have developed 16 redistricting plans that have been enacted for use in elections by North Carolina jurisdictions at various levels of government, and I am currently working on developing a 17th.

4. I earned a bachelor's degree in Geology & Geophysics and International Studies from Yale University and a master's degree in Computer and Information Technology from the University of Pennsylvania. I hold professional certifications both as a Geographic Information Systems Professional (GISP) and as a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP).

5. I have taught graduate-level semester courses in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and have presented on redistricting at conferences at Harvard University, Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Texas, and several other universities. I have also presented at national events organized by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association (URISA), and the American Planning Association (APA), as well as GIS conferences in Europe.

6. In addition to speaking engagements, my work and opinions related to redistricting have often been cited in media outlets, and some of my related writings have been published or cited in national publications. Again, for details, please see **Attachment A**.

7. I am being compensated at a rate of \$325 per hour. No part of my compensation is dependent upon the conclusions that I reach or the opinions that I offer.

B. About this report

8. Plaintiffs' counsel has asked me to determine whether there is an area in northeastern North Carolina where the Black population is "sufficiently large and geographically compact"¹ to enable the creation of a majority-Black State Senate district that adheres to redistricting criteria such as population deviation, contiguity, compactness, and minimizing traversals of counties and election precincts.

¹ *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).

9. Additionally, Plaintiffs' counsel has asked me to determine whether it is possible to create a majority-Black State Senate district which adheres to the criteria mentioned in the previous paragraph and is entirely contained within the area occupied by Districts 1 and 2 in the enacted State Senate redistricting plan.

10. Following a demographic overview of northeastern North Carolina, the report will provide a brief discussion of the state's distinctive county grouping requirements for legislative redistricting. I will then review the configuration of the districts in the enacted State Senate plan in the relevant area, present two alternative demonstration district configurations, and supply some analysis of selected characteristics of the plans.

11. All map images in the report are ones that I created (though they may be maps showing redistricting plans I did not create).

12. More detailed information about the sources of data, the software, and my methodology can be found in **Attachment B**.

C. Summary of conclusions

13. It is possible to create an additional majority-Black State Senate district in northeastern North Carolina in accordance with traditional redistricting principles. Further, it is possible to create another district in the same region in accordance with traditional redistricting principles where Black voting-age citizens are the majority—in a configuration that lies entirely within the area occupied by enacted State Senate districts 1 and 2.

II. Statewide and regional demographic overview

A. North Carolina and the 2020 Census

14. North Carolina's population increased by more than 900,000 people between the 2010 and 2020 censuses, from 9,535,483 to 10,439,388—an increase of approximately 9.5%.²

15. According to the 2020 census, 22.5% of North Carolina's population identified as “Black or African American alone or in combination.”³ The 2010–2020 population increase in this group essentially kept pace with the growth in the state as a whole, increasing by approximately 9.0%.

16. By contrast, the state's population identifying as White and no other race *decreased* by 0.6% between 2010 and 2020. In 2010, this group constituted 68.5% of North Carolina's population, but in 2020 just 62.2%.

B. Regional distribution of the Black population


17. Eight of North Carolina's one hundred counties have a total population that is majority-Black. All of these counties are in the northeastern part of the state, and each of these counties is adjacent to at least one other such county. These eight counties are,

² The demographic analysis in this section is based on statistics obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau website, <https://www.census.gov>. For URLs of specific census resources used, please consult Attachment B.

³ The Census Bureau classification “Black or African American alone or in combination,” sometimes stated as “any part Black,” will be the measure of the Black population that I use most frequently in this report. Unless otherwise stated, in the text that follows, “Black” can be taken to indicate “alone or in combination.” It is my understanding that the “alone or in combination” designation is the appropriate measure for most Voting Rights Act Section 2 considerations. Additionally, unless otherwise stated, this measure includes Black residents who also identify as Hispanic.

in order of decreasing percentage of the Black population, Bertie, Hertford, Edgecombe, Northampton, Halifax, Vance, Warren, and Washington. See Figure 1. Other nearby counties have substantial Black populations, including Martin (42.1%) and Gates (31.2%).

Figure 1: Majority-Black North Carolina counties




18. North Carolina’s regions and municipalities where a significant percentage of the population is Black are of course not limited to the counties mentioned above.

Voting precincts⁴ whose populations are at least 30% Black can be found in many parts

⁴ While local election precincts in North Carolina can and do change throughout the decade, the U.S. Census Bureau uses a similar entity called “voting districts” (also referred to as “VTDs”) that are set at the time of each decennial census and do not change in between. The VTD geographies provided by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2020 as part of the P.L. 94-171 geographic support products were designed to match the precinct geographies in North Carolina at the time of that census. Most redistricting software uses the VTD geographies instead of precincts, as those are political subdivision units to which the population counts are designed to be reliably assigned. In practice, the terms “precincts” and “VTDs” often are used interchangeably. The map in Figure 2 shows VTDs, as do the maps in similar subsequent figures.

of the state, but again one finds a notable concentration of such precincts in the region in and around those eight counties—a region sometimes called the “Black Belt counties” of northeastern North Carolina. Figure 2, with voting districts shaded based on the Black percentage of the voting age population (also sometimes called BVAP), shows the distribution.

Figure 2: Voting districts classified by Black voting age population



19. For a table showing selected demographic statistics from the 2020 census for North Carolina’s counties, please see **Attachment C**.


III. North Carolina’s *Stephenson* county grouping requirements

20. North Carolina has a distinctive component to its legislative redistricting process which involves grouping counties, a component often referred to as the

Stephenson requirement. The name comes from a decision in the *Stephenson v. Bartlett* case from 2002 which, after prescribing that districts must satisfy the Voting Rights Act, provided a specific process for arranging collections of counties. Following the decennial census an algorithm is used to determine groupings of counties for each chamber in the General Assembly in such a way as to minimize the number of counties traversed by district lines. After the 2020 census, using a procedure which did not take race into account, mathematicians produced an optimal set of groupings.⁵

21. This set of groupings includes two possible ways to cluster the counties in northeastern North Carolina. See Figure 3.

Figure 3: Two county cluster alternatives for northeastern North Carolina



⁵ The article presenting these groupings (which I co-authored) can be found at <https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf>

IV. State Senate districts in northeastern North Carolina

22. With 50 districts in the North Carolina Senate, plans created in this decade are designed so that each district will have a population near 208,788, or one-fiftieth of North Carolina's total population according to the 2020 census.

A. Review of State Senate plan enacted in 2022

23. On February 17, 2022, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a plan for State Senate districts. This plan was used in the 2022 elections.

24. In this plan North Carolina's Black Belt counties are assigned to four different Senate districts, none of which is majority-Black. See Figure 4 and Table 1.

Figure 4: Enacted 2022 northeastern North Carolina State Senate districts




Table 1: Statistics for selected districts in enacted 2022 NC Senate Plan

District	Population Deviation	BVAP	Black-CVAP	Reock	Polsby-Popper
SD 1	-4.33%	17.47%	18.34%	0.40	0.18
SD 3	-4.96%	42.33%	44.47%	0.30	0.17
SD 5 (Edgecombe & Pitt Counties)	+4.96%	40.35%	40.31%	0.40	0.34
SD 11 (Vance, Franklin, & Nash Counties)	-1.28%	36.65%	38.98%	0.46	0.38

25. In addition to measures of the Black population, Table 1 includes statistics for other characteristics of the districts which will be discussed later in this report. “SD” in the table stands for Senate District, and this abbreviation will be used in other tables and text that follow.


26. The 2022 plan uses the first grouping alternative shown in Figure 3.

27. For more statistics related to the enacted 2022 State Senate districts, please see **Attachment D**.

B. Review of State Senate plan enacted in 2023

28. On October 25, 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new plan for State Senate districts.

29. In this plan, like the 2022 plan, North Carolina’s Black Belt counties are assigned to four different Senate districts, none of which is majority-Black. See Figure 5 and Table 2.

Figure 5: Enacted 2023 northeastern North Carolina State Senate districts**Table 2: Statistics for selected districts in enacted 2023 NC Senate Plan**

District	Population Deviation	BVAP	Black-CVAP	Reock	Polsby-Popper
SD 1	-4.39%	29.49%	31.60%	0.26	0.21
SD 2	-4.90%	30.01%	31.51%	0.23	0.10
SD 5 (Edgecombe & Pitt Counties)	+4.96%	40.35%	40.31%	0.40	0.34
SD 11 (Vance, Franklin, & Nash Counties)	-1.28%	36.65%	38.98%	0.46	0.38

30. In addition to measures of the Black population, Table 2 includes statistics for other characteristics of the districts which will be discussed later in this report.

31. The choice of county groupings in this plan means that SD 2, which includes Warren and Halifax Counties, extends in a slender, sinuous fashion all the way down to the southern Outer Banks and Carteret County's Crystal Coast.

32. For more statistics related to the enacted 2023 State Senate districts, please see **Attachment E**.

C. Demonstration District A

33. Per the first request from Plaintiffs' counsel (described in Paragraph 8), I set out to ascertain whether a majority-Black State Senate district could be created in northeastern North Carolina. The result, which I will call Demonstration District A, is composed of eight counties, namely Bertie, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Vance, Warren, and Washington—in their entirety. The BVAP for the district is 51.47% and the Black percentage of the citizen voting age population (abbreviated as CVAP, and also a measure often used in Voting Rights Act Section 2 litigation) is 53.12%.⁶ See Figure 6 and Table 3.

⁶ This second percentage (along with similar such percentages for other districts) was derived from the citizen voting age population special tabulation from the U. S. Census Bureau's 2016-2020 5-Year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates. The "Black alone or in combination" classification for this dataset, per the practice used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is slightly different from that typically used for measurements derived from the decennial census P.L. 94-171 data in that it does not include people who identify as Hispanic, and the "in combination" refers to people who identify as both Black and White or Black and American Indian but not Black in combination with other racial categories.

Figure 6: Map of Demonstration District A




Table 3: Statistics for Demonstration District A

District	Population Deviation	BVAP	Black-CVAP	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Demonstration District A	-4.29%	51.47%	53.12%	0.30	0.32

34. In addition to measures of the Black population, Table 3 includes statistics related to other characteristics of the demonstration district which will be discussed later in this report. For more demographic statistics related to Demonstration District A, please see **Attachment F**.

D. Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2

35. Per the second request from Plaintiffs’ counsel (described in Paragraph 9), I set out to ascertain whether a majority-Black State Senate district could be created

wholly within the outer boundary of the county groupings shown in Figure 3. The result, which I will call Demonstration District B-1, is composed of Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, and Warren Counties in their entirety and a portion of Pasquotank County. The BVAP for the district is slightly less than 50%, but the Black CVAP is 50.19%. See Figure 7 and Table 4.

Figure 7: Map of Demonstration District B-1





Table 4: Statistics for Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2

District	Population Deviation	BVAP	Black-CVAP	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Demonstration District B-1	-4.93%	48.41%	50.19%	0.35	0.29
Demonstration District B-2	-4.36%	11.37%	12.58%	0.39	0.25

36. In addition to measures of the Black population, Table 4 includes statistics related to other characteristics of the demonstration districts which will be discussed

later in this report. For more demographic statistics related to these demonstration districts, please see **Attachment G**.

37. Another important feature of Demonstration District B-1 is that, not only does it fit entirely within the area occupied by Districts 1 and 2 in the enacted State Senate redistricting plan, but it can be paired with another demonstration Senate district (which I will call Demonstration District B-2) which also fits within that same bounding area and is in accordance with permissible population deviation and other redistricting standards. Figure 8 below shows the geographic configuration, and Table 4 above includes relevant statistics for Demonstration District B-2 as well as Demonstration District B-1.

Figure 8: Map of Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2

E. Analysis of comparative characteristics

38. As part of the process of creating the new 2023 redistricting plan for the North Carolina Senate, the General Assembly’s Redistricting and Elections Senate Standing Committee adopted the “2023 SENATE PLAN CRITERIA” document, which is appended to this report as **Attachment H**. The document includes a number of criteria that it states either must be adhered to, “should be considered,” “may be considered,” or—in one case—“shall *not* be” considered. I will now go through these criteria in the same order as in the document to discuss how the demonstration districts meet these standards.

39. Equal Population: all of the demonstration districts, like the enacted districts from 2022 and 2023, have populations that are at or within plus or minus five percent of the ideal district population.

40. County Groupings and Traversals: this item instructs that districts will comply with *Stephenson* and other related court decisions that prescribe county groupings. As stated above, the *Stephenson* ruling also emphasizes compliance with the Voting Rights Act. These demonstration districts were drawn as part of an examination of the feasibility of satisfying the Voting Rights Act. The collections of counties contained within the districts depart from the groupings described in Paragraph 20, but, as will be discussed below, the traversal of counties was either entirely avoided (Demonstration District A) or minimized (Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2).

41. Traditional Districting Principles: this element in the document seems to serve essentially as a preface for three items that follow it: “compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” It does allude to “traditional districting principles” as a concept but does not elucidate what those might be other than the three mentioned above.

42. Compactness: numerous metrics exist for quantifying compactness of districts. Two of the most widely used are the Reock and Polsby-Popper measures, and these are also the ones recently reported by the North Carolina General Assembly. These two formulas, based on two different ways of comparing the geometry of a district to the geometry of a circle, yield resulting scores between zero and one, with a higher score indicating more compactness. (A fuller explanation of these compactness metrics is

provided as **Attachment I**.) The scores for the relevant districts are shown in the tables I provided with the presentation of the maps of the enacted and demonstration districts earlier in Section IV.

43. Compactness, cont.: Demonstration District A and Demonstration District B-1 both score significantly higher on both compactness measures than the analogous SD 2 enacted in 2023. In fact, 2023's enacted SD 2 has an unusually low Polsby-Popper score, indicating it as the least compact district (by that measure) in that enacted plan. Compared to the analogous district from the enacted 2022 plan, SD 3, both Demonstration District A and Demonstration District B-1 score as high or higher on the Reock measure, and both score significantly higher on the Polsby-Popper measure.

44. Compactness, cont.: Demonstration District B-2's Reock score is significantly higher than that of the analogous enacted SD 1 from 2023, and comparable to (just one one-hundredth of a point lower than) the score for SD 1 from 2022. This demonstration district outscores the analogous district from both recently enacted plans on the Polsby-Popper measure.

45. Compactness, cont.: the "Compactness" item in the aforementioned criteria document includes a phrase saying that "Communities of interest should be considered," but it does not define communities of interest or specify which categories of communities to consider. The integrity of communities of interest is harder to quantify than performance on other criteria because communities of interest often do not have definitively established borders. That said, in my opinion, northeastern North Carolina's Black Belt counties could be considered a significant community of interest,

and Demonstration Districts A and B-1 keep more of that community intact than do the districts in either of the recently enacted plans.

46. Contiguity: the demonstration districts all adhere to the contiguity requirement in the same manner as the districts from the enacted plans.

47. Respect for Existing Political Subdivisions: the document states that “County lines, VTDs and municipal boundaries may be considered when possible in forming districts that do not split these existing political subdivisions.” Demonstration District A divides zero counties. The boundary between Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2 divides Pasquotank County. None of the demonstration districts divides a single VTD. While most of Elizabeth City is within Demonstration District B-1, following VTD boundaries led to small portions of the city being placed in the adjacent Demonstration District B-2. The enacted 2022 plan also divided Elizabeth City, with most of the city in SD 1 but a small portion in SD 3.

48. Racial Data: while the North Carolina Senate’s criteria document stated that race-related data “shall *not* be used,” I did, by necessity, consult data on race as a part of my process.

49. Political Considerations: the document states that legislators “may consider partisan advantage.” I did not include any partisan data in my analysis—neither election results, nor voter registration statistics, nor party affiliation of incumbents.

50. Incumbent Residence: the criteria document states that “Incumbent residence may be considered in the formation of Senate districts.” My analysis indicates that Demonstration Districts A and B-1 do not contain incumbent residences.

Demonstration District B-2 would include the home counties of two incumbent Senators (Currituck and Pamlico). Such a pairing is reminiscent of the pairing that occurred in the 2022 enacted plan, when two incumbents were both located in SD 1.⁷

51. For more detailed statistics and reports on some of the characteristics referenced in the criteria above, please see **Attachment J**.

V. Conclusion

52. This report has demonstrated that it is possible to create a majority-Black State Senate district in northeastern North Carolina that splits no counties or VTDs and is in accordance with other traditional redistricting principles. Further, it is possible to create another district in accordance with traditional redistricting principles where Black voting-age citizens are the majority—in a configuration that lies entirely within the area occupied by current enacted State Senate districts 1 and 2.

53. I reserve the right to supplement this report in consideration of additional facts, testimony, or materials that may come to light.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 22, 2023.



Blakeman B. Esselstyn

⁷ See <https://islandfreepress.org/hatteras-community-news/nc-senate-incumbents-steinburg-and-sanderson-face-off-in-district-1-gop-primary/>

Attachment A

Contents	
Item 1:	Author's Curriculum Vitae (CV)
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

November 2023

Blakeman ("Blake") B. Esselstyn

United States: 49 North Street · Asheville, NC 28801-1141

The Netherlands: Schovenlaan 110 · 6225JS Maastricht

blake@mapfigure.com · +1 828-338-8528

EDUCATION

- University of Pennsylvania, School of Engineering and Applied Science, Master of Computer and Information Technology, 2003; GPA 4.0
- Yale University, Geology & Geophysics and International Studies, Bachelor of Arts, 1996

PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS

- Geographic Information Systems Professional (GISP), #6946, 2009
- American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP), #026364, 2013

EMPLOYMENT (Teaching positions listed separately)

- Redistricting Consultant, dba Mapfigure Consulting (and as Blake Esselstyn), Asheville, NC, 2016-present (and in the Netherlands starting late 2022)
- Principal Consultant, FrontWater, LLC, Asheville, NC, 2015-present
- Urban Planner III – GIS Specialist, City of Asheville Department of Planning and Urban Design, Asheville, NC, 2008-2015
- Urban Planner II, City of Asheville Planning Department, Asheville, NC, 2004-2008
- Independent GIS Consultant, Freelance, Asheville, NC, 2003-2004
- GIS Programmer, Azavea, Inc., Philadelphia, PA, 2002
- Web Support Fellow, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 2002
- GIS Analyst, Applied Geographics, Inc., Boston, MA, 2001
- GIS Intern, Community and Environmental Spatial Analysis Center, Seattle, WA, 2000
- GIS Analyst, Applied Geographics, Inc., Boston, MA, 2000
- Mapping Technician, Schlosser Geographic Systems, Seattle, WA, 1997
- Digital Mapping Resources Consultant, Social Science Statistical Laboratory at Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1997
- Special Assistant to the CityRoom Coordinator, Neighborhood Partnerships Network, New Haven, CT, 1996-1997

- Lab Monitor, Center for Earth Observation at Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1995

TEACHING EMPLOYMENT

- Adjunct Faculty, Lenoir-Rhyne University, Asheville, NC, 2019
Taught full-semester graduate-level Geographic Information Systems (GIS) course
- Adjunct Faculty, Western Carolina University, Asheville, NC, 2017
Taught full-semester graduate-level GIS course
- GIS Course Assistant, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 2002-2003
Served as teaching assistant for two undergraduate GIS semester courses
- Teacher, Equity American School, Guatemala City, Guatemala, 1998-1999
Led mathematics department for grades 7-12; taught one technology course
- Teacher, International School of Panama, Panama City, Republic of Panama, 1997-1998
Taught computer programming and mathematics to secondary school students

LITIGATION EXPERIENCE (As GIS and/or redistricting expert)

- Testifying expert for plaintiffs, in *Grant v. Raffensperger*, U.S District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, 2022
- Consulting expert for plaintiffs, in *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Abbott*, U.S District Court for the Western District of Texas, 2022
- Consulting expert for plaintiffs, in *Rivera v. Schwab*, Wyandotte County (KS) District Court, 2022
- Consulting expert for plaintiffs, in *Harper v. Lewis*, Wake County (NC) Superior Court, 2019
- Consulting expert for plaintiffs, in *Common Cause v. Lewis*, Wake County (NC) Superior Court, 2019
- Preparation of redistricting map exhibits used in *Vesilind v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, Richmond (VA) Circuit Court, 2017
- Expert witness analysis, deposition, and testimony for City of Asheville, in *Jensen v. City of Asheville*, Buncombe County (NC) Superior Court, 2009-2010
- Expert witness analysis and testimony for City of Asheville, in *Hall v. City of Asheville*, Buncombe County (NC) Superior Court, 2007
- Expert witness analysis and testimony for City of Asheville, in *Arnold v. City of Asheville*, Buncombe County (NC) Superior Court, 2005

PUBLIC REDISTRICTING PROJECT EXPERIENCE

- Design of electoral redistricting plans for Buncombe County (NC) Board of Education, 2023 (adoption expected in early 2024)
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Wake County (NC) Board of Education, 2021-2022
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Mecklenburg County (NC) Board of Commissioners, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Craven County (NC) Board of Commissioners, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for City of Fayetteville (NC) City Council, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for City of Greenville (NC) City Council, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Town of Cary (NC) Town Council, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for City of Hickory (NC) City Council, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Town of Mooresville (NC) Board of Commissioners, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for City of Clinton (NC) City Council, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Siler City (NC) Board of Commissioners, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Town of Tarboro (NC) Town Council, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Durham Public Schools (NC) Board of Education, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Pitt County (NC) Board of Education, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Union County (NC) Board of Education, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans for Edgecombe County (NC) Board of Education, 2021
- Design and completion of adopted electoral redistricting plans (in advance of Census data delivery) for Town of Cary (NC) Town Council, 2021
- Lead presenter, Lenoir-Rhyne University Hands-on Redistricting Workshop, Virtual, 2021

- Software operator and presenter, National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Seminar: Redistricting Simulation, Columbus, OH, 2019
- Software operator and presenter, National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Seminar: Redistricting Simulation, Providence, RI, 2019
- Hands-on GIS software workshop session leader, Metric Geometry of Gerrymandering Group (MGGG) Conference at the University of Texas, Austin, TX, 2018
- Co-leader of redistricting hackathon, Metric Geometry of Gerrymandering Group (MGGG) Conference at Duke University, Durham, NC, 2017
- Preparation of simulated redistricting plans for Democracy North Carolina's Districting Voter Education Forum, Asheville, NC, 2017
- Hands-on GIS software workshop session assistant, Metric Geometry of Gerrymandering Group (MGGG) Conference at Tufts University, Medford, MA, 2017
- Redistricting software operator (converting retired jurists' instructions into maps), Duke University and Common Cause NC independent redistricting commission simulation, Raleigh, NC *and* Winston-Salem, NC, 2016

SPEAKER OR PANELIST

- "Politics and QGIS: Open Source Legislative Reapportionment," QGIS User Conference, Den Bosch, The Netherlands, 2023
- "Political Reapportionment: Drawing Boundaries with QGIS," FOSS4G (Free and Open Source Software for Geospatial) Conference, Florence, Italy, 2022
- "Just Maps: How Gerrymandering Imperils the Right to Vote," Osher Lifelong Learning Institute at the University of North Carolina Asheville, virtual, 2022
- "How to Be a Redistricting Watchdog," Duke University's Redistricting and American Democracy Conference, Durham, NC, 2021
- "North Carolina Redistricting with Geographers: Local Knowledge & Community Considerations," American Association of Geographers (AAG) Redistricting Panel Series, Virtual, 2021
- "The Basics of Redistricting for Local Governments," NC Council of School Attorneys Summer Law Conference, Virtual, 2021
- "Census Timing and Redistricting," UNC School of Government: Municipal Attorneys' Winter Conference, Virtual, 2021
- "Census Delays and Redistricting," North Carolina League of Municipalities Online Meeting, Virtual, 2021
- "Redistricting: Ten Big Changes that GIS People Should Know About for 2021," North Carolina GIS Conference, Virtual, 2021

- “Demographics, the Census, and a Bit about Redistricting,” UNC School of Government: County Attorneys Conference, Virtual, 2021
- “NC Redistricting Updates for the GIS Community,” Mountain Region GIS Alliance, Virtual, 2021
- “The Census and Demographics,” UNC School of Government: Redistricting for Local Governments Conference, Virtual, 2021
- “The Mechanics of Redistricting,” UNC School of Government: Redistricting for Local Governments Conference, Virtual, 2021
- “Ask the Experts Panel,” National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) Redistricting Seminar, Virtual, 2021
- “GIS and the Data Handoff,” National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) Redistricting Seminar, Virtual, 2021
- “Electoral Redistricting for School Boards after the 2020 Census,” North Carolina School Boards Association 2020 Annual Conference, Virtual, 2020
- “Redistricting Software 2021: The Next Generation of Tools Could Open New Doors,” Urban and Regional Information Systems Association (URISA) GIS-Pro Conference, Virtual, 2020
- “Changing Demographics, Drawing Districts, and County Impacts,” North Carolina Association of County Commissioners 113th Annual Conference, Virtual, 2020
- “QGIS and democracy: Redistricting and reapportionment with QGIS,” QGIS North America Conference, Virtual, 2020
- “Does Your Vote Count?: The Impact of Gerrymandering,” virtual panel hosted by League of Women Voters Asheville Buncombe, NC, 2020
- [Scheduled, but cancelled due to COVID-19] “Redistricting with QGIS,” Free and Open Source Software for Geospatial Conference, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 2020
- [Scheduled, but cancelled due to COVID-19] Teaching Faculty (session title to be determined), National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Seminar, Las Vegas, NV, 2020
- [Scheduled, but cancelled due to COVID-19] “Census Geography, Precision, & Privacy,” Census Symposium, University of North Carolina Asheville, NC, 2020
- “The State of Redistricting Software and Data Resources for 2020,” Quantitative Investigations of Gerrymandering and Redistricting Conference, Duke University, Durham, NC, 2020
- “School Board Elections,” 53rd School Attorneys’ Conference, UNC School of Government, Chapel Hill, NC, 2020
- “Methods and Techniques in Redistricting,” Harvard Geography of Redistricting Conference, Cambridge, MA, 2019

- “Redistricting Software: A new generation of geospatial tools,” North Carolina GIS Conference, Winston-Salem, NC, 2019
- “The Latest Mapping Technology,” Reason, Reform & Redistricting Conference, Duke University, Durham, NC, 2019
- “Redistricting—What Happens Now?” Voter Education Panel hosted by League of Women Voters (and others), Hendersonville, NC, 2019
- “What are all These Districts? How did We Get Here, and Redistricting Reform,” Grassroots Democracy: A Nonpartisan Voter Education Series, Leicester, NC, 2019
- “Re-GIS-tracting? A new generation of redistricting geo-tools,” Mountain Region GIS Alliance, Asheville, NC, 2019
- “Representing (mis)representation,” Tapestry Data Storytelling Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, 2018
- “A Redistricting Tour,” Democracy in our Hands Conference, Asheville, NC, 2018
- “Dis-tricks: GIS and Public Understanding of Redistricting,” NC ArcGIS Users Group, Asheville, NC, 2018
- “Visual Explanations of Gerrymandering,” Highlands Indivisible, Highlands, NC, 2018
- “Dave’s Redistricting App,” Metric Geometry of Gerrymandering Workshop, University of Texas, Austin, TX, 2018
- “Districting Voter Education Forum,” Democracy North Carolina, Asheville, NC, 2017
- “When GIS leads planners astray,” American Planning Association National Conference, New York, NY, 2017
- “Conveying Uncertainty with GIS,” Azavea, Philadelphia, PA, 2017
- “GISkepticism,” Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, 2017
- “When GIS leads planners astray,” North Carolina Planning Conference, American Planning Association North Carolina Chapter, Asheville, NC, 2016
- “What if the ‘S’ in GIS stood for Skepticism?” Mountain Region GIS Alliance, Asheville, NC, 2015
- “Open Data? Show Me the Money!” North Carolina GIS Conference, Raleigh, NC, 2015

TEACHING AS SINGLE-CLASS GUEST SPEAKER (On redistricting and/or GIS)

- Lenoir-Rhyne University, Public Policy Course (speaking on redistricting and representation), 2021
- Lenoir-Rhyne University, Geographic Information Systems Course (speaking on GIS), 2021

- University of North Carolina Asheville, Mathematics: Voting Theory Course (speaking on redistricting), 2020
- Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group Redistricting Lab (Tufts University + MIT), Geodata Bootcamp Mapmaking Session (speaking on redistricting software), 2020
- [Scheduled, but cancelled due to COVID-19] Duke University, Law School: Election Law Course (leading hands-on redistricting simulation exercise), April 2020
- Duke University, Data Science Capstone Seminar (speaking on data science professional/career advice), 2020
- University of North Carolina Asheville, Political Science: Census Course (speaking on redistricting), 2020
- Lenoir-Rhyne University, Public Policy Course (speaking on redistricting), 2019
- Western Carolina University, Geographic Information Systems Course (speaking on GIS), 2019
- Duke University, Democracy Lab Seminar (speaking on redistricting software tools), 2018
- University of North Carolina Asheville, Political Science: US Elections Course (speaking on redistricting), 2018
- University of North Carolina Asheville, Mathematics: Voting Theory Course (speaking on redistricting), 2018
- Lenoir-Rhyne University, Sustainability Management & Decision-Making Course (speaking on GIS/location intelligence), 2018
- Yale University, School of Organization and Management: Business Information Course (speaking on Maptitude—one class + multiple labs), 1997

MEDIA APPEARANCES, OP-EDS, AND CITATIONS

- “Gerrymandered or no? How will courts judge new North Carolina political maps?” *Raleigh News & Observer*, February 8, 2022
- “Monster: Math, maps and power in North Carolina,” special podcast series from *Raleigh News & Observer*, September 24, 2021
- “Census data has arrived. What comes next?” *Chatham News + Record*, September 1, 2021
- “An Explainer for Redistricting Criteria, Part 1: Political Boundaries,” *John Locke Foundation*, August 23, 2021
- “Special report: Demystifying the redistricting process,” *NC Policy Watch*, August 20, 2021
- “Raleigh, Cary and other NC cities may have to push back their 2021 elections,” *Raleigh News & Observer*, February 24, 2021
- “Triad Cities Awaiting Census Data May Delay Elections,” WFDD Radio, February 17, 2021

- Live interview, WPTF Radio Afternoon News, February 15, 2021
- “Census Delays Could Delay Charlotte City Council, CMS Fall Elections,” WFAE Radio, January 28, 2021
- “What do Buncombe's new district lines mean for 2020 commissioner elections?” (map citation), *Asheville Citizen-Times*, November 21, 2019
- “Confused about new legislative districts? This ‘map geek’ can help,” *NC Policy Watch*, November 21, 2019
- “Which district are you in? After gerrymandering fight, Asheville, Buncombe get final state districts,” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, November 4, 2019
- “Suggestions for a fair redistricting process,” *Princeton Election Consortium*, September 16, 2019
- “How will Asheville, Buncombe County be affected by gerrymandering decision?” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, September 6, 2019
- “2019 Districting,” JMPRO TV's *The Weekly Update*, September 1, 2019
- “As redistricting battle continues in NC, League of Women Voters holds panel,” *WLOS-TV*, August 11, 2019
- “With No Supreme Court End to Gerrymandering, Will States Make It More Extreme?” (citation/link of blog article), *New York Times*, June 28, 2019
- “The Supreme Court takes on gerrymandering. A cottage industry wants to prove it's gone too far,” *USA Today*, March 26, 2019
- “Gerrymandering: 'Packing' and 'Cracking,' the meat and potatoes of partisan redistricting,” *USA Today*, March 25, 2019
- “NC gerrymandering: Turner, McGrady lead reform effort on redistricting,” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, February 14, 2019
- “Looking for a Way Forward on Redistricting Reform,” *Duke Today*, January 28, 2019
- “Will Asheville try to stop the state from splitting it into districts?” (map citation), *Asheville Citizen-Times*, January 23, 2019
- “Some takeaways from NC's elections,” WRAL.com, Nov 7, 2018
- “New Asheville districts are racial gerrymandering, black council members say” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, July 2, 2018
- “Legislature sets up districts for Asheville council, eliminates primaries” (map citation), *Asheville Citizen-Times*, June 27, 2018
- “Van Duyn to back Asheville council districts bill if Senate shifts election dates” (map citation), *Asheville Citizen-Times*, June 21, 2018

- “I Ran the Worst 5K of My Life So I Could Explain Gerrymandering to You,” *POLITICO Magazine*, November 15, 2017
- “Event to cover Nov. vote on City Council districts,” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, October 17, 2017
- “Republicans silent in wake of court order to draw new maps in one month,” *NC Policy Watch*, August 2, 2017
- “Who makes the grade? This week’s editorial report card,” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, June 2, 2017
- “Asheville grows; Charlotte, Raleigh and their suburbs grow faster,” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, May 29, 2017
- “Boundary issues: Where does Asheville end?” (op-ed), *Mountain Xpress*, April 29, 2016
- “For better or worse, Asheville growth inevitable,” *Asheville Citizen-Times*, November 21, 2015
- “St. Lawrence Green no litmus test for voters” (op-ed), *Mountain Xpress*, October 29, 2015

PUBLISHED WORK

- “Redistricting Software Applications, Data, and Related Tools,” supplement to *Redistricting: A Guide for the GIS Community*, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association, 2021
- (Co-authored with Mark Salling, PhD, GISP) “GIS Software Functionality for Redistricting,” *The GIS Professional*, Issue 301, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association, May/June 2021
- (Co-authored with Joan Gardner, Suzanne Rotwein, and Tong Zhang) “Integrating GIS and Social Marketing at HCFA,” *ESRI Map Book*, Volume 16, ESRI Press, 2001

SELF-PUBLISHED PUBLIC-FACING EXPLANATORY WRITING & MAPS

- (Co-authored with Christopher Cooper, Gregory Herschlag, Jonathan Mattingly, Rebecca Tippet) “NC General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census,” *Quantifying Gerrymandering Blog*, August 17, 2021
- (Co-authored with Christopher Cooper, Gregory Herschlag, Jonathan Mattingly, Rebecca Tippet) “Legislative County Clustering in North Carolina—Looking towards the 2020 Census,” *Quantifying Gerrymandering Blog*, July 16, 2021
- Created the blogs at districks.com (2017) and mapfigure.com (2020) — the story maps “A ‘Stephenson’ explainer” and “Could COVID repercussions delay NC elections in 2021 & 2022?” have each been viewed more than 2,000 times.

REDISTRICTING AND GIS SOFTWARE EXPERIENCE

- MapInfo (first used 1996)
- Maptitude (first used 1997)
- Esri ArcGIS/ArcInfo/ArcView (first used 2000)
- QGIS (first used 2015)
- Maptitude for Redistricting (first used 2016)
- Dave's Redistricting App (first used 2016)
- DistrictBuilder (first used 2017)
- Esri Redistricting (first used 2018)
- Districtr (first used 2019)
- Statto Software Redistricter (first used 2019)
- ArcBridge DISTRICTSolv (first used 2020)

SELECTED AWARDS (As team member)

- G. Herbert Stout Award for Visionary use of GIS by Local Government, 2009
- International Economic Development Council, Excellence in New Media Initiatives, 2008
- Marvin Collins Outstanding Planning Award for Innovations in Planning Services, Education, and Public Involvement, 2007

SERVICE AS ELECTION OFFICIAL

- Poll worker for multiple elections in Buncombe County, North Carolina (2012, 2020, 2022) and King County, Washington (2000), including as Chief Precinct Judge in 2020 general election and 2022 primary election

SERVICE ON BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

- Asheville City Council Appointee to Comprehensive Plan Advisory Committee, 2016-2018

ADDITIONAL TRAINING

- Introduction to GIS for Equity and Social Justice, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Certified Workshop, Virtual, 2020

- Public Data, Public Access, Privacy, and Security: U.S. Law and Policy, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Certified Workshop, Raleigh, NC, 2015
- An Overview of Open Source GIS Software, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Certified Workshop, Portland, OR, 2012
- An Introduction to Public Participation GIS: Using GIS to Support Community Decision Making, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Certified Workshop, Orlando, FL, 2010
- 3-D Geospatial Best Practices and Project Implementation Methods, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Certified Workshop, Vancouver, BC (Canada), 2006

MEMBERSHIPS

- Urban and Regional Information Systems Association (URISA)
- Mountain Region GIS Alliance (MRGAC)
- American Planning Association (APA)

Attachment B

Contents	
Item 1:	Data, software, and methodology information
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

Data sources, software, and methodology

1. One important source of data for the expert report was the United States Census Bureau, whose resources are made available to the public via its website (<https://www.census.gov>). This federal agency produces a) geographic files—e.g., county boundaries and block boundaries, b) tables of the block-level demographic information yielded specifically for redistricting (sometimes referred to as the PL 94-171 data) from the decennial census counts, c) “block assignment files,” which are important for linking geography data to other data, d) special tabulations of data from the American Community Survey (ACS) which include information on topics like citizenship, and e) other interactive web-based resources. Representative links for these five categories of data are provided below:

- a) <https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/time-series/geo/tiger-line-file.2020.html>
- b) <https://data.census.gov/cedsci/all?q=&y=2020&d=DEC%20Redistricting%20Data%20%28PL%2094-171%29>
- c) <https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/geo/block-assignment-files.html>
- d) <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.2020.html>
- e) <https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/north-carolina-population-change-between-census-decade.html>

2. Another key source of information for the analysis was the North Carolina General Assembly’s Legislative and Congressional Redistricting webpage, available at <https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting>. This webpage provided links to representations of the enacted State Senate plans, as well as statistical reports for the plans and the October 2023 Senate Plan Criteria document.

3. To determine the home counties of incumbent senators in districts that overlap with the demonstration districts, I used the North Carolina State Board of Elections Voter Search webpage, available at <https://vt.ncsbe.gov/reglkup/>

4. To tabulate citizen voting age population totals at the precinct level for the CVAP statistics in the report, I used a dataset from the Redistricting Data Hub (RDH). The RDH uses the CVAP special tabulation from the U. S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey referenced in 1.d) above and disaggregates the block group level data to the block level. The dataset can be found at <https://redistrictingdatahub.org/dataset/north-carolina-cvap-data-disaggregated-to-the-2020-block-level-2020/> and the methodology used to produce it can be found at https://redistrictingdatahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/readme_nc_cvap_2020_2020_b.txt

5. One software application I used in the analysis of maps and the creation of the demonstration districts is *Maptitude for Redistricting*, produced by the Caliper Corporation. This specialized geographic information system (GIS) software facilitates the installation, interconnecting, and synthesis of Census Bureau data files. It allows for an existing redistricting plan to be imported (like the enacted plans from the North Carolina General Assembly), or plans can be created and edited starting from a blank template. The application generates not only the aggregated statistics for each of the created districts, but also can supply reports on overall characteristics of the plan like average district compactness and population deviation. *Maptitude for Redistricting* is widely used by state and local governments for redistricting and is in fact used by the North Carolina General Assembly.

6. Another software application that was useful as a supplemental tool is an open-source GIS software package called *QGIS*. My primary use of *QGIS* was for the production of the visual figures in the report. For creating custom map illustrations, *QGIS* enables me to take geographic files exported from *Maptitude for Redistricting* or downloaded from the North Carolina General Assembly or the U. S. Census Bureau and create high-resolution graphics for insertion into the document with myriad options for presentation of visual elements. Additionally, *QGIS* offers modules that provide redistricting features similar to the functionality of *Maptitude for Redistricting* described above, though not as extensive.

7. I also used software called *DRA 2020*, a web-based tool which includes multiple categories of pre-loaded census data and allows for the review and creation of redistricting plans. I used *DRA 2020* as a quick cross-check to corroborate results produced by programs mentioned above, like *Maptitude for Redistricting*. Please note that when I used *DRA 2020*, I always used it in the “Hide Election Data and Partisan Analytics” mode.

8. I used *Microsoft Excel* for preparation of spreadsheets and for some statistical calculations.

9. As alluded to in the “Analysis of comparative characteristics” section of the report, I did not use or consult any data relating to election results, partisan advantage, or voter registration as part of my process. (Two clarifications: as mentioned in item 3 above, I did look up basic voter registration information for three incumbent senators solely to determine their home counties, and I did download the “stat packs” published by the North Carolina General Assembly for the recently enacted Senate plans, and those stat packs include election information, but I avoided looking at those sections).

Attachment C

Contents	
Item 1:	Demographic summary for North Carolina counties
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

County Name	Population	%AmerInd	%Asian	%AP_Black	%Hispanic	%NHPI	%Other	%White
Alamance	171,415	0.83%	1.66%	22.03%	14.41%	0.06%	9.01%	61.75%
Alexander	36,444	0.40%	1.08%	6.39%	5.04%	0.01%	2.77%	85.84%
Alleghany	10,888	0.43%	0.14%	1.75%	11.83%	0.06%	5.53%	87.66%
Anson	22,055	0.48%	1.00%	46.42%	3.02%	0.03%	2.01%	48.48%
Ashe	26,577	0.29%	0.39%	1.03%	5.72%	0.05%	2.72%	91.94%
Avery	17,806	0.50%	0.35%	4.17%	5.54%	0.01%	3.07%	88.43%
Beaufort	44,652	0.38%	0.37%	24.50%	7.69%	0.04%	5.27%	66.78%
Bertie	17,934	0.35%	0.35%	61.54%	1.84%	0.03%	1.15%	35.35%
Bladen	29,606	2.70%	0.16%	33.91%	8.60%	0.04%	6.05%	54.39%
Brunswick	136,693	0.65%	0.67%	9.64%	5.43%	0.07%	2.60%	82.16%
Buncombe	269,452	0.46%	1.23%	7.09%	8.14%	0.18%	4.17%	81.23%
Burke	87,570	1.53%	3.62%	6.85%	8.20%	0.08%	4.37%	79.56%
Cabarrus	225,804	0.50%	5.31%	21.19%	12.07%	0.06%	6.58%	61.01%
Caldwell	80,652	0.42%	0.67%	6.43%	6.10%	0.02%	3.13%	85.38%
Camden	10,355	0.47%	1.15%	11.93%	3.28%	0.02%	1.18%	80.27%
Carteret	67,686	0.46%	0.88%	6.02%	4.61%	0.09%	2.09%	86.07%
Caswell	22,736	0.37%	0.28%	31.63%	4.41%	0.10%	2.43%	62.60%
Catawba	160,610	0.64%	4.37%	9.83%	10.82%	0.06%	5.91%	74.06%
Chatham	76,285	0.62%	2.13%	11.93%	13.60%	0.05%	8.31%	71.35%
Cherokee	28,774	1.52%	0.55%	2.22%	3.12%	0.00%	1.14%	89.11%
Chowan	13,708	0.34%	0.29%	33.62%	3.87%	0.01%	2.20%	60.92%
Clay	11,089	0.40%	0.36%	1.29%	3.95%	0.08%	1.60%	91.53%
Cleveland	99,519	0.28%	0.87%	22.08%	4.06%	0.03%	2.10%	71.42%
Columbus	50,623	3.42%	0.32%	30.60%	5.16%	0.03%	3.50%	60.01%
Craven	100,720	0.41%	3.07%	22.31%	7.14%	0.17%	2.98%	66.23%
Cumberland	334,728	1.66%	2.74%	42.54%	11.80%	0.43%	4.73%	42.40%
Currituck	28,100	0.42%	0.98%	6.49%	4.33%	0.10%	1.45%	84.98%
Dare	36,915	0.49%	0.72%	2.84%	6.92%	0.03%	3.16%	87.85%
Davidson	168,930	0.60%	1.46%	10.91%	8.23%	0.03%	4.61%	78.09%
Davie	42,712	0.48%	0.66%	7.12%	7.90%	0.02%	4.48%	82.74%
Duplin	48,715	1.00%	0.36%	25.24%	22.20%	0.03%	14.80%	53.54%
Durham	324,833	0.70%	5.18%	36.32%	15.42%	0.04%	9.87%	42.86%
Edgecombe	48,900	0.40%	0.23%	57.82%	5.53%	0.02%	3.82%	36.06%
Forsyth	382,590	0.66%	2.43%	27.06%	14.29%	0.07%	8.42%	56.16%
Franklin	68,573	0.72%	0.68%	25.25%	10.15%	0.04%	6.02%	63.40%
Gaston	227,943	0.47%	1.55%	19.53%	8.80%	0.03%	4.83%	68.79%
Gates	10,478	0.68%	0.24%	31.17%	1.92%	0.11%	0.83%	64.54%
Graham	8,030	7.35%	0.27%	1.54%	2.73%	0.06%	1.21%	86.09%
Granville	60,992	0.61%	0.61%	32.10%	10.18%	0.06%	6.44%	56.69%
Greene	20,451	0.90%	0.18%	36.80%	14.36%	0.06%	10.24%	48.86%
Guilford	541,299	0.59%	5.34%	36.04%	9.63%	0.05%	5.31%	48.67%
Halifax	48,622	3.43%	0.58%	52.98%	2.99%	0.02%	1.76%	39.70%
Harnett	133,568	1.07%	1.12%	23.34%	14.15%	0.21%	7.10%	61.29%
Haywood	62,089	0.58%	0.60%	1.80%	4.56%	0.00%	1.98%	90.90%
Henderson	116,281	0.49%	1.16%	3.98%	12.90%	0.54%	7.22%	80.97%
Hertford	21,552	0.96%	0.57%	59.31%	7.33%	0.01%	2.16%	35.37%

County Name	Population	%AmerInd	%Asian	%AP_Black	%Hispanic	%NHPI	%Other	%White
Hoke	52,082	7.80%	1.44%	36.36%	14.76%	0.41%	7.16%	40.38%
Hyde	4,589	0.22%	0.15%	27.59%	7.56%	0.04%	4.71%	64.41%
Iredell	186,693	0.38%	2.56%	13.20%	8.45%	0.04%	4.08%	74.65%
Jackson	43,109	9.51%	1.19%	2.98%	7.64%	0.02%	3.86%	77.54%
Johnston	215,999	0.82%	0.87%	17.57%	15.93%	0.05%	8.40%	65.94%
Jones	9,172	0.67%	0.37%	29.92%	4.30%	0.05%	2.27%	63.97%
Lee	63,285	0.84%	1.05%	19.17%	20.73%	0.08%	11.72%	60.70%
Lenoir	55,122	0.33%	0.61%	41.97%	7.92%	0.06%	4.85%	49.19%
Lincoln	86,810	0.38%	0.82%	6.31%	7.39%	0.04%	3.46%	83.76%
Macon	37,014	0.75%	0.72%	1.48%	9.45%	0.02%	4.78%	86.72%
Madison	21,193	0.34%	0.41%	1.75%	3.53%	0.01%	1.53%	91.41%
Martin	22,031	0.37%	0.45%	42.11%	4.06%	0.01%	2.59%	52.76%
McDowell	44,578	0.48%	0.87%	4.88%	6.61%	0.00%	3.99%	86.04%
Mecklenburg	1,115,482	0.60%	6.46%	31.89%	15.23%	0.06%	8.75%	46.67%
Mitchell	14,903	0.20%	0.36%	1.03%	4.70%	0.01%	2.40%	91.68%
Montgomery	25,751	0.54%	1.53%	17.69%	15.24%	0.04%	10.66%	65.69%
Moore	99,727	0.83%	1.27%	12.24%	7.39%	0.06%	3.35%	77.22%
Nash	94,970	0.78%	0.96%	40.75%	7.71%	0.04%	4.92%	49.89%
New Hanover	225,702	0.46%	1.56%	13.74%	7.67%	0.07%	3.60%	75.69%
Northampton	17,471	0.27%	0.15%	57.21%	2.02%	0.02%	1.22%	39.58%
Onslow	204,576	0.71%	2.31%	16.95%	13.51%	0.40%	4.98%	67.00%
Orange	148,696	0.57%	8.52%	12.33%	10.63%	0.03%	5.44%	66.64%
Pamlico	12,276	0.47%	0.51%	18.71%	4.04%	0.07%	1.98%	75.07%
Pasquotank	40,568	0.53%	1.16%	37.87%	5.51%	0.07%	2.54%	54.28%
Pender	60,203	0.59%	0.57%	13.95%	8.28%	0.05%	4.71%	75.25%
Perquimans	13,005	0.30%	0.30%	22.55%	2.38%	0.08%	1.05%	72.37%
Person	39,097	0.72%	0.32%	27.24%	5.61%	0.02%	3.21%	65.36%
Pitt	170,243	0.42%	1.81%	37.81%	7.62%	0.06%	4.57%	52.15%
Polk	19,328	0.42%	0.31%	4.55%	5.31%	0.07%	2.31%	87.61%
Randolph	144,171	0.80%	1.51%	7.39%	13.21%	0.01%	7.47%	77.31%
Richmond	42,946	2.42%	0.85%	32.03%	7.15%	0.05%	5.16%	55.81%
Robeson	116,530	38.51%	0.78%	24.65%	10.09%	0.07%	7.03%	25.78%
Rockingham	91,096	0.48%	0.55%	20.25%	6.68%	0.03%	3.57%	71.83%
Rowan	146,875	0.52%	1.04%	17.21%	10.85%	0.06%	6.13%	69.92%
Rutherford	64,444	0.35%	0.54%	11.05%	5.10%	0.04%	2.34%	81.94%
Sampson	59,036	2.19%	0.39%	25.58%	20.75%	0.04%	14.40%	52.94%
Scotland	34,174	10.96%	1.00%	40.45%	3.24%	0.04%	2.10%	42.14%
Stanly	62,504	0.44%	1.83%	12.76%	4.94%	0.01%	3.01%	78.63%
Stokes	44,520	0.41%	0.36%	4.59%	3.27%	0.03%	1.41%	89.77%
Surry	71,359	0.44%	0.53%	4.49%	11.91%	0.02%	6.66%	83.11%
Swain	14,117	29.55%	0.38%	1.79%	4.19%	0.10%	1.59%	61.19%
Transylvania	32,986	0.38%	0.52%	4.37%	5.15%	0.07%	2.57%	87.79%
Tyrrell	3,245	0.15%	1.33%	30.97%	8.38%	0.00%	4.75%	58.64%
Union	238,267	0.51%	4.02%	12.91%	12.64%	0.05%	6.86%	69.49%
Vance	42,578	0.38%	0.67%	51.71%	8.73%	0.03%	5.86%	39.18%
Wake	1,129,410	0.51%	8.59%	20.42%	11.35%	0.05%	6.05%	58.78%

County Name	Population	%AmerInd	%Asian	%AP_Black	%Hispanic	%NHPI	%Other	%White
Warren	18,642	5.25%	0.33%	51.10%	3.96%	0.02%	2.73%	38.91%
Washington	11,003	0.21%	0.34%	50.36%	3.37%	0.08%	2.03%	45.43%
Watauga	54,086	0.24%	1.75%	4.93%	6.51%	0.04%	4.00%	84.54%
Wayne	117,333	0.58%	1.35%	32.78%	12.72%	0.07%	7.80%	53.23%
Wilkes	65,969	0.33%	0.49%	5.13%	7.05%	0.02%	4.13%	86.56%
Wilson	78,784	0.62%	1.14%	40.22%	11.45%	0.03%	7.19%	47.40%
Yadkin	37,214	0.55%	0.38%	3.84%	11.78%	0.00%	7.67%	82.88%
Yancey	18,470	0.44%	0.22%	1.21%	5.50%	0.02%	2.72%	91.32%

Attachment D

Contents	
Item 1:	Excerpts from enacted 2022 Senate plan "Stat Pack"
Source:	https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting
Item 2:	Enacted 2022 Senate plan demographic summary
Source:	Blake Esselstyn (ncleg.gov did not publish race data for this plan)
Item 3:	Enacted 2022 plan CVAP statistics
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

Population Deviation Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	Seats	Ideal Pop	Actual Pop	Deviation	Deviation %
1	1	208,788	199,750	-9,038	-4.33%
2	1	208,788	200,494	-8,294	-3.97%
3	1	208,788	198,430	-10,358	-4.96%
4	1	208,788	216,568	7,780	3.73%
5	1	208,788	219,143	10,355	4.96%
6	1	208,788	204,576	-4,212	-2.02%
7	1	208,788	208,637	-151	-0.07%
8	1	208,788	204,381	-4,407	-2.11%
9	1	208,788	202,791	-5,997	-2.87%
10	1	208,788	215,999	7,211	3.45%
11	1	208,788	206,121	-2,667	-1.28%
12	1	208,788	200,794	-7,994	-3.83%
13	1	208,788	198,383	-10,405	-4.98%
14	1	208,788	198,391	-10,397	-4.98%
15	1	208,788	198,416	-10,372	-4.97%
16	1	208,788	198,364	-10,424	-4.99%
17	1	208,788	198,370	-10,418	-4.99%
18	1	208,788	198,478	-10,310	-4.94%
19	1	208,788	216,664	7,876	3.77%
20	1	208,788	199,272	-9,516	-4.56%
21	1	208,788	217,791	9,003	4.31%
22	1	208,788	201,846	-6,942	-3.32%
23	1	208,788	210,529	1,741	0.83%
24	1	208,788	202,786	-6,002	-2.87%
25	1	208,788	217,130	8,342	4.00%
26	1	208,788	216,942	8,154	3.91%
27	1	208,788	203,438	-5,350	-2.56%
28	1	208,788	212,015	3,227	1.55%
29	1	208,788	218,867	10,079	4.83%
30	1	208,788	211,642	2,854	1.37%
31	1	208,788	216,024	7,236	3.47%
32	1	208,788	211,086	2,298	1.10%
33	1	208,788	209,379	591	0.28%
34	1	208,788	217,563	8,775	4.20%
35	1	208,788	216,849	8,061	3.86%
36	1	208,788	210,986	2,198	1.05%
37	1	208,788	215,363	6,575	3.15%
38	1	208,788	216,250	7,462	3.57%
39	1	208,788	217,710	8,922	4.27%
40	1	208,788	218,745	9,957	4.77%
41	1	208,788	216,976	8,188	3.92%
42	1	208,788	217,131	8,343	4.00%
43	1	208,788	211,229	2,441	1.17%

Population Deviation Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	Seats	Ideal Pop	Actual Pop	Deviation	Deviation %
44	1	208,788	203,043	-5,745	-2.75%
45	1	208,788	218,526	9,738	4.66%
46	1	208,788	200,646	-8,142	-3.90%
47	1	208,788	209,958	1,170	0.56%
48	1	208,788	200,053	-8,735	-4.18%
49	1	208,788	200,954	-7,834	-3.75%
50	1	208,788	213,909	5,121	2.45%
Totals:	50		10,439,388		

Deviation range: -4.99% to 4.96%

County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

County	District	Total County Population	Total District Population	County Pop in District	Percent of County Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in County
Alamance	25	171,415	217,130	171,415	100.00 %	78.95 %
Alexander	36	36,444	210,986	36,444	100.00 %	17.27 %
Alleghany	47	10,888	209,958	10,888	100.00 %	5.19 %
Anson	29	22,055	218,867	22,055	100.00 %	10.08 %
Ashe	47	26,577	209,958	26,577	100.00 %	12.66 %
Avery	47	17,806	209,958	17,806	100.00 %	8.48 %
Beaufort	2	44,652	200,494	44,652	100.00 %	22.27 %
Bertie	3	17,934	198,430	17,934	100.00 %	9.04 %
Bladen	9	29,606	202,791	29,606	100.00 %	14.60 %
Brunswick	8	136,693	204,381	136,693	100.00 %	66.88 %
Buncombe	46	269,452	200,646	68,498	25.42 %	34.14 %
	49	269,452	200,954	200,954	74.58 %	100.00 %
Burke	46	87,570	200,646	87,570	100.00 %	43.64 %
Cabarrus	34	225,804	217,563	217,563	96.35 %	100.00 %
	35	225,804	216,849	8,241	3.65 %	3.80 %
Caldwell	45	80,652	218,526	57,916	71.81 %	26.50 %
	47	80,652	209,958	22,736	28.19 %	10.83 %
Camden	3	10,355	198,430	10,355	100.00 %	5.22 %
Carteret	1	67,686	199,750	67,686	100.00 %	33.89 %
Caswell	23	22,736	210,529	22,736	100.00 %	10.80 %
Catawba	45	160,610	218,526	160,610	100.00 %	73.50 %
Chatham	20	76,285	199,272	76,285	100.00 %	38.28 %
Cherokee	50	28,774	213,909	28,774	100.00 %	13.45 %
Chowan	1	13,708	199,750	13,708	100.00 %	6.86 %
Clay	50	11,089	213,909	11,089	100.00 %	5.18 %
Cleveland	44	99,519	203,043	99,519	100.00 %	49.01 %
Columbus	8	50,623	204,381	50,623	100.00 %	24.77 %
Craven	2	100,720	200,494	100,720	100.00 %	50.24 %
Cumberland	19	334,728	216,664	216,664	64.73 %	100.00 %
	21	334,728	217,791	118,064	35.27 %	54.21 %
Currituck	3	28,100	198,430	28,100	100.00 %	14.16 %
Dare	1	36,915	199,750	36,915	100.00 %	18.48 %
Davidson	30	168,930	211,642	168,930	100.00 %	79.82 %
Davie	30	42,712	211,642	42,712	100.00 %	20.18 %
Duplin	9	48,715	202,791	48,715	100.00 %	24.02 %
Durham	20	324,833	199,272	122,987	37.86 %	61.72 %
	22	324,833	201,846	201,846	62.14 %	100.00 %
Edgecombe	5	48,900	219,143	48,900	100.00 %	22.31 %
Forsyth	31	382,590	216,024	171,504	44.83 %	79.39 %
	32	382,590	211,086	211,086	55.17 %	100.00 %
Franklin	11	68,573	206,121	68,573	100.00 %	33.27 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-CntyDist] - Generated 2/17/2022

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County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

County	District	Total County Population	Total District Population	County Pop in District	Percent of County Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in County
Gaston	43	227,943	211,229	211,229	92.67 %	100.00 %
	44	227,943	203,043	16,714	7.33 %	8.23 %
Gates	3	10,478	198,430	10,478	100.00 %	5.28 %
Graham	50	8,030	213,909	8,030	100.00 %	3.75 %
Granville	18	60,992	198,478	60,992	100.00 %	30.73 %
Greene	4	20,451	216,568	20,451	100.00 %	9.44 %
Guilford	26	541,299	216,942	125,846	23.25 %	58.01 %
	27	541,299	203,438	203,438	37.58 %	100.00 %
	28	541,299	212,015	212,015	39.17 %	100.00 %
Halifax	3	48,622	198,430	48,622	100.00 %	24.50 %
Harnett	12	133,568	200,794	133,568	100.00 %	66.52 %
Haywood	47	62,089	209,958	23,299	37.53 %	11.10 %
	50	62,089	213,909	38,790	62.47 %	18.13 %
Henderson	48	116,281	200,053	116,281	100.00 %	58.13 %
Hertford	3	21,552	198,430	21,552	100.00 %	10.86 %
Hoke	24	52,082	202,786	52,082	100.00 %	25.68 %
Hyde	1	4,589	199,750	4,589	100.00 %	2.30 %
Iredell	37	186,693	215,363	186,693	100.00 %	86.69 %
Jackson	50	43,109	213,909	43,109	100.00 %	20.15 %
Johnston	10	215,999	215,999	215,999	100.00 %	100.00 %
Jones	9	9,172	202,791	9,172	100.00 %	4.52 %
Lee	12	63,285	200,794	63,285	100.00 %	31.52 %
Lenoir	2	55,122	200,494	55,122	100.00 %	27.49 %
Lincoln	44	86,810	203,043	86,810	100.00 %	42.75 %
Macon	50	37,014	213,909	37,014	100.00 %	17.30 %
Madison	47	21,193	209,958	21,193	100.00 %	10.09 %
Martin	3	22,031	198,430	22,031	100.00 %	11.10 %
McDowell	46	44,578	200,646	44,578	100.00 %	22.22 %
Mecklenburg	37	1,115,482	215,363	28,670	2.57 %	13.31 %
	38	1,115,482	216,250	216,250	19.39 %	100.00 %
	39	1,115,482	217,710	217,710	19.52 %	100.00 %
	40	1,115,482	218,745	218,745	19.61 %	100.00 %
	41	1,115,482	216,976	216,976	19.45 %	100.00 %
	42	1,115,482	217,131	217,131	19.47 %	100.00 %
Mitchell	47	14,903	209,958	14,903	100.00 %	7.10 %
Montgomery	29	25,751	218,867	25,751	100.00 %	11.77 %
Moore	21	99,727	217,791	99,727	100.00 %	45.79 %
Nash	11	94,970	206,121	94,970	100.00 %	46.07 %
New Hanover	7	225,702	208,637	208,637	92.44 %	100.00 %
	8	225,702	204,381	17,065	7.56 %	8.35 %
Northampton	3	17,471	198,430	17,471	100.00 %	8.80 %
Onslow	6	204,576	204,576	204,576	100.00 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-CntyDist] - Generated 2/17/2022

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County - District Report

District Plan: SL 2022-2

County	District	Total County Population	Total District Population	County Pop in District	Percent of County Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in County
Orange	23	148,696	210,529	148,696	100.00 %	70.63 %
Pamlico	1	12,276	199,750	12,276	100.00 %	6.15 %
Pasquotank	1	40,568	199,750	40,568	100.00 %	20.31 %
Pender	9	60,203	202,791	60,203	100.00 %	29.69 %
Perquimans	1	13,005	199,750	13,005	100.00 %	6.51 %
Person	23	39,097	210,529	39,097	100.00 %	18.57 %
Pitt	5	170,243	219,143	170,243	100.00 %	77.69 %
Polk	48	19,328	200,053	19,328	100.00 %	9.66 %
Randolph	25	144,171	217,130	45,715	31.71 %	21.05 %
	29	144,171	218,867	98,456	68.29 %	44.98 %
Richmond	29	42,946	218,867	42,946	100.00 %	19.62 %
Robeson	24	116,530	202,786	116,530	100.00 %	57.46 %
Rockingham	26	91,096	216,942	91,096	100.00 %	41.99 %
Rowan	33	146,875	209,379	146,875	100.00 %	70.15 %
Rutherford	48	64,444	200,053	64,444	100.00 %	32.21 %
Sampson	9	59,036	202,791	55,095	93.32 %	27.17 %
	12	59,036	200,794	3,941	6.68 %	1.96 %
Scotland	24	34,174	202,786	34,174	100.00 %	16.85 %
Stanly	33	62,504	209,379	62,504	100.00 %	29.85 %
Stokes	31	44,520	216,024	44,520	100.00 %	20.61 %
Surry	36	71,359	210,986	71,359	100.00 %	33.82 %
Swain	50	14,117	213,909	14,117	100.00 %	6.60 %
Transylvania	50	32,986	213,909	32,986	100.00 %	15.42 %
Tyrrell	3	3,245	198,430	3,245	100.00 %	1.64 %
Union	29	238,267	218,867	29,659	12.45 %	13.55 %
	35	238,267	216,849	208,608	87.55 %	96.20 %
Vance	11	42,578	206,121	42,578	100.00 %	20.66 %
Wake	13	1,129,410	198,383	198,383	17.57 %	100.00 %
	14	1,129,410	198,391	198,391	17.57 %	100.00 %
	15	1,129,410	198,416	198,416	17.57 %	100.00 %
	16	1,129,410	198,364	198,364	17.56 %	100.00 %
	17	1,129,410	198,370	198,370	17.56 %	100.00 %
	18	1,129,410	198,478	137,486	12.17 %	69.27 %
Warren	3	18,642	198,430	18,642	100.00 %	9.39 %
Washington	1	11,003	199,750	11,003	100.00 %	5.51 %
Watauga	47	54,086	209,958	54,086	100.00 %	25.76 %
Wayne	4	117,333	216,568	117,333	100.00 %	54.18 %
Wilkes	36	65,969	210,986	65,969	100.00 %	31.27 %
Wilson	4	78,784	216,568	78,784	100.00 %	36.38 %
Yadkin	36	37,214	210,986	37,214	100.00 %	17.64 %
Yancey	47	18,470	209,958	18,470	100.00 %	8.80 %
Assigned Geography Total:				10,439,388		

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Report display: all assigned counties

Total Counties Statewide: 100

Fully Assigned Counties: 100

Partially Assigned Counties: 0

Fully Unassigned Counties: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split Counties: 15

District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
1	Carteret	199,750	67,686	67,686	33.89 %	100.00 %
	Chowan	199,750	13,708	13,708	6.86 %	100.00 %
	Dare	199,750	36,915	36,915	18.48 %	100.00 %
	Hyde	199,750	4,589	4,589	2.30 %	100.00 %
	Pamlico	199,750	12,276	12,276	6.15 %	100.00 %
	Pasquotank	199,750	40,568	40,568	20.31 %	100.00 %
	Perquimans	199,750	13,005	13,005	6.51 %	100.00 %
	Washington	199,750	11,003	11,003	5.51 %	100.00 %
2	Beaufort	200,494	44,652	44,652	22.27 %	100.00 %
	Craven	200,494	100,720	100,720	50.24 %	100.00 %
	Lenoir	200,494	55,122	55,122	27.49 %	100.00 %
3	Bertie	198,430	17,934	17,934	9.04 %	100.00 %
	Camden	198,430	10,355	10,355	5.22 %	100.00 %
	Currituck	198,430	28,100	28,100	14.16 %	100.00 %
	Gates	198,430	10,478	10,478	5.28 %	100.00 %
	Halifax	198,430	48,622	48,622	24.50 %	100.00 %
	Hertford	198,430	21,552	21,552	10.86 %	100.00 %
	Martin	198,430	22,031	22,031	11.10 %	100.00 %
	Northampton	198,430	17,471	17,471	8.80 %	100.00 %
	Tyrrell	198,430	3,245	3,245	1.64 %	100.00 %
	Warren	198,430	18,642	18,642	9.39 %	100.00 %
4	Greene	216,568	20,451	20,451	9.44 %	100.00 %
	Wayne	216,568	117,333	117,333	54.18 %	100.00 %
	Wilson	216,568	78,784	78,784	36.38 %	100.00 %
5	Edgecombe	219,143	48,900	48,900	22.31 %	100.00 %
	Pitt	219,143	170,243	170,243	77.69 %	100.00 %
6	Onslow	204,576	204,576	204,576	100.00 %	100.00 %
7	New Hanover	208,637	225,702	208,637	100.00 %	92.44 %
8	Brunswick	204,381	136,693	136,693	66.88 %	100.00 %
	Columbus	204,381	50,623	50,623	24.77 %	100.00 %
	New Hanover	204,381	225,702	17,065	8.35 %	7.56 %
9	Bladen	202,791	29,606	29,606	14.60 %	100.00 %
	Duplin	202,791	48,715	48,715	24.02 %	100.00 %
	Jones	202,791	9,172	9,172	4.52 %	100.00 %
	Pender	202,791	60,203	60,203	29.69 %	100.00 %
	Sampson	202,791	59,036	55,095	27.17 %	93.32 %
10	Johnston	215,999	215,999	215,999	100.00 %	100.00 %
11	Franklin	206,121	68,573	68,573	33.27 %	100.00 %
	Nash	206,121	94,970	94,970	46.07 %	100.00 %
	Vance	206,121	42,578	42,578	20.66 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
12	Harnett	200,794	133,568	133,568	66.52 %	100.00 %
	Lee	200,794	63,285	63,285	31.52 %	100.00 %
	Sampson	200,794	59,036	3,941	1.96 %	6.68 %
13	Wake	198,383	1,129,410	198,383	100.00 %	17.57 %
14	Wake	198,391	1,129,410	198,391	100.00 %	17.57 %
15	Wake	198,416	1,129,410	198,416	100.00 %	17.57 %
16	Wake	198,364	1,129,410	198,364	100.00 %	17.56 %
17	Wake	198,370	1,129,410	198,370	100.00 %	17.56 %
18	Granville	198,478	60,992	60,992	30.73 %	100.00 %
	Wake	198,478	1,129,410	137,486	69.27 %	12.17 %
19	Cumberland	216,664	334,728	216,664	100.00 %	64.73 %
20	Chatham	199,272	76,285	76,285	38.28 %	100.00 %
	Durham	199,272	324,833	122,987	61.72 %	37.86 %
21	Cumberland	217,791	334,728	118,064	54.21 %	35.27 %
	Moore	217,791	99,727	99,727	45.79 %	100.00 %
22	Durham	201,846	324,833	201,846	100.00 %	62.14 %
23	Caswell	210,529	22,736	22,736	10.80 %	100.00 %
	Orange	210,529	148,696	148,696	70.63 %	100.00 %
	Person	210,529	39,097	39,097	18.57 %	100.00 %
24	Hoke	202,786	52,082	52,082	25.68 %	100.00 %
	Robeson	202,786	116,530	116,530	57.46 %	100.00 %
	Scotland	202,786	34,174	34,174	16.85 %	100.00 %
25	Alamance	217,130	171,415	171,415	78.95 %	100.00 %
	Randolph	217,130	144,171	45,715	21.05 %	31.71 %
26	Guilford	216,942	541,299	125,846	58.01 %	23.25 %
	Rockingham	216,942	91,096	91,096	41.99 %	100.00 %
27	Guilford	203,438	541,299	203,438	100.00 %	37.58 %
28	Guilford	212,015	541,299	212,015	100.00 %	39.17 %
29	Anson	218,867	22,055	22,055	10.08 %	100.00 %
	Montgomery	218,867	25,751	25,751	11.77 %	100.00 %
	Randolph	218,867	144,171	98,456	44.98 %	68.29 %
	Richmond	218,867	42,946	42,946	19.62 %	100.00 %
	Union	218,867	238,267	29,659	13.55 %	12.45 %
30	Davidson	211,642	168,930	168,930	79.82 %	100.00 %
	Davie	211,642	42,712	42,712	20.18 %	100.00 %
31	Forsyth	216,024	382,590	171,504	79.39 %	44.83 %
	Stokes	216,024	44,520	44,520	20.61 %	100.00 %
32	Forsyth	211,086	382,590	211,086	100.00 %	55.17 %
33	Rowan	209,379	146,875	146,875	70.15 %	100.00 %
	Stanly	209,379	62,504	62,504	29.85 %	100.00 %
34	Cabarrus	217,563	225,804	217,563	100.00 %	96.35 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
35	Cabarrus	216,849	225,804	8,241	3.80 %	3.65 %
	Union	216,849	238,267	208,608	96.20 %	87.55 %
36	Alexander	210,986	36,444	36,444	17.27 %	100.00 %
	Surry	210,986	71,359	71,359	33.82 %	100.00 %
	Wilkes	210,986	65,969	65,969	31.27 %	100.00 %
	Yadkin	210,986	37,214	37,214	17.64 %	100.00 %
37	Iredell	215,363	186,693	186,693	86.69 %	100.00 %
	Mecklenburg	215,363	1,115,482	28,670	13.31 %	2.57 %
38	Mecklenburg	216,250	1,115,482	216,250	100.00 %	19.39 %
39	Mecklenburg	217,710	1,115,482	217,710	100.00 %	19.52 %
40	Mecklenburg	218,745	1,115,482	218,745	100.00 %	19.61 %
41	Mecklenburg	216,976	1,115,482	216,976	100.00 %	19.45 %
42	Mecklenburg	217,131	1,115,482	217,131	100.00 %	19.47 %
43	Gaston	211,229	227,943	211,229	100.00 %	92.67 %
44	Cleveland	203,043	99,519	99,519	49.01 %	100.00 %
	Gaston	203,043	227,943	16,714	8.23 %	7.33 %
	Lincoln	203,043	86,810	86,810	42.75 %	100.00 %
45	Caldwell	218,526	80,652	57,916	26.50 %	71.81 %
	Catawba	218,526	160,610	160,610	73.50 %	100.00 %
46	Buncombe	200,646	269,452	68,498	34.14 %	25.42 %
	Burke	200,646	87,570	87,570	43.64 %	100.00 %
	McDowell	200,646	44,578	44,578	22.22 %	100.00 %
47	Alleghany	209,958	10,888	10,888	5.19 %	100.00 %
	Ashe	209,958	26,577	26,577	12.66 %	100.00 %
	Avery	209,958	17,806	17,806	8.48 %	100.00 %
	Caldwell	209,958	80,652	22,736	10.83 %	28.19 %
	Haywood	209,958	62,089	23,299	11.10 %	37.53 %
	Madison	209,958	21,193	21,193	10.09 %	100.00 %
	Mitchell	209,958	14,903	14,903	7.10 %	100.00 %
	Watauga	209,958	54,086	54,086	25.76 %	100.00 %
Yancey	209,958	18,470	18,470	8.80 %	100.00 %	
48	Henderson	200,053	116,281	116,281	58.13 %	100.00 %
	Polk	200,053	19,328	19,328	9.66 %	100.00 %
	Rutherford	200,053	64,444	64,444	32.21 %	100.00 %
49	Buncombe	200,954	269,452	200,954	100.00 %	74.58 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-DistCnty] - Generated 2/17/2022

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District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
50	Cherokee	213,909	28,774	28,774	13.45 %	100.00 %
	Clay	213,909	11,089	11,089	5.18 %	100.00 %
	Graham	213,909	8,030	8,030	3.75 %	100.00 %
	Haywood	213,909	62,089	38,790	18.13 %	62.47 %
	Jackson	213,909	43,109	43,109	20.15 %	100.00 %
	Macon	213,909	37,014	37,014	17.30 %	100.00 %
	Swain	213,909	14,117	14,117	6.60 %	100.00 %
	Transylvania	213,909	32,986	32,986	15.42 %	100.00 %
Total:				10,439,388		

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Total Counties Statewide: 100

Fully Assigned Counties: 100

Partially Assigned Counties: 0

Fully Unassigned Counties: 0

Split Counties: 15

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-DistCnty] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Aberdeen	21	8,516	217,791	8,516	100.00 %	3.91 %
Ahoskie	3	4,891	198,430	4,891	100.00 %	2.46 %
Alamance	25	988	217,130	988	100.00 %	0.46 %
Albemarle	33	16,432	209,379	16,432	100.00 %	7.85 %
Alliance	1	733	199,750	733	100.00 %	0.37 %
Andrews	50	1,667	213,909	1,667	100.00 %	0.78 %
Angier	12	5,265	200,794	4,709	89.44 %	2.35 %
	17	5,265	198,370	556	10.56 %	0.28 %
Ansonville	29	440	218,867	440	100.00 %	0.20 %
Apex	16	58,780	198,364	16,256	27.66 %	8.20 %
	17	58,780	198,370	42,524	72.34 %	21.44 %
Arapahoe	1	416	199,750	416	100.00 %	0.21 %
Archdale	25	11,907	217,130	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	27	11,907	203,438	380	3.19 %	0.19 %
	29	11,907	218,867	11,527	96.81 %	5.27 %
Archer Lodge	10	4,797	215,999	4,797	100.00 %	2.22 %
Asheboro	25	27,156	217,130	1,217	4.48 %	0.56 %
	29	27,156	218,867	25,939	95.52 %	11.85 %
Asheville	46	94,589	200,646	1,387	1.47 %	0.69 %
	49	94,589	200,954	93,202	98.53 %	46.38 %
Askewville	3	184	198,430	184	100.00 %	0.09 %
Atkinson	9	296	202,791	296	100.00 %	0.15 %
Atlantic Beach	1	1,364	199,750	1,364	100.00 %	0.68 %
Aulander	3	763	198,430	763	100.00 %	0.38 %
Aurora	2	455	200,494	455	100.00 %	0.23 %
Autryville	9	167	202,791	167	100.00 %	0.08 %
Ayden	5	4,977	219,143	4,977	100.00 %	2.27 %
Badin	33	2,024	209,379	2,024	100.00 %	0.97 %
Bailey	11	568	206,121	568	100.00 %	0.28 %
Bakersville	47	450	209,958	450	100.00 %	0.21 %
Bald Head Island	8	268	204,381	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Banner Elk	47	1,049	209,958	1,049	100.00 %	0.50 %
Bath	2	245	200,494	245	100.00 %	0.12 %
Bayboro	1	1,161	199,750	1,161	100.00 %	0.58 %
Bear Grass	3	89	198,430	89	100.00 %	0.04 %
Beaufort	1	4,464	199,750	4,464	100.00 %	2.23 %
Beech Mountain	47	675	209,958	675	100.00 %	0.32 %
Belhaven	2	1,410	200,494	1,410	100.00 %	0.70 %
Belmont	43	15,010	211,229	15,010	100.00 %	7.11 %
Belville	8	2,406	204,381	2,406	100.00 %	1.18 %
Belwood	44	857	203,043	857	100.00 %	0.42 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

[G20-MuniDist] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Benson	10	3,967	215,999	3,967	100.00 %	1.84 %
	12	3,967	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bermuda Run	30	3,120	211,642	3,120	100.00 %	1.47 %
Bessemer City	43	5,428	211,229	5,428	100.00 %	2.57 %
	44	5,428	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bethania	31	344	216,024	344	100.00 %	0.16 %
	32	344	211,086	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bethel	5	1,373	219,143	1,373	100.00 %	0.63 %
Beulaville	9	1,116	202,791	1,116	100.00 %	0.55 %
Biltmore Forest	49	1,409	200,954	1,409	100.00 %	0.70 %
Biscoe	29	1,848	218,867	1,848	100.00 %	0.84 %
Black Creek	4	692	216,568	692	100.00 %	0.32 %
Black Mountain	46	8,426	200,646	8,426	100.00 %	4.20 %
Bladenboro	9	1,648	202,791	1,648	100.00 %	0.81 %
Blowing Rock	47	1,376	209,958	1,376	100.00 %	0.66 %
Boardman	8	166	204,381	166	100.00 %	0.08 %
Bogue	1	695	199,750	695	100.00 %	0.35 %
Boiling Spring Lakes	8	5,943	204,381	5,943	100.00 %	2.91 %
Boiling Springs	44	4,615	203,043	4,615	100.00 %	2.27 %
Bolivia	8	149	204,381	149	100.00 %	0.07 %
Bolton	8	519	204,381	519	100.00 %	0.25 %
Boone	47	19,092	209,958	19,092	100.00 %	9.09 %
Boonville	36	1,185	210,986	1,185	100.00 %	0.56 %
Bostic	48	355	200,053	355	100.00 %	0.18 %
Brevard	50	7,744	213,909	7,744	100.00 %	3.62 %
Bridgeton	2	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Broadway	12	1,267	200,794	1,267	100.00 %	0.63 %
Brookford	45	442	218,526	442	100.00 %	0.20 %
Brunswick	8	973	204,381	973	100.00 %	0.48 %
Bryson City	50	1,558	213,909	1,558	100.00 %	0.73 %
Bunn	11	327	206,121	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Burgaw	9	3,088	202,791	3,088	100.00 %	1.52 %
Burlington	25	57,303	217,130	55,481	96.82 %	25.55 %
	26	57,303	216,942	1,822	3.18 %	0.84 %
Burnsville	47	1,614	209,958	1,614	100.00 %	0.77 %
Butner	18	8,397	198,478	8,397	100.00 %	4.23 %
Cajah's Mountain	45	2,722	218,526	2,722	100.00 %	1.25 %
Calabash	8	2,011	204,381	2,011	100.00 %	0.98 %
Calypso	9	327	202,791	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Cameron	21	244	217,791	244	100.00 %	0.11 %
Candor	21	813	217,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	29	813	218,867	813	100.00 %	0.37 %

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District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Canton	47	4,422	209,958	4,422	100.00 %	2.11 %
Cape Carteret	1	2,224	199,750	2,224	100.00 %	1.11 %
Carolina Beach	7	6,564	208,637	6,564	100.00 %	3.15 %
Carolina Shores	8	4,588	204,381	4,588	100.00 %	2.24 %
Carrboro	23	21,295	210,529	21,295	100.00 %	10.11 %
Carthage	21	2,775	217,791	2,775	100.00 %	1.27 %
Cary	15	174,721	198,416	33,852	19.37 %	17.06 %
	16	174,721	198,364	128,099	73.32 %	64.58 %
	17	174,721	198,370	9,061	5.19 %	4.57 %
	20	174,721	199,272	3,709	2.12 %	1.86 %
Casar	44	305	203,043	305	100.00 %	0.15 %
Castalia	11	264	206,121	264	100.00 %	0.13 %
Caswell Beach	8	395	204,381	395	100.00 %	0.19 %
Catawba	45	702	218,526	702	100.00 %	0.32 %
Cedar Point	1	1,764	199,750	1,764	100.00 %	0.88 %
Cedar Rock	45	301	218,526	301	100.00 %	0.14 %
Cerro Gordo	8	131	204,381	131	100.00 %	0.06 %
Chadbourn	8	1,574	204,381	1,574	100.00 %	0.77 %
Chapel Hill	20	61,960	199,272	2,906	4.69 %	1.46 %
	23	61,960	210,529	59,054	95.31 %	28.05 %
Charlotte	38	874,579	216,250	211,216	24.15 %	97.67 %
	39	874,579	217,710	197,245	22.55 %	90.60 %
	40	874,579	218,745	165,897	18.97 %	75.84 %
	41	874,579	216,976	114,003	13.04 %	52.54 %
	42	874,579	217,131	186,218	21.29 %	85.76 %
Cherryville	44	6,078	203,043	6,078	100.00 %	2.99 %
Chimney Rock Village	48	140	200,053	140	100.00 %	0.07 %
China Grove	33	4,434	209,379	4,434	100.00 %	2.12 %
Chocowinity	2	722	200,494	722	100.00 %	0.36 %
Claremont	45	1,692	218,526	1,692	100.00 %	0.77 %
Clarkton	9	614	202,791	614	100.00 %	0.30 %
Clayton	10	26,307	215,999	26,307	100.00 %	12.18 %
	14	26,307	198,391	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Clemmons	32	21,163	211,086	21,163	100.00 %	10.03 %
Cleveland	33	846	209,379	846	100.00 %	0.40 %
Clinton	9	8,383	202,791	8,383	100.00 %	4.13 %
Clyde	47	1,368	209,958	1,368	100.00 %	0.65 %
Coats	12	2,155	200,794	2,155	100.00 %	1.07 %
Cofield	3	267	198,430	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Colerain	3	217	198,430	217	100.00 %	0.11 %
Columbia	3	610	198,430	610	100.00 %	0.31 %
Columbus	48	1,060	200,053	1,060	100.00 %	0.53 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Como	3	67	198,430	67	100.00 %	0.03 %
Concord	34	105,240	217,563	105,240	100.00 %	48.37 %
Conetoe	5	198	219,143	198	100.00 %	0.09 %
Connelly Springs	46	1,529	200,646	1,529	100.00 %	0.76 %
Conover	45	8,421	218,526	8,421	100.00 %	3.85 %
Conway	3	752	198,430	752	100.00 %	0.38 %
Coolemeec	30	940	211,642	940	100.00 %	0.44 %
Cornelius	37	31,412	215,363	18,991	60.46 %	8.82 %
	41	31,412	216,976	12,421	39.54 %	5.72 %
Cove City	2	378	200,494	378	100.00 %	0.19 %
Cramerton	43	5,296	211,229	5,296	100.00 %	2.51 %
Creedmoor	18	4,866	198,478	4,866	100.00 %	2.45 %
Creswell	1	207	199,750	207	100.00 %	0.10 %
Crossnore	47	143	209,958	143	100.00 %	0.07 %
Dallas	43	5,927	211,229	5,927	100.00 %	2.81 %
Danbury	31	189	216,024	189	100.00 %	0.09 %
Davidson	37	15,106	215,363	378	2.50 %	0.18 %
	41	15,106	216,976	14,728	97.50 %	6.79 %
Dellview	44	6	203,043	6	100.00 %	0.00 %
Denton	30	1,494	211,642	1,494	100.00 %	0.71 %
Dillsboro	50	213	213,909	213	100.00 %	0.10 %
Dobbins Heights	29	687	218,867	687	100.00 %	0.31 %
Dobson	36	1,462	210,986	1,462	100.00 %	0.69 %
Dortches	11	1,082	206,121	1,082	100.00 %	0.52 %
Dover	2	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Drexel	46	1,760	200,646	1,760	100.00 %	0.88 %
Dublin	9	267	202,791	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Duck	1	742	199,750	742	100.00 %	0.37 %
Dunn	12	8,446	200,794	8,446	100.00 %	4.21 %
Durham	13	283,506	198,383	269	0.09 %	0.14 %
	16	283,506	198,364	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	20	283,506	199,272	115,188	40.63 %	57.80 %
	22	283,506	201,846	167,905	59.22 %	83.18 %
	23	283,506	210,529	144	0.05 %	0.07 %
Earl	44	198	203,043	198	100.00 %	0.10 %
East Arcadia	9	418	202,791	418	100.00 %	0.21 %
East Bend	36	634	210,986	634	100.00 %	0.30 %
East Laurinburg	24	234	202,786	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
Eastover	19	3,656	216,664	3,656	100.00 %	1.69 %
East Spencer	33	1,567	209,379	1,567	100.00 %	0.75 %
Eden	26	15,421	216,942	15,421	100.00 %	7.11 %
Edenton	1	4,460	199,750	4,460	100.00 %	2.23 %

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Municipality - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Elizabeth City	1	18,631	199,750	18,593	99.80 %	9.31 %
	3	18,631	198,430	38	0.20 %	0.02 %
Elizabethtown	9	3,296	202,791	3,296	100.00 %	1.63 %
Elkin	36	4,122	210,986	4,122	100.00 %	1.95 %
Elk Park	47	542	209,958	542	100.00 %	0.26 %
Ellenboro	48	723	200,053	723	100.00 %	0.36 %
Ellerbe	29	864	218,867	864	100.00 %	0.39 %
Elm City	4	1,218	216,568	1,218	100.00 %	0.56 %
	11	1,218	206,121	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Elon	25	11,336	217,130	11,336	100.00 %	5.22 %
Emerald Isle	1	3,847	199,750	3,847	100.00 %	1.93 %
Enfield	3	1,865	198,430	1,865	100.00 %	0.94 %
Erwin	12	4,542	200,794	4,542	100.00 %	2.26 %
Eureka	4	214	216,568	214	100.00 %	0.10 %
Everetts	3	150	198,430	150	100.00 %	0.08 %
Fair Bluff	8	709	204,381	709	100.00 %	0.35 %
Fairmont	24	2,191	202,786	2,191	100.00 %	1.08 %
Fairview	35	3,456	216,849	3,456	100.00 %	1.59 %
Faison	9	784	202,791	784	100.00 %	0.39 %
Faith	33	819	209,379	819	100.00 %	0.39 %
Falcon	9	324	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	19	324	216,664	324	100.00 %	0.15 %
Falkland	5	47	219,143	47	100.00 %	0.02 %
Fallston	44	627	203,043	627	100.00 %	0.31 %
Farmville	5	4,461	219,143	4,461	100.00 %	2.04 %
Fayetteville	19	208,501	216,664	110,573	53.03 %	51.03 %
	21	208,501	217,791	97,928	46.97 %	44.96 %
Flat Rock	48	3,486	200,053	3,486	100.00 %	1.74 %
Fletcher	48	7,987	200,053	7,987	100.00 %	3.99 %
Fontana Dam	50	13	213,909	13	100.00 %	0.01 %
Forest City	48	7,377	200,053	7,377	100.00 %	3.69 %
Forest Hills	50	303	213,909	303	100.00 %	0.14 %
Fountain	5	385	219,143	385	100.00 %	0.18 %
Four Oaks	10	2,158	215,999	2,158	100.00 %	1.00 %
Foxfire	21	1,288	217,791	1,288	100.00 %	0.59 %
Franklin	50	4,175	213,909	4,175	100.00 %	1.95 %
Franklinton	11	2,456	206,121	2,456	100.00 %	1.19 %
Franklinville	25	1,197	217,130	1,197	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fremont	4	1,196	216,568	1,196	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fuquay-Varina	12	34,152	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	15	34,152	198,416	30	0.09 %	0.02 %
	17	34,152	198,370	34,122	99.91 %	17.20 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Gamewell	45	3,702	218,526	65	1.76 %	0.03 %
	47	3,702	209,958	3,637	98.24 %	1.73 %
Garland	9	595	202,791	595	100.00 %	0.29 %
Garner	14	31,159	198,391	24,703	79.28 %	12.45 %
	15	31,159	198,416	2,754	8.84 %	1.39 %
	17	31,159	198,370	3,702	11.88 %	1.87 %
Garysburg	3	904	198,430	904	100.00 %	0.46 %
Gaston	3	1,008	198,430	1,008	100.00 %	0.51 %
Gastonia	43	80,411	211,229	80,411	100.00 %	38.07 %
	44	80,411	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Gatesville	3	267	198,430	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Gibson	24	449	202,786	449	100.00 %	0.22 %
Gibsonville	25	8,920	217,130	4,278	47.96 %	1.97 %
	26	8,920	216,942	4,642	52.04 %	2.14 %
Glen Alpine	46	1,529	200,646	1,529	100.00 %	0.76 %
Godwin	19	128	216,664	128	100.00 %	0.06 %
Goldsboro	4	33,657	216,568	33,657	100.00 %	15.54 %
Goldston	20	234	199,272	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
Graham	25	17,157	217,130	17,157	100.00 %	7.90 %
Grandfather Village	47	95	209,958	95	100.00 %	0.05 %
Granite Falls	45	4,965	218,526	4,965	100.00 %	2.27 %
Granite Quarry	33	2,984	209,379	2,984	100.00 %	1.43 %
Grantsboro	1	692	199,750	692	100.00 %	0.35 %
Greenevers	9	567	202,791	567	100.00 %	0.28 %
Green Level	25	3,152	217,130	3,152	100.00 %	1.45 %
Greensboro	26	299,035	216,942	32,095	10.73 %	14.79 %
	27	299,035	203,438	55,112	18.43 %	27.09 %
	28	299,035	212,015	211,828	70.84 %	99.91 %
Greenville	5	87,521	219,143	87,521	100.00 %	39.94 %
Grifton	2	2,448	200,494	147	6.00 %	0.07 %
	5	2,448	219,143	2,301	94.00 %	1.05 %
Grimesland	5	386	219,143	386	100.00 %	0.18 %
Grover	44	802	203,043	802	100.00 %	0.39 %
Halifax	3	170	198,430	170	100.00 %	0.09 %
Hamilton	3	306	198,430	306	100.00 %	0.15 %
Hamlet	29	6,025	218,867	6,025	100.00 %	2.75 %
Harmony	37	543	215,363	543	100.00 %	0.25 %
Harrells	9	160	202,791	160	100.00 %	0.08 %
Harrellsville	3	85	198,430	85	100.00 %	0.04 %
Harrisburg	34	18,967	217,563	18,967	100.00 %	8.72 %
Hassell	3	49	198,430	49	100.00 %	0.02 %
Havelock	2	16,621	200,494	16,621	100.00 %	8.29 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Haw River	25	2,252	217,130	2,252	100.00 %	1.04 %
Hayesville	50	461	213,909	461	100.00 %	0.22 %
Hemby Bridge	35	1,614	216,849	1,614	100.00 %	0.74 %
Henderson	11	15,060	206,121	15,060	100.00 %	7.31 %
Hendersonville	48	15,137	200,053	15,137	100.00 %	7.57 %
Hertford	1	1,934	199,750	1,934	100.00 %	0.97 %
Hickory	45	43,490	218,526	43,411	99.82 %	19.87 %
	46	43,490	200,646	79	0.18 %	0.04 %
Highlands	50	1,072	213,909	1,072	100.00 %	0.50 %
High Point	27	114,059	203,438	107,321	94.09 %	52.75 %
	29	114,059	218,867	8	0.01 %	0.00 %
	30	114,059	211,642	6,646	5.83 %	3.14 %
	31	114,059	216,024	84	0.07 %	0.04 %
High Shoals	43	595	211,229	595	100.00 %	0.28 %
	44	595	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Hildebran	46	1,679	200,646	1,679	100.00 %	0.84 %
Hillsborough	23	9,660	210,529	9,660	100.00 %	4.59 %
Hobgood	3	268	198,430	268	100.00 %	0.14 %
Hoffman	29	418	218,867	418	100.00 %	0.19 %
Holden Beach	8	921	204,381	921	100.00 %	0.45 %
Holly Ridge	6	4,171	204,576	4,171	100.00 %	2.04 %
Holly Springs	17	41,239	198,370	41,239	100.00 %	20.79 %
Hookerton	4	413	216,568	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
Hope Mills	19	17,808	216,664	17,808	100.00 %	8.22 %
Hot Springs	47	520	209,958	520	100.00 %	0.25 %
Hudson	45	3,780	218,526	3,780	100.00 %	1.73 %
Huntersville	37	61,376	215,363	9,667	15.75 %	4.49 %
	41	61,376	216,976	51,709	84.25 %	23.83 %
Indian Beach	1	223	199,750	223	100.00 %	0.11 %
Indian Trail	35	39,997	216,849	39,997	100.00 %	18.44 %
Jackson	3	430	198,430	430	100.00 %	0.22 %
Jacksonville	6	72,723	204,576	72,723	100.00 %	35.55 %
Jamestown	27	3,668	203,438	3,668	100.00 %	1.80 %
Jamesville	3	424	198,430	424	100.00 %	0.21 %
Jefferson	47	1,622	209,958	1,622	100.00 %	0.77 %
Jonesville	36	2,308	210,986	2,308	100.00 %	1.09 %
Kannapolis	33	53,114	209,379	10,268	19.33 %	4.90 %
	34	53,114	217,563	42,846	80.67 %	19.69 %
Kelford	3	203	198,430	203	100.00 %	0.10 %
Kenansville	9	770	202,791	770	100.00 %	0.38 %
Kenly	4	1,491	216,568	198	13.28 %	0.09 %
	10	1,491	215,999	1,293	86.72 %	0.60 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Kernersville	27	26,449	203,438	502	1.90 %	0.25 %
	31	26,449	216,024	25,947	98.10 %	12.01 %
Kill Devil Hills	1	7,656	199,750	7,656	100.00 %	3.83 %
King	31	7,197	216,024	7,197	100.00 %	3.33 %
Kings Mountain	43	11,142	211,229	1,110	9.96 %	0.53 %
	44	11,142	203,043	10,032	90.04 %	4.94 %
Kingstown	44	656	203,043	656	100.00 %	0.32 %
Kinston	2	19,900	200,494	19,900	100.00 %	9.93 %
Kittrell	11	132	206,121	132	100.00 %	0.06 %
Kitty Hawk	1	3,689	199,750	3,689	100.00 %	1.85 %
Knightdale	14	19,435	198,391	19,435	100.00 %	9.80 %
Kure Beach	7	2,191	208,637	2,191	100.00 %	1.05 %
La Grange	2	2,595	200,494	2,595	100.00 %	1.29 %
Lake Lure	48	1,365	200,053	1,365	100.00 %	0.68 %
Lake Park	35	3,269	216,849	3,269	100.00 %	1.51 %
Lake Santeetlah	50	38	213,909	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Lake Waccamaw	8	1,296	204,381	1,296	100.00 %	0.63 %
Landis	33	3,690	209,379	3,690	100.00 %	1.76 %
Lansing	47	126	209,958	126	100.00 %	0.06 %
Lasker	3	64	198,430	64	100.00 %	0.03 %
Lattimore	44	406	203,043	406	100.00 %	0.20 %
Laurel Park	48	2,250	200,053	2,250	100.00 %	1.12 %
Laurinburg	24	14,978	202,786	14,978	100.00 %	7.39 %
Lawndale	44	570	203,043	570	100.00 %	0.28 %
Leggett	5	37	219,143	37	100.00 %	0.02 %
Leland	8	22,908	204,381	22,908	100.00 %	11.21 %
Lenoir	45	18,352	218,526	13,830	75.36 %	6.33 %
	47	18,352	209,958	4,522	24.64 %	2.15 %
Lewiston Woodville	3	426	198,430	426	100.00 %	0.21 %
Lewisville	32	13,381	211,086	13,381	100.00 %	6.34 %
Lexington	30	19,632	211,642	19,632	100.00 %	9.28 %
Liberty	25	2,655	217,130	2,655	100.00 %	1.22 %
Lilesville	29	395	218,867	395	100.00 %	0.18 %
Lillington	12	4,735	200,794	4,735	100.00 %	2.36 %
Lincolnton	44	11,091	203,043	11,091	100.00 %	5.46 %
Linden	19	136	216,664	136	100.00 %	0.06 %
Littleton	3	559	198,430	559	100.00 %	0.28 %
Locust	33	4,537	209,379	3,996	88.08 %	1.91 %
	34	4,537	217,563	423	9.32 %	0.19 %
	35	4,537	216,849	118	2.60 %	0.05 %
Long View	45	5,088	218,526	4,353	85.55 %	1.99 %
	46	5,088	200,646	735	14.45 %	0.37 %

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District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Louisburg	11	3,064	206,121	3,064	100.00 %	1.49 %
Love Valley	37	154	215,363	154	100.00 %	0.07 %
Lowell	43	3,654	211,229	3,654	100.00 %	1.73 %
Lucama	4	1,036	216,568	1,036	100.00 %	0.48 %
Lumber Bridge	24	82	202,786	82	100.00 %	0.04 %
Lumberton	24	19,025	202,786	19,025	100.00 %	9.38 %
McAdenville	43	890	211,229	890	100.00 %	0.42 %
Macclesfield	5	413	219,143	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
McDonald	24	94	202,786	94	100.00 %	0.05 %
McFarlan	29	94	218,867	94	100.00 %	0.04 %
Macon	3	110	198,430	110	100.00 %	0.06 %
Madison	26	2,129	216,942	2,129	100.00 %	0.98 %
Maggie Valley	50	1,687	213,909	1,687	100.00 %	0.79 %
Magnolia	9	831	202,791	831	100.00 %	0.41 %
Maiden	44	3,736	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	45	3,736	218,526	3,736	100.00 %	1.71 %
Manteo	1	1,600	199,750	1,600	100.00 %	0.80 %
Marietta	24	111	202,786	111	100.00 %	0.05 %
Marion	46	7,717	200,646	7,717	100.00 %	3.85 %
Marshall	47	777	209,958	777	100.00 %	0.37 %
Mars Hill	47	2,007	209,958	2,007	100.00 %	0.96 %
Marshville	29	2,522	218,867	2,522	100.00 %	1.15 %
Marvin	35	6,358	216,849	6,358	100.00 %	2.93 %
Matthews	40	29,435	218,745	10,695	36.33 %	4.89 %
	42	29,435	217,131	18,740	63.67 %	8.63 %
Maxton	24	2,110	202,786	2,110	100.00 %	1.04 %
Mayodan	26	2,418	216,942	2,418	100.00 %	1.11 %
Maysville	9	818	202,791	818	100.00 %	0.40 %
Mebane	23	17,797	210,529	3,171	17.82 %	1.51 %
	25	17,797	217,130	14,626	82.18 %	6.74 %
Mesic	1	144	199,750	144	100.00 %	0.07 %
Micro	10	458	215,999	458	100.00 %	0.21 %
Middleburg	11	101	206,121	101	100.00 %	0.05 %
Middlesex	11	912	206,121	912	100.00 %	0.44 %
Midland	34	4,684	217,563	4	0.09 %	0.00 %
	35	4,684	216,849	4,680	99.91 %	2.16 %
	40	4,684	218,745	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Midway	30	4,742	211,642	4,742	100.00 %	2.24 %
Mills River	48	7,078	200,053	7,078	100.00 %	3.54 %
Milton	23	155	210,529	155	100.00 %	0.07 %
Mineral Springs	35	3,159	216,849	3,159	100.00 %	1.46 %
Minnesott Beach	1	530	199,750	530	100.00 %	0.27 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Mint Hill	35	26,450	216,849	6	0.02 %	0.00 %
	40	26,450	218,745	26,444	99.98 %	12.09 %
Misenheimer	33	650	209,379	650	100.00 %	0.31 %
Mocksville	30	5,900	211,642	5,900	100.00 %	2.79 %
Momeyer	11	277	206,121	277	100.00 %	0.13 %
Monroe	29	34,562	218,867	225	0.65 %	0.10 %
	35	34,562	216,849	34,337	99.35 %	15.83 %
Montreat	46	901	200,646	901	100.00 %	0.45 %
Mooresboro	44	293	203,043	293	100.00 %	0.14 %
Mooresville	37	50,193	215,363	50,193	100.00 %	23.31 %
Morehead City	1	9,556	199,750	9,556	100.00 %	4.78 %
Morganton	46	17,474	200,646	17,474	100.00 %	8.71 %
Morrisville	16	29,630	198,364	29,423	99.30 %	14.83 %
	20	29,630	199,272	207	0.70 %	0.10 %
Morven	29	329	218,867	329	100.00 %	0.15 %
Mount Airy	36	10,676	210,986	10,676	100.00 %	5.06 %
Mount Gilead	29	1,171	218,867	1,171	100.00 %	0.54 %
Mount Holly	43	17,703	211,229	17,703	100.00 %	8.38 %
Mount Olive	4	4,198	216,568	4,193	99.88 %	1.94 %
	9	4,198	202,791	5	0.12 %	0.00 %
Mount Pleasant	34	1,671	217,563	1,671	100.00 %	0.77 %
Murfreesboro	3	2,619	198,430	2,619	100.00 %	1.32 %
Murphy	50	1,608	213,909	1,608	100.00 %	0.75 %
Nags Head	1	3,168	199,750	3,168	100.00 %	1.59 %
Nashville	11	5,632	206,121	5,632	100.00 %	2.73 %
Navassa	8	1,367	204,381	1,367	100.00 %	0.67 %
New Bern	2	31,291	200,494	31,291	100.00 %	15.61 %
Newland	47	715	209,958	715	100.00 %	0.34 %
New London	33	607	209,379	607	100.00 %	0.29 %
Newport	1	4,364	199,750	4,364	100.00 %	2.18 %
Newton	45	13,148	218,526	13,148	100.00 %	6.02 %
Newton Grove	9	585	202,791	585	100.00 %	0.29 %
Norlina	3	920	198,430	920	100.00 %	0.46 %
Norman	29	100	218,867	100	100.00 %	0.05 %
North Topsail Beach	6	1,005	204,576	1,005	100.00 %	0.49 %
Northwest	8	703	204,381	703	100.00 %	0.34 %
North Wilkesboro	36	4,382	210,986	4,382	100.00 %	2.08 %
Norwood	33	2,367	209,379	2,367	100.00 %	1.13 %
Oakboro	33	2,128	209,379	2,128	100.00 %	1.02 %
Oak City	3	266	198,430	266	100.00 %	0.13 %
Oak Island	8	8,396	204,381	8,396	100.00 %	4.11 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Oak Ridge	26	7,474	216,942	7,471	99.96 %	3.44 %
	27	7,474	203,438	3	0.04 %	0.00 %
Ocean Isle Beach	8	867	204,381	867	100.00 %	0.42 %
Old Fort	46	811	200,646	811	100.00 %	0.40 %
Oriental	1	880	199,750	880	100.00 %	0.44 %
Orrum	24	59	202,786	59	100.00 %	0.03 %
Ossipee	25	536	217,130	536	100.00 %	0.25 %
Oxford	18	8,628	198,478	8,628	100.00 %	4.35 %
Pantego	2	164	200,494	164	100.00 %	0.08 %
Parkton	24	504	202,786	504	100.00 %	0.25 %
Parmele	3	243	198,430	243	100.00 %	0.12 %
Patterson Springs	44	571	203,043	571	100.00 %	0.28 %
Peachland	29	390	218,867	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Peletier	1	769	199,750	769	100.00 %	0.38 %
Pembroke	24	2,823	202,786	2,823	100.00 %	1.39 %
Pikeville	4	712	216,568	712	100.00 %	0.33 %
Pilot Mountain	36	1,440	210,986	1,440	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pinebluff	21	1,473	217,791	1,473	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pinehurst	21	17,581	217,791	17,581	100.00 %	8.07 %
Pine Knoll Shores	1	1,388	199,750	1,388	100.00 %	0.69 %
Pine Level	10	2,046	215,999	2,046	100.00 %	0.95 %
Pinetops	5	1,200	219,143	1,200	100.00 %	0.55 %
Pineville	39	10,602	217,710	3,621	34.15 %	1.66 %
	42	10,602	217,131	6,981	65.85 %	3.22 %
Pink Hill	2	451	200,494	451	100.00 %	0.22 %
Pittsboro	20	4,537	199,272	4,537	100.00 %	2.28 %
Pleasant Garden	27	5,000	203,438	5,000	100.00 %	2.46 %
Plymouth	1	3,320	199,750	3,320	100.00 %	1.66 %
Polkton	29	2,250	218,867	2,250	100.00 %	1.03 %
Polkville	44	516	203,043	516	100.00 %	0.25 %
Pollocksville	9	268	202,791	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Powellsville	3	189	198,430	189	100.00 %	0.10 %
Princeton	10	1,315	215,999	1,315	100.00 %	0.61 %
Princeville	5	1,254	219,143	1,254	100.00 %	0.57 %
Proctorville	24	121	202,786	121	100.00 %	0.06 %
Raeford	24	4,559	202,786	4,559	100.00 %	2.25 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Raleigh	13	467,665	198,383	177,965	38.05 %	89.71 %
	14	467,665	198,391	87,185	18.64 %	43.95 %
	15	467,665	198,416	139,357	29.80 %	70.23 %
	16	467,665	198,364	20,224	4.32 %	10.20 %
	18	467,665	198,478	41,375	8.85 %	20.85 %
	20	467,665	199,272	233	0.05 %	0.12 %
	22	467,665	201,846	1,326	0.28 %	0.66 %
Ramseur	25	1,774	217,130	1,774	100.00 %	0.82 %
Randleman	25	4,595	217,130	4,595	100.00 %	2.12 %
Ranlo	43	4,511	211,229	4,511	100.00 %	2.14 %
Raynham	24	60	202,786	60	100.00 %	0.03 %
Red Cross	33	762	209,379	762	100.00 %	0.36 %
Red Oak	11	3,342	206,121	3,342	100.00 %	1.62 %
Red Springs	24	3,087	202,786	3,087	100.00 %	1.52 %
Reidsville	26	14,583	216,942	14,583	100.00 %	6.72 %
Rennert	24	275	202,786	275	100.00 %	0.14 %
Rhodhiss	45	997	218,526	358	35.91 %	0.16 %
	46	997	200,646	639	64.09 %	0.32 %
Richfield	33	582	209,379	582	100.00 %	0.28 %
Richlands	6	2,287	204,576	2,287	100.00 %	1.12 %
Rich Square	3	894	198,430	894	100.00 %	0.45 %
River Bend	2	2,902	200,494	2,902	100.00 %	1.45 %
Roanoke Rapids	3	15,229	198,430	15,229	100.00 %	7.67 %
Robbins	21	1,168	217,791	1,168	100.00 %	0.54 %
Robbinsville	50	597	213,909	597	100.00 %	0.28 %
Robersonville	3	1,269	198,430	1,269	100.00 %	0.64 %
Rockingham	29	9,243	218,867	9,243	100.00 %	4.22 %
Rockwell	33	2,302	209,379	2,302	100.00 %	1.10 %
Rocky Mount	5	54,341	219,143	15,414	28.37 %	7.03 %
	11	54,341	206,121	38,927	71.63 %	18.89 %
Rolesville	18	9,475	198,478	9,475	100.00 %	4.77 %
Ronda	36	438	210,986	438	100.00 %	0.21 %
Roper	1	485	199,750	485	100.00 %	0.24 %
Roseboro	9	1,163	202,791	1,163	100.00 %	0.57 %
Rose Hill	9	1,371	202,791	1,371	100.00 %	0.68 %
Rosman	50	701	213,909	701	100.00 %	0.33 %
Rowland	24	885	202,786	885	100.00 %	0.44 %
Roxboro	23	8,134	210,529	8,134	100.00 %	3.86 %
Roxobel	3	187	198,430	187	100.00 %	0.09 %
Rural Hall	31	3,351	216,024	3,351	100.00 %	1.55 %
Ruth	48	347	200,053	347	100.00 %	0.17 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Rutherford College	45	1,226	218,526	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	46	1,226	200,646	1,226	100.00 %	0.61 %
Rutherfordton	48	3,640	200,053	3,640	100.00 %	1.82 %
St. Helena	9	417	202,791	417	100.00 %	0.21 %
St. James	8	6,529	204,381	6,529	100.00 %	3.19 %
St. Pauls	24	2,045	202,786	2,045	100.00 %	1.01 %
Salemburg	9	457	202,791	457	100.00 %	0.23 %
Salisbury	33	35,540	209,379	35,540	100.00 %	16.97 %
Saluda	48	631	200,053	631	100.00 %	0.32 %
Sandy Creek	8	248	204,381	248	100.00 %	0.12 %
Sandyfield	8	430	204,381	430	100.00 %	0.21 %
Sanford	12	30,261	200,794	30,261	100.00 %	15.07 %
Saratoga	4	353	216,568	353	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sawmills	45	5,020	218,526	5,020	100.00 %	2.30 %
Scotland Neck	3	1,640	198,430	1,640	100.00 %	0.83 %
Seaboard	3	542	198,430	542	100.00 %	0.27 %
Seagrove	29	235	218,867	235	100.00 %	0.11 %
Sedalia	26	676	216,942	676	100.00 %	0.31 %
Selma	10	6,317	215,999	6,317	100.00 %	2.92 %
Seven Devils	47	313	209,958	313	100.00 %	0.15 %
Seven Springs	4	55	216,568	55	100.00 %	0.03 %
Severn	3	191	198,430	191	100.00 %	0.10 %
Shalotte	8	4,185	204,381	4,185	100.00 %	2.05 %
Sharpsburg	4	1,697	216,568	421	24.81 %	0.19 %
	5	1,697	219,143	215	12.67 %	0.10 %
	11	1,697	206,121	1,061	62.52 %	0.51 %
Shelby	44	21,918	203,043	21,918	100.00 %	10.79 %
Siler City	20	7,702	199,272	7,702	100.00 %	3.87 %
Simpson	5	390	219,143	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Sims	4	275	216,568	275	100.00 %	0.13 %
Smithfield	10	11,292	215,999	11,292	100.00 %	5.23 %
Snow Hill	4	1,481	216,568	1,481	100.00 %	0.68 %
Southern Pines	21	15,545	217,791	15,545	100.00 %	7.14 %
Southern Shores	1	3,090	199,750	3,090	100.00 %	1.55 %
Southport	8	3,971	204,381	3,971	100.00 %	1.94 %
Sparta	47	1,834	209,958	1,834	100.00 %	0.87 %
Speed	5	63	219,143	63	100.00 %	0.03 %
Spencer	33	3,308	209,379	3,308	100.00 %	1.58 %
Spencer Mountain	43	0	211,229	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Spindale	48	4,225	200,053	4,225	100.00 %	2.11 %
Spring Hope	11	1,309	206,121	1,309	100.00 %	0.64 %
Spring Lake	21	11,660	217,791	11,660	100.00 %	5.35 %

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Spruce Pine	47	2,194	209,958	2,194	100.00 %	1.04 %
Staley	25	397	217,130	397	100.00 %	0.18 %
Stallings	35	16,112	216,849	15,728	97.62 %	7.25 %
	40	16,112	218,745	373	2.32 %	0.17 %
	42	16,112	217,131	11	0.07 %	0.01 %
Stanfield	33	1,585	209,379	1,585	100.00 %	0.76 %
Stanley	43	3,963	211,229	3,963	100.00 %	1.88 %
Stantonsburg	4	762	216,568	762	100.00 %	0.35 %
Star	29	806	218,867	806	100.00 %	0.37 %
Statesville	37	28,419	215,363	28,419	100.00 %	13.20 %
Stedman	19	1,277	216,664	1,277	100.00 %	0.59 %
Stem	18	960	198,478	960	100.00 %	0.48 %
Stokesdale	26	5,924	216,942	5,924	100.00 %	2.73 %
Stoneville	26	1,308	216,942	1,308	100.00 %	0.60 %
Stonewall	1	214	199,750	214	100.00 %	0.11 %
Stovall	18	324	198,478	324	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sugar Mountain	47	371	209,958	371	100.00 %	0.18 %
Summerfield	26	10,951	216,942	10,951	100.00 %	5.05 %
Sunset Beach	8	4,175	204,381	4,175	100.00 %	2.04 %
Surf City	6	3,867	204,576	334	8.64 %	0.16 %
	9	3,867	202,791	3,533	91.36 %	1.74 %
Swansboro	6	3,744	204,576	3,744	100.00 %	1.83 %
Sweptonville	25	2,445	217,130	2,445	100.00 %	1.13 %
Sylva	50	2,578	213,909	2,578	100.00 %	1.21 %
Tabor City	8	3,781	204,381	3,781	100.00 %	1.85 %
Tarboro	5	10,721	219,143	10,721	100.00 %	4.89 %
Tar Heel	9	90	202,791	90	100.00 %	0.04 %
Taylorsville	36	2,320	210,986	2,320	100.00 %	1.10 %
Taylortown	21	634	217,791	634	100.00 %	0.29 %
Teachey	9	448	202,791	448	100.00 %	0.22 %
Thomasville	29	27,183	218,867	521	1.92 %	0.24 %
	30	27,183	211,642	26,662	98.08 %	12.60 %
Tobaccoville	31	2,578	216,024	2,578	100.00 %	1.19 %
Topsail Beach	9	461	202,791	461	100.00 %	0.23 %
Trenton	9	238	202,791	238	100.00 %	0.12 %
Trent Woods	2	4,074	200,494	4,074	100.00 %	2.03 %
Trinity	29	7,006	218,867	7,006	100.00 %	3.20 %
Troutman	37	3,698	215,363	3,698	100.00 %	1.72 %
Troy	29	2,850	218,867	2,850	100.00 %	1.30 %
Tryon	48	1,562	200,053	1,562	100.00 %	0.78 %
Turkey	9	213	202,791	213	100.00 %	0.11 %
Unionville	35	6,643	216,849	6,643	100.00 %	3.06 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Valdese	46	4,689	200,646	4,689	100.00 %	2.34 %
Vanceboro	2	869	200,494	869	100.00 %	0.43 %
Vandemere	1	246	199,750	246	100.00 %	0.12 %
Varnamtown	8	525	204,381	525	100.00 %	0.26 %
Vass	21	952	217,791	952	100.00 %	0.44 %
Waco	44	310	203,043	310	100.00 %	0.15 %
Wade	19	638	216,664	638	100.00 %	0.29 %
Wadesboro	29	5,008	218,867	5,008	100.00 %	2.29 %
Wagram	24	615	202,786	615	100.00 %	0.30 %
Wake Forest	11	47,601	206,121	1,504	3.16 %	0.73 %
	18	47,601	198,478	46,097	96.84 %	23.23 %
Walkertown	31	5,692	216,024	5,692	100.00 %	2.63 %
Wallace	9	3,413	202,791	3,413	100.00 %	1.68 %
Wallburg	30	3,051	211,642	3,051	100.00 %	1.44 %
Walnut Cove	31	1,586	216,024	1,586	100.00 %	0.73 %
Walnut Creek	4	1,084	216,568	1,084	100.00 %	0.50 %
Walstonburg	4	193	216,568	193	100.00 %	0.09 %
Warrenton	3	851	198,430	851	100.00 %	0.43 %
Warsaw	9	2,733	202,791	2,733	100.00 %	1.35 %
Washington	2	9,875	200,494	9,875	100.00 %	4.93 %
Washington Park	2	392	200,494	392	100.00 %	0.20 %
Watha	9	181	202,791	181	100.00 %	0.09 %
Waxhaw	29	20,534	218,867	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	35	20,534	216,849	20,534	100.00 %	9.47 %
Waynesville	50	10,140	213,909	10,140	100.00 %	4.74 %
Weaverville	46	4,567	200,646	3,751	82.13 %	1.87 %
	49	4,567	200,954	816	17.87 %	0.41 %
Webster	50	372	213,909	372	100.00 %	0.17 %
Weddington	35	13,181	216,849	13,176	99.96 %	6.08 %
	42	13,181	217,131	5	0.04 %	0.00 %
Weldon	3	1,444	198,430	1,444	100.00 %	0.73 %
Wendell	14	9,793	198,391	9,793	100.00 %	4.94 %
Wentworth	26	2,662	216,942	2,662	100.00 %	1.23 %
Wesley Chapel	35	8,681	216,849	8,681	100.00 %	4.00 %
West Jefferson	47	1,279	209,958	1,279	100.00 %	0.61 %
Whispering Pines	21	4,987	217,791	4,987	100.00 %	2.29 %
Whitakers	5	627	219,143	290	46.25 %	0.13 %
	11	627	206,121	337	53.75 %	0.16 %
White Lake	9	843	202,791	843	100.00 %	0.42 %
Whiteville	8	4,766	204,381	4,766	100.00 %	2.33 %
Whitsett	26	584	216,942	584	100.00 %	0.27 %
Wilkesboro	36	3,687	210,986	3,687	100.00 %	1.75 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Williamston	3	5,248	198,430	5,248	100.00 %	2.64 %
Wilmington	7	115,451	208,637	98,467	85.29 %	47.20 %
	8	115,451	204,381	16,984	14.71 %	8.31 %
Wilson	4	47,851	216,568	47,851	100.00 %	22.10 %
Wilson's Mills	10	2,534	215,999	2,534	100.00 %	1.17 %
Windsor	3	3,582	198,430	3,582	100.00 %	1.81 %
Winfall	1	555	199,750	555	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wingate	29	4,055	218,867	4,055	100.00 %	1.85 %
Winston-Salem	31	249,545	216,024	90,274	36.18 %	41.79 %
	32	249,545	211,086	159,271	63.82 %	75.45 %
Winterville	5	10,462	219,143	10,462	100.00 %	4.77 %
Winton	3	629	198,430	629	100.00 %	0.32 %
Woodfin	49	7,936	200,954	7,936	100.00 %	3.95 %
Woodland	3	557	198,430	557	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wrightsville Beach	7	2,473	208,637	2,473	100.00 %	1.19 %
Yadkinville	36	2,995	210,986	2,995	100.00 %	1.42 %
Yanceyville	23	1,937	210,529	1,937	100.00 %	0.92 %
Youngsville	11	2,016	206,121	2,016	100.00 %	0.98 %
Zebulon	10	6,903	215,999	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	14	6,903	198,391	6,903	100.00 %	3.48 %
Assigned Geography Total:				6,017,605		

Report display: all municipalities

Total Municipalities Statewide: 553

Fully Assigned Municipalities: 553

Partially Assigned Municipalities: 0

Fully Unassigned Municipalities: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split Municipalities: 65

Splits Involving Population: 52

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Aberdeen	21	8,516	217,791	8,516	100.00 %	3.91 %
Ahoskie	3	4,891	198,430	4,891	100.00 %	2.46 %
Alamance	25	988	217,130	988	100.00 %	0.46 %
Albemarle	33	16,432	209,379	16,432	100.00 %	7.85 %
Alliance	1	733	199,750	733	100.00 %	0.37 %
Andrews	50	1,667	213,909	1,667	100.00 %	0.78 %
Angier (Harnett)	12	4,709	200,794	4,709	100.00 %	2.35 %
Angier (Wake)	17	556	198,370	556	100.00 %	0.28 %
Ansonville	29	440	218,867	440	100.00 %	0.20 %
Apex	16	58,780	198,364	16,256	27.66 %	8.20 %
	17	58,780	198,370	42,524	72.34 %	21.44 %
Arapahoe	1	416	199,750	416	100.00 %	0.21 %
Archdale (Guilford)	27	380	203,438	380	100.00 %	0.19 %
Archdale (Randolph)	25	11,527	217,130	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	29	11,527	218,867	11,527	100.00 %	5.27 %
Archer Lodge	10	4,797	215,999	4,797	100.00 %	2.22 %
Asheboro	25	27,156	217,130	1,217	4.48 %	0.56 %
	29	27,156	218,867	25,939	95.52 %	11.85 %
Asheville	46	94,589	200,646	1,387	1.47 %	0.69 %
	49	94,589	200,954	93,202	98.53 %	46.38 %
Askewville	3	184	198,430	184	100.00 %	0.09 %
Atkinson	9	296	202,791	296	100.00 %	0.15 %
Atlantic Beach	1	1,364	199,750	1,364	100.00 %	0.68 %
Aulander	3	763	198,430	763	100.00 %	0.38 %
Aurora	2	455	200,494	455	100.00 %	0.23 %
Autoryville	9	167	202,791	167	100.00 %	0.08 %
Ayden	5	4,977	219,143	4,977	100.00 %	2.27 %
Badin	33	2,024	209,379	2,024	100.00 %	0.97 %
Bailey	11	568	206,121	568	100.00 %	0.28 %
Bakersville	47	450	209,958	450	100.00 %	0.21 %
Bald Head Island	8	268	204,381	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Banner Elk	47	1,049	209,958	1,049	100.00 %	0.50 %
Bath	2	245	200,494	245	100.00 %	0.12 %
Bayboro	1	1,161	199,750	1,161	100.00 %	0.58 %
Bear Grass	3	89	198,430	89	100.00 %	0.04 %
Beaufort	1	4,464	199,750	4,464	100.00 %	2.23 %
Beech Mountain (Avery)	47	62	209,958	62	100.00 %	0.03 %
Beech Mountain (Watauga)	47	613	209,958	613	100.00 %	0.29 %
Belhaven	2	1,410	200,494	1,410	100.00 %	0.70 %
Belmont	43	15,010	211,229	15,010	100.00 %	7.11 %
Belville	8	2,406	204,381	2,406	100.00 %	1.18 %

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Belwood	44	857	203,043	857	100.00 %	0.42 %
Benson (Harnett)	12	0	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Benson (Johnston)	10	3,967	215,999	3,967	100.00 %	1.84 %
Bermuda Run	30	3,120	211,642	3,120	100.00 %	1.47 %
Bessemer City	43	5,428	211,229	5,428	100.00 %	2.57 %
	44	5,428	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bethania	31	344	216,024	344	100.00 %	0.16 %
	32	344	211,086	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bethel	5	1,373	219,143	1,373	100.00 %	0.63 %
Beulaville	9	1,116	202,791	1,116	100.00 %	0.55 %
Biltmore Forest	49	1,409	200,954	1,409	100.00 %	0.70 %
Biscoe	29	1,848	218,867	1,848	100.00 %	0.84 %
Black Creek	4	692	216,568	692	100.00 %	0.32 %
Black Mountain	46	8,426	200,646	8,426	100.00 %	4.20 %
Bladenboro	9	1,648	202,791	1,648	100.00 %	0.81 %
Blowing Rock (Caldwell)	47	91	209,958	91	100.00 %	0.04 %
Blowing Rock (Watauga)	47	1,285	209,958	1,285	100.00 %	0.61 %
Boardman	8	166	204,381	166	100.00 %	0.08 %
Bogue	1	695	199,750	695	100.00 %	0.35 %
Boiling Spring Lakes	8	5,943	204,381	5,943	100.00 %	2.91 %
Boiling Springs	44	4,615	203,043	4,615	100.00 %	2.27 %
Bolivia	8	149	204,381	149	100.00 %	0.07 %
Bolton	8	519	204,381	519	100.00 %	0.25 %
Boone	47	19,092	209,958	19,092	100.00 %	9.09 %
Boonville	36	1,185	210,986	1,185	100.00 %	0.56 %
Bostic	48	355	200,053	355	100.00 %	0.18 %
Brevard	50	7,744	213,909	7,744	100.00 %	3.62 %
Bridgeton	2	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Broadway (Harnett)	12	0	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Broadway (Lee)	12	1,267	200,794	1,267	100.00 %	0.63 %
Brookford	45	442	218,526	442	100.00 %	0.20 %
Brunswick	8	973	204,381	973	100.00 %	0.48 %
Bryson City	50	1,558	213,909	1,558	100.00 %	0.73 %
Bunn	11	327	206,121	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Burgaw	9	3,088	202,791	3,088	100.00 %	1.52 %
Burlington (Alamance)	25	55,481	217,130	55,481	100.00 %	25.55 %
Burlington (Guilford)	26	1,822	216,942	1,822	100.00 %	0.84 %
Burnsville	47	1,614	209,958	1,614	100.00 %	0.77 %
Butner	18	8,397	198,478	8,397	100.00 %	4.23 %
Cajah's Mountain	45	2,722	218,526	2,722	100.00 %	1.25 %
Calabash	8	2,011	204,381	2,011	100.00 %	0.98 %

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Calypso	9	327	202,791	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Cameron	21	244	217,791	244	100.00 %	0.11 %
Candor (Montgomery)	29	813	218,867	813	100.00 %	0.37 %
Candor (Moore)	21	0	217,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Canton	47	4,422	209,958	4,422	100.00 %	2.11 %
Cape Carteret	1	2,224	199,750	2,224	100.00 %	1.11 %
Carolina Beach	7	6,564	208,637	6,564	100.00 %	3.15 %
Carolina Shores	8	4,588	204,381	4,588	100.00 %	2.24 %
Carrboro	23	21,295	210,529	21,295	100.00 %	10.11 %
Carthage	21	2,775	217,791	2,775	100.00 %	1.27 %
Cary (Chatham)	20	3,709	199,272	3,709	100.00 %	1.86 %
Cary (Wake)	15	171,012	198,416	33,852	19.80 %	17.06 %
	16	171,012	198,364	128,099	74.91 %	64.58 %
	17	171,012	198,370	9,061	5.30 %	4.57 %
Casar	44	305	203,043	305	100.00 %	0.15 %
Castalia	11	264	206,121	264	100.00 %	0.13 %
Caswell Beach	8	395	204,381	395	100.00 %	0.19 %
Catawba	45	702	218,526	702	100.00 %	0.32 %
Cedar Point	1	1,764	199,750	1,764	100.00 %	0.88 %
Cedar Rock	45	301	218,526	301	100.00 %	0.14 %
Cerro Gordo	8	131	204,381	131	100.00 %	0.06 %
Chadbourn	8	1,574	204,381	1,574	100.00 %	0.77 %
Chapel Hill (Durham)	20	2,906	199,272	2,906	100.00 %	1.46 %
Chapel Hill (Orange)	23	59,054	210,529	59,054	100.00 %	28.05 %
Charlotte	38	874,579	216,250	211,216	24.15 %	97.67 %
	39	874,579	217,710	197,245	22.55 %	90.60 %
	40	874,579	218,745	165,897	18.97 %	75.84 %
	41	874,579	216,976	114,003	13.04 %	52.54 %
	42	874,579	217,131	186,218	21.29 %	85.76 %
Cherryville	44	6,078	203,043	6,078	100.00 %	2.99 %
Chimney Rock Village	48	140	200,053	140	100.00 %	0.07 %
China Grove	33	4,434	209,379	4,434	100.00 %	2.12 %
Chocowinity	2	722	200,494	722	100.00 %	0.36 %
Claremont	45	1,692	218,526	1,692	100.00 %	0.77 %
Clarkton	9	614	202,791	614	100.00 %	0.30 %
Clayton (Johnston)	10	26,307	215,999	26,307	100.00 %	12.18 %
Clayton (Wake)	14	0	198,391	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Clemmons	32	21,163	211,086	21,163	100.00 %	10.03 %
Cleveland	33	846	209,379	846	100.00 %	0.40 %
Clinton	9	8,383	202,791	8,383	100.00 %	4.13 %
Clyde	47	1,368	209,958	1,368	100.00 %	0.65 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Coats	12	2,155	200,794	2,155	100.00 %	1.07 %
Cofield	3	267	198,430	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Colerain	3	217	198,430	217	100.00 %	0.11 %
Columbia	3	610	198,430	610	100.00 %	0.31 %
Columbus	48	1,060	200,053	1,060	100.00 %	0.53 %
Como	3	67	198,430	67	100.00 %	0.03 %
Concord	34	105,240	217,563	105,240	100.00 %	48.37 %
Conetoe	5	198	219,143	198	100.00 %	0.09 %
Connelly Springs	46	1,529	200,646	1,529	100.00 %	0.76 %
Conover	45	8,421	218,526	8,421	100.00 %	3.85 %
Conway	3	752	198,430	752	100.00 %	0.38 %
Cooleemee	30	940	211,642	940	100.00 %	0.44 %
Cornelius	37	31,412	215,363	18,991	60.46 %	8.82 %
	41	31,412	216,976	12,421	39.54 %	5.72 %
Cove City	2	378	200,494	378	100.00 %	0.19 %
Cramerton	43	5,296	211,229	5,296	100.00 %	2.51 %
Creedmoor	18	4,866	198,478	4,866	100.00 %	2.45 %
Creswell	1	207	199,750	207	100.00 %	0.10 %
Crossnore	47	143	209,958	143	100.00 %	0.07 %
Dallas	43	5,927	211,229	5,927	100.00 %	2.81 %
Danbury	31	189	216,024	189	100.00 %	0.09 %
Davidson (Iredell)	37	378	215,363	378	100.00 %	0.18 %
Davidson (Mecklenburg)	41	14,728	216,976	14,728	100.00 %	6.79 %
Dellview	44	6	203,043	6	100.00 %	0.00 %
Denton	30	1,494	211,642	1,494	100.00 %	0.71 %
Dillsboro	50	213	213,909	213	100.00 %	0.10 %
Dobbins Heights	29	687	218,867	687	100.00 %	0.31 %
Dobson	36	1,462	210,986	1,462	100.00 %	0.69 %
Dortches	11	1,082	206,121	1,082	100.00 %	0.52 %
Dover	2	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Drexel	46	1,760	200,646	1,760	100.00 %	0.88 %
Dublin	9	267	202,791	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Duck	1	742	199,750	742	100.00 %	0.37 %
Dunn	12	8,446	200,794	8,446	100.00 %	4.21 %
Durham (Durham)	20	283,093	199,272	115,188	40.69 %	57.80 %
	22	283,093	201,846	167,905	59.31 %	83.18 %
Durham (Orange)	23	144	210,529	144	100.00 %	0.07 %
Durham (Wake)	13	269	198,383	269	100.00 %	0.14 %
	16	269	198,364	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Earl	44	198	203,043	198	100.00 %	0.10 %
East Arcadia	9	418	202,791	418	100.00 %	0.21 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
East Bend	36	634	210,986	634	100.00 %	0.30 %
East Laurinburg	24	234	202,786	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
East Spencer	33	1,567	209,379	1,567	100.00 %	0.75 %
Eastover	19	3,656	216,664	3,656	100.00 %	1.69 %
Eden	26	15,421	216,942	15,421	100.00 %	7.11 %
Edenton	1	4,460	199,750	4,460	100.00 %	2.23 %
Elizabeth City (Camden)	3	38	198,430	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Elizabeth City (Pasquotank)	1	18,593	199,750	18,593	100.00 %	9.31 %
Elizabethtown	9	3,296	202,791	3,296	100.00 %	1.63 %
Elk Park	47	542	209,958	542	100.00 %	0.26 %
Elkin (Surry)	36	4,049	210,986	4,049	100.00 %	1.92 %
Elkin (Wilkes)	36	73	210,986	73	100.00 %	0.03 %
Ellenboro	48	723	200,053	723	100.00 %	0.36 %
Ellerbe	29	864	218,867	864	100.00 %	0.39 %
Elm City (Nash)	11	0	206,121	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Elm City (Wilson)	4	1,218	216,568	1,218	100.00 %	0.56 %
Elon	25	11,336	217,130	11,336	100.00 %	5.22 %
Emerald Isle	1	3,847	199,750	3,847	100.00 %	1.93 %
Enfield	3	1,865	198,430	1,865	100.00 %	0.94 %
Erwin	12	4,542	200,794	4,542	100.00 %	2.26 %
Eureka	4	214	216,568	214	100.00 %	0.10 %
Everetts	3	150	198,430	150	100.00 %	0.08 %
Fair Bluff	8	709	204,381	709	100.00 %	0.35 %
Fairmont	24	2,191	202,786	2,191	100.00 %	1.08 %
Fairview	35	3,456	216,849	3,456	100.00 %	1.59 %
Faison (Duplin)	9	784	202,791	784	100.00 %	0.39 %
Faison (Sampson)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Faith	33	819	209,379	819	100.00 %	0.39 %
Falcon (Cumberland)	19	324	216,664	324	100.00 %	0.15 %
Falcon (Sampson)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Falkland	5	47	219,143	47	100.00 %	0.02 %
Fallston	44	627	203,043	627	100.00 %	0.31 %
Farmville	5	4,461	219,143	4,461	100.00 %	2.04 %
Fayetteville	19	208,501	216,664	110,573	53.03 %	51.03 %
	21	208,501	217,791	97,928	46.97 %	44.96 %
Flat Rock	48	3,486	200,053	3,486	100.00 %	1.74 %
Fletcher	48	7,987	200,053	7,987	100.00 %	3.99 %
Fontana Dam	50	13	213,909	13	100.00 %	0.01 %
Forest City	48	7,377	200,053	7,377	100.00 %	3.69 %
Forest Hills	50	303	213,909	303	100.00 %	0.14 %
Fountain	5	385	219,143	385	100.00 %	0.18 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Four Oaks	10	2,158	215,999	2,158	100.00 %	1.00 %
Foxfire	21	1,288	217,791	1,288	100.00 %	0.59 %
Franklin	50	4,175	213,909	4,175	100.00 %	1.95 %
Franklinton	11	2,456	206,121	2,456	100.00 %	1.19 %
Franklinville	25	1,197	217,130	1,197	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fremont	4	1,196	216,568	1,196	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fuquay-Varina (Harnett)	12	0	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Fuquay-Varina (Wake)	15	34,152	198,416	30	0.09 %	0.02 %
	17	34,152	198,370	34,122	99.91 %	17.20 %
Gamewell	45	3,702	218,526	65	1.76 %	0.03 %
	47	3,702	209,958	3,637	98.24 %	1.73 %
Garland	9	595	202,791	595	100.00 %	0.29 %
Garner	14	31,159	198,391	24,703	79.28 %	12.45 %
	15	31,159	198,416	2,754	8.84 %	1.39 %
	17	31,159	198,370	3,702	11.88 %	1.87 %
Garysburg	3	904	198,430	904	100.00 %	0.46 %
Gaston	3	1,008	198,430	1,008	100.00 %	0.51 %
Gastonia	43	80,411	211,229	80,411	100.00 %	38.07 %
	44	80,411	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Gatesville	3	267	198,430	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Gibson	24	449	202,786	449	100.00 %	0.22 %
Gibsonville (Alamance)	25	4,278	217,130	4,278	100.00 %	1.97 %
Gibsonville (Guilford)	26	4,642	216,942	4,642	100.00 %	2.14 %
Glen Alpine	46	1,529	200,646	1,529	100.00 %	0.76 %
Godwin	19	128	216,664	128	100.00 %	0.06 %
Goldsboro	4	33,657	216,568	33,657	100.00 %	15.54 %
Goldston	20	234	199,272	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
Graham	25	17,157	217,130	17,157	100.00 %	7.90 %
Grandfather Village	47	95	209,958	95	100.00 %	0.05 %
Granite Falls	45	4,965	218,526	4,965	100.00 %	2.27 %
Granite Quarry	33	2,984	209,379	2,984	100.00 %	1.43 %
Grantsboro	1	692	199,750	692	100.00 %	0.35 %
Green Level	25	3,152	217,130	3,152	100.00 %	1.45 %
Greenevers	9	567	202,791	567	100.00 %	0.28 %
Greensboro	26	299,035	216,942	32,095	10.73 %	14.79 %
	27	299,035	203,438	55,112	18.43 %	27.09 %
	28	299,035	212,015	211,828	70.84 %	99.91 %
Greenville	5	87,521	219,143	87,521	100.00 %	39.94 %
Grifton (Lenoir)	2	147	200,494	147	100.00 %	0.07 %
Grifton (Pitt)	5	2,301	219,143	2,301	100.00 %	1.05 %
Grimesland	5	386	219,143	386	100.00 %	0.18 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Grover	44	802	203,043	802	100.00 %	0.39 %
Halifax	3	170	198,430	170	100.00 %	0.09 %
Hamilton	3	306	198,430	306	100.00 %	0.15 %
Hamlet	29	6,025	218,867	6,025	100.00 %	2.75 %
Harmony	37	543	215,363	543	100.00 %	0.25 %
Harrells (Duplin)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Harrells (Sampson)	9	160	202,791	160	100.00 %	0.08 %
Harrellsville	3	85	198,430	85	100.00 %	0.04 %
Harrisburg	34	18,967	217,563	18,967	100.00 %	8.72 %
Hassell	3	49	198,430	49	100.00 %	0.02 %
Havelock	2	16,621	200,494	16,621	100.00 %	8.29 %
Haw River	25	2,252	217,130	2,252	100.00 %	1.04 %
Hayesville	50	461	213,909	461	100.00 %	0.22 %
Hemby Bridge	35	1,614	216,849	1,614	100.00 %	0.74 %
Henderson	11	15,060	206,121	15,060	100.00 %	7.31 %
Hendersonville	48	15,137	200,053	15,137	100.00 %	7.57 %
Hertford	1	1,934	199,750	1,934	100.00 %	0.97 %
Hickory (Burke)	46	79	200,646	79	100.00 %	0.04 %
Hickory (Caldwell)	45	32	218,526	32	100.00 %	0.01 %
Hickory (Catawba)	45	43,379	218,526	43,379	100.00 %	19.85 %
High Point (Davidson)	30	6,646	211,642	6,646	100.00 %	3.14 %
High Point (Forsyth)	31	84	216,024	84	100.00 %	0.04 %
High Point (Guilford)	27	107,321	203,438	107,321	100.00 %	52.75 %
High Point (Randolph)	29	8	218,867	8	100.00 %	0.00 %
High Shoals	43	595	211,229	595	100.00 %	0.28 %
	44	595	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Highlands (Jackson)	50	12	213,909	12	100.00 %	0.01 %
Highlands (Macon)	50	1,060	213,909	1,060	100.00 %	0.50 %
Hildebran	46	1,679	200,646	1,679	100.00 %	0.84 %
Hillsborough	23	9,660	210,529	9,660	100.00 %	4.59 %
Hobgood	3	268	198,430	268	100.00 %	0.14 %
Hoffman	29	418	218,867	418	100.00 %	0.19 %
Holden Beach	8	921	204,381	921	100.00 %	0.45 %
Holly Ridge	6	4,171	204,576	4,171	100.00 %	2.04 %
Holly Springs	17	41,239	198,370	41,239	100.00 %	20.79 %
Hookerton	4	413	216,568	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
Hope Mills	19	17,808	216,664	17,808	100.00 %	8.22 %
Hot Springs	47	520	209,958	520	100.00 %	0.25 %
Hudson	45	3,780	218,526	3,780	100.00 %	1.73 %
Huntersville	37	61,376	215,363	9,667	15.75 %	4.49 %
	41	61,376	216,976	51,709	84.25 %	23.83 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Indian Beach	1	223	199,750	223	100.00 %	0.11 %
Indian Trail	35	39,997	216,849	39,997	100.00 %	18.44 %
Jackson	3	430	198,430	430	100.00 %	0.22 %
Jacksonville	6	72,723	204,576	72,723	100.00 %	35.55 %
Jamestown	27	3,668	203,438	3,668	100.00 %	1.80 %
Jamesville	3	424	198,430	424	100.00 %	0.21 %
Jefferson	47	1,622	209,958	1,622	100.00 %	0.77 %
Jonesville	36	2,308	210,986	2,308	100.00 %	1.09 %
Kannapolis (Cabarrus)	34	42,846	217,563	42,846	100.00 %	19.69 %
Kannapolis (Rowan)	33	10,268	209,379	10,268	100.00 %	4.90 %
Kelford	3	203	198,430	203	100.00 %	0.10 %
Kenansville	9	770	202,791	770	100.00 %	0.38 %
Kenly (Johnston)	10	1,293	215,999	1,293	100.00 %	0.60 %
Kenly (Wilson)	4	198	216,568	198	100.00 %	0.09 %
Kernersville (Forsyth)	31	25,947	216,024	25,947	100.00 %	12.01 %
Kernersville (Guilford)	27	502	203,438	502	100.00 %	0.25 %
Kill Devil Hills	1	7,656	199,750	7,656	100.00 %	3.83 %
King (Forsyth)	31	591	216,024	591	100.00 %	0.27 %
King (Stokes)	31	6,606	216,024	6,606	100.00 %	3.06 %
Kings Mountain (Cleveland)	44	10,032	203,043	10,032	100.00 %	4.94 %
Kings Mountain (Gaston)	43	1,110	211,229	1,110	100.00 %	0.53 %
Kingstown	44	656	203,043	656	100.00 %	0.32 %
Kinston	2	19,900	200,494	19,900	100.00 %	9.93 %
Kittrell	11	132	206,121	132	100.00 %	0.06 %
Kitty Hawk	1	3,689	199,750	3,689	100.00 %	1.85 %
Knightdale	14	19,435	198,391	19,435	100.00 %	9.80 %
Kure Beach	7	2,191	208,637	2,191	100.00 %	1.05 %
La Grange	2	2,595	200,494	2,595	100.00 %	1.29 %
Lake Lure	48	1,365	200,053	1,365	100.00 %	0.68 %
Lake Park	35	3,269	216,849	3,269	100.00 %	1.51 %
Lake Santeetlah	50	38	213,909	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Lake Waccamaw	8	1,296	204,381	1,296	100.00 %	0.63 %
Landis	33	3,690	209,379	3,690	100.00 %	1.76 %
Lansing	47	126	209,958	126	100.00 %	0.06 %
Lasker	3	64	198,430	64	100.00 %	0.03 %
Lattimore	44	406	203,043	406	100.00 %	0.20 %
Laurel Park	48	2,250	200,053	2,250	100.00 %	1.12 %
Laurinburg	24	14,978	202,786	14,978	100.00 %	7.39 %
Lawndale	44	570	203,043	570	100.00 %	0.28 %
Leggett	5	37	219,143	37	100.00 %	0.02 %
Leland	8	22,908	204,381	22,908	100.00 %	11.21 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Lenoir	45	18,352	218,526	13,830	75.36 %	6.33 %
	47	18,352	209,958	4,522	24.64 %	2.15 %
Lewiston Woodville	3	426	198,430	426	100.00 %	0.21 %
Lewisville	32	13,381	211,086	13,381	100.00 %	6.34 %
Lexington	30	19,632	211,642	19,632	100.00 %	9.28 %
Liberty	25	2,655	217,130	2,655	100.00 %	1.22 %
Lilesville	29	395	218,867	395	100.00 %	0.18 %
Lillington	12	4,735	200,794	4,735	100.00 %	2.36 %
Lincolnton	44	11,091	203,043	11,091	100.00 %	5.46 %
Linden	19	136	216,664	136	100.00 %	0.06 %
Littleton	3	559	198,430	559	100.00 %	0.28 %
Locust (Cabarrus)	34	541	217,563	423	78.19 %	0.19 %
	35	541	216,849	118	21.81 %	0.05 %
Locust (Stanly)	33	3,996	209,379	3,996	100.00 %	1.91 %
Long View (Burke)	46	735	200,646	735	100.00 %	0.37 %
Long View (Catawba)	45	4,353	218,526	4,353	100.00 %	1.99 %
Louisburg	11	3,064	206,121	3,064	100.00 %	1.49 %
Love Valley	37	154	215,363	154	100.00 %	0.07 %
Lowell	43	3,654	211,229	3,654	100.00 %	1.73 %
Lucama	4	1,036	216,568	1,036	100.00 %	0.48 %
Lumber Bridge	24	82	202,786	82	100.00 %	0.04 %
Lumberton	24	19,025	202,786	19,025	100.00 %	9.38 %
Macclesfield	5	413	219,143	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
Macon	3	110	198,430	110	100.00 %	0.06 %
Madison	26	2,129	216,942	2,129	100.00 %	0.98 %
Maggie Valley	50	1,687	213,909	1,687	100.00 %	0.79 %
Magnolia	9	831	202,791	831	100.00 %	0.41 %
Maiden (Catawba)	45	3,736	218,526	3,736	100.00 %	1.71 %
Maiden (Lincoln)	44	0	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Manteo	1	1,600	199,750	1,600	100.00 %	0.80 %
Marietta	24	111	202,786	111	100.00 %	0.05 %
Marion	46	7,717	200,646	7,717	100.00 %	3.85 %
Mars Hill	47	2,007	209,958	2,007	100.00 %	0.96 %
Marshall	47	777	209,958	777	100.00 %	0.37 %
Marshville	29	2,522	218,867	2,522	100.00 %	1.15 %
Marvin	35	6,358	216,849	6,358	100.00 %	2.93 %
Matthews	40	29,435	218,745	10,695	36.33 %	4.89 %
	42	29,435	217,131	18,740	63.67 %	8.63 %
Maxton (Robeson)	24	1,902	202,786	1,902	100.00 %	0.94 %
Maxton (Scotland)	24	208	202,786	208	100.00 %	0.10 %
Mayodan	26	2,418	216,942	2,418	100.00 %	1.11 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Maysville	9	818	202,791	818	100.00 %	0.40 %
McAdenville	43	890	211,229	890	100.00 %	0.42 %
McDonald	24	94	202,786	94	100.00 %	0.05 %
McFarlan	29	94	218,867	94	100.00 %	0.04 %
Mebane (Alamance)	25	14,626	217,130	14,626	100.00 %	6.74 %
Mebane (Orange)	23	3,171	210,529	3,171	100.00 %	1.51 %
Mesic	1	144	199,750	144	100.00 %	0.07 %
Micro	10	458	215,999	458	100.00 %	0.21 %
Middleburg	11	101	206,121	101	100.00 %	0.05 %
Middlesex	11	912	206,121	912	100.00 %	0.44 %
Midland (Cabarrus)	34	4,684	217,563	4	0.09 %	0.00 %
	35	4,684	216,849	4,680	99.91 %	2.16 %
Midland (Mecklenburg)	40	0	218,745	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Midway	30	4,742	211,642	4,742	100.00 %	2.24 %
Mills River	48	7,078	200,053	7,078	100.00 %	3.54 %
Milton	23	155	210,529	155	100.00 %	0.07 %
Mineral Springs	35	3,159	216,849	3,159	100.00 %	1.46 %
Minnesott Beach	1	530	199,750	530	100.00 %	0.27 %
Mint Hill (Mecklenburg)	40	26,444	218,745	26,444	100.00 %	12.09 %
Mint Hill (Union)	35	6	216,849	6	100.00 %	0.00 %
Misenheimer	33	650	209,379	650	100.00 %	0.31 %
Mocksville	30	5,900	211,642	5,900	100.00 %	2.79 %
Momeyer	11	277	206,121	277	100.00 %	0.13 %
Monroe	29	34,562	218,867	225	0.65 %	0.10 %
	35	34,562	216,849	34,337	99.35 %	15.83 %
Montreat	46	901	200,646	901	100.00 %	0.45 %
Moorestboro	44	293	203,043	293	100.00 %	0.14 %
Moorestville	37	50,193	215,363	50,193	100.00 %	23.31 %
Morehead City	1	9,556	199,750	9,556	100.00 %	4.78 %
Morganton	46	17,474	200,646	17,474	100.00 %	8.71 %
Morrisville (Durham)	20	207	199,272	207	100.00 %	0.10 %
Morrisville (Wake)	16	29,423	198,364	29,423	100.00 %	14.83 %
Morven	29	329	218,867	329	100.00 %	0.15 %
Mount Airy	36	10,676	210,986	10,676	100.00 %	5.06 %
Mount Gilead	29	1,171	218,867	1,171	100.00 %	0.54 %
Mount Holly	43	17,703	211,229	17,703	100.00 %	8.38 %
Mount Olive (Duplin)	9	5	202,791	5	100.00 %	0.00 %
Mount Olive (Wayne)	4	4,193	216,568	4,193	100.00 %	1.94 %
Mount Pleasant	34	1,671	217,563	1,671	100.00 %	0.77 %
Murfreesboro	3	2,619	198,430	2,619	100.00 %	1.32 %
Murphy	50	1,608	213,909	1,608	100.00 %	0.75 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Nags Head	1	3,168	199,750	3,168	100.00 %	1.59 %
Nashville	11	5,632	206,121	5,632	100.00 %	2.73 %
Navassa	8	1,367	204,381	1,367	100.00 %	0.67 %
New Bern	2	31,291	200,494	31,291	100.00 %	15.61 %
New London	33	607	209,379	607	100.00 %	0.29 %
Newland	47	715	209,958	715	100.00 %	0.34 %
Newport	1	4,364	199,750	4,364	100.00 %	2.18 %
Newton	45	13,148	218,526	13,148	100.00 %	6.02 %
Newton Grove	9	585	202,791	585	100.00 %	0.29 %
Norlina	3	920	198,430	920	100.00 %	0.46 %
Norman	29	100	218,867	100	100.00 %	0.05 %
North Topsail Beach	6	1,005	204,576	1,005	100.00 %	0.49 %
North Wilkesboro	36	4,382	210,986	4,382	100.00 %	2.08 %
Northwest	8	703	204,381	703	100.00 %	0.34 %
Norwood	33	2,367	209,379	2,367	100.00 %	1.13 %
Oak City	3	266	198,430	266	100.00 %	0.13 %
Oak Island	8	8,396	204,381	8,396	100.00 %	4.11 %
Oak Ridge	26	7,474	216,942	7,471	99.96 %	3.44 %
	27	7,474	203,438	3	0.04 %	0.00 %
Oakboro	33	2,128	209,379	2,128	100.00 %	1.02 %
Ocean Isle Beach	8	867	204,381	867	100.00 %	0.42 %
Old Fort	46	811	200,646	811	100.00 %	0.40 %
Oriental	1	880	199,750	880	100.00 %	0.44 %
Orrum	24	59	202,786	59	100.00 %	0.03 %
Ossipee	25	536	217,130	536	100.00 %	0.25 %
Oxford	18	8,628	198,478	8,628	100.00 %	4.35 %
Pantego	2	164	200,494	164	100.00 %	0.08 %
Parkton	24	504	202,786	504	100.00 %	0.25 %
Parmelee	3	243	198,430	243	100.00 %	0.12 %
Patterson Springs	44	571	203,043	571	100.00 %	0.28 %
Peachland	29	390	218,867	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Peletier	1	769	199,750	769	100.00 %	0.38 %
Pembroke	24	2,823	202,786	2,823	100.00 %	1.39 %
Pikeville	4	712	216,568	712	100.00 %	0.33 %
Pilot Mountain	36	1,440	210,986	1,440	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pine Knoll Shores	1	1,388	199,750	1,388	100.00 %	0.69 %
Pine Level	10	2,046	215,999	2,046	100.00 %	0.95 %
Pinebluff	21	1,473	217,791	1,473	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pinehurst	21	17,581	217,791	17,581	100.00 %	8.07 %
Pinetops	5	1,200	219,143	1,200	100.00 %	0.55 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Pineville	39	10,602	217,710	3,621	34.15 %	1.66 %
	42	10,602	217,131	6,981	65.85 %	3.22 %
Pink Hill	2	451	200,494	451	100.00 %	0.22 %
Pittsboro	20	4,537	199,272	4,537	100.00 %	2.28 %
Pleasant Garden	27	5,000	203,438	5,000	100.00 %	2.46 %
Plymouth	1	3,320	199,750	3,320	100.00 %	1.66 %
Polkton	29	2,250	218,867	2,250	100.00 %	1.03 %
Polkville	44	516	203,043	516	100.00 %	0.25 %
Pollocksville	9	268	202,791	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Powellsville	3	189	198,430	189	100.00 %	0.10 %
Princeton	10	1,315	215,999	1,315	100.00 %	0.61 %
Princeville	5	1,254	219,143	1,254	100.00 %	0.57 %
Proctorville	24	121	202,786	121	100.00 %	0.06 %
Raeford	24	4,559	202,786	4,559	100.00 %	2.25 %
Raleigh (Durham)	20	1,559	199,272	233	14.95 %	0.12 %
	22	1,559	201,846	1,326	85.05 %	0.66 %
Raleigh (Wake)	13	466,106	198,383	177,965	38.18 %	89.71 %
	14	466,106	198,391	87,185	18.70 %	43.95 %
	15	466,106	198,416	139,357	29.90 %	70.23 %
	16	466,106	198,364	20,224	4.34 %	10.20 %
	18	466,106	198,478	41,375	8.88 %	20.85 %
Ramseur	25	1,774	217,130	1,774	100.00 %	0.82 %
Randleman	25	4,595	217,130	4,595	100.00 %	2.12 %
Ranlo	43	4,511	211,229	4,511	100.00 %	2.14 %
Raynham	24	60	202,786	60	100.00 %	0.03 %
Red Cross	33	762	209,379	762	100.00 %	0.36 %
Red Oak	11	3,342	206,121	3,342	100.00 %	1.62 %
Red Springs (Hoke)	24	0	202,786	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Red Springs (Robeson)	24	3,087	202,786	3,087	100.00 %	1.52 %
Reidsville	26	14,583	216,942	14,583	100.00 %	6.72 %
Rennert	24	275	202,786	275	100.00 %	0.14 %
Rhodhiss (Burke)	46	639	200,646	639	100.00 %	0.32 %
Rhodhiss (Caldwell)	45	358	218,526	358	100.00 %	0.16 %
Rich Square	3	894	198,430	894	100.00 %	0.45 %
Richfield	33	582	209,379	582	100.00 %	0.28 %
Richlands	6	2,287	204,576	2,287	100.00 %	1.12 %
River Bend	2	2,902	200,494	2,902	100.00 %	1.45 %
Roanoke Rapids	3	15,229	198,430	15,229	100.00 %	7.67 %
Robbins	21	1,168	217,791	1,168	100.00 %	0.54 %
Robbinsville	50	597	213,909	597	100.00 %	0.28 %
Robersonville	3	1,269	198,430	1,269	100.00 %	0.64 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Rockingham	29	9,243	218,867	9,243	100.00 %	4.22 %
Rockwell	33	2,302	209,379	2,302	100.00 %	1.10 %
Rocky Mount (Edgecombe)	5	15,414	219,143	15,414	100.00 %	7.03 %
Rocky Mount (Nash)	11	38,927	206,121	38,927	100.00 %	18.89 %
Rolesville	18	9,475	198,478	9,475	100.00 %	4.77 %
Ronda	36	438	210,986	438	100.00 %	0.21 %
Roper	1	485	199,750	485	100.00 %	0.24 %
Rose Hill	9	1,371	202,791	1,371	100.00 %	0.68 %
Roseboro	9	1,163	202,791	1,163	100.00 %	0.57 %
Rosman	50	701	213,909	701	100.00 %	0.33 %
Rowland	24	885	202,786	885	100.00 %	0.44 %
Roxboro	23	8,134	210,529	8,134	100.00 %	3.86 %
Roxobel	3	187	198,430	187	100.00 %	0.09 %
Rural Hall	31	3,351	216,024	3,351	100.00 %	1.55 %
Ruth	48	347	200,053	347	100.00 %	0.17 %
Rutherford College (Burke)	46	1,226	200,646	1,226	100.00 %	0.61 %
Rutherford College (Caldwell)	45	0	218,526	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Rutherfordton	48	3,640	200,053	3,640	100.00 %	1.82 %
Salemburg	9	457	202,791	457	100.00 %	0.23 %
Salisbury	33	35,540	209,379	35,540	100.00 %	16.97 %
Saluda (Henderson)	48	11	200,053	11	100.00 %	0.01 %
Saluda (Polk)	48	620	200,053	620	100.00 %	0.31 %
Sandy Creek	8	248	204,381	248	100.00 %	0.12 %
Sandyfield	8	430	204,381	430	100.00 %	0.21 %
Sanford	12	30,261	200,794	30,261	100.00 %	15.07 %
Saratoga	4	353	216,568	353	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sawmills	45	5,020	218,526	5,020	100.00 %	2.30 %
Scotland Neck	3	1,640	198,430	1,640	100.00 %	0.83 %
Seaboard	3	542	198,430	542	100.00 %	0.27 %
Seagrove	29	235	218,867	235	100.00 %	0.11 %
Sedalia	26	676	216,942	676	100.00 %	0.31 %
Selma	10	6,317	215,999	6,317	100.00 %	2.92 %
Seven Devils (Avery)	47	38	209,958	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Seven Devils (Watauga)	47	275	209,958	275	100.00 %	0.13 %
Seven Springs	4	55	216,568	55	100.00 %	0.03 %
Severn	3	191	198,430	191	100.00 %	0.10 %
Shallotte	8	4,185	204,381	4,185	100.00 %	2.05 %
Sharpsburg (Edgecombe)	5	215	219,143	215	100.00 %	0.10 %
Sharpsburg (Nash)	11	1,061	206,121	1,061	100.00 %	0.51 %
Sharpsburg (Wilson)	4	421	216,568	421	100.00 %	0.19 %
Shelby	44	21,918	203,043	21,918	100.00 %	10.79 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Siler City	20	7,702	199,272	7,702	100.00 %	3.87 %
Simpson	5	390	219,143	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Sims	4	275	216,568	275	100.00 %	0.13 %
Smithfield	10	11,292	215,999	11,292	100.00 %	5.23 %
Snow Hill	4	1,481	216,568	1,481	100.00 %	0.68 %
Southern Pines	21	15,545	217,791	15,545	100.00 %	7.14 %
Southern Shores	1	3,090	199,750	3,090	100.00 %	1.55 %
Southport	8	3,971	204,381	3,971	100.00 %	1.94 %
Sparta	47	1,834	209,958	1,834	100.00 %	0.87 %
Speed	5	63	219,143	63	100.00 %	0.03 %
Spencer	33	3,308	209,379	3,308	100.00 %	1.58 %
Spencer Mountain	43	0	211,229	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Spindale	48	4,225	200,053	4,225	100.00 %	2.11 %
Spring Hope	11	1,309	206,121	1,309	100.00 %	0.64 %
Spring Lake	21	11,660	217,791	11,660	100.00 %	5.35 %
Spruce Pine	47	2,194	209,958	2,194	100.00 %	1.04 %
St. Helena	9	417	202,791	417	100.00 %	0.21 %
St. James	8	6,529	204,381	6,529	100.00 %	3.19 %
St. Pauls	24	2,045	202,786	2,045	100.00 %	1.01 %
Staley	25	397	217,130	397	100.00 %	0.18 %
Stallings (Mecklenburg)	40	384	218,745	373	97.14 %	0.17 %
	42	384	217,131	11	2.86 %	0.01 %
Stallings (Union)	35	15,728	216,849	15,728	100.00 %	7.25 %
Stanfield	33	1,585	209,379	1,585	100.00 %	0.76 %
Stanley	43	3,963	211,229	3,963	100.00 %	1.88 %
Stantonsburg	4	762	216,568	762	100.00 %	0.35 %
Star	29	806	218,867	806	100.00 %	0.37 %
Statesville	37	28,419	215,363	28,419	100.00 %	13.20 %
Stedman	19	1,277	216,664	1,277	100.00 %	0.59 %
Stem	18	960	198,478	960	100.00 %	0.48 %
Stokesdale	26	5,924	216,942	5,924	100.00 %	2.73 %
Stoneville	26	1,308	216,942	1,308	100.00 %	0.60 %
Stonewall	1	214	199,750	214	100.00 %	0.11 %
Stovall	18	324	198,478	324	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sugar Mountain	47	371	209,958	371	100.00 %	0.18 %
Summerfield	26	10,951	216,942	10,951	100.00 %	5.05 %
Sunset Beach	8	4,175	204,381	4,175	100.00 %	2.04 %
Surf City (Onslow)	6	334	204,576	334	100.00 %	0.16 %
Surf City (Pender)	9	3,533	202,791	3,533	100.00 %	1.74 %
Swansboro	6	3,744	204,576	3,744	100.00 %	1.83 %
Sweptonville	25	2,445	217,130	2,445	100.00 %	1.13 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Sylva	50	2,578	213,909	2,578	100.00 %	1.21 %
Tabor City	8	3,781	204,381	3,781	100.00 %	1.85 %
Tar Heel	9	90	202,791	90	100.00 %	0.04 %
Tarboro	5	10,721	219,143	10,721	100.00 %	4.89 %
Taylorsville	36	2,320	210,986	2,320	100.00 %	1.10 %
Taylortown	21	634	217,791	634	100.00 %	0.29 %
Teachey	9	448	202,791	448	100.00 %	0.22 %
Thomasville (Davidson)	30	26,662	211,642	26,662	100.00 %	12.60 %
Thomasville (Randolph)	29	521	218,867	521	100.00 %	0.24 %
Tobaccoville (Forsyth)	31	2,578	216,024	2,578	100.00 %	1.19 %
Tobaccoville (Stokes)	31	0	216,024	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Topsail Beach	9	461	202,791	461	100.00 %	0.23 %
Trent Woods	2	4,074	200,494	4,074	100.00 %	2.03 %
Trenton	9	238	202,791	238	100.00 %	0.12 %
Trinity	29	7,006	218,867	7,006	100.00 %	3.20 %
Troutman	37	3,698	215,363	3,698	100.00 %	1.72 %
Troy	29	2,850	218,867	2,850	100.00 %	1.30 %
Tryon	48	1,562	200,053	1,562	100.00 %	0.78 %
Turkey	9	213	202,791	213	100.00 %	0.11 %
Unionville	35	6,643	216,849	6,643	100.00 %	3.06 %
Valdese	46	4,689	200,646	4,689	100.00 %	2.34 %
Vanceboro	2	869	200,494	869	100.00 %	0.43 %
Vandemere	1	246	199,750	246	100.00 %	0.12 %
Varnamtown	8	525	204,381	525	100.00 %	0.26 %
Vass	21	952	217,791	952	100.00 %	0.44 %
Waco	44	310	203,043	310	100.00 %	0.15 %
Wade	19	638	216,664	638	100.00 %	0.29 %
Wadesboro	29	5,008	218,867	5,008	100.00 %	2.29 %
Wagram	24	615	202,786	615	100.00 %	0.30 %
Wake Forest (Franklin)	11	1,504	206,121	1,504	100.00 %	0.73 %
Wake Forest (Wake)	18	46,097	198,478	46,097	100.00 %	23.23 %
Walkertown	31	5,692	216,024	5,692	100.00 %	2.63 %
Wallace (Duplin)	9	3,413	202,791	3,413	100.00 %	1.68 %
Wallace (Pender)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Wallburg	30	3,051	211,642	3,051	100.00 %	1.44 %
Walnut Cove	31	1,586	216,024	1,586	100.00 %	0.73 %
Walnut Creek	4	1,084	216,568	1,084	100.00 %	0.50 %
Walstonburg	4	193	216,568	193	100.00 %	0.09 %
Warrenton	3	851	198,430	851	100.00 %	0.43 %
Warsaw	9	2,733	202,791	2,733	100.00 %	1.35 %
Washington	2	9,875	200,494	9,875	100.00 %	4.93 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Washington Park	2	392	200,494	392	100.00 %	0.20 %
Watha	9	181	202,791	181	100.00 %	0.09 %
Waxhaw	29	20,534	218,867	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	35	20,534	216,849	20,534	100.00 %	9.47 %
Waynesville	50	10,140	213,909	10,140	100.00 %	4.74 %
Weaverville	46	4,567	200,646	3,751	82.13 %	1.87 %
	49	4,567	200,954	816	17.87 %	0.41 %
Webster	50	372	213,909	372	100.00 %	0.17 %
Weddington (Mecklenburg)	42	5	217,131	5	100.00 %	0.00 %
Weddington (Union)	35	13,176	216,849	13,176	100.00 %	6.08 %
Weldon	3	1,444	198,430	1,444	100.00 %	0.73 %
Wendell	14	9,793	198,391	9,793	100.00 %	4.94 %
Wentworth	26	2,662	216,942	2,662	100.00 %	1.23 %
Wesley Chapel	35	8,681	216,849	8,681	100.00 %	4.00 %
West Jefferson	47	1,279	209,958	1,279	100.00 %	0.61 %
Whispering Pines	21	4,987	217,791	4,987	100.00 %	2.29 %
Whitakers (Edgecombe)	5	290	219,143	290	100.00 %	0.13 %
Whitakers (Nash)	11	337	206,121	337	100.00 %	0.16 %
White Lake	9	843	202,791	843	100.00 %	0.42 %
Whiteville	8	4,766	204,381	4,766	100.00 %	2.33 %
Whitsett	26	584	216,942	584	100.00 %	0.27 %
Wilkesboro	36	3,687	210,986	3,687	100.00 %	1.75 %
Williamston	3	5,248	198,430	5,248	100.00 %	2.64 %
Wilmington	7	115,451	208,637	98,467	85.29 %	47.20 %
	8	115,451	204,381	16,984	14.71 %	8.31 %
Wilson	4	47,851	216,568	47,851	100.00 %	22.10 %
Wilson's Mills	10	2,534	215,999	2,534	100.00 %	1.17 %
Windsor	3	3,582	198,430	3,582	100.00 %	1.81 %
Winfall	1	555	199,750	555	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wingate	29	4,055	218,867	4,055	100.00 %	1.85 %
Winston-Salem	31	249,545	216,024	90,274	36.18 %	41.79 %
	32	249,545	211,086	159,271	63.82 %	75.45 %
Winterville	5	10,462	219,143	10,462	100.00 %	4.77 %
Winton	3	629	198,430	629	100.00 %	0.32 %
Woodfin	49	7,936	200,954	7,936	100.00 %	3.95 %
Woodland	3	557	198,430	557	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wrightsville Beach	7	2,473	208,637	2,473	100.00 %	1.19 %
Yadkinville	36	2,995	210,986	2,995	100.00 %	1.42 %
Yanceyville	23	1,937	210,529	1,937	100.00 %	0.92 %
Youngsville	11	2,016	206,121	2,016	100.00 %	0.98 %
Zebulon (Johnston)	10	0	215,999	0	0.00 %	0.00 %

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Zebulon (Wake)	14	6,903	198,391	6,903	100.00 %	3.48 %
Assigned Geography Total:				6,017,605		

Report display: all municipalities

Total Municipalities (by County) Statewide: 614

Fully Assigned Municipalities: 614

Partially Assigned Municipalities: 0

Fully Unassigned Municipalities: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split Municipalities: 33

Splits Involving Population: 26

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
1	Alliance	199,750	733	733	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Arapahoe	199,750	416	416	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Atlantic Beach	199,750	1,364	1,364	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Bayboro	199,750	1,161	1,161	0.58 %	100.00 %
	Beaufort	199,750	4,464	4,464	2.23 %	100.00 %
	Bogue	199,750	695	695	0.35 %	100.00 %
	Cape Carteret	199,750	2,224	2,224	1.11 %	100.00 %
	Cedar Point	199,750	1,764	1,764	0.88 %	100.00 %
	Creswell	199,750	207	207	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Duck	199,750	742	742	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Edenton	199,750	4,460	4,460	2.23 %	100.00 %
	Elizabeth City (Pasquotank)	199,750	18,593	18,593	9.31 %	100.00 %
	Emerald Isle	199,750	3,847	3,847	1.93 %	100.00 %
	Grantsboro	199,750	692	692	0.35 %	100.00 %
	Hertford	199,750	1,934	1,934	0.97 %	100.00 %
	Indian Beach	199,750	223	223	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Kill Devil Hills	199,750	7,656	7,656	3.83 %	100.00 %
	Kitty Hawk	199,750	3,689	3,689	1.85 %	100.00 %
	Manteo	199,750	1,600	1,600	0.80 %	100.00 %
	Mesic	199,750	144	144	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Minnesott Beach	199,750	530	530	0.27 %	100.00 %
	Morehead City	199,750	9,556	9,556	4.78 %	100.00 %
	Nags Head	199,750	3,168	3,168	1.59 %	100.00 %
	Newport	199,750	4,364	4,364	2.18 %	100.00 %
	Oriental	199,750	880	880	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Peletier	199,750	769	769	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Pine Knoll Shores	199,750	1,388	1,388	0.69 %	100.00 %
	Plymouth	199,750	3,320	3,320	1.66 %	100.00 %
	Roper	199,750	485	485	0.24 %	100.00 %
	Southern Shores	199,750	3,090	3,090	1.55 %	100.00 %
Stonewall	199,750	214	214	0.11 %	100.00 %	
Vandemere	199,750	246	246	0.12 %	100.00 %	
Winfall	199,750	555	555	0.28 %	100.00 %	
2	Aurora	200,494	455	455	0.23 %	100.00 %
	Bath	200,494	245	245	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Belhaven	200,494	1,410	1,410	0.70 %	100.00 %
	Bridgeton	200,494	349	349	0.17 %	100.00 %
	Chocowinity	200,494	722	722	0.36 %	100.00 %
	Cove City	200,494	378	378	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Dover	200,494	349	349	0.17 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

[G20-DMbC] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
2	Grifton (Lenoir)	200,494	147	147	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Havelock	200,494	16,621	16,621	8.29 %	100.00 %
	Kinston	200,494	19,900	19,900	9.93 %	100.00 %
	La Grange	200,494	2,595	2,595	1.29 %	100.00 %
	New Bern	200,494	31,291	31,291	15.61 %	100.00 %
	Pantego	200,494	164	164	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Pink Hill	200,494	451	451	0.22 %	100.00 %
	River Bend	200,494	2,902	2,902	1.45 %	100.00 %
	Trent Woods	200,494	4,074	4,074	2.03 %	100.00 %
	Vanceboro	200,494	869	869	0.43 %	100.00 %
	Washington	200,494	9,875	9,875	4.93 %	100.00 %
	Washington Park	200,494	392	392	0.20 %	100.00 %
3	Ahoskie	198,430	4,891	4,891	2.46 %	100.00 %
	Askewville	198,430	184	184	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Aulander	198,430	763	763	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Bear Grass	198,430	89	89	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Cofield	198,430	267	267	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Colerain	198,430	217	217	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Columbia	198,430	610	610	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Como	198,430	67	67	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Conway	198,430	752	752	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Elizabeth City (Camden)	198,430	38	38	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Enfield	198,430	1,865	1,865	0.94 %	100.00 %
	Everetts	198,430	150	150	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Garysburg	198,430	904	904	0.46 %	100.00 %
	Gaston	198,430	1,008	1,008	0.51 %	100.00 %
	Gatesville	198,430	267	267	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Halifax	198,430	170	170	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Hamilton	198,430	306	306	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Harrellsville	198,430	85	85	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Hassell	198,430	49	49	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Hobgood	198,430	268	268	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Jackson	198,430	430	430	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Jamesville	198,430	424	424	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Kelford	198,430	203	203	0.10 %	100.00 %
Lasker	198,430	64	64	0.03 %	100.00 %	
Lewiston Woodville	198,430	426	426	0.21 %	100.00 %	
Littleton	198,430	559	559	0.28 %	100.00 %	
Macon	198,430	110	110	0.06 %	100.00 %	
Murfreesboro	198,430	2,619	2,619	1.32 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
3	Norlina	198,430	920	920	0.46 %	100.00 %
	Oak City	198,430	266	266	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Parmele	198,430	243	243	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Powellsville	198,430	189	189	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Rich Square	198,430	894	894	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Roanoke Rapids	198,430	15,229	15,229	7.67 %	100.00 %
	Robersonville	198,430	1,269	1,269	0.64 %	100.00 %
	Roxobel	198,430	187	187	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Scotland Neck	198,430	1,640	1,640	0.83 %	100.00 %
	Seaboard	198,430	542	542	0.27 %	100.00 %
	Severn	198,430	191	191	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Warrenton	198,430	851	851	0.43 %	100.00 %
	Weldon	198,430	1,444	1,444	0.73 %	100.00 %
	Williamston	198,430	5,248	5,248	2.64 %	100.00 %
	Windsor	198,430	3,582	3,582	1.81 %	100.00 %
	Winton	198,430	629	629	0.32 %	100.00 %
Woodland	198,430	557	557	0.28 %	100.00 %	
4	Black Creek	216,568	692	692	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Elm City (Wilson)	216,568	1,218	1,218	0.56 %	100.00 %
	Eureka	216,568	214	214	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Fremont	216,568	1,196	1,196	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Goldsboro	216,568	33,657	33,657	15.54 %	100.00 %
	Hookerton	216,568	413	413	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Kenly (Wilson)	216,568	198	198	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Lucama	216,568	1,036	1,036	0.48 %	100.00 %
	Mount Olive (Wayne)	216,568	4,193	4,193	1.94 %	100.00 %
	Pikeville	216,568	712	712	0.33 %	100.00 %
	Saratoga	216,568	353	353	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Seven Springs	216,568	55	55	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Sharpsburg (Wilson)	216,568	421	421	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Sims	216,568	275	275	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Snow Hill	216,568	1,481	1,481	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Stantonsburg	216,568	762	762	0.35 %	100.00 %
	Walnut Creek	216,568	1,084	1,084	0.50 %	100.00 %
	Walstonburg	216,568	193	193	0.09 %	100.00 %
Wilson	216,568	47,851	47,851	22.10 %	100.00 %	
5	Ayden	219,143	4,977	4,977	2.27 %	100.00 %
	Bethel	219,143	1,373	1,373	0.63 %	100.00 %
	Conetoe	219,143	198	198	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Falkland	219,143	47	47	0.02 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
5	Farmville	219,143	4,461	4,461	2.04 %	100.00 %
	Fountain	219,143	385	385	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Greenville	219,143	87,521	87,521	39.94 %	100.00 %
	Grifton (Pitt)	219,143	2,301	2,301	1.05 %	100.00 %
	Grimesland	219,143	386	386	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Leggett	219,143	37	37	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Macclesfield	219,143	413	413	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Pinetops	219,143	1,200	1,200	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Princeville	219,143	1,254	1,254	0.57 %	100.00 %
	Rocky Mount (Edgecombe)	219,143	15,414	15,414	7.03 %	100.00 %
	Sharpsburg (Edgecombe)	219,143	215	215	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Simpson	219,143	390	390	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Speed	219,143	63	63	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Tarboro	219,143	10,721	10,721	4.89 %	100.00 %
	Whitakers (Edgecombe)	219,143	290	290	0.13 %	100.00 %
Winterville	219,143	10,462	10,462	4.77 %	100.00 %	
6	Holly Ridge	204,576	4,171	4,171	2.04 %	100.00 %
	Jacksonville	204,576	72,723	72,723	35.55 %	100.00 %
	North Topsail Beach	204,576	1,005	1,005	0.49 %	100.00 %
	Richlands	204,576	2,287	2,287	1.12 %	100.00 %
	Surf City (Onslow)	204,576	334	334	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Swansboro	204,576	3,744	3,744	1.83 %	100.00 %
7	Carolina Beach	208,637	6,564	6,564	3.15 %	100.00 %
	Kure Beach	208,637	2,191	2,191	1.05 %	100.00 %
	Wilmington	208,637	115,451	98,467	47.20 %	85.29 %
	Wrightsville Beach	208,637	2,473	2,473	1.19 %	100.00 %
8	Bald Head Island	204,381	268	268	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Belville	204,381	2,406	2,406	1.18 %	100.00 %
	Boardman	204,381	166	166	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Boiling Spring Lakes	204,381	5,943	5,943	2.91 %	100.00 %
	Bolivia	204,381	149	149	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Bolton	204,381	519	519	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Brunswick	204,381	973	973	0.48 %	100.00 %
	Calabash	204,381	2,011	2,011	0.98 %	100.00 %
	Carolina Shores	204,381	4,588	4,588	2.24 %	100.00 %
	Caswell Beach	204,381	395	395	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Cerro Gordo	204,381	131	131	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Chadbourn	204,381	1,574	1,574	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Fair Bluff	204,381	709	709	0.35 %	100.00 %
Holden Beach	204,381	921	921	0.45 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
8	Lake Waccamaw	204,381	1,296	1,296	0.63 %	100.00 %
	Leland	204,381	22,908	22,908	11.21 %	100.00 %
	Navassa	204,381	1,367	1,367	0.67 %	100.00 %
	Northwest	204,381	703	703	0.34 %	100.00 %
	Oak Island	204,381	8,396	8,396	4.11 %	100.00 %
	Ocean Isle Beach	204,381	867	867	0.42 %	100.00 %
	Sandy Creek	204,381	248	248	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Sandyfield	204,381	430	430	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Shallotte	204,381	4,185	4,185	2.05 %	100.00 %
	Southport	204,381	3,971	3,971	1.94 %	100.00 %
	St. James	204,381	6,529	6,529	3.19 %	100.00 %
	Sunset Beach	204,381	4,175	4,175	2.04 %	100.00 %
	Tabor City	204,381	3,781	3,781	1.85 %	100.00 %
	Varnamtown	204,381	525	525	0.26 %	100.00 %
	Whiteville	204,381	4,766	4,766	2.33 %	100.00 %
Wilmington	204,381	115,451	16,984	8.31 %	14.71 %	
9	Atkinson	202,791	296	296	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Autryville	202,791	167	167	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Beulaville	202,791	1,116	1,116	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Bladenboro	202,791	1,648	1,648	0.81 %	100.00 %
	Burgaw	202,791	3,088	3,088	1.52 %	100.00 %
	Calypso	202,791	327	327	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Clarkton	202,791	614	614	0.30 %	100.00 %
	Clinton	202,791	8,383	8,383	4.13 %	100.00 %
	Dublin	202,791	267	267	0.13 %	100.00 %
	East Arcadia	202,791	418	418	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Elizabethtown	202,791	3,296	3,296	1.63 %	100.00 %
	Faison (Duplin)	202,791	784	784	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Faison (Sampson)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Falcon (Sampson)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Garland	202,791	595	595	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Greenevers	202,791	567	567	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Harrells (Duplin)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Harrells (Sampson)	202,791	160	160	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Kenansville	202,791	770	770	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Magnolia	202,791	831	831	0.41 %	100.00 %
Maysville	202,791	818	818	0.40 %	100.00 %	
Mount Olive (Duplin)	202,791	5	5	0.00 %	100.00 %	
Newton Grove	202,791	585	585	0.29 %	100.00 %	
Pollocksville	202,791	268	268	0.13 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
9	Rose Hill	202,791	1,371	1,371	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Roseboro	202,791	1,163	1,163	0.57 %	100.00 %
	Salemburg	202,791	457	457	0.23 %	100.00 %
	St. Helena	202,791	417	417	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Surf City (Pender)	202,791	3,533	3,533	1.74 %	100.00 %
	Tar Heel	202,791	90	90	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Teachey	202,791	448	448	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Topsail Beach	202,791	461	461	0.23 %	100.00 %
	Trenton	202,791	238	238	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Turkey	202,791	213	213	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Wallace (Duplin)	202,791	3,413	3,413	1.68 %	100.00 %
	Wallace (Pender)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Warsaw	202,791	2,733	2,733	1.35 %	100.00 %
	Watha	202,791	181	181	0.09 %	100.00 %
	White Lake	202,791	843	843	0.42 %	100.00 %
10	Archer Lodge	215,999	4,797	4,797	2.22 %	100.00 %
	Benson (Johnston)	215,999	3,967	3,967	1.84 %	100.00 %
	Clayton (Johnston)	215,999	26,307	26,307	12.18 %	100.00 %
	Four Oaks	215,999	2,158	2,158	1.00 %	100.00 %
	Kenly (Johnston)	215,999	1,293	1,293	0.60 %	100.00 %
	Micro	215,999	458	458	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Pine Level	215,999	2,046	2,046	0.95 %	100.00 %
	Princeton	215,999	1,315	1,315	0.61 %	100.00 %
	Selma	215,999	6,317	6,317	2.92 %	100.00 %
	Smithfield	215,999	11,292	11,292	5.23 %	100.00 %
	Wilson's Mills	215,999	2,534	2,534	1.17 %	100.00 %
	Zebulon (Johnston)	215,999	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
11	Bailey	206,121	568	568	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Bunn	206,121	327	327	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Castalia	206,121	264	264	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Dortches	206,121	1,082	1,082	0.52 %	100.00 %
	Elm City (Nash)	206,121	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Franklinton	206,121	2,456	2,456	1.19 %	100.00 %
	Henderson	206,121	15,060	15,060	7.31 %	100.00 %
	Kittrell	206,121	132	132	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Louisburg	206,121	3,064	3,064	1.49 %	100.00 %
	Middleburg	206,121	101	101	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Middlesex	206,121	912	912	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Momeyer	206,121	277	277	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Nashville	206,121	5,632	5,632	2.73 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
11	Red Oak	206,121	3,342	3,342	1.62 %	100.00 %
	Rocky Mount (Nash)	206,121	38,927	38,927	18.89 %	100.00 %
	Sharpsburg (Nash)	206,121	1,061	1,061	0.51 %	100.00 %
	Spring Hope	206,121	1,309	1,309	0.64 %	100.00 %
	Wake Forest (Franklin)	206,121	1,504	1,504	0.73 %	100.00 %
	Whitakers (Nash)	206,121	337	337	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Youngsville	206,121	2,016	2,016	0.98 %	100.00 %
12	Angier (Harnett)	200,794	4,709	4,709	2.35 %	100.00 %
	Benson (Harnett)	200,794	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Broadway (Harnett)	200,794	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Broadway (Lee)	200,794	1,267	1,267	0.63 %	100.00 %
	Coats	200,794	2,155	2,155	1.07 %	100.00 %
	Dunn	200,794	8,446	8,446	4.21 %	100.00 %
	Erwin	200,794	4,542	4,542	2.26 %	100.00 %
	Fuquay-Varina (Harnett)	200,794	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Lillington	200,794	4,735	4,735	2.36 %	100.00 %
	Sanford	200,794	30,261	30,261	15.07 %	100.00 %
13	Durham (Wake)	198,383	269	269	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,383	466,106	177,965	89.71 %	38.18 %
14	Clayton (Wake)	198,391	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Garner	198,391	31,159	24,703	12.45 %	79.28 %
	Knightdale	198,391	19,435	19,435	9.80 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,391	466,106	87,185	43.95 %	18.70 %
	Wendell	198,391	9,793	9,793	4.94 %	100.00 %
	Zebulon (Wake)	198,391	6,903	6,903	3.48 %	100.00 %
15	Cary (Wake)	198,416	171,012	33,852	17.06 %	19.80 %
	Fuquay-Varina (Wake)	198,416	34,152	30	0.02 %	0.09 %
	Garner	198,416	31,159	2,754	1.39 %	8.84 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,416	466,106	139,357	70.23 %	29.90 %
16	Apex	198,364	58,780	16,256	8.20 %	27.66 %
	Cary (Wake)	198,364	171,012	128,099	64.58 %	74.91 %
	Durham (Wake)	198,364	269	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Morrisville (Wake)	198,364	29,423	29,423	14.83 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,364	466,106	20,224	10.20 %	4.34 %
17	Angier (Wake)	198,370	556	556	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Apex	198,370	58,780	42,524	21.44 %	72.34 %
	Cary (Wake)	198,370	171,012	9,061	4.57 %	5.30 %
	Fuquay-Varina (Wake)	198,370	34,152	34,122	17.20 %	99.91 %
	Garner	198,370	31,159	3,702	1.87 %	11.88 %
	Holly Springs	198,370	41,239	41,239	20.79 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

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18	Butner	198,478	8,397	8,397	4.23 %	100.00 %
	Creedmoor	198,478	4,866	4,866	2.45 %	100.00 %
	Oxford	198,478	8,628	8,628	4.35 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,478	466,106	41,375	20.85 %	8.88 %
	Rolesville	198,478	9,475	9,475	4.77 %	100.00 %
	Stem	198,478	960	960	0.48 %	100.00 %
	Stovall	198,478	324	324	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Wake Forest (Wake)	198,478	46,097	46,097	23.23 %	100.00 %
19	Eastover	216,664	3,656	3,656	1.69 %	100.00 %
	Falcon (Cumberland)	216,664	324	324	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Fayetteville	216,664	208,501	110,573	51.03 %	53.03 %
	Godwin	216,664	128	128	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Hope Mills	216,664	17,808	17,808	8.22 %	100.00 %
	Linden	216,664	136	136	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Stedman	216,664	1,277	1,277	0.59 %	100.00 %
	Wade	216,664	638	638	0.29 %	100.00 %
20	Cary (Chatham)	199,272	3,709	3,709	1.86 %	100.00 %
	Chapel Hill (Durham)	199,272	2,906	2,906	1.46 %	100.00 %
	Durham (Durham)	199,272	283,093	115,188	57.80 %	40.69 %
	Goldston	199,272	234	234	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Morrisville (Durham)	199,272	207	207	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Pittsboro	199,272	4,537	4,537	2.28 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Durham)	199,272	1,559	233	0.12 %	14.95 %
	Siler City	199,272	7,702	7,702	3.87 %	100.00 %
21	Aberdeen	217,791	8,516	8,516	3.91 %	100.00 %
	Cameron	217,791	244	244	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Candor (Moore)	217,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Carthage	217,791	2,775	2,775	1.27 %	100.00 %
	Fayetteville	217,791	208,501	97,928	44.96 %	46.97 %
	Foxfire	217,791	1,288	1,288	0.59 %	100.00 %
	Pinebluff	217,791	1,473	1,473	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Pinehurst	217,791	17,581	17,581	8.07 %	100.00 %
	Robbins	217,791	1,168	1,168	0.54 %	100.00 %
	Southern Pines	217,791	15,545	15,545	7.14 %	100.00 %
	Spring Lake	217,791	11,660	11,660	5.35 %	100.00 %
	Taylorstown	217,791	634	634	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Vass	217,791	952	952	0.44 %	100.00 %
Whispering Pines	217,791	4,987	4,987	2.29 %	100.00 %	
22	Durham (Durham)	201,846	283,093	167,905	83.18 %	59.31 %
	Raleigh (Durham)	201,846	1,559	1,326	0.66 %	85.05 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
23	Carrboro	210,529	21,295	21,295	10.11 %	100.00 %
	Chapel Hill (Orange)	210,529	59,054	59,054	28.05 %	100.00 %
	Durham (Orange)	210,529	144	144	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Hillsborough	210,529	9,660	9,660	4.59 %	100.00 %
	Mebane (Orange)	210,529	3,171	3,171	1.51 %	100.00 %
	Milton	210,529	155	155	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Roxboro	210,529	8,134	8,134	3.86 %	100.00 %
	Yanceyville	210,529	1,937	1,937	0.92 %	100.00 %
24	East Laurinburg	202,786	234	234	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Fairmont	202,786	2,191	2,191	1.08 %	100.00 %
	Gibson	202,786	449	449	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Laurinburg	202,786	14,978	14,978	7.39 %	100.00 %
	Lumber Bridge	202,786	82	82	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Lumberton	202,786	19,025	19,025	9.38 %	100.00 %
	Marietta	202,786	111	111	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Maxton (Robeson)	202,786	1,902	1,902	0.94 %	100.00 %
	Maxton (Scotland)	202,786	208	208	0.10 %	100.00 %
	McDonald	202,786	94	94	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Orrum	202,786	59	59	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Parkton	202,786	504	504	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Pembroke	202,786	2,823	2,823	1.39 %	100.00 %
	Proctorville	202,786	121	121	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Raeford	202,786	4,559	4,559	2.25 %	100.00 %
	Raynham	202,786	60	60	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Red Springs (Hoke)	202,786	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Red Springs (Robeson)	202,786	3,087	3,087	1.52 %	100.00 %
	Rennert	202,786	275	275	0.14 %	100.00 %
Rowland	202,786	885	885	0.44 %	100.00 %	
St. Pauls	202,786	2,045	2,045	1.01 %	100.00 %	
Wagram	202,786	615	615	0.30 %	100.00 %	
25	Alamance	217,130	988	988	0.46 %	100.00 %
	Archdale (Randolph)	217,130	11,527	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Asheboro	217,130	27,156	1,217	0.56 %	4.48 %
	Burlington (Alamance)	217,130	55,481	55,481	25.55 %	100.00 %
	Elon	217,130	11,336	11,336	5.22 %	100.00 %
	Franklinville	217,130	1,197	1,197	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Gibsonville (Alamance)	217,130	4,278	4,278	1.97 %	100.00 %
	Graham	217,130	17,157	17,157	7.90 %	100.00 %
	Green Level	217,130	3,152	3,152	1.45 %	100.00 %
Haw River	217,130	2,252	2,252	1.04 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
25	Liberty	217,130	2,655	2,655	1.22 %	100.00 %
	Mebane (Alamance)	217,130	14,626	14,626	6.74 %	100.00 %
	Ossipee	217,130	536	536	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Ramseur	217,130	1,774	1,774	0.82 %	100.00 %
	Randleman	217,130	4,595	4,595	2.12 %	100.00 %
	Staley	217,130	397	397	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Swepsonville	217,130	2,445	2,445	1.13 %	100.00 %
26	Burlington (Guilford)	216,942	1,822	1,822	0.84 %	100.00 %
	Eden	216,942	15,421	15,421	7.11 %	100.00 %
	Gibsonville (Guilford)	216,942	4,642	4,642	2.14 %	100.00 %
	Greensboro	216,942	299,035	32,095	14.79 %	10.73 %
	Madison	216,942	2,129	2,129	0.98 %	100.00 %
	Mayodan	216,942	2,418	2,418	1.11 %	100.00 %
	Oak Ridge	216,942	7,474	7,471	3.44 %	99.96 %
	Reidsville	216,942	14,583	14,583	6.72 %	100.00 %
	Sedalia	216,942	676	676	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Stokesdale	216,942	5,924	5,924	2.73 %	100.00 %
	Stoneville	216,942	1,308	1,308	0.60 %	100.00 %
	Summerfield	216,942	10,951	10,951	5.05 %	100.00 %
	Wentworth	216,942	2,662	2,662	1.23 %	100.00 %
Whitsett	216,942	584	584	0.27 %	100.00 %	
27	Archdale (Guilford)	203,438	380	380	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Greensboro	203,438	299,035	55,112	27.09 %	18.43 %
	High Point (Guilford)	203,438	107,321	107,321	52.75 %	100.00 %
	Jamestown	203,438	3,668	3,668	1.80 %	100.00 %
	Kernersville (Guilford)	203,438	502	502	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Oak Ridge	203,438	7,474	3	0.00 %	0.04 %
	Pleasant Garden	203,438	5,000	5,000	2.46 %	100.00 %
28	Greensboro	212,015	299,035	211,828	99.91 %	70.84 %
29	Ansonville	218,867	440	440	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Archdale (Randolph)	218,867	11,527	11,527	5.27 %	100.00 %
	Asheboro	218,867	27,156	25,939	11.85 %	95.52 %
	Biscoe	218,867	1,848	1,848	0.84 %	100.00 %
	Candor (Montgomery)	218,867	813	813	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Dobbins Heights	218,867	687	687	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Ellerbe	218,867	864	864	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Hamlet	218,867	6,025	6,025	2.75 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Randolph)	218,867	8	8	0.00 %	100.00 %
	Hoffman	218,867	418	418	0.19 %	100.00 %
Lilesville	218,867	395	395	0.18 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
29	Marshville	218,867	2,522	2,522	1.15 %	100.00 %
	McFarlan	218,867	94	94	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Monroe	218,867	34,562	225	0.10 %	0.65 %
	Morven	218,867	329	329	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Mount Gilead	218,867	1,171	1,171	0.54 %	100.00 %
	Norman	218,867	100	100	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Peachland	218,867	390	390	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Polkton	218,867	2,250	2,250	1.03 %	100.00 %
	Rockingham	218,867	9,243	9,243	4.22 %	100.00 %
	Seagrove	218,867	235	235	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Star	218,867	806	806	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Thomasville (Randolph)	218,867	521	521	0.24 %	100.00 %
	Trinity	218,867	7,006	7,006	3.20 %	100.00 %
	Troy	218,867	2,850	2,850	1.30 %	100.00 %
	Wadesboro	218,867	5,008	5,008	2.29 %	100.00 %
	Waxhaw	218,867	20,534	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Wingate	218,867	4,055	4,055	1.85 %	100.00 %	
30	Bermuda Run	211,642	3,120	3,120	1.47 %	100.00 %
	Cooleemee	211,642	940	940	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Denton	211,642	1,494	1,494	0.71 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Davidson)	211,642	6,646	6,646	3.14 %	100.00 %
	Lexington	211,642	19,632	19,632	9.28 %	100.00 %
	Midway	211,642	4,742	4,742	2.24 %	100.00 %
	Mocksville	211,642	5,900	5,900	2.79 %	100.00 %
	Thomasville (Davidson)	211,642	26,662	26,662	12.60 %	100.00 %
	Wallburg	211,642	3,051	3,051	1.44 %	100.00 %
31	Bethania	216,024	344	344	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Danbury	216,024	189	189	0.09 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Forsyth)	216,024	84	84	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Kernersville (Forsyth)	216,024	25,947	25,947	12.01 %	100.00 %
	King (Forsyth)	216,024	591	591	0.27 %	100.00 %
	King (Stokes)	216,024	6,606	6,606	3.06 %	100.00 %
	Rural Hall	216,024	3,351	3,351	1.55 %	100.00 %
	Tobaccoville (Forsyth)	216,024	2,578	2,578	1.19 %	100.00 %
	Tobaccoville (Stokes)	216,024	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Walkertown	216,024	5,692	5,692	2.63 %	100.00 %
	Walnut Cove	216,024	1,586	1,586	0.73 %	100.00 %
	Winston-Salem	216,024	249,545	90,274	41.79 %	36.18 %
32	Bethania	211,086	344	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Clemmons	211,086	21,163	21,163	10.03 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
32	Lewisville	211,086	13,381	13,381	6.34 %	100.00 %
	Winston-Salem	211,086	249,545	159,271	75.45 %	63.82 %
33	Albemarle	209,379	16,432	16,432	7.85 %	100.00 %
	Badin	209,379	2,024	2,024	0.97 %	100.00 %
	China Grove	209,379	4,434	4,434	2.12 %	100.00 %
	Cleveland	209,379	846	846	0.40 %	100.00 %
	East Spencer	209,379	1,567	1,567	0.75 %	100.00 %
	Faith	209,379	819	819	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Granite Quarry	209,379	2,984	2,984	1.43 %	100.00 %
	Kannapolis (Rowan)	209,379	10,268	10,268	4.90 %	100.00 %
	Landis	209,379	3,690	3,690	1.76 %	100.00 %
	Locust (Stanly)	209,379	3,996	3,996	1.91 %	100.00 %
	Misenheimer	209,379	650	650	0.31 %	100.00 %
	New London	209,379	607	607	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Norwood	209,379	2,367	2,367	1.13 %	100.00 %
	Oakboro	209,379	2,128	2,128	1.02 %	100.00 %
	Red Cross	209,379	762	762	0.36 %	100.00 %
	Richfield	209,379	582	582	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Rockwell	209,379	2,302	2,302	1.10 %	100.00 %
	Salisbury	209,379	35,540	35,540	16.97 %	100.00 %
	Spencer	209,379	3,308	3,308	1.58 %	100.00 %
Stanfield	209,379	1,585	1,585	0.76 %	100.00 %	
34	Concord	217,563	105,240	105,240	48.37 %	100.00 %
	Harrisburg	217,563	18,967	18,967	8.72 %	100.00 %
	Kannapolis (Cabarrus)	217,563	42,846	42,846	19.69 %	100.00 %
	Locust (Cabarrus)	217,563	541	423	0.19 %	78.19 %
	Midland (Cabarrus)	217,563	4,684	4	0.00 %	0.09 %
	Mount Pleasant	217,563	1,671	1,671	0.77 %	100.00 %
35	Fairview	216,849	3,456	3,456	1.59 %	100.00 %
	Hemby Bridge	216,849	1,614	1,614	0.74 %	100.00 %
	Indian Trail	216,849	39,997	39,997	18.44 %	100.00 %
	Lake Park	216,849	3,269	3,269	1.51 %	100.00 %
	Locust (Cabarrus)	216,849	541	118	0.05 %	21.81 %
	Marvin	216,849	6,358	6,358	2.93 %	100.00 %
	Midland (Cabarrus)	216,849	4,684	4,680	2.16 %	99.91 %
	Mineral Springs	216,849	3,159	3,159	1.46 %	100.00 %
	Mint Hill (Union)	216,849	6	6	0.00 %	100.00 %
	Monroe	216,849	34,562	34,337	15.83 %	99.35 %
	Stallings (Union)	216,849	15,728	15,728	7.25 %	100.00 %
	Unionville	216,849	6,643	6,643	3.06 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
35	Waxhaw	216,849	20,534	20,534	9.47 %	100.00 %
	Weddington (Union)	216,849	13,176	13,176	6.08 %	100.00 %
	Wesley Chapel	216,849	8,681	8,681	4.00 %	100.00 %
36	Boonville	210,986	1,185	1,185	0.56 %	100.00 %
	Dobson	210,986	1,462	1,462	0.69 %	100.00 %
	East Bend	210,986	634	634	0.30 %	100.00 %
	Elkin (Surry)	210,986	4,049	4,049	1.92 %	100.00 %
	Elkin (Wilkes)	210,986	73	73	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Jonesville	210,986	2,308	2,308	1.09 %	100.00 %
	Mount Airy	210,986	10,676	10,676	5.06 %	100.00 %
	North Wilkesboro	210,986	4,382	4,382	2.08 %	100.00 %
	Pilot Mountain	210,986	1,440	1,440	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Ronda	210,986	438	438	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Taylorsville	210,986	2,320	2,320	1.10 %	100.00 %
	Wilkesboro	210,986	3,687	3,687	1.75 %	100.00 %
	Yadkinville	210,986	2,995	2,995	1.42 %	100.00 %
37	Cornelius	215,363	31,412	18,991	8.82 %	60.46 %
	Davidson (Iredell)	215,363	378	378	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Harmony	215,363	543	543	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Huntersville	215,363	61,376	9,667	4.49 %	15.75 %
	Love Valley	215,363	154	154	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Mooresville	215,363	50,193	50,193	23.31 %	100.00 %
	Statesville	215,363	28,419	28,419	13.20 %	100.00 %
	Troutman	215,363	3,698	3,698	1.72 %	100.00 %
38	Charlotte	216,250	874,579	211,216	97.67 %	24.15 %
39	Charlotte	217,710	874,579	197,245	90.60 %	22.55 %
	Pineville	217,710	10,602	3,621	1.66 %	34.15 %
40	Charlotte	218,745	874,579	165,897	75.84 %	18.97 %
	Matthews	218,745	29,435	10,695	4.89 %	36.33 %
	Midland (Mecklenburg)	218,745	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Mint Hill (Mecklenburg)	218,745	26,444	26,444	12.09 %	100.00 %
	Stallings (Mecklenburg)	218,745	384	373	0.17 %	97.14 %
41	Charlotte	216,976	874,579	114,003	52.54 %	13.04 %
	Cornelius	216,976	31,412	12,421	5.72 %	39.54 %
	Davidson (Mecklenburg)	216,976	14,728	14,728	6.79 %	100.00 %
	Huntersville	216,976	61,376	51,709	23.83 %	84.25 %
42	Charlotte	217,131	874,579	186,218	85.76 %	21.29 %
	Matthews	217,131	29,435	18,740	8.63 %	63.67 %
	Pineville	217,131	10,602	6,981	3.22 %	65.85 %
	Stallings (Mecklenburg)	217,131	384	11	0.01 %	2.86 %

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

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42	Weddington (Mecklenburg)	217,131	5	5	0.00 %	100.00 %
43	Belmont	211,229	15,010	15,010	7.11 %	100.00 %
	Bessemer City	211,229	5,428	5,428	2.57 %	100.00 %
	Cramerton	211,229	5,296	5,296	2.51 %	100.00 %
	Dallas	211,229	5,927	5,927	2.81 %	100.00 %
	Gastonia	211,229	80,411	80,411	38.07 %	100.00 %
	High Shoals	211,229	595	595	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Kings Mountain (Gaston)	211,229	1,110	1,110	0.53 %	100.00 %
	Lowell	211,229	3,654	3,654	1.73 %	100.00 %
	McAdenville	211,229	890	890	0.42 %	100.00 %
	Mount Holly	211,229	17,703	17,703	8.38 %	100.00 %
	Ranlo	211,229	4,511	4,511	2.14 %	100.00 %
	Spencer Mountain	211,229	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Stanley	211,229	3,963	3,963	1.88 %	100.00 %
44	Belwood	203,043	857	857	0.42 %	100.00 %
	Bessemer City	203,043	5,428	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Boiling Springs	203,043	4,615	4,615	2.27 %	100.00 %
	Casar	203,043	305	305	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Cherryville	203,043	6,078	6,078	2.99 %	100.00 %
	Dellview	203,043	6	6	0.00 %	100.00 %
	Earl	203,043	198	198	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Fallston	203,043	627	627	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Gastonia	203,043	80,411	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Grover	203,043	802	802	0.39 %	100.00 %
	High Shoals	203,043	595	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Kings Mountain (Cleveland)	203,043	10,032	10,032	4.94 %	100.00 %
	Kingstown	203,043	656	656	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Lattimore	203,043	406	406	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Lawndale	203,043	570	570	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Lincolnton	203,043	11,091	11,091	5.46 %	100.00 %
	Maiden (Lincoln)	203,043	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Mooresboro	203,043	293	293	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Patterson Springs	203,043	571	571	0.28 %	100.00 %
Polkville	203,043	516	516	0.25 %	100.00 %	
Shelby	203,043	21,918	21,918	10.79 %	100.00 %	
Waco	203,043	310	310	0.15 %	100.00 %	
45	Brookford	218,526	442	442	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Cajah's Mountain	218,526	2,722	2,722	1.25 %	100.00 %
	Catawba	218,526	702	702	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Cedar Rock	218,526	301	301	0.14 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

[G20-DMbC] - Generated 2/17/2022

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
45	Claremont	218,526	1,692	1,692	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Conover	218,526	8,421	8,421	3.85 %	100.00 %
	Gamewell	218,526	3,702	65	0.03 %	1.76 %
	Granite Falls	218,526	4,965	4,965	2.27 %	100.00 %
	Hickory (Caldwell)	218,526	32	32	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Hickory (Catawba)	218,526	43,379	43,379	19.85 %	100.00 %
	Hudson	218,526	3,780	3,780	1.73 %	100.00 %
	Lenoir	218,526	18,352	13,830	6.33 %	75.36 %
	Long View (Catawba)	218,526	4,353	4,353	1.99 %	100.00 %
	Maiden (Catawba)	218,526	3,736	3,736	1.71 %	100.00 %
	Newton	218,526	13,148	13,148	6.02 %	100.00 %
	Rhodhiss (Caldwell)	218,526	358	358	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Rutherford College (Caldwell)	218,526	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Sawmills	218,526	5,020	5,020	2.30 %	100.00 %
46	Asheville	200,646	94,589	1,387	0.69 %	1.47 %
	Black Mountain	200,646	8,426	8,426	4.20 %	100.00 %
	Connelly Springs	200,646	1,529	1,529	0.76 %	100.00 %
	Drexel	200,646	1,760	1,760	0.88 %	100.00 %
	Glen Alpine	200,646	1,529	1,529	0.76 %	100.00 %
	Hickory (Burke)	200,646	79	79	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Hildebran	200,646	1,679	1,679	0.84 %	100.00 %
	Long View (Burke)	200,646	735	735	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Marion	200,646	7,717	7,717	3.85 %	100.00 %
	Montreat	200,646	901	901	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Morganton	200,646	17,474	17,474	8.71 %	100.00 %
	Old Fort	200,646	811	811	0.40 %	100.00 %
	Rhodhiss (Burke)	200,646	639	639	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Rutherford College (Burke)	200,646	1,226	1,226	0.61 %	100.00 %
Valdese	200,646	4,689	4,689	2.34 %	100.00 %	
Weaverville	200,646	4,567	3,751	1.87 %	82.13 %	
47	Bakersville	209,958	450	450	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Banner Elk	209,958	1,049	1,049	0.50 %	100.00 %
	Beech Mountain (Avery)	209,958	62	62	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Beech Mountain (Watauga)	209,958	613	613	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Blowing Rock (Caldwell)	209,958	91	91	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Blowing Rock (Watauga)	209,958	1,285	1,285	0.61 %	100.00 %
	Boone	209,958	19,092	19,092	9.09 %	100.00 %
	Burnsville	209,958	1,614	1,614	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Canton	209,958	4,422	4,422	2.11 %	100.00 %
	Clyde	209,958	1,368	1,368	0.65 %	100.00 %

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Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
47	Crossnore	209,958	143	143	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Elk Park	209,958	542	542	0.26 %	100.00 %
	Gamewell	209,958	3,702	3,637	1.73 %	98.24 %
	Grandfather Village	209,958	95	95	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Hot Springs	209,958	520	520	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Jefferson	209,958	1,622	1,622	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Lansing	209,958	126	126	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Lenoir	209,958	18,352	4,522	2.15 %	24.64 %
	Mars Hill	209,958	2,007	2,007	0.96 %	100.00 %
	Marshall	209,958	777	777	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Newland	209,958	715	715	0.34 %	100.00 %
	Seven Devils (Avery)	209,958	38	38	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Seven Devils (Watauga)	209,958	275	275	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Sparta	209,958	1,834	1,834	0.87 %	100.00 %
	Spruce Pine	209,958	2,194	2,194	1.04 %	100.00 %
	Sugar Mountain	209,958	371	371	0.18 %	100.00 %
West Jefferson	209,958	1,279	1,279	0.61 %	100.00 %	
48	Bostic	200,053	355	355	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Chimney Rock Village	200,053	140	140	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Columbus	200,053	1,060	1,060	0.53 %	100.00 %
	Ellenboro	200,053	723	723	0.36 %	100.00 %
	Flat Rock	200,053	3,486	3,486	1.74 %	100.00 %
	Fletcher	200,053	7,987	7,987	3.99 %	100.00 %
	Forest City	200,053	7,377	7,377	3.69 %	100.00 %
	Hendersonville	200,053	15,137	15,137	7.57 %	100.00 %
	Lake Lure	200,053	1,365	1,365	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Laurel Park	200,053	2,250	2,250	1.12 %	100.00 %
	Mills River	200,053	7,078	7,078	3.54 %	100.00 %
	Ruth	200,053	347	347	0.17 %	100.00 %
	Rutherfordton	200,053	3,640	3,640	1.82 %	100.00 %
	Saluda (Henderson)	200,053	11	11	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Saluda (Polk)	200,053	620	620	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Spindale	200,053	4,225	4,225	2.11 %	100.00 %
Tryon	200,053	1,562	1,562	0.78 %	100.00 %	
49	Asheville	200,954	94,589	93,202	46.38 %	98.53 %
	Biltmore Forest	200,954	1,409	1,409	0.70 %	100.00 %
	Weaverville	200,954	4,567	816	0.41 %	17.87 %
	Woodfin	200,954	7,936	7,936	3.95 %	100.00 %
50	Andrews	213,909	1,667	1,667	0.78 %	100.00 %
	Brevard	213,909	7,744	7,744	3.62 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

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Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
50	Bryson City	213,909	1,558	1,558	0.73 %	100.00 %
	Dillsboro	213,909	213	213	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Fontana Dam	213,909	13	13	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Forest Hills	213,909	303	303	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Franklin	213,909	4,175	4,175	1.95 %	100.00 %
	Hayesville	213,909	461	461	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Highlands (Jackson)	213,909	12	12	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Highlands (Macon)	213,909	1,060	1,060	0.50 %	100.00 %
	Lake Santeetlah	213,909	38	38	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Maggie Valley	213,909	1,687	1,687	0.79 %	100.00 %
	Murphy	213,909	1,608	1,608	0.75 %	100.00 %
	Robbinsville	213,909	597	597	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Rosman	213,909	701	701	0.33 %	100.00 %
	Sylva	213,909	2,578	2,578	1.21 %	100.00 %
	Waynesville	213,909	10,140	10,140	4.74 %	100.00 %
	Webster	213,909	372	372	0.17 %	100.00 %
Total:				6,017,605		

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Total Municipalities (by County) Statewide: 614

Fully Assigned Municipalities: 614

Partially Assigned Municipalities: 0

Fully Unassigned Municipalities: 0

Split Municipalities: 33

Splits Involving Population: 26

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

[G20-DMbC] - Generated 2/17/2022

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

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Districts included: All

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
1	Carteret	28	0
	Chowan	6	0
	Dare	16	0
	Hyde	7	0
	Pamlico	10	0
	Pasquotank	9	0
	Perquimans	7	0
	Washington	6	0
2	Beaufort	21	0
	Craven	21	0
	Lenoir	22	0
3	Bertie	12	0
	Camden	3	0
	Currituck	11	0
	Gates	6	0
	Halifax	23	0
	Hertford	13	0
	Martin	13	0
	Northampton	13	0
	Tyrrell	6	0
Warren	14	0	
4	Greene	10	0
	Wayne	28	0
	Wilson	24	0
5	Edgecombe	21	0
	Pitt	40	0
6	Onslow	24	0
7	New Hanover	39	0
8	Brunswick	25	0
	Columbus	26	0
	New Hanover	4	0
9	Bladen	17	0
	Duplin	19	0
	Jones	7	0
	Pender	20	0
	Sampson	22	0
10	Johnston	36	0
11	Franklin	18	0
	Nash	24	0
	Vance	12	0
12	Harnett	13	0
	Lee	10	0
	Sampson	1	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
13	Wake	47	1
14	Wake	33	1
15	Wake	42	1
16	Wake	31	2
17	Wake	26	1
18	Granville	15	0
	Wake	22	0
19	Cumberland	52	0
20	Chatham	18	0
	Durham	22	0
21	Cumberland	24	0
	Moore	26	0
22	Durham	35	0
23	Caswell	9	0
	Orange	41	0
	Person	11	0
24	Hoke	15	0
	Robeson	39	0
	Scotland	7	0
25	Alamance	37	0
	Randolph	8	0
26	Guilford	31	0
	Rockingham	15	0
27	Guilford	65	0
28	Guilford	69	0
29	Anson	9	0
	Montgomery	14	0
	Randolph	14	0
	Richmond	16	0
	Union	9	0
30	Davidson	43	0
	Davie	14	0
31	Forsyth	40	0
	Stokes	18	0
32	Forsyth	61	0
33	Rowan	41	0
	Stanly	22	0
34	Cabarrus	39	0
35	Cabarrus	1	0
	Union	43	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

District	County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
36	Alexander	10	0
	Surry	24	0
	Wilkes	27	0
	Yadkin	12	0
37	Iredell	29	0
	Mecklenburg	4	0
38	Mecklenburg	35	0
39	Mecklenburg	41	0
40	Mecklenburg	38	0
41	Mecklenburg	30	0
42	Mecklenburg	47	0
43	Gaston	41	0
44	Cleveland	21	0
	Gaston	5	0
	Lincoln	23	0
45	Caldwell	13	0
	Catawba	40	0
46	Buncombe	24	0
	Burke	33	0
	McDowell	17	0
47	Alleghany	4	0
	Ashe	17	0
	Avery	19	0
	Caldwell	7	0
	Haywood	12	0
	Madison	12	0
	Mitchell	9	0
	Watauga	20	0
Yancey	11	0	
48	Henderson	34	0
	Polk	7	0
	Rutherford	17	0
49	Buncombe	55	0
50	Cherokee	16	0
	Clay	9	0
	Graham	4	0
	Haywood	17	0
	Jackson	13	0
	Macon	15	0
	Swain	5	0
	Transylvania	15	0
Total:		2,663	

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Total VTDs Statewide: 2666

Fully Assigned VTDs: 2666

Partially Assigned VTDs: 0

Fully Unassigned VTDs: 0

Split VTDs: 3

Splits Involving Population: 3

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
Alamance	37	0
Alexander	10	0
Alleghany	4	0
Anson	9	0
Ashe	17	0
Avery	19	0
Beaufort	21	0
Bertie	12	0
Bladen	17	0
Brunswick	25	0
Buncombe	79	0
Burke	33	0
Cabarrus	40	0
Caldwell	20	0
Camden	3	0
Carteret	28	0
Caswell	9	0
Catawba	40	0
Chatham	18	0
Cherokee	16	0
Chowan	6	0
Clay	9	0
Cleveland	21	0
Columbus	26	0
Craven	21	0
Cumberland	76	0
Currituck	11	0
Dare	16	0
Davidson	43	0
Davie	14	0
Duplin	19	0
Durham	57	0
Edgecombe	21	0
Forsyth	101	0
Franklin	18	0
Gaston	46	0
Gates	6	0
Graham	4	0
Granville	15	0
Greene	10	0
Guilford	165	0
Halifax	23	0
Harnett	13	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbC] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
Haywood	29	0
Henderson	34	0
Hertford	13	0
Hoke	15	0
Hyde	7	0
Iredell	29	0
Jackson	13	0
Johnston	36	0
Jones	7	0
Lee	10	0
Lenoir	22	0
Lincoln	23	0
Macon	15	0
Madison	12	0
Martin	13	0
McDowell	17	0
Mecklenburg	195	0
Mitchell	9	0
Montgomery	14	0
Moore	26	0
Nash	24	0
New Hanover	43	0
Northampton	13	0
Onslow	24	0
Orange	41	0
Pamlico	10	0
Pasquotank	9	0
Pender	20	0
Perquimans	7	0
Person	11	0
Pitt	40	0
Polk	7	0
Randolph	22	0
Richmond	16	0
Robeson	39	0
Rockingham	15	0
Rowan	41	0
Rutherford	17	0
Sampson	23	0
Scotland	7	0
Stanly	22	0
Stokes	18	0
Surry	24	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbC] - Generated 2/17/2022

Page 2 of 3

Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2**

County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
Swain	5	0
Transylvania	15	0
Tyrrell	6	0
Union	52	0
Vance	12	0
Wake	201	3
Warren	14	0
Washington	6	0
Watauga	20	0
Wayne	28	0
Wilkes	27	0
Wilson	24	0
Yadkin	12	0
Yancey	11	0
Totals:	2,663	3

Total VTDs Statewide: 2666

Fully Assigned VTDs: 2666

Partially Assigned VTDs: 0

Fully Unassigned VTDs: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split VTDs: 3

Splits Involving Population: 3

Split VTD Detail Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2

County	VTD	District	Total VTD Population	VTD Pop in District	Percent of VTD Pop in District
Wake	04-11	15	2,820	1,312	46.52 %
		16	2,820	1,508	53.48 %
	17-01	13	5,510	3,931	71.34 %
		14	5,510	1,579	28.66 %
	20-08	16	7,596	6,641	87.43 %
		17	7,596	955	12.57 %
Assigned Geography Total:				15,926	

Total VTDs Statewide: 2666

Fully Assigned VTDs: 2666

Partially Assigned VTDs: 0

Fully Unassigned VTDs: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split VTDs: 3

Splits Involving Population: 3

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-VTD-SDet] - Generated 2/17/2022

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

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Incumbent-District Report**District Plan: SL 2022-2****Residence Set: NC Senate - 2/12/2022**

Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District	District in this Plan
Alexander	W. Ted	R	44	44
Ballard	Deanna	R	45	47
Barnes	Lisa	R	11	11
Batch	Sydney	D	17	17
Bazemore	Ernestine	D	3	3
Berger	Philip	R	30	26
Blue	Daniel	D	14	14
Britt	Danny	R	13	24
Burgin	James	R	12	12
Chaudhuri	Jay	D	15	15
Clark	Robert	D	21	24
Corbin	Harold	R	50	50
Craven	David	R	26	29
Crawford	Sarah	D	18	18
Daniel	Warren	R	46	46
Davis	Donald	D	5	5
deViere	Kirk	D	19	19
Edwards	Charles	R	48	48
Fitch	Milton	D	4	4
Ford	Carl	R	33	33
Foushee	Valerie	D	23	23
Galey	Amy	R	24	25
Garrett	Michael	D	27	27
Harrington	Kathryn	R	43	43
Hise	Ralph	R	47	47
Jackson	Brent	R	10	9
Jackson	Jeffrey	D	37	42
Jarvis	Steven	R	29	30
Johnson	Matthew	R	35	35
Krawiec	Joyce	R	31	31
Lazzara	Michael	R	6	6
Lee	Michael	R	9	7
Lowe	Paul	D	32	32
Marcus	Natasha	D	41	41
Mayfield	Julie	D	49	49
McInnis	Thomas	R	25	21
Mohammed	Mujtaba	D	38	38
Murdock	Natalie	D	20	20
Newton	Paul	R	36	34
Nickel	George	D	16	16
Perry	Jim	R	7	2
Proctor	Dean	R	42	45

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Row shading indicates that the district in this plan is shared by more than one incumbent.

[G20-IncDist] - Generated 2/17/2022

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Incumbent-District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2**Residence Set: NC Senate - 2/12/2022**

Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District	District in this Plan
Rabon	William	R	8	8
Robinson	Gladys	D	28	28
Salvador	DeAndrea	D	39	39
Sanderson	Norman	R	2	1
Sawyer	Vickie	R	34	37
Steinburg	Bob	R	1	1
Waddell	Joyce	D	40	40
Woodard	Mike	D	22	22

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

Row shading indicates that the district in this plan is shared by more than one incumbent.

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District-Incumbent Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2**Residence Set: NC Senate - 2/12/2022**

District in this Plan	Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District
1	Sanderson	Norman	R	2
	Steinburg	Bob	R	1
2	Perry	Jim	R	7
3	Bazemore	Ernestine	D	3
4	Fitch	Milton	D	4
5	Davis	Donald	D	5
6	Lazzara	Michael	R	6
7	Lee	Michael	R	9
8	Rabon	William	R	8
9	Jackson	Brent	R	10
10				
11	Barnes	Lisa	R	11
12	Burgin	James	R	12
13				
14	Blue	Daniel	D	14
15	Chaudhuri	Jay	D	15
16	Nickel	George	D	16
17	Batch	Sydney	D	17
18	Crawford	Sarah	D	18
19	deViere	Kirk	D	19
20	Murdock	Natalie	D	20
21	McInnis	Thomas	R	25
22	Woodard	Mike	D	22
23	Foushee	Valerie	D	23
24	Britt	Danny	R	13
	Clark	Robert	D	21
25	Galey	Amy	R	24
26	Berger	Philip	R	30
27	Garrett	Michael	D	27
28	Robinson	Gladys	D	28
29	Craven	David	R	26
30	Jarvis	Steven	R	29
31	Krawiec	Joyce	R	31
32	Lowe	Paul	D	32
33	Ford	Carl	R	33
34	Newton	Paul	R	36
35	Johnson	Matthew	R	35
36				
37	Sawyer	Vickie	R	34
38	Mohammed	Mujtaba	D	38
39	Salvador	DeAndrea	D	39
40	Waddell	Joyce	D	40

District plan definition file: 'SL 2022-2.csv', modified 2/17/2022 8:15 PM

[G20-DistInc] - Generated 2/17/2022

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JA146

District-Incumbent Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2022-2**Residence Set: NC Senate - 2/12/2022**

District in this Plan	Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District
41	Marcus	Natasha	D	41
42	Jackson	Jeffrey	D	37
43	Harrington	Kathryn	R	43
44	Alexander	W. Ted	R	44
45	Proctor	Dean	R	42
46	Daniel	Warren	R	46
47	Ballard	Deanna	R	45
	Hise	Ralph	R	47
48	Edwards	Charles	R	48
49	Mayfield	Julie	D	49
50	Corbin	Harold	R	50

User: Blake Esselstyn
Plan Name: NC Sen Enacted 2022
Plan Type: Enacted

Population Summary

Monday, November 20, 2023

8:24 PM

District	Population	Deviation	% Devn. [% Amlndian]	[% Asian]	[% AP_Blik]	[% Hispanic Origin]	[% White]	[% 18+ AP_Blik]
1	199,750	-9,038	-4.33%	0.76%	18.59%	4.99%	73.91%	17.47%
2	200,494	-8,294	-3.97%	1.79%	28.2%	7.48%	61.66%	26.66%
3	198,430	-10,358	-4.96%	0.56%	43.19%	3.72%	50.35%	42.33%
4	216,568	7,780	3.73%	1.16%	35.86%	12.42%	50.69%	35.02%
5	219,143	10,355	4.96%	1.46%	42.27%	7.15%	48.56%	40.35%
6	204,576	-4,212	-2.02%	2.31%	16.95%	13.51%	67%	15.33%
7	208,637	-151	-0.07%	1.62%	12.66%	7.31%	76.9%	11.68%
8	204,381	-4,407	-2.11%	0.59%	16.28%	5.91%	74.91%	14.84%
9	202,791	-5,997	-2.87%	0.4%	23.76%	15.06%	59.94%	23.92%
10	215,999	7,211	3.45%	0.87%	17.57%	15.93%	65.94%	16.73%
11	206,121	-2,667	-1.28%	0.81%	37.86%	8.73%	52.17%	36.65%
12	200,794	-7,994	-3.83%	1%	21.77%	16.17%	61.43%	20.61%
13	198,383	-10,405	-4.98%	4.63%	20.85%	13.31%	60.8%	19.87%
14	198,391	-10,397	-4.98%	2.25%	43.78%	18.4%	36.3%	42.99%
15	198,416	-10,372	-4.97%	5.95%	15.35%	10.1%	67.2%	14.28%
16	198,364	-10,424	-4.99%	26.8%	11.12%	7.24%	53.23%	10.74%
17	198,370	-10,418	-4.99%	6.5%	11.62%	9.89%	70.63%	11.47%
18	198,478	-10,310	-4.94%	2.96%	23.38%	8.82%	63.86%	22.97%
19	216,664	7,876	3.77%	2.57%	41.42%	11.04%	43.45%	39.24%
20	199,272	-9,516	-4.56%	5.03%	28.16%	12.56%	53.57%	27.34%
21	217,791	9,003	4.31%	2.24%	29.78%	10.53%	57.29%	28.45%
22	201,846	-6,942	-3.32%	4.17%	35.15%	17.56%	43.06%	34.45%
23	210,529	1,741	0.83%	6.11%	17.18%	9.03%	65.97%	16.73%
24	202,786	-6,002	-2.87%	0.99%	30.32%	10.13%	32.29%	29.63%
25	217,130	8,342	4.00%	1.43%	18.94%	13.72%	65.52%	17.88%



Population Summary

NC Sen Enacted 2022

District	Population	Deviation	% Devn. [% AmIndian]	[% Asian]	[% AP_Blk]	[% Hispanic Origin]	[% White]	[% 18+ AP_Blk]
26	216,942	8,154	3.91%	2.4%	23.38%	6.71%	66.56%	22.07%
27	203,438	-5,350	-2.56%	7.2%	30.97%	9.87%	51.52%	28.98%
28	212,015	3,227	1.55%	4.52%	47.09%	11.13%	37.57%	45.64%
29	218,867	10,079	4.83%	1.42%	18.65%	11.36%	67.39%	17.81%
30	211,642	2,854	1.37%	1.3%	10.15%	8.16%	79.03%	9.21%
31	216,024	7,236	3.47%	1.08%	23.18%	14.79%	60.83%	22.21%
32	211,086	2,298	1.10%	3.37%	26.3%	11.46%	58.48%	25.19%
33	209,379	591	0.28%	1.27%	15.88%	9.09%	72.52%	14.88%
34	217,563	8,775	4.20%	5.46%	21.59%	12.22%	60.35%	20.14%
35	216,849	8,061	3.86%	4.37%	12.29%	12.71%	69.7%	11.74%
36	210,986	2,198	1.05%	0.59%	4.9%	9.18%	84.62%	4.48%
37	215,363	6,575	3.15%	2.63%	12.45%	8.14%	75.57%	11.41%
38	216,250	7,462	3.57%	6.66%	45.57%	14.86%	33.5%	43.67%
39	217,710	8,922	4.27%	5.83%	23.93%	17.52%	53.21%	23.13%
40	218,745	9,957	4.77%	6.1%	39.53%	22.45%	33.48%	38.67%
41	216,976	8,188	3.92%	4.01%	40.51%	12.96%	42.54%	39.59%
42	217,131	8,343	4.00%	10.15%	13.13%	9.52%	66.02%	12.48%
43	211,229	2,441	1.17%	1.64%	20.42%	9.1%	67.6%	18.57%
44	203,043	-5,745	-2.75%	0.82%	14.2%	5.56%	77.72%	13.14%
45	218,526	9,738	4.66%	3.42%	8.55%	9.56%	77.41%	7.57%
46	200,646	-8,142	-3.90%	2.02%	5.32%	6.88%	83.72%	4.9%
47	209,958	1,170	0.56%	0.71%	3.53%	5.82%	88.17%	3.37%
48	200,053	-8,735	-4.18%	0.88%	6.31%	9.65%	81.92%	5.51%
49	200,954	-7,834	-3.75%	1.41%	8.27%	9.08%	79.08%	7.25%
50	213,909	5,121	2.45%	0.7%	2.36%	5.81%	84.68%	1.98%
Total Population:			10,439,388					
Ideal District Population:			208,788					

Summary Statistics:



Population Summary

Population Range: 198,364 to 219,143
 Ratio Range: 0.10
 Absolute Range: -10,424 to 10,355
 Absolute Overall Range: 20,779
 Relative Range: -4.99% to 4.96%
 Relative Overall Range: 9.95%
 Absolute Mean Deviation: 6,948.16
 Relative Mean Deviation: 3.33%
 Standard Deviation: 7,562.14

Enacted 2022 Senate Northeastern Districts

Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Statistics

District ID	Total CVA Pop	Black CVA Pop	Black CVAP %
1	161,125	29,552	18.34%
3	164,825	73,305	44.47%
5	175,860	70,881	40.31%
11	154,485	60,216	38.98%

Attachment E

Contents	
Item 1:	Excerpts from enacted 2023 Senate plan "Stat Pack"
Source:	https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting
Item 2:	Enacted 2023 plan CVAP statistics
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

Population Deviation Report

District Plan: SL 2023-146

NC General Assembly

District	Seats	Ideal Pop	Actual Pop	Deviation	Deviation %
1	1	208,788	199,623	-9,165	-4.39%
2	1	208,788	198,557	-10,231	-4.90%
3	1	208,788	200,494	-8,294	-3.97%
4	1	208,788	216,568	7,780	3.73%
5	1	208,788	219,143	10,355	4.96%
6	1	208,788	204,576	-4,212	-2.02%
7	1	208,788	198,476	-10,312	-4.94%
8	1	208,788	214,542	5,754	2.76%
9	1	208,788	202,791	-5,997	-2.87%
10	1	208,788	215,999	7,211	3.45%
11	1	208,788	206,121	-2,667	-1.28%
12	1	208,788	200,794	-7,994	-3.83%
13	1	208,788	198,371	-10,417	-4.99%
14	1	208,788	198,512	-10,276	-4.92%
15	1	208,788	198,368	-10,420	-4.99%
16	1	208,788	198,384	-10,404	-4.98%
17	1	208,788	198,415	-10,373	-4.97%
18	1	208,788	198,352	-10,436	-5.00%
19	1	208,788	216,471	7,683	3.68%
20	1	208,788	201,314	-7,474	-3.58%
21	1	208,788	217,984	9,196	4.40%
22	1	208,788	199,804	-8,984	-4.30%
23	1	208,788	210,529	1,741	0.83%
24	1	208,788	202,786	-6,002	-2.87%
25	1	208,788	217,448	8,660	4.15%
26	1	208,788	211,801	3,013	1.44%
27	1	208,788	210,558	1,770	0.85%
28	1	208,788	210,036	1,248	0.60%
29	1	208,788	218,829	10,041	4.81%
30	1	208,788	211,642	2,854	1.37%
31	1	208,788	215,359	6,571	3.15%
32	1	208,788	211,751	2,963	1.42%
33	1	208,788	209,379	591	0.28%
34	1	208,788	214,990	6,202	2.97%
35	1	208,788	219,142	10,354	4.96%
36	1	208,788	210,986	2,198	1.05%
37	1	208,788	219,210	10,422	4.99%
38	1	208,788	217,905	9,117	4.37%
39	1	208,788	219,123	10,335	4.95%
40	1	208,788	218,881	10,093	4.83%
41	1	208,788	217,678	8,890	4.26%
42	1	208,788	209,378	590	0.28%
43	1	208,788	211,229	2,441	1.17%

Population Deviation Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Seats	Ideal Pop	Actual Pop	Deviation	Deviation %
44	1	208,788	203,043	-5,745	-2.75%
45	1	208,788	218,989	10,201	4.89%
46	1	208,788	199,859	-8,929	-4.28%
47	1	208,788	204,671	-4,117	-1.97%
48	1	208,788	200,053	-8,735	-4.18%
49	1	208,788	201,741	-7,047	-3.38%
50	1	208,788	218,733	9,945	4.76%
Totals:	50		10,439,388		

Deviation range: -5.00% to 4.99%

Census All Ages by Race Report District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	White	% White	Black	% Black	NA	% NA	API	% API	Other	% Other	MR	% MR	Total
1	125,591	62.91%	57,106	28.61%	993	0.50%	1,553	0.78%	3,988	2.00%	10,392	5.21%	199,623
2	121,958	61.42%	59,169	29.80%	3,177	1.60%	1,286	0.65%	4,336	2.18%	8,631	4.35%	198,557
3	123,633	61.66%	52,702	26.29%	763	0.38%	3,809	1.90%	8,030	4.01%	11,557	5.76%	200,494
4	109,785	50.69%	73,142	33.77%	1,356	0.63%	2,631	1.21%	16,909	7.81%	12,745	5.88%	216,568
5	106,421	48.56%	87,843	40.08%	905	0.41%	3,309	1.51%	9,646	4.40%	11,019	5.03%	219,143
6	137,072	67.00%	28,026	13.70%	1,460	0.71%	5,554	2.71%	10,196	4.98%	22,268	10.88%	204,576
7	157,787	79.50%	16,543	8.34%	891	0.45%	3,398	1.71%	7,101	3.58%	12,756	6.43%	198,476
8	155,737	72.59%	36,975	17.23%	2,774	1.29%	1,448	0.67%	6,352	2.96%	11,256	5.25%	214,542
9	121,550	59.94%	45,144	22.26%	2,937	1.45%	900	0.44%	20,252	9.99%	12,008	5.92%	202,791
10	142,425	65.94%	33,730	15.62%	1,767	0.82%	1,989	0.92%	18,150	8.40%	17,938	8.30%	215,999
11	107,533	52.17%	74,185	35.99%	1,391	0.67%	1,743	0.85%	11,299	5.48%	9,970	4.84%	206,121
12	123,342	61.43%	38,666	19.26%	2,015	1.00%	2,491	1.24%	17,191	8.56%	17,089	8.51%	200,794
13	141,140	71.15%	22,160	11.17%	1,110	0.56%	7,474	3.77%	10,777	5.43%	15,710	7.92%	198,371
14	68,213	34.36%	83,900	42.26%	1,674	0.84%	6,498	3.27%	23,382	11.78%	14,845	7.48%	198,512
15	119,784	60.38%	40,134	20.23%	1,035	0.52%	8,772	4.42%	14,101	7.11%	14,542	7.33%	198,368
16	130,932	66.00%	25,553	12.89%	789	0.40%	15,334	7.73%	9,696	4.89%	16,070	8.10%	198,384
17	105,063	52.95%	18,055	9.10%	601	0.30%	55,186	27.81%	5,037	2.54%	14,473	7.29%	198,415
18	133,279	67.19%	37,116	18.71%	917	0.46%	4,756	2.40%	9,230	4.65%	13,054	6.58%	198,352
19	75,828	35.03%	98,857	45.67%	3,101	1.43%	7,355	3.40%	10,032	4.63%	21,298	9.84%	216,471
20	108,904	54.10%	51,907	25.78%	1,036	0.51%	10,440	5.19%	14,326	7.12%	14,701	7.30%	201,314
21	143,094	65.64%	39,424	18.09%	3,280	1.50%	4,596	2.11%	9,142	4.19%	18,448	8.46%	217,984
22	84,758	42.42%	66,617	33.34%	1,720	0.86%	8,172	4.09%	24,063	12.04%	14,474	7.24%	199,804
23	138,877	65.97%	32,609	15.49%	1,217	0.58%	12,944	6.15%	9,901	4.70%	14,981	7.12%	210,529
24	65,474	32.29%	56,352	27.79%	52,679	25.98%	2,308	1.14%	12,640	6.23%	13,333	6.57%	202,786
25	142,645	65.60%	36,611	16.84%	1,819	0.84%	4,121	1.90%	17,754	8.16%	14,498	6.67%	217,448
26	145,757	68.82%	40,237	19.00%	1,105	0.52%	5,133	2.42%	7,520	3.55%	12,049	5.69%	211,801
27	117,501	55.80%	54,113	25.70%	1,049	0.50%	14,194	6.74%	9,998	4.75%	13,703	6.51%	210,558
28	65,604	31.23%	104,287	49.65%	1,470	0.70%	10,390	4.95%	14,452	6.88%	13,833	6.59%	210,036
29	141,450	64.64%	40,298	18.42%	2,325	1.06%	2,263	1.03%	18,680	8.54%	13,813	6.31%	218,829
30	167,262	79.03%	18,493	8.74%	1,225	0.58%	2,805	1.33%	9,704	4.59%	12,153	5.74%	211,642
31	160,520	74.54%	25,283	11.74%	1,170	0.54%	4,354	2.02%	10,222	4.75%	13,810	6.41%	215,359
32	94,323	44.54%	71,685	33.85%	1,539	0.73%	5,383	2.54%	22,602	10.67%	16,219	7.66%	211,751
33	151,842	72.52%	30,091	14.37%	1,036	0.49%	2,764	1.32%	10,884	5.20%	12,762	6.10%	209,379
34	130,960	60.91%	40,669	18.92%	1,097	0.51%	11,039	5.13%	14,656	6.82%	16,569	7.71%	214,990

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File.

Black = Black or African American, NA = American Indian and Alaskan Native, API = Asian and Pacific Islander, MR = two or more races

District plan definition file: 'SL_2023-146.csv', model: 'Case 2:23-cv-00193-D-RN Document 17-1 Filed 11/22/23 Page 121 of 236'

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Census All Ages by Race Report
District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	White	% White	Black	% Black	NA	% NA	API	% API	Other	% Other	MR	% MR	Total
35	157,147	71.71%	21,765	9.93%	970	0.44%	10,548	4.81%	11,728	5.35%	16,984	7.75%	219,142
36	178,538	84.62%	8,188	3.88%	879	0.42%	1,270	0.60%	11,343	5.38%	10,768	5.10%	210,986
37	166,786	76.09%	23,165	10.57%	800	0.36%	5,773	2.63%	8,229	3.75%	14,457	6.60%	219,210
38	96,083	44.09%	77,403	35.52%	973	0.45%	14,336	6.58%	12,953	5.94%	16,157	7.41%	217,905
39	100,168	45.71%	53,698	24.51%	1,859	0.85%	17,926	8.18%	24,832	11.33%	20,640	9.42%	219,123
40	65,794	30.06%	85,954	39.27%	1,994	0.91%	13,595	6.21%	32,511	14.85%	19,033	8.70%	218,881
41	80,770	37.11%	93,411	42.91%	1,140	0.52%	8,875	4.08%	19,311	8.87%	14,171	6.51%	217,678
42	150,335	71.80%	18,505	8.84%	645	0.31%	17,048	8.14%	7,357	3.51%	15,488	7.40%	209,378
43	142,790	67.60%	39,168	18.54%	1,029	0.49%	3,527	1.67%	10,628	5.03%	14,087	6.67%	211,229
44	157,796	77.72%	25,796	12.70%	658	0.32%	1,720	0.85%	5,485	2.70%	11,588	5.71%	203,043
45	168,519	76.95%	15,636	7.14%	1,289	0.59%	7,521	3.43%	11,534	5.27%	14,490	6.62%	218,989
46	166,870	83.49%	8,005	4.01%	1,851	0.93%	4,109	2.06%	7,988	4.00%	11,036	5.52%	199,859
47	181,442	88.65%	4,710	2.30%	715	0.35%	1,591	0.78%	6,043	2.95%	10,170	4.97%	204,671
48	163,893	81.92%	9,989	4.99%	870	0.43%	2,423	1.21%	10,346	5.17%	12,532	6.26%	200,053
49	160,024	79.32%	13,892	6.89%	945	0.47%	3,335	1.65%	8,867	4.40%	14,678	7.28%	201,741
50	185,460	84.79%	3,240	1.48%	9,992	4.57%	1,580	0.72%	5,986	2.74%	12,475	5.70%	218,733
Total:	6,488,459	62.15%	2,140,217	20.50%	130,032	1.25%	351,569	3.37%	617,390	5.91%	711,721	6.82%	10,439,388

Census All Ages by Ethnicity Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Hispanic	% Hispanic	Non-Hisp	% Non-Hisp	White Non-Hisp	% White Non-Hisp
1	9,393	4.71%	190,230	95.29%	122,974	61.60%
2	7,951	4.00%	190,606	96.00%	120,603	60.74%
3	14,993	7.48%	185,501	92.52%	120,946	60.32%
4	26,887	12.42%	189,681	87.58%	105,949	48.92%
5	15,674	7.15%	203,469	92.85%	104,177	47.54%
6	27,641	13.51%	176,935	86.49%	129,499	63.30%
7	15,249	7.68%	183,227	92.32%	154,491	77.84%
8	12,084	5.63%	202,458	94.37%	153,394	71.50%
9	30,536	15.06%	172,255	84.94%	117,737	58.06%
10	34,400	15.93%	181,599	84.07%	136,464	63.18%
11	18,001	8.73%	188,120	91.27%	104,845	50.87%
12	32,469	16.17%	168,325	83.83%	116,903	58.22%
13	21,886	11.03%	176,485	88.97%	137,321	69.22%
14	36,267	18.27%	162,245	81.73%	64,311	32.40%
15	24,943	12.57%	173,425	87.43%	116,412	58.68%
16	20,080	10.12%	178,304	89.88%	127,881	64.46%
17	13,750	6.93%	184,665	93.07%	102,266	51.54%
18	17,526	8.84%	180,826	91.16%	130,439	65.76%
19	24,990	11.54%	191,481	88.46%	70,917	32.76%
20	24,279	12.06%	177,035	87.94%	105,842	52.58%
21	21,873	10.03%	196,111	89.97%	137,675	63.16%
22	36,197	18.12%	163,607	81.88%	81,013	40.55%
23	19,009	9.03%	191,520	90.97%	135,705	64.46%
24	20,550	10.13%	182,236	89.87%	63,073	31.10%
25	28,820	13.25%	188,628	86.75%	138,591	63.74%
26	14,508	6.85%	197,293	93.15%	143,126	67.58%
27	18,921	8.99%	191,637	91.01%	114,460	54.36%
28	24,809	11.81%	185,227	88.19%	62,272	29.65%
29	29,610	13.53%	189,219	86.47%	137,436	62.81%
30	17,277	8.16%	194,365	91.84%	164,296	77.63%
31	19,879	9.23%	195,480	90.77%	157,175	72.98%
32	36,265	17.13%	175,486	82.87%	90,560	42.77%
33	19,026	9.09%	190,353	90.91%	148,780	71.06%
34	26,632	12.39%	188,358	87.61%	127,117	59.13%
35	23,726	10.83%	195,416	89.17%	153,298	69.95%
36	19,368	9.18%	191,618	90.82%	175,337	83.10%
37	17,512	7.99%	201,698	92.01%	163,439	74.56%
38	24,625	11.30%	193,280	88.70%	92,614	42.50%
39	44,099	20.13%	175,024	79.87%	94,879	43.30%
40	52,065	23.79%	166,816	76.21%	59,296	27.09%
41	30,058	13.81%	187,620	86.19%	77,498	35.60%
42	17,340	8.28%	192,038	91.72%	147,350	70.38%
43	19,228	9.10%	192,001	90.90%	139,800	66.18%
44	11,291	5.56%	191,752	94.44%	155,677	76.67%
45	21,296	9.72%	197,693	90.28%	164,942	75.32%
46	14,904	7.46%	184,955	92.54%	164,245	82.18%
47	11,673	5.70%	192,998	94.30%	178,735	87.33%
48	19,311	9.65%	180,742	90.35%	160,489	80.22%

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File. Hispanic indicates Hispanic or Latino origin without regard to race.

District plan definition for SL 2023-146 as of 10/26/2023 9:39 AM
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Census All Ages by Ethnicity Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Hispanic	% Hispanic	Non-Hisp	% Non-Hisp	White Non-Hisp	% White Non-Hisp
49	17,149	8.50%	184,592	91.50%	157,069	77.86%
50	12,576	5.75%	206,157	94.25%	182,830	83.59%
Total:	1,118,596	10.72%	9,320,792	89.28%	6,312,148	60.46%

Census All Age Black Populations Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Single Race Black	% Single Race Black	Multi-Race Black	% Multi-Race Black	Any Part Black	% Any Part Black
1	57,106	28.61%	3,384	1.70%	60,490	30.30%
2	59,169	29.80%	3,179	1.60%	62,348	31.40%
3	52,702	26.29%	3,846	1.92%	56,548	28.20%
4	73,142	33.77%	4,529	2.09%	77,671	35.86%
5	87,843	40.08%	4,794	2.19%	92,637	42.27%
6	28,026	13.70%	6,649	3.25%	34,675	16.95%
7	16,543	8.34%	2,805	1.41%	19,348	9.75%
8	36,975	17.23%	3,359	1.57%	40,334	18.80%
9	45,144	22.26%	3,040	1.50%	48,184	23.76%
10	33,730	15.62%	4,214	1.95%	37,944	17.57%
11	74,185	35.99%	3,843	1.86%	78,028	37.86%
12	38,666	19.26%	5,041	2.51%	43,707	21.77%
13	22,160	11.17%	3,293	1.66%	25,453	12.83%
14	83,900	42.26%	5,333	2.69%	89,233	44.95%
15	40,134	20.23%	4,067	2.05%	44,201	22.28%
16	25,563	12.89%	3,855	1.94%	29,418	14.83%
17	18,055	9.10%	3,129	1.58%	21,184	10.68%
18	37,116	18.71%	3,579	1.80%	40,695	20.52%
19	98,857	45.67%	10,371	4.79%	109,228	50.46%
20	51,907	25.78%	4,346	2.16%	56,253	27.94%
21	39,424	18.09%	5,941	2.73%	45,365	20.81%
22	66,617	33.34%	4,193	2.10%	70,810	35.44%
23	32,609	15.49%	3,567	1.69%	36,176	17.18%
24	56,352	27.79%	5,139	2.53%	61,491	30.32%
25	36,611	16.84%	4,344	2.00%	40,955	18.83%
26	40,237	19.00%	4,054	1.91%	44,291	20.91%
27	54,113	25.70%	4,431	2.10%	58,544	27.80%
28	104,287	49.65%	6,429	3.06%	110,716	52.71%
29	40,298	18.42%	3,444	1.57%	43,742	19.99%
30	18,493	8.74%	2,982	1.41%	21,475	10.15%
31	25,283	11.74%	3,284	1.52%	28,567	13.26%
32	71,685	33.85%	5,323	2.51%	77,008	36.37%
33	30,091	14.37%	3,166	1.51%	33,257	15.88%
34	40,669	18.92%	5,005	2.33%	45,674	21.24%
35	21,765	9.93%	3,431	1.57%	25,196	11.50%
36	8,188	3.88%	2,158	1.02%	10,346	4.90%
37	23,165	10.57%	3,337	1.52%	26,502	12.09%
38	77,403	35.52%	5,605	2.57%	83,008	38.09%
39	53,698	24.51%	4,870	2.22%	58,568	26.73%
40	85,954	39.27%	5,917	2.70%	91,871	41.97%
41	93,411	42.91%	5,244	2.41%	98,655	45.32%
42	18,505	8.84%	3,236	1.55%	21,741	10.38%
43	39,168	18.54%	3,958	1.87%	43,126	20.42%
44	25,796	12.70%	3,044	1.50%	28,840	14.20%
45	15,636	7.14%	3,881	1.77%	19,517	8.91%
46	8,005	4.01%	2,297	1.15%	10,302	5.15%
47	4,710	2.30%	1,654	0.81%	6,364	3.11%
48	9,989	4.99%	2,640	1.32%	12,629	6.31%

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File.

District plan definition for SL 2023-146 as of 10/26/2023 9:39 AM
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Census All Age Black Populations Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Single Race Black	% Single Race Black	Multi-Race Black	% Multi-Race Black	Any Part Black	% Any Part Black
49	13,892	6.89%	3,087	1.53%	16,979	8.42%
50	3,240	1.48%	2,019	0.92%	5,259	2.40%
Total:	2,140,217	20.50%	204,336	1.96%	2,344,553	22.46%

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File.

District plan definition for SL 2023-146 as of 10/26/2023 9:59 AM

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Census Voting Age by Race Report District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	White	% White	Black	% Black	NA	% NA	API	% API	Other	% Other	MR	% MR	Total
1	103,642	64.49%	45,755	28.47%	818	0.51%	1,288	0.80%	2,728	1.70%	6,485	4.04%	160,716
2	103,272	63.62%	46,983	28.94%	2,509	1.55%	1,047	0.65%	2,911	1.79%	5,600	3.45%	162,322
3	102,555	64.62%	40,501	25.52%	616	0.39%	2,767	1.74%	5,222	3.29%	7,050	4.44%	158,711
4	89,726	53.37%	56,499	33.61%	996	0.59%	2,118	1.26%	10,787	6.42%	7,997	4.76%	168,123
5	87,678	51.44%	66,044	38.74%	696	0.41%	2,658	1.56%	6,387	3.75%	6,999	4.11%	170,462
6	108,554	68.94%	20,997	13.33%	1,155	0.73%	4,704	2.99%	8,141	5.17%	13,916	8.84%	157,467
7	132,176	81.58%	13,161	8.12%	679	0.42%	2,772	1.71%	4,757	2.94%	8,480	5.23%	162,025
8	135,123	75.48%	28,867	16.13%	2,163	1.21%	1,196	0.67%	4,188	2.34%	7,473	4.17%	179,010
9	97,650	62.39%	36,004	23.01%	2,164	1.38%	710	0.45%	12,695	8.11%	7,280	4.65%	156,503
10	110,168	68.81%	24,948	15.58%	1,226	0.77%	1,546	0.97%	11,594	7.24%	10,617	6.63%	160,099
11	87,920	54.75%	56,850	35.40%	1,049	0.65%	1,356	0.84%	7,303	4.55%	6,111	3.81%	160,589
12	96,625	64.65%	28,612	19.14%	1,517	1.02%	1,930	1.29%	10,977	7.34%	9,791	6.55%	149,452
13	106,709	73.16%	16,766	11.50%	807	0.55%	5,507	3.78%	7,018	4.81%	9,044	6.20%	145,851
14	55,751	37.34%	63,007	42.19%	1,216	0.81%	5,075	3.40%	14,815	9.92%	9,461	6.34%	149,325
15	101,455	63.39%	30,850	19.28%	779	0.49%	7,443	4.65%	9,496	5.93%	10,021	6.26%	160,044
16	109,478	68.34%	19,916	12.43%	572	0.36%	12,620	7.88%	6,753	4.22%	10,847	6.77%	160,186
17	79,550	55.69%	13,396	9.38%	397	0.28%	37,731	26.41%	3,541	2.48%	8,240	5.77%	142,855
18	103,473	68.98%	28,564	19.04%	671	0.45%	3,614	2.41%	5,956	3.97%	7,735	5.16%	150,013
19	62,393	37.76%	73,952	44.75%	2,420	1.46%	6,043	3.66%	7,213	4.37%	13,224	8.00%	165,245
20	91,563	56.66%	41,395	25.62%	814	0.50%	8,934	5.53%	9,440	5.84%	9,458	5.85%	161,604
21	114,181	68.19%	30,012	17.92%	2,488	1.49%	3,594	2.15%	6,506	3.89%	10,667	6.37%	167,448
22	72,651	45.76%	52,665	33.18%	1,184	0.75%	7,184	4.53%	15,418	9.71%	9,647	6.08%	158,749
23	115,116	68.08%	26,336	15.58%	933	0.55%	10,473	6.19%	6,661	3.94%	9,567	5.66%	169,086
24	53,176	34.81%	42,826	28.03%	39,263	25.70%	1,806	1.18%	8,042	5.26%	7,659	5.01%	152,772
25	116,994	68.80%	28,191	16.58%	1,354	0.80%	3,107	1.83%	11,446	6.73%	8,955	5.27%	170,047
26	118,842	71.43%	30,774	18.50%	856	0.51%	3,722	2.24%	4,932	2.96%	7,252	4.36%	166,378
27	98,311	59.29%	40,781	24.59%	804	0.48%	10,375	6.26%	6,968	4.20%	8,572	5.17%	165,811
28	56,181	34.18%	80,573	49.02%	1,068	0.65%	7,891	4.80%	9,571	5.82%	9,073	5.52%	164,357
29	115,602	67.85%	31,043	18.22%	1,746	1.02%	1,742	1.02%	11,922	7.00%	8,329	4.89%	170,384
30	135,137	81.43%	14,086	8.49%	969	0.58%	2,148	1.29%	6,206	3.74%	7,417	4.47%	165,963
31	130,145	77.15%	19,316	11.45%	880	0.52%	3,181	1.89%	6,592	3.91%	8,576	5.08%	168,690
32	79,908	48.50%	55,061	33.42%	1,084	0.66%	4,319	2.62%	13,850	8.41%	10,525	6.39%	164,747
33	123,504	75.20%	23,105	14.07%	800	0.49%	2,084	1.27%	6,878	4.19%	7,861	4.79%	164,232
34	103,325	64.65%	29,187	18.26%	802	0.50%	7,339	4.59%	9,280	5.81%	9,883	6.18%	159,816

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File.

Black = Black or African American, NA = American Indian and Alaskan Native, API = Asian and Pacific Islander, MR = two or more races

District plan definition file: 'SL_2023-146.csv', model: 'Case 24-23-CV-00193-D-RN Document 17-1 Filed 11/22/23 Page 127 of 236 [PL20-VA-RCE] - Generated 10/26/2023

Census Voting Age by Race Report
District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	White	% White	Black	% Black	NA	% NA	API	% API	Other	% Other	MR	% MR	Total
35	117,609	74.11%	15,843	9.98%	692	0.44%	7,062	4.45%	7,516	4.74%	9,978	6.29%	158,700
36	145,551	86.72%	6,635	3.95%	672	0.40%	979	0.58%	7,257	4.32%	6,752	4.02%	167,846
37	133,334	78.50%	17,287	10.18%	622	0.37%	4,237	2.49%	5,488	3.23%	8,893	5.24%	169,861
38	76,120	46.02%	58,387	35.30%	689	0.42%	11,056	6.68%	8,758	5.30%	10,384	6.28%	165,394
39	83,113	49.07%	41,001	24.21%	1,263	0.75%	13,480	7.96%	16,667	9.84%	13,862	8.18%	169,386
40	56,123	33.49%	65,316	38.98%	1,483	0.88%	10,370	6.19%	21,536	12.85%	12,744	7.61%	167,572
41	70,937	41.23%	70,763	41.13%	845	0.49%	7,056	4.10%	12,602	7.32%	9,855	5.73%	172,058
42	118,288	74.14%	13,977	8.76%	498	0.31%	12,004	7.52%	5,081	3.18%	9,701	6.08%	159,549
43	116,337	70.74%	28,762	17.49%	838	0.51%	2,735	1.66%	7,038	4.28%	8,754	5.32%	164,464
44	127,240	79.61%	19,769	12.37%	518	0.32%	1,402	0.88%	3,732	2.33%	7,169	4.49%	159,830
45	138,217	79.95%	12,180	7.05%	908	0.53%	5,203	3.01%	7,648	4.42%	8,726	5.05%	172,882
46	136,895	85.51%	6,625	4.14%	1,292	0.81%	2,999	1.87%	5,163	3.22%	7,123	4.45%	160,097
47	152,430	89.54%	4,174	2.45%	567	0.33%	1,356	0.80%	4,485	2.63%	7,229	4.25%	170,241
48	136,617	84.30%	7,869	4.86%	678	0.42%	1,900	1.17%	7,078	4.37%	7,909	4.88%	162,051
49	135,749	81.97%	10,771	6.50%	739	0.45%	2,657	1.60%	6,024	3.64%	9,660	5.83%	165,600
50	157,043	87.01%	2,661	1.47%	6,927	3.84%	1,221	0.68%	4,109	2.28%	8,525	4.72%	180,486
Total:	5,300,137	64.99%	1,639,043	20.10%	96,726	1.19%	265,741	3.26%	406,376	4.98%	447,076	5.48%	8,155,099

Census Voting Age Population by Ethnicity Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Hispanic	% Hispanic	Non-Hisp	% Non-Hisp	White Non-Hisp	% White Non-Hisp
1	6,381	3.97%	154,335	96.03%	101,719	63.29%
2	5,104	3.14%	157,218	96.86%	102,468	63.13%
3	9,520	6.00%	149,191	94.00%	100,918	63.59%
4	16,845	10.02%	151,278	89.98%	87,490	52.04%
5	10,266	6.02%	160,196	93.98%	86,233	50.59%
6	19,679	12.50%	137,788	87.50%	103,466	65.71%
7	10,100	6.23%	151,925	93.77%	129,954	80.21%
8	7,927	4.43%	171,083	95.57%	133,642	74.66%
9	18,791	12.01%	137,712	87.99%	95,517	61.03%
10	21,098	13.18%	139,001	86.82%	106,884	66.76%
11	11,321	7.05%	149,268	92.95%	86,353	53.77%
12	19,720	13.19%	129,732	86.81%	93,063	62.27%
13	13,686	9.38%	132,165	90.62%	104,495	71.65%
14	23,152	15.50%	126,173	84.50%	53,349	35.73%
15	17,093	10.68%	142,951	89.32%	99,051	61.89%
16	14,044	8.77%	146,142	91.23%	107,281	66.97%
17	9,046	6.33%	133,809	93.67%	77,755	54.43%
18	11,116	7.41%	138,897	92.59%	101,718	67.81%
19	16,909	10.23%	148,336	89.77%	58,984	35.69%
20	16,069	9.94%	145,535	90.06%	89,569	55.42%
21	14,405	8.60%	153,043	91.40%	110,633	66.07%
22	23,488	14.80%	135,261	85.20%	70,103	44.16%
23	12,697	7.51%	156,389	92.49%	113,016	66.84%
24	12,751	8.35%	140,021	91.65%	51,706	33.85%
25	18,183	10.69%	151,864	89.31%	114,589	67.39%
26	9,056	5.44%	157,322	94.56%	117,377	70.55%
27	12,539	7.56%	153,272	92.44%	96,343	58.10%
28	16,195	9.85%	148,162	90.15%	54,107	32.92%
29	18,412	10.81%	151,972	89.19%	113,305	66.50%
30	10,695	6.44%	155,268	93.56%	133,468	80.42%
31	12,510	7.42%	156,180	92.58%	128,183	75.99%
32	22,506	13.66%	142,241	86.34%	77,591	47.10%
33	11,794	7.18%	152,438	92.82%	121,681	74.09%
34	16,532	10.34%	143,284	89.66%	101,052	63.23%
35	14,888	9.38%	143,812	90.62%	115,343	72.68%
36	12,040	7.17%	155,806	92.83%	143,701	85.61%
37	11,386	6.70%	158,475	93.30%	131,276	77.28%
38	16,559	10.01%	148,835	89.99%	73,806	44.62%
39	29,885	17.64%	139,501	82.36%	79,602	46.99%
40	34,608	20.65%	132,964	79.35%	51,831	30.93%
41	19,949	11.59%	152,109	88.41%	68,599	39.87%
42	11,752	7.37%	147,797	92.63%	116,283	72.88%
43	12,484	7.59%	151,980	92.41%	114,497	69.62%
44	7,413	4.64%	152,417	95.36%	125,981	78.82%
45	13,555	7.84%	159,327	92.16%	136,150	78.75%
46	9,408	5.88%	150,689	94.12%	135,276	84.50%
47	8,169	4.80%	162,072	95.20%	150,645	88.49%
48	12,767	7.88%	149,284	92.12%	134,530	83.02%

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File. Hispanic indicates Hispanic or Latino origin without regard to race.

District plan definition for SL 2023-146 as of 10/26/2023 9:39 AM
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Census Voting Age Population by Ethnicity Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Hispanic	% Hispanic	Non-Hisp	% Non-Hisp	White Non-Hisp	% White Non-Hisp
49	11,479	6.93%	154,121	93.07%	133,760	80.77%
50	8,339	4.62%	172,147	95.38%	155,290	86.04%
Total:	724,311	8.88%	7,430,788	91.12%	5,189,633	63.64%

Census Voting Age Black Populations Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Single Race Black	% Single Race Black	Multi-Race Black	% Multi-Race Black	Any Part Black	% Any Part Black
1	45,755	28.47%	1,648	1.03%	47,403	29.49%
2	46,983	28.94%	1,722	1.06%	48,705	30.01%
3	40,501	25.52%	1,812	1.14%	42,313	26.66%
4	56,499	33.61%	2,379	1.42%	58,878	35.02%
5	66,044	38.74%	2,737	1.61%	68,781	40.35%
6	20,997	13.33%	3,137	1.99%	24,134	15.33%
7	13,161	8.12%	1,505	0.93%	14,666	9.05%
8	28,867	16.13%	1,703	0.95%	30,570	17.08%
9	36,004	23.01%	1,428	0.91%	37,432	23.92%
10	24,948	15.58%	1,839	1.15%	26,787	16.73%
11	56,850	35.40%	2,000	1.25%	58,850	36.65%
12	28,612	19.14%	2,193	1.47%	30,805	20.61%
13	16,766	11.50%	1,549	1.06%	18,315	12.56%
14	63,007	42.19%	2,960	1.98%	65,967	44.18%
15	30,850	19.28%	2,485	1.55%	33,335	20.83%
16	19,916	12.43%	2,323	1.45%	22,239	13.88%
17	13,396	9.38%	1,619	1.13%	15,015	10.51%
18	28,564	19.04%	1,706	1.14%	30,270	20.18%
19	73,952	44.75%	5,481	3.32%	79,433	48.07%
20	41,395	25.62%	2,396	1.48%	43,791	27.10%
21	30,012	17.92%	2,734	1.63%	32,746	19.56%
22	52,665	33.18%	2,536	1.60%	55,201	34.77%
23	26,336	15.58%	1,945	1.15%	28,281	16.73%
24	42,826	28.03%	2,442	1.60%	45,268	29.63%
25	28,191	16.58%	2,027	1.19%	30,218	17.77%
26	30,774	18.50%	1,833	1.10%	32,607	19.60%
27	40,781	24.59%	2,341	1.41%	43,122	26.01%
28	80,573	49.02%	3,934	2.39%	84,507	51.42%
29	31,043	18.22%	1,518	0.89%	32,561	19.11%
30	14,086	8.49%	1,192	0.72%	15,278	9.21%
31	19,316	11.45%	1,501	0.89%	20,817	12.34%
32	55,061	33.42%	3,101	1.88%	58,162	35.30%
33	23,105	14.07%	1,333	0.81%	24,438	14.88%
34	29,187	18.26%	2,398	1.50%	31,585	19.76%
35	15,843	9.98%	1,513	0.95%	17,356	10.94%
36	6,635	3.95%	881	0.52%	7,516	4.48%
37	17,287	10.18%	1,537	0.90%	18,824	11.08%
38	58,387	35.30%	3,279	1.98%	61,666	37.28%
39	41,001	24.21%	2,847	1.68%	43,848	25.89%
40	65,316	38.98%	3,527	2.10%	68,843	41.08%
41	70,763	41.13%	3,290	1.91%	74,053	43.04%
42	13,977	8.76%	1,754	1.10%	15,731	9.86%
43	28,762	17.49%	1,780	1.08%	30,542	18.57%
44	19,769	12.37%	1,230	0.77%	20,999	13.14%
45	12,180	7.05%	1,510	0.87%	13,690	7.92%
46	6,625	4.14%	984	0.61%	7,609	4.75%
47	4,174	2.45%	944	0.55%	5,118	3.01%
48	7,869	4.86%	1,052	0.65%	8,921	5.51%

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File.

District plan definition for SL 2023-146 as of 10/26/2023 9:39 AM
Case 4:23-cv-00193-D-RN Document 17-1 Filed 11/22/23 Page 131 of 236

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Census Voting Age Black Populations Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	Single Race Black	% Single Race Black	Multi-Race Black	% Multi-Race Black	Any Part Black	% Any Part Black
49	10,771	6.50%	1,425	0.86%	12,196	7.36%
50	2,661	1.47%	999	0.55%	3,660	2.03%
Total:	1,639,043	20.10%	104,009	1.28%	1,743,052	21.37%

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File.

District plan definition for SL 2023-146 as of 10/26/2023 9:59 AM

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County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

County	District	Total County Population	Total District Population	County Pop in District	Percent of County Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in County
Alamance	25	171,415	217,448	171,415	100.00 %	78.83 %
Alexander	36	36,444	210,986	36,444	100.00 %	17.27 %
Alleghany	47	10,888	204,671	10,888	100.00 %	5.32 %
Anson	29	22,055	218,829	22,055	100.00 %	10.08 %
Ashe	47	26,577	204,671	26,577	100.00 %	12.99 %
Avery	47	17,806	204,671	17,806	100.00 %	8.70 %
Beaufort	3	44,652	200,494	44,652	100.00 %	22.27 %
Bertie	1	17,934	199,623	17,934	100.00 %	8.98 %
Bladen	9	29,606	202,791	29,606	100.00 %	14.60 %
Brunswick	8	136,693	214,542	136,693	100.00 %	63.71 %
Buncombe	46	269,452	199,859	67,711	25.13 %	33.88 %
	49	269,452	201,741	201,741	74.87 %	100.00 %
Burke	46	87,570	199,859	87,570	100.00 %	43.82 %
Cabarrus	34	225,804	214,990	214,990	95.21 %	100.00 %
	35	225,804	219,142	10,814	4.79 %	4.93 %
Caldwell	45	80,652	218,989	58,379	72.38 %	26.66 %
	47	80,652	204,671	22,273	27.62 %	10.88 %
Camden	1	10,355	199,623	10,355	100.00 %	5.19 %
Carteret	2	67,686	198,557	67,686	100.00 %	34.09 %
Caswell	23	22,736	210,529	22,736	100.00 %	10.80 %
Catawba	45	160,610	218,989	160,610	100.00 %	73.34 %
Chatham	20	76,285	201,314	76,285	100.00 %	37.89 %
Cherokee	50	28,774	218,733	28,774	100.00 %	13.15 %
Chowan	2	13,708	198,557	13,708	100.00 %	6.90 %
Clay	50	11,089	218,733	11,089	100.00 %	5.07 %
Cleveland	44	99,519	203,043	99,519	100.00 %	49.01 %
Columbus	8	50,623	214,542	50,623	100.00 %	23.60 %
Craven	3	100,720	200,494	100,720	100.00 %	50.24 %
Cumberland	19	334,728	216,471	216,471	64.67 %	100.00 %
	21	334,728	217,984	118,257	35.33 %	54.25 %
Currituck	1	28,100	199,623	28,100	100.00 %	14.08 %
Dare	1	36,915	199,623	36,915	100.00 %	18.49 %
Davidson	30	168,930	211,642	168,930	100.00 %	79.82 %
Davie	30	42,712	211,642	42,712	100.00 %	20.18 %
Duplin	9	48,715	202,791	48,715	100.00 %	24.02 %
Durham	20	324,833	201,314	125,029	38.49 %	62.11 %
	22	324,833	199,804	199,804	61.51 %	100.00 %
Edgecombe	5	48,900	219,143	48,900	100.00 %	22.31 %
Forsyth	31	382,590	215,359	170,839	44.65 %	79.33 %
	32	382,590	211,751	211,751	55.35 %	100.00 %
Franklin	11	68,573	206,121	68,573	100.00 %	33.27 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-CntyDist] - Generated 10/26/2023

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County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

County	District	Total County Population	Total District Population	County Pop in District	Percent of County Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in County
Gaston	43	227,943	211,229	211,229	92.67 %	100.00 %
	44	227,943	203,043	16,714	7.33 %	8.23 %
Gates	1	10,478	199,623	10,478	100.00 %	5.25 %
Graham	50	8,030	218,733	8,030	100.00 %	3.67 %
Granville	18	60,992	198,352	60,992	100.00 %	30.75 %
Greene	4	20,451	216,568	20,451	100.00 %	9.44 %
Guilford	26	541,299	211,801	120,705	22.30 %	56.99 %
	27	541,299	210,558	210,558	38.90 %	100.00 %
	28	541,299	210,036	210,036	38.80 %	100.00 %
Halifax	2	48,622	198,557	48,622	100.00 %	24.49 %
Harnett	12	133,568	200,794	133,568	100.00 %	66.52 %
Haywood	47	62,089	204,671	18,475	29.76 %	9.03 %
	50	62,089	218,733	43,614	70.24 %	19.94 %
Henderson	48	116,281	200,053	116,281	100.00 %	58.13 %
Hertford	1	21,552	199,623	21,552	100.00 %	10.80 %
Hoke	24	52,082	202,786	52,082	100.00 %	25.68 %
Hyde	2	4,589	198,557	4,589	100.00 %	2.31 %
Iredell	37	186,693	219,210	186,693	100.00 %	85.17 %
Jackson	50	43,109	218,733	43,109	100.00 %	19.71 %
Johnston	10	215,999	215,999	215,999	100.00 %	100.00 %
Jones	9	9,172	202,791	9,172	100.00 %	4.52 %
Lee	12	63,285	200,794	63,285	100.00 %	31.52 %
Lenoir	3	55,122	200,494	55,122	100.00 %	27.49 %
Lincoln	44	86,810	203,043	86,810	100.00 %	42.75 %
Macon	50	37,014	218,733	37,014	100.00 %	16.92 %
Madison	47	21,193	204,671	21,193	100.00 %	10.35 %
Martin	2	22,031	198,557	22,031	100.00 %	11.10 %
McDowell	46	44,578	199,859	44,578	100.00 %	22.30 %
Mecklenburg	37	1,115,482	219,210	32,517	2.92 %	14.83 %
	38	1,115,482	217,905	217,905	19.53 %	100.00 %
	39	1,115,482	219,123	219,123	19.64 %	100.00 %
	40	1,115,482	218,881	218,881	19.62 %	100.00 %
	41	1,115,482	217,678	217,678	19.51 %	100.00 %
	42	1,115,482	209,378	209,378	18.77 %	100.00 %
Mitchell	47	14,903	204,671	14,903	100.00 %	7.28 %
Montgomery	29	25,751	218,829	25,751	100.00 %	11.77 %
Moore	21	99,727	217,984	99,727	100.00 %	45.75 %
Nash	11	94,970	206,121	94,970	100.00 %	46.07 %
New Hanover	7	225,702	198,476	198,476	87.94 %	100.00 %
	8	225,702	214,542	27,226	12.06 %	12.69 %
Northampton	1	17,471	199,623	17,471	100.00 %	8.75 %
Onslow	6	204,576	204,576	204,576	100.00 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

County	District	Total County Population	Total District Population	County Pop in District	Percent of County Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in County
Orange	23	148,696	210,529	148,696	100.00 %	70.63 %
Pamlico	2	12,276	198,557	12,276	100.00 %	6.18 %
Pasquotank	1	40,568	199,623	40,568	100.00 %	20.32 %
Pender	9	60,203	202,791	60,203	100.00 %	29.69 %
Perquimans	1	13,005	199,623	13,005	100.00 %	6.51 %
Person	23	39,097	210,529	39,097	100.00 %	18.57 %
Pitt	5	170,243	219,143	170,243	100.00 %	77.69 %
Polk	48	19,328	200,053	19,328	100.00 %	9.66 %
Randolph	25	144,171	217,448	46,033	31.93 %	21.17 %
	29	144,171	218,829	98,138	68.07 %	44.85 %
Richmond	29	42,946	218,829	42,946	100.00 %	19.63 %
Robeson	24	116,530	202,786	116,530	100.00 %	57.46 %
Rockingham	26	91,096	211,801	91,096	100.00 %	43.01 %
Rowan	33	146,875	209,379	146,875	100.00 %	70.15 %
Rutherford	48	64,444	200,053	64,444	100.00 %	32.21 %
Sampson	9	59,036	202,791	55,095	93.32 %	27.17 %
	12	59,036	200,794	3,941	6.68 %	1.96 %
Scotland	24	34,174	202,786	34,174	100.00 %	16.85 %
Stanly	33	62,504	209,379	62,504	100.00 %	29.85 %
Stokes	31	44,520	215,359	44,520	100.00 %	20.67 %
Surry	36	71,359	210,986	71,359	100.00 %	33.82 %
Swain	50	14,117	218,733	14,117	100.00 %	6.45 %
Transylvania	50	32,986	218,733	32,986	100.00 %	15.08 %
Tyrrell	1	3,245	199,623	3,245	100.00 %	1.63 %
Union	29	238,267	218,829	29,939	12.57 %	13.68 %
	35	238,267	219,142	208,328	87.43 %	95.07 %
Vance	11	42,578	206,121	42,578	100.00 %	20.66 %
Wake	13	1,129,410	198,371	198,371	17.56 %	100.00 %
	14	1,129,410	198,512	198,512	17.58 %	100.00 %
	15	1,129,410	198,368	198,368	17.56 %	100.00 %
	16	1,129,410	198,384	198,384	17.57 %	100.00 %
	17	1,129,410	198,415	198,415	17.57 %	100.00 %
Wake	18	1,129,410	198,352	137,360	12.16 %	69.25 %
Warren	2	18,642	198,557	18,642	100.00 %	9.39 %
Washington	2	11,003	198,557	11,003	100.00 %	5.54 %
Watauga	47	54,086	204,671	54,086	100.00 %	26.43 %
Wayne	4	117,333	216,568	117,333	100.00 %	54.18 %
Wilkes	36	65,969	210,986	65,969	100.00 %	31.27 %
Wilson	4	78,784	216,568	78,784	100.00 %	36.38 %
Yadkin	36	37,214	210,986	37,214	100.00 %	17.64 %
Yancey	47	18,470	204,671	18,470	100.00 %	9.02 %
Assigned Geography Total:				10,439,388		

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Report display: all assigned counties

Total Counties Statewide: 100

Fully Assigned Counties: 100

Partially Assigned Counties: 0

Fully Unassigned Counties: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split Counties: 15

District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
1	Bertie	199,623	17,934	17,934	8.98 %	100.00 %
	Camden	199,623	10,355	10,355	5.19 %	100.00 %
	Currituck	199,623	28,100	28,100	14.08 %	100.00 %
	Dare	199,623	36,915	36,915	18.49 %	100.00 %
	Gates	199,623	10,478	10,478	5.25 %	100.00 %
	Hertford	199,623	21,552	21,552	10.80 %	100.00 %
	Northampton	199,623	17,471	17,471	8.75 %	100.00 %
	Pasquotank	199,623	40,568	40,568	20.32 %	100.00 %
	Perquimans	199,623	13,005	13,005	6.51 %	100.00 %
	Tyrrell	199,623	3,245	3,245	1.63 %	100.00 %
2	Carteret	198,557	67,686	67,686	34.09 %	100.00 %
	Chowan	198,557	13,708	13,708	6.90 %	100.00 %
	Halifax	198,557	48,622	48,622	24.49 %	100.00 %
	Hyde	198,557	4,589	4,589	2.31 %	100.00 %
	Martin	198,557	22,031	22,031	11.10 %	100.00 %
	Pamlico	198,557	12,276	12,276	6.18 %	100.00 %
	Warren	198,557	18,642	18,642	9.39 %	100.00 %
	Washington	198,557	11,003	11,003	5.54 %	100.00 %
3	Beaufort	200,494	44,652	44,652	22.27 %	100.00 %
	Craven	200,494	100,720	100,720	50.24 %	100.00 %
	Lenoir	200,494	55,122	55,122	27.49 %	100.00 %
4	Greene	216,568	20,451	20,451	9.44 %	100.00 %
	Wayne	216,568	117,333	117,333	54.18 %	100.00 %
	Wilson	216,568	78,784	78,784	36.38 %	100.00 %
5	Edgecombe	219,143	48,900	48,900	22.31 %	100.00 %
	Pitt	219,143	170,243	170,243	77.69 %	100.00 %
6	Onslow	204,576	204,576	204,576	100.00 %	100.00 %
7	New Hanover	198,476	225,702	198,476	100.00 %	87.94 %
8	Brunswick	214,542	136,693	136,693	63.71 %	100.00 %
	Columbus	214,542	50,623	50,623	23.60 %	100.00 %
	New Hanover	214,542	225,702	27,226	12.69 %	12.06 %
9	Bladen	202,791	29,606	29,606	14.60 %	100.00 %
	Duplin	202,791	48,715	48,715	24.02 %	100.00 %
	Jones	202,791	9,172	9,172	4.52 %	100.00 %
	Pender	202,791	60,203	60,203	29.69 %	100.00 %
	Sampson	202,791	59,036	55,095	27.17 %	93.32 %
10	Johnston	215,999	215,999	215,999	100.00 %	100.00 %
11	Franklin	206,121	68,573	68,573	33.27 %	100.00 %
	Nash	206,121	94,970	94,970	46.07 %	100.00 %
	Vance	206,121	42,578	42,578	20.66 %	100.00 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
12	Harnett	200,794	133,568	133,568	66.52 %	100.00 %
	Lee	200,794	63,285	63,285	31.52 %	100.00 %
	Sampson	200,794	59,036	3,941	1.96 %	6.68 %
13	Wake	198,371	1,129,410	198,371	100.00 %	17.56 %
14	Wake	198,512	1,129,410	198,512	100.00 %	17.58 %
15	Wake	198,368	1,129,410	198,368	100.00 %	17.56 %
16	Wake	198,384	1,129,410	198,384	100.00 %	17.57 %
17	Wake	198,415	1,129,410	198,415	100.00 %	17.57 %
18	Granville	198,352	60,992	60,992	30.75 %	100.00 %
	Wake	198,352	1,129,410	137,360	69.25 %	12.16 %
19	Cumberland	216,471	334,728	216,471	100.00 %	64.67 %
20	Chatham	201,314	76,285	76,285	37.89 %	100.00 %
	Durham	201,314	324,833	125,029	62.11 %	38.49 %
21	Cumberland	217,984	334,728	118,257	54.25 %	35.33 %
	Moore	217,984	99,727	99,727	45.75 %	100.00 %
22	Durham	199,804	324,833	199,804	100.00 %	61.51 %
23	Caswell	210,529	22,736	22,736	10.80 %	100.00 %
	Orange	210,529	148,696	148,696	70.63 %	100.00 %
	Person	210,529	39,097	39,097	18.57 %	100.00 %
24	Hoke	202,786	52,082	52,082	25.68 %	100.00 %
	Robeson	202,786	116,530	116,530	57.46 %	100.00 %
	Scotland	202,786	34,174	34,174	16.85 %	100.00 %
25	Alamance	217,448	171,415	171,415	78.83 %	100.00 %
	Randolph	217,448	144,171	46,033	21.17 %	31.93 %
26	Guilford	211,801	541,299	120,705	56.99 %	22.30 %
	Rockingham	211,801	91,096	91,096	43.01 %	100.00 %
27	Guilford	210,558	541,299	210,558	100.00 %	38.90 %
28	Guilford	210,036	541,299	210,036	100.00 %	38.80 %
29	Anson	218,829	22,055	22,055	10.08 %	100.00 %
	Montgomery	218,829	25,751	25,751	11.77 %	100.00 %
	Randolph	218,829	144,171	98,138	44.85 %	68.07 %
	Richmond	218,829	42,946	42,946	19.63 %	100.00 %
	Union	218,829	238,267	29,939	13.68 %	12.57 %
30	Davidson	211,642	168,930	168,930	79.82 %	100.00 %
	Davie	211,642	42,712	42,712	20.18 %	100.00 %
31	Forsyth	215,359	382,590	170,839	79.33 %	44.65 %
	Stokes	215,359	44,520	44,520	20.67 %	100.00 %
32	Forsyth	211,751	382,590	211,751	100.00 %	55.35 %
33	Rowan	209,379	146,875	146,875	70.15 %	100.00 %
	Stanly	209,379	62,504	62,504	29.85 %	100.00 %
34	Cabarrus	214,990	225,804	214,990	100.00 %	95.21 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

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District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
35	Cabarrus	219,142	225,804	10,814	4.93 %	4.79 %
	Union	219,142	238,267	208,328	95.07 %	87.43 %
36	Alexander	210,986	36,444	36,444	17.27 %	100.00 %
	Surry	210,986	71,359	71,359	33.82 %	100.00 %
	Wilkes	210,986	65,969	65,969	31.27 %	100.00 %
	Yadkin	210,986	37,214	37,214	17.64 %	100.00 %
37	Iredell	219,210	186,693	186,693	85.17 %	100.00 %
	Mecklenburg	219,210	1,115,482	32,517	14.83 %	2.92 %
38	Mecklenburg	217,905	1,115,482	217,905	100.00 %	19.53 %
39	Mecklenburg	219,123	1,115,482	219,123	100.00 %	19.64 %
40	Mecklenburg	218,881	1,115,482	218,881	100.00 %	19.62 %
41	Mecklenburg	217,678	1,115,482	217,678	100.00 %	19.51 %
42	Mecklenburg	209,378	1,115,482	209,378	100.00 %	18.77 %
43	Gaston	211,229	227,943	211,229	100.00 %	92.67 %
44	Cleveland	203,043	99,519	99,519	49.01 %	100.00 %
	Gaston	203,043	227,943	16,714	8.23 %	7.33 %
	Lincoln	203,043	86,810	86,810	42.75 %	100.00 %
45	Caldwell	218,989	80,652	58,379	26.66 %	72.38 %
	Catawba	218,989	160,610	160,610	73.34 %	100.00 %
46	Buncombe	199,859	269,452	67,711	33.88 %	25.13 %
	Burke	199,859	87,570	87,570	43.82 %	100.00 %
	McDowell	199,859	44,578	44,578	22.30 %	100.00 %
47	Alleghany	204,671	10,888	10,888	5.32 %	100.00 %
	Ashe	204,671	26,577	26,577	12.99 %	100.00 %
	Avery	204,671	17,806	17,806	8.70 %	100.00 %
	Caldwell	204,671	80,652	22,273	10.88 %	27.62 %
	Haywood	204,671	62,089	18,475	9.03 %	29.76 %
	Madison	204,671	21,193	21,193	10.35 %	100.00 %
	Mitchell	204,671	14,903	14,903	7.28 %	100.00 %
	Watauga	204,671	54,086	54,086	26.43 %	100.00 %
Yancey	204,671	18,470	18,470	9.02 %	100.00 %	
48	Henderson	200,053	116,281	116,281	58.13 %	100.00 %
	Polk	200,053	19,328	19,328	9.66 %	100.00 %
	Rutherford	200,053	64,444	64,444	32.21 %	100.00 %
49	Buncombe	201,741	269,452	201,741	100.00 %	74.87 %

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District - County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

District	County	Total District Population	Total County Population	District Pop in County	Percent of District Pop in County	Percent of County Pop in District
50	Cherokee	218,733	28,774	28,774	13.15 %	100.00 %
	Clay	218,733	11,089	11,089	5.07 %	100.00 %
	Graham	218,733	8,030	8,030	3.67 %	100.00 %
	Haywood	218,733	62,089	43,614	19.94 %	70.24 %
	Jackson	218,733	43,109	43,109	19.71 %	100.00 %
	Macon	218,733	37,014	37,014	16.92 %	100.00 %
	Swain	218,733	14,117	14,117	6.45 %	100.00 %
	Transylvania	218,733	32,986	32,986	15.08 %	100.00 %
Total:				10,439,388		

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Total Counties Statewide: 100

Fully Assigned Counties: 100

Partially Assigned Counties: 0

Fully Unassigned Counties: 0

Split Counties: 15

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Aberdeen	21	8,516	217,984	8,516	100.00 %	3.91 %
Ahoskie	1	4,891	199,623	4,891	100.00 %	2.45 %
Alamance	25	988	217,448	988	100.00 %	0.45 %
Albemarle	33	16,432	209,379	16,432	100.00 %	7.85 %
Alliance	2	733	198,557	733	100.00 %	0.37 %
Andrews	50	1,667	218,733	1,667	100.00 %	0.76 %
Angier	12	5,265	200,794	4,709	89.44 %	2.35 %
	13	5,265	198,371	556	10.56 %	0.28 %
Ansonville	29	440	218,829	440	100.00 %	0.20 %
Apex	13	58,780	198,371	8,749	14.88 %	4.41 %
	16	58,780	198,384	297	0.51 %	0.15 %
	17	58,780	198,415	49,734	84.61 %	25.07 %
Arapahoe	2	416	198,557	416	100.00 %	0.21 %
Archdale	25	11,907	217,448	11,326	95.12 %	5.21 %
	26	11,907	211,801	250	2.10 %	0.12 %
	27	11,907	210,558	130	1.09 %	0.06 %
	29	11,907	218,829	201	1.69 %	0.09 %
Archer Lodge	10	4,797	215,999	4,797	100.00 %	2.22 %
Asheboro	25	27,156	217,448	1,217	4.48 %	0.56 %
	29	27,156	218,829	25,939	95.52 %	11.85 %
Asheville	46	94,589	199,859	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	49	94,589	201,741	94,589	100.00 %	46.89 %
Askewville	1	184	199,623	184	100.00 %	0.09 %
Atkinson	9	296	202,791	296	100.00 %	0.15 %
Atlantic Beach	2	1,364	198,557	1,364	100.00 %	0.69 %
Aulander	1	763	199,623	763	100.00 %	0.38 %
Aurora	3	455	200,494	455	100.00 %	0.23 %
Autryville	9	167	202,791	167	100.00 %	0.08 %
Ayden	5	4,977	219,143	4,977	100.00 %	2.27 %
Badin	33	2,024	209,379	2,024	100.00 %	0.97 %
Bailey	11	568	206,121	568	100.00 %	0.28 %
Bakersville	47	450	204,671	450	100.00 %	0.22 %
Bald Head Island	8	268	214,542	268	100.00 %	0.12 %
Banner Elk	47	1,049	204,671	1,049	100.00 %	0.51 %
Bath	3	245	200,494	245	100.00 %	0.12 %
Bayboro	2	1,161	198,557	1,161	100.00 %	0.58 %
Bear Grass	2	89	198,557	89	100.00 %	0.04 %
Beaufort	2	4,464	198,557	4,464	100.00 %	2.25 %
Beech Mountain	47	675	204,671	675	100.00 %	0.33 %
Belhaven	3	1,410	200,494	1,410	100.00 %	0.70 %
Belmont	43	15,010	211,229	15,010	100.00 %	7.11 %
Belville	8	2,406	214,542	2,406	100.00 %	1.12 %

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Municipality - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Belwood	44	857	203,043	857	100.00 %	0.42 %
Benson	10	3,967	215,999	3,967	100.00 %	1.84 %
	12	3,967	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bermuda Run	30	3,120	211,642	3,120	100.00 %	1.47 %
Bessemer City	43	5,428	211,229	5,428	100.00 %	2.57 %
	44	5,428	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bethania	31	344	215,359	344	100.00 %	0.16 %
Bethel	5	1,373	219,143	1,373	100.00 %	0.63 %
Beulaville	9	1,116	202,791	1,116	100.00 %	0.55 %
Biltmore Forest	49	1,409	201,741	1,409	100.00 %	0.70 %
Biscoe	29	1,848	218,829	1,848	100.00 %	0.84 %
Black Creek	4	692	216,568	692	100.00 %	0.32 %
Black Mountain	46	8,426	199,859	8,426	100.00 %	4.22 %
Bladenboro	9	1,648	202,791	1,648	100.00 %	0.81 %
Blowing Rock	47	1,376	204,671	1,376	100.00 %	0.67 %
Boardman	8	166	214,542	166	100.00 %	0.08 %
Bogue	2	695	198,557	695	100.00 %	0.35 %
Boiling Spring Lakes	8	5,943	214,542	5,943	100.00 %	2.77 %
Boiling Springs	44	4,615	203,043	4,615	100.00 %	2.27 %
Bolivia	8	149	214,542	149	100.00 %	0.07 %
Bolton	8	519	214,542	519	100.00 %	0.24 %
Boone	47	19,092	204,671	19,092	100.00 %	9.33 %
Boonville	36	1,185	210,986	1,185	100.00 %	0.56 %
Bostic	48	355	200,053	355	100.00 %	0.18 %
Brevard	50	7,744	218,733	7,744	100.00 %	3.54 %
Bridgeton	3	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Broadway	12	1,267	200,794	1,267	100.00 %	0.63 %
Brookford	45	442	218,989	442	100.00 %	0.20 %
Brunswick	8	973	214,542	973	100.00 %	0.45 %
Bryson City	50	1,558	218,733	1,558	100.00 %	0.71 %
Bunn	11	327	206,121	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Burgaw	9	3,088	202,791	3,088	100.00 %	1.52 %
Burlington	25	57,303	217,448	55,481	96.82 %	25.51 %
	26	57,303	211,801	1,822	3.18 %	0.86 %
Burnsville	47	1,614	204,671	1,614	100.00 %	0.79 %
Butner	18	8,397	198,352	8,397	100.00 %	4.23 %
Cajah's Mountain	45	2,722	218,989	2,722	100.00 %	1.24 %
Calabash	8	2,011	214,542	2,011	100.00 %	0.94 %
Calypso	9	327	202,791	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Cameron	21	244	217,984	244	100.00 %	0.11 %
Candor	21	813	217,984	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	29	813	218,829	813	100.00 %	0.37 %

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Canton	47	4,422	204,671	2,438	55.13 %	1.19 %
	50	4,422	218,733	1,984	44.87 %	0.91 %
Cape Carteret	2	2,224	198,557	2,224	100.00 %	1.12 %
Carolina Beach	7	6,564	198,476	6,564	100.00 %	3.31 %
Carolina Shores	8	4,588	214,542	4,588	100.00 %	2.14 %
Carrboro	23	21,295	210,529	21,295	100.00 %	10.11 %
Carthage	21	2,775	217,984	2,775	100.00 %	1.27 %
Cary	13	174,721	198,371	19,385	11.09 %	9.77 %
	16	174,721	198,384	67,911	38.87 %	34.23 %
	17	174,721	198,415	83,716	47.91 %	42.19 %
	20	174,721	201,314	3,709	2.12 %	1.84 %
Casar	44	305	203,043	305	100.00 %	0.15 %
Castalia	11	264	206,121	264	100.00 %	0.13 %
Caswell Beach	8	395	214,542	395	100.00 %	0.18 %
Catawba	45	702	218,989	702	100.00 %	0.32 %
Cedar Point	2	1,764	198,557	1,764	100.00 %	0.89 %
Cedar Rock	47	301	204,671	301	100.00 %	0.15 %
Cerro Gordo	8	131	214,542	131	100.00 %	0.06 %
Chadbourn	8	1,574	214,542	1,574	100.00 %	0.73 %
Chapel Hill	20	61,960	201,314	2,906	4.69 %	1.44 %
	23	61,960	210,529	59,054	95.31 %	28.05 %
Charlotte	38	874,579	217,905	126,901	14.51 %	58.24 %
	39	874,579	219,123	183,069	20.93 %	83.55 %
	40	874,579	218,881	209,707	23.98 %	95.81 %
	41	874,579	217,678	209,066	23.90 %	96.04 %
	42	874,579	209,378	145,836	16.67 %	69.65 %
Cherryville	44	6,078	203,043	6,078	100.00 %	2.99 %
Chimney Rock Village	48	140	200,053	140	100.00 %	0.07 %
China Grove	33	4,434	209,379	4,434	100.00 %	2.12 %
Chocowinity	3	722	200,494	722	100.00 %	0.36 %
Claremont	45	1,692	218,989	1,692	100.00 %	0.77 %
Clarkton	9	614	202,791	614	100.00 %	0.30 %
Clayton	10	26,307	215,999	26,307	100.00 %	12.18 %
	13	26,307	198,371	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	14	26,307	198,512	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Clemmons	31	21,163	215,359	21,163	100.00 %	9.83 %
Cleveland	33	846	209,379	846	100.00 %	0.40 %
Clinton	9	8,383	202,791	8,383	100.00 %	4.13 %
Clyde	47	1,368	204,671	1,368	100.00 %	0.67 %
Coats	12	2,155	200,794	2,155	100.00 %	1.07 %
Cofield	1	267	199,623	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Colerain	1	217	199,623	217	100.00 %	0.11 %

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Columbia	1	610	199,623	610	100.00 %	0.31 %
Columbus	48	1,060	200,053	1,060	100.00 %	0.53 %
Como	1	67	199,623	67	100.00 %	0.03 %
Concord	34	105,240	214,990	105,240	100.00 %	48.95 %
Conetoe	5	198	219,143	198	100.00 %	0.09 %
Connelly Springs	46	1,529	199,859	1,529	100.00 %	0.77 %
Conover	45	8,421	218,989	8,421	100.00 %	3.85 %
Conway	1	752	199,623	752	100.00 %	0.38 %
Cooleemee	30	940	211,642	940	100.00 %	0.44 %
Cornelius	37	31,412	219,210	18,991	60.46 %	8.66 %
	38	31,412	217,905	12,421	39.54 %	5.70 %
Cove City	3	378	200,494	378	100.00 %	0.19 %
Cramerton	43	5,296	211,229	5,296	100.00 %	2.51 %
Creedmoor	18	4,866	198,352	4,866	100.00 %	2.45 %
Creswell	2	207	198,557	207	100.00 %	0.10 %
Crossnore	47	143	204,671	143	100.00 %	0.07 %
Dallas	43	5,927	211,229	5,927	100.00 %	2.81 %
Danbury	31	189	215,359	189	100.00 %	0.09 %
Davidson	37	15,106	219,210	13,068	86.51 %	5.96 %
	38	15,106	217,905	2,038	13.49 %	0.94 %
Dellview	44	6	203,043	6	100.00 %	0.00 %
Denton	30	1,494	211,642	1,494	100.00 %	0.71 %
Dillsboro	50	213	218,733	213	100.00 %	0.10 %
Dobbins Heights	29	687	218,829	687	100.00 %	0.31 %
Dobson	36	1,462	210,986	1,462	100.00 %	0.69 %
Dortches	11	1,082	206,121	1,082	100.00 %	0.52 %
Dover	3	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Drexel	46	1,760	199,859	1,760	100.00 %	0.88 %
Dublin	9	267	202,791	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Duck	1	742	199,623	742	100.00 %	0.37 %
Dunn	12	8,446	200,794	8,446	100.00 %	4.21 %
Durham	16	283,506	198,384	269	0.09 %	0.14 %
	17	283,506	198,415	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	20	283,506	201,314	116,918	41.24 %	58.08 %
	22	283,506	199,804	166,175	58.61 %	83.17 %
	23	283,506	210,529	144	0.05 %	0.07 %
Earl	44	198	203,043	198	100.00 %	0.10 %
East Arcadia	9	418	202,791	418	100.00 %	0.21 %
East Bend	36	634	210,986	634	100.00 %	0.30 %
East Laurinburg	24	234	202,786	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
Eastover	21	3,656	217,984	3,656	100.00 %	1.68 %
East Spencer	33	1,567	209,379	1,567	100.00 %	0.75 %

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Municipality - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Eden	26	15,421	211,801	15,421	100.00 %	7.28 %
Edenton	2	4,460	198,557	4,460	100.00 %	2.25 %
Elizabeth City	1	18,631	199,623	18,631	100.00 %	9.33 %
Elizabethtown	9	3,296	202,791	3,296	100.00 %	1.63 %
Elkin	36	4,122	210,986	4,122	100.00 %	1.95 %
Elk Park	47	542	204,671	542	100.00 %	0.26 %
Ellenboro	48	723	200,053	723	100.00 %	0.36 %
Ellerbe	29	864	218,829	864	100.00 %	0.39 %
Elm City	4	1,218	216,568	1,218	100.00 %	0.56 %
	11	1,218	206,121	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Elon	25	11,336	217,448	11,336	100.00 %	5.21 %
Emerald Isle	2	3,847	198,557	3,847	100.00 %	1.94 %
Enfield	2	1,865	198,557	1,865	100.00 %	0.94 %
Erwin	12	4,542	200,794	4,542	100.00 %	2.26 %
Eureka	4	214	216,568	214	100.00 %	0.10 %
Everetts	2	150	198,557	150	100.00 %	0.08 %
Fair Bluff	8	709	214,542	709	100.00 %	0.33 %
Fairmont	24	2,191	202,786	2,191	100.00 %	1.08 %
Fairview	35	3,456	219,142	3,456	100.00 %	1.58 %
Faison	9	784	202,791	784	100.00 %	0.39 %
Faith	33	819	209,379	819	100.00 %	0.39 %
Falcon	9	324	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	21	324	217,984	324	100.00 %	0.15 %
Falkland	5	47	219,143	47	100.00 %	0.02 %
Fallston	44	627	203,043	627	100.00 %	0.31 %
Farmville	5	4,461	219,143	4,461	100.00 %	2.04 %
Fayetteville	19	208,501	216,471	183,928	88.21 %	84.97 %
	21	208,501	217,984	24,573	11.79 %	11.27 %
Flat Rock	48	3,486	200,053	3,486	100.00 %	1.74 %
Fletcher	48	7,987	200,053	7,987	100.00 %	3.99 %
Fontana Dam	50	13	218,733	13	100.00 %	0.01 %
Forest City	48	7,377	200,053	7,377	100.00 %	3.69 %
Forest Hills	50	303	218,733	303	100.00 %	0.14 %
Fountain	5	385	219,143	385	100.00 %	0.18 %
Four Oaks	10	2,158	215,999	2,158	100.00 %	1.00 %
Foxfire	21	1,288	217,984	1,288	100.00 %	0.59 %
Franklin	50	4,175	218,733	4,175	100.00 %	1.91 %
Franklinton	11	2,456	206,121	2,456	100.00 %	1.19 %
Franklinville	29	1,197	218,829	1,197	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fremont	4	1,196	216,568	1,196	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fuquay-Varina	12	34,152	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	13	34,152	198,371	34,152	100.00 %	17.22 %

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District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Gamewell	45	3,702	218,989	3,702	100.00 %	1.69 %
Garland	9	595	202,791	595	100.00 %	0.29 %
Garner	13	31,159	198,371	17,010	54.59 %	8.57 %
	14	31,159	198,512	14,149	45.41 %	7.13 %
Garysburg	1	904	199,623	904	100.00 %	0.45 %
Gaston	1	1,008	199,623	1,008	100.00 %	0.50 %
Gastonia	43	80,411	211,229	80,411	100.00 %	38.07 %
	44	80,411	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Gatesville	1	267	199,623	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Gibson	24	449	202,786	449	100.00 %	0.22 %
Gibsonville	25	8,920	217,448	4,278	47.96 %	1.97 %
	26	8,920	211,801	4,642	52.04 %	2.19 %
Glen Alpine	46	1,529	199,859	1,529	100.00 %	0.77 %
Godwin	21	128	217,984	128	100.00 %	0.06 %
Goldsboro	4	33,657	216,568	33,657	100.00 %	15.54 %
Goldston	20	234	201,314	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
Graham	25	17,157	217,448	17,157	100.00 %	7.89 %
Grandfather Village	47	95	204,671	95	100.00 %	0.05 %
Granite Falls	45	4,965	218,989	4,965	100.00 %	2.27 %
Granite Quarry	33	2,984	209,379	2,984	100.00 %	1.43 %
Grantsboro	2	692	198,557	692	100.00 %	0.35 %
Greenevers	9	567	202,791	567	100.00 %	0.28 %
Green Level	25	3,152	217,448	3,152	100.00 %	1.45 %
Greensboro	26	299,035	211,801	12,884	4.31 %	6.08 %
	27	299,035	210,558	88,480	29.59 %	42.02 %
	28	299,035	210,036	197,671	66.10 %	94.11 %
Greenville	5	87,521	219,143	87,521	100.00 %	39.94 %
Grifton	3	2,448	200,494	147	6.00 %	0.07 %
	5	2,448	219,143	2,301	94.00 %	1.05 %
Grimesland	5	386	219,143	386	100.00 %	0.18 %
Grover	44	802	203,043	802	100.00 %	0.39 %
Halifax	2	170	198,557	170	100.00 %	0.09 %
Hamilton	2	306	198,557	306	100.00 %	0.15 %
Hamlet	29	6,025	218,829	6,025	100.00 %	2.75 %
Harmony	37	543	219,210	543	100.00 %	0.25 %
Harrells	9	160	202,791	160	100.00 %	0.08 %
Harrellsville	1	85	199,623	85	100.00 %	0.04 %
Harrisburg	34	18,967	214,990	14,257	75.17 %	6.63 %
	35	18,967	219,142	4,710	24.83 %	2.15 %
Hassell	2	49	198,557	49	100.00 %	0.02 %
Havelock	3	16,621	200,494	16,621	100.00 %	8.29 %
Haw River	25	2,252	217,448	2,252	100.00 %	1.04 %

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District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Hayesville	50	461	218,733	461	100.00 %	0.21 %
Hemby Bridge	35	1,614	219,142	1,614	100.00 %	0.74 %
Henderson	11	15,060	206,121	15,060	100.00 %	7.31 %
Hendersonville	48	15,137	200,053	15,137	100.00 %	7.57 %
Hertford	1	1,934	199,623	1,934	100.00 %	0.97 %
Hickory	45	43,490	218,989	43,411	99.82 %	19.82 %
	46	43,490	199,859	79	0.18 %	0.04 %
Highlands	50	1,072	218,733	1,072	100.00 %	0.49 %
High Point	25	114,059	217,448	3	0.00 %	0.00 %
	26	114,059	211,801	5,625	4.93 %	2.66 %
	27	114,059	210,558	101,696	89.16 %	48.30 %
	29	114,059	218,829	5	0.00 %	0.00 %
	30	114,059	211,642	6,646	5.83 %	3.14 %
High Shoals	31	114,059	215,359	84	0.07 %	0.04 %
	43	595	211,229	595	100.00 %	0.28 %
Hildebran	44	595	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	46	1,679	199,859	1,679	100.00 %	0.84 %
Hillsborough	23	9,660	210,529	9,660	100.00 %	4.59 %
Hobgood	2	268	198,557	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Hoffman	29	418	218,829	418	100.00 %	0.19 %
Holden Beach	8	921	214,542	921	100.00 %	0.43 %
Holly Ridge	6	4,171	204,576	4,171	100.00 %	2.04 %
Holly Springs	13	41,239	198,371	26,396	64.01 %	13.31 %
	17	41,239	198,415	14,843	35.99 %	7.48 %
Hookerton	4	413	216,568	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
Hope Mills	19	17,808	216,471	2,593	14.56 %	1.20 %
	21	17,808	217,984	15,215	85.44 %	6.98 %
Hot Springs	47	520	204,671	520	100.00 %	0.25 %
Hudson	45	3,780	218,989	3,780	100.00 %	1.73 %
Huntersville	37	61,376	219,210	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	38	61,376	217,905	61,376	100.00 %	28.17 %
Indian Beach	2	223	198,557	223	100.00 %	0.11 %
Indian Trail	35	39,997	219,142	39,997	100.00 %	18.25 %
Jackson	1	430	199,623	430	100.00 %	0.22 %
Jacksonville	6	72,723	204,576	72,723	100.00 %	35.55 %
Jamestown	26	3,668	211,801	3,661	99.81 %	1.73 %
	27	3,668	210,558	7	0.19 %	0.00 %
Jamesville	2	424	198,557	424	100.00 %	0.21 %
Jefferson	47	1,622	204,671	1,622	100.00 %	0.79 %
Jonesville	36	2,308	210,986	2,308	100.00 %	1.09 %
Kannapolis	33	53,114	209,379	10,268	19.33 %	4.90 %
	34	53,114	214,990	42,846	80.67 %	19.93 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Kelford	1	203	199,623	203	100.00 %	0.10 %
Kenansville	9	770	202,791	770	100.00 %	0.38 %
Kenly	4	1,491	216,568	198	13.28 %	0.09 %
	10	1,491	215,999	1,293	86.72 %	0.60 %
Kernersville	26	26,449	211,801	502	1.90 %	0.24 %
	31	26,449	215,359	25,947	98.10 %	12.05 %
Kill Devil Hills	1	7,656	199,623	7,656	100.00 %	3.84 %
King	31	7,197	215,359	7,197	100.00 %	3.34 %
Kings Mountain	43	11,142	211,229	1,110	9.96 %	0.53 %
	44	11,142	203,043	10,032	90.04 %	4.94 %
Kingstown	44	656	203,043	656	100.00 %	0.32 %
Kinston	3	19,900	200,494	19,900	100.00 %	9.93 %
Kittrell	11	132	206,121	132	100.00 %	0.06 %
Kitty Hawk	1	3,689	199,623	3,689	100.00 %	1.85 %
Knightdale	13	19,435	198,371	2,933	15.09 %	1.48 %
	14	19,435	198,512	16,502	84.91 %	8.31 %
	18	19,435	198,352	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Kure Beach	7	2,191	198,476	2,191	100.00 %	1.10 %
La Grange	3	2,595	200,494	2,595	100.00 %	1.29 %
Lake Lure	48	1,365	200,053	1,365	100.00 %	0.68 %
Lake Park	35	3,269	219,142	3,269	100.00 %	1.49 %
Lake Santeetlah	50	38	218,733	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Lake Waccamaw	8	1,296	214,542	1,296	100.00 %	0.60 %
Landis	33	3,690	209,379	3,690	100.00 %	1.76 %
Lansing	47	126	204,671	126	100.00 %	0.06 %
Lasker	1	64	199,623	64	100.00 %	0.03 %
Lattimore	44	406	203,043	406	100.00 %	0.20 %
Laurel Park	48	2,250	200,053	2,250	100.00 %	1.12 %
Laurinburg	24	14,978	202,786	14,978	100.00 %	7.39 %
Lawndale	44	570	203,043	570	100.00 %	0.28 %
Leggett	5	37	219,143	37	100.00 %	0.02 %
Leland	8	22,908	214,542	22,908	100.00 %	10.68 %
Lenoir	45	18,352	218,989	11,121	60.60 %	5.08 %
	47	18,352	204,671	7,231	39.40 %	3.53 %
Lewiston Woodville	1	426	199,623	426	100.00 %	0.21 %
Lewisville	31	13,381	215,359	13,381	100.00 %	6.21 %
Lexington	30	19,632	211,642	19,632	100.00 %	9.28 %
Liberty	25	2,655	217,448	2,655	100.00 %	1.22 %
Lilesville	29	395	218,829	395	100.00 %	0.18 %
Lillington	12	4,735	200,794	4,735	100.00 %	2.36 %
Lincolnton	44	11,091	203,043	11,091	100.00 %	5.46 %
Linden	21	136	217,984	136	100.00 %	0.06 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Littleton	2	559	198,557	559	100.00 %	0.28 %
Locust	33	4,537	209,379	3,996	88.08 %	1.91 %
	34	4,537	214,990	541	11.92 %	0.25 %
Long View	45	5,088	218,989	4,353	85.55 %	1.99 %
	46	5,088	199,859	735	14.45 %	0.37 %
Louisburg	11	3,064	206,121	3,064	100.00 %	1.49 %
Love Valley	37	154	219,210	154	100.00 %	0.07 %
Lowell	43	3,654	211,229	3,654	100.00 %	1.73 %
Lucama	4	1,036	216,568	1,036	100.00 %	0.48 %
Lumber Bridge	24	82	202,786	82	100.00 %	0.04 %
Lumberton	24	19,025	202,786	19,025	100.00 %	9.38 %
McAdenville	43	890	211,229	890	100.00 %	0.42 %
Macclesfield	5	413	219,143	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
McDonald	24	94	202,786	94	100.00 %	0.05 %
McFarlan	29	94	218,829	94	100.00 %	0.04 %
Macon	2	110	198,557	110	100.00 %	0.06 %
Madison	26	2,129	211,801	2,129	100.00 %	1.01 %
Maggie Valley	50	1,687	218,733	1,687	100.00 %	0.77 %
Magnolia	9	831	202,791	831	100.00 %	0.41 %
Maiden	44	3,736	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	45	3,736	218,989	3,736	100.00 %	1.71 %
Manteo	1	1,600	199,623	1,600	100.00 %	0.80 %
Marietta	24	111	202,786	111	100.00 %	0.05 %
Marion	46	7,717	199,859	7,717	100.00 %	3.86 %
Marshall	47	777	204,671	777	100.00 %	0.38 %
Mars Hill	47	2,007	204,671	2,007	100.00 %	0.98 %
Marshville	29	2,522	218,829	2,522	100.00 %	1.15 %
Marvin	35	6,358	219,142	6,358	100.00 %	2.90 %
Matthews	42	29,435	209,378	29,435	100.00 %	14.06 %
Maxton	24	2,110	202,786	2,110	100.00 %	1.04 %
Mayodan	26	2,418	211,801	2,418	100.00 %	1.14 %
Maysville	9	818	202,791	818	100.00 %	0.40 %
Mebane	23	17,797	210,529	3,171	17.82 %	1.51 %
	25	17,797	217,448	14,626	82.18 %	6.73 %
Mesic	2	144	198,557	144	100.00 %	0.07 %
Micro	10	458	215,999	458	100.00 %	0.21 %
Middleburg	11	101	206,121	101	100.00 %	0.05 %
Middlesex	11	912	206,121	912	100.00 %	0.44 %
Midland	34	4,684	214,990	3,501	74.74 %	1.63 %
	35	4,684	219,142	1,183	25.26 %	0.54 %
	42	4,684	209,378	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Midway	30	4,742	211,642	4,742	100.00 %	2.24 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Mills River	48	7,078	200,053	7,078	100.00 %	3.54 %
Milton	23	155	210,529	155	100.00 %	0.07 %
Mineral Springs	35	3,159	219,142	3,159	100.00 %	1.44 %
Minnesott Beach	2	530	198,557	530	100.00 %	0.27 %
Mint Hill	35	26,450	219,142	6	0.02 %	0.00 %
	40	26,450	218,881	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	42	26,450	209,378	26,444	99.98 %	12.63 %
Misenheimer	33	650	209,379	650	100.00 %	0.31 %
Mocksville	30	5,900	211,642	5,900	100.00 %	2.79 %
Momeyer	11	277	206,121	277	100.00 %	0.13 %
Monroe	29	34,562	218,829	10,719	31.01 %	4.90 %
	35	34,562	219,142	23,843	68.99 %	10.88 %
Montreat	46	901	199,859	901	100.00 %	0.45 %
Mooresboro	44	293	203,043	293	100.00 %	0.14 %
Mooresville	37	50,193	219,210	50,193	100.00 %	22.90 %
Morehead City	2	9,556	198,557	9,556	100.00 %	4.81 %
Morganton	46	17,474	199,859	17,474	100.00 %	8.74 %
Morrisville	17	29,630	198,415	29,423	99.30 %	14.83 %
	20	29,630	201,314	207	0.70 %	0.10 %
Morven	29	329	218,829	329	100.00 %	0.15 %
Mount Airy	36	10,676	210,986	10,676	100.00 %	5.06 %
Mount Gilead	29	1,171	218,829	1,171	100.00 %	0.54 %
Mount Holly	43	17,703	211,229	17,703	100.00 %	8.38 %
Mount Olive	4	4,198	216,568	4,193	99.88 %	1.94 %
	9	4,198	202,791	5	0.12 %	0.00 %
Mount Pleasant	34	1,671	214,990	1,671	100.00 %	0.78 %
Murfreesboro	1	2,619	199,623	2,619	100.00 %	1.31 %
Murphy	50	1,608	218,733	1,608	100.00 %	0.74 %
Nags Head	1	3,168	199,623	3,168	100.00 %	1.59 %
Nashville	11	5,632	206,121	5,632	100.00 %	2.73 %
Navassa	8	1,367	214,542	1,367	100.00 %	0.64 %
New Bern	3	31,291	200,494	31,291	100.00 %	15.61 %
Newland	47	715	204,671	715	100.00 %	0.35 %
New London	33	607	209,379	607	100.00 %	0.29 %
Newport	2	4,364	198,557	4,364	100.00 %	2.20 %
Newton	45	13,148	218,989	13,148	100.00 %	6.00 %
Newton Grove	9	585	202,791	585	100.00 %	0.29 %
Norlina	2	920	198,557	920	100.00 %	0.46 %
Norman	29	100	218,829	100	100.00 %	0.05 %
North Topsail Beach	6	1,005	204,576	1,005	100.00 %	0.49 %
Northwest	8	703	214,542	703	100.00 %	0.33 %
North Wilkesboro	36	4,382	210,986	4,382	100.00 %	2.08 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Norwood	33	2,367	209,379	2,367	100.00 %	1.13 %
Oakboro	33	2,128	209,379	2,128	100.00 %	1.02 %
Oak City	2	266	198,557	266	100.00 %	0.13 %
Oak Island	8	8,396	214,542	8,396	100.00 %	3.91 %
Oak Ridge	26	7,474	211,801	7,445	99.61 %	3.52 %
	27	7,474	210,558	29	0.39 %	0.01 %
Ocean Isle Beach	8	867	214,542	867	100.00 %	0.40 %
Old Fort	46	811	199,859	811	100.00 %	0.41 %
Oriental	2	880	198,557	880	100.00 %	0.44 %
Orrum	24	59	202,786	59	100.00 %	0.03 %
Ossipee	25	536	217,448	536	100.00 %	0.25 %
Oxford	18	8,628	198,352	8,628	100.00 %	4.35 %
Pantego	3	164	200,494	164	100.00 %	0.08 %
Parkton	24	504	202,786	504	100.00 %	0.25 %
Parmele	2	243	198,557	243	100.00 %	0.12 %
Patterson Springs	44	571	203,043	571	100.00 %	0.28 %
Peachland	29	390	218,829	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Peletier	2	769	198,557	769	100.00 %	0.39 %
Pembroke	24	2,823	202,786	2,823	100.00 %	1.39 %
Pikeville	4	712	216,568	712	100.00 %	0.33 %
Pilot Mountain	36	1,440	210,986	1,440	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pinebluff	21	1,473	217,984	1,473	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pinehurst	21	17,581	217,984	17,581	100.00 %	8.07 %
Pine Knoll Shores	2	1,388	198,557	1,388	100.00 %	0.70 %
Pine Level	10	2,046	215,999	2,046	100.00 %	0.95 %
Pinetops	5	1,200	219,143	1,200	100.00 %	0.55 %
Pineville	39	10,602	219,123	10,602	100.00 %	4.84 %
	42	10,602	209,378	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Pink Hill	3	451	200,494	451	100.00 %	0.22 %
Pittsboro	20	4,537	201,314	4,537	100.00 %	2.25 %
Pleasant Garden	26	5,000	211,801	5,000	100.00 %	2.36 %
Plymouth	2	3,320	198,557	3,320	100.00 %	1.67 %
Polkton	29	2,250	218,829	2,250	100.00 %	1.03 %
Polkville	44	516	203,043	516	100.00 %	0.25 %
Pollocksville	9	268	202,791	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Powellsville	1	189	199,623	189	100.00 %	0.09 %
Princeton	10	1,315	215,999	1,315	100.00 %	0.61 %
Princeville	5	1,254	219,143	1,254	100.00 %	0.57 %
Proctorville	24	121	202,786	121	100.00 %	0.06 %
Raeford	24	4,559	202,786	4,559	100.00 %	2.25 %

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Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Raleigh	13	467,665	198,371	3	0.00 %	0.00 %
	14	467,665	198,512	123,813	26.47 %	62.37 %
	15	467,665	198,368	195,707	41.85 %	98.66 %
	16	467,665	198,384	119,612	25.58 %	60.29 %
	17	467,665	198,415	11,122	2.38 %	5.61 %
	18	467,665	198,352	15,849	3.39 %	7.99 %
	20	467,665	201,314	233	0.05 %	0.12 %
	22	467,665	199,804	1,326	0.28 %	0.66 %
Ramseur	29	1,774	218,829	1,774	100.00 %	0.81 %
Randleman	25	4,595	217,448	4,595	100.00 %	2.11 %
Ranlo	43	4,511	211,229	4,511	100.00 %	2.14 %
Raynham	24	60	202,786	60	100.00 %	0.03 %
Red Cross	33	762	209,379	762	100.00 %	0.36 %
Red Oak	11	3,342	206,121	3,342	100.00 %	1.62 %
Red Springs	24	3,087	202,786	3,087	100.00 %	1.52 %
Reidsville	26	14,583	211,801	14,583	100.00 %	6.89 %
Rennert	24	275	202,786	275	100.00 %	0.14 %
Rhodhiss	45	997	218,989	358	35.91 %	0.16 %
	46	997	199,859	639	64.09 %	0.32 %
Richfield	33	582	209,379	582	100.00 %	0.28 %
Richlands	6	2,287	204,576	2,287	100.00 %	1.12 %
Rich Square	1	894	199,623	894	100.00 %	0.45 %
River Bend	3	2,902	200,494	2,902	100.00 %	1.45 %
Roanoke Rapids	2	15,229	198,557	15,229	100.00 %	7.67 %
Robbins	21	1,168	217,984	1,168	100.00 %	0.54 %
Robbinsville	50	597	218,733	597	100.00 %	0.27 %
Robersonville	2	1,269	198,557	1,269	100.00 %	0.64 %
Rockingham	29	9,243	218,829	9,243	100.00 %	4.22 %
Rockwell	33	2,302	209,379	2,302	100.00 %	1.10 %
Rocky Mount	5	54,341	219,143	15,414	28.37 %	7.03 %
	11	54,341	206,121	38,927	71.63 %	18.89 %
Rolesville	14	9,475	198,512	1,305	13.77 %	0.66 %
	18	9,475	198,352	8,170	86.23 %	4.12 %
Ronda	36	438	210,986	438	100.00 %	0.21 %
Roper	2	485	198,557	485	100.00 %	0.24 %
Roseboro	9	1,163	202,791	1,163	100.00 %	0.57 %
Rose Hill	9	1,371	202,791	1,371	100.00 %	0.68 %
Rosman	50	701	218,733	701	100.00 %	0.32 %
Rowland	24	885	202,786	885	100.00 %	0.44 %
Roxboro	23	8,134	210,529	8,134	100.00 %	3.86 %
Roxobel	1	187	199,623	187	100.00 %	0.09 %
Rural Hall	31	3,351	215,359	3,351	100.00 %	1.56 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Ruth	48	347	200,053	347	100.00 %	0.17 %
Rutherford College	45	1,226	218,989	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	46	1,226	199,859	1,226	100.00 %	0.61 %
Rutherfordton	48	3,640	200,053	3,640	100.00 %	1.82 %
St. Helena	9	417	202,791	417	100.00 %	0.21 %
St. James	8	6,529	214,542	6,529	100.00 %	3.04 %
St. Pauls	24	2,045	202,786	2,045	100.00 %	1.01 %
Salemburg	9	457	202,791	457	100.00 %	0.23 %
Salisbury	33	35,540	209,379	35,540	100.00 %	16.97 %
Saluda	48	631	200,053	631	100.00 %	0.32 %
Sandy Creek	8	248	214,542	248	100.00 %	0.12 %
Sandyfield	8	430	214,542	430	100.00 %	0.20 %
Sanford	12	30,261	200,794	30,261	100.00 %	15.07 %
Saratoga	4	353	216,568	353	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sawmills	45	5,020	218,989	5,020	100.00 %	2.29 %
Scotland Neck	2	1,640	198,557	1,640	100.00 %	0.83 %
Seaboard	1	542	199,623	542	100.00 %	0.27 %
Seagrove	29	235	218,829	235	100.00 %	0.11 %
Sedalia	26	676	211,801	676	100.00 %	0.32 %
Selma	10	6,317	215,999	6,317	100.00 %	2.92 %
Seven Devils	47	313	204,671	313	100.00 %	0.15 %
Seven Springs	4	55	216,568	55	100.00 %	0.03 %
Severn	1	191	199,623	191	100.00 %	0.10 %
Shalotte	8	4,185	214,542	4,185	100.00 %	1.95 %
Sharpsburg	4	1,697	216,568	421	24.81 %	0.19 %
	5	1,697	219,143	215	12.67 %	0.10 %
	11	1,697	206,121	1,061	62.52 %	0.51 %
Shelby	44	21,918	203,043	21,918	100.00 %	10.79 %
Siler City	20	7,702	201,314	7,702	100.00 %	3.83 %
Simpson	5	390	219,143	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Sims	4	275	216,568	275	100.00 %	0.13 %
Smithfield	10	11,292	215,999	11,292	100.00 %	5.23 %
Snow Hill	4	1,481	216,568	1,481	100.00 %	0.68 %
Southern Pines	21	15,545	217,984	15,545	100.00 %	7.13 %
Southern Shores	1	3,090	199,623	3,090	100.00 %	1.55 %
Southport	8	3,971	214,542	3,971	100.00 %	1.85 %
Sparta	47	1,834	204,671	1,834	100.00 %	0.90 %
Speed	5	63	219,143	63	100.00 %	0.03 %
Spencer	33	3,308	209,379	3,308	100.00 %	1.58 %
Spencer Mountain	43	0	211,229	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Spindale	48	4,225	200,053	4,225	100.00 %	2.11 %
Spring Hope	11	1,309	206,121	1,309	100.00 %	0.64 %

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Spring Lake	21	11,660	217,984	11,660	100.00 %	5.35 %
Spruce Pine	47	2,194	204,671	2,194	100.00 %	1.07 %
Staley	25	397	217,448	397	100.00 %	0.18 %
Stallings	35	16,112	219,142	15,728	97.62 %	7.18 %
	42	16,112	209,378	384	2.38 %	0.18 %
Stanfield	33	1,585	209,379	1,585	100.00 %	0.76 %
Stanley	43	3,963	211,229	3,963	100.00 %	1.88 %
Stantonsburg	4	762	216,568	762	100.00 %	0.35 %
Star	29	806	218,829	806	100.00 %	0.37 %
Statesville	37	28,419	219,210	28,419	100.00 %	12.96 %
Stedman	21	1,277	217,984	1,277	100.00 %	0.59 %
Stem	18	960	198,352	960	100.00 %	0.48 %
Stokesdale	26	5,924	211,801	5,924	100.00 %	2.80 %
Stoneville	26	1,308	211,801	1,308	100.00 %	0.62 %
Stonewall	2	214	198,557	214	100.00 %	0.11 %
Stovall	18	324	198,352	324	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sugar Mountain	47	371	204,671	371	100.00 %	0.18 %
Summerfield	26	10,951	211,801	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	27	10,951	210,558	10,951	100.00 %	5.20 %
Sunset Beach	8	4,175	214,542	4,175	100.00 %	1.95 %
Surf City	6	3,867	204,576	334	8.64 %	0.16 %
	9	3,867	202,791	3,533	91.36 %	1.74 %
Swansboro	6	3,744	204,576	3,744	100.00 %	1.83 %
Sweptonville	25	2,445	217,448	2,445	100.00 %	1.12 %
Sylva	50	2,578	218,733	2,578	100.00 %	1.18 %
Tabor City	8	3,781	214,542	3,781	100.00 %	1.76 %
Tarboro	5	10,721	219,143	10,721	100.00 %	4.89 %
Tar Heel	9	90	202,791	90	100.00 %	0.04 %
Taylorsville	36	2,320	210,986	2,320	100.00 %	1.10 %
Taylortown	21	634	217,984	634	100.00 %	0.29 %
Teachey	9	448	202,791	448	100.00 %	0.22 %
Thomasville	29	27,183	218,829	521	1.92 %	0.24 %
	30	27,183	211,642	26,662	98.08 %	12.60 %
Tobaccoville	31	2,578	215,359	2,578	100.00 %	1.20 %
Topsail Beach	9	461	202,791	461	100.00 %	0.23 %
Trenton	9	238	202,791	238	100.00 %	0.12 %
Trent Woods	3	4,074	200,494	4,074	100.00 %	2.03 %
Trinity	29	7,006	218,829	7,006	100.00 %	3.20 %
Troutman	37	3,698	219,210	3,698	100.00 %	1.69 %
Troy	29	2,850	218,829	2,850	100.00 %	1.30 %
Tryon	48	1,562	200,053	1,562	100.00 %	0.78 %
Turkey	9	213	202,791	213	100.00 %	0.11 %

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Unionville	35	6,643	219,142	6,643	100.00 %	3.03 %
Valdese	46	4,689	199,859	4,689	100.00 %	2.35 %
Vanceboro	3	869	200,494	869	100.00 %	0.43 %
Vandemere	2	246	198,557	246	100.00 %	0.12 %
Varnantown	8	525	214,542	525	100.00 %	0.24 %
Vass	21	952	217,984	952	100.00 %	0.44 %
Waco	44	310	203,043	310	100.00 %	0.15 %
Wade	21	638	217,984	638	100.00 %	0.29 %
Wadesboro	29	5,008	218,829	5,008	100.00 %	2.29 %
Wagram	24	615	202,786	615	100.00 %	0.30 %
Wake Forest	11	47,601	206,121	1,504	3.16 %	0.73 %
	14	47,601	198,512	2,318	4.87 %	1.17 %
	15	47,601	198,368	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	18	47,601	198,352	43,779	91.97 %	22.07 %
Walkertown	31	5,692	215,359	4,716	82.85 %	2.19 %
	32	5,692	211,751	976	17.15 %	0.46 %
Wallace	9	3,413	202,791	3,413	100.00 %	1.68 %
Wallburg	30	3,051	211,642	3,051	100.00 %	1.44 %
Walnut Cove	31	1,586	215,359	1,586	100.00 %	0.74 %
Walnut Creek	4	1,084	216,568	1,084	100.00 %	0.50 %
Walstonburg	4	193	216,568	193	100.00 %	0.09 %
Warrenton	2	851	198,557	851	100.00 %	0.43 %
Warsaw	9	2,733	202,791	2,733	100.00 %	1.35 %
Washington	3	9,875	200,494	9,875	100.00 %	4.93 %
Washington Park	3	392	200,494	392	100.00 %	0.20 %
Watha	9	181	202,791	181	100.00 %	0.09 %
Waxhaw	35	20,534	219,142	20,534	100.00 %	9.37 %
Waynesville	50	10,140	218,733	10,140	100.00 %	4.64 %
Weaverville	49	4,567	201,741	4,567	100.00 %	2.26 %
Webster	50	372	218,733	372	100.00 %	0.17 %
Weddington	35	13,181	219,142	13,176	99.96 %	6.01 %
	42	13,181	209,378	5	0.04 %	0.00 %
Weldon	2	1,444	198,557	1,444	100.00 %	0.73 %
Wendell	14	9,793	198,512	6,613	67.53 %	3.33 %
	18	9,793	198,352	3,180	32.47 %	1.60 %
Wentworth	26	2,662	211,801	2,662	100.00 %	1.26 %
Wesley Chapel	35	8,681	219,142	8,681	100.00 %	3.96 %
West Jefferson	47	1,279	204,671	1,279	100.00 %	0.62 %
Whispering Pines	21	4,987	217,984	4,987	100.00 %	2.29 %
Whitakers	5	627	219,143	290	46.25 %	0.13 %
	11	627	206,121	337	53.75 %	0.16 %
White Lake	9	843	202,791	843	100.00 %	0.42 %

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Municipality - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Whiteville	8	4,766	214,542	4,766	100.00 %	2.22 %
Whitsett	26	584	211,801	584	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wilkesboro	36	3,687	210,986	3,687	100.00 %	1.75 %
Williamston	2	5,248	198,557	5,248	100.00 %	2.64 %
Wilmington	7	115,451	198,476	88,318	76.50 %	44.50 %
	8	115,451	214,542	27,133	23.50 %	12.65 %
Wilson	4	47,851	216,568	47,851	100.00 %	22.10 %
Wilson's Mills	10	2,534	215,999	2,534	100.00 %	1.17 %
Windsor	1	3,582	199,623	3,582	100.00 %	1.79 %
Winfall	1	555	199,623	555	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wingate	29	4,055	218,829	4,055	100.00 %	1.85 %
Winston-Salem	31	249,545	215,359	45,330	18.17 %	21.05 %
	32	249,545	211,751	204,215	81.83 %	96.44 %
Winterville	5	10,462	219,143	10,462	100.00 %	4.77 %
Winton	1	629	199,623	629	100.00 %	0.32 %
Woodfin	46	7,936	199,859	288	3.63 %	0.14 %
	49	7,936	201,741	7,648	96.37 %	3.79 %
Woodland	1	557	199,623	557	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wrightsville Beach	7	2,473	198,476	2,473	100.00 %	1.25 %
Yadkinville	36	2,995	210,986	2,995	100.00 %	1.42 %
Yanceyville	23	1,937	210,529	1,937	100.00 %	0.92 %
Youngsville	11	2,016	206,121	2,016	100.00 %	0.98 %
Zebulon	10	6,903	215,999	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	14	6,903	198,512	4,668	67.62 %	2.35 %
	18	6,903	198,352	2,235	32.38 %	1.13 %
Assigned Geography Total:				6,017,605		

Report display: all municipalities

Total Municipalities Statewide: 553

Fully Assigned Municipalities: 553

Partially Assigned Municipalities: 0

Fully Unassigned Municipalities: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split Municipalities: 70

Splits Involving Population: 55

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Aberdeen	21	8,516	217,984	8,516	100.00 %	3.91 %
Ahoskie	1	4,891	199,623	4,891	100.00 %	2.45 %
Alamance	25	988	217,448	988	100.00 %	0.45 %
Albemarle	33	16,432	209,379	16,432	100.00 %	7.85 %
Alliance	2	733	198,557	733	100.00 %	0.37 %
Andrews	50	1,667	218,733	1,667	100.00 %	0.76 %
Angier (Harnett)	12	4,709	200,794	4,709	100.00 %	2.35 %
Angier (Wake)	13	556	198,371	556	100.00 %	0.28 %
Ansonville	29	440	218,829	440	100.00 %	0.20 %
Apex	13	58,780	198,371	8,749	14.88 %	4.41 %
	16	58,780	198,384	297	0.51 %	0.15 %
	17	58,780	198,415	49,734	84.61 %	25.07 %
Arapahoe	2	416	198,557	416	100.00 %	0.21 %
Archdale (Guilford)	26	380	211,801	250	65.79 %	0.12 %
	27	380	210,558	130	34.21 %	0.06 %
Archdale (Randolph)	25	11,527	217,448	11,326	98.26 %	5.21 %
	29	11,527	218,829	201	1.74 %	0.09 %
Archer Lodge	10	4,797	215,999	4,797	100.00 %	2.22 %
Asheboro	25	27,156	217,448	1,217	4.48 %	0.56 %
	29	27,156	218,829	25,939	95.52 %	11.85 %
Asheville	46	94,589	199,859	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	49	94,589	201,741	94,589	100.00 %	46.89 %
Askewville	1	184	199,623	184	100.00 %	0.09 %
Atkinson	9	296	202,791	296	100.00 %	0.15 %
Atlantic Beach	2	1,364	198,557	1,364	100.00 %	0.69 %
Aulander	1	763	199,623	763	100.00 %	0.38 %
Aurora	3	455	200,494	455	100.00 %	0.23 %
Autryville	9	167	202,791	167	100.00 %	0.08 %
Ayden	5	4,977	219,143	4,977	100.00 %	2.27 %
Badin	33	2,024	209,379	2,024	100.00 %	0.97 %
Bailey	11	568	206,121	568	100.00 %	0.28 %
Bakersville	47	450	204,671	450	100.00 %	0.22 %
Bald Head Island	8	268	214,542	268	100.00 %	0.12 %
Banner Elk	47	1,049	204,671	1,049	100.00 %	0.51 %
Bath	3	245	200,494	245	100.00 %	0.12 %
Bayboro	2	1,161	198,557	1,161	100.00 %	0.58 %
Bear Grass	2	89	198,557	89	100.00 %	0.04 %
Beaufort	2	4,464	198,557	4,464	100.00 %	2.25 %
Beech Mountain (Avery)	47	62	204,671	62	100.00 %	0.03 %
Beech Mountain (Watauga)	47	613	204,671	613	100.00 %	0.30 %
Belhaven	3	1,410	200,494	1,410	100.00 %	0.70 %

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Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Belmont	43	15,010	211,229	15,010	100.00 %	7.11 %
Belville	8	2,406	214,542	2,406	100.00 %	1.12 %
Belwood	44	857	203,043	857	100.00 %	0.42 %
Benson (Harnett)	12	0	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Benson (Johnston)	10	3,967	215,999	3,967	100.00 %	1.84 %
Bermuda Run	30	3,120	211,642	3,120	100.00 %	1.47 %
Bessemer City	43	5,428	211,229	5,428	100.00 %	2.57 %
	44	5,428	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Bethania	31	344	215,359	344	100.00 %	0.16 %
Bethel	5	1,373	219,143	1,373	100.00 %	0.63 %
Beulaville	9	1,116	202,791	1,116	100.00 %	0.55 %
Biltmore Forest	49	1,409	201,741	1,409	100.00 %	0.70 %
Biscoe	29	1,848	218,829	1,848	100.00 %	0.84 %
Black Creek	4	692	216,568	692	100.00 %	0.32 %
Black Mountain	46	8,426	199,859	8,426	100.00 %	4.22 %
Bladenboro	9	1,648	202,791	1,648	100.00 %	0.81 %
Blowing Rock (Caldwell)	47	91	204,671	91	100.00 %	0.04 %
Blowing Rock (Watauga)	47	1,285	204,671	1,285	100.00 %	0.63 %
Boardman	8	166	214,542	166	100.00 %	0.08 %
Bogue	2	695	198,557	695	100.00 %	0.35 %
Boiling Spring Lakes	8	5,943	214,542	5,943	100.00 %	2.77 %
Boiling Springs	44	4,615	203,043	4,615	100.00 %	2.27 %
Bolivia	8	149	214,542	149	100.00 %	0.07 %
Bolton	8	519	214,542	519	100.00 %	0.24 %
Boone	47	19,092	204,671	19,092	100.00 %	9.33 %
Boonville	36	1,185	210,986	1,185	100.00 %	0.56 %
Bostic	48	355	200,053	355	100.00 %	0.18 %
Brevard	50	7,744	218,733	7,744	100.00 %	3.54 %
Bridgeton	3	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Broadway (Harnett)	12	0	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Broadway (Lee)	12	1,267	200,794	1,267	100.00 %	0.63 %
Brookford	45	442	218,989	442	100.00 %	0.20 %
Brunswick	8	973	214,542	973	100.00 %	0.45 %
Bryson City	50	1,558	218,733	1,558	100.00 %	0.71 %
Bunn	11	327	206,121	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Burgaw	9	3,088	202,791	3,088	100.00 %	1.52 %
Burlington (Alamance)	25	55,481	217,448	55,481	100.00 %	25.51 %
Burlington (Guilford)	26	1,822	211,801	1,822	100.00 %	0.86 %
Burnsville	47	1,614	204,671	1,614	100.00 %	0.79 %
Butner	18	8,397	198,352	8,397	100.00 %	4.23 %
Cajah's Mountain	45	2,722	218,989	2,722	100.00 %	1.24 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Calabash	8	2,011	214,542	2,011	100.00 %	0.94 %
Calypso	9	327	202,791	327	100.00 %	0.16 %
Cameron	21	244	217,984	244	100.00 %	0.11 %
Candor (Montgomery)	29	813	218,829	813	100.00 %	0.37 %
Candor (Moore)	21	0	217,984	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Canton	47	4,422	204,671	2,438	55.13 %	1.19 %
	50	4,422	218,733	1,984	44.87 %	0.91 %
Cape Carteret	2	2,224	198,557	2,224	100.00 %	1.12 %
Carolina Beach	7	6,564	198,476	6,564	100.00 %	3.31 %
Carolina Shores	8	4,588	214,542	4,588	100.00 %	2.14 %
Carrboro	23	21,295	210,529	21,295	100.00 %	10.11 %
Carthage	21	2,775	217,984	2,775	100.00 %	1.27 %
Cary (Chatham)	20	3,709	201,314	3,709	100.00 %	1.84 %
Cary (Wake)	13	171,012	198,371	19,385	11.34 %	9.77 %
	16	171,012	198,384	67,911	39.71 %	34.23 %
	17	171,012	198,415	83,716	48.95 %	42.19 %
Casar	44	305	203,043	305	100.00 %	0.15 %
Castalia	11	264	206,121	264	100.00 %	0.13 %
Caswell Beach	8	395	214,542	395	100.00 %	0.18 %
Catawba	45	702	218,989	702	100.00 %	0.32 %
Cedar Point	2	1,764	198,557	1,764	100.00 %	0.89 %
Cedar Rock	47	301	204,671	301	100.00 %	0.15 %
Cerro Gordo	8	131	214,542	131	100.00 %	0.06 %
Chadbourne	8	1,574	214,542	1,574	100.00 %	0.73 %
Chapel Hill (Durham)	20	2,906	201,314	2,906	100.00 %	1.44 %
Chapel Hill (Orange)	23	59,054	210,529	59,054	100.00 %	28.05 %
Charlotte	38	874,579	217,905	126,901	14.51 %	58.24 %
	39	874,579	219,123	183,069	20.93 %	83.55 %
	40	874,579	218,881	209,707	23.98 %	95.81 %
	41	874,579	217,678	209,066	23.90 %	96.04 %
	42	874,579	209,378	145,836	16.67 %	69.65 %
Cherryville	44	6,078	203,043	6,078	100.00 %	2.99 %
Chimney Rock Village	48	140	200,053	140	100.00 %	0.07 %
China Grove	33	4,434	209,379	4,434	100.00 %	2.12 %
Chocowinity	3	722	200,494	722	100.00 %	0.36 %
Claremont	45	1,692	218,989	1,692	100.00 %	0.77 %
Clarkton	9	614	202,791	614	100.00 %	0.30 %
Clayton (Johnston)	10	26,307	215,999	26,307	100.00 %	12.18 %
Clayton (Wake)	13	0	198,371	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	14	0	198,512	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Clemmons	31	21,163	215,359	21,163	100.00 %	9.83 %

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Cleveland	33	846	209,379	846	100.00 %	0.40 %
Clinton	9	8,383	202,791	8,383	100.00 %	4.13 %
Clyde	47	1,368	204,671	1,368	100.00 %	0.67 %
Coats	12	2,155	200,794	2,155	100.00 %	1.07 %
Cofield	1	267	199,623	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Colerain	1	217	199,623	217	100.00 %	0.11 %
Columbia	1	610	199,623	610	100.00 %	0.31 %
Columbus	48	1,060	200,053	1,060	100.00 %	0.53 %
Como	1	67	199,623	67	100.00 %	0.03 %
Concord	34	105,240	214,990	105,240	100.00 %	48.95 %
Conetoe	5	198	219,143	198	100.00 %	0.09 %
Connelly Springs	46	1,529	199,859	1,529	100.00 %	0.77 %
Conover	45	8,421	218,989	8,421	100.00 %	3.85 %
Conway	1	752	199,623	752	100.00 %	0.38 %
Cooleemee	30	940	211,642	940	100.00 %	0.44 %
Cornelius	37	31,412	219,210	18,991	60.46 %	8.66 %
	38	31,412	217,905	12,421	39.54 %	5.70 %
Cove City	3	378	200,494	378	100.00 %	0.19 %
Cramerton	43	5,296	211,229	5,296	100.00 %	2.51 %
Creedmoor	18	4,866	198,352	4,866	100.00 %	2.45 %
Creswell	2	207	198,557	207	100.00 %	0.10 %
Crossnore	47	143	204,671	143	100.00 %	0.07 %
Dallas	43	5,927	211,229	5,927	100.00 %	2.81 %
Danbury	31	189	215,359	189	100.00 %	0.09 %
Davidson (Iredell)	37	378	219,210	378	100.00 %	0.17 %
Davidson (Mecklenburg)	37	14,728	219,210	12,690	86.16 %	5.79 %
	38	14,728	217,905	2,038	13.84 %	0.94 %
Dellview	44	6	203,043	6	100.00 %	0.00 %
Denton	30	1,494	211,642	1,494	100.00 %	0.71 %
Dillsboro	50	213	218,733	213	100.00 %	0.10 %
Dobbins Heights	29	687	218,829	687	100.00 %	0.31 %
Dobson	36	1,462	210,986	1,462	100.00 %	0.69 %
Dortches	11	1,082	206,121	1,082	100.00 %	0.52 %
Dover	3	349	200,494	349	100.00 %	0.17 %
Drexel	46	1,760	199,859	1,760	100.00 %	0.88 %
Dublin	9	267	202,791	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Duck	1	742	199,623	742	100.00 %	0.37 %
Dunn	12	8,446	200,794	8,446	100.00 %	4.21 %
Durham (Durham)	20	283,093	201,314	116,918	41.30 %	58.08 %
	22	283,093	199,804	166,175	58.70 %	83.17 %
Durham (Orange)	23	144	210,529	144	100.00 %	0.07 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Durham (Wake)	16	269	198,384	269	100.00 %	0.14 %
	17	269	198,415	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Earl	44	198	203,043	198	100.00 %	0.10 %
East Arcadia	9	418	202,791	418	100.00 %	0.21 %
East Bend	36	634	210,986	634	100.00 %	0.30 %
East Laurinburg	24	234	202,786	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
East Spencer	33	1,567	209,379	1,567	100.00 %	0.75 %
Eastover	21	3,656	217,984	3,656	100.00 %	1.68 %
Eden	26	15,421	211,801	15,421	100.00 %	7.28 %
Edenton	2	4,460	198,557	4,460	100.00 %	2.25 %
Elizabeth City (Camden)	1	38	199,623	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Elizabeth City (Pasquotank)	1	18,593	199,623	18,593	100.00 %	9.31 %
Elizabethtown	9	3,296	202,791	3,296	100.00 %	1.63 %
Elk Park	47	542	204,671	542	100.00 %	0.26 %
Elkin (Surry)	36	4,049	210,986	4,049	100.00 %	1.92 %
Elkin (Wilkes)	36	73	210,986	73	100.00 %	0.03 %
Ellenboro	48	723	200,053	723	100.00 %	0.36 %
Ellerbe	29	864	218,829	864	100.00 %	0.39 %
Elm City (Nash)	11	0	206,121	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Elm City (Wilson)	4	1,218	216,568	1,218	100.00 %	0.56 %
Elon	25	11,336	217,448	11,336	100.00 %	5.21 %
Emerald Isle	2	3,847	198,557	3,847	100.00 %	1.94 %
Enfield	2	1,865	198,557	1,865	100.00 %	0.94 %
Erwin	12	4,542	200,794	4,542	100.00 %	2.26 %
Eureka	4	214	216,568	214	100.00 %	0.10 %
Everetts	2	150	198,557	150	100.00 %	0.08 %
Fair Bluff	8	709	214,542	709	100.00 %	0.33 %
Fairmont	24	2,191	202,786	2,191	100.00 %	1.08 %
Fairview	35	3,456	219,142	3,456	100.00 %	1.58 %
Faison (Duplin)	9	784	202,791	784	100.00 %	0.39 %
Faison (Sampson)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Faith	33	819	209,379	819	100.00 %	0.39 %
Falcon (Cumberland)	21	324	217,984	324	100.00 %	0.15 %
Falcon (Sampson)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Falkland	5	47	219,143	47	100.00 %	0.02 %
Fallston	44	627	203,043	627	100.00 %	0.31 %
Farmville	5	4,461	219,143	4,461	100.00 %	2.04 %
Fayetteville	19	208,501	216,471	183,928	88.21 %	84.97 %
	21	208,501	217,984	24,573	11.79 %	11.27 %
Flat Rock	48	3,486	200,053	3,486	100.00 %	1.74 %
Fletcher	48	7,987	200,053	7,987	100.00 %	3.99 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Fontana Dam	50	13	218,733	13	100.00 %	0.01 %
Forest City	48	7,377	200,053	7,377	100.00 %	3.69 %
Forest Hills	50	303	218,733	303	100.00 %	0.14 %
Fountain	5	385	219,143	385	100.00 %	0.18 %
Four Oaks	10	2,158	215,999	2,158	100.00 %	1.00 %
Foxfire	21	1,288	217,984	1,288	100.00 %	0.59 %
Franklin	50	4,175	218,733	4,175	100.00 %	1.91 %
Franklinton	11	2,456	206,121	2,456	100.00 %	1.19 %
Franklinville	29	1,197	218,829	1,197	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fremont	4	1,196	216,568	1,196	100.00 %	0.55 %
Fuquay-Varina (Harnett)	12	0	200,794	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Fuquay-Varina (Wake)	13	34,152	198,371	34,152	100.00 %	17.22 %
Gamewell	45	3,702	218,989	3,702	100.00 %	1.69 %
Garland	9	595	202,791	595	100.00 %	0.29 %
Garner	13	31,159	198,371	17,010	54.59 %	8.57 %
	14	31,159	198,512	14,149	45.41 %	7.13 %
Garysburg	1	904	199,623	904	100.00 %	0.45 %
Gaston	1	1,008	199,623	1,008	100.00 %	0.50 %
Gastonia	43	80,411	211,229	80,411	100.00 %	38.07 %
	44	80,411	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Gatesville	1	267	199,623	267	100.00 %	0.13 %
Gibson	24	449	202,786	449	100.00 %	0.22 %
Gibsonville (Alamance)	25	4,278	217,448	4,278	100.00 %	1.97 %
Gibsonville (Guilford)	26	4,642	211,801	4,642	100.00 %	2.19 %
Glen Alpine	46	1,529	199,859	1,529	100.00 %	0.77 %
Godwin	21	128	217,984	128	100.00 %	0.06 %
Goldsboro	4	33,657	216,568	33,657	100.00 %	15.54 %
Goldston	20	234	201,314	234	100.00 %	0.12 %
Graham	25	17,157	217,448	17,157	100.00 %	7.89 %
Grandfather Village	47	95	204,671	95	100.00 %	0.05 %
Granite Falls	45	4,965	218,989	4,965	100.00 %	2.27 %
Granite Quarry	33	2,984	209,379	2,984	100.00 %	1.43 %
Grantsboro	2	692	198,557	692	100.00 %	0.35 %
Green Level	25	3,152	217,448	3,152	100.00 %	1.45 %
Greenevers	9	567	202,791	567	100.00 %	0.28 %
Greensboro	26	299,035	211,801	12,884	4.31 %	6.08 %
	27	299,035	210,558	88,480	29.59 %	42.02 %
	28	299,035	210,036	197,671	66.10 %	94.11 %
Greenville	5	87,521	219,143	87,521	100.00 %	39.94 %
Grifton (Lenoir)	3	147	200,494	147	100.00 %	0.07 %
Grifton (Pitt)	5	2,301	219,143	2,301	100.00 %	1.05 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Grimesland	5	386	219,143	386	100.00 %	0.18 %
Grover	44	802	203,043	802	100.00 %	0.39 %
Halifax	2	170	198,557	170	100.00 %	0.09 %
Hamilton	2	306	198,557	306	100.00 %	0.15 %
Hamlet	29	6,025	218,829	6,025	100.00 %	2.75 %
Harmony	37	543	219,210	543	100.00 %	0.25 %
Harrells (Duplin)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Harrells (Sampson)	9	160	202,791	160	100.00 %	0.08 %
Harrellsville	1	85	199,623	85	100.00 %	0.04 %
Harrisburg	34	18,967	214,990	14,257	75.17 %	6.63 %
	35	18,967	219,142	4,710	24.83 %	2.15 %
Hassell	2	49	198,557	49	100.00 %	0.02 %
Havelock	3	16,621	200,494	16,621	100.00 %	8.29 %
Haw River	25	2,252	217,448	2,252	100.00 %	1.04 %
Hayesville	50	461	218,733	461	100.00 %	0.21 %
Hemby Bridge	35	1,614	219,142	1,614	100.00 %	0.74 %
Henderson	11	15,060	206,121	15,060	100.00 %	7.31 %
Hendersonville	48	15,137	200,053	15,137	100.00 %	7.57 %
Hertford	1	1,934	199,623	1,934	100.00 %	0.97 %
Hickory (Burke)	46	79	199,859	79	100.00 %	0.04 %
Hickory (Caldwell)	45	32	218,989	32	100.00 %	0.01 %
Hickory (Catawba)	45	43,379	218,989	43,379	100.00 %	19.81 %
High Point (Davidson)	30	6,646	211,642	6,646	100.00 %	3.14 %
High Point (Forsyth)	31	84	215,359	84	100.00 %	0.04 %
High Point (Guilford)	26	107,321	211,801	5,625	5.24 %	2.66 %
	27	107,321	210,558	101,696	94.76 %	48.30 %
High Point (Randolph)	25	8	217,448	3	37.50 %	0.00 %
	29	8	218,829	5	62.50 %	0.00 %
High Shoals	43	595	211,229	595	100.00 %	0.28 %
	44	595	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Highlands (Jackson)	50	12	218,733	12	100.00 %	0.01 %
Highlands (Macon)	50	1,060	218,733	1,060	100.00 %	0.48 %
Hildebran	46	1,679	199,859	1,679	100.00 %	0.84 %
Hillsborough	23	9,660	210,529	9,660	100.00 %	4.59 %
Hobgood	2	268	198,557	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Hoffman	29	418	218,829	418	100.00 %	0.19 %
Holden Beach	8	921	214,542	921	100.00 %	0.43 %
Holly Ridge	6	4,171	204,576	4,171	100.00 %	2.04 %
Holly Springs	13	41,239	198,371	26,396	64.01 %	13.31 %
	17	41,239	198,415	14,843	35.99 %	7.48 %
Hookerton	4	413	216,568	413	100.00 %	0.19 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Hope Mills	19	17,808	216,471	2,593	14.56 %	1.20 %
	21	17,808	217,984	15,215	85.44 %	6.98 %
Hot Springs	47	520	204,671	520	100.00 %	0.25 %
Hudson	45	3,780	218,989	3,780	100.00 %	1.73 %
Huntersville	37	61,376	219,210	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	38	61,376	217,905	61,376	100.00 %	28.17 %
Indian Beach	2	223	198,557	223	100.00 %	0.11 %
Indian Trail	35	39,997	219,142	39,997	100.00 %	18.25 %
Jackson	1	430	199,623	430	100.00 %	0.22 %
Jacksonville	6	72,723	204,576	72,723	100.00 %	35.55 %
Jamestown	26	3,668	211,801	3,661	99.81 %	1.73 %
	27	3,668	210,558	7	0.19 %	0.00 %
Jamesville	2	424	198,557	424	100.00 %	0.21 %
Jefferson	47	1,622	204,671	1,622	100.00 %	0.79 %
Jonesville	36	2,308	210,986	2,308	100.00 %	1.09 %
Kannapolis (Cabarrus)	34	42,846	214,990	42,846	100.00 %	19.93 %
Kannapolis (Rowan)	33	10,268	209,379	10,268	100.00 %	4.90 %
Kelford	1	203	199,623	203	100.00 %	0.10 %
Kenansville	9	770	202,791	770	100.00 %	0.38 %
Kenly (Johnston)	10	1,293	215,999	1,293	100.00 %	0.60 %
Kenly (Wilson)	4	198	216,568	198	100.00 %	0.09 %
Kernersville (Forsyth)	31	25,947	215,359	25,947	100.00 %	12.05 %
Kernersville (Guilford)	26	502	211,801	502	100.00 %	0.24 %
Kill Devil Hills	1	7,656	199,623	7,656	100.00 %	3.84 %
King (Forsyth)	31	591	215,359	591	100.00 %	0.27 %
King (Stokes)	31	6,606	215,359	6,606	100.00 %	3.07 %
Kings Mountain (Cleveland)	44	10,032	203,043	10,032	100.00 %	4.94 %
Kings Mountain (Gaston)	43	1,110	211,229	1,110	100.00 %	0.53 %
Kingstown	44	656	203,043	656	100.00 %	0.32 %
Kinston	3	19,900	200,494	19,900	100.00 %	9.93 %
Kittrell	11	132	206,121	132	100.00 %	0.06 %
Kitty Hawk	1	3,689	199,623	3,689	100.00 %	1.85 %
Knightdale	13	19,435	198,371	2,933	15.09 %	1.48 %
	14	19,435	198,512	16,502	84.91 %	8.31 %
	18	19,435	198,352	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Kure Beach	7	2,191	198,476	2,191	100.00 %	1.10 %
La Grange	3	2,595	200,494	2,595	100.00 %	1.29 %
Lake Lure	48	1,365	200,053	1,365	100.00 %	0.68 %
Lake Park	35	3,269	219,142	3,269	100.00 %	1.49 %
Lake Santeetlah	50	38	218,733	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Lake Waccamaw	8	1,296	214,542	1,296	100.00 %	0.60 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Landis	33	3,690	209,379	3,690	100.00 %	1.76 %
Lansing	47	126	204,671	126	100.00 %	0.06 %
Lasker	1	64	199,623	64	100.00 %	0.03 %
Lattimore	44	406	203,043	406	100.00 %	0.20 %
Laurel Park	48	2,250	200,053	2,250	100.00 %	1.12 %
Laurinburg	24	14,978	202,786	14,978	100.00 %	7.39 %
Lawndale	44	570	203,043	570	100.00 %	0.28 %
Leggett	5	37	219,143	37	100.00 %	0.02 %
Leland	8	22,908	214,542	22,908	100.00 %	10.68 %
Lenoir	45	18,352	218,989	11,121	60.60 %	5.08 %
	47	18,352	204,671	7,231	39.40 %	3.53 %
Lewiston Woodville	1	426	199,623	426	100.00 %	0.21 %
Lewisville	31	13,381	215,359	13,381	100.00 %	6.21 %
Lexington	30	19,632	211,642	19,632	100.00 %	9.28 %
Liberty	25	2,655	217,448	2,655	100.00 %	1.22 %
Lilesville	29	395	218,829	395	100.00 %	0.18 %
Lillington	12	4,735	200,794	4,735	100.00 %	2.36 %
Lincolnton	44	11,091	203,043	11,091	100.00 %	5.46 %
Linden	21	136	217,984	136	100.00 %	0.06 %
Littleton	2	559	198,557	559	100.00 %	0.28 %
Locust (Cabarrus)	34	541	214,990	541	100.00 %	0.25 %
Locust (Stanly)	33	3,996	209,379	3,996	100.00 %	1.91 %
Long View (Burke)	46	735	199,859	735	100.00 %	0.37 %
Long View (Catawba)	45	4,353	218,989	4,353	100.00 %	1.99 %
Louisburg	11	3,064	206,121	3,064	100.00 %	1.49 %
Love Valley	37	154	219,210	154	100.00 %	0.07 %
Lowell	43	3,654	211,229	3,654	100.00 %	1.73 %
Lucama	4	1,036	216,568	1,036	100.00 %	0.48 %
Lumber Bridge	24	82	202,786	82	100.00 %	0.04 %
Lumberton	24	19,025	202,786	19,025	100.00 %	9.38 %
Macclesfield	5	413	219,143	413	100.00 %	0.19 %
Macon	2	110	198,557	110	100.00 %	0.06 %
Madison	26	2,129	211,801	2,129	100.00 %	1.01 %
Maggie Valley	50	1,687	218,733	1,687	100.00 %	0.77 %
Magnolia	9	831	202,791	831	100.00 %	0.41 %
Maiden (Catawba)	45	3,736	218,989	3,736	100.00 %	1.71 %
Maiden (Lincoln)	44	0	203,043	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Manteo	1	1,600	199,623	1,600	100.00 %	0.80 %
Marietta	24	111	202,786	111	100.00 %	0.05 %
Marion	46	7,717	199,859	7,717	100.00 %	3.86 %
Mars Hill	47	2,007	204,671	2,007	100.00 %	0.98 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Marshall	47	777	204,671	777	100.00 %	0.38 %
Marshville	29	2,522	218,829	2,522	100.00 %	1.15 %
Marvin	35	6,358	219,142	6,358	100.00 %	2.90 %
Matthews	42	29,435	209,378	29,435	100.00 %	14.06 %
Maxton (Robeson)	24	1,902	202,786	1,902	100.00 %	0.94 %
Maxton (Scotland)	24	208	202,786	208	100.00 %	0.10 %
Mayodan	26	2,418	211,801	2,418	100.00 %	1.14 %
Maysville	9	818	202,791	818	100.00 %	0.40 %
McAdenville	43	890	211,229	890	100.00 %	0.42 %
McDonald	24	94	202,786	94	100.00 %	0.05 %
McFarlan	29	94	218,829	94	100.00 %	0.04 %
Mebane (Alamance)	25	14,626	217,448	14,626	100.00 %	6.73 %
Mebane (Orange)	23	3,171	210,529	3,171	100.00 %	1.51 %
Mesic	2	144	198,557	144	100.00 %	0.07 %
Micro	10	458	215,999	458	100.00 %	0.21 %
Middleburg	11	101	206,121	101	100.00 %	0.05 %
Middlesex	11	912	206,121	912	100.00 %	0.44 %
Midland (Cabarrus)	34	4,684	214,990	3,501	74.74 %	1.63 %
	35	4,684	219,142	1,183	25.26 %	0.54 %
Midland (Mecklenburg)	42	0	209,378	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Midway	30	4,742	211,642	4,742	100.00 %	2.24 %
Mills River	48	7,078	200,053	7,078	100.00 %	3.54 %
Milton	23	155	210,529	155	100.00 %	0.07 %
Mineral Springs	35	3,159	219,142	3,159	100.00 %	1.44 %
Minnesott Beach	2	530	198,557	530	100.00 %	0.27 %
Mint Hill (Mecklenburg)	40	26,444	218,881	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	42	26,444	209,378	26,444	100.00 %	12.63 %
Mint Hill (Union)	35	6	219,142	6	100.00 %	0.00 %
Misenheimer	33	650	209,379	650	100.00 %	0.31 %
Mocksville	30	5,900	211,642	5,900	100.00 %	2.79 %
Momeyer	11	277	206,121	277	100.00 %	0.13 %
Monroe	29	34,562	218,829	10,719	31.01 %	4.90 %
	35	34,562	219,142	23,843	68.99 %	10.88 %
Montreat	46	901	199,859	901	100.00 %	0.45 %
Mooresboro	44	293	203,043	293	100.00 %	0.14 %
Mooresville	37	50,193	219,210	50,193	100.00 %	22.90 %
Morehead City	2	9,556	198,557	9,556	100.00 %	4.81 %
Morganton	46	17,474	199,859	17,474	100.00 %	8.74 %
Morrisville (Durham)	20	207	201,314	207	100.00 %	0.10 %
Morrisville (Wake)	17	29,423	198,415	29,423	100.00 %	14.83 %
Morven	29	329	218,829	329	100.00 %	0.15 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Mount Airy	36	10,676	210,986	10,676	100.00 %	5.06 %
Mount Gilead	29	1,171	218,829	1,171	100.00 %	0.54 %
Mount Holly	43	17,703	211,229	17,703	100.00 %	8.38 %
Mount Olive (Duplin)	9	5	202,791	5	100.00 %	0.00 %
Mount Olive (Wayne)	4	4,193	216,568	4,193	100.00 %	1.94 %
Mount Pleasant	34	1,671	214,990	1,671	100.00 %	0.78 %
Murfreesboro	1	2,619	199,623	2,619	100.00 %	1.31 %
Murphy	50	1,608	218,733	1,608	100.00 %	0.74 %
Nags Head	1	3,168	199,623	3,168	100.00 %	1.59 %
Nashville	11	5,632	206,121	5,632	100.00 %	2.73 %
Navassa	8	1,367	214,542	1,367	100.00 %	0.64 %
New Bern	3	31,291	200,494	31,291	100.00 %	15.61 %
New London	33	607	209,379	607	100.00 %	0.29 %
Newland	47	715	204,671	715	100.00 %	0.35 %
Newport	2	4,364	198,557	4,364	100.00 %	2.20 %
Newton	45	13,148	218,989	13,148	100.00 %	6.00 %
Newton Grove	9	585	202,791	585	100.00 %	0.29 %
Norlina	2	920	198,557	920	100.00 %	0.46 %
Norman	29	100	218,829	100	100.00 %	0.05 %
North Topsail Beach	6	1,005	204,576	1,005	100.00 %	0.49 %
North Wilkesboro	36	4,382	210,986	4,382	100.00 %	2.08 %
Northwest	8	703	214,542	703	100.00 %	0.33 %
Norwood	33	2,367	209,379	2,367	100.00 %	1.13 %
Oak City	2	266	198,557	266	100.00 %	0.13 %
Oak Island	8	8,396	214,542	8,396	100.00 %	3.91 %
Oak Ridge	26	7,474	211,801	7,445	99.61 %	3.52 %
	27	7,474	210,558	29	0.39 %	0.01 %
Oakboro	33	2,128	209,379	2,128	100.00 %	1.02 %
Ocean Isle Beach	8	867	214,542	867	100.00 %	0.40 %
Old Fort	46	811	199,859	811	100.00 %	0.41 %
Oriental	2	880	198,557	880	100.00 %	0.44 %
Orrum	24	59	202,786	59	100.00 %	0.03 %
Ossipee	25	536	217,448	536	100.00 %	0.25 %
Oxford	18	8,628	198,352	8,628	100.00 %	4.35 %
Pantego	3	164	200,494	164	100.00 %	0.08 %
Parkton	24	504	202,786	504	100.00 %	0.25 %
Parmele	2	243	198,557	243	100.00 %	0.12 %
Patterson Springs	44	571	203,043	571	100.00 %	0.28 %
Peachland	29	390	218,829	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Peletier	2	769	198,557	769	100.00 %	0.39 %
Pembroke	24	2,823	202,786	2,823	100.00 %	1.39 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Pikeville	4	712	216,568	712	100.00 %	0.33 %
Pilot Mountain	36	1,440	210,986	1,440	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pine Knoll Shores	2	1,388	198,557	1,388	100.00 %	0.70 %
Pine Level	10	2,046	215,999	2,046	100.00 %	0.95 %
Pinebluff	21	1,473	217,984	1,473	100.00 %	0.68 %
Pinehurst	21	17,581	217,984	17,581	100.00 %	8.07 %
Pinetops	5	1,200	219,143	1,200	100.00 %	0.55 %
Pineville	39	10,602	219,123	10,602	100.00 %	4.84 %
	42	10,602	209,378	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Pink Hill	3	451	200,494	451	100.00 %	0.22 %
Pittsboro	20	4,537	201,314	4,537	100.00 %	2.25 %
Pleasant Garden	26	5,000	211,801	5,000	100.00 %	2.36 %
Plymouth	2	3,320	198,557	3,320	100.00 %	1.67 %
Polkton	29	2,250	218,829	2,250	100.00 %	1.03 %
Polkville	44	516	203,043	516	100.00 %	0.25 %
Pollocksville	9	268	202,791	268	100.00 %	0.13 %
Powellsville	1	189	199,623	189	100.00 %	0.09 %
Princeton	10	1,315	215,999	1,315	100.00 %	0.61 %
Princeville	5	1,254	219,143	1,254	100.00 %	0.57 %
Proctorville	24	121	202,786	121	100.00 %	0.06 %
Raeford	24	4,559	202,786	4,559	100.00 %	2.25 %
Raleigh (Durham)	20	1,559	201,314	233	14.95 %	0.12 %
	22	1,559	199,804	1,326	85.05 %	0.66 %
Raleigh (Wake)	13	466,106	198,371	3	0.00 %	0.00 %
	14	466,106	198,512	123,813	26.56 %	62.37 %
	15	466,106	198,368	195,707	41.99 %	98.66 %
	16	466,106	198,384	119,612	25.66 %	60.29 %
	17	466,106	198,415	11,122	2.39 %	5.61 %
	18	466,106	198,352	15,849	3.40 %	7.99 %
Ramseur	29	1,774	218,829	1,774	100.00 %	0.81 %
Randleman	25	4,595	217,448	4,595	100.00 %	2.11 %
Ranlo	43	4,511	211,229	4,511	100.00 %	2.14 %
Raynham	24	60	202,786	60	100.00 %	0.03 %
Red Cross	33	762	209,379	762	100.00 %	0.36 %
Red Oak	11	3,342	206,121	3,342	100.00 %	1.62 %
Red Springs (Hoke)	24	0	202,786	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Red Springs (Robeson)	24	3,087	202,786	3,087	100.00 %	1.52 %
Reidsville	26	14,583	211,801	14,583	100.00 %	6.89 %
Rennert	24	275	202,786	275	100.00 %	0.14 %
Rhodhiss (Burke)	46	639	199,859	639	100.00 %	0.32 %
Rhodhiss (Caldwell)	45	358	218,989	358	100.00 %	0.16 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Rich Square	1	894	199,623	894	100.00 %	0.45 %
Richfield	33	582	209,379	582	100.00 %	0.28 %
Richlands	6	2,287	204,576	2,287	100.00 %	1.12 %
River Bend	3	2,902	200,494	2,902	100.00 %	1.45 %
Roanoke Rapids	2	15,229	198,557	15,229	100.00 %	7.67 %
Robbins	21	1,168	217,984	1,168	100.00 %	0.54 %
Robbinsville	50	597	218,733	597	100.00 %	0.27 %
Robersonville	2	1,269	198,557	1,269	100.00 %	0.64 %
Rockingham	29	9,243	218,829	9,243	100.00 %	4.22 %
Rockwell	33	2,302	209,379	2,302	100.00 %	1.10 %
Rocky Mount (Edgecombe)	5	15,414	219,143	15,414	100.00 %	7.03 %
Rocky Mount (Nash)	11	38,927	206,121	38,927	100.00 %	18.89 %
Rolesville	14	9,475	198,512	1,305	13.77 %	0.66 %
	18	9,475	198,352	8,170	86.23 %	4.12 %
Ronda	36	438	210,986	438	100.00 %	0.21 %
Roper	2	485	198,557	485	100.00 %	0.24 %
Rose Hill	9	1,371	202,791	1,371	100.00 %	0.68 %
Roseboro	9	1,163	202,791	1,163	100.00 %	0.57 %
Rosman	50	701	218,733	701	100.00 %	0.32 %
Rowland	24	885	202,786	885	100.00 %	0.44 %
Roxboro	23	8,134	210,529	8,134	100.00 %	3.86 %
Roxobel	1	187	199,623	187	100.00 %	0.09 %
Rural Hall	31	3,351	215,359	3,351	100.00 %	1.56 %
Ruth	48	347	200,053	347	100.00 %	0.17 %
Rutherford College (Burke)	46	1,226	199,859	1,226	100.00 %	0.61 %
Rutherford College (Caldwell)	45	0	218,989	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Rutherfordton	48	3,640	200,053	3,640	100.00 %	1.82 %
Salemburg	9	457	202,791	457	100.00 %	0.23 %
Salisbury	33	35,540	209,379	35,540	100.00 %	16.97 %
Saluda (Henderson)	48	11	200,053	11	100.00 %	0.01 %
Saluda (Polk)	48	620	200,053	620	100.00 %	0.31 %
Sandy Creek	8	248	214,542	248	100.00 %	0.12 %
Sandyfield	8	430	214,542	430	100.00 %	0.20 %
Sanford	12	30,261	200,794	30,261	100.00 %	15.07 %
Saratoga	4	353	216,568	353	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sawmills	45	5,020	218,989	5,020	100.00 %	2.29 %
Scotland Neck	2	1,640	198,557	1,640	100.00 %	0.83 %
Seaboard	1	542	199,623	542	100.00 %	0.27 %
Seagrove	29	235	218,829	235	100.00 %	0.11 %
Sedalia	26	676	211,801	676	100.00 %	0.32 %
Selma	10	6,317	215,999	6,317	100.00 %	2.92 %

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Municipality by County - District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Seven Devils (Avery)	47	38	204,671	38	100.00 %	0.02 %
Seven Devils (Watauga)	47	275	204,671	275	100.00 %	0.13 %
Seven Springs	4	55	216,568	55	100.00 %	0.03 %
Severn	1	191	199,623	191	100.00 %	0.10 %
Shalotte	8	4,185	214,542	4,185	100.00 %	1.95 %
Sharpsburg (Edgecombe)	5	215	219,143	215	100.00 %	0.10 %
Sharpsburg (Nash)	11	1,061	206,121	1,061	100.00 %	0.51 %
Sharpsburg (Wilson)	4	421	216,568	421	100.00 %	0.19 %
Shelby	44	21,918	203,043	21,918	100.00 %	10.79 %
Siler City	20	7,702	201,314	7,702	100.00 %	3.83 %
Simpson	5	390	219,143	390	100.00 %	0.18 %
Sims	4	275	216,568	275	100.00 %	0.13 %
Smithfield	10	11,292	215,999	11,292	100.00 %	5.23 %
Snow Hill	4	1,481	216,568	1,481	100.00 %	0.68 %
Southern Pines	21	15,545	217,984	15,545	100.00 %	7.13 %
Southern Shores	1	3,090	199,623	3,090	100.00 %	1.55 %
Southport	8	3,971	214,542	3,971	100.00 %	1.85 %
Sparta	47	1,834	204,671	1,834	100.00 %	0.90 %
Speed	5	63	219,143	63	100.00 %	0.03 %
Spencer	33	3,308	209,379	3,308	100.00 %	1.58 %
Spencer Mountain	43	0	211,229	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Spindale	48	4,225	200,053	4,225	100.00 %	2.11 %
Spring Hope	11	1,309	206,121	1,309	100.00 %	0.64 %
Spring Lake	21	11,660	217,984	11,660	100.00 %	5.35 %
Spruce Pine	47	2,194	204,671	2,194	100.00 %	1.07 %
St. Helena	9	417	202,791	417	100.00 %	0.21 %
St. James	8	6,529	214,542	6,529	100.00 %	3.04 %
St. Pauls	24	2,045	202,786	2,045	100.00 %	1.01 %
Staley	25	397	217,448	397	100.00 %	0.18 %
Stallings (Mecklenburg)	42	384	209,378	384	100.00 %	0.18 %
Stallings (Union)	35	15,728	219,142	15,728	100.00 %	7.18 %
Stanfield	33	1,585	209,379	1,585	100.00 %	0.76 %
Stanley	43	3,963	211,229	3,963	100.00 %	1.88 %
Stantonsburg	4	762	216,568	762	100.00 %	0.35 %
Star	29	806	218,829	806	100.00 %	0.37 %
Statesville	37	28,419	219,210	28,419	100.00 %	12.96 %
Stedman	21	1,277	217,984	1,277	100.00 %	0.59 %
Stem	18	960	198,352	960	100.00 %	0.48 %
Stokesdale	26	5,924	211,801	5,924	100.00 %	2.80 %
Stoneville	26	1,308	211,801	1,308	100.00 %	0.62 %
Stonewall	2	214	198,557	214	100.00 %	0.11 %

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

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Stovall	18	324	198,352	324	100.00 %	0.16 %
Sugar Mountain	47	371	204,671	371	100.00 %	0.18 %
Summerfield	26	10,951	211,801	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	27	10,951	210,558	10,951	100.00 %	5.20 %
Sunset Beach	8	4,175	214,542	4,175	100.00 %	1.95 %
Surf City (Onslow)	6	334	204,576	334	100.00 %	0.16 %
Surf City (Pender)	9	3,533	202,791	3,533	100.00 %	1.74 %
Swansboro	6	3,744	204,576	3,744	100.00 %	1.83 %
Swepsonville	25	2,445	217,448	2,445	100.00 %	1.12 %
Sylva	50	2,578	218,733	2,578	100.00 %	1.18 %
Tabor City	8	3,781	214,542	3,781	100.00 %	1.76 %
Tar Heel	9	90	202,791	90	100.00 %	0.04 %
Tarboro	5	10,721	219,143	10,721	100.00 %	4.89 %
Taylorsville	36	2,320	210,986	2,320	100.00 %	1.10 %
Taylortown	21	634	217,984	634	100.00 %	0.29 %
Teachey	9	448	202,791	448	100.00 %	0.22 %
Thomasville (Davidson)	30	26,662	211,642	26,662	100.00 %	12.60 %
Thomasville (Randolph)	29	521	218,829	521	100.00 %	0.24 %
Tobacconville (Forsyth)	31	2,578	215,359	2,578	100.00 %	1.20 %
Tobacconville (Stokes)	31	0	215,359	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Topsail Beach	9	461	202,791	461	100.00 %	0.23 %
Trent Woods	3	4,074	200,494	4,074	100.00 %	2.03 %
Trenton	9	238	202,791	238	100.00 %	0.12 %
Trinity	29	7,006	218,829	7,006	100.00 %	3.20 %
Troutman	37	3,698	219,210	3,698	100.00 %	1.69 %
Troy	29	2,850	218,829	2,850	100.00 %	1.30 %
Tryon	48	1,562	200,053	1,562	100.00 %	0.78 %
Turkey	9	213	202,791	213	100.00 %	0.11 %
Unionville	35	6,643	219,142	6,643	100.00 %	3.03 %
Valdese	46	4,689	199,859	4,689	100.00 %	2.35 %
Vanceboro	3	869	200,494	869	100.00 %	0.43 %
Vandemere	2	246	198,557	246	100.00 %	0.12 %
Varnamtown	8	525	214,542	525	100.00 %	0.24 %
Vass	21	952	217,984	952	100.00 %	0.44 %
Waco	44	310	203,043	310	100.00 %	0.15 %
Wade	21	638	217,984	638	100.00 %	0.29 %
Wadesboro	29	5,008	218,829	5,008	100.00 %	2.29 %
Wagram	24	615	202,786	615	100.00 %	0.30 %
Wake Forest (Franklin)	11	1,504	206,121	1,504	100.00 %	0.73 %

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Wake Forest (Wake)	14	46,097	198,512	2,318	5.03 %	1.17 %
	15	46,097	198,368	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	18	46,097	198,352	43,779	94.97 %	22.07 %
Walkertown	31	5,692	215,359	4,716	82.85 %	2.19 %
	32	5,692	211,751	976	17.15 %	0.46 %
Wallace (Duplin)	9	3,413	202,791	3,413	100.00 %	1.68 %
Wallace (Pender)	9	0	202,791	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Wallburg	30	3,051	211,642	3,051	100.00 %	1.44 %
Walnut Cove	31	1,586	215,359	1,586	100.00 %	0.74 %
Walnut Creek	4	1,084	216,568	1,084	100.00 %	0.50 %
Walstonburg	4	193	216,568	193	100.00 %	0.09 %
Warrenton	2	851	198,557	851	100.00 %	0.43 %
Warsaw	9	2,733	202,791	2,733	100.00 %	1.35 %
Washington	3	9,875	200,494	9,875	100.00 %	4.93 %
Washington Park	3	392	200,494	392	100.00 %	0.20 %
Watha	9	181	202,791	181	100.00 %	0.09 %
Waxhaw	35	20,534	219,142	20,534	100.00 %	9.37 %
Waynesville	50	10,140	218,733	10,140	100.00 %	4.64 %
Weaverville	49	4,567	201,741	4,567	100.00 %	2.26 %
Webster	50	372	218,733	372	100.00 %	0.17 %
Weddington (Mecklenburg)	42	5	209,378	5	100.00 %	0.00 %
Weddington (Union)	35	13,176	219,142	13,176	100.00 %	6.01 %
Weldon	2	1,444	198,557	1,444	100.00 %	0.73 %
Wendell	14	9,793	198,512	6,613	67.53 %	3.33 %
	18	9,793	198,352	3,180	32.47 %	1.60 %
Wentworth	26	2,662	211,801	2,662	100.00 %	1.26 %
Wesley Chapel	35	8,681	219,142	8,681	100.00 %	3.96 %
West Jefferson	47	1,279	204,671	1,279	100.00 %	0.62 %
Whispering Pines	21	4,987	217,984	4,987	100.00 %	2.29 %
Whitakers (Edgecombe)	5	290	219,143	290	100.00 %	0.13 %
Whitakers (Nash)	11	337	206,121	337	100.00 %	0.16 %
White Lake	9	843	202,791	843	100.00 %	0.42 %
Whiteville	8	4,766	214,542	4,766	100.00 %	2.22 %
Whitsett	26	584	211,801	584	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wilkesboro	36	3,687	210,986	3,687	100.00 %	1.75 %
Williamston	2	5,248	198,557	5,248	100.00 %	2.64 %
Wilmington	7	115,451	198,476	88,318	76.50 %	44.50 %
	8	115,451	214,542	27,133	23.50 %	12.65 %
Wilson	4	47,851	216,568	47,851	100.00 %	22.10 %
Wilson's Mills	10	2,534	215,999	2,534	100.00 %	1.17 %
Windsor	1	3,582	199,623	3,582	100.00 %	1.79 %

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Municipality by County - District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Municipality	District	Total Muni Population	Total District Population	Muni Pop in District	Percent of Muni Pop in District	Percent of District Pop in Muni
Winfall	1	555	199,623	555	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wingate	29	4,055	218,829	4,055	100.00 %	1.85 %
Winston-Salem	31	249,545	215,359	45,330	18.17 %	21.05 %
	32	249,545	211,751	204,215	81.83 %	96.44 %
Winterville	5	10,462	219,143	10,462	100.00 %	4.77 %
Winton	1	629	199,623	629	100.00 %	0.32 %
Woodfin	46	7,936	199,859	288	3.63 %	0.14 %
	49	7,936	201,741	7,648	96.37 %	3.79 %
Woodland	1	557	199,623	557	100.00 %	0.28 %
Wrightsville Beach	7	2,473	198,476	2,473	100.00 %	1.25 %
Yadkinville	36	2,995	210,986	2,995	100.00 %	1.42 %
Yanceyville	23	1,937	210,529	1,937	100.00 %	0.92 %
Youngsville	11	2,016	206,121	2,016	100.00 %	0.98 %
Zebulon (Johnston)	10	0	215,999	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Zebulon (Wake)	14	6,903	198,512	4,668	67.62 %	2.35 %
	18	6,903	198,352	2,235	32.38 %	1.13 %
Assigned Geography Total:				6,017,605		

Report display: all municipalities

Total Municipalities (by County) Statewide: 614

Fully Assigned Municipalities: 614

Partially Assigned Municipalities: 0

Fully Unassigned Municipalities: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split Municipalities: 44

Splits Involving Population: 34

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
1	Ahoskie	199,623	4,891	4,891	2.45 %	100.00 %
	Askewville	199,623	184	184	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Aulander	199,623	763	763	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Cofield	199,623	267	267	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Colerain	199,623	217	217	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Columbia	199,623	610	610	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Como	199,623	67	67	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Conway	199,623	752	752	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Duck	199,623	742	742	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Elizabeth City (Camden)	199,623	38	38	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Elizabeth City (Pasquotank)	199,623	18,593	18,593	9.31 %	100.00 %
	Garysburg	199,623	904	904	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Gaston	199,623	1,008	1,008	0.50 %	100.00 %
	Gatesville	199,623	267	267	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Harrellsville	199,623	85	85	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Hertford	199,623	1,934	1,934	0.97 %	100.00 %
	Jackson	199,623	430	430	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Kelford	199,623	203	203	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Kill Devil Hills	199,623	7,656	7,656	3.84 %	100.00 %
	Kitty Hawk	199,623	3,689	3,689	1.85 %	100.00 %
	Lasker	199,623	64	64	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Lewiston Woodville	199,623	426	426	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Manteo	199,623	1,600	1,600	0.80 %	100.00 %
	Murfreesboro	199,623	2,619	2,619	1.31 %	100.00 %
	Nags Head	199,623	3,168	3,168	1.59 %	100.00 %
	Powellsville	199,623	189	189	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Rich Square	199,623	894	894	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Roxobel	199,623	187	187	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Seaboard	199,623	542	542	0.27 %	100.00 %
	Severn	199,623	191	191	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Southern Shores	199,623	3,090	3,090	1.55 %	100.00 %
Windsor	199,623	3,582	3,582	1.79 %	100.00 %	
Winfall	199,623	555	555	0.28 %	100.00 %	
Winton	199,623	629	629	0.32 %	100.00 %	
Woodland	199,623	557	557	0.28 %	100.00 %	
2	Alliance	198,557	733	733	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Arapahoe	198,557	416	416	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Atlantic Beach	198,557	1,364	1,364	0.69 %	100.00 %
	Bayboro	198,557	1,161	1,161	0.58 %	100.00 %
	Bear Grass	198,557	89	89	0.04 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
2	Beaufort	198,557	4,464	4,464	2.25 %	100.00 %
	Bogue	198,557	695	695	0.35 %	100.00 %
	Cape Carteret	198,557	2,224	2,224	1.12 %	100.00 %
	Cedar Point	198,557	1,764	1,764	0.89 %	100.00 %
	Creswell	198,557	207	207	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Edenton	198,557	4,460	4,460	2.25 %	100.00 %
	Emerald Isle	198,557	3,847	3,847	1.94 %	100.00 %
	Enfield	198,557	1,865	1,865	0.94 %	100.00 %
	Everetts	198,557	150	150	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Grantsboro	198,557	692	692	0.35 %	100.00 %
	Halifax	198,557	170	170	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Hamilton	198,557	306	306	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Hassell	198,557	49	49	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Hobgood	198,557	268	268	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Indian Beach	198,557	223	223	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Jamesville	198,557	424	424	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Littleton	198,557	559	559	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Macon	198,557	110	110	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Mesic	198,557	144	144	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Minnesott Beach	198,557	530	530	0.27 %	100.00 %
	Morehead City	198,557	9,556	9,556	4.81 %	100.00 %
	Newport	198,557	4,364	4,364	2.20 %	100.00 %
	Norlina	198,557	920	920	0.46 %	100.00 %
	Oak City	198,557	266	266	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Oriental	198,557	880	880	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Parmele	198,557	243	243	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Peletier	198,557	769	769	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Pine Knoll Shores	198,557	1,388	1,388	0.70 %	100.00 %
	Plymouth	198,557	3,320	3,320	1.67 %	100.00 %
	Roanoke Rapids	198,557	15,229	15,229	7.67 %	100.00 %
	Robersonville	198,557	1,269	1,269	0.64 %	100.00 %
Roper	198,557	485	485	0.24 %	100.00 %	
Scotland Neck	198,557	1,640	1,640	0.83 %	100.00 %	
Stonewall	198,557	214	214	0.11 %	100.00 %	
Vandemere	198,557	246	246	0.12 %	100.00 %	
Warrenton	198,557	851	851	0.43 %	100.00 %	
Weldon	198,557	1,444	1,444	0.73 %	100.00 %	
Williamston	198,557	5,248	5,248	2.64 %	100.00 %	
3	Aurora	200,494	455	455	0.23 %	100.00 %
	Bath	200,494	245	245	0.12 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
3	Belhaven	200,494	1,410	1,410	0.70 %	100.00 %
	Bridgeton	200,494	349	349	0.17 %	100.00 %
	Chocowinity	200,494	722	722	0.36 %	100.00 %
	Cove City	200,494	378	378	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Dover	200,494	349	349	0.17 %	100.00 %
	Grifton (Lenoir)	200,494	147	147	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Havelock	200,494	16,621	16,621	8.29 %	100.00 %
	Kinston	200,494	19,900	19,900	9.93 %	100.00 %
	La Grange	200,494	2,595	2,595	1.29 %	100.00 %
	New Bern	200,494	31,291	31,291	15.61 %	100.00 %
	Pantego	200,494	164	164	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Pink Hill	200,494	451	451	0.22 %	100.00 %
	River Bend	200,494	2,902	2,902	1.45 %	100.00 %
	Trent Woods	200,494	4,074	4,074	2.03 %	100.00 %
	Vanceboro	200,494	869	869	0.43 %	100.00 %
	Washington	200,494	9,875	9,875	4.93 %	100.00 %
Washington Park	200,494	392	392	0.20 %	100.00 %	
4	Black Creek	216,568	692	692	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Elm City (Wilson)	216,568	1,218	1,218	0.56 %	100.00 %
	Eureka	216,568	214	214	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Fremont	216,568	1,196	1,196	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Goldsboro	216,568	33,657	33,657	15.54 %	100.00 %
	Hookerton	216,568	413	413	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Kenly (Wilson)	216,568	198	198	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Lucama	216,568	1,036	1,036	0.48 %	100.00 %
	Mount Olive (Wayne)	216,568	4,193	4,193	1.94 %	100.00 %
	Pikeville	216,568	712	712	0.33 %	100.00 %
	Saratoga	216,568	353	353	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Seven Springs	216,568	55	55	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Sharpsburg (Wilson)	216,568	421	421	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Sims	216,568	275	275	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Snow Hill	216,568	1,481	1,481	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Stantonsburg	216,568	762	762	0.35 %	100.00 %
	Walnut Creek	216,568	1,084	1,084	0.50 %	100.00 %
	Walstonburg	216,568	193	193	0.09 %	100.00 %
Wilson	216,568	47,851	47,851	22.10 %	100.00 %	
5	Ayden	219,143	4,977	4,977	2.27 %	100.00 %
	Bethel	219,143	1,373	1,373	0.63 %	100.00 %
	Conetoe	219,143	198	198	0.09 %	100.00 %
	Falkland	219,143	47	47	0.02 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
5	Farmville	219,143	4,461	4,461	2.04 %	100.00 %
	Fountain	219,143	385	385	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Greenville	219,143	87,521	87,521	39.94 %	100.00 %
	Grifton (Pitt)	219,143	2,301	2,301	1.05 %	100.00 %
	Grimesland	219,143	386	386	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Leggett	219,143	37	37	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Macclesfield	219,143	413	413	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Pinetops	219,143	1,200	1,200	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Princeville	219,143	1,254	1,254	0.57 %	100.00 %
	Rocky Mount (Edgecombe)	219,143	15,414	15,414	7.03 %	100.00 %
	Sharpsburg (Edgecombe)	219,143	215	215	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Simpson	219,143	390	390	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Speed	219,143	63	63	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Tarboro	219,143	10,721	10,721	4.89 %	100.00 %
	Whitakers (Edgecombe)	219,143	290	290	0.13 %	100.00 %
Winterville	219,143	10,462	10,462	4.77 %	100.00 %	
6	Holly Ridge	204,576	4,171	4,171	2.04 %	100.00 %
	Jacksonville	204,576	72,723	72,723	35.55 %	100.00 %
	North Topsail Beach	204,576	1,005	1,005	0.49 %	100.00 %
	Richlands	204,576	2,287	2,287	1.12 %	100.00 %
	Surf City (Onslow)	204,576	334	334	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Swansboro	204,576	3,744	3,744	1.83 %	100.00 %
7	Carolina Beach	198,476	6,564	6,564	3.31 %	100.00 %
	Kure Beach	198,476	2,191	2,191	1.10 %	100.00 %
	Wilmington	198,476	115,451	88,318	44.50 %	76.50 %
	Wrightsville Beach	198,476	2,473	2,473	1.25 %	100.00 %
8	Bald Head Island	214,542	268	268	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Belville	214,542	2,406	2,406	1.12 %	100.00 %
	Boardman	214,542	166	166	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Boiling Spring Lakes	214,542	5,943	5,943	2.77 %	100.00 %
	Bolivia	214,542	149	149	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Bolton	214,542	519	519	0.24 %	100.00 %
	Brunswick	214,542	973	973	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Calabash	214,542	2,011	2,011	0.94 %	100.00 %
	Carolina Shores	214,542	4,588	4,588	2.14 %	100.00 %
	Caswell Beach	214,542	395	395	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Cerro Gordo	214,542	131	131	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Chadbourn	214,542	1,574	1,574	0.73 %	100.00 %
	Fair Bluff	214,542	709	709	0.33 %	100.00 %
Holden Beach	214,542	921	921	0.43 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
8	Lake Waccamaw	214,542	1,296	1,296	0.60 %	100.00 %
	Leland	214,542	22,908	22,908	10.68 %	100.00 %
	Navassa	214,542	1,367	1,367	0.64 %	100.00 %
	Northwest	214,542	703	703	0.33 %	100.00 %
	Oak Island	214,542	8,396	8,396	3.91 %	100.00 %
	Ocean Isle Beach	214,542	867	867	0.40 %	100.00 %
	Sandy Creek	214,542	248	248	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Sandyfield	214,542	430	430	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Shallotte	214,542	4,185	4,185	1.95 %	100.00 %
	Southport	214,542	3,971	3,971	1.85 %	100.00 %
	St. James	214,542	6,529	6,529	3.04 %	100.00 %
	Sunset Beach	214,542	4,175	4,175	1.95 %	100.00 %
	Tabor City	214,542	3,781	3,781	1.76 %	100.00 %
	Varnamtown	214,542	525	525	0.24 %	100.00 %
	Whiteville	214,542	4,766	4,766	2.22 %	100.00 %
Wilmington	214,542	115,451	27,133	12.65 %	23.50 %	
9	Atkinson	202,791	296	296	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Autryville	202,791	167	167	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Beulaville	202,791	1,116	1,116	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Bladenboro	202,791	1,648	1,648	0.81 %	100.00 %
	Burgaw	202,791	3,088	3,088	1.52 %	100.00 %
	Calypso	202,791	327	327	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Clarkton	202,791	614	614	0.30 %	100.00 %
	Clinton	202,791	8,383	8,383	4.13 %	100.00 %
	Dublin	202,791	267	267	0.13 %	100.00 %
	East Arcadia	202,791	418	418	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Elizabethtown	202,791	3,296	3,296	1.63 %	100.00 %
	Faison (Duplin)	202,791	784	784	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Faison (Sampson)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Falcon (Sampson)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Garland	202,791	595	595	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Greenevers	202,791	567	567	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Harrells (Duplin)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Harrells (Sampson)	202,791	160	160	0.08 %	100.00 %
	Kenansville	202,791	770	770	0.38 %	100.00 %
	Magnolia	202,791	831	831	0.41 %	100.00 %
Maysville	202,791	818	818	0.40 %	100.00 %	
Mount Olive (Duplin)	202,791	5	5	0.00 %	100.00 %	
Newton Grove	202,791	585	585	0.29 %	100.00 %	
Pollocksville	202,791	268	268	0.13 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
9	Rose Hill	202,791	1,371	1,371	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Roseboro	202,791	1,163	1,163	0.57 %	100.00 %
	Salemburg	202,791	457	457	0.23 %	100.00 %
	St. Helena	202,791	417	417	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Surf City (Pender)	202,791	3,533	3,533	1.74 %	100.00 %
	Tar Heel	202,791	90	90	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Teachey	202,791	448	448	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Topsail Beach	202,791	461	461	0.23 %	100.00 %
	Trenton	202,791	238	238	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Turkey	202,791	213	213	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Wallace (Duplin)	202,791	3,413	3,413	1.68 %	100.00 %
	Wallace (Pender)	202,791	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Warsaw	202,791	2,733	2,733	1.35 %	100.00 %
	Watha	202,791	181	181	0.09 %	100.00 %
	White Lake	202,791	843	843	0.42 %	100.00 %
10	Archer Lodge	215,999	4,797	4,797	2.22 %	100.00 %
	Benson (Johnston)	215,999	3,967	3,967	1.84 %	100.00 %
	Clayton (Johnston)	215,999	26,307	26,307	12.18 %	100.00 %
	Four Oaks	215,999	2,158	2,158	1.00 %	100.00 %
	Kenly (Johnston)	215,999	1,293	1,293	0.60 %	100.00 %
	Micro	215,999	458	458	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Pine Level	215,999	2,046	2,046	0.95 %	100.00 %
	Princeton	215,999	1,315	1,315	0.61 %	100.00 %
	Selma	215,999	6,317	6,317	2.92 %	100.00 %
	Smithfield	215,999	11,292	11,292	5.23 %	100.00 %
	Wilson's Mills	215,999	2,534	2,534	1.17 %	100.00 %
	Zebulon (Johnston)	215,999	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
11	Bailey	206,121	568	568	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Bunn	206,121	327	327	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Castalia	206,121	264	264	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Dortches	206,121	1,082	1,082	0.52 %	100.00 %
	Elm City (Nash)	206,121	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Franklinton	206,121	2,456	2,456	1.19 %	100.00 %
	Henderson	206,121	15,060	15,060	7.31 %	100.00 %
	Kittrell	206,121	132	132	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Louisburg	206,121	3,064	3,064	1.49 %	100.00 %
	Middleburg	206,121	101	101	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Middlesex	206,121	912	912	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Momeyer	206,121	277	277	0.13 %	100.00 %
	Nashville	206,121	5,632	5,632	2.73 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
11	Red Oak	206,121	3,342	3,342	1.62 %	100.00 %
	Rocky Mount (Nash)	206,121	38,927	38,927	18.89 %	100.00 %
	Sharpsburg (Nash)	206,121	1,061	1,061	0.51 %	100.00 %
	Spring Hope	206,121	1,309	1,309	0.64 %	100.00 %
	Wake Forest (Franklin)	206,121	1,504	1,504	0.73 %	100.00 %
	Whitakers (Nash)	206,121	337	337	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Youngsville	206,121	2,016	2,016	0.98 %	100.00 %
12	Angier (Harnett)	200,794	4,709	4,709	2.35 %	100.00 %
	Benson (Harnett)	200,794	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Broadway (Harnett)	200,794	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Broadway (Lee)	200,794	1,267	1,267	0.63 %	100.00 %
	Coats	200,794	2,155	2,155	1.07 %	100.00 %
	Dunn	200,794	8,446	8,446	4.21 %	100.00 %
	Erwin	200,794	4,542	4,542	2.26 %	100.00 %
	Fuquay-Varina (Harnett)	200,794	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Lillington	200,794	4,735	4,735	2.36 %	100.00 %
	Sanford	200,794	30,261	30,261	15.07 %	100.00 %
13	Angier (Wake)	198,371	556	556	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Apex	198,371	58,780	8,749	4.41 %	14.88 %
	Cary (Wake)	198,371	171,012	19,385	9.77 %	11.34 %
	Clayton (Wake)	198,371	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Fuquay-Varina (Wake)	198,371	34,152	34,152	17.22 %	100.00 %
	Garner	198,371	31,159	17,010	8.57 %	54.59 %
	Holly Springs	198,371	41,239	26,396	13.31 %	64.01 %
	Knightdale	198,371	19,435	2,933	1.48 %	15.09 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,371	466,106	3	0.00 %	0.00 %
14	Clayton (Wake)	198,512	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Garner	198,512	31,159	14,149	7.13 %	45.41 %
	Knightdale	198,512	19,435	16,502	8.31 %	84.91 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,512	466,106	123,813	62.37 %	26.56 %
	Rolesville	198,512	9,475	1,305	0.66 %	13.77 %
	Wake Forest (Wake)	198,512	46,097	2,318	1.17 %	5.03 %
	Wendell	198,512	9,793	6,613	3.33 %	67.53 %
	Zebulon (Wake)	198,512	6,903	4,668	2.35 %	67.62 %
15	Raleigh (Wake)	198,368	466,106	195,707	98.66 %	41.99 %
	Wake Forest (Wake)	198,368	46,097	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
16	Apex	198,384	58,780	297	0.15 %	0.51 %
	Cary (Wake)	198,384	171,012	67,911	34.23 %	39.71 %
	Durham (Wake)	198,384	269	269	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,384	466,106	119,612	60.29 %	25.66 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
17	Apex	198,415	58,780	49,734	25.07 %	84.61 %
	Cary (Wake)	198,415	171,012	83,716	42.19 %	48.95 %
	Durham (Wake)	198,415	269	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Holly Springs	198,415	41,239	14,843	7.48 %	35.99 %
	Morrisville (Wake)	198,415	29,423	29,423	14.83 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,415	466,106	11,122	5.61 %	2.39 %
18	Butner	198,352	8,397	8,397	4.23 %	100.00 %
	Creedmoor	198,352	4,866	4,866	2.45 %	100.00 %
	Knightdale	198,352	19,435	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Oxford	198,352	8,628	8,628	4.35 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Wake)	198,352	466,106	15,849	7.99 %	3.40 %
	Rolesville	198,352	9,475	8,170	4.12 %	86.23 %
	Stem	198,352	960	960	0.48 %	100.00 %
	Stovall	198,352	324	324	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Wake Forest (Wake)	198,352	46,097	43,779	22.07 %	94.97 %
	Wendell	198,352	9,793	3,180	1.60 %	32.47 %
	Zebulon (Wake)	198,352	6,903	2,235	1.13 %	32.38 %
19	Fayetteville	216,471	208,501	183,928	84.97 %	88.21 %
	Hope Mills	216,471	17,808	2,593	1.20 %	14.56 %
20	Cary (Chatham)	201,314	3,709	3,709	1.84 %	100.00 %
	Chapel Hill (Durham)	201,314	2,906	2,906	1.44 %	100.00 %
	Durham (Durham)	201,314	283,093	116,918	58.08 %	41.30 %
	Goldston	201,314	234	234	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Morrisville (Durham)	201,314	207	207	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Pittsboro	201,314	4,537	4,537	2.25 %	100.00 %
	Raleigh (Durham)	201,314	1,559	233	0.12 %	14.95 %
	Siler City	201,314	7,702	7,702	3.83 %	100.00 %
21	Aberdeen	217,984	8,516	8,516	3.91 %	100.00 %
	Cameron	217,984	244	244	0.11 %	100.00 %
	Candor (Moore)	217,984	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Carthage	217,984	2,775	2,775	1.27 %	100.00 %
	Eastover	217,984	3,656	3,656	1.68 %	100.00 %
	Falcon (Cumberland)	217,984	324	324	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Fayetteville	217,984	208,501	24,573	11.27 %	11.79 %
	Foxfire	217,984	1,288	1,288	0.59 %	100.00 %
	Godwin	217,984	128	128	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Hope Mills	217,984	17,808	15,215	6.98 %	85.44 %
	Linden	217,984	136	136	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Pinebluff	217,984	1,473	1,473	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Pinehurst	217,984	17,581	17,581	8.07 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
21	Robbins	217,984	1,168	1,168	0.54 %	100.00 %
	Southern Pines	217,984	15,545	15,545	7.13 %	100.00 %
	Spring Lake	217,984	11,660	11,660	5.35 %	100.00 %
	Stedman	217,984	1,277	1,277	0.59 %	100.00 %
	Taylortown	217,984	634	634	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Vass	217,984	952	952	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Wade	217,984	638	638	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Whispering Pines	217,984	4,987	4,987	2.29 %	100.00 %
22	Durham (Durham)	199,804	283,093	166,175	83.17 %	58.70 %
	Raleigh (Durham)	199,804	1,559	1,326	0.66 %	85.05 %
23	Carrboro	210,529	21,295	21,295	10.11 %	100.00 %
	Chapel Hill (Orange)	210,529	59,054	59,054	28.05 %	100.00 %
	Durham (Orange)	210,529	144	144	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Hillsborough	210,529	9,660	9,660	4.59 %	100.00 %
	Mebane (Orange)	210,529	3,171	3,171	1.51 %	100.00 %
	Milton	210,529	155	155	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Roxboro	210,529	8,134	8,134	3.86 %	100.00 %
	Yanceyville	210,529	1,937	1,937	0.92 %	100.00 %
24	East Laurinburg	202,786	234	234	0.12 %	100.00 %
	Fairmont	202,786	2,191	2,191	1.08 %	100.00 %
	Gibson	202,786	449	449	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Laurinburg	202,786	14,978	14,978	7.39 %	100.00 %
	Lumber Bridge	202,786	82	82	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Lumberton	202,786	19,025	19,025	9.38 %	100.00 %
	Marietta	202,786	111	111	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Maxton (Robeson)	202,786	1,902	1,902	0.94 %	100.00 %
	Maxton (Scotland)	202,786	208	208	0.10 %	100.00 %
	McDonald	202,786	94	94	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Orrum	202,786	59	59	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Parkton	202,786	504	504	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Pembroke	202,786	2,823	2,823	1.39 %	100.00 %
	Proctorville	202,786	121	121	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Raeford	202,786	4,559	4,559	2.25 %	100.00 %
	Raynham	202,786	60	60	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Red Springs (Hoke)	202,786	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Red Springs (Robeson)	202,786	3,087	3,087	1.52 %	100.00 %
	Rennert	202,786	275	275	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Rowland	202,786	885	885	0.44 %	100.00 %
St. Pauls	202,786	2,045	2,045	1.01 %	100.00 %	
Wagram	202,786	615	615	0.30 %	100.00 %	

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

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25	Alamance	217,448	988	988	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Archdale (Randolph)	217,448	11,527	11,326	5.21 %	98.26 %
	Asheboro	217,448	27,156	1,217	0.56 %	4.48 %
	Burlington (Alamance)	217,448	55,481	55,481	25.51 %	100.00 %
	Elon	217,448	11,336	11,336	5.21 %	100.00 %
	Gibsonville (Alamance)	217,448	4,278	4,278	1.97 %	100.00 %
	Graham	217,448	17,157	17,157	7.89 %	100.00 %
	Green Level	217,448	3,152	3,152	1.45 %	100.00 %
	Haw River	217,448	2,252	2,252	1.04 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Randolph)	217,448	8	3	0.00 %	37.50 %
	Liberty	217,448	2,655	2,655	1.22 %	100.00 %
	Mebane (Alamance)	217,448	14,626	14,626	6.73 %	100.00 %
	Ossipee	217,448	536	536	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Randleman	217,448	4,595	4,595	2.11 %	100.00 %
	Staley	217,448	397	397	0.18 %	100.00 %
Swepsonville	217,448	2,445	2,445	1.12 %	100.00 %	
26	Archdale (Guilford)	211,801	380	250	0.12 %	65.79 %
	Burlington (Guilford)	211,801	1,822	1,822	0.86 %	100.00 %
	Eden	211,801	15,421	15,421	7.28 %	100.00 %
	Gibsonville (Guilford)	211,801	4,642	4,642	2.19 %	100.00 %
	Greensboro	211,801	299,035	12,884	6.08 %	4.31 %
	High Point (Guilford)	211,801	107,321	5,625	2.66 %	5.24 %
	Jamestown	211,801	3,668	3,661	1.73 %	99.81 %
	Kernersville (Guilford)	211,801	502	502	0.24 %	100.00 %
	Madison	211,801	2,129	2,129	1.01 %	100.00 %
	Mayodan	211,801	2,418	2,418	1.14 %	100.00 %
	Oak Ridge	211,801	7,474	7,445	3.52 %	99.61 %
	Pleasant Garden	211,801	5,000	5,000	2.36 %	100.00 %
	Reidsville	211,801	14,583	14,583	6.89 %	100.00 %
	Sedalia	211,801	676	676	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Stokesdale	211,801	5,924	5,924	2.80 %	100.00 %
	Stoneville	211,801	1,308	1,308	0.62 %	100.00 %
	Summerfield	211,801	10,951	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Wentworth	211,801	2,662	2,662	1.26 %	100.00 %	
Whitsett	211,801	584	584	0.28 %	100.00 %	
27	Archdale (Guilford)	210,558	380	130	0.06 %	34.21 %
	Greensboro	210,558	299,035	88,480	42.02 %	29.59 %
	High Point (Guilford)	210,558	107,321	101,696	48.30 %	94.76 %
	Jamestown	210,558	3,668	7	0.00 %	0.19 %
	Oak Ridge	210,558	7,474	29	0.01 %	0.39 %

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

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27	Summerfield	210,558	10,951	10,951	5.20 %	100.00 %
28	Greensboro	210,036	299,035	197,671	94.11 %	66.10 %
29	Ansonville	218,829	440	440	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Archdale (Randolph)	218,829	11,527	201	0.09 %	1.74 %
	Asheboro	218,829	27,156	25,939	11.85 %	95.52 %
	Biscoe	218,829	1,848	1,848	0.84 %	100.00 %
	Candor (Montgomery)	218,829	813	813	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Dobbins Heights	218,829	687	687	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Ellerbe	218,829	864	864	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Franklinville	218,829	1,197	1,197	0.55 %	100.00 %
	Hamlet	218,829	6,025	6,025	2.75 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Randolph)	218,829	8	5	0.00 %	62.50 %
	Hoffman	218,829	418	418	0.19 %	100.00 %
	Lilesville	218,829	395	395	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Marshville	218,829	2,522	2,522	1.15 %	100.00 %
	McFarlan	218,829	94	94	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Monroe	218,829	34,562	10,719	4.90 %	31.01 %
	Morven	218,829	329	329	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Mount Gilead	218,829	1,171	1,171	0.54 %	100.00 %
	Norman	218,829	100	100	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Peachland	218,829	390	390	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Polkton	218,829	2,250	2,250	1.03 %	100.00 %
	Ramseur	218,829	1,774	1,774	0.81 %	100.00 %
	Rockingham	218,829	9,243	9,243	4.22 %	100.00 %
	Seagrove	218,829	235	235	0.11 %	100.00 %
Star	218,829	806	806	0.37 %	100.00 %	
Thomasville (Randolph)	218,829	521	521	0.24 %	100.00 %	
Trinity	218,829	7,006	7,006	3.20 %	100.00 %	
Troy	218,829	2,850	2,850	1.30 %	100.00 %	
Wadesboro	218,829	5,008	5,008	2.29 %	100.00 %	
Wingate	218,829	4,055	4,055	1.85 %	100.00 %	
30	Bermuda Run	211,642	3,120	3,120	1.47 %	100.00 %
	Cooleemee	211,642	940	940	0.44 %	100.00 %
	Denton	211,642	1,494	1,494	0.71 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Davidson)	211,642	6,646	6,646	3.14 %	100.00 %
	Lexington	211,642	19,632	19,632	9.28 %	100.00 %
	Midway	211,642	4,742	4,742	2.24 %	100.00 %
	Mocksville	211,642	5,900	5,900	2.79 %	100.00 %
	Thomasville (Davidson)	211,642	26,662	26,662	12.60 %	100.00 %
Wallburg	211,642	3,051	3,051	1.44 %	100.00 %	

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
31	Bethania	215,359	344	344	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Clemmons	215,359	21,163	21,163	9.83 %	100.00 %
	Danbury	215,359	189	189	0.09 %	100.00 %
	High Point (Forsyth)	215,359	84	84	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Kernersville (Forsyth)	215,359	25,947	25,947	12.05 %	100.00 %
	King (Forsyth)	215,359	591	591	0.27 %	100.00 %
	King (Stokes)	215,359	6,606	6,606	3.07 %	100.00 %
	Lewisville	215,359	13,381	13,381	6.21 %	100.00 %
	Rural Hall	215,359	3,351	3,351	1.56 %	100.00 %
	Tobaccoville (Forsyth)	215,359	2,578	2,578	1.20 %	100.00 %
	Tobaccoville (Stokes)	215,359	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Walkertown	215,359	5,692	4,716	2.19 %	82.85 %
	Walnut Cove	215,359	1,586	1,586	0.74 %	100.00 %
	Winston-Salem	215,359	249,545	45,330	21.05 %	18.17 %
32	Walkertown	211,751	5,692	976	0.46 %	17.15 %
	Winston-Salem	211,751	249,545	204,215	96.44 %	81.83 %
33	Albemarle	209,379	16,432	16,432	7.85 %	100.00 %
	Badin	209,379	2,024	2,024	0.97 %	100.00 %
	China Grove	209,379	4,434	4,434	2.12 %	100.00 %
	Cleveland	209,379	846	846	0.40 %	100.00 %
	East Spencer	209,379	1,567	1,567	0.75 %	100.00 %
	Faith	209,379	819	819	0.39 %	100.00 %
	Granite Quarry	209,379	2,984	2,984	1.43 %	100.00 %
	Kannapolis (Rowan)	209,379	10,268	10,268	4.90 %	100.00 %
	Landis	209,379	3,690	3,690	1.76 %	100.00 %
	Locust (Stanly)	209,379	3,996	3,996	1.91 %	100.00 %
	Misenheimer	209,379	650	650	0.31 %	100.00 %
	New London	209,379	607	607	0.29 %	100.00 %
	Norwood	209,379	2,367	2,367	1.13 %	100.00 %
	Oakboro	209,379	2,128	2,128	1.02 %	100.00 %
	Red Cross	209,379	762	762	0.36 %	100.00 %
	Richfield	209,379	582	582	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Rockwell	209,379	2,302	2,302	1.10 %	100.00 %
	Salisbury	209,379	35,540	35,540	16.97 %	100.00 %
Spencer	209,379	3,308	3,308	1.58 %	100.00 %	
Stanfield	209,379	1,585	1,585	0.76 %	100.00 %	
34	Concord	214,990	105,240	105,240	48.95 %	100.00 %
	Harrisburg	214,990	18,967	14,257	6.63 %	75.17 %
	Kannapolis (Cabarrus)	214,990	42,846	42,846	19.93 %	100.00 %
	Locust (Cabarrus)	214,990	541	541	0.25 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
34	Midland (Cabarrus)	214,990	4,684	3,501	1.63 %	74.74 %
	Mount Pleasant	214,990	1,671	1,671	0.78 %	100.00 %
35	Fairview	219,142	3,456	3,456	1.58 %	100.00 %
	Harrisburg	219,142	18,967	4,710	2.15 %	24.83 %
	Hemby Bridge	219,142	1,614	1,614	0.74 %	100.00 %
	Indian Trail	219,142	39,997	39,997	18.25 %	100.00 %
	Lake Park	219,142	3,269	3,269	1.49 %	100.00 %
	Marvin	219,142	6,358	6,358	2.90 %	100.00 %
	Midland (Cabarrus)	219,142	4,684	1,183	0.54 %	25.26 %
	Mineral Springs	219,142	3,159	3,159	1.44 %	100.00 %
	Mint Hill (Union)	219,142	6	6	0.00 %	100.00 %
	Monroe	219,142	34,562	23,843	10.88 %	68.99 %
	Stallings (Union)	219,142	15,728	15,728	7.18 %	100.00 %
	Unionville	219,142	6,643	6,643	3.03 %	100.00 %
	Waxhaw	219,142	20,534	20,534	9.37 %	100.00 %
	Weddington (Union)	219,142	13,176	13,176	6.01 %	100.00 %
	Wesley Chapel	219,142	8,681	8,681	3.96 %	100.00 %
36	Boonville	210,986	1,185	1,185	0.56 %	100.00 %
	Dobson	210,986	1,462	1,462	0.69 %	100.00 %
	East Bend	210,986	634	634	0.30 %	100.00 %
	Elkin (Surry)	210,986	4,049	4,049	1.92 %	100.00 %
	Elkin (Wilkes)	210,986	73	73	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Jonesville	210,986	2,308	2,308	1.09 %	100.00 %
	Mount Airy	210,986	10,676	10,676	5.06 %	100.00 %
	North Wilkesboro	210,986	4,382	4,382	2.08 %	100.00 %
	Pilot Mountain	210,986	1,440	1,440	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Ronda	210,986	438	438	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Taylorsville	210,986	2,320	2,320	1.10 %	100.00 %
	Wilkesboro	210,986	3,687	3,687	1.75 %	100.00 %
	Yadkinville	210,986	2,995	2,995	1.42 %	100.00 %
37	Cornelius	219,210	31,412	18,991	8.66 %	60.46 %
	Davidson (Iredell)	219,210	378	378	0.17 %	100.00 %
	Davidson (Mecklenburg)	219,210	14,728	12,690	5.79 %	86.16 %
	Harmony	219,210	543	543	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Huntersville	219,210	61,376	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Love Valley	219,210	154	154	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Mooresville	219,210	50,193	50,193	22.90 %	100.00 %
	Statesville	219,210	28,419	28,419	12.96 %	100.00 %
	Troutman	219,210	3,698	3,698	1.69 %	100.00 %
38	Charlotte	217,905	874,579	126,901	58.24 %	14.51 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
38	Cornelius	217,905	31,412	12,421	5.70 %	39.54 %
	Davidson (Mecklenburg)	217,905	14,728	2,038	0.94 %	13.84 %
	Huntersville	217,905	61,376	61,376	28.17 %	100.00 %
39	Charlotte	219,123	874,579	183,069	83.55 %	20.93 %
	Pineville	219,123	10,602	10,602	4.84 %	100.00 %
40	Charlotte	218,881	874,579	209,707	95.81 %	23.98 %
	Mint Hill (Mecklenburg)	218,881	26,444	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
41	Charlotte	217,678	874,579	209,066	96.04 %	23.90 %
42	Charlotte	209,378	874,579	145,836	69.65 %	16.67 %
	Matthews	209,378	29,435	29,435	14.06 %	100.00 %
	Midland (Mecklenburg)	209,378	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Mint Hill (Mecklenburg)	209,378	26,444	26,444	12.63 %	100.00 %
	Pineville	209,378	10,602	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Stallings (Mecklenburg)	209,378	384	384	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Weddington (Mecklenburg)	209,378	5	5	0.00 %	100.00 %
43	Belmont	211,229	15,010	15,010	7.11 %	100.00 %
	Bessemer City	211,229	5,428	5,428	2.57 %	100.00 %
	Cramerton	211,229	5,296	5,296	2.51 %	100.00 %
	Dallas	211,229	5,927	5,927	2.81 %	100.00 %
	Gastonia	211,229	80,411	80,411	38.07 %	100.00 %
	High Shoals	211,229	595	595	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Kings Mountain (Gaston)	211,229	1,110	1,110	0.53 %	100.00 %
	Lowell	211,229	3,654	3,654	1.73 %	100.00 %
	McAdenville	211,229	890	890	0.42 %	100.00 %
	Mount Holly	211,229	17,703	17,703	8.38 %	100.00 %
	Ranlo	211,229	4,511	4,511	2.14 %	100.00 %
	Spencer Mountain	211,229	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Stanley	211,229	3,963	3,963	1.88 %	100.00 %
44	Belwood	203,043	857	857	0.42 %	100.00 %
	Bessemer City	203,043	5,428	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Boiling Springs	203,043	4,615	4,615	2.27 %	100.00 %
	Casar	203,043	305	305	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Cherryville	203,043	6,078	6,078	2.99 %	100.00 %
	Dellview	203,043	6	6	0.00 %	100.00 %
	Earl	203,043	198	198	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Fallston	203,043	627	627	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Gastonia	203,043	80,411	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Grover	203,043	802	802	0.39 %	100.00 %
	High Shoals	203,043	595	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Kings Mountain (Cleveland)	203,043	10,032	10,032	4.94 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
44	Kingstown	203,043	656	656	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Lattimore	203,043	406	406	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Lawndale	203,043	570	570	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Lincolnton	203,043	11,091	11,091	5.46 %	100.00 %
	Maiden (Lincoln)	203,043	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Mooresboro	203,043	293	293	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Patterson Springs	203,043	571	571	0.28 %	100.00 %
	Polkville	203,043	516	516	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Shelby	203,043	21,918	21,918	10.79 %	100.00 %
	Waco	203,043	310	310	0.15 %	100.00 %
45	Brookford	218,989	442	442	0.20 %	100.00 %
	Cajah's Mountain	218,989	2,722	2,722	1.24 %	100.00 %
	Catawba	218,989	702	702	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Claremont	218,989	1,692	1,692	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Conover	218,989	8,421	8,421	3.85 %	100.00 %
	Gamewell	218,989	3,702	3,702	1.69 %	100.00 %
	Granite Falls	218,989	4,965	4,965	2.27 %	100.00 %
	Hickory (Caldwell)	218,989	32	32	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Hickory (Catawba)	218,989	43,379	43,379	19.81 %	100.00 %
	Hudson	218,989	3,780	3,780	1.73 %	100.00 %
	Lenoir	218,989	18,352	11,121	5.08 %	60.60 %
	Long View (Catawba)	218,989	4,353	4,353	1.99 %	100.00 %
	Maiden (Catawba)	218,989	3,736	3,736	1.71 %	100.00 %
	Newton	218,989	13,148	13,148	6.00 %	100.00 %
	Rhodhiss (Caldwell)	218,989	358	358	0.16 %	100.00 %
	Rutherford College (Caldwell)	218,989	0	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
Sawmills	218,989	5,020	5,020	2.29 %	100.00 %	
46	Asheville	199,859	94,589	0	0.00 %	0.00 %
	Black Mountain	199,859	8,426	8,426	4.22 %	100.00 %
	Connelly Springs	199,859	1,529	1,529	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Drexel	199,859	1,760	1,760	0.88 %	100.00 %
	Glen Alpine	199,859	1,529	1,529	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Hickory (Burke)	199,859	79	79	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Hildebran	199,859	1,679	1,679	0.84 %	100.00 %
	Long View (Burke)	199,859	735	735	0.37 %	100.00 %
	Marion	199,859	7,717	7,717	3.86 %	100.00 %
	Montreat	199,859	901	901	0.45 %	100.00 %
	Morganton	199,859	17,474	17,474	8.74 %	100.00 %
	Old Fort	199,859	811	811	0.41 %	100.00 %
	Rhodhiss (Burke)	199,859	639	639	0.32 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

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District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
46	Rutherford College (Burke)	199,859	1,226	1,226	0.61 %	100.00 %
	Valdese	199,859	4,689	4,689	2.35 %	100.00 %
	Woodfin	199,859	7,936	288	0.14 %	3.63 %
47	Bakersville	204,671	450	450	0.22 %	100.00 %
	Banner Elk	204,671	1,049	1,049	0.51 %	100.00 %
	Beech Mountain (Avery)	204,671	62	62	0.03 %	100.00 %
	Beech Mountain (Watauga)	204,671	613	613	0.30 %	100.00 %
	Blowing Rock (Caldwell)	204,671	91	91	0.04 %	100.00 %
	Blowing Rock (Watauga)	204,671	1,285	1,285	0.63 %	100.00 %
	Boone	204,671	19,092	19,092	9.33 %	100.00 %
	Burnsville	204,671	1,614	1,614	0.79 %	100.00 %
	Canton	204,671	4,422	2,438	1.19 %	55.13 %
	Cedar Rock	204,671	301	301	0.15 %	100.00 %
	Clyde	204,671	1,368	1,368	0.67 %	100.00 %
	Crossnore	204,671	143	143	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Elk Park	204,671	542	542	0.26 %	100.00 %
	Grandfather Village	204,671	95	95	0.05 %	100.00 %
	Hot Springs	204,671	520	520	0.25 %	100.00 %
	Jefferson	204,671	1,622	1,622	0.79 %	100.00 %
	Lansing	204,671	126	126	0.06 %	100.00 %
	Lenoir	204,671	18,352	7,231	3.53 %	39.40 %
	Mars Hill	204,671	2,007	2,007	0.98 %	100.00 %
	Marshall	204,671	777	777	0.38 %	100.00 %
Newland	204,671	715	715	0.35 %	100.00 %	
Seven Devils (Avery)	204,671	38	38	0.02 %	100.00 %	
Seven Devils (Watauga)	204,671	275	275	0.13 %	100.00 %	
Sparta	204,671	1,834	1,834	0.90 %	100.00 %	
Spruce Pine	204,671	2,194	2,194	1.07 %	100.00 %	
Sugar Mountain	204,671	371	371	0.18 %	100.00 %	
West Jefferson	204,671	1,279	1,279	0.62 %	100.00 %	
48	Bostic	200,053	355	355	0.18 %	100.00 %
	Chimney Rock Village	200,053	140	140	0.07 %	100.00 %
	Columbus	200,053	1,060	1,060	0.53 %	100.00 %
	Ellenboro	200,053	723	723	0.36 %	100.00 %
	Flat Rock	200,053	3,486	3,486	1.74 %	100.00 %
	Fletcher	200,053	7,987	7,987	3.99 %	100.00 %
	Forest City	200,053	7,377	7,377	3.69 %	100.00 %
	Hendersonville	200,053	15,137	15,137	7.57 %	100.00 %
	Lake Lure	200,053	1,365	1,365	0.68 %	100.00 %
	Laurel Park	200,053	2,250	2,250	1.12 %	100.00 %

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	Municipality	Total District Population	Total Muni Population	District Pop in Muni	Percent of District Pop in Muni	Percent of Muni Pop in District
48	Mills River	200,053	7,078	7,078	3.54 %	100.00 %
	Ruth	200,053	347	347	0.17 %	100.00 %
	Rutherfordton	200,053	3,640	3,640	1.82 %	100.00 %
	Saluda (Henderson)	200,053	11	11	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Saluda (Polk)	200,053	620	620	0.31 %	100.00 %
	Spindale	200,053	4,225	4,225	2.11 %	100.00 %
	Tryon	200,053	1,562	1,562	0.78 %	100.00 %
49	Asheville	201,741	94,589	94,589	46.89 %	100.00 %
	Biltmore Forest	201,741	1,409	1,409	0.70 %	100.00 %
	Weaverville	201,741	4,567	4,567	2.26 %	100.00 %
	Woodfin	201,741	7,936	7,648	3.79 %	96.37 %
50	Andrews	218,733	1,667	1,667	0.76 %	100.00 %
	Brevard	218,733	7,744	7,744	3.54 %	100.00 %
	Bryson City	218,733	1,558	1,558	0.71 %	100.00 %
	Canton	218,733	4,422	1,984	0.91 %	44.87 %
	Dillsboro	218,733	213	213	0.10 %	100.00 %
	Fontana Dam	218,733	13	13	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Forest Hills	218,733	303	303	0.14 %	100.00 %
	Franklin	218,733	4,175	4,175	1.91 %	100.00 %
	Hayesville	218,733	461	461	0.21 %	100.00 %
	Highlands (Jackson)	218,733	12	12	0.01 %	100.00 %
	Highlands (Macon)	218,733	1,060	1,060	0.48 %	100.00 %
	Lake Santeetlah	218,733	38	38	0.02 %	100.00 %
	Maggie Valley	218,733	1,687	1,687	0.77 %	100.00 %
	Murphy	218,733	1,608	1,608	0.74 %	100.00 %
	Robbinsville	218,733	597	597	0.27 %	100.00 %
	Rosman	218,733	701	701	0.32 %	100.00 %
	Sylva	218,733	2,578	2,578	1.18 %	100.00 %
Waynesville	218,733	10,140	10,140	4.64 %	100.00 %	
Webster	218,733	372	372	0.17 %	100.00 %	
Total:				6,017,605		

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Districts included: All

District - Municipality by County Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Total Municipalities (by County) Statewide: 614

Fully Assigned Municipalities: 614

Partially Assigned Municipalities: 0

Fully Unassigned Municipalities: 0

Split Municipalities: 44

Splits Involving Population: 34

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

[G20-DMbC] - Generated 10/26/2023

Municipalities derive from the 2020 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Shapefiles. Population figures are based on the associated Summary File.

Note that for the purposes of this report, portions of municipalities in different counties are treated separately.

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Districts included: All

[Case 4:23-cv-00193-D-RN Document 17-1 Filed 11/22/23 Page 191 of 236](#)

JA225

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
1	Bertie	12	0
	Camden	3	0
	Currituck	11	0
	Dare	16	0
	Gates	6	0
	Hertford	13	0
	Northampton	13	0
	Pasquotank	9	0
	Perquimans	7	0
	Tyrrell	6	0
2	Carteret	28	0
	Chowan	6	0
	Halifax	23	0
	Hyde	7	0
	Martin	13	0
	Pamlico	10	0
	Warren	14	0
	Washington	6	0
3	Beaufort	21	0
	Craven	21	0
	Lenoir	22	0
4	Greene	10	0
	Wayne	28	0
	Wilson	24	0
5	Edgecombe	21	0
	Pitt	40	0
6	Onslow	24	0
7	New Hanover	37	0
8	Brunswick	25	0
	Columbus	26	0
	New Hanover	6	0
9	Bladen	17	0
	Duplin	19	0
	Jones	7	0
	Pender	20	0
	Sampson	22	0
10	Johnston	36	0
11	Franklin	18	0
	Nash	24	0
	Vance	12	0
12	Harnett	13	0
	Lee	10	0
	Sampson	1	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 10/26/2023

Page 1 of 4

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
13	Wake	28	3
14	Wake	29	3
15	Wake	45	2
16	Wake	44	1
17	Wake	25	2
18	Granville	15	0
	Wake	27	1
19	Cumberland	56	0
20	Chatham	18	0
	Durham	21	1
21	Cumberland	20	0
	Moore	26	0
22	Durham	35	1
23	Caswell	9	0
	Orange	41	0
	Person	11	0
24	Hoke	15	0
	Robeson	39	0
	Scotland	7	0
25	Alamance	37	0
	Randolph	7	0
26	Guilford	32	2
	Rockingham	15	0
27	Guilford	71	2
28	Guilford	60	0
29	Anson	9	0
	Montgomery	14	0
	Randolph	15	0
	Richmond	16	0
	Union	10	0
30	Davidson	43	0
	Davie	14	0
31	Forsyth	39	0
	Stokes	18	0
32	Forsyth	62	0
33	Rowan	41	0
	Stanly	22	0
34	Cabarrus	37	2
35	Cabarrus	1	2
	Union	42	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 10/26/2023

Page 2 of 4

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

District	County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
36	Alexander	10	0
	Surry	24	0
	Wilkes	27	0
	Yadkin	12	0
37	Iredell	29	0
	Mecklenburg	4	1
38	Mecklenburg	23	1
39	Mecklenburg	37	0
40	Mecklenburg	43	0
41	Mecklenburg	43	0
42	Mecklenburg	44	0
43	Gaston	41	0
44	Cleveland	21	0
	Gaston	5	0
	Lincoln	23	0
45	Caldwell	13	0
	Catawba	40	0
46	Buncombe	19	0
	Burke	33	0
	McDowell	17	0
47	Alleghany	4	0
	Ashe	17	0
	Avery	19	0
	Caldwell	7	0
	Haywood	8	0
	Madison	12	0
	Mitchell	9	0
	Watauga	20	0
Yancey	11	0	
48	Henderson	34	0
	Polk	7	0
	Rutherford	17	0
49	Buncombe	60	0
50	Cherokee	16	0
	Clay	9	0
	Graham	4	0
	Haywood	21	0
	Jackson	13	0
	Macon	15	0
	Swain	5	0
	Transylvania	15	0
Total:		2,654	

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 10/26/2023

Page 3 of 4

Whole-Split VTD Counts by District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Total VTDs Statewide: 2666

Fully Assigned VTDs: 2666

Partially Assigned VTDs: 0

Fully Unassigned VTDs: 0

Split VTDs: 12

Splits Involving Population: 12

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbD] - Generated 10/26/2023

Page 4 of 4

Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
Alamance	37	0
Alexander	10	0
Alleghany	4	0
Anson	9	0
Ashe	17	0
Avery	19	0
Beaufort	21	0
Bertie	12	0
Bladen	17	0
Brunswick	25	0
Buncombe	79	0
Burke	33	0
Cabarrus	38	2
Caldwell	20	0
Camden	3	0
Carteret	28	0
Caswell	9	0
Catawba	40	0
Chatham	18	0
Cherokee	16	0
Chowan	6	0
Clay	9	0
Cleveland	21	0
Columbus	26	0
Craven	21	0
Cumberland	76	0
Currituck	11	0
Dare	16	0
Davidson	43	0
Davie	14	0
Duplin	19	0
Durham	56	1
Edgecombe	21	0
Forsyth	101	0
Franklin	18	0
Gaston	46	0
Gates	6	0
Graham	4	0
Granville	15	0
Greene	10	0
Guilford	163	2
Halifax	23	0
Harnett	13	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbC] - Generated 10/26/2023

Page 1 of 3

Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
Haywood	29	0
Henderson	34	0
Hertford	13	0
Hoke	15	0
Hyde	7	0
Iredell	29	0
Jackson	13	0
Johnston	36	0
Jones	7	0
Lee	10	0
Lenoir	22	0
Lincoln	23	0
Macon	15	0
Madison	12	0
Martin	13	0
McDowell	17	0
Mecklenburg	194	1
Mitchell	9	0
Montgomery	14	0
Moore	26	0
Nash	24	0
New Hanover	43	0
Northampton	13	0
Onslow	24	0
Orange	41	0
Pamlico	10	0
Pasquotank	9	0
Pender	20	0
Perquimans	7	0
Person	11	0
Pitt	40	0
Polk	7	0
Randolph	22	0
Richmond	16	0
Robeson	39	0
Rockingham	15	0
Rowan	41	0
Rutherford	17	0
Sampson	23	0
Scotland	7	0
Stanly	22	0
Stokes	18	0
Surry	24	0

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

[G20-VTD-SbC] - Generated 10/26/2023

Page 2 of 3

Whole-Split VTD Counts by County Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146**

County	Whole VTDs	Split VTDs
Swain	5	0
Transylvania	15	0
Tyrrell	6	0
Union	52	0
Vance	12	0
Wake	198	6
Warren	14	0
Washington	6	0
Watauga	20	0
Wayne	28	0
Wilkes	27	0
Wilson	24	0
Yadkin	12	0
Yancey	11	0
Totals:	2,654	12

Total VTDs Statewide: 2666

Fully Assigned VTDs: 2666

Partially Assigned VTDs: 0

Fully Unassigned VTDs: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split VTDs: 12

Splits Involving Population: 12

Split VTD Detail Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146

County	VTD	District	Total VTD Population	VTD Pop in District	Percent of VTD Pop in District
Cabarrus	01-02	34	4,425	3,705	83.73 %
		35	4,425	720	16.27 %
	10-00	34	8,241	6,538	79.34 %
		35	8,241	1,703	20.66 %
Durham	30-1	20	14,985	6,577	43.89 %
		22	14,985	8,408	56.11 %
Guilford	NCGR2	26	3,393	986	29.06 %
		27	3,393	2,407	70.94 %
	SF2	26	2,230	192	8.61 %
		27	2,230	2,038	91.39 %
Mecklenburg	127	37	6,891	4,481	65.03 %
		38	6,891	2,410	34.97 %
Wake	05-05	16	12,050	900	7.47 %
		17	12,050	11,150	92.53 %
	06-04	13	6,929	5,865	84.64 %
		17	6,929	1,064	15.36 %
	13-01	14	10,658	4,043	37.93 %
		15	10,658	6,615	62.07 %
	16-09	13	6,707	1,822	27.17 %
		14	6,707	4,885	72.83 %
	17-02	13	3,094	2,894	93.54 %
		14	3,094	200	6.46 %
	19-14	15	4,802	3,025	62.99 %
		18	4,802	1,777	37.01 %
Assigned Geography Total:				84,405	

Total VTDs Statewide: 2666

Fully Assigned VTDs: 2666

Partially Assigned VTDs: 0

Fully Unassigned VTDs: 0

Total Districts Assigned: 50

Split VTDs: 12

Splits Involving Population: 12

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Data Source: 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File - North Carolina

[G20-VTD-SDet] - Generated 10/26/2023

Based on TIGER 2020 VTDs

Page 1 of 1

Incumbent-District Report**District Plan: SL 2023-146****Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/22/2023**

Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District	District in this Plan
Adcock	Gale	Democrat	16	16
Alexander	William	Republican	44	44
Applewhite	Valencia	Democrat	19	19
Barnes	Lisa	Republican	11	11
Batch	Sydney	Democrat	17	17
Berger	Philip	Republican	26	26
Blue	Daniel	Democrat	14	14
Bode	Mary Wills	Democrat	18	18
Britt	Danny	Republican	24	24
Burgin	James	Republican	12	12
Chaudhuri	Jay	Democrat	15	15
Corbin	Harold	Republican	50	50
Craven	David	Republican	29	29
Daniel	Warren	Republican	46	46
Ford	Carl	Republican	33	33
Galey	Amy	Republican	25	25
Garrett	Michael	Democrat	27	27
Grafstein	Lisa	Democrat	13	15
Hanig	Robert	Republican	3	1
Hise	Ralph	Republican	47	47
Hunt	Rachel	Democrat	42	42
Jackson	Brent	Republican	9	9
Jarvis	Steven	Republican	30	30
Johnson	Matthew	Republican	35	35
Krawiec	Joyce	Republican	31	31
Lazzara	Michael	Republican	6	6
Lee	Michael	Republican	7	7
Lowe	Paul	Democrat	32	32
Marcus	Natasha	Democrat	41	37
Mayfield	Julie	Democrat	49	49
McInnis	Thomas	Republican	21	21
Meyer	Graig	Democrat	23	23
Moffitt	Timothy	Republican	48	48
Mohammed	Mujtaba	Democrat	38	38
Murdock	Natalie	Democrat	20	20
Newton	Eldon	Republican	4	4
Newton	Paul	Republican	34	34
Overcash	Bradley	Republican	43	43
Perry	James	Republican	2	3
Proctor	Dean	Republican	45	45
Rabon	William	Republican	8	8
Robinson	Gladys	Democrat	28	28

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Row shading indicates that the district in this plan is shared by more than one incumbent.

[G20-IncDist] - Generated 10/26/2023

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Incumbent-District Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146**Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/22/2023**

Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District	District in this Plan
Salvador	DeAndrea	Democrat	39	39
Sanderson	Norman	Republican	1	2
Sawrey	Benton	Republican	10	10
Sawyer	Victoria	Republican	37	37
Settle	Eddie	Republican	36	36
Smith	Kandie	Democrat	5	5
Waddell	Joyce	Democrat	40	40
Woodard	Mike	Democrat	22	22

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

Row shading indicates that the district in this plan is shared by more than one incumbent.

[G20-IncDist] - Generated 10/26/2023

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District-Incumbent Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146**Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/22/2023**

District in this Plan	Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District
1	Hanig	Robert	Republican	3
2	Sanderson	Norman	Republican	1
3	Perry	James	Republican	2
4	Newton	Eldon	Republican	4
5	Smith	Kandie	Democrat	5
6	Lazzara	Michael	Republican	6
7	Lee	Michael	Republican	7
8	Rabon	William	Republican	8
9	Jackson	Brent	Republican	9
10	Sawrey	Benton	Republican	10
11	Barnes	Lisa	Republican	11
12	Burgin	James	Republican	12
13				
14	Blue	Daniel	Democrat	14
15	Chaudhuri	Jay	Democrat	15
	Grafstein	Lisa	Democrat	13
16	Adcock	Gale	Democrat	16
17	Batch	Sydney	Democrat	17
18	Bode	Mary Wills	Democrat	18
19	Applewhite	Valencia	Democrat	19
20	Murdock	Natalie	Democrat	20
21	McInnis	Thomas	Republican	21
22	Woodard	Mike	Democrat	22
23	Meyer	Graig	Democrat	23
24	Britt	Danny	Republican	24
25	Galey	Amy	Republican	25
26	Berger	Philip	Republican	26
27	Garrett	Michael	Democrat	27
28	Robinson	Gladys	Democrat	28
29	Craven	David	Republican	29
30	Jarvis	Steven	Republican	30
31	Krawiec	Joyce	Republican	31
32	Lowe	Paul	Democrat	32
33	Ford	Carl	Republican	33
34	Newton	Paul	Republican	34
35	Johnson	Matthew	Republican	35
36	Settle	Eddie	Republican	36
37	Marcus	Natasha	Democrat	41
	Sawyer	Victoria	Republican	37
38	Mohammed	Mujtaba	Democrat	38
39	Salvador	DeAndrea	Democrat	39
40	Waddell	Joyce	Democrat	40

District plan definition file: 'SL 2023-146.csv', modified 10/26/2023 9:39 AM

[G20-DistInc] - Generated 10/26/2023

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Case 4:23-cv-00193-D-RN Document 17-1 Filed 11/22/23 Page 202 of 236

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District-Incumbent Report

NC General Assembly

District Plan: SL 2023-146**Residence Set: NC Senate - 9/22/2023**

District in this Plan	Last Name	First Name	Party	Current District
41				
42	Hunt	Rachel	Democrat	42
43	Overcash	Bradley	Republican	43
44	Alexander	William	Republican	44
45	Proctor	Dean	Republican	45
46	Daniel	Warren	Republican	46
47	Hise	Ralph	Republican	47
48	Moffitt	Timothy	Republican	48
49	Mayfield	Julie	Democrat	49
50	Corbin	Harold	Republican	50

Enacted 2023 Senate Northeastern Districts

Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Statistics

District ID	Total CVA Pop	Black CVA Pop	Black CVAP %
1	162,180	51,253	31.60%
2	163,770	51,604	31.51%
5	175,860	70,881	40.31%
11	154,485	60,216	38.98%

Attachment F

Contents	
Item 1:	Demonstration District A demographic summary
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 2:	Demonstration District A CVAP statistics
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

User: Blake Esselstyn
Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration A
Plan Type: Demonstration

Population Summary

Monday, November 20, 2023

7:26 PM

District	Population	Deviation	% Devn.	[% Amlndian]	[% Asian]	[% AP_Blk]	[% Hispanic Origin]	[% White]	[% 18+_AP_Blk]
1	199,833	-8,955	-4.29%	1.62%	0.49%	53.01%	4.72%	40.4%	51.47%

Total Population: 199,833
Ideal District Population: 208,788

Summary Statistics:

Population Range: 199,833 to 199,833
 Ratio Range: 0.00
 Absolute Range: -8,955 to -8,955
 Absolute Overall Range: -4.29% to -4.29%
 Relative Range: 0.00%
 Absolute Mean Deviation: 8,955.00
 Relative Mean Deviation: 4.29%
 Standard Deviation: 0.00

Demonstration District A

Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Statistics

District ID	Total CVA Pop	Black CVA Pop	Black CVAP %
A	165,240	87,783	53.12%

Attachment G

Contents	
Item 1:	Demonstration Districts B-1 & B-2 demographic summary
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 2:	Demonstration Districts B-1 & B-2 CVAP statistics
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

User: Blake Esselstyn
Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration B
Plan Type: Demonstration

Population Summary

Monday, November 20, 2023

7:55 PM

District	Population	Deviation	% Devn. [% Amlndian]	[% Asian]	[% AP_Blk]	[% Hispanic Origin]	[% White]	[% 18+ AP_Blk]
B-1	198,499	-10,289	-4.93%	1.68%	0.53%	49.69%	3.91%	48.41%
B-2	199,681	-9,107	-4.36%	0.42%	0.79%	12.13%	4.8%	11.37%

Total Population: 398,180

Ideal District Population: 208,788

Summary Statistics:

Population Range: 198,499 to 199,681
 Ratio Range: 0.01
 Absolute Range: -10,289 to -9,107
 Absolute Overall Range: 1,182
 Relative Range: -4.93% to -4.36%
 Relative Overall Range: 0.57%
 Absolute Mean Deviation: 9,698.00
 Relative Mean Deviation: 4.64%
 Standard Deviation: 591.00



Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2

Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Statistics

District ID	Total CVA Pop	Black CVA Pop	Black CVAP %
B-1	164,484	82,553	50.19%
B-2	161,467	20,305	12.58%

Attachment H

Contents	
Item 1:	2023 SENATE PLAN CRITERIA
Source:	https://www.ncleg.gov/Committees/CommitteeInfo/SenateStanding/154/Documents/16032

2023 SENATE PLAN CRITERIA

October 2023

- Equal Population. The Committee chairs will use the 2020 federal decennial census data as the sole basis of population for the establishment of districts in the 2023 Senate Plan. In forming new legislative districts, any deviation from the ideal population for a legislative district shall be at or within plus or minus five percent for purposes of compliance with federal “one-person, one-vote” requirements. *Stephenson v. Bartlett*, 357 N.C. 301 (2003) (*Stephenson II*).
- County Groupings and Traversals. The Committee chairs shall draw legislative districts within county groupings as required by *Stephenson v. Bartlett*, 355 N.C. 354 (2002) (*Stephenson I*), *Stephenson II*, *Dickson v. Rucho*, 367 N.C. 542 (2014) (*Dickson I*) and *Dickson v. Rucho*, 368 N.C. 481 (2015) (*Dickson II*). Within county groupings, county lines shall not be traversed except as authorized by *Stephenson I*, *Stephenson II*, *Dickson I*, and *Dickson II*.
- Traditional Districting Principles. We observe that the State Constitution’s limitations upon redistricting and apportionment uphold what the United States Supreme Court has termed “traditional districting principles.” These principles include factors such as “compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” *Stephenson II* (quoting *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
- Compactness. Communities of interest should be considered in the formation of compact and contiguous electoral districts. *Stephenson II*.
- Contiguity. Each Senate district shall at all times consist of contiguous territory. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 3. Contiguity by water is sufficient.
- Respect for Existing Political Subdivisions. County lines, VTDs and municipal boundaries may be considered when possible in forming districts that do not split these existing political subdivisions.
- Racial Data. Data identifying the race of individuals or voters shall *not* be used in the drafting of districts in the 2023 Senate Plan.
- Political Considerations. Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment. *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). The General Assembly may consider partisan advantage and incumbency protection in the application of its discretionary redistricting decisions...but it must do so in conformity with the State Constitution. *Stephenson II*. To hold that legislators cannot take partisan interests into account when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities. *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 588 U.S. ____ (2019).
- Incumbent Residence. Incumbent residence may be considered in the formation of Senate districts.

Attachment I

Contents	
Item 1:	Descriptions of compactness measures
Source:	Blake Esselstyn

Explanation of compactness measures

The following explanations of the two measures of compactness considered in the report are taken from the documentation that accompanies *Maptitude for Redistricting*, the software that was used to generate the compactness scores.

The **Reock** test is an area-based measure that compares each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape possible. For each district, the Reock test computes the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the minimum enclosing circle for the district. The measure is always between 0 (zero) and 1 (one), with 1 (one) being the most compact.

The **Polsby-Popper** test computes the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle with the same perimeter: $4\pi\text{Area}/(\text{Perimeter}^2)$. The measure is always between 0 (zero) and 1 (one), with 1 (one) being the most compact.

Attachment J

Contents	
Item 1:	Enacted 2022 Senate plan compactness report
Source:	https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting
Item 2:	Enacted 2023 Senate plan compactness report
Source:	https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting
Item 3:	Demonstration District A compactness report
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 4:	Demonstration Districts B-1 & B-2 compactness report
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 5:	Demonstration District A condensed COI report
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 6:	Demonstration Districts B-1 & B-2 condensed COI report
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 7:	Demonstration District A political subdivisions report
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 8:	Demonstration Districts B-1 & B-2 political subdivisions report
Source:	Blake Esselstyn
Item 9:	Incumbent counties of residence
Source:	https://vt.ncsbe.gov/reglkup/

User:
Plan Name: SL 2022-2
Plan Type: Senate

Measures of Compactness Report

Thursday, February 17, 2022

8:01 PM

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.13
Max	0.70	0.62
Mean	0.44	0.38
Std. Dev.	0.10	0.12

District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
1	0.40	0.18
2	0.41	0.18
3	0.30	0.17
4	0.57	0.41
5	0.40	0.34
6	0.62	0.59
7	0.23	0.25
8	0.44	0.46
9	0.44	0.23
10	0.62	0.61
11	0.46	0.38

Measures of Compactness Report

SL 2022-2

	Reock	Polisby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.13
Max	0.70	0.62
Mean	0.44	0.38
Std. Dev.	0.10	0.12
District	Reock	Polisby-Popper
12	0.39	0.40
13	0.35	0.33
14	0.46	0.35
15	0.54	0.36
16	0.60	0.52
17	0.46	0.44
18	0.35	0.39
19	0.48	0.29
20	0.39	0.36
21	0.31	0.26
22	0.47	0.47
23	0.50	0.53
24	0.52	0.45
25	0.38	0.34



SL 2022-2

Measures of Compactness Report

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.13
Max	0.70	0.62
Mean	0.44	0.38
Std. Dev.	0.10	0.12
District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
26	0.45	0.45
27	0.44	0.37
28	0.70	0.28
29	0.34	0.21
30	0.40	0.46
31	0.48	0.47
32	0.59	0.44
33	0.32	0.29
34	0.47	0.48
35	0.36	0.24
36	0.46	0.41
37	0.36	0.42
38	0.37	0.39
39	0.40	0.34

Measures of Compactness Report

SL 2022-2

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.13
Max	0.70	0.62
Mean	0.44	0.38
Std. Dev.	0.10	0.12
District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
40	0.47	0.62
41	0.32	0.34
42	0.56	0.54
43	0.54	0.52
44	0.39	0.46
45	0.42	0.32
46	0.34	0.28
47	0.19	0.13
48	0.41	0.38
49	0.52	0.30
50	0.43	0.44



Measures of Compactness Report

SL 2022-2

Measures of Compactness Summary

Reock

The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.

Polisby-Popper

The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.

User:
Plan Name: SL 2023-146
Plan Type: Senate

Measures of Compactness Report

Thursday, October 26, 2023

9:35 AM

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.10
Max	0.68	0.61
Mean	0.40	0.31
Std. Dev.	0.12	0.13
District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
1	0.26	0.21
2	0.23	0.10
3	0.41	0.18
4	0.57	0.41
5	0.40	0.34
6	0.62	0.59
7	0.23	0.21
8	0.44	0.42
9	0.44	0.23
10	0.62	0.61
11	0.46	0.38



SL 2023-146

Measures of Compactness Report

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.10
Max	0.68	0.61
Mean	0.40	0.31
Std. Dev.	0.12	0.13
District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
12	0.39	0.40
13	0.30	0.19
14	0.29	0.11
15	0.24	0.16
16	0.41	0.23
17	0.30	0.23
18	0.29	0.23
19	0.53	0.34
20	0.35	0.34
21	0.22	0.14
22	0.47	0.40
23	0.50	0.53
24	0.52	0.45
25	0.33	0.25

Measures of Compactness Report

SL 2023-146

	Reock	Polisby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.10
Max	0.68	0.61
Mean	0.40	0.31
Std. Dev.	0.12	0.13
District	Reock	Polisby-Popper
26	0.47	0.21
27	0.30	0.22
28	0.45	0.24
29	0.42	0.23
30	0.40	0.46
31	0.48	0.32
32	0.61	0.36
33	0.32	0.29
34	0.50	0.57
35	0.39	0.23
36	0.46	0.41
37	0.40	0.42
38	0.50	0.30
39	0.39	0.20



SL 2023-146

Measures of Compactness Report

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.19	0.10
Max	0.68	0.61
Mean	0.40	0.31
Std. Dev.	0.12	0.13
District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
40	0.35	0.36
41	0.41	0.33
42	0.30	0.19
43	0.54	0.52
44	0.39	0.46
45	0.32	0.30
46	0.23	0.15
47	0.19	0.13
48	0.41	0.38
49	0.68	0.34
50	0.43	0.42

Measures of Compactness Report

SL 2023-146

Measures of Compactness Summary

Reock The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.
Polisby-Popper The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.

User: Blake Esselstyn
Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration A
Plan Type: Demonstration

Measures of Compactness Report

Wednesday, November 22, 2023

11:27 AM

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.30	0.32
Max	0.30	0.32
Mean	0.30	0.32
Std. Dev.		

District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
1	0.30	0.32

Measures of Compactness Report

NC Sen Demonstration A

Measures of Compactness Summary

Reock The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.
Polisby-Popper The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.

User: Blake Esselstyn
Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration B
Plan Type: Demonstration

Measures of Compactness Report

Wednesday, November 22, 2023

11:34 AM

	Reock	Polsby-Popper
Sum	N/A	N/A
Min	0.35	0.25
Max	0.39	0.29
Mean	0.37	0.27
Std. Dev.	0.03	0.03
District	Reock	Polsby-Popper
B-1	0.35	0.29
B-2	0.39	0.25

Measures of Compactness Report

NC Sen Demonstration B

Measures of Compactness Summary

Reock The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.
Polisby-Popper The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.

User: Blake Esselstyn

Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration A

Plan Type: Demonstration

Communities of Interest (Condensed)

Wednesday, November 22, 2023

12:52 PM

Whole City/Town : 775

City/Town Splits: 0

Zero Population City/Town Splits: 1

District	City/Town	Population	% Pop	District	City/Town	Population	% Pop
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User: Blake Esselstyn

Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration B

Plan Type: Demonstration

Communities of Interest (Condensed)

Wednesday, November 22, 2023

11:49 AM

Whole City/Town : 774

City/Town Splits: 2

Zero Population City/Town Splits: 1

District	City/Town	Population	% Pop	District	City/Town	Population	% Pop
B-1	Elizabeth City NC	17,084	91.70%				
B-2	Elizabeth City NC	1,547	8.30%				

User: Blake Esselstyn

Plan Name: NC Sen Demonstration A

Plan Type: Demonstration

Political Subdivision Splits Between Districts

Wednesday, November 22, 2023

12:31 PM

Number of subdivisions not split:

County 100

Voting District 2,666

Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County 0

Voting District 0

Number of splits involving no population:

County

Voting District

Split Counts

County	Voting District	District	Population
<i>Split</i>			

User: **Blake Esselstyn**Plan Name: **NC Sen Demonstration B**Plan Type: **Demonstration**

Political Subdivision Splits Between Districts

Wednesday, November 22, 2023

1:17 PM

Number of subdivisions not split:

County 99

Voting District 2,666

Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County 1

Voting District 0

Number of splits involving no population:

County 0

Voting District 0

Split Counts

County

Cases where an area is split among 2 Districts: 1

County	Voting District	District	Population
<i>Split Counties:</i>			
Pasquotank NC		B-1	28,061
Pasquotank NC		B-2	12,507

Search Criteria



Click a voter's name to view that voter's information.

Search Results (1)



<u>County</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>City/State/Zip</u>
PAMLICO	ACTIVE	SANDERSON, NORMAN WESLEY JR	MINNESOTT BEACH, NC 28510

1 - 1 Of 1 Records

Search Criteria



Click a voter's name to view that voter's information.

Search Results (1)



<u>County</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>City/State/Zip</u>
CURRITUCK	ACTIVE	HANIG, ROBERT OTHO	POWELLS POINT, NC 27966

1 - 1 Of 1 Records

First Prev 1 Next Last

Search Criteria



Click a voter's name to view that voter's information.

Search Results (1)



<u>County</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>City/State/Zip</u>
NASH	ACTIVE	BARNES, LISA STONE	SPRING HOPE, NC 27882

1 - 1 Of 1 Records

First Prev **1** Next Last

Exhibit 2

Expert Report of Dr. Matt Barreto

Expert Report by Dr. Matt Barreto and Mr. Michael Rios on North Carolina Voting Patterns

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1746, I, Matt Barreto, declare as follows:
2. My name is Dr. Matt Barreto, and I am currently Professor of Political Science and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. I was appointed Full Professor with tenure at UCLA in 2015. Prior to that I was a tenured professor of Political Science at the University of Washington from 2005 to 2014. I earned my Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Irvine.
3. At UCLA I am the faculty director of the Voting Rights Project in the Luskin School of Public Affairs and I teach a year-long course on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), focusing specifically on social science statistical analysis, demographics and voting patterns, and mapping analysis that are relevant in political science expert reports in VRA cases. I have written expert reports and been qualified as an expert witness more than four dozen times in federal and state voting rights and civil rights cases, including in the state of North Carolina. I have published peer-reviewed social science articles specifically about minority voting patterns and racially polarized voting and have co-authored a software package (eiCompare) specifically for use in understanding racial voting patterns in VRA cases. I have been retained as an expert consultant by cities, counties and states across the country to advise them on racial voting patterns as they relate to VRA compliance during redistricting. As an expert witness in VRA lawsuits, I have testified dozens of times and my testimony has been relied on by courts to find in favor of both plaintiffs and defendants.
4. I have published books and articles specifically about the intersection of politics, ideology, and racially polarized voting. My 2013 book, *Change They Can't Believe In*, was published by Princeton University Press and was about the inherent connectedness between politics and racial attitudes in America today. The book won the American Political Science Association award for best book on the topic of racial and ethnic politics. I have submitted dozens of expert reports in federal and state courts, and numerous courts have relied on my testimony as credible.
5. My full professional qualifications and activities are set forth in my curriculum vitae. A true and correct copy has been attached hereto as Appendix C. I am being compensated by Plaintiffs at a fixed fee of \$30,000 for this report, \$500 per hour for subsequent work, and \$700 per hour for testimony. My compensation is strictly for work performed and is not dependent on my opinions or conclusions.
6. I was retained in this case to assess voting patterns in North Carolina to determine if Black and white voters exhibit racially polarized voting, in particular focusing on a region with a large Black population in the northeast part of the state. I also reviewed the 2023 state Senate map enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly, as well as illustrative maps offered by Plaintiffs to assess their effectiveness as Black opportunity districts. Mr. Michael Rios, data scientist at the UCLA Voting Rights Project, assisted me with data collection and analysis, and has served as an expert witness and co-authored expert reports in numerous states.

7. I also reviewed population demographics for North Carolina from the 2010 and 2020 decennial Census and the 2021 and 2022 American Community Survey (ACS), for purposes of understanding population characteristics by racial/ethnic group statewide and within the northeast region.
8. Data for this report comes from the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Because of previous VRA requirements for states under the Section 5 preclearance, North Carolina continues to provide the race or ethnicity of voters and to archive that data with the State Board of Elections. Election results data,¹ voter racial/ethnic demographics,² and precinct shape files³ can all be found online at the Board of Elections website. Map boundaries are available from the General Assembly's website for the 2023 newly enacted map. Plaintiffs' illustrative district map boundaries were provided to us by counsel. We obtained election and demographic data from counsel, from a public report submitted to the North Carolina state legislature during the redistricting process in 2023⁴. Race and population data were obtained from the U.S. Census 2010 and 2020 PL-94 Redistricting files, U.S. Census and ACS datasets⁵.

I. Summary Conclusions

9. North Carolina racial and ethnic population demographics have changed significantly over the last decade. The share of the population that is white, non-Hispanic has declined from constituting 66% in 2012 to 62.2% in 2022, according to the U.S. Census ACS. In contrast, the Black population has increased from 22.6% in 2012 to 23.3% in 2022. Even though the white population is larger, the Black population grew by a larger number, adding 281,710 people over the last ten years, growing by 13.1% compared to growth of just 3.3% among whites.
10. Despite the Black population growing, the 2023 enacted state Senate map reduces Black voters' opportunity to elect candidates of choice, by diluting a Black influence district in Northeast North Carolina, reducing the Black voting age population by over 12 points in comparison to the prior map used in the 2022 elections. Even as the white share of the population declined statewide, the 2023 map enhances white voter influence and ignores the opportunity to create a performing Black-majority district.
11. In 31 contests analyzed across recent elections in 2020 to 2022, a strong and consistent pattern of racially polarized voting is found in North Carolina statewide, as well as in the 10-county Northeast region. The original analysis we conducted for this report is reinforced by the Harvard Law School Election Law Clinic, which reports statistically significant racially polarized voting in North Carolina statewide, as well as in the Northeast region for elections 2016–2020.⁶ Our independent analysis was conducted across more than two dozen elections for

¹ Election data for 2022: https://dl.ncsbe.gov/?prefix=ENRS/2022_11_08/results_precinct_sort/ and election data for 2020: https://dl.ncsbe.gov/?prefix=ENRS/2020_11_03/results_precinct_sort/

² Voter demographic data for 2022: https://dl.ncsbe.gov/?prefix=ENRS/2022_11_08/ and demographic data for 2020: https://dl.ncsbe.gov/?prefix=ENRS/2020_11_03/

³ <https://dl.ncsbe.gov/?prefix=PrecinctMaps/>

⁴ <https://southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/NCGA-VRA-Senate-Ltr-10.22.23-FINAL.pdf>

⁵ <https://data.census.gov/>

⁶ Harvard Law School Election Law Clinic. "Ecological inference estimates – North Carolina 2020." RPV Near Me. https://www.rpvnearme.org/analyses/NC_2020.html

the North Carolina state legislature, North Carolina statewide offices, and federal offices, using two different court-approved ecological inference techniques and relying on the race of voters on the voter file for each election. The result was more than 350 ecological inference models and more than 350 racially polarized voting charts for statewide and regional analyses. In these elections, Black voters are cohesive in their support for Black-preferred candidates in every single contest. In contrast, the analysis finds that white, non-Hispanics consistently bloc vote against Black candidates of choice in North Carolina statewide, as well as specifically within the Northeast region. Thus, the second *Gingles*⁷ precondition requiring that the minority group vote cohesively, and the third *Gingles* precondition requiring that whites vote as a bloc to typically defeat the minority group's candidate of choice, are both easily met in North Carolina statewide, as well as within the Northeast region specifically.

12. The two illustrative maps submitted by Plaintiffs both create a State Senate district in Northeast North Carolina that will give Black voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Reviewing more than 30 recent election results, confined to just the geographic boundaries of the two illustrative maps, demonstrates that Plaintiffs' districts would allow the Black candidate of choice to be elected in all 30/30 elections. In contrast, the 2023 enacted map dilutes the Black vote and does not elect a Black candidate of choice in the geographic area covered by Plaintiffs' districts.

II. North Carolina Population Growth Characteristics

13. To situate the discussion about voting patterns and minority representation, we begin with a broader view of North Carolina and how its population has changed and shifted over the past ten years. The most recent data available is the U.S. Census American Community Survey 1-year population data, which is available by race and ethnicity. Overall, North Carolina's total population has increased by 946,900 since 2010. However, these gains were uneven by geography and race/ethnicity. Specifically, the white population experienced a decline in their population share from 66.0% in 2012 to 62.2% in 2022. While whites account for over 60% of the state population as a whole, only 21.6% of the population growth over the last ten years is attributable to whites, whereas 78.4% of population growth is attributable to non-Whites. The single largest growth in North Carolina over the last ten years has been from the Black population which added 281,710 population from 2012 to 2022. The Hispanic and Asian population also experienced considerable population growth. Overall, the white population grew by just 3.3% while the Black population grew at a rate four times higher than whites, growing by 13.1% in the last ten years.

⁷ See *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

Table 1: North Carolina Population Change 2012 to 2022 by race/ethnicity

	2012	%	2022	%	Growth	%	Share Δ
Total	9,752,073		10,698,973		946,900	9.7%	
White, Non-Hispanic	6,292,533	66.0%	6,497,519	62.2%	204,986	3.3%	-3.8%
Black alone or combination	2,154,693	22.6%	2,436,403	23.3%	281,710	13.1%	0.7%
Hispanic or Latino	844,896	8.9%	1,114,799	10.7%	269,903	31.9%	1.8%
Asian alone or combination	271,751	2.8%	439,392	4.2%	167,641	61.7%	1.4%
All Other/Multiracial	188,200	2.0%	210,860	2.0%	22,660	12.0%	0.0%

* U.S. Census American Community Survey, 1-year population data for 2012 and 2022

Table 2: North Carolina Northeast Region (12-county) Population 2021 by race/ethnicity

	2021	%
Total	279,880	
White, Non-Hispanic	124,399	44.4%
Black alone or combination	134,966	48.2%
Hispanic or Latino	12,612	4.5%
Asian	2,106	0.8%
All Other / Multiracial	5,797	2.1%


* U.S. Census American Community Survey, 5-year population data for 2021

12-county region is: Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Vance, Warren, and Washington counties


14. Looking to the 12-county region in Northeast North Carolina (Table 2) it is clear that the Black community is large enough to create a majority-Black State Senate district. Using data from the 2021 5-year Census ACS, across the entire region Blacks are the largest racial or ethnic group at 48.2% of the population, while whites make up 44.4% of the population. Given that the Black population is *larger than* the white population, map makers would have to go out of their way to crack the Black population to create Senate districts in which it is smaller than the white population in Northeast North Carolina.

15. The Black population in the northeast region of the state is large and geographically compact, as shown in Figures 1-2. The newly enacted 2023 state Senate map cracks the Black population in this region between districts 1 and 2 and dilutes Black voting strength such that neither district 1 nor district 2 has a large enough Black voting age population to elect Black candidates of choice. As is clearly seen in Figures 1-2, looking at both county boundaries, or census block groups, there is a large enough Black population, concentrated in adjacent bordering counties, to meet the *Gingles 1* standard for creating a majority-Black district. Indeed, as we note below in an analysis of the Plaintiffs' illustrative maps, the *Gingles 1* threshold is met here.

**Figure 1: Racial Heat Map of North Carolina
Counties Shaded by Percent Black (Green)**



**Figure 2: Racial Heat Map of North Carolina
Census Block Groups Shaded by Percent Black (Green)**



III. Racially Polarized Voting Analysis

16. We next examine whether voters of different racial/ethnic backgrounds tend to prefer different or similar candidates in a wide range of electoral settings. The phenomenon called *racially polarized voting* (RPV) is defined as voters of different racial or ethnic groups exhibiting different candidate preferences in an election. It means simply that voters of different racial or ethnic groups are voting in polar opposite directions, rather than in a multi-racial or multi-ethnic coalition. If some groups of voters are voting in coalition, RPV analysis will identify such a trend. Voters may vote for their candidates of choice for a variety of reasons, and RPV analysis is agnostic as to why voters make decisions. RPV analysis simply reports *how* voters are voting. It measures the outcomes of voting patterns and determines whether patterns track with the race/ethnicity demographics of neighborhoods, cities, and voting precincts.
17. Issues related to minority vote dilution are especially consequential in the face of racially polarized voting. In 1986, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in *Thornburg v. Gingles* that redistricting plans cannot dilute minority voting strength by cracking their population into multiple districts, nor can they pack the population into too few districts. In this decision, the Court established specific tests to determine if a redistricting plan or electoral system violated the VRA, in particular drawing on a statistical analysis of voting patterns by race and ethnicity. The *Gingles* test concerns how minorities and whites vote, and whether they prefer the same, or different, candidates. Specifically, the Court asks if minority voters are politically cohesive (*Gingles* II); that is, if they generally tend to vote for a “candidate of choice.” And next, the Court examines who the larger majority (or white) voters prefer as their candidate, and, if that candidate is different than the minority candidate of choice, whether they regularly vote as a bloc to defeat the minority candidate of choice (*Gingles* III). Courts refer to evidence of this phenomenon—voters of one racial group are voting in one direction, while voters of the other racial group are voting in the opposite direction—as “racially polarized voting.”
18. Several methods are available to assess the *Gingles* preconditions of minority cohesion and white bloc voting.⁸ Ecological Inference (EI) “has been the benchmark method courts use in evaluating racial polarization in voting rights lawsuits and has been used widely in comparative politics research on group and ethnic voting patterns.”⁹ Two variations of EI that have emerged

⁸ For an approachable overview of this material, see Bruce M. Clarke and Robert Timothy Reagan, “Redistricting Litigation: An Overview Of Legal, Statistical, and Case-Management Issues,” *Federal Judicial Center* (2002).

⁹ Loren Collingwood, Kassra Oskooii, Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Matt Barreto, “eiCompare Comparing Ecological Inference Estimates across EI and EI:R x C,” *The R Journal* 8, no. 2 (2016): 92–101 at 93; see also Marisa A. Abrajano, Christopher S. Elmendorf, and Kevin M. Quinn, “Using Experiments to Estimate Racially Polarized Voting,” *UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series* no. 419 (February 2015) at 1 (“ecological inference (EI) [is] the standard statistical tool of vote-dilution litigation). Despite the method’s prominence, researchers have identified certain limitations on EI’s ability to reveal race-correlated voting patterns in jurisdictions with more than two racial groups and non-trivial residential integration. See D. James Greiner, “Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot,” *Indiana Law Journal* 86, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 447–498; D. James Greiner and Kevin M Quinn, “Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting: Combining Individual Level and R x C Ecological Data,” *The Annals of Applied Statistics* 4, no. 4 (2010): 1774–1796. Strategic calculations by potential candidates as well as interest groups and donors also skew EI data. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn, and Marisa A. Abrajano, “Racially Polarized Voting,” *The University of Chicago Law Review* 83, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 587–692; D. James Greiner, “Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation,” *Harvard Law Review* 122, no. 2 (December 2008): 533–598 at 533.

are referred to as King's EI and EI: RxC. The two methods are closely related, and Professor Gary King, the creator of King's EI,¹⁰ was a co-author and collaborator on the RxC method.¹¹ Generally speaking, both methods take ecological data in the aggregate—such as precinct vote totals and racial demographics—and use Bayesian statistical methods to find voting patterns by regressing candidate choice against racial demographics within the aggregate precinct. King's EI is sometimes referred to as the iterative approach, in that it runs an analysis of each candidate and each racial group in iterations, whereas the RxC method allows multiple rows (candidates) and multiple columns (racial groups) to be estimated simultaneously in one model. In essence, both versions of EI operate as described above: by compiling data on the percentage of each racial group in a precinct and merging that with precinct-level vote choice from relevant election results.

19. One popular software program that has been relied on by federal courts¹² is *eiCompare*, which imports data, runs both King's EI and RxC models, and offers comparison diagnostics.¹³ Collingwood, et al. have concluded that both EI and RxC produce similarly reliable regression estimates of vote choice. The EI models are agnostic on what type of input data political scientists use for racial demographics. It can be Voting Age Population (VAP) or Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) data from the U.S. Census, or it can be a BISG estimate of race of the voter file.¹⁴ When voters self-report race on the voter file, as is the case in North Carolina, this data is typically preferred because it allows the analyst to use the most precise race data about voting precincts. If the analyst is well-trained and uses the software properly, the models will perform the same statistical analysis and produce reliable estimates about voter preference by race.
20. To conduct an analysis for North Carolina, we relied on official election results and voter file data obtained from the North Carolina State Board of Elections. For each election, we used the voter file with vote history which contains voters' self-reported race or ethnicity to create percentages of voter race/ethnicity consolidated to each voting precinct in North Carolina. This information was merged with precinct level election results, to be used in an ecological inference (EI) analysis.
21. We used the software package *eiCompare* to run racially polarized voting analysis.¹⁵ Full replication instructions are publicly available at the *eiCompare* portal, which explain the

¹⁰ See Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data*. (Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹¹ See Ori Rosen, Wenxin Jiang, Gary King, and Martin A. Tanner, "Bayesian and Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: The R x C Case," *Statistica Neerlandica* 55, no. 2 (2001): 134–156 at 134-146.

¹² Decision and Order, ECF No. 568 at ¶ 22, *NAACP v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist.*, No. 17-CV-8943-CS-JCM (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2020); see also Memorandum and Opinion, ECF No. 80 at 8–9, *Baltimore County NAACP v. Baltimore County, MD et al.*, No. 1:21-cv-03232-LKG (D. Md. March 25, 2022).

¹³ Collingwood et al., "eiCompare," 94.

¹⁴ The full R script (code) with examples is available at the public repository: <https://github.com/RPVote/eiCompare> and includes instructions on how to run EI compare.

¹⁵ RPVote. "RPVOTE/eiCompare: Comparing Ecological Inference Techniques." GitHub. <https://github.com/RPVote/eiCompare>.

procedure in-depth with tutorials and sample R script. The software package eiCompare has been used by numerous experts in preparing racially polarized voting analysis for state and federal courts, and federal district and circuit courts have relied on eiCompare as accurate and reliable for producing vote choice estimates by race.

A. RPV Results

22. Across all 31 recent North Carolina elections we analyzed for this report, there is a clear, consistent, and statistically significant finding of racially polarized voting in North Carolina statewide as well as within the Northeast region in particular. Time and again, Black voters are cohesive and vote for candidates of choice by roughly a 9-to-1 margin or greater, in contrast to white voters who usually vote as a bloc against Black candidates of choice. Indeed, these voting patterns have been widely reported by other national organizations, including the Harvard Law School Election Law Clinic,¹⁶ which provided a voting analysis in North Carolina and concluded statistically significant racially polarized voting exists statewide as well as in the Northeast region. Beyond this, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice (SCSJ) submitted an analysis to the North Carolina state legislature¹⁷ in October 2023 in which Dr. Kassra Oskooi, a recognized expert on RPV analysis, “identified definitive evidence of RPV patterns.” The data presented in this report are consistent with those prior analyses.
23. In the more than 350 ecological inference statistical models performed for this report, based on well-established social science published methodology, I conclude that, across the 31 recent elections in 2020 and 2022, elections in North Carolina statewide and the Northeast region are clearly defined by racially polarized voting (*see* Appendix A for tables of racially polarized voting results).
24. In elections across North Carolina, and specifically within the Northeast region¹⁸, ecological inference models point to a clear pattern of racially polarized voting that satisfies both *Gingles* II, minority cohesion, and *Gingles* III, white bloc voting. In elections analyzed, Black voters demonstrate unified and cohesive voting, siding for the same candidates of choice with clear support in the 95% range. In contrast, white voters strongly bloc vote against Black candidates of choice. White bloc voting is consistent across all 31 elections with rates as high as 85% opposition to minority-preferred candidates in some instances. White voters demonstrate considerable bloc voting against Black candidates of choice, regularly voting in the exact

¹⁶ Harvard Law School Election Law Clinic. “Ecological inference estimates – North Carolina 2020.” RPV Near Me. https://www.rpvnearme.org/analyses/NC_2020.html


¹⁷ Southern Coalition for Social Justice. October 22, 2023. Letter to Senator Phil Berger, President Pro Tempore, North Carolina Senate. “Racially Polarized Voting in North Carolina and its Effect on the 2023 Redistricting Plans” <https://southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/NCGA-VRA-Senate-Ltr-10.22.23-FINAL.pdf>

¹⁸ **Northeast-1** = Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Warren, Washington, Vance counties; **Northeast-2** = Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Warren, Washington, Vance AND Pitt and Edgecombe counties; The fourth column of results represents only Pitt and Edgecombe counties.


opposite pattern of Black voters in North Carolina. Taken as a whole, the full set of elections analyzed easily clear the political science threshold for the existence of racially polarized voting that is consistent with what I have observed in the more than 50 jurisdictions I have analyzed in my career.

25. The summary results of the ecological inference analysis found in Appendix A report both types of EI analysis, King's EI and EI RxC. For each type of analysis, we report candidate support estimates for white voters and Black voters. Looking at nearly every one of the 31 elections reported in Appendix A, Tables 1-2 reveals clear evidence of racially polarized voting.
26. Starting with elections most closely resembling endogenous elections, those for State House and State Senate, the EI models report that 98-99% of Black voters are cohesive in voting for their candidates of choice in 2020 (Table A1) and 98-99% of Black voters are similarly cohesive in voting for their candidates of choice in 2022 (Table A1). In contrast, white voters bloc vote *against* Black candidates of choice, siding with the opposing candidate in every single election for State House and State Senate. Indeed, the EI model reports that in Northeast North Carolina between 80-88% of white voters are unified in bloc-voting against Black voter-preferred candidates.
27. Beyond these endogenous elections, extensive evidence exists in recent exogenous elections in North Carolina for statewide offices from Insurance Commissioner to State Supreme Court to Governor and many others. Across 10 statewide offices a strong and consistent pattern of racially polarized voting emerges in which 97-99% of Black voters are cohesive and unified in their support for their candidates of choice, while white voters vote in the exact opposite direction in every one of these elections.
28. Looking to federal offices for elections such as U.S. Senate or President reveals the same pattern of statistically significant racially polarized voting.
29. These trends are consistent for the statewide analysis of all 2,665 voting precincts across the entirety of North Carolina, as well as for specific analysis confined to the 191 voting precincts in Northeastern North Carolina. Tables A1 and A2 report three additional variations of the geography. First is a 12-county region that excludes Pitt and Edgecombe counties, which combine to make up Senate District 5 in the 2023 enacted Senate map (see footnote 18 on page 9). Next, we include Pitt and Edgecombe with the other 12 counties for a combined 14-county region, and finally we separate out Pitt and Edgecombe alone in a 2-county region. In every single permutation of the northeast region, Black and white voters demonstrated stark racially polarized voting. Black voters are consistently cohesive while white voters bloc-vote against Black candidates of choice. Indeed, white bloc-voting against Black candidates of choice is consistently more extreme in the northeast region than in other parts of North Carolina.
30. The full EI regression results are reported in Tables A1-A2, and more than 350 additional charts detailing racially polarized voting can be found in appendices D and E. However, it is also helpful to visualize the precinct data along a simple X-Y scatterplot. We offer two examples to clearly depict the pattern of racially polarized voting in the 12-county Northeast

region. Figure 3 plots every single precinct in the 12-county Northeast region for the 2022 North Carolina State House of Representatives elections. Blue dots represent the percent voting Democrat and red dots represent the percent voting Republican. The horizontal X-axis reports the percentage of all voters who are Black within each precinct. Taken together, the scatterplot shows an extremely clear pattern of racially polarized voting where Black and white precincts are mirror opposites of each other in the Northeast region.



31. The same pattern of racially polarized voting is clear to see in the 2020 election for Governor of North Carolina in the Northeast region of the state (Figure 4). Precincts with a large share of Black voters on the right side of the graph show a very high vote for Cooper, who was the Black-preferred candidate. In contrast, as precincts become less Black, and more heavily White, the vote for Cooper falls off and the vote for Forest increases linearly. The highest density white precincts gave 80% or more of their vote to Forest in opposition to Black vote choice.




IV. Evaluations of Plaintiffs' Illustrative Districts

32. The Black population in the northeast region of North Carolina is large and geographically compact and can form a majority-Black State Senate district that will elect Black candidates of choice.
33. Under the newly enacted 2023 map, Black candidates of choice cannot win office in either Senate District 1 or 2, where the large Black population has been cracked between the two districts, rendering it too small to be influential.
34. Comparing the boundaries of two different illustrative districts submitted by Plaintiffs reveals that a map can be drawn which follows all traditional redistricting principles and affords Black voters the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. In Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2 we recompile election results from 2022 and 2020 for the two different Plaintiffs' illustrative maps as compared to the 2023 enacted map. The first column reports election results within Demonstration District A, and the next two columns report election results for Demonstration B, Districts B1 and B2. The final two columns examine the 2023 Enacted Plan, Districts 1 and 2.
35. In our analysis of the performance of the demonstration districts, we found that Plaintiffs' demonstration maps both create State Senate districts in which Black voters can elect their candidates of choice, while not disturbing the existing Black influence district in Pitt and

Edgecombe counties (District 5 in the 2023 enacted map). According to Table B1, in the 2022 election, Demonstration District A consistently performs for Black candidates of choice by a 55-45 margin. Demonstration District B1 also consistently performs for Black candidates of choice by a 53-47 margin. In stark contrast, both District 1 and District 2 in the 2023 enacted plan result in Black candidates of choice losing every single election.

36. Looking to the 2020 election results (Table B2) reveals that Plaintiffs' Demonstration A and Demonstration B1 perform even stronger for Black candidates of choice. This is not surprising given that Black voter turnout was much higher in 2020 than in 2022. However, even in the lower turnout 2022 election, Table B1 shows that Plaintiffs' two illustrative districts both perform for Black candidates of choice. Despite higher Black turnout in the 2020 election, the 2023 enacted plan does not perform for Black candidates of choice, instead providing strong and consistent support for white candidates of choice in both Senate districts in 2020.
37. In reviewing both Demonstration Map A and Demonstration Map B it is clear that Plaintiffs have offered two versions of State Senate districts that are majority Black, and perform for Black candidates of choice. Further, both options preserve an existing Black influence district in Pitt and Edgecombe counties.
38. In preparing this report, there may have been some data that was not yet produced, or made readily available by the State of North Carolina, and as more data does become available, or new elections results are posted, I reserve the right to provide additional data and analysis of population statistics and election results to supplement this report.
39. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge.

November 21, 2023



Dr. Matt A. Barreto

Agoura Hills, California



Mr. Michael Rios

Rancho Cucamonga, California

Appendix A: Racially Polarized Voting Tables

Table A1: North Carolina Ecological Inference (EI) Candidate Choice Estimates

Year	Office	Candidate	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
			White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2022	Appeals Court # 10	Tyson	69.6	1.0	87.6	1.2	83.4	0.9	78.6	0.9
		Adams	30.4	99.1	12.4	98.7	16.7	99.0	21.5	98.7
	Appeals Court # 11	Stading	69.8	1.0	87.3	1.2	83.0	1.0	78.1	1.0
		Jackson	30.2	98.9	12.8	98.7	17.0	99.0	21.9	99.2
	Appeals Court #8	Flood	69.2	1.0	86.4	1.1	82.6	0.9	78.1	1.1
		Thompson	30.8	98.8	13.7	98.8	17.3	99.0	21.9	98.6
	Appeals Court #9	Stroud	71.7	0.8	88.7	1.1	84.6	0.9	79.8	1.0
		Salmon	28.3	99.1	11.4	98.7	15.5	98.8	19.9	98.8
	Supreme Court #3	Dietz	69.1	0.9	86.7	1.1	82.8	0.9	78.6	1.0
		Inman	30.9	99.0	13.3	98.7	17.2	98.7	21.3	99.1
Supreme Court #5	Allen	68.7	0.9	86.1	1.5	81.9	1.2	77.2	0.4	
	Ervin	31.3	99.0	13.9	98.3	18.1	98.7	22.4	98.6	
U.S. Senate	Budd	68.2	0.9	87.0	0.9	82.5	1.0	76.9	1.0	
	Beasley	31.9	99.1	13.0	98.7	17.5	98.8	22.9	99.1	
NC State House	Republicans	65.9	0.8	84.1	3.2	80.4	1.3	76.9	1.0	
	Democrats	34.1	99.1	16.0	98.3	19.7	98.6	23.1	99.0	
NC State Senate	Republicans	62.1	18.4	88.4	1.1	82.9	1.1	78.6	1.2	
	Democrats	37.9	81.5	11.6	98.5	17.2	99.0	21.5	98.5	
Attorney General	O'Neill	72.6	1.0	86.2	0.9	82.8	0.9	79.2	0.9	
	Stein	27.5	98.8	13.7	99.0	17.0	98.9	20.6	99.0	
Agriculture Commission	Troxler	78.2	0.9	91.6	0.9	88.1	0.9	85.7	1.1	
	Wadsworth	21.9	99.1	8.3	98.8	11.2	99.0	14.3	99.0	
Appeals Court #13	Griffin	74.7	0.9	87.1	0.9	84.6	0.9	81.4	1.1	
	Brook	25.4	98.9	12.7	98.9	15.3	98.9	18.6	98.6	
Appeals Court #4	Wood	75.2	0.9	88.3	0.9	85.2	1.0	82.9	1.0	
2020	Attorney General	O'Neill	72.6	1.0	86.2	0.9	82.8	0.9	79.2	0.9
		Stein	27.5	98.8	13.7	99.0	17.0	98.9	20.6	99.0
	Agriculture Commission	Troxler	78.2	0.9	91.6	0.9	88.1	0.9	85.7	1.1
		Wadsworth	21.9	99.1	8.3	98.8	11.2	99.0	14.3	99.0
	Appeals Court #13	Griffin	74.7	0.9	87.1	0.9	84.6	0.9	81.4	1.1
		Brook	25.4	98.9	12.7	98.9	15.3	98.9	18.6	98.6
	Appeals Court #4	Wood	75.2	0.9	88.3	0.9	85.2	1.0	82.9	1.0

	Shields	24.7	98.2	11.3	98.9	14.2	98.9	17.2	99.3
Appeals Court #5	Gore	74.6	0.9	87.9	0.9	85.0	1.0	81.7	1.1
	Cubbage	25.4	99.1	11.9	98.9	15.2	99.0	18.4	98.9
Appeals Court #6	Dillon	75.6	0.9	88.4	0.9	85.3	1.0	82.5	0.8
	Styers	24.4	99.1	11.3	98.9	14.3	99.1	17.6	99.1
	Carpenter	75.2	1.0	88.0	0.9	85.2	0.6	81.7	0.8
Appeals Court #7	Young	24.7	98.9	11.8	98.8	15.0	98.7	18.3	99.0
	Street	71.5	0.6	82.5	0.9	78.8	0.9	73.5	0.9
Auditor	Wood	28.5	99.3	17.1	99.1	21.5	98.8	26.3	99.2
	Forest	69.6	0.5	85.0	0.9	80.7	0.8	77.9	0.8
Governor	Cooper	30.5	99.5	15.3	98.9	18.9	98.9	22.1	99.0
	Causey	75.5	0.9	86.0	1.0	84.1	0.9	82.5	0.8
Insurance Commission	Goodwin	24.5	98.6	13.7	98.9	15.8	99.1	17.6	99.2
	Dobson	74.2	1.0	87.0	0.9	84.0	1.0	80.7	1.1
Labor Commission	Holmes	25.8	99.0	12.7	99.0	15.9	98.9	19.3	99.0
	Robinson	75.1	1.0	89.1	0.8	86.2	1.0	83.4	0.9
Lt. Governor	Holley	24.9	98.9	10.7	98.9	13.7	98.9	16.6	99.2
	Trump	73.3	0.9	89.0	1.0	84.8	0.9	80.9	1.0
President	Biden	26.7	99.0	11.0	99.0	14.8	99.1	18.7	99.1
	Sykes	71.3	0.6	83.4	0.9	80.3	0.9	76.7	1.1
Sec. of State	Marshall	28.8	99.1	16.6	99.0	19.7	98.9	23.2	99.1
	Truitt	74.8	0.9	87.7	0.9	84.3	1.0	81.4	0.0
Superintendent	Mangrum	25.2	98.0	12.2	99.0	15.3	98.8	18.6	98.8
	Newby	73.0	0.8	86.8	1.0	83.4	0.9	80.1	0.9
Supreme Court #1	Beasley	27.0	98.9	13.1	98.9	16.5	99.1	19.8	99.0
	Berger	73.8	1.1	87.4	1.0	84.3	1.0	81.1	1.0
Supreme Court #2	Inman	26.2	98.6	12.4	98.8	15.6	98.8	18.9	99.1
	Barringer	74.6	1.2	86.6	0.9	83.5	0.9	80.1	0.4
Supreme Court #4	Davis	25.4	98.7	13.7	98.9	16.5	98.9	19.8	98.9
	Folwell	76.1	0.8	88.8	0.7	85.9	0.9	81.3	1.0

	Chatterji	23.9	99.1	10.6	98.6	14.2	98.8	18.7	98.6
U.S. Senate	Tillis	73.9	1.1	87.6	0.9	84.6	1.0	81.4	1.0
	Cunningham	26.0	98.8	12.1	99.1	15.3	98.8	18.4	98.8
NC State House	Republicans	75.2	0.9	83.9	0.9	82.8	1.0	81.5	1.1
	Democrats	24.8	99.2	16.1	98.9	17.3	98.9	18.3	98.8
NC State Senate	Republicans	74.5	1.2	87.8	1.1	83.9	1.0	79.7	1.0
	Democrats	25.6	98.6	11.9	98.6	15.9	98.7	20.3	99.0

Northeast-1 = Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Warren, Washington, Vance counties

Northeast-2 = Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Warren, Washington, Vance AND Pitt and Edgecombe counties

Table A2: North Carolina Ecological Inference (RxC) Candidate Choice Estimates

Year	Office	Candidate	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
			White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2022	Appeals Court # 10	Tyson	69.6	2.4	87.2	2.4	82.9	2.3	75.3	3.7
		Adams	30.4	97.7	12.8	97.6	17.1	97.7	24.7	96.3
		Stading	69.8	2.2	86.9	2.4	82.4	2.5	74.9	4.0
	Appeals Court # 11	Jackson	30.2	97.8	13.1	97.6	17.5	97.5	25.1	96.0
		Flood	69.3	2.2	85.9	2.2	81.9	2.4	74.7	4.0
	Appeals Court #8	Thompson	30.7	97.8	14.1	97.8	18.1	97.6	25.3	96.0
		Stroud	71.7	2.7	88.3	2.5	84.2	2.4	76.2	4.8
	Appeals Court #9	Salmon	28.3	97.3	11.7	97.5	15.8	97.6	23.8	95.2
		Dietz	69.1	2.4	86.1	2.4	82.4	2.6	75.4	4.2
	Supreme Court #3	Inman	30.9	97.6	13.9	97.6	17.6	97.4	24.6	95.8
		Allen	68.7	2.7	85.8	2.4	81.6	2.8	74.6	4.8
Supreme Court #5	Ervin	31.3	97.3	14.2	97.7	18.4	97.2	25.4	95.2	
	Budd	68.3	1.9	86.4	2.3	81.7	2.2	73.8	3.8	
U.S. Senate	Beasley	31.7	98.1	13.7	97.7	18.3	97.8	26.2	96.2	
	Republicans	65.9	2.7	83.5	2.9	79.7	3.2	73.9	3.8	
NC State House	Democrats	34.1	97.3	16.5	97.1	20.3	96.8	26.1	96.2	
	Republicans	59.4	16.1	88.2	2.2	82.2	2.3	75.5	3.9	
NC State Senate	Democrats	40.6	83.9	11.8	97.8	17.8	97.7	24.5	96.1	
	O'Neill	72.5	2.3	85.8	2.0	82.3	2.1	76.8	2.8	
Attorney General	Stein	27.5	97.7	14.2	98.0	17.7	97.9	23.2	97.2	
	Troxler	78.4	2.5	91.7	1.8	88.5	2.0	83.0	2.7	
Agriculture Commiss.	Wadsworth	21.6	97.5	8.3	98.2	11.5	98.0	17.0	97.3	
	Griffin	74.8	2.1	87.1	1.9	84.1	1.8	78.9	3.3	
Appeals Court #13	Brook	25.2	97.9	13.0	98.1	15.9	98.2	21.1	96.7	
	Wood	75.3	2.6	88.1	2.0	85.3	1.9	79.0	3.5	
Appeals Court #4	Shields	24.7	97.4	11.9	98.0	14.7	98.1	21.0	96.5	

Appeals Court #5	Gore	74.8	2.3	87.8	1.9	84.4	2.0	79.1	2.6
	Cabbage	25.2	97.7	12.2	98.1	15.6	98.0	20.9	97.4
Appeals Court #6	Dillon	75.7	2.4	88.3	2.1	85.7	1.9	79.8	2.5
	Styers	24.3	97.6	11.7	97.9	14.3	98.1	20.2	97.5
Appeals Court #7	Carpenter	75.3	2.2	87.8	1.9	84.7	2.0	78.8	3.4
	Young	24.7	97.8	12.2	98.1	15.3	98.0	21.2	96.6
Auditor	Street	71.6	2.1	82.0	2.0	77.5	2.1	70.0	3.5
	Wood	28.4	97.9	18.0	98.0	22.5	97.9	30.0	96.5
Governor	Forest	69.8	1.8	84.4	1.8	80.8	2.0	74.5	3.3
	Cooper	30.2	98.2	15.6	98.2	19.2	98.0	25.5	96.7
Insurance Commiss.	Causey	75.6	2.1	85.8	1.9	83.8	2.0	79.3	3.2
	Goodwin	24.3	97.9	14.2	98.1	16.2	98.0	20.7	96.8
Labor Commiss.	Dobson	74.4	2.0	87.0	1.9	83.4	1.8	77.3	3.3
	Holmes	25.6	98.0	13.1	98.1	16.6	98.2	22.7	96.7
Lt. Governor	Robinson	75.2	2.2	89.2	1.9	86.0	2.2	80.5	3.4
	Holley	24.8	97.8	10.8	98.1	14.0	97.8	19.5	96.7
President	Trump	73.6	2.2	88.9	2.1	85.0	2.1	78.4	3.3
	Biden	26.4	97.8	11.1	97.9	15.0	97.9	21.6	96.7
Sec. of State	Sykes	71.4	1.9	82.2	2.0	79.4	2.0	73.4	3.3
	Marshall	28.6	98.1	17.8	98.0	20.6	98.0	26.6	96.7
State Superintendent	Truitt	74.8	2.5	87.4	2.0	84.4	2.1	78.2	2.9
	Mangrum	25.2	97.4	12.6	98.0	15.7	97.9	21.8	97.1
Supreme Court #1	Newby	73.1	2.3	86.2	1.9	83.0	2.0	76.6	3.3
	Beasley	26.9	97.7	13.8	98.1	17.0	98.0	23.4	96.7
Supreme Court #2	Berger	73.9	2.2	87.2	1.8	84.0	2.0	78.4	2.6
	Inman	26.2	97.8	12.8	98.2	16.0	98.0	21.6	97.4
Supreme Court #4	Barringer	74.5	2.7	85.6	2.1	82.6	2.0	76.7	3.3
	Davis	25.5	97.3	14.4	97.9	17.4	98.0	23.3	96.7
Treasurer	Folwell	75.6	5.4	88.1	2.2	85.0	3.0	79.1	4.7
	Chatterji	24.3	94.6	11.9	97.8	15.0	97.0	20.8	95.3

U.S. Senate	Tillis	74.0	1.9	87.2	2.1	84.2	1.9	78.1	3.1
	Cunningham	26.0	98.1	12.8	97.9	15.8	98.1	21.9	96.9
	Republicans	75.2	2.7	82.2	2.4	81.8	2.1	78.9	3.0
NC State House	Democrats	24.8	97.3	17.8	97.6	18.2	97.9	21.1	97.0
	Republicans	74.6	2.7	87.8	2.5	83.9	2.5	76.6	3.7
NC State Senate	Democrats	25.4	97.3	12.2	97.5	16.1	97.6	23.4	96.3

Northeast-1 = Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Warren, Washington, Vance counties

Northeast-2 = Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Warren, Washington, Vance AND Pitt and Edgecombe counties

Appendix B: Evaluation of Plaintiffs' Illustrative Maps

Table B1: Performance Analysis 2022 Elections

	Demonstration			Demonstration B		2023 Adopted	
	District A	District B1	District B2	District 1	District 2	District 1	District 2
	Black CVAP	53.1%	50.2%	12.6%	31.6%	31.6%	31.5%
	Black voters	45.5%	42.1%	8.2%	23.3%	23.3%	22.7%
	White voters	49.1%	52.2%	85.6%	71.2%	71.2%	70.8%
	Other voters	5.3%	5.7%	6.2%	5.4%	5.4%	6.5%
	U.S. Senate	44.4%	46.7%	67.6%	57.8%	57.8%	59.1%
	U.S. Senate	55.6%	53.3%	32.4%	42.2%	42.2%	40.9%
	Supreme Court #3	44.7%	46.9%	67.9%	57.8%	57.8%	59.7%
	Supreme Court #3	55.3%	53.1%	32.1%	42.2%	42.2%	40.3%
	Supreme Court #5	44.6%	46.6%	67.6%	57.6%	57.6%	59.3%
	Supreme Court #5	55.4%	53.4%	32.4%	42.4%	42.4%	40.7%
	Appeals Court #8	44.7%	46.7%	67.5%	57.5%	57.5%	59.4%
	Appeals Court #8	55.3%	53.3%	32.5%	42.5%	42.5%	40.6%
	Appeals Court #9	45.9%	47.9%	69.2%	59.1%	59.1%	60.7%
	Appeals Court #9	54.1%	52.1%	30.8%	40.9%	40.9%	39.3%
	Appeals Court #10	45.4%	47.4%	67.8%	57.9%	57.9%	59.9%
	Appeals Court #10	54.6%	52.6%	32.2%	42.1%	42.1%	40.1%
	Appeals Court #11	45.1%	47.1%	68.1%	58.1%	58.1%	59.8%
	Appeals Court #11	54.9%	52.9%	31.9%	41.9%	41.9%	40.2%
	NC State House	43.2%	43.8%	71.8%	50.3%	50.3%	58.0%
	NC State House	56.8%	56.2%	28.2%	49.7%	49.7%	42.0%
	NC State Senate	44.8%	45.6%	75.3%	57.8%	57.8%	45.9%
	NC State Senate	55.2%	54.4%	24.7%	42.2%	42.2%	54.1%

* indicates Black voter-preferred candidate

Table B2: Performance Analysis 2020 Elections

	Demonstration			2023 Adopted	
	District A	District B1	District B2	District 1	District 2
Black voters	49.2%	45.6%	9.5%	26.1%	26.4%
White voters	42.8%	46.2%	81.2%	65.6%	64.4%
Other voters	8.1%	8.1%	9.3%	8.3%	9.3%
President	Trump	41.1%	65.9%	54.5%	56.7%
President	Biden *	58.9%	34.1%	45.5%	43.3%
U.S. Senate	Tillis	39.7%	65.9%	54.7%	55.5%
U.S. Senate	Cunningham *	60.3%	34.1%	45.3%	44.5%
Governor	Forest	38.4%	63.5%	52.5%	54.0%
Governor	Cooper *	61.6%	36.5%	47.5%	46.0%
Lt. Governor	Robinson	41.0%	66.6%	54.9%	57.0%
Lt. Governor	Holley *	59.0%	33.4%	45.1%	43.0%
Attorney General	O'Neill	38.9%	65.2%	53.9%	54.9%
Attorney General	Stein *	61.1%	34.8%	46.1%	45.1%
Auditor	Street	37.7%	63.4%	52.3%	53.0%
Auditor	Wood *	62.3%	36.6%	47.7%	47.0%
Agriculture Commiss.	Troxler	42.4%	67.7%	55.6%	58.6%
Agriculture Commiss.	Wadsworth *	57.6%	32.3%	44.4%	41.4%
Insurance Commiss.	Causey	39.9%	65.8%	53.9%	55.7%
Insurance Commiss.	Goodwin *	60.1%	34.2%	46.1%	44.3%
Labor Commiss.	Dobson	39.9%	65.2%	53.6%	55.6%
Labor Commiss.	Holmes *	60.1%	34.8%	46.4%	44.4%
Sec. of State	Sykes	37.5%	63.3%	52.2%	53.2%
Sec. of State	Marshall *	62.5%	36.7%	47.8%	46.8%

State Superintendent	Truitt	40.3%	42.7%	65.9%	54.3%	56.1%
State Superintendent	Mangrum*	59.7%	57.3%	34.1%	45.7%	43.9%
Treasurer	Folwell	41.5%	43.9%	66.5%	55.5%	56.7%
Treasurer	Chatterji*	58.5%	56.1%	33.5%	44.5%	43.3%
Supreme Court #1	Newby	39.6%	42.2%	64.8%	53.5%	55.3%
Supreme Court #1	Beasley*	60.4%	57.8%	35.2%	46.5%	44.7%
Supreme Court #2	Berger	40.2%	42.6%	65.3%	53.8%	55.8%
Supreme Court #2	Inman*	59.8%	57.4%	34.7%	46.2%	44.2%
Supreme Court #4	Barringer	39.2%	41.9%	65.4%	53.7%	55.3%
Supreme Court #4	Davis*	60.8%	58.1%	34.6%	46.3%	44.7%
Appeals Court #4	Wood	40.6%	43.1%	66.3%	54.6%	56.5%
Appeals Court #4	Shields*	59.4%	56.9%	33.7%	45.4%	43.5%
Appeals Court #5	Gore	40.3%	42.7%	65.8%	54.1%	56.2%
Appeals Court #5	Cubbage*	59.7%	57.3%	34.2%	45.9%	43.8%
Appeals Court #6	Dillon	40.4%	43.0%	66.7%	54.8%	56.7%
Appeals Court #6	Styers*	59.6%	57.0%	33.3%	45.2%	43.3%
Appeals Court #7	Carpenter	40.3%	42.8%	66.3%	54.4%	56.4%
Appeals Court #7	Young*	59.7%	57.2%	33.7%	45.6%	43.6%
Appeals Court #13	Griffin	39.9%	42.4%	65.9%	54.0%	56.1%
Appeals Court #13	Brook*	60.1%	57.6%	34.1%	46.0%	43.9%
NC State House	Republicans	37.8%	40.0%	66.4%	53.1%	55.4%
NC State House	Democrats*	62.2%	60.0%	33.6%	46.9%	44.6%
NC State Senate	Republicans	41.5%	43.4%	64.9%	52.8%	57.1%
NC State Senate	Democrats*	58.5%	56.6%	35.1%	47.2%	42.9%

* indicates Black voter-preferred candidate

Appendix C: Barreto CV



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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, 3345 BUNCHE HALL, LOS ANGELES CA 90095 / 909.489.2955

EMPLOYMENT:

Professor, Political Science, University of California Los Angeles (2015 – present)
Professor, Chicana/o Studies, University of California Los Angeles (2015 – present)
Co-Founder & Faculty Director, Latino Policy & Politics Institute (LPPI)
Co-Founder & Faculty Director, UCLA Voting Rights Project (VRP)

Dept. Political Science, University of Washington

Professor (2014 – 2015)

Associate Professor (2009 – 2014)

Assistant Professor (2005 – 2009)

Co-Founder & Director, Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race

Founding Director, Center for Democracy and Voting Rights, UW School of Law

Affiliated Research Centers

Latino Policy & Politics Institute (LPPI), University of California, Los Angeles

Chicano Studies Research Center (CSRC), University of California, Los Angeles

Center for the Study of Los Angeles (CSLA), Loyola Marymount University

PERSONAL:

Born: June 6, 1976

San Juan, Puerto Rico

High School: 1994, Washburn Rural HS, Topeka, KS

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Political Science, June 2005

University of California – Irvine

Sub Fields: American Politics / Race, Ethnicity and Politics / Methodology

Thesis: Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation

Thesis Committee: Bernard Grofman (chair), Louis DeSipio, Katherine Tate, Carole Uhlaner

Thesis Awards: *Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship for Minorities, 04-05*

University of California President's Dissertation Fellowship, 04-05

University of California Institute for Mexico & the U.S. Dissertation Grant, 04-05

Master of Science, Social Science, March 2003

University of California – Irvine

Bachelor of Science, Political Science, May 1998

Eastern New Mexico University, Portales, NM

Minor: English. Cumulative GPA: 3.9, *Summa Cum Laude*

PUBLICATION RECORD

Google Scholar citation indices: Cites: 5,826 h-index: 37 i10-index: 68 i100-index: 14 Cites/year: 324

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3. Barreto, Matt and Ricardo Ramírez. 2005. "The Race Card and California Politics: Minority Voters and Racial Cues in the 2003 Recall Election." In Shaun Bowler and Bruce Cain (eds.) Clicker Politics: Essays on the California Recall. Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
2. Barreto, Matt and Nathan Woods. 2005. "The Anti-Latino Political Context and its Impact on GOP Detachment and Increasing Latino Voter Turnout in Los Angeles County." In Gary Segura and Shawn Bowler (eds.) Diversity in Democracy: Minority Representation in the United States. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
1. Pachon, Harry, Matt Barreto and Frances Marquez. 2004. "Latino Politics Comes of Age in the Golden State." In Rodolfo de la Garza and Louis DeSipio (eds.) Muted Voices: Latino Politics in the 2000 Election. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

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RESEARCH AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

June 2020	WK Kellogg Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$2,500,000 – 24 months
June 2020	Casey Family Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$900,000 – 18 months
Aug 2018	Provost Initiative for Voting Rights Research UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Chad Dunn]	\$90,000 – 24 months
April 2018	Democracy Fund & Wellspring Philanthropic UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$200,000 – 18 months
March 2018	AltaMed California UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$250,000 – 12 months
Dec 2017	California Community Foundation UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [With Sonja Diaz]	\$100,000 – 12 months
July 2013	Ford Foundation UW Center for Democracy and Voting Rights	\$200,000 – 12 months
April 2012	American Values Institute [With Ben Gonzalez] Racial Narratives and Public Response to Racialized Moments	\$40,000 – 3 months
Jan 2012	American Civil Liberties Union Foundation [With Gabriel Sanchez] Voter Identification Laws in Wisconsin	\$60,000 – 6 months
June 2011	State of California Citizens Redistricting Commission An Analysis of Racial Bloc Voting in California Elections	\$60,000 – 3 months
Apr 2011	Social Science Research Council (SSRC) [With Karam Dana] Muslim and American? A national conference on the political and social incorporation of American Muslims	\$50,000 – 18 months
Jan 2011	impreMedia [With Gary Segura] Latino public opinion tracking poll of voter attitudes in 2011	\$30,000 – 6 months
Oct 2010	National Council of La Raza (NCLR) [With Gary Segura] Measuring Latino Influence in the 2010 Elections	\$128,000 – 6 months
Oct 2010	We Are America Alliance (WAAA) [With Gary Segura] Latino and Asian American Immigrant Community Voter Study	\$79,000 – 3 months
May 2010	National Council of La Raza (NCLR) [With Gary Segura] A Study of Latino Views Towards Arizona SB1070	\$25,000 – 3 months
Apr 2010	Social Science Research Council (SSRC) [With Karam Dana] Muslim and American? The influence of religiosity in Muslim political incorporation	\$50,000 – 18 months
Oct 2009	American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) [With Gary Segura] Health care reform and Latino public opinion	\$25,000 – 3 months
Nov 2008	impreMedia & National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) [With Gary Segura] 2008 National Latino Post-Election Survey, Presidential Election	\$46,000 – 3 months

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RESEARCH GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS CONTINUED...

July 2008	National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) [With Gary Segura] Latino voter outreach survey – an evaluation of Obama and McCain	\$72,000 – 3 months
June 2008	The Pew Charitable Trusts, Make Voting Work Project [with Karin MacDonald and Bonnie Glaser] Evaluating Online Voter Registration (OVR) Systems in Arizona and Washington	\$220,000 – 10 months
April 2008	National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) & National Council of La Raza (NCLR), 2008 Latino voter messaging survey	\$95,000 – 6 months
Dec. 2007	Research Royalty Fund, University of Washington 2008 Latino national post-election survey	\$39,000 – 12 months
Oct. 2007	Brenan Center for Justice, New York University [with Stephen Nuño and Gabriel Sanchez] Indiana Voter Identification Study	\$40,000 – 6 months
June 2007	National Science Foundation, Political Science Division [with Gary Segura] American National Election Study – Spanish translation and Latino oversample	\$750,000 – 24 months
Oct. 2006	University of Washington, Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education Absentee voter study during the November 2006 election in King County, WA	\$12,000 – 6 months
Mar. 2006	Latino Policy Coalition Public Opinion Research Grant [with Gary Segura] Awarded to the Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race	\$40,000 – 18 months
2005 – 2006	University of Washington, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Research Grant	\$8,000 – 12 months
Mar. 2005	Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Foundation Grant [with Fernando Guerra] Conduct Exit Poll during Los Angeles Mayoral Election, Mar. 8 & May 17, 2005 Awarded to the Center for the Study of Los Angeles	\$30,000 – 6 months
2004 – 2005	Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship for Minorities	\$21,000 – 12 months
2004 – 2005	University of California President's Dissertation Fellowship	\$14,700 – 9 months
2004 – 2005	University of California Mexico-US (UC MEXUS) Dissertation Grant	\$12,000 – 9 months
Apr – 2004	UC Regents pre-dissertation fellowship, University of California, Irvine,	\$4,700 – 3 months
2003 – 2004	Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Foundation Grant [with Fernando Guerra] Awarded to the Center for the Study of Los Angeles	\$20,000 – 12 months
2002 – 2003	Ford Foundation Grant on Institutional Inequality [with Harry Pachon] Conducted longitudinal study of Prop 209 on Latino and Black college admittance Awarded to Tomás Rivera Policy Institute	\$150,000 – 12 months
2002 – 2003	Haynes Foundation Grant on Economic Development [with Louis Tornatzky] Knowledge Economy in the Inland Empire region of Southern California Awarded to Tomás Rivera Policy Institute	\$150,000 – 18 months
2001 – 2002	William F Podlich Graduate Fellowship, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine	\$24,000 – 9 months

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RESEARCH UNDER REVIEW/WORKING PAPERS:

Barreto, Matt, and Christopher Parker. The Great White Hope: Donald Trump, Race, and the Crisis of American Politics. Under Contract, University of Chicago Press, *expected 2020*

Barreto, Matt and Christopher Parker. "The Great White Hope: Existential Threat and Demographic Anxiety in the Age of Trump." Revise and Resubmit.

Barreto, Matt, Natalie Masuoka, Gabe Sanchez and Stephen El-Khatib. "Religiosity, Discrimination and Group Identity Among Muslim Americans" Revise and Resubmit

Barreto, Matt, Gabe Sanchez and Barbara Gomez. "Latinos, Blacks, and Black Latinos: Competition, Cooperation, or Indifference?" Revise and Resubmit

Walker, Hannah, Matt Barreto, Stephen Nuño, and Gabriel Sanchez. "A comprehensive review of access to valid photo ID and the right to vote in America" [Under review]

Gutierrez, Angela, Angela Ocampo, Matt Barreto and Gary Segura. "From Proposition 187 to Donald Trump: New Evidence that Anti-Immigrant Threat Mobilizes Latino Voters." [Under Review]

Oskooii, Kassra, Matt Barreto, and Karam Dana. "No Sharia, No Mosque: Orientalist Notions of Islam and Intolerance Toward Muslims in the United States" [Under Review]

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EXPERT REPORTS:

- North Carolina 2023, State Senate redistricting, *Democracy Project II*.
- Dodge City, Kansas 2022-23, city redistricting, *Coca et al. vs. Dodge City, KS*.
- Florida 2022-23, Statewide redistricting, *Common Cause et al. vs. Byrd*
- Galveston County, Texas 2022-23, county redistricting, *Petteway et al. v. Galveston County, TX*.
- Benton, Chelan, Yakima counties signature rejection, 2022-23, *Reyes et al. v. Chilton et al.*
- San Juan County, New Mexico 2022-23, county redistricting, *Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, NM*
- Texas Statewide redistricting, 2022, *LULAC v. Abbott* (on behalf of Mexican American Legislative Caucus)
- Franklin County, WA, 2021-22, county redistricting, rebuttal expert for Plaintiffs, *Portugal et al. vs. Franklin County*
- Texas Statewide redistricting, 2021-22, *Brooks v. Abbott* Senate District 10 (Tarrant County)
- Baltimore County Council, 2021-22, *NAACP v. Baltimore County*, (on behalf of NAACP and ACLU-MD)
- Maryland Office of Attorney General, 2021-22, racially polarized voting analysis as part of statewide redistricting
- Pennsylvania House Democrats, 2021-22, racially polarized voting analysis as part of statewide redistricting
- Washington State Senate Democrats, 2021-22, racially polarized voting analysis as part of statewide redistricting
- City of San Jose, 2021, racially polarized voting analysis as part of city redistricting
- Santa Clara County, 2021, racially polarized voting analysis as part of county redistricting
- Pennsylvania, 2020, *Boockvar v. Trump*, Expert for Intervenors, (Perkins Coie) related to voter intimidation
- Missouri, 2020, *Missouri NAACP vs. State of Missouri*, Expert for plaintiffs related to vote by mail
- Georgia, 2020, *Black Voters Matter vs. Raffesnsperger*, Expert for plaintiffs related to vote by mail
- New York, 2019, Expert for NYAG *New York v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 1:19-cv-08876*
- North Carolina, 2019, Expert for Plaintiffs in North Carolina voter ID lawsuit, *NAACP v. Cooper*
- East Ramapo CSD, 2019, Expert for Plaintiffs in Section 2 VRA lawsuit, assessed polarized voting
- New York, 2018, Expert for Plaintiffs in Census Citizenship Lawsuit, *New York v. U.S. Dept of Commerce* (also an expert related cases: *California v. Ross* and *Kravitz v. Dept of Commerce*)
- Dallas County, TX, 2017, Expert for Defense in Section 2 VRA lawsuit, *Harding v. Dallas County*
- Kansas, 2016, Expert for Plaintiffs in Kansas voter registration lawsuit, *Fish v. Kobach 2:16-cv-02105-JAR*
- North Dakota, 2015, Expert for Plaintiffs in North Dakota voter ID lawsuit, *Brakebill v. Jaeger 1:16-cv-00008-CSM*
- Alabama, 2015, Expert for Plaintiffs in Alabama voter ID lawsuit, *Birmingham Ministries v. State of Alabama 2:15-cv-02193-LSC*
- Texas, 2014, Testifying Expert for Plaintiffs in Texas voter ID lawsuit, *Veasey v. Perry 2:13-cv-00193*
- Galveston County, TX Redistricting, 2013, Expert report for *Dunn & Brazil, LLC*, Demographic analysis, vote dilution analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit Galveston County JP/Constable districting
- Pasadena, TX Redistricting, 2013, Expert report for *Dunn & Brazil, LLC*, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit within Pasadena School District
- Harris County, TX Redistricting, 2011, Testifying Expert for *Dunn & Brazil, LLC*, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, and racially polarized voting analysis for Section 2 lawsuit within Harris County

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- Pennsylvania, 2012, Testifying Expert for ACLU Foundation of Pennsylvania in voter ID lawsuit, *Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania No. 330 MD 2012*
- Milwaukee County, WI, 2012, Testifying Expert for ACLU Foundation of Wisconsin in voter ID lawsuit, *Frank v. Walker 2:11-cv-01128(LA)*
- Orange County, FL, 2012, Consulting Expert for Latino Justice/PRLDEF, Racially polarized voting analysis in Orange County, Florida
- Anaheim, CA, 2012, Consulting Expert for Goldstein, Demchak & Baller Legal, Racially polarized voting analysis for CVRA redistricting case Anaheim, CA
- Los Angeles County, CA, 2011, Consulting Expert for Goldstein, Demchak & Baller Legal, Racially polarized voting analysis for three redistricting cases in L.A.: Cerritos Community College Board; ABC Unified Schools; City of West Covina
- Harris County, TX Redistricting, 2011, Consulting Expert for Dunn & Brazil, LLC, Demographic analysis, voter registration analysis, for Section 5 objection within Harris County
- Monterey County, CA Redistricting, 2011, Consulting Expert for City of Salinas, Demographic analysis, creation of alternative maps, and racially polarized Voting analysis within Monterey County
- Los Angeles County Redistricting Commission, 2011, Consulting Expert for Supervisor Gloria Molina, Racially Polarized voting analysis within L.A. County
- State of California, Citizens Redistricting Commission, 2011, Consulting Expert, Racially Polarized Voting analysis throughout state of California
- Asian Pacific American Legal Center, 2011, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Asian American candidates in Los Angeles for APALC redistricting brief
- Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Arnold & Porter, LLP, 2010-12, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino and Asian candidates in San Mateo County, concerning San Mateo County Board of Supervisors
- ACLU of Washington, 2010-11, preliminary analysis of Latino population patterns in Yakima, Washington, to assess ability to draw majority Latino council districts
- State of Washington, 2010-11, provided expert analysis and research for *State of Washington v. MacLean* in case regarding election misconduct and voting patterns
- Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association, 2008-10, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino candidates in L.A. County for VRA case, concerning L.A. County Board of Supervisors redistricting (6 reports issued 08-10)
- Brennan Center for Justice and Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, 2009-10 Amicus Brief submitted to Indiana Supreme Court, *League of Women Voters v. Rokita*, regarding access to voter identification among minority and lower resource citizens
- State of New Mexico, consulting expert for state in *AAPD v. New Mexico*, 2008,
- District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), statistical consultant for survey methodology of opinion survey of parents in DCPS district (for pending suit), 2008,
- Brennan Center for Justice, 2007-08, Amicus Brief submitted to U.S. Supreme Court, and cited in Supreme Court decision, *Crawford v. Marion County*, regarding access to voter identification among minority and lower-resource citizens
- Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association, 2002-07, Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino candidates in L.A. County for VRA case, concerning L.A. County Board of Supervisors redistricting (12 + reports issued during 5 years)
- Monterrey County School Board, 2007, demographic and population analysis for VRA case
- Sweetwater Union School District, 2007-08, Racially Polarized Voting analysis, and demographic and population analysis for VRA case
- Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, 2007-08, Racially Polarized Voting analysis for Latino candidates, for City of Whittier city council races, for VRA case

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- ACLU of Washington, 2008, preliminary analysis of voting patterns in Eastern Washington, related to electability of Latino candidates
- Nielsen Media Research, 2005-08, with Willie C. Velasquez Institute, assessed the methodology of Latino household recruitment in Nielsen sample

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**TEACHING
EXPERIENCE:**

UCLA & UW

2005 – Present

- Minority Political Behavior (Grad Seminar)
- Politics of Immigration in the U.S. (Grad Seminar)
- Introduction to Empirical/Regression Analysis (Grad Seminar)
- Advanced Empirical/Regression Analysis (Grad Seminar)
- Qualitative Research Methods (Grad Seminar)
- Political Participation & Elections (Grad Seminar)
- The Voting Rights Act (Law School seminar)
- Research methodology II (Law School Ph.D. program seminar)
- U.S. Latino Politics
- Racial and Ethnic Politics in the U.S.
- Politics of Immigration in the U.S.
- Introduction to American Government
- Public Opinion Research
- Campaigns and Elections in the U.S.
- Presidential Primary Elections

Teaching Assistant

University of California, Irvine

2002 – 2005

- Intro to American Politics (K. Tate)
- Intro to Minority Politics (L. DeSipio)
- **Recognized as Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Winter 2002**
- Statistics and Research Methods (B. Grofman)
- **Recognized as Outstanding Teaching Assistant, Winter 2003**

**BOARD &
RESEARCH
APPOINTMENTS****Founding Partner**

Barreto Segura Partners (BSP) Research, LLC

2021 - Present**Founding Partner**

Latino Decisions

2007 – 2020**Board of Advisors**

American National Election Study, University of Michigan

2010 – 2017**Advisory Board**States of Change: Demographics & Democracy Project
*CAP, AEI, Brookings Collaborative Project*2014 – Present**Research Advisor**

American Values Institute / Perception Institute

2009 – 2014**Expert Consultant**

State of California, Citizens Redistricting Committee

2011 – 2012**Senior Scholar & Advisory Council**

Latino Policy Coalition, San Francisco, CA

2006 – 2008**Board of Directors**

CASA Latina, Seattle, WA

2006 – 2009**Faculty Research Scholar**

Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, University of Southern California

1999 – 2009

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PHD STUDENTS

UCLA & UW

Committee Chair or Co-Chair

- Francisco I. Pedraza – University of California, Riverside (UW Ph.D. 2009)
- Loren Collingwood – University of California, Riverside (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Betsy Cooper – Public Religion Research Institute, Washington DC (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Sergio I. Garcia-Rios – Cornell University (UW Ph.D. 2015)
- Hannah Walker – Rutgers University (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Kassra Oskooii – University of Delaware (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Angela Ocampo – Arizona State University (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Ayobami Lanionu – University of Toronto (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Bryan Wilcox-Archuleta – Facebook Analytics (UCLA 2019)
- Tyler Reny – Claremont Graduate University (UCLA 2020)
- Adria Tinin – Environmental Policy Analyst (UCLA Ph.D. 2020)
- Angie Gutierrez – University of Texas (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Vivien Leung – Bucknell University (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Marcel Roman – University of Texas (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Shakari Byerly-Nelson – *in progress* (UCLA)

Committee Member

- Jessica Stewart – Emory University (UCLA Ph.D. 2018)
- Jonathan Collins – Brown University (UCLA Ph.D., 2017)
- Lisa Sanchez – University of Arizona (UNM Ph.D., 2016)
- Nazita Lajevardi – Michigan State University (UC San Diego Ph.D., 2016)
- Kiku Huckle – Pace University (UW Ph.D. 2016)
- Patrick Rock (Social Psychology) – (UCLA Ph.D. 2016)
- Raynee Gutting – Loyola Marymount University (Stony Brook Ph.D. 2015)
- Christopher Towler – Sacramento State University (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Benjamin F. Gonzalez – San Diego State University (UW Ph.D. 2014)
- Marcela Garcia-Castañon – San Francisco State University (UW Ph.D. 2013)
- Justin Reedy (Communications) – University of Oklahoma (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Dino Bozonelos – Cal State San Marcos (UC Riverside Ph.D. 2012)
- Brandon Bosch – University of Nebraska (UW Ph.D. 2012)
- Karam Dana (Middle East Studies) – UW Bothell (UW Ph.D. 2010)
- Joy Wilke – *in progress* (UCLA ABD)
- Erik Hanson – *in progress* (UCLA)
- Christine Slaughter – Princeton (UCLA Ph.D. 2021)
- Lauren Goldstein (Social Psychology) – *in progress* (UCLA)
- Barbara Gomez-Aguinaga – University of Nebraska (UNM Ph.D. 2020)
- Bang Quan Zheng – Florida International University (UCLA Ph.D. 2020)


Appendix D:

Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals


Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

EI Density Plots

USSenate_Tillis_20 vs USSenate_Cunningham_20 for Pct_Whi




USSenate_Tillis_20 vs USSenate_Cunningham_20 for Pct_Blac




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

USSenate_Budd_22 vs USSenate_Beasley_22 for Pct_White vc




USSenate_Budd_22 vs USSenate_Beasley_22 for Pct_Black vc




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Treasurer_Folwell_20 vs Treasurer_Chatterji_20 for Pct_White




Treasurer_Folwell_20 vs Treasurer_Chatterji_20 for Pct_Black




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt5_Allen_22 vs SupCrt5_Ervin_22 for Pct_White voters (c




SupCrt5_Allen_22 vs SupCrt5_Ervin_22 for Pct_Black voters (c




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt4_Barringer_20 vs SupCrt4_Davis_20 for Pct_White vot




SupCrt4_Barringer_20 vs SupCrt4_Davis_20 for Pct_Black vot




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt3_Dietz_22 vs SupCrt3_Inman_22 for Pct_White voters (




SupCrt3_Dietz_22 vs SupCrt3_Inman_22 for Pct_Black voters (




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt2_Berger_20 vs SupCrt2_Inman_20 for Pct_White voter:




SupCrt2_Berger_20 vs SupCrt2_Inman_20 for Pct_Black voters:




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt1_Newby_20 vs SupCrt1_Beasley_20 for Pct_White vote




SupCrt1_Newby_20 vs SupCrt1_Beasley_20 for Pct_Black vote




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SprIntdnt_Truitt_20 vs SprIntdnt_Mangrum_20 for Pct_White v




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


Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SOS_Sykes_20 vs SOS_Marshall_20 for Pct_White voters (ove




SOS_Sykes_20 vs SOS_Marshall_20 for Pct_Black voters (ove




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pres_Trump_20 vs Pres_Biden_20 for Pct_White voters (overla




Pres_Trump_20 vs Pres_Biden_20 for Pct_Black voters (overla




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCSenate_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_22 for Pct_Whi




Pct_NCSenate_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_22 for Pct_Oth




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCSenate_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_22 for Pct_Blac




Pct_NCSenate_Dem_20 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_20 for Pct_Whi




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCSenate_Dem_20 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_20 for Pct_Blac




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


Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCHouse_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCHouse_Rep_22 for Pct_Black




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


Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCHouse_Dem_20 vs Pct_NCHouse_Rep_20 for Pct_Black




LtGov_Robinson_20 vs LtGov_Holley_20 for Pct_White voters




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

LtGov_Robinson_20 vs LtGov_Holley_20 for Pct_Black voters




Labor_Dobson_20 vs Labor_Holmes_20 for Pct_White voters (




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Labor_Dobson_20 vs Labor_Holmes_20 for Pct_Black voters (n=100)




Insur_Causey_20 vs Insur_Goodwin_20 for Pct_White voters (n=100)




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Insur_Causey_20 vs Insur_Goodwin_20 for Pct_Black voters (c




Gov_Forest_20 vs Gov_Cooper_20 for Pct_White voters (overl




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Gov_Forest_20 vs Gov_Cooper_20 for Pct_Black voters (overlaid)




Auditor_Street_20 vs Auditor_Wood_20 for Pct_White voters (overlaid)




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Auditor_Street_20 vs Auditor_Wood_20 for Pct_Black voters (c




ApplsCr13_Griffin_20 vs ApplsCr13_Brook_20 for Pct_White




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr13_Griffin_20 vs AppIsCr13_Brook_20 for Pct_Black




AppIsCr11_Stading_22 vs AppIsCr11_Jackson_22 for Pct_Wh




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr11_Stading_22 vs ApplsCr11_Jackson_22 for Pct_Bl




ApplsCr10_Tyson_22 vs ApplsCr10_Adams_22 for Pct_White




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr10_Tyson_22 vs AppIsCr10_Adams_22 for Pct_Black




AppIsCr9_Stroud_22 vs AppIsCr9_Salmon_22 for Pct_White




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr9_Stroud_22 vs AppIsCr9_Salmon_22 for Pct_Black v




AppIsCr8_Flood_22 vs AppIsCr8_Thompson_22 for Pct_Whit




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr8_Flood_22 vs AppIsCr8_Thompson_22 for Pct_Blac




AppIsCr7_Carpenter_20 vs AppIsCr7_Young_20 for Pct_Whit




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr7_Carpenter_20 vs ApplsCr7_Young_20 for Pct_Black




ApplsCr6_Dillon_20 vs ApplsCr6_Styers_20 for Pct_White vo




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr6_Dillon_20 vs AppIsCr6_Styers_20 for Pct_Black vo




AppIsCr5_Gore_20 vs AppIsCr5_Cubbage_20 for Pct_White v




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr5_Gore_20 vs AppIsCr5_Cubbage_20 for Pct_Black v




AppIsCr4_Wood_20 vs AppIsCr4_Shields_20 for Pct_White v




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCrt4_Wood_20 vs AppIsCrt4_Shields_20 for Pct_Black vote




Agrcltr_Troxler_20 vs Agrcltr_Wadsworth_20 for Pct_White vote




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Agrcltr_Troxler_20 vs Agrcltr_Wadsworth_20 for Pct_Black vot




AG_ONeill_20 vs AG_Stein_20 for Pct_White voters (overlap: 0



Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



AG_ONeill_20 vs AG_Stein_20 for Pct_Black voters (overlap: 0)





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

eiCompare TIE Fighter Plots



Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals




Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





● EI Iter ● RxC





● EI Iter ● RxC


Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Statewide RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals




Appendix E:

Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals


Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

EI Density Plots

USSenate_Tillis_20 vs USSenate_Cunningham_20 for Pct_Whi




USSenate_Tillis_20 vs USSenate_Cunningham_20 for Pct_Blac




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

USSenate_Budd_22 vs USSenate_Beasley_22 for Pct_White vc




USSenate_Budd_22 vs USSenate_Beasley_22 for Pct_Black vc




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Treasurer_Folwell_20 vs Treasurer_Chatterji_20 for Pct_White




Treasurer_Folwell_20 vs Treasurer_Chatterji_20 for Pct_Black




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt5_Allen_22 vs SupCrt5_Ervin_22 for Pct_White voters (a)




SupCrt5_Allen_22 vs SupCrt5_Ervin_22 for Pct_Black voters (c)




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt4_Barringer_20 vs SupCrt4_Davis_20 for Pct_White vot




SupCrt4_Barringer_20 vs SupCrt4_Davis_20 for Pct_Black vote




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt3_Dietz_22 vs SupCrt3_Inman_22 for Pct_White voters (




SupCrt3_Dietz_22 vs SupCrt3_Inman_22 for Pct_Black voters (




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt2_Berger_20 vs SupCrt2_Inman_20 for Pct_White voter:




SupCrt2_Berger_20 vs SupCrt2_Inman_20 for Pct_Black voters:




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SupCrt1_Newby_20 vs SupCrt1_Beasley_20 for Pct_White vote




SupCrt1_Newby_20 vs SupCrt1_Beasley_20 for Pct_Black vote




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SprIntdnt_Truitt_20 vs SprIntdnt_Mangrum_20 for Pct_White v




SprIntdnt_Truitt_20 vs SprIntdnt_Mangrum_20 for Pct_Black v




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

SOS_Sykes_20 vs SOS_Marshall_20 for Pct_White voters (ove




SOS_Sykes_20 vs SOS_Marshall_20 for Pct_Black voters (ove




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pres_Trump_20 vs Pres_Biden_20 for Pct_White voters (overla




Pres_Trump_20 vs Pres_Biden_20 for Pct_Black voters (overla




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCSenate_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_22 for Pct_Whi




Pct_NCSenate_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_22 for Pct_Blac




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCSenate_Dem_20 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_20 for Pct_Whi




Pct_NCSenate_Dem_20 vs Pct_NCSenate_Rep_20 for Pct_Blac




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCHouse_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCHouse_Rep_22 for Pct_Whit




Pct_NCHouse_Dem_22 vs Pct_NCHouse_Rep_22 for Pct_Black




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Pct_NCHouse_Dem_20 vs Pct_NCHouse_Rep_20 for Pct_Whit




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


Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

LtGov_Robinson_20 vs LtGov_Holley_20 for Pct_White voters




LtGov_Robinson_20 vs LtGov_Holley_20 for Pct_Black voters




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Labor_Dobson_20 vs Labor_Holmes_20 for Pct_White voters (



Labor_Dobson_20 vs Labor_Holmes_20 for Pct_Black voters (




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Gov_Forest_20 vs Gov_Cooper_20 for Pct_White voters (overl




Gov_Forest_20 vs Gov_Cooper_20 for Pct_Black voters (overl




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Auditor_Street_20 vs Auditor_Wood_20 for Pct_White voters (c




Auditor_Street_20 vs Auditor_Wood_20 for Pct_Black voters (c




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr13_Griffin_20 vs ApplsCr13_Brook_20 for Pct_White




ApplsCr13_Griffin_20 vs ApplsCr13_Brook_20 for Pct_Black




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr11_Stading_22 vs ApplsCr11_Jackson_22 for Pct_Wr




ApplsCr11_Stading_22 vs ApplsCr11_Jackson_22 for Pct_Bl




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplesCr10_Tyson_22 vs ApplesCr10_Adams_22 for Pct_White




ApplesCr10_Tyson_22 vs ApplesCr10_Adams_22 for Pct_Black




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr9_Stroud_22 vs ApplsCr9_Salmon_22 for Pct_White




ApplsCr9_Stroud_22 vs ApplsCr9_Salmon_22 for Pct_Black




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCrt8_Flood_22 vs AppIsCrt8_Thompson_22 for Pct_Whit




AppIsCrt8_Flood_22 vs AppIsCrt8_Thompson_22 for Pct_Blac




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr7_Carpenter_20 vs ApplsCr7_Young_20 for Pct_Whit




ApplsCr7_Carpenter_20 vs ApplsCr7_Young_20 for Pct_Black




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

ApplsCr6_Dillon_20 vs ApplsCr6_Styers_20 for Pct_White vo




ApplsCr6_Dillon_20 vs ApplsCr6_Styers_20 for Pct_Black vo




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr5_Gore_20 vs AppIsCr5_Cubbage_20 for Pct_White v




AppIsCr5_Gore_20 vs AppIsCr5_Cubbage_20 for Pct_Black v




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AppIsCr4_Wood_20 vs AppIsCr4_Shields_20 for Pct_White v




AppIsCr4_Wood_20 vs AppIsCr4_Shields_20 for Pct_Black v




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

Agrcltr_Troxler_20 vs Agrcltr_Wadsworth_20 for Pct_White voi




Agrcltr_Troxler_20 vs Agrcltr_Wadsworth_20 for Pct_Black voi




Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

AG_O'Neill_20 vs AG_Stein_20 for Pct_White voters (overlap: 0)





AG_O'Neill_20 vs AG_Stein_20 for Pct_Black voters (overlap: 0)





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals

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

Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





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

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

Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals





Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals



Northeast region RPV analysis: Black and white point estimates and confidence intervals




Exhibit 3

Expert Report of Dr. Traci Burch

DECLARATION OF DR. TRACI BURCH

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Traci Burch, make the following declaration:

Qualifications

I am an Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University and a Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation. I received my Ph.D. in Government and Social Policy from Harvard University in 2007.

Over the past 15 years, I have led several large, long-term quantitative and qualitative research projects on political participation in the United States. I have participated in and coauthored several book chapters and articles that examine race, political participation, and inequality, and I am widely regarded as an expert on political behavior, barriers to voting, and political participation. My work has been widely cited and replicated and has won several awards. I have received several grants for my work. I routinely review the work of my peers for tenure, scholarly journals, university presses, and grants and have served as a reviewer for the American Political Science Review, The American Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Politics, Political Behavior, the National Science Foundation, Cambridge University Press, Princeton University Press, the University of Chicago Press, Oxford University Press, and many other entities.

I am the author of several books and articles examining voter turnout and political participation, race and ethnic politics, and criminal justice using multiple methods. In particular, my articles “Did Disfranchisement Laws Help Elect President Bush? New Evidence on the Turnout and Party Registration of Florida’s Ex-Felons” and “Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General Election,” which appeared in the peer-reviewed journals Law and Society Review and Political Behavior, respectively, included my calculations of felony disenfranchisement and voter turnout among people with felony convictions. My academic book on the community-level effects of criminal convictions on political participation, *Trading Democracy for Justice*, was published by the University of Chicago Press and also won multiple national awards from the American Political Science Association and its sections, including the Ralph J. Bunche Award for the best scholarly work that explores the phenomenon of ethnic and cultural pluralism and best book awards from the law and politics and urban politics sections. *Trading Democracy for Justice*, along with many of my articles, relies on the analysis of large criminal justice and voter registration data files.

In addition to my published work, I have conducted analyses of legal financial obligations, re-registration after felony convictions and barriers to voting as an expert witness. I have testified in cases involving *Arlington Heights* and the Senate Factors under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I have also testified before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights about the collateral consequences of felony convictions with respect to voting and other issues.

Several of these projects have involved conducting research on voting in North Carolina. I examined voting among people with felony convictions and people who live near people with felony convictions in North Carolina for my book *Trading Democracy for Justice*, as well as for

several articles published in peer-reviewed journals. I also analyzed voter turnout among people with felony convictions for a case in North Carolina state court.

My curriculum vitae is provided in the appendix. I am being compensated at the rate of \$400 per hour for work in this case, plus expenses. My compensation does not depend on the opinions I render. My prior expert engagements are set forth in my CV. In all cases where an opinion was issued, the courts accepted my expert testimony.

Scope of the Report

For this case, I was asked by the attorneys for the plaintiffs to examine the passage of SB758 with respect to information relevant for evaluating the totality of the circumstances as it relates to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I was asked to discuss information pertaining to Senate Factor 5, or “the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process,” particularly with respect to Black North Carolinians. I also was asked to discuss information that would be relevant for evaluating Senate Factor 6, or “the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns” and Senate Factor 7, or “the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.”

In formulating my opinions, I relied on my analysis of standard sources for political scientists such as the reviews of scholarly literature and the analysis of demographic data, census data, historical records, and government reports and data where noted.

Opinions Offered

1. Educational attainment is a fundamental explanatory factor for voter turnout, such that highly educated voters are more likely to turn out than voters with low educational attainment. Educational attainment gaps in North Carolina are the result of contemporary and historical discrimination.
2. Socioeconomic indicators such as income, poverty, employment, and homeownership have been shown to affect voting. There are large gaps in unemployment, income, poverty, and homeownership between Black and White North Carolina residents.
3. Health outcomes vary by race in North Carolina and health is another important predictor of voter turnout. For instance, Black North Carolinians are worse off than White North Carolinians with respect to life expectancy, infant mortality, cancer, and diabetes. Black North Carolina residents lack insurance at higher rates relative to White North Carolina residents.
4. Criminal justice involvement also has been shown to affect voting. Criminal justice outcomes vary by race in North Carolina. Black people are overrepresented among North Carolina’s arrestees and correctional populations. Research has shown that

racial discrimination plays a role in racial disparities in criminal justice in North Carolina.

5. Political campaigns in North Carolina have historically been and remain marked by implicit and explicit racial appeals. Racial appeals featured prominently in the 2022 U.S. Senate election and other candidates and political organizations have made racial appeals recently as well.
6. Black people are just over one-fifth of North Carolina's overall population, yet are underrepresented in several elected positions that I examined, including the governorship and the U.S. senate.

Senate Factor 5: the Extent of Racial Discrimination

I have been asked to provide information relevant for evaluating Senate Factor 5, or “the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.” I will examine disparities between Black and White residents of North Carolina both statewide and, where available, in the Black belt counties at issue in this case. As shown below, there are significant racial gaps between Black and White North Carolinians in socioeconomic status, health, and criminal justice.

Education

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady explain in one of the most widely cited books in American politics, *Voice and Equality*, that resources such as time, money, and civic skills are important to voting and other forms of political participation precisely because such resources allow people to surmount the costs of participation more easily.¹ Socioeconomic status is an important factor in an individual's ability to vote² because socioeconomic status is related to the available time, money, and civic skills an individual can devote to overcoming the costs of voting.³ These costs can include the time it takes to acquire information about the candidates and issues or the process of registering, as well as the time or lost wages required to vote in person.⁴

Of the components of socioeconomic status, educational attainment is the most important predictor of voting. In fact, “The powerful relationship between education and voter turnout is

¹ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press, 1995.

² See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; See also Burden, Barry C. "The dynamic effects of education on voter turnout." *Electoral studies* 28, no. 4 (2009): 540-549.

³ Smets, Kaat, and Carolien Van Ham. "The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout." *Electoral studies* 32.2 (2013): 344-359.

⁴ Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995.

arguably the most well-documented and robust finding in American survey research.”⁵ An analysis of research appearing in top-10 political science journals finds that most studies confirm the importance of individual socioeconomic status, particularly educational attainment, to voting.⁶ Research also shows that the relationship between education and voting is a causal one.⁷ Socioeconomic status also is an important mechanism that explains gaps in voting by race and ethnicity.⁸

Education is so important to voting that it is important to examine educational disparities when considering how racial disparities may shape the ability to vote. Black people historically have faced educational discrimination in North Carolina, which has hindered their ability to vote. Although the U. S. Supreme Court ruled segregation in public schools unconstitutional in *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954, and Congress outlawed segregation in public accommodations in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, districts across the state failed to desegregate for several years after those rulings. For instance, by 1961, the Southern Educational Reporting Service found that in North Carolina only 11 out of the 173 K-12 school districts and 5 of 17 state universities had desegregated.⁹ However, “desegregation” meant that only 203 out of more than 60,000 Black K-12 students attended schools with White children.¹⁰ The process of desegregation accelerated later in the 1960s, partly as a result of court orders.¹¹ However, it is worth remembering that 19.7% of North Carolina’s citizen voting age population is age 55 or older and born in North Carolina, which means that about one-fifth of North Carolina’s current electorate is likely to have been educated during the time when the state’s districts were racially segregated by law.¹²

Current North Carolina students face school segregation and disparities in educational outcomes in the contemporary period. For instance, Duke University researchers found that school segregation has *increased* in North Carolina since 1998.¹³ The index of dissimilarity (a

⁵ Sondheimer, Rachel Milstein, and Donald P. Green. "Using experiments to estimate the effects of education on voter turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 1 (2010): 174-189: 174.

⁶ Smets and Van Ham 2013.

⁷ Sondheimer and Green 2010.

⁸ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman H Nie. 1993. "Race, ethnicity and political resources: Participation in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (4):453-497. See also Smets and Van Ham, 2013.

⁹ Southern Educational Reporting Service. 1961. A statistical summary, State by State, of segregation-desegregation activity affecting Southern schools from 1954 to present, together with pertinent data on enrollment, teachers, colleges, litigation and legislation. Southern Education Reporting Service: 28.

¹⁰ Southern Education Reporting Service 1961: 28.

¹¹ Southern Education Reporting Service 1961: 28-29; see also *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.*, [402 U.S. 1](#) (1971).

¹² 2022 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Tables C06001 and B29002.

¹³ [Clotfelter](#), Charles, [Helen Ladd](#), Calen R. Clifton, Mavzuna Turaeva. “School Segregation at the Classroom Level in a Southern ‘New Destination’ State.” 2020. CALDER Working Paper

measure of segregation) for North Carolina elementary school segregation was .44, which is considered to be “moderately” segregated.¹⁴ Elementary school segregation is considered high in Halifax, Washington, and Vance Counties, and moderate in Warren and Martin Counties.¹⁵ Statewide, North Carolina has a persistent gap in proficiency between Black and White students, as shown in Figure 1. Within the Black belt counties at issue in this case, Black reading and math test scores are lower than White scores across the board (Figures 2 and 3). Racial disparities in school discipline also exist: Black students are 24.5% of North Carolina public school students,¹⁶ but are 52.1% of students given short-term suspensions, 55.6% of students given long-term suspensions, and 64.6% of students expelled from North Carolina public schools.¹⁷ School suspensions have been shown to increase subsequent arrests and other anti-social behavior in youth.¹⁸

No. 230-0220-3. Available online <https://caldercenter.org/sites/default/files/WP%20230-0220-3.pdf>. Accessed 17 Nov 2023: 35.

¹⁴ Diversity and Disparities Project. “Residential Segregation.” Brown University. Available online <https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/segregation2020/Default.aspx>. Accessed 17 Nov 2023.

¹⁵ Clotfelter, et al. 2020: 47-48.

¹⁶ North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. “Pupils in Membership by Race and Sex.” Available online <http://apps.schools.nc.gov/ords/f?p=145:15:::NO:::>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

¹⁷ North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. “Table S11 Short Term Long Term Expulsion by Sex Ethnicity (2021-2022).” Available online <https://www.dpi.nc.gov/tables11-short-term-long-term-expulsion-sex-ethnicity-2021-22>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

¹⁸ Mowen, Thomas, and John Brent. 2016. “School discipline as a turning point: The cumulative effect of suspension on arrest.” *Journal of research in crime and delinquency* 53 (5):628-653; Hemphill, Sheryl A, John W Toumbourou, Todd I Herrenkohl, Barbara J McMorris, and Richard F Catalano. 2006. “The effect of school suspensions and arrests on subsequent adolescent antisocial behavior in Australia and the United States.” *Journal of adolescent health* 39 (5):736-744.

Figure 1: Student Test Scores by Race in North Carolina, 2008-2022. Source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. "Historical Trends and Results." Available online <https://www.dpi.nc.gov/historical-trends-and-results/open>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023: 8.

The North Carolina State Testing Results, 2021-22
Figure 2b. 1992-93 to 2021-22 End-of-Grade General Test Results
Statewide Percent of Students At or Above Proficiency in Both Reading and Mathematics
Grades 3-8, for All Ethnicities (continued)




Figure 2: Average Reading Scores, by Race, 2018. Source: County Health Rankings & Roadmaps, 2023 County Health Rankings. Available online <https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/explore-health-rankings/rankings-data-documentation>. Accessed 15 Nov 2023.





Figure 3 Average Math Scores, by Race, 2018. Source: County Health Rankings & Roadmaps, 2023 County Health Rankings. Available online <https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/explore-health-rankings/rankings-data-documentation>. Accessed 15 Nov 2023.



Historical and contemporary educational disparities such as these have led to disparities in educational attainment among the people of North Carolina. Although there have been gains in educational attainment over time, racial gaps persist. Data from the 2021 5-Year American Community Survey, which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, show that White¹⁹ adults aged 25 and older are far more likely than Black adults in North Carolina to have earned a bachelor's or postgraduate degree. Statewide, 25.6% of Black North Carolinians over the age of 25 have earned a bachelor's or postgraduate degree, compared with 40.0% of White North Carolinians.²⁰ On the opposite end of the scale, 10.9% of Black North Carolina residents over the age of 25 have not earned a high school diploma or equivalent, compared with 6.7% of White North Carolina residents.²¹ As shown in Figures 4 and 5, these patterns are repeated at the


¹⁹ In all data from the American Community Survey, White refers to White alone, non-Hispanic, and Black refers to Black Alone.

²⁰ 2022 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Tables B15002B and B15002H.

²¹ 2022 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Tables B15002B and B15002H.


county level: Black residents are less likely to have finished high school and less likely to have bachelor's degrees than White residents.²²

Figure 4: Less than High School Diploma, by Race. Source: 2021 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates



²² U.S. Census Bureau. "Sex By Educational Attainment for The Population 25 Years And Over (White Alone, Not Hispanic Or Latino)." American Community Survey, Acs 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table C15002h, 2021, <https://Data.Census.Gov/Table/Acsdt5y2021.C15002h?Q=RaceVehicle&T=Education&G=050xx00us37015,37041,37065,37073,37083,37091,37117,37131,37181,37185,37187>. Accessed On November 16, 2023. U.S. Census Bureau. "Sex By Educational Attainment for The Population 25 Years and Over (Black Or African American Alone)." American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table C15002B, 2021, <https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT5Y2021.C15002B?q=racevehicle&t=Education&g=050XX00US37015,37041,37065,37073,37083,37091,37117,37131,37181,37185,37187>. Accessed on November 16, 2023.

Figure 5: Bachelor's Degree or higher, by Race. Source: 2021 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates



Income, Poverty, and Employment

Income, poverty, and other socioeconomic factors affect voting to the extent that greater resources can make it easier to overcome the costs of voting, such as having the ability to afford time off work to go to the polls.²³ Much of the impact of socioeconomic status happens through education, because education affects income, poverty, and employment.²⁴ However, decades of persistent discrimination in employment and access to capital also contribute to economic disparities.

In North Carolina, Black residents are worse off economically than their White counterparts. For instance, the median income of North Carolina households headed by Black people, at \$42,996, is more than \$20,000 less than the median income of White households (\$68,259).²⁵ Within the Black belt counties at issue in this case, White households also have


²³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.

²⁴ Long, Mark C. 2010. "Changes in the returns to education and college quality." *Economics of Education Review* 29 (3):338-347. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.10.005>.

²⁵ 2021 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table S1903.

much higher incomes than Black households as shown in Figure 6. There are racial disparities in family poverty in North Carolina as well: the poverty rate for families headed by White people is 6.3%, while the poverty rate for Black-headed families is 17.3%.²⁶ As shown in Figure 7, Black family poverty rates at the county level can be double, even triple the rate found for White families. Statewide, the Black unemployment rate, at 8.3%, is higher than the White unemployment rate, which is 4.3%.²⁷ County-level unemployment rates are higher for Black residents than White residents as well (Figure 8).

Figure 6: Median Household Income by Race. Source: U.S. Census Bureau. "MEDIAN INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2021 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS)." American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S1903, 2021, . Accessed on November 15, 2023.



²⁶ 2021 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table S1702.

²⁷ 2021 American Community Survey 5 Year Estimates, Table S2301.

Figure 7: Family Poverty, by Race. Source: 2021 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table S1702.





Figure 8: Unemployment, by Race. Source: U.S. Census Bureau. "EMPLOYMENT STATUS." American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S2301, 2021. Accessed on November 15, 2023.



Other aspects of socioeconomic status matter as well. For instance, homeownership is important because residency requirements have been shown to reduce voter registration and turnout, largely because residential mobility increases the administrative burden of maintaining registration.²⁸ Renters are more mobile than owners and are less likely to vote. There is a gap in homeownership rates by race in North Carolina: 74.9% of White householders own their homes, compared with just 47.1% of Black householders.²⁹

Health

Health status also may affect voting. Several studies have associated poor health with lower voter turnout.³⁰ The effects of health on voting may take many pathways, such as

²⁸ Highton, Benjamin. 2000. "Residential mobility, community mobility, and electoral participation." *Political Behavior* 22 (2):109-120.

²⁹ 2021 American Community Survey 5 Year Estimates, Table S2502.

³⁰ Blakely, Tony A, Bruce P Kennedy, and Ichiro Kawachi. 2001. "Socioeconomic inequality in voting participation and self-rated health." *American journal of public health* 91 (1):99. Lyon, Gregory. 2021. "The Conditional Effects of Health on Voter Turnout." *Journal of Health*

reducing the availability of free time and money that could otherwise be devoted to politics.³¹ Impaired cognitive functioning or physical disability also may make voting more difficult.³² Poor health is likely the reason that voter turnout declines in old age.³³ People with disabilities also are less likely to vote; problems with polling place accessibility only partially explain this gap.³⁴

Black residents of North Carolina, by many measures, suffer worse health outcomes than White residents of the state. There are significant racial gaps in life expectancy at birth, which is a more general measure of overall health. White North Carolinians are expected to live 78.1 years, which is more than 3 years longer than the life expectancy for Black North Carolinians (74.7 years).³⁵ These racial disparities in life expectancy are apparent at the county level as well (Figure 9). With respect to specific measures of health, infant mortality among Black babies, at 12.1 per 1,000 live births, is more than twice as high as the mortality rate for White babies (5.1 per 1,000 live births).³⁶ Moreover, despite lower incidence rates of cancer between Black and White North Carolinians (427.8 per 100,000 vs. 433.9 per 100,000, respectively), Black invasive cancer mortality is higher than that of White North Carolinians (165.1 per 100,000 vs. 148.5 per 100,000).³⁷ Statewide diabetes rates are higher for Black North Carolinians than White North Carolinians as well (17.4% vs. 9.2% respectively).³⁸ Health insurance coverage is slightly lower for Black North Carolinians: 9.1% of Black residents of the state are uninsured, compared with 6.4% of White residents.³⁹

Politics, Policy and Law 46 (3):409-433. Pacheco, Julianna, and Jason Fletcher. 2015. "Incorporating health into studies of political behavior: Evidence for turnout and partisanship." *Political research quarterly* 68 (1):104-116.

³¹ Pacheco and Fletcher 2015.

³² Pacheco and Fletcher 2015.

³³ Pacheco and Fletcher 2015.

³⁴ Schur, Lisa, Mason Ameri, and Meera Adya. 2017. "Disability, voter turnout, and polling place accessibility." *Social Science Quarterly* 98 (5):1374-1390. Schur, Lisa, Todd Shields, Douglas Kruse, and Kay Schriener. 2002. "Enabling democracy: Disability and voter turnout." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (1):167-190.

³⁵ North Carolina State Center for Health Statistics. "Life Expectancy." Available online <https://schs.dph.ncdhhs.gov/data/lifexpectancy/>. Accessed 15 Nov 2023.


³⁶ North Carolina State Center for Health Statistics. "2021 North Carolina Infant Mortality Report, Table 1A." Available online <https://schs.dph.ncdhhs.gov/data/vital/ims/2021/2021-IMR-TABLE-1A-FINAL.html>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

³⁷ Centers for Disease Control. "United States Cancer Statistics: Data Visualizations." Available online <https://gis.cdc.gov/Cancer/USCS/#/AtAGlance/>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

³⁸ Centers For Disease Control. "Diagnosed Diabetes." Available online <https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/diabetes/diabetesatlas-surveillance.html#>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

³⁹ 2021 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table S2701.

Figure 9: Life Expectancy at Birth 2018-2021. Source: North Carolina State Center for Health Statistics. "Life Expectancy." Available online <https://schs.dph.ncdhhs.gov/data/lifexpectancy/>. Accessed 15 Nov 2023.



Criminal Justice

A growing body of research shows that criminal justice interactions affect political behavior. Several studies have shown that, for individuals, contact with the criminal justice system, from police stops, to arrest, to incarceration, directly decreases voter turnout.⁴⁰ Primarily, criminal justice contact decreases turnout through “the combined forces of stigma, punishment and exclusion” which impose “barriers to most avenues of influence” and diminish “factors such as civic capacity, governmental trust, individual efficacy, and social connectedness that encourage activity.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ Burch, Traci. 2007. "Punishment and Participation: How Criminal Convictions Threaten American Democracy." Ph.D., Program in Government and Social Policy, Harvard University. Lerman, Amy E, and Vesla M Weaver. 2014. *Arresting citizenship: The democratic consequences of American crime control*: University of Chicago Press. Weaver, Vesla M, and Amy E Lerman. 2010. "Political consequences of the carceral state." *American Political Science Review* 104 (04):817-833.

⁴¹ Burch 2007: 12.

There are racial disparities in contact with the criminal justice system in North Carolina. Black people make up 20.0% of North Carolina's adult population,⁴² but are 44.1% of arrestees,⁴³ 52.9% of North Carolina's prisoners and 44.2% of people serving time in the community.⁴⁴ These disparities in arrest and punishment may not be explained solely by disparities in crime rates.⁴⁵

Racial discrimination still is an important contributor to the disproportionate representation of Black people in the criminal justice system in North Carolina today. Racial disparities in arrests are caused partially by factors that make it more likely that police will stop or search Black people, such as spatially differentiated policing, racial residential segregation, and discrimination.⁴⁶ For instance, in an extensive study of millions of traffic stops in North Carolina, Baumgartner and his coauthors (2017) find that Black North Carolina drivers are more likely to be searched and arrested than White drivers.⁴⁷ Baumgartner and coauthors (2017) also find that Black males have the highest likelihood of being searched during a traffic stop in the state.⁴⁸

Conclusion

⁴² 2022 American Community Survey 1-Year Projections. Table S0201.

⁴³ Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Crime Data Explorer: Arrests in North Carolina, Arrestee Race." Available online <https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#/pages/explorer/crime/arrest>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁴⁴ North Carolina Department of Adult Correction. "Automated System Query." Available online <https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/apps/asqExt/ASQ>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁴⁵ Mitchell, Ojmarrh, and Michael S Caudy. 2017. "Race differences in drug offending and drug distribution arrests." *Crime & Delinquency* 63 (2):91-112.

⁴⁶ Beckett, Katherine, Kris Nyrop, and Lori Pfingst. 2006. "Race, drugs, and policing: Understanding disparities in drug delivery arrests." *Criminology* 44 (1):105-137. Gelman, Andrew, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss. 2007. "An analysis of the New York City police department's "stop-and-frisk" policy in the context of claims of racial bias." *Journal of the American statistical association* 102 (479):813-823. Ousey, Graham C, and Matthew R Lee. 2008. "Racial disparity in formal social control: An investigation of alternative explanations of arrest rate inequality." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 45 (3):322-355. Pierson, Emma, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, and Ravi Shroff. 2020. "A large-scale analysis of racial disparities in police stops across the United States." *Nature human behaviour* 4 (7):736-745.

⁴⁷ Baumgartner, Frank R., Derek A. Epp, Kelsey Shoub, and Bayard Love. "Targeting young men of color for search and arrest during traffic stops: evidence from North Carolina, 2002–2013." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5, no. 1 (2017): 107-131.

⁴⁸ Baumgartner, Frank R., Leah Christiani, Derek A. Epp, Kevin Roach, and Kelsey Shoub. "Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes." In *Duke Forum for Law & Social Change*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 21-53. Duke University School of Law, 2017.

As I have shown in this section, there are racial disparities between Black and White North Carolinians with respect to the factors that research has shown to affect voter turnout. Black people are worse off than White people in North Carolina in terms of educational attainment, income, poverty, employment, health, and criminal justice outcomes. These disparities partly can be traced to contemporary and historical discrimination.

Senate Factor 6: Racial Appeals in Campaigns

Whether politics is marked by “the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns” is another consideration of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A deep and robust literature on racial appeals in campaigns exists in political science.⁴⁹ Writing in 2001, Mendelberg argued that a “norm of racial equality,” which held that “southern segregation and the ideology of white supremacy were illegitimate” gained ascendance in the U.S.⁵⁰ The norm of racial equality meant that using explicitly racist rhetoric or espousing explicitly racist policy positions would not help, and may even hurt, politicians.⁵¹ However, because “racial attitudes are still a potent force in American politics,” candidates still have an incentive to appeal to white racial fears.⁵² These two phenomena, the need to appear racially egalitarian while activating racial attitudes, means that campaigns would work to activate white voters’ negative racial attitudes through covert or implicit means such as images or coded language.⁵³

Implicit racial appeals make racial attitudes and concerns more salient in the minds of voters, even without explicitly mentioning or referring to a particular race or group.⁵⁴ Implicit racial appeals may rely on certain code words or issues, use images of Black exemplars, or a combination of both, to make race more salient to voters.⁵⁵ In particular, Caliendo and McIlwain highlight racist appeals, which “prime antiminority racial fear, resentment, and bias . . . through a variety of audiovisual and textual cues that associate persons of color with long-standing, negative,

⁴⁹ Hutchings, Vincent L, and Nicholas A Valentino. 2004. "The centrality of race in American politics." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 7:383-408. Stephens-Dougan, LaFleur. 2021. "The Persistence of Racial Cues and Appeals in American Elections." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24:301-320.

⁵⁰ Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 70.

⁵¹ Mendelberg 2001.

⁵² Valentino, Nicholas A, Vincent L Hutchings, and Ismail K White. 2002. "Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 96 (1):75-90: 76.

⁵³ Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Mendelberg 2001.

⁵⁴ Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Mendelberg 2001.

⁵⁵ Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002.

racial stereotypes.”⁵⁶ These implicit racial appeals can rely on code words such as “inner-city” or “sanctuary city” or reference crime, welfare, and illegal immigration.⁵⁷ More broadly, McIlwain and Caliendo argue that racial appeals in television ads typically include elements such as, “a salient stereotype, most often those of criminality, laziness, taking undeserved advantage, and the charge of liberalism (read, ‘extreme’ liberal, ‘dangerously’ liberal, ‘radical,’ etc.); a minority opponent’s image; all-White, noncandidate images; and an exposed audience that includes a high percentage of White potential voters.”⁵⁸ The conventional wisdom based on studies conducted primarily before the elections of Presidents Obama and Trump argued that these kinds of implicit racial appeals were more effective than explicit racial appeals, which could backfire.⁵⁹ However, recent studies suggest that candidates can increase their vote share by making explicit racial appeals.⁶⁰

The 1988 Willie Horton ad targeting Michael Dukakis is probably the most famous example of an implicit racial appeal.⁶¹ In this ad:

“. . . the narrator of the spot states that Willie Horton, a convicted murderer, received multiple weekend furlough passes from prison, during the last of which, the narrator informs us, he ‘fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbing the man and repeatedly raping

⁵⁶ McIlwain, Charlton D, and Stephen M Caliendo. 2014. "Mitt Romney’s racist appeals: How race was played in the 2012 presidential election." *American Behavioral Scientist* 58 (9):1157-1168: 1159.

⁵⁷ Brader, Ted, Nicholas A Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4):959-978; Collingwood, Loren, and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. 2019. *Sanctuary cities: The politics of refuge*: Oxford University Press, USA; Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 2005. "Playing the race card in the post–Willie Horton era: The impact of racialized code words on support for punitive crime policy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (1):99-112; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002.

⁵⁸ McIlwain and Caliendo 2014: 1159.

⁵⁹ Stephens-Dougan 2021; White, Ismail K. 2007. "When race matters and when it doesn't: Racial group differences in response to racial cues." *American Political Science Review* 101 (2):339-354; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002; Mendelberg 2001.

⁶⁰ Reny, Tyler T, Ali A Valenzuela, and Loren Collingwood. 2020. "'No, you're playing the race card': Testing the effects of anti-black, anti-Latino, and anti-immigrant appeals in the post-Obama era." *Political Psychology* 41 (2):283-302; Valentino, Nicholas A, Fabian G Neuner, and L Matthew Vandebroek. 2018. "The changing norms of racial political rhetoric and the end of racial priming." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (3):757-771; Stephens-Dougan 2021; Christiani, Leah. 2021. "When are explicit racial appeals accepted? Examining the role of racial status threat." *Political Behavior*:1-21; Major, Brenda, Alison Blodorn, and Gregory Major Blascovich. 2018. "The threat of increasing diversity: Why many White Americans support Trump in the 2016 presidential election." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 21 (6):931-940.

⁶¹ Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002; Mendelberg 2001.

his girlfriend.’ While the ad could have conveyed exactly the same information without graphics, NSPAC elected to superimpose the most menacing possible picture of Horton, a Black man, over the narrative.”⁶²

The ad never explicitly mention’s Horton’s race, but the ad does incorporate many of the elements common to implicit racial appeals as expressed in the literature: evoking the salient stereotype of criminality and the charge of liberalism by using images of a Black exemplar, in this case, Horton’s mugshot.

There are prominent examples of racial appeals in North Carolina politics. Jesse Helms is described by Mendelberg as “the anomalous example of a politician who continued to use explicitly racial appeals after the early 1970s.”⁶³ Most notably, in the 1990 North Carolina senate election, Jesse Helms used racial appeals against his Black opponent, Harvey Gantt:

“A preceding ad by Helms had this message: ‘How did Harvey Gantt become a millionaire? He used his position as mayor and his minority status to get himself and his friends a free TV station license from the government. Only weeks later, they sold out—to a white-owned corporation for \$3.5 million. The black community felt betrayed, but the deal made the mayor a millionaire. Harvey Gantt made government work for Harvey Gantt.’”⁶⁴

During that same senate race, the Helms campaign also ran “a now-infamous, explicitly racial ad in which a pair of white hands crumples a job rejection letter with the blame placed on a ‘minority.’”⁶⁵ In the 1984 senate race, Helms “charged in 1984 that his Democratic opponent in the North Carolina senatorial contest was colluding with Jesse Jackson to register ‘hundreds of thousands of blacks’ who would vote as a bloc against him.”⁶⁶

Jesse Helms died in 2008, but one can still find racial appeals in North Carolina politics in more recent elections. There were several racially-charged ads during the 2022 North Carolina senate race between now-Senator Ted Budd, who is White, and Cheri Beasley, who is Black. For instance, like the Horton ad, attack ads attempted to blame Beasley for crimes committed by people after their early release from prison.⁶⁷ The ads never explicitly mention race, but similar to the Horton ad, a Club for Growth ad about crime features a White victim and prominently displays

⁶² Hurwitz and Peffley 2005: 100.

⁶³ Mendelberg 2001: 100.

⁶⁴ McIlwain, Charlton and Stephen M. Caliendo. 2011. *Race Appeal: How Candidates Invoke Race in U.S. Political Campaigns*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press: 40-41.

⁶⁵ Mendelberg 2001: 101.

⁶⁶ Mendelberg 2001: 8.

⁶⁷ Gabriel, Trip. 2022. “North Carolina TV Stations Pull an Attack Ad Against Cheri Beasley, A Democrat Running for Senate.” *New York Times*. Available online <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/03/us/politics/cheri-beasley-attack-ad.html>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

images of Black men in custody on the same screen with an image of Cheri Beasley.⁶⁸ The imagery of an National Republican Senatorial Committee ad about crime also features White victims and images of Beasley.⁶⁹ Ted Budd won that senate race.

Explicit racial appeals also take place in North Carolina politics. For example, at a campaign event with Senator Budd, President Trump asked if the crowd knew what the “N-word is” when telling a story about Vladimir Putin.⁷⁰ When some people in the crowd reportedly responded by yelling a racial slur,⁷¹ President Trump responded, “No, no, no, it’s the nuclear word.”⁷² Representative Madison Cawthorn’s campaign, in 2020, put up “A new attack website” that included “an explicitly racist broadside against his opponent, Moe Davis (D-N.C.), for associating himself with people who want to ‘ruin white males.’”⁷³ Racial appeals already have been made in the 2024 race for attorney general between Representative Jeff Jackson and Representative Dan Bishop. According to the News and Observer:

“Calling the Democrat a “Chinese Social Media Star,” Bishop released a mock statement made to look like it was from Jackson’s campaign. It was written in Chinese, and included a translation that said Jackson was a “Tiktok star who wants to make North Carolina soft on crime” and was “helping China spy on North Carolina.” At the top, it included the logo for Jackson’s campaign. Posting the mock statement on X, formerly Twitter, Bishop wrote that it was “for our unamerican friends.”⁷⁴

⁶⁸ Club for Growth. “Good Person.” Available online <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gipaxcSHoaA>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁶⁹ NRSC. “NC: Victims.” Available online <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TidAbar7E2U>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁷⁰ https://twitter.com/brenonade/status/1573473754453254145?s=20&t=vL6_5ydkUo-w5ivikIdi1A

⁷¹ Capehart, Jonathan. 2022. “Trump’s Flirtation with the N-Word Cannot Be Ignored.” *The Washington Post*. Available online <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/08/trump-n-word-rally-dangerous/>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁷² https://twitter.com/brenonade/status/1573473754453254145?s=20&t=vL6_5ydkUo-w5ivikIdi1A

⁷³ Miller, Tim. 2020. “Madison Cawthorn’s Racist Website.” *The Bulwark*. Available online <https://www.thebulwark.com/madison-cawthorns-racist-website/>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023. See also “Washington Through and Through.” Available online <https://web.archive.org/web/20201022031459/https://www.moetaxes.com/washington>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁷⁴ Bajpai, Avi. 2023. “NC Democrats Slam Bishop for ‘Racist’ Post About Jeff Jackson’s TikTok Use.” *The News and Observer* Available online <https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article281096863.html>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

This ad has been criticized as anti-Chinese and anti-Asian.⁷⁵

Senate Factor 7: Black Elected Officials

Black North Carolinians are slightly underrepresented in some offices relative to their share of the population with respect to Senate Factor 7, or “the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.” There have been no Black people elected as Governor of North Carolina. Mark Robinson, elected in 2020, currently serves as the first Black Lieutenant Governor of North Carolina and is running for Governor in 2024. No Black people have been elected to the U.S. Senate from North Carolina and 11 Black people have been elected to the U.S. House.⁷⁶

Currently in the North Carolina state legislature, Black members are close to parity with the share of Black people in the state population, but slightly underrepresented in the state Senate. There are 26 Black House members, or 21.6% of the chamber. There are 9 Black senators, making

⁷⁵ Bajpai 2023.

⁷⁶ United States House of Representatives. “History Art and Archives.” Available online <https://history.house.gov/People/Search?Term=Search&SearchIn=LastName&ShowNonMember=true&ShowNonMember=false&Office=&Leadership=&State=NC&Party=&ContinentalCongress=false&BlackAmericansInCongress=true&BlackAmericansInCongress=false&WomenInCongress=false&HispanicAmericansInCongress=false&AsianPacificAmericansInCongress=false&CongressNumberList=41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100-101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118&CurrentPage=1&SortOrder=LastName&ResultType=Grid&PreviousSearch=Search%2CLastName%2C%2C%2C%2C%2CFalse%2CTrue%2CFalse%2C41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100-101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118%2CLastName>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

up 18.0% of the chamber.⁷⁷ Several cities in North Carolina have Black mayors, including Fayetteville,⁷⁸ Durham,⁷⁹ and Charlotte.⁸⁰

Summary

To conclude, this report has surveyed evidence related to Senate Factors 5, 6, and 7 as they relate to the passage of SB 758. As I have shown, with respect to Senate Factor 5, there are persistent gaps between Black and White North Carolinians on several indicators of socioeconomic, health, and criminal justice outcomes. Black North Carolina residents are worse-off than White North Carolina residents along each of the dimensions that I analyzed in this report. With respect to Senate Factor 6, I discuss several recent examples of advertisements and campaign rhetoric that the political science literature would categorize as implicit or explicit racial appeals. With respect to Senate Factor 7, Black North Carolinians are underrepresented relative to their share of the population for several elected offices, including the governorship, the U.S. Senate, and the state senate.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 21, 2023.



⁷⁷ Vaughan, Dawn Baumgartner. 2023. "How Do NC Lawmakers Compare to the Rest of the State's Population? What the Data Shows." *The News and Observer*. Available online <https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article271897427.html>. Accessed 16 Nov 2023.

⁷⁸ "Mayor Mitch Colvin." Available online <https://www.fayettevillenc.gov/city-council/city-council-members/mayor-mitch-colvin>. Accessed 17 Nov 2023.

⁷⁹ "Elaine M. O'Neal." Available online <https://www.durhamnc.gov/1329/About-the-Mayor>. Accessed 17 Nov 2023.

⁸⁰ "Meet the Mayor: Mayor Vi Lyles." Available online <https://www.charlottenc.gov/City-Government/Leadership/Mayor/Meet-the-Mayor>. Accessed 17 Nov 2023.

Traci Burch

Employment

- Associate Professor, Northwestern University Department of Political Science (2014-Present)
- Research Professor, American Bar Foundation (2007- Present)
- Assistant Professor, Northwestern University Department of Political Science (2007-2014)

Education

- *Harvard University*

Ph.D. in Government and Social Policy

Dissertation: *Punishment and Participation: How Criminal Convictions Threaten American Democracy*

Committee: Jennifer Hochschild (Chair), Sidney Verba, and Gary King

- *Princeton University*

A.B. in Politics, *magna cum laude*

Publications

- Burch, Traci. 2023. "Which Lives Matter: Factors Shaping Public Attention to and Protest of Officer-Involved Killings." *Cambridge Elements in Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*.
- Burch, Traci. 2022. "Adding Insult to Injury: the Justification Frame in Official Narratives of Officer-Involved Killings." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*.
- Burch, Traci. 2022. "Officer-Involved Killings and the Repression of Protest." *Urban Affairs Review*.
- Burch, Traci. 2021. "Not All Black Lives Matter: Officer-Involved Deaths and the Role of Victim Characteristics in Shaping Political Interest and Voter Turnout." *Perspectives on Politics*.
- Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. Brady. 2018. "Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Happens When Those Organizations Have No Members?" *Perspectives on Politics*.
- Burch, Traci. 2016. "Political Equality and the Criminal Justice System." In Resources, Engagement, and Recruitment. Casey Klofstad, ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

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- Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. Brady. 2015. "Louder Chorus – Same Accent: The Representation of Interests in Pressure Politics, 1981-2011." In Darren Halpin, David Lowery, Virginia Gray, eds. The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burch, Traci. 2015. "Skin Color and the Criminal Justice System: Beyond Black-White Disparities in Criminal Sentencing." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 12(3): 395-420.
- Burch, Traci. 2014. "The Old Jim Crow: Racial Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Imprisonment." *Law & Policy* 36(3) 223-255.
- Burch, Traci. 2014. "The Effects of Imprisonment and Community Supervision on Political Participation." Detaining Democracy Special Issue. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 651 (1) 184-201.
- Burch, Traci. 2013. Trading Democracy for Justice: Criminal Convictions and the Decline of Neighborhood Political Participation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hochschild, Jennifer, Vesla Weaver, and Traci Burch. 2012. Transforming the American Racial Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, Henry Brady, Traci Burch, and Phillip Jones. 2012. "Who Sings in the Heavenly Chorus? The Shape of the Organized Interest System." In Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, Henry Brady, Phillip Jones, and Traci Burch. 2012. "Political Voice through Organized Interest Activity." In Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Burch, Traci. 2012. "Did Disfranchisement Laws Help Elect President Bush? New Evidence on the Turnout and Party Registration of Florida's Ex-Felons." *Political Behavior* 34 (1); 1-26.
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- Burch, Traci. 2009. “Can the New Commander-In-Chief Sustain His All Volunteer Standing Army?” *The Dubois Review on Race* 6(1).
- Burch, Traci. 2009. “Review of *Imprisoning Communities*, by Todd Clear.” *Law and Society Review* 43(3) 716-18.
- Burch, Traci. 2009. “American Politics and the Not-So-Benign Neglect of Criminal Justice,” in The Future of American Politics, ed. Gary King, Kay Schlozman, and Norman Nie. (New York: Routledge).
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman and Traci Burch. 2009. “Political Voice in an Age of Inequality,” in America at Risk: Threats to Liberal Self-Government in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. Robert Faulkner and Susan Shell (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- Hochschild, Jennifer and Traci Burch. 2007. “Contingent Public Policies and the Stability of Racial Hierarchy: Lessons from Immigration and Census Policy,” in Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the Unforseen, ed. Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi (New York: NYU Press).

Grants

- Co-Principal Investigator. “Fellowship and Mentoring Program on Law and Inequality.” September 1, 2020 to August 31, 2023. \$349, 313. National Science Foundation.

Honors and Fellowships

- American Political Science Association 2014 Ralph J. Bunche Award (for Trading Democracy for Justice).
- American Political Science Association Urban Section 2014 Best Book Award (for Trading Democracy for Justice).
- American Political Science Association Law and Courts Section 2014 C. Herman Pritchett Award (for Trading Democracy for Justice).
- Research grant, Stanford University Center for Poverty and Inequality (2012).
- American Political Science Association E. E. Schattschneider Award for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of American Government (2009)
- American Political Science Association William Anderson Award for the best doctoral

dissertation in the field of state and local politics, federalism, or intergovernmental relations (2008)

- American Political Science Association Urban Section Best Dissertation in Urban Politics Award (2008)
- Harvard University Robert Noxon Toppan Prize for the best dissertation in political science (2007)
- Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences Research Fellowship (2006-07)
- *European Network on Inequality* Fellowship (2005)
- Research Fellowship, The Sentencing Project (2005)
- Doctoral Fellow, Malcolm Weiner Center for Inequality and Social Policy (2004-07)

Professional Service

- APSA Law and Courts Section Best Paper Award Committee (2020-2021)
- APSA Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior Executive Committee (2020-2023)
- General Social Survey Board of Overseers (2020-2024)
- APSA Kammerer Prize Committee (2017)
- Associate Editor, *Political Behavior* (2015-2019)
- APSA Law and Courts Section, Lifetime Achievement Award Prize Committee (2014-2015)
- Law and Society Association, Kalven Prize Committee (2013-2014)
- American Political Science Association, Urban Politics Section Dissertation Prize Committee (2012-13)
- American Political Science Association, Urban Politics Section Executive Committee (2012-13)
- Law and Society Association Diversity Committee, (2012-2013)
- American Political Science Association, Urban Politics Section Program Co-Chair (2011)
- Associate Editor, *Law and Social Inquiry*

- American Political Science Association, Urban Politics Section Book Prize Committee (2009)
- Reviewer for *The American Political Science Review*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *American Politics Research*, *Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences*, etc.

Presentations and Invited Talks

- Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. “Chicago Area Behavior Conference: The Politics of Officer Involved Killings.” May 2023.
- Loyola University, Chicago, IL. “Hartigan Lecture: Limits on the Use of Force by Police: Perspectives from Law, Courts, and the Public.” February 2023.
- American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada. “Not All Black Lives Matter: Officer-Involved Deaths and the Role of Victim Characteristics in Shaping Political Interest and Voter Turnout.” September 2022.
- University of Pennsylvania. Virtual. “Voice and Representation in American Politics.” April 2021.
- University of Michigan. Virtual. “Which Lives Matter? Factors Affecting Mobilization in Response to Officer-Involved Killings.” February 2021.
- University of Pittsburgh. Virtual. “Policing and Participation.” November 2020.
- Hamilton College Constitution Day Seminar. Virtual. “Racial Protests and the Constitution.” September 2020.
- New York Fellows of the American Bar Foundation. New York, NY. “Police Shootings and Political Participation.” March 2020.
- Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA. “Effect of Officer Involved Killings on Protest. November 2019.
- Princeton University. Princeton NJ. “Effects of Police Shootings on Protest among Young Blacks.” November 2019.
- Missouri Fellows of the American Bar Foundation. Branson, MO. Police Shootings and Political Participation in Chicago. September 2019.
- Northwestern University. “Police Shootings and Political Participation.” November, 2018.
- Princeton University. Princeton, NJ. “Police Shootings and Political Participation.”

September, 2018.

- University of California at Los Angeles. Los Angeles, CA. “Police Shootings and Political Participation.” August, 2018.
- American Bar Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL. “Police Shootings and Political Participation.” August 2018.
- American Bar Endowment Annual Meeting. Lexington, KY. “Effects of Police Shooting in Chicago on Political Participation.” June 2018.
- Vanderbilt University. “Effects of Police Shootings in Chicago on Political Participation.” April 2018.
- Washington University in St. Louis. “Effects of Pedestrian and Auto Stops on Voter Turnout in St. Louis.” February 2018.
- Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Los Angeles. “Assaulting Democracy.” January 2018.
- Northwestern University Reviving American Democracy Conference. Panel presentation. “Barriers to Voting.” January 2018.
- University of Illinois at Chicago. “Effects of Police Shootings in Chicago on Political Participation.” October, 2017.
- Chico State University. “Constitution Day Address: Policing and Political Participation.” September, 2017.
- Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Atlanta, Georgia. “Policing in Georgia.” May 2017.
- United States Commission on Civil Rights. Testimony. “Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration.” May 2017.
- Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. “Effects of Police Stops of Cars and Pedestrians on Voter Turnout in St. Louis.” April 2017.
- University of California at Los Angeles. Race and Ethnic Politics Workshop. “Effects of Police Stops of Cars and Pedestrians on Voter Turnout in St. Louis.” March 2017.
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. American Politics Workshop. “Effects of Police Stops of Cars and Pedestrians on Voter Turnout in St. Louis.” February 2017.

- National Bar Association, St. Louis MO. “Political Effects of Mass Incarceration.” July 2016.
- Harvard University, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics. Inequalities/Equalities in Cities Workshop. April 2016.
- American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. September 2015. “Responsibility for Racial Justice.” Discussant.
- St. Olaf College. April 2015. “The Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration.”
- Northwestern University. Institute for Policy Research. February 2015. “The Civic Culture Structure.”
- Texas A&M University. Race, Ethnicity, and Politics Workshop. September 2014. “Trading Democracy for Justice.”
- Columbia University Teachers College. The Suburban Promise of Brown Conference. May 2014. “Can We All Get Along, Revisited: Racial Attitudes, the Tolerance for Diversity, and the Prospects for Integration in the 21st Century.”
- University of Kentucky. Reversing Trajectories: Incarceration, Violence, and Political Consequences Conference. April 2014. “Trading Democracy for Justice.”
- University of Chicago. American Politics Workshop. March 2014. “How Geographic Differences in Neighborhood Civic Capacity Affect Voter Turnout.”
- Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. February 2014. “Trading Democracy for Justice.”
- University of Michigan. American Politics Workshop. December 2013. “Trading Democracy for Justice.”
- Yale University. American Politics and Public Policy Workshop. September 2013. “Trading Democracy for Justice.”
- American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. August 2013. “The Heavenly Chorus Is Even Louder: The Growth and Changing Composition of the Washington Pressure System.” With Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, Henry Brady, and Phillip Jones.
- National Bar Association, Miami Florida, July 2013. “The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment.”

- Loyola University. American Politics Workshop. December 2012. “Mass Imprisonment and Neighborhood Voter Turnout.”
- Marquette University School of Law. November 2012. “The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment.”
- Yale University. Detaining Democracy Conference. November 2012. “The Effects of Imprisonment and Community Supervision on Political Participation.”
- Brown University. American Politics Workshop. October 2012. “Mass Imprisonment and Neighborhood Voter Turnout.”
- American Bar Association National Meeting, August 2012. “Mass Imprisonment: Consequences for Society and Politics.”
- University of Madison-Wisconsin. American Politics Workshop. March 2012. “The Spatial Concentration of Imprisonment and Racial Political Inequality.”
- American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. 2011. “Theme Panel: How Can Political Science Help Us Understand the Politics of Decarceration?”
- University of Pennsylvania. Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism Conference. April, 2011. “Vicarious Imprisonment and Neighborhood Political Inequality.”
- University of Chicago School of Law. Public Laws Colloquium. Chicago, IL. November, 2010. “The Effects of Neighborhood Incarceration Rates on Individual Political Efficacy and Perceptions of Discrimination.”
- Pomona College. November, 2010. “Incarceration Nation.”
- University of Washington. Surveying Social Marginality Workshop. October 2010. “Using Government Data to Study Current and Former Felons.”
- American Bar Foundation, Chicago, IL, September 2010. “The Effects of Neighborhood Incarceration Rates on Individual Political Attitudes.”
- Northwestern University. Chicago Area Behavior Conference. May 2010. “Trading Democracy for Justice: The Spillover Effects of Incarceration on Voter Turnout in Charlotte and Atlanta.”
- Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, IL, May 2010. “Neighborhood Criminal Justice Involvement and Voter Turnout in the 2008 General Election.”

- Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, January 2010. "The Art and Science of Voter Mobilization: Grassroots Perspectives on Registration and GOTV from Charlotte, Atlanta, and Chicago."
- University of Illinois at Chicago. Institute for Government and Public Affairs. November 2009. "Turnout and Party Registration among Convicted Offenders during the 2008 Presidential Election."
- Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, September 2009. "'I Wanted to Vote for History:' Turnout and Party Registration among Convicted Offenders during the 2008 Presidential Election."
- Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago. American Politics Workshop. December 2008. "Trading Democracy for Justice? The Spillover Effects of Imprisonment on Neighborhood Voter Participation."
- Northwestern University School of Law. Law and Political Economy Colloquium. November 2008. "Did Disfranchisement Laws Help Elect President Bush? New Evidence on the Turnout Rates and Candidate Preferences of Florida's Ex-Felons."
- University of California, Berkeley. Center for the Study of Law and Society. October 2008. "Trading Democracy for Justice? The Spillover Effects of Imprisonment on Neighborhood Voter Participation."
- Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, May 2008. "Did Disfranchisement Laws Help Elect President Bush? New Evidence on the Turnout Rates and Candidate Preferences of Florida's Ex-Felons."
- Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, May 2008. "Trading Democracy for Justice? The Spillover Effects of Imprisonment on Neighborhood Voter Participation."
- Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, April 2007. Paper: "Concentrated Incarceration: How Neighborhood Incarceration Decreases Voter Registration."

Additional Activities

- Expert witness in *Kelvin Jones vs. Ron DeSantis, etc. et al.* (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida Consolidated Case No. 4:19-cv-00).
- Expert witness in *Community Success Initiative, et al., Plaintiffs v. Timothy K. Moore* (Superior Court, Wake County, NC Case No. 19-cv-15941).

- Expert witness in *People First of Alabama v. Merrill* (U.S. District Court in Birmingham, Alabama, Case No. 2: 20-cv-00619-AKK)
- Expert witness in *Florida State Conference of the NAACP v. Lee* (U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Florida, Case No. 4:21-cv-00187-MW-MAF)
- Expert witness in *One Wisconsin Institute Inc. v. Jacobs* (U.S. District Court in the Western District of Wisconsin, Case No. 15-CV-324-JDP).
- Expert witness in *Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Inc., et al. v. Raffensperger* (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Case No. 1:21-cv-05337-SCJ)
- Expert witness in *Robinson, et al. v. Ardoin* (U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Civil Action No. 22-cv-00211).
- Expert witness in *Nairne, et al. v. Ardoin* (U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00178 SDD-SDJ).
- Expert witness in *White, et al. v. State Board of Election Commissioners, et al.* (U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00062-SA-JMV).
- Expert witness in *Honorable Terry Petteway et al. v. Galveston County et al.* (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston, Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-57-JVB).
- Expert Witness in *Tennessee Conference of the NAACP et al. v. Lee, et al.* (U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville, Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01039).
- Expert Witness in *Voice of the Experienced et al. v. Ardoin* (U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Civil No. 3:23-cv-00331-JWD-SDJ).
- Expert Witness in *Mi Familia Vota, et al. v. Fontes*, (U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Civil No.2:22-cv-00509-SRB).

Exhibit 4

Declaration of Rodney D. Pierce

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION

RODNEY D. PIERCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.


Case No. 4:23-cv-00193-D

DECLARATION OF RODNEY D. PIERCE

I, Rodney D. Pierce, make the following declaration:

1. I am a Plaintiff in the above-captioned case.
2. I identify as Black.
3. I live in Halifax County, North Carolina.
4. I am a registered voter in Senate District 2 under the 2023 enacted map for North Carolina Senate.
5. I resided in Senate District 3 under the 2022 enacted map for North Carolina Senate.
6. In 2022, I voted for the Black senate candidate, Valerie Jordan, who was defeated by the white candidate, Bobby Hanig.
7. I intend to vote in future state senate elections, including the 2024 election.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.


Rodney D. Pierce

11/20/2023
Date/

Exhibit 5

Declaration of Moses Matthews

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION

RODNEY D. PIERCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 4:23-cv-00193-D

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF MOSES MATTHEWS

I, Moses Matthews, make the following declaration:

1. I am a Plaintiff in the above-captioned case.
2. I identify as Black.
3. I live in Martin County, North Carolina.
4. I am a registered voter in Senate District 2 under the 2023 enacted map for North Carolina Senate.
5. I resided in Senate District 3 under the 2022 enacted map for North Carolina Senate.
6. In 2022, I voted for the Black senate candidate, Valerie Jordan, who was defeated by the white candidate, Bobby Hanig.
7. I intend to vote in future state senate elections, including the 2024 election.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Moses Matthews
Moses Matthews

11-21-23
Date

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:23-CV-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE)
and MOSES MATTHEWS,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
v.)
)
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE)
BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

ORDER

On November 20, 2023, Rodney D. Pierce (“Pierce”) and Moses Matthews (“Matthews”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and its five members in their official capacities (collectively “the Board defendants”), Philip E. Berger in his official capacity as President pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate (“Berger”), and Timothy K. Moore in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives (“Moore”) (collectively “the legislative defendants”) alleging that North Carolina Senate Bill 758 (“SB 758”), which establishes new state Senate districts for North Carolina, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (“Section 2”) [D.E. 1]. On November 20, 2023, plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for expedited briefing and decision on plaintiffs’ forthcoming motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 5] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 6]. On November 22, 2023, the legislative defendants responded in opposition [D.E. 12]. On November 22, 2023, plaintiffs replied [D.E. 20].

In their motion to expedite, plaintiffs propose the following deadlines:

- By November 22, 2023, plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction.¹
- By November 27, 2023, defendants respond in opposition.
- By November 28, 2023, plaintiffs reply.
- On November 29, 2023, the court holds oral argument, if needed.
- By December 1, 2023, the court decides plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

See [D.E. 5] 2. Plaintiffs ask the court to decide their motion for a preliminary injunction by December 1, 2023, because candidate filing for 2024 elections begins on December 4, 2023.

See [D.E. 6] ¶ 6.

On October 25, 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted SB 758. See Compl. [D.E. 1] ¶ 2. Plaintiffs do not explain why they waited 26 days to file this action and 28 days to move for a preliminary injunction. In so waiting, plaintiffs belie their “claim that there is an urgent need for speedy action to protect [their] rights” or that their entitlement to a preliminary injunction is clear. John Lemmon Films, Inc. v. Atl. Releasing Corp., 617 F. Supp. 992, 996 (W.D.N.C. 1985). Moreover, plaintiffs fail to justify giving defendants one business day to respond to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, which plaintiffs waited to file until the day before Thanksgiving. Cf. Court Holidays, <https://www.nced.uscourts.gov/public1/holidays.aspx> (last visited Nov. 27, 2023). Thus, plaintiffs ask the court to expedite defendants' response to a motion before the court or defendants know the contents of that motion. Cf. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 16 (2023) (noting that the three-judge district court's preliminary injunction hearing involving a challenge to Alabama's congressional redistricting statute lasted seven days and included live testimony from 17 witnesses, more than 1,000 pages of briefing, approximately 350 exhibits, and arguments from 43 different lawyers). Plaintiffs also concede that “it would still be feasible” to grant a preliminary

¹ On November 22, 2023, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 16] and filed a 25-page memorandum in support [D.E. 17] and five exhibits totaling over 400 pages [D.E. 17-1 to 17-5].

injunction after December 4, 2023. [D.E. 5] 2. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ request completely ignores that their case is not the only case on the court’s docket and that plaintiffs do not set this court’s schedule for holding hearings or deciding motions. This court has over 1,000 cases. For example, this week the court will hold thirteen sentencing hearings, three revocation hearings, a civil bench trial, and two pretrial conferences in criminal cases set for jury trial during the weeks of December 4, 2023, and December 11, 2023. The court also will resolve countless motions in numerous other cases.

“Redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act . . . is . . . sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. But it is not a game of ambush.” In re Landry, 83 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023). This court declines plaintiffs’ invitation to make this case a game of any kind, much less a game of ambush. Plaintiffs fail to justify their expedited schedule.

In opposition to this conclusion, plaintiffs contend that the “General Assembly unreasonably delayed six months before enacting the 2023 Senate map” and defendants allegedly should have the expert analyses they need to respond to plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. See [D.E. 20] ¶¶ 1, 3 (emphasis removed). The court rejects plaintiffs’ contention that six months is an “unreasonable delay” for the General Assembly to enact a new electoral Senate map. Cf. Covington v. State, 267 F. Supp. 3d 664, 666–67 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (describing the process of redrawing legislative districts). Moreover, plaintiffs seek expedited relief in this court, not defendants. Thus, plaintiffs bear the burden of justifying an expedited process. See, e.g., Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51, 56–58 (2005). Plaintiffs have not met that burden.

Even if defendants have evidence concerning Section 2 in the legislative record, in light of plaintiffs’ 28-day delay, plaintiffs still fail to explain why the court should expect defendants to convert that evidence into a response to plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction within one

business day or over the Thanksgiving holiday weekend. Plaintiffs assert they “worked diligently,” [D.E. 20] ¶ 2, but do not, for example, explain how long it took their three experts to prepare their analyses or how long they then needed to prepare their extensive filings in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the arguments fail.

In sum, the court DENIES as meritless plaintiffs’ emergency motion to expedite [D.E. 5]. Defendants may file a response to plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in accordance with this court’s local rules. See Local Civ. R. 7.1(f)(1). Plaintiffs may reply in accordance with this court’s local rules. See Local Civ. R. 7.1(g)(1). The court will hold a hearing in due course if one is needed to resolve plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED. This 27 day of November, 2023.


JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:23-CV-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE)
and MOSES MATTHEWS,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
v.)
)
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE)
BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

ORDER

On December 6, 2023, defendants Phillip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, (collectively, the “Legislative defendants”) moved for an extension of time to respond to plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction [D.E. 25]. On December 7, 2023, plaintiffs responded in opposition [D.E. 26], and the Legislative defendants replied [D.E. 27].

The court has reviewed the motion, the opposition, the reply, the record, and the governing law. The court finds good cause to grant the motion.

In sum, the court GRANTS the Legislative defendants’ motion for extension of time to respond to plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction [D.E. 25]. The Legislative defendants and the North Carolina State Board of Elections defendants shall have until and including December 22, 2023, to respond to plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED. This 8 day of December, 2023.



JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION**

RODNEY D. PIERCE; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

NATURE OF THE CASE

The only thing “egregious” about this case, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, D.E. 17, (“Mem.”) 1, is the racial gerrymandering that would result if the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ erroneous position. North Carolina redistricting plans have experienced virtually constant litigation for the past decade, and the one “clear-cut” proposition, *id.*, that has emerged is that voting in the State is not racially polarized at legally significant levels. On that basis, a three-judge federal court invalidated all 28 of the State’s majority-minority legislative districts last decade, *Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117, 169 (M.D.N.C. 2016), and evidence and findings in recent state-court litigation have consistently confirmed that no majority-minority district is necessary or justified under present electoral conditions. Plaintiffs make a familiar error in presenting evidence of “statistically significant” bloc voting, not *legally* significant bloc voting, and their demand to dismantle the State’s formulaic county groupings for

predominantly racial reasons has no basis in law or fact. Simply stated, §2 of the Voting Rights Act does not compel the race-based remedy Plaintiffs seek.

In all events, no emergency injunction can issue because the candidate-filing period has come and gone, absentee voting begins on January 19, and federal intrusion into the election process is unwarranted. There is no time to effectuate the relief Plaintiffs demand, which is certainly not “limited and straightforward.” Mem. 7. Plaintiffs promise that their proposed remedy will leave “all other districts in the 2023 enacted map wholly untouched,” *id.*, and that only a handful of districts would need reconfiguring. But their majority-minority illustrative district resets the State’s county groupings, which would send shock waves across the plan and potentially mandate that many Senate districts be redrawn. An injunction now would risk an election meltdown. The Court should deny the motion without argument.

BACKGROUND

After each decennial census, “States must redistrict to account for any changes or shifts in population.” *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. 461, 489 n.2 (2003). In North Carolina, the State Constitution commits that task solely to the General Assembly. N.C. Const. art. II, §§3, 5. “Redistricting is never easy.” *Abbott v. Perez*, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2314 (2018). The General Assembly is subject to “complex and delicately balanced requirements regarding the consideration of race” under federal law, as well as “special state-law districting rules.” *Id.* This case does not occur against a blank slate and must be understood against the backdrop of those principles and North Carolina’s history in attempting to implement them.

Federal Requirements. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...prevents a State, in the absence of ‘sufficient justification,’ from ‘separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.’” *Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 291

(2017) (citation omitted). Under the governing framework, a state's predominant use of race in redistricting is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. *Id.* at 1464-65.

At the same time, the VRA “pulls in the opposite direction: It often insists that districts be created precisely because of race.” *Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2314. VRA §2 requires majority-minority districts upon proof that “members of a [protected] class...have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. §10301(b). Plaintiffs alleging vote dilution under §2 must prove “three threshold conditions”: that the minority relevant group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority’ in some reasonably configured legislative district”; that the group is “politically cohesive”; and that a white majority votes “sufficiently as a bloc’ to usually ‘defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301-02 (citation omitted). “If a plaintiff makes that showing, it must then go on to prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, the district lines dilute the votes of the members of the minority group.” *Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2331. The Supreme Court has long assumed that a state that creates a majority-minority district for predominantly racial reasons can only justify that choice under strict scrutiny by establishing (at the time of redistricting) the three *Gingles* preconditions. *Id.* at 2309-10. But if the state lacks a strong basis in evidence to believe that each is met, the majority-minority district will be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. *See Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301-02.

State Requirements. The North Carolina Constitution’s Whole County Provisions (“WCP”) dictate that “[no] county shall be divided in the formation of a Senate district.” N.C. Const. art. II, §3; *see id.* art. II, §5 (same for House districts). Although the federal one-person, one-vote rule and (in some instances) the VRA render strict compliance with the WCP impossible,

the North Carolina Supreme Court resolved this tension by interpreting the WCP to forbid county lines from being transgressed “for reasons unrelated to compliance with federal law.” *Stephenson v. Bartlett*, 355 N.C. 354, 371, 562 S.E.2d 377, 389 (2002) (*Stephenson I*).

The court therefore directed that “legislative districts required by the VRA” be “formed prior to creation of non-VRA districts,” that total-population deviations “be at or within plus or minus five percent for purposes of compliance with federal ‘one-person, one-vote’ requirements,” and that county groupings be identified consistent with those federal rules to ensure that county lines are followed except where federal law otherwise requires. *See id.* at 383, 562 S.E.2d at 396-97. As Plaintiffs acknowledge (Mem. 9), the WCP county groupings and traversal formula is objectively ascertainable. *Id.*; *see also Stephenson v. Bartlett*, 357 N.C. 301, 302, 582 S.E.2d 247, 248 (2003) (*Stephenson II*); *Dickson v. Rucho*, 367 N.C. 542, 571-72, 766 S.E.2d 238, 258 (2014), *vacated on other grounds*, 575 U.S. 959 (2015).

North Carolina Litigation History. In the 1990 redistricting cycle, the Supreme Court first recognized the racial-gerrymandering claim adjudicating a challenge to North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12, *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (*Shaw I*), ultimately determining that CD12 was a racial gerrymander because the district did not satisfy the *Gingles* compactness requirement, *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 906 (1996) (*Shaw II*). In *Cooper*, the Court again encountered CD1 and CD12 and invalidated both. 581 U.S. at 322-23 As relevant here, it concluded that race predominated in CD1 because the General Assembly “purposefully” made it a majority-minority district and moved a significant number of voters to achieve that end. *Id.* at 300. The Court then determined that CD1 failed strict scrutiny because the third *Gingles* precondition was not met: evidence before the General Assembly demonstrated that a district below a 50% Black voting-age population (“BVAP”) majority (known as a “crossover” district) would provide equal minority opportunity

to elect and that there was no reason to believe “a plaintiff could establish...effective white bloc voting.” *Id.* at 304. CD1 occupied various counties, including Northampton, Hertford, Halifax, Warren, Bertie, Gates, Chowan, and Washington, *see id.* at 325, the same counties at issue here, *see* Mem. 1, 6, 10-11.

Legislative redistricting has proven equally contentious in North Carolina. *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1 (2009), arose out of Pender County, where the General Assembly departed from the WCP formula to create a district with “an African-American voting-age population of 39.36 percent.” *Id.* at 7 (plurality opinion). Both the United States and North Carolina Supreme Courts held that this departure from state constitutional requirements was not justified by §2, because it does not require districts “in which minority voters make up less than a majority of the voting-age population” (i.e., crossover districts). *Id.* at 13; *see also id.* at 11, 14. Accordingly, the WCP—not §2—controlled the district configuration.

After that experience, during 2011 redistricting, the General Assembly hired an expert to conduct a polarized voting study to ascertain the State’s §2 obligations. *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 169. Based on the expert’s conclusion that voting was racially polarized—and recognizing that crossover districts are not mandated by §2—the General Assembly included 28 majority-minority districts in the 2011 House and Senate plans, seeking to achieve proportionality, *see id.* at 132–33.

A subsequent suit challenged each of these districts as racial gerrymanders, and it succeeded. First, the *Covington* three-judge district court found race predominated in each challenged district because of the way the General Assembly sought VRA compliance and its goal of drawing majority-minority districts under the VRA “first, before any other ‘non-VRA’ districts were drawn” and because that goal required departure from the WCP formula. *Id.* at 130-31; 138-39. Second, it found that the use of race was not narrowly tailored, even though the General

Assembly relied on expert polarization analysis, because neither that nor any other analysis “made any determination whether majority bloc voting existed at such a level that the candidate of choice of African-American voters would usually be defeated without a VRA remedy.”¹ *Id.* at 168. In other words, even if voting is polarized, polarization is not “legally significant” unless white bloc voting is sufficient to defeat Black-preferred candidates in districts below 50% BVAP. *Id.* at 168-69. The *Covington* court enjoined the 2011 plans. But it made “no finding that the General Assembly acted in bad faith or with discriminatory intent.” *Id.* at 124 n.1. That is, the *Covington* court determined that the General Assembly made only a legal mistake in considering race in reliance on a statistical analysis that failed to establish the third *Gingles* precondition. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed that decision. *North Carolina v. Covington*, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017).

The Race-Neutral Approach. After being afforded the opportunity to remedy the federal-law violation, the General Assembly in 2017 adopted a different approach by adopting a criterion of race-neutrality. *Covington v. North Carolina*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 418 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (quoting the criterion). The General Assembly implemented that criterion in the remedial redistricting. To be sure, the *Covington* court itself considered racial data, *see id.* at 421, and ultimately again made alterations in small portions of the General Assembly’s plans. *Id.* at 449. The *Covington* court, however, did not find that §2 required any majority-minority districts, and it affirmed most of the 2017 districts. *Id.* at 458.

In 2018, different plaintiffs—represented by the legal team that brings this suit—filed a suit in state court, challenging large swaths of the 2017 legislative plans under a novel state constitutional doctrine purportedly prohibiting “partisan” gerrymandering. *Common Cause v.*

¹ The court “express[ed] no view as to whether the *Stephenson* cases require that VRA districts be drawn first both in priority and in time.” *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 132 n.12.

Lewis, No. 18-cvs-014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *1-2, 38 (N.C. Super. Sep. 03, 2019). In September 2019, a three-judge panel invalidated the plans. *Id.* at *135. During the subsequent redistricting, the General Assembly adopted the strategy it utilized after the *Covington* ruling, and race was not used. The *Lewis* court had—at the prompting of the lawyers who bring this suit—imposed severe restrictions on racial considerations by, *inter alia*, (1) forbidding the General Assembly from asserting that consideration of race was necessary in certain county groupings where expert evidence had shown it was not necessary and (2) requiring the General Assembly to “provide evidentiary support” for any asserted need to consider race. *Id.* at *133.

The *Common Cause* plaintiffs presented a brief and a comprehensive expert study addressing various county groupings in North Carolina and opining that legally significant white bloc voting did not exist anywhere a majority-Black district could be drawn, because “the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice” was below 50%. Ex. 1, at 6, 7-32. On that basis, the state court entered an order finding that the *Gingles* preconditions were not satisfied in any of the areas addressed. Ex. 2, Order. Although the brief, expert report, and order did not explicitly address elections in the counties at issue here, the expert’s merits-phase supporting data and tables did and showed victories for Black candidates of choice in districts below 50% BVAP. Ex. 3, Handley Backup Data Senate Tables (SD3, SD4, and SD5). No portion of the 2019 plans were challenged under §2.

The 2020 Redistricting Cycle. The 2021 plans, adopted on November 4, 2021, were likewise drawn without racial data. *See NCLCV v. Hall*, Nos 21 CVS 015426, 21 CVS 500085, 2022 WL 124616 at *9, FOF ¶54 (Wake Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2022). The General Assembly determined there were two permissible *Stephenson* county groupings for the Senate Plan in the

northeastern part of the State.² Plaintiffs, including some represented by the same counsel as Plaintiffs in this matter, challenged the 2021 legislative and congressional plans (the “2021 Plans”) under theories of partisan gerrymandering, but not under the VRA. In February 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court invalidated the 2021 Plans under this theory. *See Harper v. Hall*, 380 N.C. 317, 868 S.E.2d 499 (2022) (*Harper I*). During the remedial redistricting phase, the General Assembly selected the alternative Senate county grouping configuration for the northeastern part of the state in an effort to remedy the alleged “partisan gerrymandering.”³

In evaluating the remedial redistricting plans, both the state trial court and North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether §2 liability might arise under the General Assembly’s remedial plans, and both concluded that a polarized voting analysis of Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, who advised the General Assembly, demonstrated that §2 liability would not arise. *Harper v. Hall*, 383 N.C. 89, 123, 881 S.E.2d 156, 180 (2022) (*Harper II*). The North Carolina Supreme Court observed that, while crossover districts might improve minority opportunity, federal law “do[es] not require the General Assembly to create functioning crossover districts.” *Id.* at 124, 881 S.E.2d at 180.

The North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently re-heard the case and reversed its prior ruling on the partisan-gerrymandering question and permitted the General Assembly to redraw the State’s legislative and congressional districts without encumbrance of that novel (and erroneous) doctrine. *Harper v. Hall*, 384 N.C. 292, 886 S.E.2d 393 (2023) (*Harper III*). The General

² These findings were confirmed by Dr. Jonathan Mattingly, an expert who was hired in prior litigation by Plaintiffs’ counsel in this matter. *See NCLV*, 2022 WL 124616 at *11, FOF ¶¶59-60. A copy of the 2021 Senate Plan with the county groupings can be found here: https://www.ncleg.gov/Files/GIS/Plans_Main/Senate_2021/SL%202021-173%20Senate%20-%2011%20x%2017%20Map.pdf

³ A copy of the 2022 Senate Plan with County Grouping configurations can be found here: https://www.ncleg.gov/Files/GIS/Plans_Main/Senate_2022/SL%202022-2%20Senate%20-%2011%20x%2017%20Map.pdf (While currently numbered as SD 2, this district was previously numbered as SD 3)

Assembly enacted the challenged Senate plan on October 25, 2023 (the “Senate Plan”). Before doing so, it conducted public hearings across the state, including one in Elizabeth City, and accepted comments from an online public portal. Ex. 4, 9.27 Public Hearing Tr. 4:6-15. This was in addition to the 13 hearings held after the 2020 census data was released. *See NCLCV*, 2022 WL 124616 at *10 FOF ¶¶55-56. The Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee, consistent with past practice, adopted criteria, including equal population, traditional redistricting principles, compactness, contiguity, respect for existing political subdivisions, political considerations and incumbent residence, along with the WCP rules for legislative maps. Ex. 5, 10.19.23 Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee Meeting Tr. 4:2-12. The Committee’s co-chair, Senator Hise, testified that no racial data was used to draw maps *Id.* 4:13-16, given that the predominant use of race violates the federal constitution under the “Cooper and Covington cases.” *Id.* 4:17-25.

Senator Hise also addressed the VRA, noting that there “must be a strong basis in evidence of [the] three *Gingles* Criteria” to justify the use of race under the “totality of the circumstances.” *Id.* 5:1-8. Senator Hise noted that “[p]ast decisions and court records demonstrate that to this point nowhere in North Carolina can anyone provide evidence of the three *Gingles* conditions” *Id.* 5:9-12, that “in the absence of any evidence of the three *Gingles* preconditions” the chairs elected not to use race to “protect the state from lawsuits alleging illegal racial gerrymandering” *Id.* 5:12-17, that racial data would not have been helpful in reaching any political or legislative redistricting goal, and that any political considerations were informed by political, not racial, data. *Id.* 5:18-23.

Upon the public filing of the proposed maps, Senator Hise directed the non-partisan Central Staff to load racial data into Maptitude for the first time, to create statpacks with racial data for the committee members and the public. *Id.* 5:24-6:15. Senator Hise stated that the Chairs would “consider any evidence that a member of this Committee or a third party advocating altering plans

for racial reasons brings forth that provides a strong basis in evidence that the Gingles preconditions are present in a particular area of the state.” *Id.* 6:22-7:6. And that “[o]nly then will the chairs consider using race in amending the districts.” *Id.* Neither Plaintiffs, nor their Counsel submitted evidence to the Committee.⁴ When questioned about potential VRA liability, Senator Hise referred committee members to studies “regarding racial polarization [that] were done as part of the lawsuit a year and half ago” and since the census data was released. *Id.* 13:4-7.

Plaintiffs seek to create their demonstrative districts out of portions of SD1, SD2, and SD11. Each of these districts represent single district *Stephenson* groupings which are identical to the Senate 2021 Plan, which was never challenged under the VRA. Senator Daniel testified about the formation of these districts:⁵

- SD1 was “created by the county grouping choice”⁶ in the northeastern part of the state containing the whole counties of Northampton, Bertie, Hertford, Gates, Perquimans, Pasquotank, Camden, Currituck, Tyrell, and Dare.” *Id.* 46:12-18. Senator Daniel noted that this configuration kept intact four of the five finger counties in northeastern North Carolina. *Id.* 46:18-21. Senator Daniel also noted that many of the district’s residents work or travel frequently to Virginia’s tidewater, and that 7/10 of the counties and 81% of the population were in the Norfolk media market. *Id.* 46:22-47:2.
- SD2 “follows the Roanoke River from Warren county to the Albemarle Sound in Washington County” and noted that Chowan county, directly across from the Albemarle Sound was also included in this district. Senator Daniel testified that the Pamlico Sound and River were also included in the district, as was Carteret county, which spans the inner and outer banks. *Id.* 47:12-22. Senator Daniel noted that 5/8 counties and 2/3 of the population lived in the Greenville media market. *Id.* 47:23-48:4.

⁴ The only additional evidence received was from the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, who asked that the county grouping for SD 1 and 2 be changed to the alternate county grouping used in 2022. They did not request any majority-minority districts.

⁵ A Map of the Senate Plan with the county groupings can be found at https://www.ncleg.gov/Files/GIS/Plans_Main/Senate_2023/SL%202023-146%20Senate%20-%202011%20x%2017%20Map.pdf

⁶ In 2023, the General Assembly returned to the county grouping configuration from the 2021 Plan.

- SD11 was created by the base county grouping map of Vance, Franklin, and Nash counties. *Id.* 50:12-16.

The Instant Lawsuit. Plaintiffs filed this suit 26 days after the Senate Plan was enacted and moved for provisional relief on the 28th day. D.E. 1, 16. In tension with their prior advocacy, Plaintiffs’ counsel insist that the General Assembly’s failure to create a majority-minority Senate district in Vance, Warren, Halifax, Northampton, Hertford, Bertie, Martin, and Washington Counties amounts to an “egregious and clear-cut violation of Section 2.” Mem. 1. Plaintiffs propose two alternatives, both of which would destroy the State’s county groupings. *Id.* at 10-11. One configuration (Demonstration B-1 and B-2) creates a crossover district of 48% BVAP. Mem. 11; D.E. 17-1 (“Esselstyn Rep.”) 13. The other (Demonstration A) includes a majority-BVAP district that so thoroughly breaks up the State’s county groupings that implementing it would likely require reconfiguring many Senate districts. *See* Mem. 10. Plaintiffs demand emergency relief in time for the 2024 primary. Absentee voting begins January 19. *See* Part II, *infra*.

THE LEGAL STANDARD

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[P]reliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” *MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.*, 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because “[t]he rationale behind a grant of a preliminary injunction has been explained as preserving the status quo,” *Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina*, 945 F.2d 781, 788 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), “[m]andatory preliminary injunctive relief”—i.e., relief that

“goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo *pendente lite*”— “in any circumstance is disfavored.” *Taylor v. Freeman*, 34 F.3d 266, 270 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs seek to alter the status quo by compelling the State to adopt redistricting configurations substantially dissimilar from those the State has currently or recently employed. *See* Mem. 1, 6, 9–11; Esselstyn Rep. 7-10, 12-15. Their request is presumptively “disfavored” and can be justified only by “the most extraordinary circumstances.” *Taylor*, 34 F.3d at 270 n.2.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Will Not Succeed on the Merits

A. Plaintiffs Lack a Right of Action

As the Eighth Circuit recently held, there is no private right of action to enforce §2. *Arkansas State Conf. NAACP v. Arkansas Bd. of Apportionment*, 86 F.4th 1204, 1206-07 (8th Cir. 2023). That view is likely to prevail, and Plaintiffs in all events cannot make a clear showing given this uncertainty. “[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). “The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” *Id.* As will be shown in more detail in Legislative Defendants’ forthcoming motion to dismiss, the VRA contains neither a private right nor a private remedy.

Plaintiffs also have no recourse to a right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002). Under §1983, “the initial inquiry—determining whether a statute confers any right at all—is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case,” *id.* at 285, so the absence of a private right ends that inquiry. And the VRA’s remedial scheme supplants any presumptive §1983 remedy, as the forthcoming motion to dismiss will show.

B. Plaintiffs' §2 Claim Fails Numerous *Gingles* Elements

Even assuming a cause of action, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed under §2. As explained, Plaintiffs alleging vote dilution under §2 must prove the *Gingles* preconditions and that vote dilution is occurring under the totality of the circumstances. *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301-02 (citation omitted); *Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2331. Plaintiffs are unlikely to make the necessary showings.

1. The First Precondition

Plaintiffs' illustrative plans do not establish the first precondition, which is “focused on geographical compactness and numerosity.” *Allen v. Milligan*, 599 U.S. 1, 18 (2023).

a. Demonstration B

Demonstration District B-1 does not satisfy the numerosity requirement. Plaintiffs barely defend it because (as they have to admit) its BVAP of 48.4% is “shy of 50%.” Mem. 11; Esselstyn Rep. 14; Ex. 6 Expert Report of Dr. Sean Trende (“Trende Rep.”) 8. The numerosity element is not met where “the minority group makes up less than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the potential election district.” *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 12 (plurality opinion); *see also Hall v. Virginia*, 385 F.3d 421, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2004). As in *Bartlett*, which found §2 does not require the State to sacrifice the WCP formula for a district below 50% BVAP, 556 U.S. at 7, Plaintiffs admit that Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2 contravene the WCP, Mem. 11, and they cannot show §2 liability.

Plaintiffs observe that the Black citizen voting-age population (“CVAP”) of Demonstration District B-1 is 50.19%. Mem. 11; Esselstyn Rep. 14. “However, CVAP has been applied only where there is a significant noncitizen population.” *Pope v. Cnty. of Albany*, No. 1:11-CV-0736, 2014 WL 316703, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014). Otherwise, the first precondition looks to “the voting-age population in the potential election district.” *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added); *accord Hall*, 385 F.3d at 430. The purpose of utilizing CVAP is for “refinement” of VAP figures

to account for “a significant difference in the citizenship rates of the majority and minority populations,” as often occurs in cases involving Hispanic populations. *Negron v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.*, 113 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1997). CVAP is “is less reliable” than VAP, *Pope*, 2014 WL 316703, at *13, which is reported in the decennial census, an enumeration of the population in each U.S. jurisdiction, *Dep’t of Com. v. U.S. House of Representatives*, 525 U.S. 316, 342–43 (1999). By contrast, CVAP estimates are drawn from the American Community Survey (“ACS”) as “a rolling statistical estimate with accompanying margins of error.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, *Evenwel v. Abbott*, No. 14-940, 2015 WL 5675829, at *22 (filed Sep. 2015). The ACS “is less reliable than Census data and not intended to be used in redistricting.” *Pope*, 2014 WL 316703, at *13 n.22 (citation omitted). It is the wrong metric here.

b. Demonstration District A

Demonstration District A fails the first precondition on multiple grounds.⁷

First, it is not “reasonably configured.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 20. This inquiry looks to “traditional districting criteria,” including maintaining “county lines.” *Id.* at 20; *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997). As explained, county lines occupy a preeminent place among North Carolina’s legislative redistricting criteria. *Stephenson I*, 355 N.C. at 366, 562 S.E.2d at 386 (citing “the long-standing tradition of respecting county lines during the redistricting process in this State”); N.C. Const. art. II, §3; *see id.* art. II, §5 (same for House districts). Demonstration District A contravenes the WCP by drawing a district that breaks the single-district county

⁷ Many of these failings likewise plague Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2, including numerous violations of the WCP. While Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2 break the county groupings, this configuration also illegally divides Pasquotank county to pick up 14% of the B-1’s Black population and form a crossover district — the same scenario deemed unconstitutional by the North Carolina Supreme Court in *Pender County*, 649 S.E.2d 364, 361 N.C. 491 (2007), *affirmed Bartlett*, 556 U.S. 1. *Trende Rep.* 8. However, the Court need not reach these issues because they clearly fail the numerosity requirement.

groupings of SD1, SD2, and SD11 by combining three counties from SD1 (Northampton, Hertford, Bertie), four counties from SD2 (Warren, Halifax, Martin, Washington), and one from SD11 (Vance). Mem. 6, 9-11, Adopting Demonstration District A would inflict such havoc that numerous Senate districts would likely need to be redrawn. Districts that dismantle the WCP are not “reasonably configured.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 20. The Supreme Court recently held that §2 “never requires adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles.” *Id.* at 30 (citation and alteration marks omitted); *see also id.* at 43 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (recognizing that §2 does not require districts that flout “county, city, and town lines”).

Plaintiffs appear to believe that county boundaries are optional because *Stephenson I* and its progeny authorize departures from county lines for “legislative districts required by the VRA.” *Stephenson I*, 355 N.C. at 383, 562 S.E.2d at 396-97. But that is circular logic. Districts that do not comply with a state’s neutral criteria are not reasonably configured and §2 does not require them. *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 20. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s recognition that federal law overrides state law did not alter the scope of federal law, authorize federal courts to override county boundaries more than necessary to implement federal dictates, or declare that districts dismantling county groupings are “reasonably configured.” Rather, *Stephenson I* referenced federal dictates that do not have a “reasonable configuration” requirement, including the one-person, one-vote principle and the non-retrogression command of VRA §5. *See Stephenson I*, 355 N.C. at 382-83, 562 S.E.2d at 396-97.⁸

Second, Demonstration District A is a racial gerrymander. Section 2 does not require majority-minority districts drawn with “a ‘quintessentially race-conscious calculus,’” *Allen*, 599

⁸ Plaintiffs criticize enacted SD2, Mem. 10-11, but elsewhere acknowledge (as they must) that SD2 simply occupies a county grouping created by the WCP formula, Esselstyn Rep. 212. This illustrates the paramount supremacy of the county-line criterion in North Carolina.

U.S. at 31 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted), which occurs where the map-maker “subordinate[s] traditional race-neutral districting principles...to racial considerations,” *Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 580 U.S. 178, 187 (2017) (citation omitted). For North Carolina legislative plans, application of that test has proven straightforward because departures from the WCP formula to hit racial targets present clean cases of predominance. *See Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 131-32, 138-39. Plaintiffs ignore the lesson learned in *Covington*. Plaintiffs’ expert deemed hitting 50% targets (measured by both BVAP and CVAP) more important than North Carolina redistricting principles, opting to destroy State constitutionally-mandated districts to achieve a singular goal. Esselstyn Rep. 16. This is further demonstrated by the counties chosen for inclusion in Demonstration District A. Each county present in the district is required to achieve a majority Black District. Trende Rep. 5. And even if the counties were split, which would violate *Stephenson*, only 2 or 3 precincts could be removed before the district would lose majority-Black status. *Id.* To be clear, Mr. Esselstyn drew with such surgical precision that nearly every Black resident is needed to create Demonstrative District A as a majority-Black district. *Id.* “While the line between racial predominance and racial consciousness can be difficult to discern,” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 31, it is not here.

Third, Plaintiffs have not proven that Demonstration District A can be part of a reasonably configured Senate plan governing North Carolina. Plaintiffs seeking §2 relief customarily present entire plans with additional majority-minority districts, not isolated districts. *See Allen*, 599 U.S. at 19-21; *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 435 (2006). That type of showing is necessary because there would be no value in a showing that a majority-minority district is reasonably configured if that accomplishment will turn neighboring districts, or the plan, into “a monstrosity.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 28 (quoting *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995)).

Here, Plaintiffs present only isolated districts, not entire plans. That failing is not a technicality. As explained *supra* pp. 13-16 Demonstration District A destroys the State's county groupings. *See* Mem. 10-11; Trende Rep. 4-5. As also explained, assuming the VRA requires certain districts, State precedent requires that the General Assembly configure them "prior to...non-VRA districts," *Stephenson I*, 562 S.E.2d at 396-97, because the county-grouping formula governs the entire State and builds upon the placement of VRA districts, *see Dickson*, 367 N.C. at 571-72, 766 S.E.2d at 258 (explaining the order of operations). By breaking up the county groupings in northeastern North Carolina, Plaintiffs' Demonstration District A would reset the county-grouping formula. Trende Rep. 5. Any order adopting Demonstration A will send shockwaves that will likely result in a significant re-draw. *Id.* Without a statewide illustrative map, it is impossible to know how many *Stephenson* groupings will be destroyed by Demonstrative A. Because Plaintiffs have not proven that this re-draw will result in reasonably configured districts elsewhere, they fail the first precondition.

Fourth, there is particular reason for concern of impact on neighboring districts, given that enacted SD1 and SD2 border SD5, which has a BVAP of 40.35%, Esselstyn Rep. 10, and likely qualifies as a "crossover" district, i.e., a district "in which minority voters make up less than a majority of the voting-age population" but where "the minority population, at least potentially, is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority." *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion). Plaintiffs concede SD5 is a current minority opportunity district. Mem. 10. Neighboring SD11, at 36.65% BVAP, may also qualify as a crossover district. Esselstyn Rep. 10. Although §2 does not mandate crossover districts, states may create them "as a matter of legislative choice or discretion," *id.* at 23, and §2 can "be *satisfied* by crossover districts," *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 305. Demonstration District A dismantles SD 1, 2, and

11, reconfiguring the county groupings and district lines, which in turn, may dismantle districts like SD 5 that currently provide equal minority opportunity.

But “a § 2 violation is proved for a particular area,” *Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 917, so dismantling one district for some minority voters (in SD5) to create another district for other minority voters (Demonstrative A) is improper, *see id.* at 917 (rejecting the notion that a majority-Black district may be drawn “anywhere” as “a misconception of the vote-dilution claim”); *Johnson v. DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1019 (1994) (rejecting the notion that “the rights of some minority voters under §2 may be traded off against the rights of other members of the same minority class”). Without establishing the impact of Demonstration District A on minority opportunity elsewhere, Plaintiffs show “that lines could have been drawn elsewhere, nothing more.” *DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1015.

2. The Third Precondition

a. Majority-Minority Districts Are Unnecessary and Unjustified

Plaintiffs are also unlikely to establish the third precondition, which requires proof of an “amount of white bloc voting that can generally ‘minimize or cancel’ black voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted). The best available evidence shows that a majority-Black district is unnecessary to ensure equal minority opportunity to elect in the districts that are destroyed to create Demonstrative A (SD1, SD2, SD5, SD11) and white bloc voting lacks legal significance.

While “the general term ‘racially polarized voting’ is defined much more broadly and simply refers to when different racial groups ‘vote in blocs for different candidates,’” the “third *Gingles* inquiry is concerned only with ‘legally significant racially polarized voting.’” *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170 (citations omitted). “[A] general finding regarding the existence of any racially polarized voting, no matter the level, is not enough” to satisfy the third precondition. *Id.* “The key

inquiry...is whether racial bloc voting is operating at such a level that it would actually minimize or cancel minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice, *if no remedial district were drawn.*" *Id.* at 168 (emphasis added) (quotation and edit marks omitted). Because a remedial district is a 50% plus one BVAP district, *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 19, there is no legally significant racially polarized voting if minority-preferred candidates have an equal opportunity to win districts at below 50% BVAP. *Id.* at 18; *Covington*, 316 F.R.D at 168-69.

The Supreme Court made this clear in *Bartlett*. In holding that §2 does not require "crossover" districts, the Court reasoned that "the majority-bloc voting requirement" will not "be met in a district where, by definition, white voters join in sufficient numbers with minority voters to elect the minority's preferred candidate." 556 U.S. at 16. The Court further explained that, where crossover voting is sufficient to create performing crossover districts, "majority-minority districts would not be required in the first place." *Id.* at 24.

The Supreme Court's summary affirmance in *Covington* confirmed this principle. The *Covington* court took issue with the General Assembly's decision to create majority-Black districts in North Carolina's legislative plans based on the advice of experts who found "statistically significant racially polarized voting in 50 of the 51 counties studied." *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 169 (quotation marks omitted). The Court criticized these experts for addressing "'racially polarized voting'" which "simply refers to when different racial groups 'vote in blocs for different candidates.'" *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170. But they missed, the Court wrote, the "crucial difference between legally significant and statistically significant racially polarized voting." *Id.* (underlining in original). Whereas polarized voting can occur "when 51% of a minority group's voters prefer a candidate and 49% of the majority group's voters prefer that same candidate," *id.* at 170, "the third *Gingles* inquiry is concerned only with 'legally significant racially polarized

voting,” *id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 51, 55-56). Non-actionable polarized voting becomes legally significant only when “racial bloc voting is operating at such a level that it would actually minimize or cancel minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice, if no remedial district were drawn.” *Id.* at 168 (quotation and alteration marks omitted; emphasis added). The question is whether “the candidate of choice of African-American voters would usually be defeated *without a VRA remedy.*” *Id.* (emphasis added). Because the third precondition was not shown, the court struck down the plan as a racial gerrymander, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiffs’ claim is likely to fail on this same basis. Their expert—like the experts in *Covington*—found “statistically significant racially polarized voting,” D.E. 17-2, (“Barreto Rep.”) 10; *see also id.* at 11, but not legally significant racially polarized voting. That doomed the General Assembly last decade and should doom the Plaintiffs here. *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170. Dr. Barretto did not determine whether “a VRA remedy” in the form of a majority-BVAP district is necessary for equal minority opportunity. *Id.* at 168. As *Covington* explained, the way to determine whether majority-BVAP districts are necessary is a “district effectiveness analysis,” which “determines the minority voting-age population level at which a district ‘becomes effective in providing a realistic opportunity for voters of that minority group to elect candidates of their choice.’” *Id.* at 169 & n.46 (quotation and alteration marks omitted). But Dr. Barretto did not perform a district effectiveness analysis and offers no opinion that only with districts at or above 50% BVAP will minority voters be able to elect their candidates of choice in the relevant area. Moreover, Plaintiffs admit as much by drawing a 48.47% district (Demonstrative B-1) and stating it will perform. Mem. 13, 23, Esselstyn Rep. 13

This is unlikely to be shown. Legislative Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alford, opines that it is unlikely any of these districts need a 50% BVAP for a Black candidate of choice to prevail. Ex. 7,

Report of Dr. John Alford (“Alford Rep.”) 2. Moreover, the evidence *before the General Assembly at the time of drawing* clearly shows that SD1 and SD2 have high levels of white crossover support of 24% and 26%, respectively, in general elections, which is sufficient for Black candidates of choice to win without majority-minority districts. Ex. 8 December 28, 2021, Report of Dr. Jeffrey B Lewis in *NCLCV v. Hall*, (“Lewis Rep.”) Table 1 p. 10. White crossover voting is also high in SD11, which contains Vance County, and an average BVAP of only 31% would enable the minority candidate of choice to be elected in general elections. *Id.* Analyzing Democratic primaries, Dr. Lewis showed white crossover support ranging from 45-49% in these districts, and an average BVAP percentage of 7-12% needed to win. *Id.* Table 2, p. 23. Voting is not polarized at legally significant levels.

Additional points of context demonstrate that the third precondition cannot be shown. One is that *Covington* involved some of the counties at issue here. *See* 316 F.R.D. at 151-52, 158-59. This includes then-SD4 (containing Vance, Warren, and Halifax counties) which the court invalidated because the third precondition was not established. *Id.* Moreover, the Supreme Court in *Cooper* found no legally significant racially polarized voting in last decade’s rendition of CD1, 581 U.S. at 301-06, which occupied the same counties at issue here, *see id.* at 325. There is no reason to believe the third precondition can be satisfied in this case when it was not in *Cooper* or *Covington*. Further, evidence and court findings in both the *Common Cause* and *Harper* litigation established that legally significant polarized voting does not exist in North Carolina, and Plaintiffs’ counsel sponsored evidence supporting those findings and showing they apply equally in the areas at issue in this case. *See supra* pp. 6-9

b. Polarization Is Political, Not Racial

North Carolina voting patterns lack legal significance for the additional reason that they reflect a partisan, not a racial, divide. The VRA “is a balm for racial minorities, not political ones—even though the two often coincide.” *Baird v. Consol. City of Indianapolis*, 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). If “partisan affiliation, not race, best explains the divergent voting patterns among minority and white citizens,” then there is no “legally significant” racially polarized voting under the third *Gingles* precondition. *League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). This is so because “[t]he Voting Rights Act does not guarantee that nominees of the Democratic Party will be elected, even if Black voters are likely to favor that party’s candidates.” *Id.* at 854 (quotation omitted). VRA § 2 “is implicated only where Democrats lose because they are Black, not where Blacks lose because they are Democrats.” *Id.* As the Fifth Circuit explained in *LULAC, Council No. 4434*, a majority of Justices in *Gingles* held §2 liability does not lie where different candidate preferences reflect “interest-group politics.” *See id.* at 855-59.

Here, Plaintiffs’ expert did not analyze whether voting patterns are polarized for partisan or racial reasons, and Dr. Alford’s study shows that voting is divided along partisan lines and that “the race of the candidates does not appear to have a polarizing impact on vote choice.” Alford Rep. 10. In all elections Dr. Alford studied, he found that partisan affiliation better predicted the choice of a voter than race. *Id.* at 12-13. For example, when comparing the 2020 US Senate election (which had two white candidates), with the 2022 US Senate Election (which had one white and one Black candidate), Dr. Alford’s analysis revealed a higher level of white support for the Black Democratic candidate statewide, and in all areas of interest studied, than for the white Democratic candidate in 2020. *Id.* at 6-7. This pattern is again evident, with one exception, across all five Court

of Appeals races in 2020. *Id.* at 8-9. The 2020 Court of Appeals elections are highly probative for another reason: Dr. Alford's EI estimates (at table 3) clearly showed that Black Democrats, statewide and in all areas of interest studied, displayed a significant preference for a White Democratic candidate over a Black Republican candidate. *Id.* In fact, Black support behind all democratic candidates was nearly identical regardless of the race of the candidate.⁹ *Id.* Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed for this additional reason.

3. The Totality of the Circumstances

In all events, Plaintiffs are unlikely to make the "ultimate" showing of vote dilution under "the totality of the circumstances." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 78. "The ultimate determination of vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act...must be made on the basis of the 'totality of the circumstances.'" *Lewis v. Alamance County*, 99 F.3d 600, 604 (4th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). The factors germane to that inquiry, *see Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 36-37, cut against Plaintiffs.

First, "the policy underlying the state[']s use of" the challenged districts is not "tenuous," but compelling. *Id.* at 37 (citation omitted). As demonstrated, North Carolina's WCP principles represent a sovereign policy recognized at least as of 1776 and are implemented through objective, neutral, and non-arbitrary means. The State's interest in districts that adhere to county lines to the maximum extent possible "lies at the heart of representative government and thus must be treated with great respect." *Fusilier v. Landry*, 963 F.3d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 2020).

Second, the "extent to which voting in the elections of the state...is racially polarized" is limited at most. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37. As shown, majority-minority districts are unnecessary in

⁹ The one exception is the statewide estimate for the democratic candidate for Court of Appeals Seat #4 who received 98% instead of 99% of the Black vote.

North Carolina and in the areas relevant to this case, which indicates “substantial crossover voting,” *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 24.

Third, there are no “other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group,” such as “unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, [or] anti-single shot provisions.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs point to past practices they believe were discriminatory, but the question here is whether the challenged scheme interacts with other mechanisms in the *present* to enhance the discriminatory impact of the challenged system. *See, e.g., Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration*, 979 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding majority-vote requirement enhanced impact of system lacking in majority-minority districts). Plaintiffs show nothing like that here.

Fourth, Black representatives have been elected to the North Carolina General Assembly in large numbers. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37. Plaintiffs acknowledge that 21.6% of House members and 18% of Senate members are Black. Mem. 20; D.E. 17-3, “Burch Rep.” 21-22. Plaintiffs claim Black voters are “underrepresented.” Mem. 20. But the legal question is not whether Black voters are “underrepresented” under a standard of proportional representation, but whether “no members,” or just a “few,” “of a minority group have been elected to office over an extended period of time.” S. Rep. 97-417 at 29, n.115 (1982). “Forcing proportional representation is unlawful and inconsistent with [the Supreme] Court’s approach to implementing § 2.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 28.

Fifth, Plaintiffs present no evidence of “a significant lack of responsiveness” in the General Assembly to minority needs. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs assert that a supposed “failure to remedy...socioeconomic disparities between Black and white North

Carolinians” proves a lack of responsiveness. Mem. 20. But responsiveness does not guarantee outcomes, and representative democracy is not magic, whereby an elected body can cure all manner of social ills by mere force of will. *See N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, N.Y.*, 65 F.3d 1002, 1023 & n.24 (2d Cir. 1995).

Sixth, the evidence does not support Plaintiffs’ assertion that North Carolina elections frequently see racial appeals to voters. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Burch, cites attack ads against Black candidates as evidence of racial appeals, even if they are not racial. Burch Rep. 20. For example, she cites a New York Times article regarding an advertisement about three opinions then-Justice Beasley joined involving child sex offenders, but the advertisements did not mention the race of the offenders. *Id.* at 20 n.47. This type of evidence proves only that Black candidates run for office in contested races and face harsh opposition, like all other candidates.

Finally, the Supreme Court has explained, one “may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect (much less infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political feast.” *DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1017. Accordingly, vote dilution will ordinarily not be found where minority voters “would enjoy substantial proportionality” of equal-opportunity districts. *Id.* at 1014. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently found this to be satisfied without a majority-Black district in the region at issue. *Harper II*, 383 N.C. at 124, 881 S.E.2d at 180. Plaintiffs do not address this element and are unlikely to succeed at trial.

II. Plaintiffs Have Not Established That the Equitable Factors Favor an Exceptional Mandatory Injunction

Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction for the independent reason that the equities do not support one. *See Winter*, 555 U.S. at 25-26. The equities analysis in an election case is governed by the *Purcell* principle, “which establish[es] (i) that federal district courts ordinarily should not enjoin state election laws in the period close to an election, and (ii) that

federal appellate courts should stay injunctions when, as here, lower federal courts contravene that principle.” *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)). This principle, in fact, antecedes the *Purcell* decision by two generations, having its genesis in *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which ruled that the lower court “acted wisely in declining to stay the impending primary election in Alabama,” *id.* at 586, even though the challenged redistricting plan was plainly unconstitutional, *id.* at 545. “*Sims* has been the guidon to a number of courts that have refrained from enjoining impending elections,” *Chisom v. Roemer*, 853 F.2d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 1988), “even in the face of an undisputed constitutional violation,” *Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley*, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003); see *Wise v. Circosta*, 978 F.3d 93, 98–99 (4th Cir. 2020).

The *Purcell* principle applies here because the “State’s election machinery is already in progress.” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 585. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the candidate filing period has come and gone (running from December 4 to December 15). Mem. 22. But Plaintiffs’ discussion of the primary election is misleading: it is not “many months away.” *Id.* Ballots will be sent to voters in North Carolina’s no-excuse absentee system beginning January 19, 2024, and printing must begin before then. North Carolina State Board of Elections, *Upcoming Election, Overview of 2024 Elections*.¹⁰ In-person early voting runs from February 15 to March 2, with election day for the primary on March 5. *Id.* Thus, the election is already beginning.

An injunction therefore cannot issue. In *Milligan*, the Supreme Court intervened to stay a three-judge panel’s redistricting injunction, which was issued “seven weeks” before delivery of ballots for absentee voting in “the primary elections.” 142 S. Ct. at 879 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). According to the two Justices whose votes were decisive, the strength of the *Purcell*

¹⁰ <https://www.ncsbe.gov/voting/upcoming-election>

principle, standing alone, compelled that result. *Id.* at 879-82. In this case, the earliest an injunction could issue would be three weeks before the beginning of absentee voting, making it a far more compelling *Purcell* case than *Milligan*. Notably, a stay was required in *Milligan*, even though the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed on the merits, concluding that the court “faithfully applied our precedents.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 23. Around the same time, the Fifth Circuit declined to stay a June district-court injunction under §2 in Louisiana, despite that ballot-mailing would begin in September, calling *Milligan* “an outlier.” *Robinson v. Ardoin*, 37 F.4th 208, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2022). That was erroneous. The Supreme Court promptly entered the stay the Fifth Circuit refused to enter. *Ardoin v. Robinson*, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (2022). Other courts have bought similar arguments; their injunctions were short lived. *See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett*, 455 U.S. 1303 (1982) (Brennan, J., in chambers); *Gill v. Whitford*, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017); *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018); *North Carolina v. Covington*, 138 S. Ct. 974 (2018); *Abbott v. Perez*, 138 S. Ct. 49 (2017); *North Carolina v. Covington*, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); *Perry v. Perez*, 565 U.S. 1090 (2011); *Miller v. Johnson*, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994); *Chabot v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst.*, 139 S. Ct. 2635 (2019).

Plaintiffs’ arguments to coax this Court down that tried and untrue path fail.

First, they analogize this case to litigation in 2022 in North Carolina state court. Mem. 22-23. But the Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected that analogy, holding that “*Purcell* is about *federal court* intervention” and does not cover “action by state courts.” *Wise*, 978 F.3d at 99. Whatever might be said of the North Carolina courts’ actions in 2022, it says nothing of this

Court's role here.¹¹ As *Milligan* shows, rescheduling the primaries and intervening in candidate qualification and ballot-mailing is not an option available to this Court.

Second, Plaintiffs say an injunction would not “cause any voter confusion” because it would “impact[]” just “candidate filing for two districts.” Mem. 22. That is not true. As shown, it would throw ballot *mailing* and *printing* into disarray—which would obviously confuse voters—and Plaintiffs’ only proposed majority-BVAP district (Demonstration District A) could (if implemented) require redrawing a significant number of the State’s Senate districts. Moreover, the Court would not be entitled to implement a plan on its own prerogative; it must afford the General Assembly the first opportunity to cure any violation, *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 585–86. If the injunction stayed in *Milligan* was “a prescription for chaos for candidates, campaign organizations, independent groups, political parties, and voters,” *Merrill*, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), the injunction demanded here is a prescription for a total meltdown.

Third, Plaintiffs erroneously suggest an injunction would have been appropriate on the unreasonable briefing schedule they demanded. Mem. 2. *Purcell* is not an excuse for plaintiffs to make redistricting “a game of ambush.” *In re Landry*, 83 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023). Plaintiffs’ “meritless” motion for emergency briefing, after they waited 28 days to file the instant motion, demanding that opposition briefs be filed in one business day, Order, D.E. 23 at 4, only proves that it was too late for an injunction when they first filed this motion.

Finally, Plaintiffs criticize the timing of the 2023 redistricting, but ignore that *Purcell* protects the “status quo” a State establishes, regardless of when it does so. *Wise*, 978 F.3d at 98.

¹¹ The 2022 North Carolina Supreme Court’s actions blithely ignored binding precedent. In *Pender County*, the Court entered a final judgment declaring a crossover district drawn by the General Assembly illegal for violating the WCP in August of 2007 but stayed the remedy until after the 2008 election cycle to avoid disruption. 649 S.E.2d at 376.

The timing is materially akin to that in *Wise*, where the North Carolina executive and judicial branches altered state election law in late September 2020 based on pandemic-related concerns known long before, and the Fourth Circuit held that *Purcell* protected that choice, *id.* at 96-99, over the dissent's objection that the state action came too late, *id.* at 116-17 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Likewise, in *Milligan*, the Alabama legislature enacted the challenged congressional plan on November 3, 2021, suit was filed the same day, *Caster*, 2022 WL 264819, at *6, 15, and *Purcell* barred the injunction. Here, the General Assembly acted well within its discretion to establish the status quo through the challenged plan, enacted on October 25, 2023, with ample time for election administration. Moreover, Plaintiffs waited 28 days to bring the instant motion and—given that delay—stand in no position to blame the State for *Purcell*'s impact on their belated suit. And the General Assembly had good reasons to enact the plans when it did, as it faced a prolonged budget process, in addition to its other legislative action, that occupied its time and resources from the beginning of session until the budget became law. *See* H.B. 259 (enacted at N.C. Sess. Law 2023-134). As soon as a compromise was reached, the General Assembly turned to its redistricting obligation. As in *Wise* and *Milligan*, *Purcell* applies in full force.

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.

Respectfully submitted, this the 22nd day of December, 2023.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Phillip J. Strach, hereby certify that I have this day electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will provide electronic notification to counsel of record.

This the 22nd day of December, 2023.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 5, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document and accompanying materials with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ R. Stanton Jones

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Counsel for Appellants

No. 24-01095

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RODNEY D. PIERCE and MOSES MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ALAN HIRSCH, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, JEFF CARMON III in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, STACY “FOUR” EGGERS IV in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, KEVIN N. LEWIS in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, SIOBHAN O’DUFFY MILLEN in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, PHILIP E. BERGER in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate, and TIMOTHY K. MOORE in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina
Hon. James C. Dever III (No. 4:23-cv-193-D-RN)

**JOINT APPENDIX
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Exhibit 1

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
18 CVS 014001

COMMON CAUSE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVID LEWIS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SENIOR
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
REDISTRICTING, et al.,

Defendants.

**PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
REGARDING THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT**

Pursuant to Paragraph 171 of this Court’s Judgment, Plaintiffs submit this brief “on whether the *Gingles* factors are met in particular counties and county groupings and/or the minimum BVAP needed in particular counties and county groupings for African-Americans to be able to elect candidates of their choice to the General Assembly.”

In light of the possibility of further litigation over these issues, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Referee and/or this Court set forth written findings as to why the Remedial Plans ultimately adopted by the Court comply with the VRA with respect to some or all revised county groupings, and in particular with respect to the following groupings: Columbus-Pender-Robeson, Cumberland, Forsyth-Yadkin, Pitt-Lenoir, Guilford, and Mecklenburg in the House, and Davie-Forsyth, Franklin-Wake, and Mecklenburg in the Senate.¹

I. Legal Standards

For Section 2 of the VRA to require that a legislative district have particular racial demographics, “three threshold conditions” must be met. *Cooper v. Harris*, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017). “First, a ‘minority group’ must be ‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority’ in some reasonably configured legislative district.” *Id.* (quoting *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986)). “Second, the minority group must be ‘politically cohesive.’” *Id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 51). “And third, a district’s white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” *Id.* (internal

¹ The analysis presented in this brief and in the accompany expert reports is limited to the specific districts and counties discussed, and in the specific context of this remedial process. As Dr. Handley notes in her report, “[p]articularly given the differences in voting patterns that exist across North Carolina, [the] analysis cannot be extrapolated to other counties and districts not analyzed . . . , including districts that currently have African American representatives.” Handley Report at 1.

quotation marks omitted). Each of these conditions is a “prerequisite[.]” to Section 2’s application to any given district. *Id.* Where racial considerations predominate in the drawing of a district and the VRA is invoked as a justification for doing so, there must be a “strong basis in evidence” for believing that the three *Gingles* factors were present. *Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117, 167 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff’d*, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The first and third *Gingles* factors are of particular significance for present purposes. As relevant here, the first factor requires that the minority group “could” comprise a numerical majority of the voting-age population in a “reasonably compact district[.]” in the relevant county grouping. *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2009) (plurality op.); *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997).² It is not the case that “whenever a legislature *can* draw a majority-minority district, it *must* do so” under the VRA, as a “majority-minority district would not be required” in “areas with substantial crossover voting.” *Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1472 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But for purposes of the first *Gingles* factor, it must be numerically possible that the minority group could theoretically constitute a majority of a reasonably compact district in the relevant geographic area. *See id.*

To assess whether the first *Gingles* factor is met in specific county groupings, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Chen investigated whether it is possible to a district (or in some cases, two or three districts) in the relevant county grouping that is majority-minority while adhering to equal population requirements. Dr. Chen did not apply the county traversal restriction in conducting this analysis. Instead, he tested whether it would be possible to create a majority-minority district within the grouping while adhering to equal population requirements, but without regard

² Because no party challenged the existing county groupings in this case, Plaintiffs have conducted their VRA analysis within the confines of the existing county groupings.

to county traversals or splitting municipalities or VTDs. Chen Report at 2. Dr. Chen also confirmed that, with one exception in the Franklin-Nash grouping in the House, his findings are the same regardless of whether he uses Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) data from the most recent American Community Survey or total Voting Age Population (VAP) statistics from the 2010 Decennial Census. *Id.* at 3; *see Pope v. Cty. of Albany*, 687 F.3d 565, 574 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012).

With respect to the third *Gingles* factor, the test is not whether there is some level of racially polarized voting, but rather whether there is “‘legally significant racially polarized voting,’ which occurs when the ‘majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.’” *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170 (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 51, 55-56); *see also Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56 (“[I]n general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white “crossover” votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting.”). Because the existence and degree of racially polarized voting will “vary” from county-to-county, this factor requires a localized, “district-specific assessment” of whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc “usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170-74 (internal quotation marks omitted). The need for such localized analysis is particularly acute in North Carolina: as demonstrated below and in the accompanying expert report of Dr. Lisa Handley, the existence and extent of white bloc voting varies widely across different county groupings.

There is no bright-line rule for the level of white bloc voting that is necessary for the third *Gingles* fact to be met, but prior cases provide guidance. In particular, two recent North Carolina cases—*Cooper v. Harris*, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), and *Covington v. North Carolina*,

316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff'd*, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017)—offer guidance on circumstances where the third *Gingles* factor is not met:

- In *Cooper*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was not legally significant racially polarized voting in North Carolina’s former Congressional District 1. The Court explained that, in the 20 years prior to the relevant plan’s adoption, “the district’s BVAP usually hovered between 46% and 48%,” and yet “[i]n the closest election during that period, African–Americans’ candidate of choice received 59% of the total vote; in other years, the share of the vote garnered by those candidates rose to as much as 70%.” 137 S. Ct. at 1470.
- In *Covington*, the district court held that the defendants had not presented “conclusive evidence of the third *Gingles* factor” given that, in most of the elections that the defendants’ expert analyzed, “a majority of non-African-American voters preferred the African-American voters’ candidate of choice.” 316 F.R.D. at 170. The *Covington* case involved state legislative districts in many of the same counties at issue in the remedial process of the instant case, including districts in Cumberland, Forsyth, Guilford, Wake, and Mecklenburg Counties.

In contrast, the following are examples of cases where courts have found that the third *Gingles* factor is met:

- In *Old Person v. Cooney*, 230 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held that the third *Gingles* factor was satisfied where white candidates defeated Indian candidates “in 86% of the contests in the four districts challenged on appeal.”
- In *United States v. Blaine County, Montana*, 363 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding of legally significant racially polarized voting where, “[i]n five out of seven county-wide elections between an American Indian candidate and white candidate, the American Indian candidate lost despite receiving strong American Indian support.”
- In *Rodriguez v. Pataki*, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y.), *aff'd*, 543 U.S. 997 (2004), the district court found that the third *Gingles* factor was met where “the Hispanic-preferred candidate received between (an estimated) 27.1% and 39.7% of the white vote in each [endogenous] election; and each Hispanic-preferred candidate lost to the white-preferred candidate.”
- In *Flores v. Town of Islip*, 382 F. Supp. 3d 197, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), the district court held that there was legally significant polarized voting where white crossover voting ranged from 23.8% to 39% across relevant elections.

As relevant to the third *Gingles* factor, Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Handley analyzed the extent of racially polarized voting in specific county groupings using Ecological Inference (EI) modeling. Specifically, Dr. Handley ran EI analysis on state legislative and statewide elections that had an African American candidate and occurred within one or more of the counties in the relevant grouping.

Dr. Chen's report is attached as Exhibit A to this brief and Dr. Handley's report is attached as Exhibit B.

II. House County Groupings

a. Alamance

In the Alamance county grouping, the first *Gingles* factor is not met. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 12. Dr. Chen finds that the maximum African American CVAP possible for a non-contiguous district in this county while adhering to equal population requirements is 35.83%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, for completeness, it does appear that there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. For Alamance County, Dr. Handley finds that over 96% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between 31.2% and 38.2% in these general elections. Handley Report at 14 (Table 3).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Alamance					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 64	18.5%	Lynch	Lost	42.2%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.8%	Coleman	Lost	41.8%
2016	Treasurer	18.8%	Blue III	Lost	43.2%
2012	House District 64	18.5%	McAdoo	Lost	41.0%
2012	President	18.8%	Obama	Lost	43.1%
2012	Lt. Governor	18.8%	Coleman	Lost	43.3%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 64	18.5%	Lynch	Lost	46.8%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.8%	Coleman	Won	52.3%* ³
2016	Treasurer	18.8%	Blue III	Won	57.4%
2016	Attorney General	18.8%	Williams	Won	51.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	18.8%	Ferguson	Won	50.3%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	18.8%	Foster	Lost	33.5%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 31.7% to 37.6%. Handley Report at 14 (Table 3). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 34.4%. *Id.*

b. Anson-Union

The first *Gingles* factor also is not met in the Anson-Union grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 13. He finds that the maximum African

³ Asterisks in the charts in this section indicate that the relevant Democratic primary had more than two candidates.

American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 37.63%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, for completeness, it does appear that there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 98% of African Americans have supported the same candidates in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between just 23.1% and 32.0% in these general elections. Handley Report at 14 (Table 4).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Anson-Union					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	16.5%	Coleman	Lost	33.1%
2016	Treasurer	16.5%	Blue III	Lost	34.6%
2012	President	16.5%	Obama	Lost	37.7%
2012	Lt. Governor	16.5%	Coleman	Lost	37.8%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	16.5%	Coleman	Won	40.8%*
2016	Treasurer	16.5%	Blue III	Won	56.5%
2016	Attorney General	16.5%	Williams	Won	58.3%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	16.5%	Ferguson	Won	55.3%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	16.5%	Richardson	Lost	37.2%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 38.1% to 45.7%. Handley Report at 14 (Table 4). Across the general elections she studied, the average

minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 42.2%. *See id.*

c. Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly Grouping

The first *Gingles* factor also is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 16. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 43.85%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, for completeness, it does appear that there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 97% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between 28.1% and 38.9% in these general elections. Handley Report at 16 (Table 5).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 82	14.1%	Steele	Lost	47.3%
2016	Lt. Governor	15.5%	Coleman	Lost	33.8%
2016	Treasurer	15.5%	Blue III	Lost	36.1%
2012	House District 83	15.2%	Fleming	Lost	37%
2012	President	15.5%	Obama	Lost	37.8%
2012	Lt. Governor	15.5%	Coleman	Lost	39.1%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	15.5%	Coleman	Won	45.2%*
2016	Treasurer	15.5%	Blue III	Won	53.6%

2016	Attorney General	15.5%	Williams	Won	55.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	15.5%	Ferguson	Won	53.6%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	15.5%	Foster	Lost	24%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 29.1% to 47.6%. Handley Report at 16 (Table 5). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 36.6%. *See id.*

d. Cleveland-Gaston Grouping

The first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 17. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 43.63%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, for completeness, there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 95% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between just 23.1% and 30.0% in these general elections. Handley Report at 17 (Table 6).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Cleveland-Gaston					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 110	15.3%	McCleary	Lost	32.2%
2018	Senate District 43	14.8%	Price	Lost	34.8%
2016	Lt. Governor	16.2%	Coleman	Lost	33.0%
2016	Treasurer	16.2%	Blue III	Lost	36.0%
2012	House District 110	15.3%	McKoy	Lost	34.1%
2012	President	16.2%	Obama	Lost	37.1%
2012	Lt. Governor	16.2%	Coleman	Lost	39.1%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	16.2%	Coleman	Won	42.7%*
2016	Treasurer	16.2%	Blue III	Won	52.6%
2016	Attorney General	16.2%	Williams	Won	57.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	16.2%	Ferguson	Won	53.8%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	16.2%	Foster	Lost	25.8%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 34.6% to 48.3%. Handley Report at 17 (Table 6). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 41.6%. *See id.*

e. Columbus-Pender-Robeson Grouping

1. Native Americans

Robeson County contains a large Native American population. It is possible to create a majority Native American district in Robeson County, as the current version of House District 47

has a Native American VAP close to 50% and the prior 2011 version of the district did have a Native American VAP above 50%.

With respect to the second and third *Gingles* factors, Dr. Handley analyzed elections solely within Robeson County. Regarding the second factor, in the seven general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed in Robeson County, less than 60% of Native Americans supported the same candidate in 5 of 7 elections. Handley Report at 41 (Table 22A). Similar voting patterns exist in the primaries that Dr. Handley evaluated. *Id.* at 42 (Table 22B).

Based on the elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, the third *Gingles* factor is not met with respect to Native Americans in Robeson County. Dr. Handley finds that a majority of non-Native Americans supported the same candidate as a majority of Native Americans in 5 of the 7 general elections she evaluated, and similar voting patterns exist in the primaries. Handley Report at 40-41 (Tables 22A & 22B). More importantly, the candidate of choice of Native Americans won every general election that Dr. Handley analyzed—all 7 of 7—and almost all of the primary elections as well. *Id.* Thus, non-Native Americans have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat [Native Americans’] preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56.

2. African Americans

Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley also evaluated the African American community across all three counties in this grouping.

With respect to African Americans, Dr. Chen finds that it is not possible to create even a non-contiguous district that would have an African-American CVAP above 50%. Chen Report at 18. Dr. Chen finds that it may be possible to create a non-contiguous majority-African American district using total VAP from the Decennial Census rather than CVAP, but in any

event, he finds that it is not possible to create a contiguous majority-African American district using total VAP. *Id.*

Dr. Handley finds that there is bloc voting in this grouping with respect to African Americans. Dr. Handley finds that over 82% of African Americans supported the same candidate in all general elections she studied. Handley Report at 18 (Table 7). And Dr. Handley calculates that between 26.3% and 46.0% of non-African Americans supported the black-preferred candidate in the general elections she studied. *Id.*

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Columbus-Pender-Robeson					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	Senate District 13	26.4%	Campbell	Lost	37.5%
2018	House District 46	24.7%	Yates-Lockamy	Lost	36.7%
2016	Lt. Governor	24.5%	Coleman	Lost	43.7%
2016	Treasurer	24.5%	Blue III	Lost	47.0%
2012	President	24.5%	Obama	Won	50.3%
2012	Lt. Governor	24.5%	Coleman	Won	57.4%
Primary Election					
2018	Senate District 13	26.4%	Campbell	Won	69.2%
2016	Lt. Governor	24.5%	Coleman	Won	41.6%*
2016	Treasurer	24.5%	Blue III	Won	64.8%
2016	Attorney General	24.5%	Williams	Won	60.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	24.5%	Ferguson	Lost	38.5%
2014	Senate District 13	26.4%	Williams	Lost	27.3%*
2012	Commissioner of Labor	24.5%	Richardson	Lost	27.9%

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 5.5% to 49.7%. Handley Report at 18 (Table 7). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice is 30.1%. *See id.*

f. Cumberland

Dr. Chen finds that it is not possible three non-contiguous districts that are majority-African American in Cumberland County. Chen Report at 19.

Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 83% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county. Handley Report at 19 (Table 8A).

There is far less white bloc voting under the third *Gingles* factor, however. In 2 of the 7 general elections and 4 of the 7 Democratic primaries that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority or plurality of white voters supported the African American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House Districts 42 and 43, the 2018 Democratic primary in House District 43, the 2016 Lieutenant Governor primary, and the 2012 Lieutenant Governor and Commission of Labor primaries). Handley Report at 19-20 (Tables 8A & 8B). In the remaining general elections studied, white crossover voting ranged from 29.4% to 42.4%, with similar figures for the remaining Democratic primaries.

Election results since 2012 indicate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates” in Cumberland County. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, of the state legislative and statewide general elections in Cumberland County since 2012 that had an African American candidate, the African American candidate won

9 of the 10 elections. Like in *Cooper*, of those races that African American candidates won, the “closest election” saw an African American candidate win 57% of the vote, and African American candidates won much higher margins in most of the other elections. *Id.* at 1470. The BVAP in these elections ranged from 37.1% to 52.6%. *See id.* Similar results have occurred in Democratic primaries this decade.

Cumberland					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African American Candidate	Result for African American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 42	42.2%	Lucas, Jr.	Won	76.1%
2018	House District 43	50.0%	Floyd	Won	74.1%
2016	Senate District 19	22.5%	Morris	Lost	43.6%
2016	Lt. Governor	37.1%	Coleman	Won	57.3%
2016	Treasurer	37.1%	Blue III	Won	57.6%
2012	House District 42	52.6%	Lucas, Jr.	Won	77.5%
2012	House District 43	51.5%	Floyd	Won	69.6%
2012	President	37.1%	Obama	Won	59.9%
2012	Lt. Governor	37.1%	Coleman	Won	61.6%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 43	50.0%	Floyd	Won	79.2%
2016	Lt. Governor	37.1%	Coleman	Won	59.1%*
2016	Treasurer	37.1%	Blue III	Won	52.3%
2016	Attorney General	37.1%	Williams	Won	66.7%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	37.1%	Ferguson	Lost	46.0%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	37.1%	Richardson	Won	42.8%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in Cumberland County is 18.3%.⁴ See Handley Report at 19-20 (Tables 8A & 8B).

g. Duplin-Onslow Grouping

The first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 20. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 37.61%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, for completeness, there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 97% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between just 15.1% and 28.0% in these general elections. Handley Report at 21 (Table 9).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

⁴ For purposes of the averages calculated in this brief, elections in which a majority of white voters supported the African-American-preferred candidate are considered to require 0% BVAP for the African-American-preferred candidate to have won.

Duplin-Onslow					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6%	Love	Lost	35.7%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.5%	Coleman	Lost	34.7%
2016	Treasurer	18.5%	Blue III	Lost	35.7%
2012	President	18.5%	Obama	Lost	38.7
2012	Lt. Governor	18.5%	Coleman	Lost	41.9%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6	Love	Won	57.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.5%	Coleman	Won	46.7%*
2016	Treasurer	18.5%	Blue III	Won	54.9%
2016	Attorney General	18.5%	Williams	Won	64.6%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	18.5%	Ferguson	Won	51%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	18.5%	Richardson	Lost	29.1%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 31.2% to 51.7%. Handley Report at 21 (Table 9). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 42.3%. *See id.*

h. Forsyth-Yadkin

Dr. Chen finds that it is not possible to create two contiguous districts in this grouping that are majority-African American. Chen Report at 21. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 98% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in these counties. Handley Report at 22 (Table 10).

However, with respect to the third *Gingles* factor, there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in this county grouping. In 4 of 8 of general elections and 4 of 6 Democratic primaries that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of whites supported the African-American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House District 71, House District 72, and Senate District 32, in the 2014 general election in House District 71, in the 2016 Democratic primaries for Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner of Labor, and Treasurer, and in the 2012 Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor). Handley Report at 22 (Table 10); *see Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

Election results since 2012 further demonstrate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won 9 of 11 general elections and 7 of 9 Democratic primaries across these counties since 2012. In the most probative elections for present purposes—endogenous state House and state Senate races—African American candidates have won over 70% of the two-party vote in all seven general elections, even though the BVAPs of the districts involved were between just 36.6% and 47.5%. *See Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Forsyth-Yadkin					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 71	36.6%	Terry	Won	72.7%
2018	House District 72	47.5%	Montgomery	Won	79.1%
2018	Senate District 32	39.2%	Lowe	Won	72.9%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Lost	49.1%

2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Lost	47.7%
2014	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	76.6%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	77.9%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	74.4%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	73.0%
2012	President	23.6%	Obama	Won	51.0%
2012	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Won	50.9%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Won	55.6%*
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Won	59.1%
2016	Attorney General	23.6%	Williams	Lost	45.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Ferguson	Won	60.5%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	51.3%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	43.6%*
2012	House District 74	10.7%	Gladman	Lost	44.1%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	60.0%*
2012	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Foster	Won	38.9%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied across these counties, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 16.9%. Handley report at 22 (Table 10). Dr. Handley also performed her analysis for elections solely within Forsyth County and found less polarized voting when focusing just on this county. *Id.* at 38 (Table 20). Accordingly, the average minimum BVAPs necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections in Forsyth County is lower than that across the full county grouping. *See id.*

i. Nash-Franklin

At trial, Dr. Chen presented an analysis showing that, while it is possible to create a majority- African American district in this grouping using voting-age population data from the Decennial Census, any such district would have a Polsby-Popper scores below 0.05. PX123 at 145-47 (Chen Rebuttal Report). But Dr. Chen concludes in his newest report that it is possible

create a majority-African American district with a Polsby-Popper score above 0.05 if using CVAP statistics rather than all VAP. Chen Report at 22.

With respect to the second and third *Gingles* factors, Dr. Handley finds that over 84% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections she studied, and white crossover voting has been between 20.8% and 44.8% in these general elections. Handley Report at 23 (Table 11).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Nash-Franklin					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 25	40.73%	Gailliard	Won	53.3%
2016	Lt. Governor	33.0%	Coleman	Lost	47.3%
2016	Treasurer	33.0%	Blue III	Lost	48.7%
2016	House District 7	50.7%	Richardson	Won	67.8%
2016	House District 25	16.1%	Gailliard	Lost	31.9%
2012	President	33.0%	Obama	Lost	49.5%
2012	Lt. Governor	33.0%	Coleman	Won	51.2%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	33.0%	Coleman	Won	66.5%*
2016	Treasurer	33.0%	Blue III	Won	65.1%
2016	Attorney General	33.0%	Williams	Lost	39.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	33.0%	Ferguson	Lost	25.2%
2012	House District 7	50.7%	Bryant	Won	83.5%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	33.0%	Foster	Won	36.2%*

Dr. Handley finds that the BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 11.9% to 49.6%.

Handley Report at 23 (Handley Report). Across the general elections she studied, the average BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 35.2%.

j. Guilford

The first *Gingles* factor is clearly met, at least as to the creation of a single district, given the racial demographics of Guilford County. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 98% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county. Handley Report at 24 (Table 12A).

However, with respect to the third *Gingles* factor, there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in Guilford County. In 4 of the 9 general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of white voters supported the African-American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House District 58, House District 60, and Senate District 28, and in the 2016 general election in Senate District 28). *Id.*; see *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170. And in the remaining general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, white crossover voting exceeded 40% in all but one of the elections. Handley Report at 24 (Table 12A). Similar voting patterns occurred in Democratic primaries. *Id.* at 25 (Table 12B).

Election results since 2012 further demonstrate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates” in Guilford County. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won all 12 relevant Democratic primaries since 2012 and 9 of 11 general elections. In the seven state House and state Senate general elections that African American candidates have won, the African American candidate won over 68% of the vote, including in three districts where the BVAP was between 40%-43%. See *Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Guilford					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 58	42.7%	Quick	Won	76.8%
2018	House District 60	40.1%	Brockman	Won	69.0%
2018	Senate District 28	43.6%	Robinson	Won	75.3%
2016	Senate District 28	56.5%	Robinson	Won	83.9%
2016	Lt. Governor	32.1%	Coleman	Won	58.2%
2016	Treasurer	32.1%	Blue III	Won	57.6%
2014	House District 61	15.3%	Weatherford	Lost	32.8%
2012	House District 58	51.1%	Adams	Won	79.9%
2012	House District 61	15.3%	Weatherford	Lost	36.2%
2012	President	32.1%	Obama	Won	58.3%
2012	Lt. Governor	32.1%	Coleman	Won	58.0%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 58	42.7%	Quick	Won	80.2%
2016	House District 58	51.1%	Quick	Won	71.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	32.1%	Coleman	Won	57.9%*
2016	Treasurer	32.1%	Blue III	Won	54.3%
2016	Attorney General	32.1%	Williams	Won	54.6%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	32.1%	Ferguson	Won	61.3%
2014	House District 58	51.1%	Johnson	Won	42.6%*
2014	House District 60	51.4%	Brockman	Won	54.2%*
2014	Senate District 28	56.5%	Robinson	Won	59.4%
2012	House District 60	51.4%	Brandon	Won	66.2%
2012	Senate District 28	56.5%	Robinson	Won	72.0%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	32.1%	Foster	Won	39.2%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in Guilford County is 12.8%. See Handley Report at 24 (Table 12A).

k. Pitt-Lenoir

With respect to the first *Gingles* factor, Dr. Chen finds that it is possible to create a majority-African American district with a Reock score exceeding 0.15 and a Polsby-Popper score exceeding 0.05. Chen Report at 23.

Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 86% of African Americans supported the same candidate in all general elections she analyzed in this grouping. Dr. Handley also finds evidence of white bloc voting in this grouping. Handley Report at 26 (Table 13). Dr. Handley calculates white crossover voting of between 24.9% and 46.8% in the general elections she analyzed. *Id.*

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Pitt-Lenoir					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 8	44.9%	Smith	Won	39.7%
2018	House District 9	20.5%	Rixon	Lost	49.9%
2018	House District 12	37.4%	Graham	Lost	40.0%
2016	Lt. Governor	34.2%	Coleman	Won	51.4%
2016	Treasurer	34.2%	Blue III	Won	52.6%
2012	President	34.2%	Obama	Won	52.6%
2012	Lt. Governor	34.2%	Coleman	Won	54.7%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 8	44.9%	Smith	Won	50.0%
2016	Lt. Governor	34.2%	Coleman	Won	53.6%
2016	Treasurer	34.2%	Blue III	Won	54.6%
2016	Attorney General	34.2%	Williams	Won	61.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	34.2%	Ferguson	Lost	46.5%
2012	Commissioner of	34.2%	Richardson	Lost	30.2%*

	Labor				
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Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 12.2% to 57.3%. Handley Report at 26 (Table 13). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 30.4%. *See id.*

I. Mecklenburg

The first *Gingles* factor is clearly met, at least as to the creation of a single district, given the racial demographics of Mecklenburg County. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 89% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county. Handley Report at 27 (Table 14A).

However, there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in Mecklenburg County for purposes of the third *Gingles* factor. In 14 of 19 of the general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of white voters supported the African-American-preferred candidate. Handley Report at 27 (Table 14A); *see Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

Election results since 2012 further demonstrate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won 15 of 16 relevant Democratic primaries since 2012 and 18 of 22 general elections in that time period. In 2018, African American candidates won state House races in Mecklenburg County in districts with BVAPs as low as 6.2% and 18.2%, and other African American candidates won landslide victories in districts with BVAPs between 30% and 40%. *See Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Mecklenburg					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 92	30.2%	Beasley	Won	70.0%
2018	House District 99	49.5%	Majeed	Won	82.4%
2018	House District 101	50.8%	Logan	Won	78.7%
2018	House District 104	6.2%	Lofton	Won	51.8%
2018	House District 106	38.0%	Cunningham	Won	80.6%
2018	Senate District 40	38.9%	Waddell	Won	75.6%
2016	House District 92	18.2%	Beasley	Won	54.4%
2016	House District 101	51.3%	Earle	Won	76.0%
2016	House District 105	9.5%	Green-Johnson	Lost	44.7%
2016	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	79.1%
2016	Senate District 40	51.8%	Waddell	Won	82.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	30.2%	Coleman	Won	59.6%
2016	Treasurer	30.2%	Blue III	Won	58.4%
2014	House District 92	18.2%	Bradford	Lost	47.5%
2014	House District 106	51.1%	Cunningham	Won	86.6%
2014	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	79.7%
2014	Senate District 41	13.2%	McRae	Lost	39.5%
2012	House District 92	18.2%	Bradford	Lost	48.6%
2012	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	80.2%
2012	Senate District 40	51.8%	Graham	Won	84.1%
2012	President	30.2%	Obama	Won	61.3%
2012	Lt. Governor	30.2%	Coleman	Won	59.8%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 99	49.5%	Majeed	Won	57.3%*
2018	House District 101	50.8%	Logan	Won	50.0%*
2018	House District 106	38.0%	Cunningham	Won	88.9%
2018	Senate District 38	48.5%	Ford	Lost ⁵	40.7%
2016	House District 101	51.3%	Earle	Won	78.6%
2016	House District 107	52.5%	Alexander, Jr.	Won	90.1%
2016	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	52.1%
2016	Senate District 40	51.8%	Waddell	Won	64.7%

⁵ In the 2016 Democratic primary in Senate District 38, Dr. Handley finds that the candidate of choice of African Americans was not the African American candidate, but rather another candidate who won the election.

2016	Lt. Governor	30.2%	Coleman	Won	55.2%*
2016	Treasurer	30.2%	Blue III	Won	52.7%
2016	Attorney General	30.2%	Williams	Won	55.7%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	30.2%	Ferguson	Won	57.0%
2014	Senate District 40	51.8%	Waddell	Won	41.9%*
2012	House District 101	51.3%	Earle	Won	84.9*
2012	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	52.2%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	30.2%	Richardson	Won	40.7%*

m. Buncombe

The first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 15. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 16.81%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in this county.

n. Brunswick-New Hanover

The first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 14. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 35.70%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in these counties.

III. Senate County Groupings

a. Alamance-Guilford-Randolph

After removing Senate Districts 24 and 28 (which cannot be altered under the Court's order), the remainder of this county grouping does not contain enough African Americans to constitute a majority in one of the two remedial districts to be created. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 7. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in the remaining territory in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 34.06%. *Id.*

b. Davie-Forsyth

At trial, Dr. Chen established in unrebutted testimony that it is not "mathematically possible" to create a majority-minority district in the Davie-Forsyth county grouping. Tr. 518:4-15. Dr. Chen found that, even if creating a non-contiguous district, the maximum BVAP possible for a district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is just 44.81%. PX123 at 148-49 (Chen Rebuttal Report). Dr. Chen has confirmed in his most recent report that it would not be possible to create a majority African American district in this grouping if using CVAP rather than total VAP. Chen Report at 8. Dr. Chen finds that the maximum percent CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 45.55%. *Id.*

Dr. Handley's analysis indicates that the third *Gingles* factor also is not met in this grouping. Just as was the case with the Forsyth-Yadkin grouping in the House, there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in the Davie-Forsyth grouping. In 4 of 8 of the general elections and 4 of 6 primaries that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of whites

supported the African-American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House District 71, House District 72, and Senate District 32, in the 2014 general election in House District 71, and in the 2016 Democratic primaries for Commissioner of Labor and Treasurer). Handley Report at 33 (Table 17); *see Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

Election results since 2012 confirm that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won 9 of 11 general elections and 7 of 9 Democratic primaries across these counties since 2012. In the most probative elections for present purposes—endogenous state House and state Senate races—African American candidates have won over 70% of the two-party vote in all seven general elections, even though the BVAPs of the districts involved were between just 36.6% and 47.5%. *See Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Davie-Forsyth					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 71	36.6%	Terry	Won	72.7%
2018	House District 72	47.5%	Montgomery	Won	79.1%
2018	Senate District 32	39.2%	Lowe	Won	72.9%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.8%	Coleman	Lost	49.2%
2016	Treasurer	23.8%	Blue III	Lost	47.6%
2014	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	76.6%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	77.9%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	74.4%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	73.0%
2012	President	23.8%	Obama	Won	50.9%
2012	Lt. Governor	23.8%	Coleman	Won	50.7%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	23.8%	Coleman	Won	55.6%*
2016	Treasurer	23.8%	Blue III	Won	59.2%
2016	Attorney General	23.8%	Williams	Lost	45.0%

2016	Commissioner of Labor	23.8%	Ferguson	Won	60.2%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	51.3%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	43.6%*
2012	House District 74	10.7%	Gladman	Lost	44.1%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	60.0%*
2012	Commissioner of Labor	23.8%	Foster	Won	39.3%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice is 15.5%. *See Handley Report* at 33 (Table 17). Dr. Handley also performed her analysis for elections solely within Forsyth County and found less polarized voting when focusing just on this county. *Id.* at 38 (Table 20). Accordingly, the average minimum BVAPs necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections in Forsyth County is lower than that across the full county grouping. *See id.*

c. Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson

With respect to the *Gingles* factor, Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. *Chen Report* at 11. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 47.48%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, for completeness, it does appear that there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 84% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between 15.1% and 44.8% in these general elections. *Handley Report* at 34 (Table 18A).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Johnston-Sampson-Nash-Harnett-Duplin					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6%	Love	Lost	35.7%
2018	House District 25	40.73%	Gailliard	Won	53.3%
2018	Senate District 10	24.1%	Moore	Lost	37.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Lost	38.9%
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Lost	40.6%
2012	President	23.6%	Obama	Lost	42.0%
2012	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Lost	44.4%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6	Love	Won	57.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Won	58.6%
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Won	59.2%
2016	Attorney General	23.6%	Williams	Won	50.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Ferguson	Lost	32.6%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Richardson	Lost	30.8%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 11.9% to 45.0%. Handley Report at 34 (Table 18A). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice is 36.1%. *See id.*

d. Franklin-Wake

The first *Gingles* factor is clearly met, as least to the creation of a single district, given the racial demographics of these counties. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley

finds that over 99% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county grouping. Handley Report at 36 (Table 19A).

However, with respect to the third *Gingles* factor, there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in this grouping. In 12 of 20 primary and general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of whites voted for the African American-preferred candidate. *Id.* at 36-37 (Tables 19A & 19B); *see Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170. And with respect to state legislative elections in particular, a majority of whites supported the African American-preferred candidate in 6 of 8 general elections and 2 of 2 Democratic primaries. *Id.* In the few primary and general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed in this grouping where a majority of whites did not support the African American-preferred candidate, white crossover voting exceeded 40% in all but two of these elections. *Id.*

Dr. Handley also performed her analysis for elections solely within Wake County and found less polarized voting when focusing just on this county: she found that a majority of white voters supported the African American-preferred candidate in 9 of the 13 general elections she analyzed in Wake County. Handley Report at 29 (Table 15A).

Election results since 2012 confirm that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates” in this grouping. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won all 12 relevant general elections and 7 of 10 primaries since 2012. In 2018, an African American candidate won a state House race in Wake County in a district with a BVAP of just 14.3%, and other African American candidates won landslide victories in districts with BVAPs between 38% and 49%. *See id.* at 1470.

Franklin-Wake					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 33	44.2%	Gill	Won	78.7%
2018	House District 37	14.3%	Batch	Won	51.1%
2018	House District 38	48.3%	Holley	Won	84.1%
2018	Senate District 14	38.9%	Blue Jr.	Won	71.4%
2016	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	84.8%
2016	Lt. Governor	21.1%	Coleman	Won	55.7%
2016	Treasurer	21.1%	Blue III	Won	55.4%
2014	House District 33	51.4%	Gill	Won	87.3%
2014	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	79.9%
2012	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	87.7%
2012	President	21.1%	Obama	Won	55.4%
2012	Lt. Governor	21.1%	Coleman	Won	54.9%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 33	44.2%	Gill	Won	60.2%
2016	House District 33	51.4%	Gill	Won	64.1%
2016	Lt. Governor	21.1%	Coleman	Won	60.7%*
2016	Treasurer	21.1%	Blue III	Won	63.4%
2016	Attorney General	21.1%	Williams	Lost	35.4%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	21.1%	Ferguson	Lost	27.8%
2012	House District 33	51.4%	Gill	Won	78.7%
2012	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	60.8%*
2012	House District 39	26.5%	Mial	Lost	29.5%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	21.1%	Foster	Won	37.7%*

e. Mecklenburg

The analysis for the Mecklenburg Senate county grouping is identical to that for the Mecklenburg grouping in the House. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in this Senate grouping under the third *Gingles* factor.

f. New Hanover-Bladen-Pender-Brunswick

The first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 9. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 28.11%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given there relatively low number of African Americans who live in these counties.

g. Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania

The first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 10. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 10.47%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in these counties.

Respectfully submitted this the 17th day of September, 2019

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EXHIBIT A

EXPERT REPORT OF JOWEI CHEN, Ph.D.**September 17, 2019**

Questions Analyzed: Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to analyze the following questions in this report:

1) Within each of the 2017 Senate Plan county groupings listed below, is it possible to create a single Senate district satisfying five characteristics: 1) At least 50% African-American Citizen Voting Age Population ("CVAP"); 2) Within the 5% population deviation requirement described in the 2017 Adopted Criteria; 3) Geographically contiguous; 4) A Reock compactness score of at least 0.15; and 5) A Polsby-Popper compactness score of at least 0.05?

Senate County Groupings:

- 1) Alamance-Guilford-Randolph (while freezing SD-24 and SD-28);
- 2) Bladen-Brunswick-New Hanover-Pender;
- 3) Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania;
- 4) Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson;
- 5) Davie-Forsyth.

2) Within each of the 2017 House Plan county groupings listed below, is it possible to create a single House district satisfying the five aforementioned characteristics?

House County Groupings:

- 1) Alamance;
- 2) Anson-Union;
- 3) Brunswick-New Hanover;
- 4) Buncombe;
- 5) Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly (while freezing HD-66);
- 6) Cleveland-Gaston;
- 7) Columbus-Pender-Robeson;
- 8) Duplin-Onslow;
- 9) Franklin-Nash; and
- 10) Lenoir-Pitt.

3) Within the Cumberland county grouping in the 2017 House Plan, is it possible to create three House districts that each satisfy the five aforementioned characteristics?

4) Within the Forsyth-Yadkin county grouping in the 2017 House Plan, is it possible to create two House districts that each satisfy the five aforementioned characteristics?

Summary of Findings: For the Senate Plan, I found that within each of the five county groupings I analyzed, it was not possible to create a single majority-African-American House district that satisfies the five characteristics listed above. Table 1 summarizes my findings regarding each of the Senate county groupings I analyzed.

For the House Plan, I found that within the Franklin-Nash and the Lenoir-Pitt county groupings, it is possible to create a single majority-African-American House district that satisfies the five characteristics listed above. Within the eight other House county groupings that I analyzed, I found that it is not possible to produce the number of majority-African-American House districts in question (i.e., three in Cumberland, two in Forsyth-Yadkin, and one in all other county groupings). Table 2 summarizes my findings regarding each of the House county groupings I analyzed.

For most of these House and Senate county groupings, I was able to arrive at my conclusions by analyzing a simple question: Within the county grouping, is it mathematically possible to form one or more 50%+ African-American CVAP districts by simply combining together the most heavily African-American census blocks, while ignoring districts' geographic contiguity, Reock scores, and Polsby-Popper scores? If African-Americans are not sufficiently numerous within a county grouping to form even a geographically non-contiguous district, then it is obviously impossible to form a majority-African-American district satisfying all five of the characteristics listed above.

For the remaining county groupings in which the African-American population is sufficiently numerous to potentially form one or more majority-African-American districts, I further analyzed whether such districts could be formed while adhering to the five characteristics listed above, including geographic contiguity, a Reock score of at least 0.15, and a Polsby-Popper score of at least 0.05. To analyze this question, I conducted a large number of computer simulations in which district boundaries were drawn within these county groupings in a race-conscious manner. Specifically, the algorithm attempted to intentionally create a 50% African-American CVAP district while otherwise prioritizing geographic compactness and not violating the geographic contiguity and 5% population deviation requirements. Using this simulation algorithm, I determined that it is possible to create a majority -African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria in the Lenoir-Pitt and the Franklin-Nash House county groupings, but not in the other county groupings I analyzed using this method. In programming

this particular race-conscious computer simulation algorithm, I ignored any consideration of county traversals or municipal, precinct, or VTD boundaries.

For all of the results I present below, I use Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) data from the most recent American Community Survey. However, with one exception, I have confirmed that my findings do not change if using total Voting Age Population data from the 2010 Decennial Census. That is, I have confirmed that for any grouping where I report that it is not possible to create a majority-African-American district, that is the case regardless of whether one uses CVAP or total VAP, and the same is true for any grouping where I report that it is possible to create a majority-African-American district. The one exception, as documented below, is the Franklin-Nash grouping in the House, where I find that it is possible to create a majority-African American district that is above the relevant compactness thresholds when using CVAP but not when using total VAP.

For the purpose of determining whether districts comply with the equal population requirement, I rely upon 2010 Decennial Census population counts throughout this report. Specifically, the 5% population deviation requirement implies that all House districts must have a 2010 Census population between 75,490 and 83,435, while all Senate districts must have a 2010 Census population between 181,174 and 200,245.

Table 1: County Groupings from the 2017 Senate Plan

2017 Senate County Grouping:	Frozen Districts:	Finding:
Alamance-Guilford-Randolph	SD-24 and SD-28 are frozen	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Bladen-Brunswick-New Hanover-Pender	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Buncombe-Henderson-Tennessee	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Davie-Forsyth	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.

Note: The five required district characteristics are: 1) At least 50% African-American Citizen Voting Age Population ("CVAP"); 2) within the 5% population deviation requirement described in the 2017 Adopted Criteria; 3) geographically contiguous; 4) a Reock compactness score of at least 0.15; and 5) a Polsby-Popper compactness score of at least 0.05.

Table 2: County Groupings from the 2017 House Plan

2017 House County Grouping:	Frozen Districts:	Finding:
Alamance	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Anson-Union	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Brunswick-New Hanover	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Buncombe	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly	HD-66 is frozen	After freezing HD-66, it is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Cleveland-Gaston	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Columbus-Pender-Robeson	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Cumberland	none	It is not possible to create even three non-contiguous majority-African-American districts while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Duplin-Onslow	none	It is not possible to create even one non-contiguous majority-African-American district while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Forsyth-Yadkin	none	It is not possible to create two geographically contiguous House districts with over a 50% African-American CVAP, while adhering to the equal population requirement.
Franklin-Nash	none	It is possible to create one majority-African-American House district satisfying the five characteristics listed below.
Lenoir-Pitt	none	It is possible to create one majority-African-American House district satisfying the five characteristics listed below.

Note: The five required district characteristics are: 1) At least 50% African-American Citizen Voting Age Population ("CVAP"); 2) within the 5% population deviation requirement described in the 2017 Adopted Criteria; 3) geographically contiguous; 4) a Reock compactness score of at least 0.15; and 5) a Polsby-Popper compactness score of at least 0.05.

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Analysis of Senate Plan County Groupings:

The Alamance-Guilford-Randolph Senate Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 Senate Plan, the Alamance-Guilford-Randolph county grouping contains four Senate districts. However, plaintiffs' counsel asked me to freeze two districts, SD-24 and SD-28, from the 2017 Senate Plan and to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in the remaining non-frozen areas within this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the non-frozen portions of the Alamance-Guilford-Randolph county grouping to form a majority-African-American Senate district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the non-frozen portions of the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that the non-frozen portions of this county grouping have a total population of 386,069. Each of the two Senate districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 185,824 and no higher than 200,245, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the non-frozen portions of the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 185,824 minimum Senate district population for the non-frozen portions of the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant Senate district whose African-American CVAP is only 34.06%. Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American Senate district in the non-frozen portions of the Alamance-Guilford-Randolph county grouping.

The Davie-Forsyth Senate Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 Senate Plan, the Davie-Forsyth county grouping contains two Senate districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Davie-Forsyth county grouping to form a majority-African-American Senate district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created in the county grouping using census block boundaries while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 391,910. Each of the two Senate districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 191,665 and no higher than 200,245, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 191,665 minimum Senate district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant Senate district whose African-American CVAP is only 45.55%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American Senate district in the Davie-Forsyth county grouping.

The Bladen-Brunswick-New Hanover-Pender Senate Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 Senate Plan, the Bladen-Brunswick-New Hanover-Pender county grouping contains two Senate districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Bladen-Brunswick-New Hanover-Pender county grouping to form a majority-African-American Senate district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created in the county grouping using census block boundaries while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 397,505. Each of the two Senate districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 197,260 and no higher than 200,245, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 197,260 minimum Senate district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant Senate district whose African-American CVAP is only 28.11%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American Senate district in the Bladen-Brunswick-New Hanover-Pender county grouping.

The Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania Senate Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 Senate Plan, the Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania county grouping contains two Senate districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania county grouping to form a majority-African-American Senate district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 378,148. Each of the two Senate districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 181,174 and no higher than 196,974, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 181,174 minimum Senate district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant Senate district whose African-American CVAP is only 10.47%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American Senate district in the Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania county grouping.

The Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson Senate Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 Senate Plan, the Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson county grouping contains three Senate districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson county grouping to form a majority-African-American Senate district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 559,198. Each of the three Senate districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 181,174 and no higher than 196,850, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 181,174 minimum Senate district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant Senate district whose African-American CVAP is only 47.48%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American Senate district in the Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson county grouping.

The Alamance House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Alamance county grouping contains two House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Alamance county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 151,131. Each of the two House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 75,641, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,490 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 35.83%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the Alamance county grouping.

The Anson-Union House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Anson-Union county grouping contains three House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Anson-Union county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 228,240. Each of the three House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 77,260, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,490 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 37.63%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the Anson-Union county grouping.

The Brunswick-New Hanover House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Brunswick-New Hanover county grouping contains four House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Brunswick-New Hanover county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 310,098. Each of the four House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 83,435, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,490 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 35.7%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the Brunswick-New Hanover county grouping.

The Buncombe House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Buncombe county grouping contains three House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Buncombe county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 238,318. Each of the three House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 83,435, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,490 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 16.81%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the Buncombe county grouping.

The Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly House Plan County

Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly county grouping contains six House districts. However, plaintiffs' counsel asked me to freeze one district, HD-66, from the 2017 House Plan and to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in the remaining non-frozen areas within this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the non-frozen portions of the Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the non-frozen portions of the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that the non-frozen portions of this county grouping have a total population of 409,669. Each of the five House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,929 and no higher than 83,435, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the non-frozen portions of the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,929 minimum House district population for the non-frozen portions of the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 43.84%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the non-frozen portions of the Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly county grouping.

The Cleveland-Gaston House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Cleveland-Gaston county grouping contains four House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Cleveland-Gaston county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 304,164. Each of the four House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 77,694, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,490 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 43.63%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the Cleveland-Gaston county grouping.

The Columbus-Pender-Robeson House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Columbus-Pender-Robeson county grouping contains three House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Columbus-Pender-Robeson county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 244,483. Each of the three House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 77,613 and no higher than 83,435, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 77,613 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant, non-contiguous House district whose African-American CVAP is only 49.34%.

When using VAP estimates from the Decennial Census rather than CVAP, I determined that it is possible to create a non-contiguous district in this county grouping with an African-American VAP ("BVAP") above 50%, but it is not possible to create a contiguous district in this grouping with a BVAP above 50%. I found the maximum BVAP possible for a contiguous district in this grouping to be approximately 44.2%.

The Cumberland House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Cumberland county grouping contains four House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether three majority African-American districts satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Cumberland county grouping to form three majority-African-American House districts that comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not three majority-African-American districts could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 319,431. Each of the four House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 83,435, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating three majority-African-American districts is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census block to one group containing enough population to fill three districts in Cumberland County. These census blocks were assigned to this three-district group regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the three-district group's population had just surpassed 235,996, which is the minimum combined population for any three districts in this county grouping. This process resulted in a three-district group whose African-American CVAP is only 45.05%. Having constructed this three-district group with the minimum necessary population, we can logically infer that it would not be possible for the least-African-American among these three districts to have an African-American CVAP of higher than 45.05%.

Therefore, I conclude that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form three majority-African-American House districts in the Cumberland county grouping.

The Duplin-Onslow House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Duplin-Onslow county grouping contains three House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping.

I determined that it is not possible to do so because there are mathematically not enough African-Americans in the Duplin-Onslow county grouping to form a majority-African-American House district that complies with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. To arrive at this answer, I simply calculated whether or not a majority-African-American district could be created using census block boundaries in the county grouping while complying with the equal population threshold requirement and ignoring all other districting criteria, such as geographic contiguity and compactness.

Specifically, I first calculated that this county grouping has a total population of 236,277. Each of the three House districts must therefore contain a population no lower than 75,490 and no higher than 83,435, in order to comply with the $\pm 5\%$ equal population threshold requirement. Next, to calculate whether creating a majority-African-American district is numerically possible, I identified the most heavily-African-American census blocks within the county grouping. I iteratively assigned the most heavily-African-American unassigned census blocks to one district. These census blocks were assigned to the district regardless of whether doing so would violate geographic contiguity and decrease the district's Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores. This iterative process of assigning the most heavily-African-American census blocks continued until the district's population had just surpassed the 75,490 minimum House district population for the county grouping. This process resulted in a population-compliant House district whose African-American CVAP is only 37.61%.

Hence, I concluded that, even if one were to ignore districting criteria such as geographic contiguity and compactness, it is mathematically impossible to form a majority-African-American House district in the Duplin-Onslow county grouping.

The Forsyth-Yadkin House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Forsyth-Yadkin county grouping contains five House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether two majority African-American districts satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping. I found that it is not possible to do so.

In analyzing this county grouping, I first found that African-Americans are sufficiently numerous to comprise a slight majority in two House districts if geographic contiguity were not required. However, in order to determine whether two contiguous majority-African-American districts could be drawn, I conducted a large number of computer simulations in which district boundaries were drawn within the Forsyth-Yadkin in a race-conscious manner. Specifically, the simulation algorithm attempted to intentionally create a 50% African-American CVAP district while otherwise prioritizing geographic compactness and not violating the geographic contiguity and 5% population deviation requirements. The algorithm used census blocks as the building blocks in order to produce computer-simulated plans containing a majority-African-American House district. The algorithm proceeded by reassigning census blocks from one district to the other in an intentional effort to increase the African-American CVAP of the more heavily African-American district; this redrawing of the boundaries continued until one of the two districts in the Forsyth-Yadkin grouping achieved at least a 50% African-American CVAP. Beyond this racial goal, the algorithm also prioritized geographic compactness while adhering to the contiguity and population deviation requirements.

Using this simulation algorithm, I determined that it is not possible to create two majority African-American districts satisfying the five aforementioned criteria in the Forsyth-Yadkin county grouping. Specifically, I found it was only possible to produce two districts with approximately a 49% African-American CVAP. Even when this was possible, these two heavily African-American districts had Polsby-Popper scores of well under 0.05. Thus, I conclude that it is not possible to create two majority African-American districts satisfying the five aforementioned criteria in this county grouping. Furthermore, I found that using VAP rather than CVAP counts in Forsyth-Yadkin did not alter this overall conclusion.

The Franklin-Nash House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Franklin-Nash county grouping contains two House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping. I found that it is possible to do so.

To analyze this question, I conducted a large number of computer simulations in which district boundaries were drawn within this county grouping in a race-conscious manner. Specifically, the simulation algorithm attempted to intentionally create a 50% African-American CVAP district while otherwise prioritizing geographic compactness and not violating the geographic contiguity and 5% population deviation requirements. The algorithm used census blocks as the building blocks in order to produce computer-simulated plans containing a majority-African-American House district. The algorithm proceeded by reassigning census blocks from one district to the other in an intentional effort to increase the African-American CVAP of the more heavily African-American district; this redrawing of the boundaries continued until one of the two districts in the Franklin-Nash grouping achieved at least a 50% African-American CVAP. Beyond this racial goal, the algorithm also prioritized geographic compactness while adhering to the contiguity and population deviation requirements.

Using this simulation algorithm, I determined that it is possible to create a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria in the Franklin-Nash county grouping. Specifically, I found that it is possible to create a single, geographically contiguous House district containing a 50.0% African-American CVAP, a Reock score of 0.2944, a Polsby-Popper score of 0.0533, and a total population of 75,777. Thus, this computer-simulated district demonstrates that it is possible in the Franklin-Nash county grouping to produce a single majority-African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria.

This finding is especially noteworthy because in my June 7, 2019 expert report, I had concluded it was not possible to create a 50% BVAP House district in Franklin-Nash with a Polsby-Popper score of at least 0.05. In this report, by contrast, I used CVAP numbers to measure African-American population, which led me to a different conclusion. In the Franklin-Nash county grouping, the African-American share of the 2013-2017 CVAP is higher than the African-American share of the VAP in the 2010 Census. As a result, it is possible to form a majority African-American district in this county grouping when using the updated CVAP numbers instead of the 2010 Census VAP numbers.

The Lenoir-Pitt House Plan County Grouping: In the 2017 House Plan, the Lenoir-Pitt county grouping contains three House districts. Plaintiffs' counsel asked me to determine whether a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria could be drawn in this county grouping. I found that it is possible to do so.

To analyze this question, I conducted a large number of computer simulations in which district boundaries were drawn within this county grouping in a race-conscious manner. Specifically, the simulation algorithm attempted to intentionally create a 50% African-American CVAP district while otherwise prioritizing geographic compactness and not violating the geographic contiguity and 5% population deviation requirements. The algorithm used census blocks as the building blocks in order to produce computer-simulated plans containing a majority-African-American House district. The algorithm proceeded by reassigning census blocks from one district to the other in an intentional effort to increase the African-American CVAP of the more heavily African-American district; this redrawing of the boundaries continued until one of the two districts in the Lenoir-Pitt grouping achieved at least a 50% African-American CVAP. Beyond this racial goal, the algorithm also prioritized geographic compactness while adhering to the contiguity and population deviation requirements.

Using this simulation algorithm, I determined that it is possible to create a majority African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria in the Lenoir-Pitt county grouping. Specifically, the simulation algorithm created one district containing a total population of 75,630 and an African-American CVAP of 50.23%. This district is geographically contiguous; it has a Reock score of 0.36 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.34. Thus, this computer-simulated district demonstrates that it is possible in the Lenoir-Pitt county grouping to produce a single majority-African-American district satisfying the five aforementioned criteria.

Moreover, I also determined that if one were to use VAP numbers instead of CVAP numbers to measure African-American population, it would be similarly possible to construct a majority African-American VAP district in the Lenoir-Pitt county grouping satisfying the five aforementioned criteria.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

This 17th day of September, 2019.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Chen", written over a horizontal line.

Jowei Chen

EXHIBIT B

Providing Black Voters with an Opportunity to Elect Candidates of Choice to the North Carolina State Legislature: A Jurisdiction-Specific, Functional Analysis of Select House and Senate County Grouping

Lisa Handley

September 17, 2019

I. Scope of Report

I was asked by counsel for Plaintiffs in this matter to conduct an analysis of voting patterns in select state House and Senate county groupings in North Carolina and, if voting in an election contest is racially polarized, to calculate the percent black voting age population necessary to provide black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. In one county (Robeson County), I also performed these calculations for the Native American population.

The district-specific, functional analysis I performed is specific to those counties and districts presented in this report. Particularly given the differences in voting patterns that exist across North Carolina, my analysis cannot be extrapolated to other counties and districts not analyzed in this report, including districts that currently have African American representatives that I did not evaluate.

II. Professional Experience

I have over thirty years of experience as a voting rights and redistricting expert. I have advised scores of jurisdictions and other clients on minority voting rights and redistricting-related issues and have served as an expert in more than 25 voting rights cases. My clients have included state and local jurisdictions, the U.S. Department of Justice, national civil rights organizations, and such international organizations as the United Nations.

I have been actively involved in researching, writing and teaching on subjects relating to voting rights, including minority representation, electoral system design and redistricting. I co-authored a book, *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), and co-edited a volume, *Redistricting in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford University Press, 2008), on these subjects. In addition, my research on these topics has appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as *Journal of Politics*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*,

American Politics Quarterly, *Journal of Law and Politics*, and *Law and Policy*, as well as in edited books and law reviews.

I am one of the co-authors of the 2001 *North Carolina Law Review* article, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,”¹ relied on by one of Defendants’ experts in this case, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis. In addition to writing this piece, I have used the approach outlined in it to conduct numerous district-specific, functional analyses both for interested jurisdictions and in the context of litigation. For example, most recently, I was asked to ascertain the percent black voting age population that would allow black voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in the challenged 3rd Congressional District in Virginia,² and the 11th Congressional District in Ohio.³

I have been a principal of Frontier International Electoral Consulting since co-founding the company in 1998. Frontier IEC provides electoral assistance in transitional democracies and post-conflict countries. In addition, I am a Visiting Research Academic at Oxford Brookes University in Oxford, United Kingdom. Attached to the end of this report is a copy of my *curriculum vitae*. I am being compensated at a rate of \$300 an hour for my work in this case.

III. County Groupings and Elections Examined

Conclusions about racially polarized voting and the minority population percentage needed to elect minority-preferred candidates in the context of polarization should be drawn from as many elections as applicable and feasible. It is well-established that racial voting patterns in elections that include minority candidates are the most probative for determining if voting is racially polarized.⁴ In addition, elections for the office at issue in a lawsuit – in this

¹ Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

² *Personhuballah v. Alcorn*, No. 3:13-cv-678 (E.D. Va.).

³ *Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder*, No. 1:18-CV-357 (S.D. Ohio).

⁴ See, for example, *League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993); *Nipper v. Smith*, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994).

case, state House and state Senate seats – are the most relevant,⁵ both for determining if voting is usually polarized and for calculating the percent minority population needed to elect minority-preferred candidates to the office if voting is racially polarized.

I analyzed all contested state legislative general and Democratic primary election contests since 2014 that included an African American candidate in the state Senate and state House county groupings at issue in this case.⁶ I also examined all recent statewide state and federal elections – general elections and Democratic primaries – that included an African American candidate. A statewide analysis of voting patterns in two of these contests, the 2016 primary elections for Governor and Supervisor of Public Instruction, indicated that voting was not polarized – both black and white voters supported the winning white candidate.⁷ I therefore focused my analysis on the following 2016 statewide contests for each state House and Senate grouping at issue: the general elections for Lieutenant Governor and State Treasurer and the Democratic primaries for Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Commissioner of Labor and Treasurer. In addition, I analyzed the 2012 general elections for U.S. President and Lieutenant Governor, and the 2012 Democratic primaries for Lieutenant Governor and Commissioner of Labor. While these contests were polarized statewide, they were not necessarily polarized in every given county grouping. Some of the primary elections considered had three or more candidates; although black voters often coalesced around a single candidate in some of these contests, in other instances they did not and determining a candidate of choice was not possible.

The 13 state House groupings I examined were: (1) Alamance; (2) Anson and Union; (3) Cabarrus, Davie, Montgomery, Richmond, Rowan and Stanly; (4) Cleveland and Gaston; (5) Columbus, Pender and Robeson; (6) Cumberland; (7) Duplin and Onslow; (8) Forsyth and Yadkin; (9) Franklin and Nash; (10) Guilford; (11) Lenoir and Pitt; (12) Mecklenburg; and (13)

⁵ Courts have long held that endogenous elections are more probative in assessing minority vote dilution. Examples include *Bone Shirt V. Hazeltine* 461 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2006); *Clay v. Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis*, 90 F.3d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1996); *Magnolia Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Lee* 994 F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th Cir. 1993); *Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. School 25 Dist. Bd. of Educ.* 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1993); *Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, La.* 834 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1987); *Rodriguez v. Harris Cnty, Texas* 964 19 F. Supp. 2d 686, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

⁶ In North Carolina, most black voters choose to vote in Democratic primaries as opposed to Republican primaries.

⁷ This report does not address the extent to which the 2016 Democratic primaries for Governor and Supervisor of Public Instruction were racially polarized in any specific county grouping.

Wake. The 5 state Senate county groupings were: (1) Alamance, Guilford and Randolph; (2) Davie and Forsyth; (3) Duplin, Harnett, Johnson, Lee, Nash and Sampson; (4) Franklin and Wake; and (5) Mecklenburg.⁸

IV. Success Rates of African American State Legislative Candidates

While African American state legislators have generally been elected from legislative districts with substantial black populations within the county groupings at issue here, these districts are usually not majority black in voting age population and in many cases are below or substantially below 40% in voting age population. Table 1 lists all state Senate districts under the 2017 Senate Plan that had a BVAP greater than 30% and encompass at least one county at issue in the remedial phase of this case. The table also shows the results of the 2018 election in each of these districts.

Table 1: State Senators Elected from Districts with Black Voting Age Populations Greater the 30% in Relevant Counties

2017 Senate Plan District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	State Senator	Race	Party	Share of two-party vote in 2018 general election	Senate County Grouping
38	48.46%	Mujtaba Mohammed	O	D	81.7%	Mecklenburg
28	43.64%	Gladys Robinson	AA	D	75.2%	Alamance-Guilford-Randolph
37	42.73%	Jeff Jackson	W	D	79.6%	Mecklenburg
21	42.15%	Ben Clark	AA	D	70.9%	Cumberland-Hoke
32	39.18%	Paul Lowe, Jr.	AA	D	72.9%	Davie-Forsyth
40	38.88%	Joyce Waddell	AA	D	75.6%	Mecklenburg
14	38.85%	Dan Blue	AA	D	73.4%	Franklin-Wake
7	33.93%	Louis Milford Pate, Jr.	W	R	53.9%	Lenoir-Wayne
5	32.94%	Don Davis	AA	D	55.3%	Greene-Pitt
19	31.69%	Kirk DeViere	W	D	50.4%	Cumberland-Hoke

If the Democratic candidate represented the candidate of choice for African Americans in each of the general elections listed in Table 1, then African Americans were able to elect the

⁸ Mecklenburg results are reported under the state House grouping but the discussion of course holds for the state Senate as well.

candidate of their choice in 9 of the 10 districts with a BVAP in excess of 30% in relevant Senate county groupings, and the majority of these successful candidates were African Americans. To be clear, Table 1 merely displays past election results; this analysis is not meant to suggest that a BVAP of 30% is a bright-line percentage that is either necessary or sufficient for African Americans to elect a candidate of their choice, either in the county groupings depicted in Table 1 or in other counties not in Table 1. Indeed, Table 1 does not include results for numerous counties across the State because those counties do not currently have state Senate districts with a BVAP above 30% or are not at issue in the remedial phase of this lawsuit. The results could differ significantly for such other counties.

Table 2 provides the same information as Table 1 for all state House districts under the 2017 House Plan that had a BVAP greater than 30% and encompass at least one county at issue in the remedial phase of this case.

Table 2: State Representative Elected from Districts with Black Voting Age Populations Greater the 30% in Relevant Counties

2017 House Plan District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	State Representative	Race	Party	Share of two-party vote in 2018 general election	House County Grouping
101	50.8%	Carolyn Logan	AA	D	78.7%	Mecklenburg
43	50.0%	Elmer Floyd	AA	D	74.1%	Cumberland
99	49.5%	Nasif Majeed	AA	D	82.4%	Mecklenburg
107	49.4%	Kelly Alexander	AA	D	100.0%	Mecklenburg
38	48.3%	Yvonne Lewis Holley	AA	D	84.1%	Wake
72	47.5%	Derwin Montgomery	AA	D	79.1%	Forsyth-Yadkin
8	44.9%	Kandie D. Smith	AA	D	64.6%	Lenoir-Pitt
33	44.2%	Rosa U. Gill	AA	D	78.7%	Wake
102	43.9%	Becky Carney	W	D	83.4%	Mecklenburg
58	42.7%	Amos Quick	AA	D	76.8%	Guilford
42	42.2%	Marvin W. Lucas	AA	D	78.1%	Cumberland
25	40.7%	James D. Gailliard	AA	D	53.3%	Franklin-Nash
61	40.3%	Mary Price Harrison	W	D	73.3%	Guilford
60	40.1%	Cecil Brockman	AA	D	69.0%	Guilford
21	39.0%	Raymond Smith Jr.	AA	D	52.6%	Bladen-Greene-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Sampson-Wayne
88	38.4%	Mary G. Belk	W	D	75.6%	Mecklenburg
57	38.4%	Ashton Clemmons	W	D	67.6%	Guilford
106	38.0%	Carla Cunningham	AA	D	80.6%	Mecklenburg
12	37.4%	Chris Humphrey	W	R	56.1%	Lenoir-Pitt

2017 House Plan District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	State Representative	Race	Party	Share of two-party vote in 2018 general election	House County Grouping
71	36.6%	Evelyn Terry	AA	D	72.7%	Forsyth-Yadkin
39	35.5%	Darren Jackson	W	D	67.9%	Wake
100	32.1%	John Autry	W	D	70.8%	Mecklenburg
44	31.8%	Billy Richardson	W	D	56.6%	Cumberland
22	31.5%	William Brisson	W	R	43.3%	Bladen-Greene-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Sampson-Wayne
92	30.2%	Chaz Beasley	AA	D	70.0%	Mecklenburg

As in the Senate, if the Democratic candidate represented the candidate of choice for African Americans in each of the general elections listed in Table 2, then African Americans were able to elect the candidate of their choice in 23 of the 25 districts with a BVAP in excess of 30% in relevant House county groupings, and the majority of these successful candidates were African Americans. In addition to the African American state representatives listed above, there are two elected from districts that do not have substantial black populations: Sydney Batch is elected from a 14.3% BVAP district in Wake County, and Brandon Lofton is elected from a 6.2% BVAP district in Mecklenburg County. The same clarifications apply, however, for this analysis as with the Senate. This analysis is not meant to suggest that a BVAP of 30% is a bright-line percentage that is either necessary or sufficient for African Americans to elect a candidate of their choice, either in the county groupings depicted in Table 2 or in other counties not in Table 2. As before, Table 2 does not include results for numerous counties across the State because those counties do not currently have state House districts with a BVAP above 30% or are not at issue in the remedial phase of this lawsuit, and the results could differ significantly for such other counties.

V. Analyzing Voting Patterns by Race

In addition to the above analysis, I have conducted a systematic analysis to determine what percent BVAP would be required to provide black voters the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in state legislative as well as statewide contests in relevant county groupings. For each election analyzed, I report the participation rates of black and white voters, as well as the percentage of black and white support for the black-preferred candidate. If the

contest is polarized, with black and white voters supporting different candidates, I indicate the percentage BVAP required, given the participation rates and voting patterns of black and white voters, for the black-preferred candidate to win in the given election contest.

In this report, I discuss black and white voting behavior but in reality the analysis considers black and non-black voting behavior. While in most areas of the state, non-black voters are mostly white, this is not true of Roberson County, which has a substantial Native American population. I consider not only blacks and non-blacks, but Native Americans and non-Native Americans for this county.

The voting patterns of black and white voters must be estimated using statistical techniques because direct information about how individuals have voted is simply not available – the race of the voter is not, of course, obtainable from the ballot. I used a standard statistical technique to produce estimates, King’s ecological inference (EI).⁹ Developed by Professor Gary King in the 1990s and later refined, this statistical method utilizes the method of bounds and incorporates maximum likelihood statistics to produce estimates of voting patterns by race.¹⁰ King’s EI has been introduced and accepted in numerous district court proceedings.¹¹

The database used for this analysis matched demographic data for each election precinct – white, black and Native American VAP, based on the 2010 census – with the election results for the precinct.¹² The use of VAP data made sense in this case since participation as a product

⁹ The statistical package I used was *r* for the ecological regression analysis and *eiCompare* for *r* for the ecological inference analysis.

¹⁰ The following is an example of how the method of bounds works: if a given precinct has 100 voters, of which 75 are black and 25 are white, and the African American candidate received 80 votes, then at least 55 of the black voters (80 – 25) voted for the African American candidate and at most all 75 did. (The method of bounds is less useful for calculating estimates for white voters, as anywhere between none of the white voters and all of the white voters could have voted for the candidate.) These bounds are used when calculating EI estimates but not when using ecological regression.

¹¹ A list of cases in which King’s EI was used can be found in Justin de Benedictis-Kessner, “Evidence in Voting Rights Litigation: Producing Accurate Estimates of Racial Voting Patterns,” *Election Law Journal*, vol.14 (4), 2015. This article also discusses other statistical approaches to analyzing voting patterns by race in voting rights litigation, including homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression (ER).

¹² Some of the precinct VAP data could not be matched with election results. The degree to which this occurred varied by county, with some counties assigning early and absentee votes back to the election precinct and other counties not doing this. In addition, if counties combined or split election precincts for an election, these results could not be matched up to the correct demographic data.

of VAP is required to determine the percentage of black VAP necessary for the candidate of choice of black voters to win the given election.

VI. Calculating the Percent Black Voting Age Population Needed to Elect Black-Preferred Candidate

The percentage minority population needed to create a district that provides minorities with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice varies depending on the specific location of the district – there is no single universal or statewide target that can be applied. A district-specific, functional analysis that considers the participation rates and voting patterns of whites and minorities must be conducted to determine the percentage of the minority population that is needed to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Relying on the estimates of black and white voting behavior produced by the racial bloc voting analysis I conducted, in each election contest that was polarized, I calculated the percent BVAP needed for the candidate of choice of African Americans to win. When voting is not racially polarized in a given election and area, we need not calculate the percent BVAP needed for the black-preferred candidate to win since black and white voters in that instance support the same candidate.

A. Equalizing Turnout

Black turnout as a percentage of BVAP is generally somewhat lower than white turnout as a percentage of WVAP in the general elections analyzed. For example, according to Table 3, below, in Alamance in the 2016 general election for Lieutenant Governor, 44.7% of blacks of voting age turned out and cast a vote, while 70.6% of whites of voting age cast a vote.¹³ Using these turnout percentages, I can calculate the percent black VAP needed to ensure that black voters

¹³ In this example, turnout actually refers to the percent of black and white VAP voting for the highest statewide office on the ticket that included an African American candidate in the general election – the race for Lieutenant Governor.

comprise at least 50 percent of the voters for this election.¹⁴ The equalizing percentage is calculated mathematically by solving the following equation:

Let

M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is black
 $W = 1 - M$ = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is white
 A = the proportion of the black voting age population that turned out to vote
 B = the proportion of the white voting age population that turned out to vote

Therefore,

$M(A)$ = the proportion of the population that is black and turned out to vote (1)
 $(1 - M)B$ = the proportion of total population that is white and turned out to vote (2)

To find the value of M that is needed for (1) and (2) to be equal, (1) and (2) are set as equal and we solve for M algebraically:

$$\begin{aligned} M(A) &= (1 - M)B \\ M(A) &= B - M(B) \\ M(A) + M(B) &= B \\ M(A + B) &= B \\ M &= B / (A + B) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, for the example above, $A = .447$, $B = .706$ and $M = .706 / (.447 + .706)$. Therefore, a 61.2% BVAP district would produce equalized black and white turnout in the 2016 general election in this county grouping.

The equalizing percentage for BVAP in Democratic primaries in North Carolina is much lower than in general elections. This is because most black voters choose to vote in Democratic primaries while white voters tend to divide their votes between the Democratic and Republican primaries. For example, for the same county (Alamance), black turnout as a percentage of BVAP was 14.9 and white turnout as a percentage of WVAP was 8.3.¹⁵ (See Table 3, below.) The percentage BVAP required to equalize black and white turnout in the Democratic primary in this instance is only 35.8%.

¹⁴ For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, "Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.

¹⁵ Turnout in this example is actually the percent of black and white VAP voting for the highest statewide office on the ticket that included an African American candidate in the statewide Democratic primary – the race for Lieutenant Governor.

Equalizing the number of black and white voters who vote in an election would only be necessary to ensure that minority voters had the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice if white voters are rarely willing to vote for black-preferred candidates. If a sufficient percentage of white voters, consistently demonstrate a willingness to support black-preferred candidates, then the number of black voters need not equal the number of white voters who vote in a given election – white voters will “crossover” and help elect the black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in the turnout rates of black and white voters, but also the voting patterns of white and black voters.¹⁶

B. Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting

Estimates of voting patterns by race for of the elections analyzed for this report indicate that many were not racially polarized – black voters and white voters supported the same candidates. When black and white voters support different candidates, however, close attention must be paid not only to the turnout rates of black and white voters, but to the percentage of white voters who are willing to support black-preferred candidates, as well as how cohesive black voters are in their support of these candidates. When there are very high levels of minority cohesion and consistent, sufficient white crossover voting, the district need not be majority black in composition to provide black voters with a realistic opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to office.

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 2000 persons of voting age, 50% of whom are black and 50% of whom are white. Using the estimates of black and white turnout and support for the black-preferred candidate in the 2016 general election in Alamance County for Lieutenant Governor, black turnout is lower than white turnout: 44.7% of blacks of voting age and 70.6% of whites of voting age turned out to vote. (See Table 3, below.) This means that, for our illustrative election, there will be 447 black voters and 706 white voters. As indicated by Table 3, 99.3% of the black voters supported the black-preferred candidate (Linda

¹⁶ For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

Coleman) and 31.2% of the white voters supported her in this election.¹⁷ Thus, in our example, black voters will cast 444 of their 447 votes for the black-preferred candidate and their other 3 votes for the other candidates; white voters will cast 220 of their 706 votes for the black-preferred candidate and 486 votes for the other candidates. The black-preferred candidate will receive 57.6% of the vote under these conditions:

Black and White Voters	Votes for Black-Preferred Candidate	Votes for Other Candidates
Black 1000 x .447 = 447	447 x .993 = 444	447 x .007 = 3
White 1000 x .706 = <u>706</u>	706 x .312 = <u>220</u>	706 x .688 = <u>486</u>
1153	664	486

The black-preferred candidate will garner a total of 664 votes (444 from black voters and 220 from white voters), while the other candidates will receive 486 votes (3 from black voters and 486 from white voters). The black-preferred candidate will win the election with 664 of the 1153 votes cast in the contest, or 57.6% of the vote in this hypothetical 50% black VAP district. The black-preferred candidate in this election actually received only 40.5% of the vote in Alamance County because the county is slightly less than 19% black in VAP. But as the column labeled “percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP” indicates, Coleman would have received 57.6% of the vote if the BVAP was 50%. And, as the last column in Table 3 indicates, in a district with at least 37.6% BVAP, the black-preferred candidate would win.¹⁸

The Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor in 2016 in Alamance was not racially polarized. (There were 4 candidates and thus, while Coleman received only 43% of the white vote, she was the top choice of white voters; she received 87% of the black votes cast.) However, the 2016 Democratic primary race for Attorney General was polarized in the county so this will serve as the basis for the illustrative example. (See Table 3, below.) The turnout rate for

¹⁷ The 2016 general election for Lieutenant Governor included three candidates: Dan Forest, a white Republican, Linda Coleman, an African-American Democrat, and Libertarian candidate Jacki Cole. Dan Forest won the election with 51.8% of the statewide vote.

¹⁸

Black and White Voters	Votes for Black-Preferred Candidate	Votes for Other Candidates
Black 376 x .447 = 168	168 x .993 = 167	168 x .007 = 1
White 624 x .706 = <u>441</u>	441 x .312 = <u>138</u>	441 x .688 = <u>303</u>
609	305	304

blacks was 14.4%; for whites it was 8.4%. Marcus Williams, the African American candidate, received 99.4% of the black vote and 39.0% of the white vote. However, because black turnout was so much higher than white turnout (many white voters cast ballots in the Republican primary rather than the Democratic primary), Williams would have received over 77% of the vote (176 out of 228 votes) in a 50% BVAP district:

Black and White Voters	Black-Preferred Candidate Votes	White-Preferred Candidate Votes
Black 1000 x .144 = 144	144 x .994 = 143	144 x .006 = 1
White 1000 x .084 = <u>84</u>	84 x .390 = <u>33</u>	84 x .610 = <u>67</u>
228	176	52

Williams carried Alamance County, which has a 18.9% BVAP, with 51.1% of the vote and would have won the primary in any district with at least 11.5% BVAP under these conditions.

VII. Results of Analysis

Tables 3 through 22 report the results of my racial bloc voting analysis and, if the contest is racially polarized, indicate the percentage of vote a black-preferred candidate would receive in each House and Senate grouping of interest, given the turnout rates of blacks and whites and the degree of black cohesion and white crossover voting for each election, in a 50%, 45%, 40% and 35% black VAP district. Each table considers a different state House county grouping (Tables 3-15) or state Senate county grouping (Tables 16-19). In each table, the first column indicates the relevant election, the second column indicates either the BVAP of the House or Senate district (for state legislative elections) or the BVAP of the entire counties that comprise the county grouping (for the statewide elections analyzed). The third and fourth columns then reflect the race and share of the vote received by the candidate of choice of African Americans.

Of significance, the column with the headers “black voters: B-P” and “white voters: B-P” represent my calculations of the share of black voters and white voters who supported the black-preferred candidate (i.e. the “B-P” candidate) in that election. If the numbers in these columns are both greater than 50%, it means that voting in that particular election was not racially polarized because a majority of blacks and whites both supported the candidate of choice of

African Americans. The final column calculates that percent BVAP needed for the black-preferred candidate to have won the election if that election was racially polarized.¹⁹

In addition to analyzing polarized voting across each of the county groupings at issue, I also analyzed racially polarized voting within specific individual counties, including Forsyth County (Table 20) and Pitt County (Table 21). Moreover, I conducted a racial polarization analysis for Robeson County, but for Native Americans rather than African Americans (Table 22). For this analysis, I divided all voters into Native Americans and non-Native Americans and then analyzed whether and to what extent voting was polarized between these two groups.

VIII. Conclusion

My analysis of voting patterns by race in recent statewide and state legislative contests in select North Carolina state House and Senate county groupings indicates that a number of election contests were not racially polarized. When the election contest was polarized, I used the estimates of black and white turnout, and black and white votes for the black-preferred candidate to calculate the percent BVAP required for black voters to elect their preferred candidate in that election. The black percentage needed varies both by grouping – hence the importance of conducting a district-specific analysis – and the contest considered. In some county groupings such as Guilford, Cumberland, Forsyth-Yadkin, and Mecklenburg in the House, as well as Franklin-Wake, Davie-Forsyth, and Mecklenburg in the Senate, there are many elections that were not racially polarized because a majority of whites supported the candidate of choice of African Americans. Substantially greater white bloc voting was found in other county groupings.

¹⁹The column titled “actual vote of B-P candidate” represent the raw percentage of the vote received by that candidate as reported by the State Board of Elections, and not the share of the two-party vote.

Table 3

House / Governor / Ala (a) ce	%ercent lac- . AP of Jurisdiction	race of B-P ca " \$ \$ate	actual vote for B-P ca " \$ \$ate	turnout rate for office a " \$ %ercent vote for "lac-- %referre\$ ca " \$ \$ates						%ercent of vote B-P ca " \$ \$ate have received if \$istrict Oas \$lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca " \$ \$ate have received if \$istrict Oas \$lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca " \$ \$ate have received if \$istrict Oas \$lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca " \$ \$ate have received if \$istrict Oas \$lac- . AP	
				*lac- votes		White votes		votes cast for office	all others					
				B-P	others	B-P	others							
General elections														
2018														
State House 64	18.5	AA	42.2	24.5	96.7	3.3	55.7	38.2	61.8	56.1	53.7	51.5	49.4	36.5
2016														
2016 Governor	18.9	AA	40.5	44.7	99.3	0.7	70.6	31.2	68.8	57.6	54.4	51.4	48.5	37.6
2016 Treasurer	18.9	AA	43.2	43.2	99.9	0.1	68.1	34.5	65.5	59.9	56.8	53.9	51.2	32.9
2014														
2014 Governor														
2014 Treasurer														
2012														
2012 Governor	18.9	AA	42.7	46.0	99.5	0.5	67.4	33.1	66.9	60.0	56.9	53.9	50.9	33.3
2012 Treasurer	18.9	AA	43.3	45.3	99.9	0.1	65.2	33.9	66.1	61.0	57.8	54.8	51.9	31.7
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 64	18.5	AA	46.8	5.4	87.8	12.2	3.5	35.9	64.1	67.4	64.9	62.2	59.5	19.5
2016														
2016 Governor	18.9	AA	52.3	14.9	87.0	13.0	8.3	43.0	57.0	71.3	69.2	67.0	64.6	11.5
2016 Treasurer	18.9	AA	51.1	14.4	99.4	0.6	8.4	39.0	61.0	77.1	74.3	71.2	68.0	11.5
2016 Governor	18.9	AA	50.3	14.1	83.6	16.4	8.4	40.7	59.3	67.6	65.5	63.4	61.1	14.2
2016 Treasurer	18.9	AA	57.4	14.7	60.2	39.8	8.4	54.7	45.3	58.2	57.9	57.7	57.4	14.2
2014														
2014 Governor														
2014 Treasurer														
2012														
2012 Governor	18.9	AA	49.2	10.3	52.8	47.2	9.7	48.6	51.4	50.8	50.6	50.3	50.1	32.0
2012 Treasurer	18.9	AA	33.5	10.3	58.6	41.4	9.1	26.5	73.5	43.5	41.9	40.3	38.7	70.7

Table 4

House (row 1, A, so a \$ 3 "io")	Percentage of AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca \$ State	Actual vote for B-P ca \$ State	Turnout rate for office a \$ % vote for * fac-		* fac- votes		White votes		Percentage of vote B-P ca \$ 0ou\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 50 1 * fac- . AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca \$ 0ou\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 45 1 * fac- . AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca \$ 0ou\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 40 1 * fac- . AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca \$ 0ou\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 35 1 * fac- . AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca \$ State to "oi"
				votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
General elections														
2018														
"o"e														
2016														
2016 tlover"or	16.5	AA	32.2	55.8	100.0	0.0	75.1	23.1	76.9	55.9	52.2	48.6	45.1	42.0
2016 #reasurer	16.5	AA	34.6	54.6	99.6	0.4	73.4	27.3	72.7	58.1	54.7	51.3	48.0	38.1
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 Pres\$e"t	16.5	AA	37.4	34.7	98.3	1.7	70.6	30.0	70.0	52.5	49.6	46.9	44.3	45.7
2012 tlover"or	16.5	AA	39.1	33.3	99.0	1.0	68.0	32.0	68.0	54.0	51.2	48.5	46.0	42.9
Democratic primaries														
2018														
"o"e														
2016														
2016 tlover"or	16.5	AA	40.8	23.0	87.4	12.6	6.2	10.6	89.4	71.1	68.4	65.3	61.8	22.1
2016 At# le"eral	16.5	AA	58.3	21.3	92.7	7.3	6.1	48.1	51.9	82.8	81.1	79.3	77.2	1.3
2016)o((of a*or	16.5	AA	55.3	22.9	63.5	36.5	5.9	49.7	50.3	60.7	60.2	59.7	59.0	0.6
2016 #reasurer	16.5	AA	56.5	19.4	84.3	15.7	5.9	47.6	52.4	75.7	74.4	72.8	71.1	2.1
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 tlover"or	16.5	AA	47.2	25.0	63.2	36.8	4.6	34.7	65.3	58.8	58.0	57.0	55.9	17.6
2012)o((of a*or	16.5	AA	37.2	25.0	51.7	48.3	4.1	26.9	73.1	48.2	47.6	46.8	45.9	69.0

Table 5

House / Governor / State / Presidential / Primary / Caucus	Year	Party	% of Jurisdiction	Actual Vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office						% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P		
					*lac- votes		0hite votes		% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P					% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P
					votes cast for office	all others	votes cast for office	all others								
General elections																
State House 82	2018	AA	14.1	47.3	34.8	99.9	0.1	64.2	38.9	61.1	60.3	57.6	55.1	52.7	29.1	
2016																
2016 Governor	2016	AA	15.5	32.9	34.7	100.0	0.0	67.7	26.7	73.3	51.5	48.4	45.4	42.6	47.6	
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	15.5	36.1	36.1	99.5	0.5	65.7	29.2	70.8	54.1	51.0	48.0	45.3	43.3	
2014																
2014 Governor	2014	AA	15.5	37.6	58.9	99.6	0.4	62.4	28.1	71.9	62.8	59.3	55.7	52.2	31.9	
2014 Treasurer	2014	AA	15.5	39.1	55.0	97.8	2.2	60.3	30.6	69.4	62.7	59.3	56.0	52.7	30.8	
Democratic primaries																
2018																
2018 Governor	2018	AA	15.5	45.2	14.7	73.4	26.6	6.0	37.6	62.4	63.0	61.5	59.8	58.0	17.8	
2018 Treasurer	2018	AA	15.5	55.5	14.0	87.9	12.1	5.8	46.6	53.4	75.8	74.0	72.1	69.9	3.6	
2016																
2016 Governor	2016	AA	15.5	53.6	12.5	78.2	21.8	5.7	45.8	54.2	68.1	66.6	65.0	63.3	6.4	
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	15.5	53.6	12.2	74.5	25.5	5.8	48.8	51.2	66.2	65.1	63.8	62.4	2.3	
2014																
2014 Governor	2014	AA	15.5	55.0	22.4	55.1	44.9	7.0	56.0	44.0	55.3	55.3	55.4	55.4	17.8	
2014 Treasurer	2014	AA	15.5	34.0	20.2	51.6	48.4	7.0	29.2	70.8	45.8	44.9	43.9	42.8	81.8	

Table 6

House (row 1, level 1)	AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office				% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P	% of vote for B-P		
				all	B-P	others	all							
General elections														
2018														
State House 110	15.3	AA	32.2	29.5	95.7	4.3	52.7	27.8	72.2	52.2	49.1	46.3	43.5	46.5
State Senate 43	14.8	AA	33.8	20.8	100.0	0.0	29.8	26.4	73.6	56.7	53.2	49.8	46.5	40.3
2016														
2016 Governor	16.2	AA	31.8	37.1	99.6	0.4	63.9	23.1	76.9	51.2	47.7	44.4	41.3	48.3
2016 Treasurer	16.2	AA	36.0	37.2	99.6	0.4	61.8	27.0	73.0	54.3	51.0	47.8	44.8	43.5
2014														
2014 Governor	16.2	AA	37.6	45.7	99.8	0.2	59.7	28.1	71.9	59.2	55.7	52.3	49.0	36.5
2014 Treasurer	16.2	AA	39.1	43.7	100.0	0.0	57.9	30.0	70.0	60.1	56.7	53.4	50.2	34.6
Democratic primaries														
2018														
2018 Governor	16.2	AA	44.4	17.7	81.4	18.6	4.5	23.5	76.5	69.7	67.7	65.4	62.8	17.7
2018 Treasurer	16.2	AA	57.5	17.7	95.5	4.5	4.4	29.6	70.4	82.4	80.1	77.6	74.7	10.0
2016														
2016 Governor	16.2	AA	53.8	17.3	64.3	35.7	4.3	49.7	50.3	61.4	60.9	60.3	59.7	0.5
2016 Treasurer	16.2	AA	52.6	17.3	59.5	40.5	4.4	47.2	52.8	57.0	56.6	56.1	55.6	7.0
2012														
2012 Governor	16.2	AA	59.0	13.6	55.1	44.9	7.5	58.8	41.2	56.4	56.6	56.8	57.0	10.0
2012 Treasurer	16.2	AA	32.0	12.8	40.8	59.2	7.0	31.3	68.7	37.4	37.0	36.5	36.0	10.0

Table 7

Election Year	Type of Election	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P Candidate	Actual Vote for B-P Candidate	Turnout rate for office				% of total votes	% of total votes received by B-P candidate	% of total votes received by B-P candidate	% of total votes received by B-P candidate	% of total votes received by B-P candidate		
					all voters	B-P	others	white votes							
2018	General elections	State House 46	AA	36.7	27.0	82.3	17.7	36.3	26.3	73.7	50.2	47.5	44.9	42.3	49.7
2016	General elections	State Senate 13	AA	37.5	30.5	88.3	11.7	34.7	20.8	79.2	52.4	49.0	45.7	42.5	46.4
2016	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	43.0	48.4	92.4	7.6	47.5	28.0	72.0	60.5	57.3	54.1	50.8	33.7
2012	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	47.0	45.8	94.1	5.9	47.1	33.9	66.1	63.6	60.6	57.6	54.6	27.3
2012	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	49.9	63.9	93.8	6.2	46.3	36.6	63.4	69.8	66.9	64.0	61.0	18.1
2012	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	57.4	61.8	99.6	0.4	44.7	46.0	54.0	77.1	74.4	71.7	68.9	5.5
2018	Democratic primaries	State Senate 13	AA	69.2	11.3	94.4	5.6	5.4	52.3	47.7	80.8	78.9	76.8	74.6	10.1
2016	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	41.5	12.8	59.8	40.2	8.7	31.5	68.5	48.3	47.0	45.5	44.0	56.2
2016	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	60.1	12.7	86.3	13.7	8.8	46.5	53.5	70.0	68.0	66.0	63.9	6.3
2016	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	38.5	12.9	51.6	48.4	8.7	32.6	67.4	43.9	43.0	42.0	41.0	88.0
2016	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	64.8	12.9	81.5	18.5	8.7	52.7	47.3	69.9	68.5	67.0	65.5	10.1
2012	Democratic primaries	State Senate 13	AA	27.3	20.3	46.5	53.5	12.8	19.3	80.7	36.0	34.7	33.3	31.8	4.4
2012	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	50.5	25.6	54.5	45.5	12.0	50.2	49.8	53.1	52.9	52.7	52.5	10.1
2012	Democratic primaries	State House 46	AA	27.9	21.6	39.7	60.3	11.5	26.8	73.2	35.2	34.6	34.0	33.3	10.1

Table 8A

House jurisdiction	AP of jurisdiction	State	actual vote for B-P ca	turnout rate for office at				percentage of vote for				percentage of B-P ca (just		
				B-P	others	all	office	B-P	others	all	office			
General elections														
2018														
State House 42	42.2	AA	76.1	40.2	100.0	0.0	37.8	56.8	43.2	79.1	76.9	74.7	72.5	of
State House 43	50.0	AA	74.1	36.4	99.3	0.7	36.8	50.1	49.9	74.6	72.1	69.7	67.2	of
2016														
2016 treasurer	37.1	AA	55.8	47.3	99.5	0.5	60.2	32.7	67.3	62.1	58.8	55.7	52.6	30.8
2016 State 19	37.1	AA	58.0	47.3	99.9	0.1	58.9	36.6	63.4	64.8	61.7	58.7	55.7	25.1
2014														
2014 State 19	22.5	AA	43.6	48.3	83.8	16.2	57.4	29.4	70.6	54.3	51.6	49.0	46.4	42.0
2012														
2012 State 19	37.1	AA	59.5	55.7	99.9	0.1	55.8	39.7	60.3	69.8	66.8	63.8	60.7	17.1
2012 State 43	37.1	AA	61.6	55.5	99.6	0.4	54.3	42.4	57.6	71.3	68.4	65.6	62.7	13.0

Table 8B

House (round) / State House / 2016 / 2012 / 2014 / 2016 / 2018 / 2020 / 2022 / 2024	% of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office				% of votes for		% of votes received if B-P	% of votes received if B-P	% of votes received if B-P	% of votes received if B-P
				B-P	others	all	office	white	others				
Democratic primaries													
2018													
State House 43	50	AA	79.2	7.3	94.4	5.6	6.8	65.0	35.0	80.2	78.7	77.3	75.8
2016													
2016 (over)	37.1	AA	59.1	15.4	72.1	27.9	9.9	48.6	51.4	62.9	61.8	60.6	59.3
2016 (general)	37.1	AA	66.7	15.3	90.7	9.3	9.8	43.2	56.8	72.2	69.8	67.4	64.9
2016 (of a)	37.1	AA	46.0	15.4	63.1	36.9	9.8	34.8	65.2	52.1	50.7	49.3	47.8
2016 (reassurer)	37.1	AA	52.3	15.3	74.5	25.5	11.0	39.2	60.8	59.7	58.0	56.2	54.3
2014													
2012													
2012 (over)	37.1	AA	70.7	11.9	73.5	26.5	12.8	68.5	31.5	70.9	70.7	70.4	70.2
2012 (of a)	37.1	AA	42.8	11.5	43.7	56.3	10.0	42.2	57.8	43.0	42.9	42.9	42.8

Table 9

House / round / 4 / 2011 / a / \$ 8 / \$ 100	AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca	actual vote for B-P ca	turnout rate for office a				% of vote for				AP	AP	AP	AP	AP	AP	
				*lac- votes	votes cast for office	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	others	white votes	all others							
General elections																		
2018																		
State House 4	22.6	AA	34.9	29.7	99.0	1.0	34.1	15.1	84.9	54.2	50.0	45.9	41.9	45.0				41.9 45.0
2016																		
2016 "lover" or	18.5	AA	33.5	32.4	99.2	0.8	53.3	18.0	82.0	48.7	45.0	41.4	38.0	51.7				38.0 51.7
2016 #reasurer	18.5	AA	35.7	32.1	99.6	0.4	51.2	21.1	78.9	51.4	47.7	44.2	40.9	48.2				40.9 48.2
2014																		
"o" e																		
2012																		
2012 Preside"t	18.5	AA	38.3	47.6	98.7	1.3	47.0	22.7	77.3	60.9	57.1	53.3	49.5	35.6				49.5 35.6
2012 "lover" or	18.5	AA	41.9	46.1	97.3	2.7	44.9	28.0	72.0	63.1	59.6	56.2	52.7	31.2				52.7 31.2
Democratic primaries																		
2018																		
2016																		
2016 "lover" or	18.5	AA	46.7	11.1	91.4	8.6	4.9	32.5	67.5	73.4	70.8	67.9	64.9	15.7				64.9 15.7
2016 A# "le" eral	18.5	AA	64.6	11.0	92.8	7.2	4.6	43.4	56.6	78.2	76.1	73.8	71.2	6.1				71.2 6.1
2016)o (of a* or	18.5	AA	51.0	11.1	71.5	28.5	4.6	46.0	54.0	64.0	62.9	61.7	60.4	7.2				60.4 7.2
2016 #reasurer	18.5	AA	54.9	11.2	94.9	5.1	4.6	41.9	58.1	79.5	77.2	74.7	72.0	6.9				72.0 6.9
2014																		
"o" e																		
2012																		
2012 "lover" or	18.5	AA	52.2	19.3	59.9	40.1	4.8	47.6	52.4	57.5	57.0	56.6	56.0	5.7				56.0 5.7
2012)o (of a* or	18.5	AA	24.8	18.9	39.8	60.2	4.2	28.5	71.5	37.7	37.4	37.0	36.5	"o clear B-P ca" \$				36.5 "o clear B-P ca" \$

Table 10

House (round, year, or session)	% of total votes for AP or incumbent	Race of B-P candidate	Actual vote for B-P candidate	Turnout rate for office				% of total votes for incumbent		% of total votes for incumbent	% of total votes for incumbent	% of total votes for incumbent	% of total votes for incumbent
				votes cast for office	B-P	others	all	votes cast for office	others				
General elections													
2018													
State House 71	36.6	AA	72.7	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6	71.3	70.1
State House 72	47.5	AA	79.1	31.8	99.6	0.4	49.4	69.6	30.4	81.3	79.9	78.6	77.3
State Senate 32	39.2	AA	72.9	28.5	99.2	0.8	50.5	65.0	35.0	77.3	75.8	74.3	73.0
2016													
2016 (November)	23.6	AA	48.2	40.5	99.3	0.7	70.9	29.1	70.9	54.6	51.5	48.5	45.6
2016 (recurring)	23.6	AA	47.7	40.1	99.5	0.5	69.6	28.2	71.8	54.3	51.0	48.0	45.1
2014													
State House 71	45.5	AA	76.6	25.8	99.3	0.7	39.6	62.6	37.4	77.1	75.4	73.7	72.1
2012													
2012 (Primary)	23.6	AA	50.6	48.9	98.8	1.2	47.0	32.7	67.3	66.4	63.1	59.8	56.4
2012 (November)	23.6	AA	50.9	46.4	98.5	1.5	44.9	34.3	65.7	66.9	63.7	60.5	57.3
Democratic primaries													
2018													
2018 (November)													
2016													
2016 (November)	23.6	AA	55.6	14.6	81.3	18.7	11.4	44.3	55.7	65.1	63.2	61.3	59.4
2016 (April)	23.6	AA	45.1	14.5	66.2	33.8	11.0	38.0	62.0	54.0	52.6	51.2	49.7
2016 (October)	23.6	AA	60.5	14.0	84.0	16.0	11.3	52.0	48.0	69.7	68.1	66.5	64.8
2016 (recurring)	23.6	AA	59.1	14.6	71.1	28.9	10.5	53.2	46.8	63.6	62.7	61.8	60.9
2014													
2014 (November)													
2012													
2012 (November)	23.6	AA	58.2	16.1	75.3	24.7	9.3	50.8	49.2	66.3	65.2	63.9	62.6
2012 (October)	23.6	AA	38.9	15.1	51.6	48.4	8.9	33.5	66.5	44.9	44.0	43.1	42.1

Table 11

House District	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office		White votes		Black votes		Hispanic votes		Asian/Pacific Islander votes		Total % of total population
				B-P	Others	B-P	Others	B-P	Others	B-P	Others	B-P	Others	
2012	AA	51.5	35.4	98.1	1.9	64.2	34.2	65.8	56.9	54.1	51.4	48.8	37.3	
2016	AA	46.5	51.3	99.9	0.1	70.5	24.0	76.0	56.0	52.3	48.8	45.4	41.7	
2016 Treasurer	AA	48.7	53.5	100.0	0.0	68.3	26.8	73.2	59.0	55.4	51.9	48.5	37.2	
2016 State House 7	AA	67.8	52.9	99.5	0.5	68.3	44.8	55.2	68.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	11.9	
2014 State House 25	AA	31.9	53.8	84.6	15.4	62.8	20.8	79.2	50.2	47.1	44.0	40.9	49.6	
2012	AA	48.6	53.8	99.1	0.9	64.4	26.6	73.4	59.6	56.0	52.5	49.1	36.3	
2012 Treasurer	AA	51.2	52.5	99.1	0.9	62.8	30.3	69.7	61.6	58.2	54.9	51.7	32.4	
Democratic primaries														
2018														
2016														
2016 Treasurer	AA	66.5	17.4	94.9	5.1	8.6	35.7	64.3	75.3	72.6	69.7	66.6	13.6	
2016 State House 7	AA	39.5	17.9	63.1	36.9	8.1	29.5	70.5	52.6	51.1	49.5	47.8	41.5	
2016 Treasurer	AA	74.8	17.0	72.5	27.5	8.8	75.7	24.3	73.6	73.7	73.9	74.1	14.0	
2014	AA	65.1	17.7	88.0	12.0	8.7	37.4	62.6	71.3	69.0	66.5	63.9	14.0	
2012	AA	58.2	16.8	68.3	31.7	10.3	50.8	49.2	61.6	60.8	59.9	59.0	14.0	
2012 Treasurer	AA	36.2	16.0	50.8	49.2	9.7	19.1	80.9	38.8	37.3	35.7	34.0	95.9	

Table 12A

House / round / unit / for	% of total votes for B-P	actual vote for B-P	turnout rate for office				white votes		% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P
			*lac- votes		0hite votes							
			votes cast for office	B-P	all others	office	votes cast for office	B-P				
General elections												
2018												
State House 58	42.7	AA 76.8	38.0	99.4	0.6	47.8	62.8	37.2	79.0	77.2	73.8	
State House 60	40.1	AA 69.0	35.2	98.9	1.1	52.5	57.1	42.9	73.9	71.9	68.2	
State Senate 28	43.6	AA 75.3	34.9	99.2	0.8	58.0	64.5	35.5	77.5	75.9	73.0	
2016												
2016 Governor	32.1	AA 56.6	44.1	98.7	1.3	78.4	42.8	57.2	62.9	60.4	55.8	
2016 Treasurer	32.1	AA 57.6	42.1	99.3	0.7	76.9	44.9	55.1	64.1	61.7	57.3	
State Senate 28	56.5	AA 83.9	59.7	99.4	0.6	59.7	62.3	37.7	80.9	79.0	75.3	
2014												
State House 61	15.3	AA 32.8	38.1	98.6	1.4	63.8	24.3	75.7	52.1	48.7	42.4	
2012												
2012 President	32.1	AA 57.8	49.6	99.9	0.1	76.4	43.7	56.3	65.8	63.2	58.3	
2012 Governor	32.1	AA 58.0	47.3	100.0	0.0	74.0	44.3	55.7	66.0	63.4	58.6	

Table 12B

House district, Illinois	Percentage of total population of jurisdiction	Race of B-P candidate	Actual vote for B-P candidate	Turnout rate for office at % turnout for all voters		White voters		Percentage of vote B-P candidate have received if district has 501 voters	Percentage of vote B-P candidate have received if district has 451 voters	Percentage of vote B-P candidate have received if district has 401 voters	Percentage of vote B-P candidate have received if district has 351 voters	Percentage of total population of jurisdiction	
				B-P	all	B-P	all						
Democratic primaries													
2018													
State House 58	42.7	AA	80.2	10.0	98.4	1.6	7.3	65.2	34.8			79.3	% of total population
2016													
2016 turnout	32.1	AA	57.9	19.2	71.8	28.2	13.5	49.2	50.8			59.0	% of total population
2016 Attorney General	32.1	AA	54.6	18.9	86.5	13.5	13.2	38.3	61.7			59.3	18.3
2016 Governor	32.1	AA	61.3	18.9	78.5	21.5	12.3	49.6	50.4			62.7	0.9
2016 Treasurer	32.1	AA	54.3	18.4	63.7	36.3	12.5	46.2	53.8			53.9	15.9
State House 58	51.1	AA	71.5	15.3	89.4	10.6	10.4	52.3	47.7			68.7	% of total population
2014													
State House 58	51.1	AA	42.6	12.2	59.4	40.6	7.2	16.8	83.2			37.1	67.6
State House 60	51.4	AA	54.2	9.9	66.5	33.5	4.9	32.7	67.3			50.3	34.2
State Senator 28	56.5	AA	59.4	12.1	71.4	34.1	6.0	34.7	65.3			52.3	28.9
2012													
2012 turnout	32.1	AA	58.6	14.6	66.5	33.5	12.4	54.3	45.7			59.0	% of total population
2012 Governor	32.1	AA	39.2	13.7	52.6	47.4	10.6	30.9	69.1			39.8	85.0

Table 13

House / Court / Election	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office						% of vote B-P received	% of vote B-P received if	% of vote B-P received if	% of vote B-P received if		
				*lac- votes		0 white votes		% of vote B-P received	% of vote B-P received if					% of vote B-P received if	% of vote B-P received if
				votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office								
General elections															
2018															
State House 8	AA	44.9	64.7	26.7	98.3	1.7	56.2	46.8	53.2	61.2	59.2	57.3	12.2		
State House 9	AA	20.5	40.0	20.1	86.1	13.9	57.6	33.1	66.9	44.9	43.1	41.5	57.3		
State House 12	AA	37.4	43.9	27.0	96.6	3.4	45.8	24.9	75.1	48.2	45.1	42.2	47.7		
2016															
2016 t! over" or	AA	34.2	50.2	39.4	97.9	2.1	65.1	42.8	57.2	61.0	58.6	56.3	19.9		
2016 #reasurer	AA	34.2	52.6	38.8	98.6	1.4	63.2	44.9	55.1	62.9	60.5	58.2	14.6		
2014															
"o"e															
2012															
2012 Preside"t	AA	34.2	52.3	52.3	99.0	1.0	60.6	30.7	69.3	62.3	55.6	52.4	31.3		
2012 t! over" or	AA	34.2	52.9	51.6	98.6	1.4	59.3	32.0	68.0	63.0	59.7	53.2	29.9		
Democratic primaries															
2018															
State House 8	AA	44.9	50.0	7.4	55.3	44.7	4.4	43.0	57.0	50.7	49.5	48.8	44.0		
2016															
2016 t! over" or	AA	34.2	53.6	17.2	73.7	26.3	7.8	34.2	65.8	61.4	57.7	55.6	23.2		
2016 Alt" le"eral	AA	34.2	61.1	16.5	86.9	13.1	7.2	32.5	67.5	70.4	65.4	62.5	17.1		
2016)o ((of a" or	AA	34.2	46.5	16.7	55.6	44.4	7.7	38.0	62.0	50.0	48.4	47.5	49.7		
2016 #reasurer	AA	34.2	54.6	16.5	53.6	46.4	7.2	52.7	47.3	53.3	53.2	53.2	"ot%olarit&e\$		
2014															
"o"e															
2012															
2012 t! over" or	AA	34.2	61.1	18.1	69.2	30.8	10.2	52.3	47.7	63.1	61.5	60.6	"ot%olarit&e\$		
2012)o ((of a" or	AA	34.2	29.9	18.0	35.2	64.8	9.5	26.1	73.9	32.1	31.6	30.7	"o dear B-P ca"\$		

Table 14A

House 1 round 5 election	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office		White votes		% of B-P who received if have	% of B-P who received if have	% of B-P who received if have	% of B-P who received if have	% of total votes	
				B-P	others	B-P	all						
General elections													
2018													
State House 92	AA	70.0	26.4	98.3	1.7	65.5	63.2	36.8	73.3	71.9	70.6	69.5	" of total votes
State House 99	AA	82.4	42.9	98.0	2.0	51.4	66.8	33.2	81.0	79.5	78.0	76.5	" of total votes
State House 101	AA	78.7	34.5	98.5	1.5	62.4	61.3	38.7	74.5	72.9	71.3	69.8	" of total votes
State House 104	AA	51.8	20.0	99.6	0.4	64.5	51.9	48.1	63.2	61.6	60.1	58.7	" of total votes
State House 106	AA	80.6	28.1	99.0	1.0	55.8	72.6	27.4	81.4	80.3	79.2	78.2	" of total votes
State Seate 40	AA	75.6	20.8	99.3	0.7	59.1	63.3	36.7	72.7	71.3	70.1	69.0	" of total votes
2016													
2016 Governor	AA	58.4	39.9	98.5	1.5	78.1	46.1	53.9	63.8	61.5	59.4	57.4	" of total votes
2016 Treasurer	AA	58.4	42.2	99.0	1.0	74.6	47.9	52.1	66.4	64.1	61.9	59.8	7.0
State House 92	AA	54.4	39.8	96.1	3.9	56.6	45.2	54.8	66.2	63.8	61.4	59.2	12.9
State House 101	AA	76.0	50.7	99.2	0.8	69.1	53.6	46.4	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5	" of total votes
State House 105	AA	44.7	42.3	97.5	2.5	63.2	41.1	58.9	63.7	61.1	58.5	56.0	21.9
State Seate 38	AA	79.1	45.4	98.7	1.3	61.9	57.9	42.1	75.2	73.2	71.3	69.5	" of total votes
State Seate 40	AA	82.5	53.8	98.5	1.5	42.6	56.1	43.9	79.8	77.6	75.5	73.3	" of total votes
2014													
State House 92	AA	47.5	26.9	95.2	4.8	33.8	36.7	63.3	62.6	59.8	57.0	54.2	27.0
State House 106	AA	86.6	30.8	89.2	10.8	30.1	78.6	21.4	84.0	83.4	82.9	82.4	" of total votes
State Seate 38	AA	79.7	31.6	99.2	0.8	35.2	60.4	39.6	78.8	76.8	74.9	73.0	" of total votes
State Seate 41	AA	39.5	25.5	98.5	1.5	49.9	34.4	65.6	56.1	53.3	50.7	48.2	38.6
2012													
2012 President	AA	60.8	43.4	98.7	1.3	73.9	51.9	48.1	69.2	67.1	65.1	63.1	" of total votes
2012 Governor	AA	59.8	42.9	99.9	0.1	70.7	50.1	49.9	68.9	66.6	64.4	62.4	" of total votes

Table 14B

House (row) + 5 sec-le " +ur+	%ercent " +lac- . AP of Jurisdiction"	race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state	turnout rate for office a "\$ %ercent "t vote for "lac-- %referre\$ ca "\$ \$tates				%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 501 *lac- . AP	%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 401 *lac- . AP	%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 351 *lac- . AP	%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 351 *lac- . AP			
				*lac- votes		0nite votes								
				votes cast for office	B-P others	all others	votes cast for office					B-P others	all others	
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 99	49.5	AA	57.3	9.8	73.8	26.2	5.9	44.2	55.8	62.7	61.3	59.8	58.2	12.8
State House 101	50.8	AA	50.0	7.8	60.2	39.8	6.5	39.4	61.5	50.5	49.5	48.4	47.3	47.4
State House 106	38.0	AA	88.9	9.4	91.3	8.7	7.5	85.2	14.8	88.6	88.3	88.0	87.7	"ot %olarie\$
State Se"ate 38	48.5	8	51.9	12.1	60.3	39.7	5.4	32.6	67.4	51.8	50.5	49.2	47.7	43.0
2016														
2016 tlover"or	30.2	AA	55.2	19.8	65.2	34.8	11.0	48.6	51.4	59.3	58.5	57.7	56.8	"ot %olarie\$
2016 Att"ie"eral	30.2	AA	55.7	19.6	86.6	13.4	10.9	31.8	68.2	67.0	64.4	61.7	58.8	21.7
2016)o (of a*or	30.2	AA	57.0	16.9	75.7	24.3	11.2	46.8	53.2	64.2	62.8	61.3	59.8	7.6
2016 #reasurer	30.2	AA	52.7	19.0	59.6	40.4	10.7	47.1	52.9	55.1	54.5	53.9	53.2	14.5
State House 101	51.3	AA	78.6	14.1	92.5	7.5	9.1	50.3	49.7	75.9	73.9	71.7	69.5	"ot %olarie\$
State House 107	52.5	AA	90.1	26.0	93.4	6.6	10.5	85.7	14.3	91.2	90.9	90.5	90.1	"ot %olarie\$
State Se"ate 38	52.5	AA	52.1	18.9	54.3	45.7	13.1	48.6	51.4	52.0	51.7	51.4	51.1	18.4
State Se"ate 40	51.8	AA	64.7	19.3	66.7	33.3	9.1	63.2	36.8	65.6	65.4	65.3	65.1	"ot %olarie\$
2014														
State Se"ate 40	51.8	AA	41.9	10.1	48.5	51.5	6.1	27.5	72.5	40.6	39.6	38.5	37.4	"o dear B-P ca "\$
2012														
2012 tlover"or	30.2	AA	67.6	11.7	61.5	38.5	9.2	70.3	29.7	65.4	65.8	66.3	66.7	"ot %olarie\$
2012)o (of a*or	30.2	AA	40.7	11.7	54.3	45.7	7.2	30.5	69.5	45.2	44.1	42.9	41.6	73.6

Table 15A

House	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P candidate	Actual vote for B-P candidate	Turnout rate for office at %		White votes		% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 50.1% of votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 45.1% of votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 40.1% of votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 35.1% of votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 30.1% of votes	
				B-P	Others	B-P	Others						
General elections													
2018													
State House 33	AA	78.7	49.7	100.0	0.0	49.3	63.2	36.8	81.7	79.8	78.0	76.1	12.9
State House 37	AA	49.9	30.4	99.2	0.8	67.3	46.7	53.3	63.0	60.9	58.9	57.0	12.9
State House 38	AA	81.9	31.5	99.1	0.9	65.4	69.4	30.6	79.1	77.8	76.6	75.5	12.9
State Senate 14	AA	71.4	32.0	99.2	0.8	67.9	63.3	36.7	74.8	73.3	71.9	70.6	12.9
2016													
2016 Governor	AA	54.7	56.9	98.6	1.4	67.8	46.2	53.8	70.1	67.5	65.0	62.5	12.9
2016 Treasurer	AA	56.1	61.1	99.2	0.8	65.3	48.3	51.7	72.9	70.4	67.9	65.4	3.6
State House 38	AA	84.8	42.1	96.9	3.1	50.9	73.8	26.2	84.3	83.1	82.0	80.9	12.9
2014													
State House 33	AA	87.3	37.0	99.3	0.7	50.0	75.4	24.6	85.6	84.4	83.3	82.2	12.9
State Senate 38	AA	79.9	43.9	99.1	0.9	43.2	66.5	33.5	82.9	81.3	79.7	78.0	12.9
2012													
2012 President	AA	55.1	41.6	99.3	0.7	70.7	47.0	53.0	66.4	64.0	61.7	59.6	9.4
2012 Governor	AA	55.3	39.8	99.7	0.3	68.7	47.3	52.7	66.5	64.2	61.9	59.8	8.6

Table 15B

House (row) ; a-e	% of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca	actual vote for B-P ca	turnout rate for office a				% of votes for "lac--"		% of vote B-P ca	% of vote B-P ca	% of vote B-P ca	% of vote B-P ca
				*lac- votes		white votes		% of votes cast for office	% of votes cast for office				
				B-P	others	B-P	others						
Democratic primaries													
2018													
State House 33	44.2	AA	60.2	11.7	61.8	38.2	8.4	58.9	41.1	60.6	60.4	60.3	60.1
2016													
2016 (over)	20.7	AA	60.3	22.4	82.2	17.8	17.8	51.4	48.6	68.6	67.0	65.5	63.8
2016 (of a*)	20.7	AA	35.0	22.0	60.4	39.6	17.8	28.4	71.6	46.1	44.5	42.9	41.2
2016 (of a*)	20.7	AA	72.2	18.8	72.1	27.9	21.9	74.7	25.3	73.5	73.6	73.8	73.9
2016 #reasurer	20.7	AA	63.2	19.9	89.2	10.8	20.7	52.9	47.1	70.7	68.9	67.1	65.3
State House 33	51.4	AA	64.1	18.5	80.6	19.4	17.7	54.3	45.7	67.7	66.4	65.1	63.8
2014													
"o"													
2012													
2012 (over)	20.7	AA	59.7	19.4	68.0	32.0	16.6	53.7	46.3	61.4	60.7	60.0	59.2
2012 (of a*)	20.7	AA	37.9	19.2	54.1	45.9	13.6	31.3	68.7	44.6	43.5	42.4	41.1

Table 16A

State	Year	Race of B-P candidate	Actual vote for B-P candidate	Turnout rate for office		White votes		% of B-P vote received if have strict OAS	% of B-P vote received if have strict OAS	% of B-P vote received if have strict OAS	% of B-P vote received if have strict OAS	% of B-P vote received if have strict OAS (state to 0)		
				*lac- votes	all others	votes cast for office	all others							
General elections														
2018														
State House 64 = Ala (a "ce)	2018	AA	42.2	24.5	96.7	3.3	55.7	38.2	61.8	56.1	53.7	51.5	49.4	36.5
State House 58 = i ulfor\$)	2018	AA	76.8	38.0	99.4	0.6	47.8	62.8	37.2	79.0	77.2	75.5	73.8	"ot %olar&e\$
State House 60 = i ulfor\$)	2018	AA	69.0	35.2	98.9	1.1	52.5	57.1	42.9	73.9	71.9	70.0	68.2	"ot %olar&e\$
State Se"ate 28 = i ulfor\$)	2018	AA	75.3	34.9	99.2	0.8	58.0	64.5	35.5	77.5	75.9	74.4	73.0	"ot %olar&e\$
<i>Insert</i>														
2016														
2016 ti over"or	2016	AA	47.8	43.6	96.6	3.4	72.2	38.1	61.9	60.1	57.4	54.9	52.5	29.7
2016 #treasurer	2016	AA	49.2	43.8	99.5	0.5	70.1	42.3	57.7	64.3	61.6	59.1	56.7	19.9
State Se"ate 28 = i ulfor\$)	2016	AA	83.9	59.7	99.4	0.6	59.7	62.3	37.7	80.9	79.0	77.1	75.3	"ot %olar&e\$
2014														
State House 61 = i ulfor\$)	2014	AA	32.8	38.1	98.6	1.4	63.8	24.3	75.7	52.1	48.7	45.5	42.4	47.0
2012														
2012 Presi&e"t	2012	AA	49.8	45.0	99.2	0.8	67.8	40.0	60.0	63.6	60.8	58.2	55.6	23.4
2012 ti over"or	2012	AA	50.2	43.5	98.4	1.6	66.9	43.5	56.5	65.1	62.6	60.1	57.7	17.1

Table 16B

Se"ate ! rou%!" , Ala (a "ce' ! uilfor\$' a "\$ 7 a "\$o%h	%ercent *lac- . AP of Jurisdiction"	race of B-P ca "\$\$ate	actual vote for B-P ca "\$\$ate	tur" out rate for office a "\$%ercent vote for *lac-- %referre\$ ca "\$\$ates				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas \$50 1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas \$40 1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas \$35 1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas \$ust e/ cees\$ for B-P ca "\$\$ate to 0!"			
				*lac- votes		0 hite votes								
				votes cast for office	B-P others	votes cast for office	B-P others							
Democratic primaries 2018														
State House 64 -Ala (a "ce>	18.5	AA	46.8	5.4	87.8	12.2	3.5	35.9	64.1	67.4	64.9	62.2	59.5	19.5
State House 58 - ! uilfor\$>	42.7	AA	80.2	10.0	98.4	1.6	7.3	65.2	34.8	84.4	82.7	81.0	79.3	"ot %olarike\$
2016														
2016 t ! over" or	24.8	AA	56.0	21.2	74.6	25.4	11.2	47.0	53.0	65.1	63.8	62.4	60.9	"ot %olarike\$
2016 Att" ! e" eral	24.8	AA	53.1	20.9	87.9	12.1	10.9	38.5	61.5	71.0	68.7	66.2	63.6	13.7
2016) o (of a *or	24.8	!	58.8	20.6	79.5	20.5	10.3	49.5	50.5	69.5	68.1	66.6	65.1	10.8
2016 #reasurer	24.8	AA	54.2	20.5	61.3	38.7	10.5	54.3	45.7	58.9	58.6	58.3	57.9	"ot %olarike\$
State House 58 - ! uilfor\$>	51.1	AA	71.5	15.3	89.4	10.6	10.4	52.3	47.7	74.4	72.6	70.7	68.7	"ot %olarike\$
2014														
State House 58 - ! uilfor\$>	51.1	AA	42.6	12.2	59.4	40.6	7.2	16.8	83.2	43.6	41.5	39.4	37.1	67.6
State House 60 - ! uilfor\$>	51.4	AA	54.2	9.9	66.5	33.5	4.9	32.7	67.3	55.3	53.8	52.1	50.3	34.2
State Se"ate 28 - ! uilfor\$>	56.5	AA	59.4	12.1	71.4	34.1	6.0	34.7	65.3	57.1	55.6	54.0	52.3	28.9
2012														
2012 t ! over" or	24.8	AA	56.7	16.9	66.7	33.3	9.8	52.1	47.9	61.3	60.6	59.9	59.1	"ot %olarike\$
2012) o (of a *or	24.8	AA	36.8	15.7	54.4	45.6	8.4	27.8	72.2	45.1	43.9	42.6	41.1	73.0

Table 17

Se"ate l i rou%"+, 4avie a"\$ 9ors6th	%erce"t *lac- . AP of Jurisdictio"	race of B-P ca"\$ \$State	actual vote for B-P ca"\$ \$State	tur" out rate for office a"\$ %erce"t vote for *lac- %rferre\$ ca"\$ \$States				%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 501 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 451 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 401 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 351 *lac- .AP	%erce"t *lac- . AP (ust e/cees for B-P ca"\$ \$State to 0!"	
				*lac- votes	White votes	votes cast for office	B-P others						votes cast for office
General elections													
2018													
State House 71 -9ors6th>	36.6	AA 72.7	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6	71.3	70.1	"ot %olarke\$
State House 72 -9ors6th>	47.5	AA 79.1	31.8	99.6	0.4	49.4	69.6	30.4	81.3	79.9	78.6	77.3	"ot %olarke\$
State Se"ate 32 -9ors6th>	39.2	AA 72.9	28.5	99.2	0.8	50.5	65.0	35.0	77.3	75.8	74.3	73.0	"ot %olarke\$
2016													
2016 t i over"or	23.8	AA 48.2	32.6	99.4	0.6	72.9	34.8	65.2	54.8	52.1	49.6	47.3	40.8
2016 #reasure	23.8	AA 41.2	29.9	100.0	0.0	71.2	34.3	65.7	53.7	51.1	48.7	46.4	42.8
2014													
State House 71	45.5	AA 76.6	25.8	99.3	0.7	39.6	62.6	37.4	77.1	75.4	73.7	72.1	"ot %olarke\$
2012													
2012 Preside"t	23.8	AA 50.5	47.8	99.3	0.7	69.8	40.6	59.4	64.5	61.7	59.0	56.4	21.8
2012 t i over"or	23.8	AA 50.7	46.4	99.1	0.9	69.5	42.3	57.7	65.0	62.4	59.8	57.3	19.0
Democratic primaries													
2018													
"o"e													
2016													
2016 t i over"or	23.8	AA 55.6	20.0	79.9	20.1	11.4	45.2	54.8	67.3	65.7	63.9	62.1	"ot %olarke\$ 1st choice sa (e
2016 Att" i e"eral	23.8	AA 45.0	20.9	68.9	31.1	11.1	36.3	63.7	57.6	56.1	54.4	52.7	27.8
2016)o (of a*or	23.8	AA 60.3	19.1	84.7	15.3	10.6	51.2	48.8	72.7	71.2	69.5	67.7	"ot %olarke\$
2016 #reasure	23.8	AA 59.1	20.5	70.5	29.5	10.6	53.6	46.4	64.7	64.0	63.1	62.2	"ot %olarke\$
2014													
"o"e													
2012													
2012 t i over"or	23.8	AA 58.5	16.1	76.5	23.5	10.4	51.8	48.2	66.8	65.6	64.3	63.0	"ot %olarke\$
2012)o (of a*or	23.8	AA 39.3	15.1	47.9	52.1	8.9	35.8	64.2	43.4	42.8	42.2	41.6	"o clear B-P ca"\$ \$

Table 18A

Se "ate ! rou%"+, 4 u%ll"> Har"elt ?oh "so"t ee' <ash' a "\$ Sa (%so"	%ercent "lac- . AP of Jurisdiction"		Race of B-P ca "\$\$ate		actual vote for B-P ca "\$\$ate		tur"out rate for office a "\$ercent" vote for "lac- %i referre\$ ca "\$\$ates				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if istrict Oas 50 1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if istrict Oas 40 1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if istrict Oas 35 1 *lac- .AP ca "\$\$ate to 0i"		
	%lac- votes		0 hite votes		votes cast for office		votes cast for office		B-P					others	
	B-P	others	B-P	others	B-P	office	B-P	office	B-P	others				B-P	others
General elections															
2018															
State House 4 =4 u%ll">	22.6	AA	34.5	29.7	99.0	1.0	34.1	15.1	84.9	54.2	50.0	45.9	41.9	45.0	
State House 25 =<ash>	40.7	AA	51.5	35.4	98.1	1.9	64.2	34.2	65.8	56.9	54.1	51.4	48.8	37.3	
State Se "ate 10	24.1	AA	37.5	30.7	99.8	0.2	33.2	16.6	83.4	56.6	52.4	48.3	44.3	42.0	
2016															
2016 tlover"or	23.3	AA	38.7	55.9	99.8	0.2	60.1	21.1	78.9	59.0	55.1	51.2	47.4	38.4	
2016 #reasurer	23.3	AA	41.5	54.8	99.8	0.2	58.4	29.7	70.3	63.6	60.1	56.7	53.2	30.3	
State House 7 =<ash>	50.7	AA	67.8	52.9	99.5	0.5	68.3	44.8	55.2	68.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	11.9	
State House 25 =<ash>	16.1	AA	31.9	53.8	84.6	15.4	62.8	20.8	79.2	50.2	47.1	44.0	40.9	49.6	
2014															
"o"e															
2012															
2012 Preside"t	23.3	AA	41.8	58.3	99.2	0.8	64.7	23.9	76.1	59.6	55.9	52.2	48.5	37.1	
2012 tlover"or	23.3	AA	44.8	57.1	99.1	0.9	63.6	28.4	71.6	61.8	58.3	54.9	51.4	32.9	

Table 18B

Se "ate i rou%ili", 4U%ili" Har"ett ?oh"so"t ee' <ash' a"\$Sa (%so"	%erce"t *lac- . AP of Jurisdictio"	race of B-P ca"\$state	actual vote for B-P ca"\$state	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %erce"t vote for *lac-- %referres\$ ca"\$states		%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receives\$ if \$istrict Oas 501 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receives\$ if \$istrict Oas 45 1 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receives\$ if \$istrict Oas 40 1 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receives\$ if \$istrict Oas 35 1 *lac- .AP	%erce"t *lac- . AP (ust el/cees\$ for B-P ca"\$state to 0i"			
				*lac- votes	0hite votes								
Democratic primaries													
2018													
"0"e													
2016													
2016 t i over"or	23.3	AA 57.8	19.0	94.1	5.9	6.5	40.2	59.8	80.4	78.2	75.8	73.2	7.1
2016 At" i e"eral	23.3	AA 49.3	18.9	64.5	35.5	7.0	42.3	57.7	58.5	57.6	56.6	55.5	16.4
2016) o (of a*or	23.3	AA 67.7	18.6	64.9	35.1	6.6	69.3	30.7	66.1	66.2	66.4	66.6	" of %olar\$es
2016 #treasurer	23.3	AA 60.1	18.8	82.7	17.3	6.6	48.4	51.6	73.8	72.4	70.9	69.2	1.7
2014													
"0"e													
2012													
2012 t i over"or	23.3	AA 51.3	24.9	56.4	43.6	7.9	56.2	43.8	56.4	56.3	56.3	56.3	" of %olar\$es
2012) o (of a*or	23.3	AA 16.9	23.9	38.5	61.5	6.9	18.4	81.6	34.0	33.3	32.4	31.5	" o dear B-P ca "\$

Table 19A

Se"ate !rou%"+, 9ra"-!l" a"\$; a-e	%ercent *lac- .AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$\$state	tur"outrate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac- %referre\$ ca "\$\$states				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 501 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 451 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 401 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 351 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 351 *lac- .AP (uste/cees\$ for B-P ca "\$\$state to 0)"		
				*lac- votes		0hite votes								
				votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office						B-P	all others
General elections														
2018														
State House 33 = ; a-e>	44.2	AA	78.7	49.7	100.0	0.0	49.3	63.2	36.8	81.7	79.8	78.0	76.1	"ot%olarie\$
State House 37 = ; a-e>	14.3	AA	49.9	30.4	99.2	0.8	67.3	46.7	53.3	63.0	60.9	58.9	57.0	12.9
State House 38 = ; a-e>	48.3	AA	81.9	31.5	99.1	0.9	65.4	69.4	30.6	79.1	77.8	76.6	75.5	"ot%olarie\$
State Se"ate 14 = ; a-e>	38.9	AA	71.4	32.0	99.2	0.8	67.9	63.3	36.7	74.8	73.3	71.9	70.6	"ot%olarie\$
2016														
2016 t!over"or	21.1	AA	54.0	58.3	99.6	0.4	85.8	44.1	55.9	66.6	63.9	61.4	59.0	14.9
2016 #reasurer	21.1	AA	55.4	57.3	99.5	0.5	84.3	46.4	53.6	67.9	65.4	63.0	60.6	9.7
State House 7 =9ra"-!l">	50.7	AA	67.8	52.9	99.5	0.5	68.3	44.8	55.2	68.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	11.9
State House 38 = ; a-e>	51.4	AA	84.8	42.1	96.9	3.1	50.9	73.8	26.2	84.3	83.1	82.0	80.9	"ot%olarie\$
2014														
State House 33 = ; a-e>	51.4	AA	87.3	37.0	99.3	0.7	50.0	75.4	24.6	85.6	84.4	83.3	82.2	"ot%olarie\$
State Se"ate 38 = ; a-e>	51.4	AA	79.9	43.9	99.1	0.9	43.2	66.5	33.5	82.9	81.3	79.7	78.0	"ot%olarie\$
2012														
2012 Pres#e"t	21.1	AA	54.7	54.7	99.5	0.5	68.3	42.1	57.9	67.6	64.8	62.1	59.4	16.6
2012 t!over"or	21.1	AA	54.9	53.6	99.3	0.7	67.1	44.0	56.0	68.6	65.9	63.2	60.6	13.2

Table 19B

Seate lrou%"+, gra "-ll" a"\$: a-e	%erce"t *lac- . AP of juris\$ictio"	race of B-P ca" \$\$\$\$	actual vote for B-P ca" \$\$\$\$	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %erce"t vote br *lac- %referre\$ ca" \$\$\$\$				%erce"t of vote B-P ca" \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas 501 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca" \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas 451 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca" \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas 401 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca" \$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas 351 *lac- .AP	%erce"t *lac- . AP (uste / oee\$ for B-P ca" \$\$\$\$ to 0l"			
				*lac- votes votes cast for office	B-P all others	votes cast for office	B-P all others								
Democratic primaries															
2018															
State House 33	44.2	AA	60.2	11.7	61.8	38.2	8.4	58.9	41.1		60.6	60.4	60.3	60.1	" of %olaride\$
2016															
2016 ti over" or	21.1	AA	60.7	17.6	84.7	15.3	13.3	51.3	48.7		70.3	68.7	67.0	65.2	" of %olaride\$
2016 Att" i e" eral	21.1	AA	35.4	17.0	63.2	15.4	13.0	32.4	67.6		56.7	54.3	51.9	49.5	36.0
2016) o (of a* or	21.1		72.2	17.0	68.6	31.4	11.6	74.7	25.3		71.1	71.4	71.7	72.0	" of %olaride\$
2016 #treasurer	21.1	AA	63.4	17.3	90.0	10.0	12.4	53.5	46.5		74.8	73.0	71.1	69.2	" of %olaride\$
State House 33	51.4	AA	64.1	18.5	80.6	19.4	17.7	54.3	45.7		67.7	66.4	65.1	63.8	" of %olaride\$
2014															
" o e															
2012															
2012 ti over" or	21.1	AA	59.8	19.4	77.0	23.0	16.6	54.9	45.1		66.8	65.7	64.6	63.4	" of %olaride\$
2012) o (of a* or	21.1	AA	37.7	19.2	56.1	43.9	13.6	31.3	68.7		45.8	44.6	43.3	42.0	68.5

Table 20

Election	Year	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout for office				% of total votes		% of total votes received by B-P	% of total votes received by P	% of total votes received by others	% of total votes received by B-P	% of total votes received by P	% of total votes received by others
				votes cast for office	votes cast for office	all others	votes cast for office	all others							
General elections															
2018															
State House 71	2018	AA	72.7	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6	71.3	70.1	77.3	73.0
State House 72	2018	AA	79.1	31.8	99.6	0.4	49.4	69.6	30.4	81.3	79.9	78.6	77.3	77.3	73.0
State Senate 32	2018	AA	72.9	28.5	99.2	0.8	50.5	65.0	35.0	77.3	75.8	74.3	73.0	77.3	73.0
2016															
2016 Governor	2016	AA	51.2	42.6	98.8	1.2	73.5	42.3	57.7	63.0	60.5	58.0	55.7	55.5	21.4
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	50.9	39.2	99.0	1.0	72.0	42.8	57.2	62.6	60.1	57.8	55.5	55.5	21.3
2014															
State House 71	2014	AA	76.6	25.8	99.3	0.7	39.6	62.6	37.4	77.1	75.4	73.7	72.1	72.1	72.1
2012															
2012 Governor	2012	AA	53.2	44.5	99.8	0.2	70.2	43.6	56.4	65.4	62.8	60.3	57.9	57.9	16.9
2012 Treasurer	2012	AA	53.4	44.2	100.0	0.0	68.3	44.2	55.8	66.1	63.5	61.0	58.6	58.6	15.2
Democratic primaries															
2018															
2016															
2016 Governor	2016	AA	56.1	19.5	79.5	20.5	12.5	45.6	54.4	66.3	64.6	62.9	61.1	61.1	8.7
2016 Attorney General	2016	AA	45.2	18.9	69.5	30.5	12.1	35.0	65.0	56.0	54.4	52.6	50.8	50.8	33.0
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	60.8	17.8	84.2	15.8	11.7	52.0	48.0	71.4	69.9	68.2	66.5	66.5	106.6
2014															
2012															
2012 Governor	2012	AA	58.8	15.1	66.5	33.5	11.2	52.9	47.1	60.7	60.0	59.3	58.6	58.6	106.6
2012 Treasurer	2012	AA	39.7	14.2	49.4	50.6	9.5	35.5	64.5	43.8	43.1	42.4	41.7	41.7	106.6

Table 21

Pitt) ou"16	%erce"t *lac- . AP of JurisSictio"	race of B-P ca "\$\$State	actual vote for B-P ca "\$\$State	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %erce"t vote for *lac-- %referre\$ ca "\$\$Sales				%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 50 1 *lac- . AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 45 1 *lac- . AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 40 1 *lac- . AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$strict Oas 35 1 *lac- . AP	%erce"t *lac- . AP (uste/ cees\$ for B- P ca "\$\$State to 0!"		
				*lac- votes	votes cast for office	all others	votes cast for office						B-P	all others
General elections														
2018														
State House 8	44.9	AA	64.7	26.7	98.3	1.7	56.2	46.8	53.2	63.4	61.2	59.2	57.3	12.2
State House 9	20.5	AA	40.0	20.1	86.1	13.9	57.6	33.1	66.9	46.8	44.9	43.1	41.5	57.3
2016														
2016 ti over"or	32.4	AA	51.0	47.4	98.6	1.4	68.1	33.2	66.8	60.0	56.9	53.9	51.0	33.2
2016 #reasurer	32.4	AA	53.0	45.3	99.4	0.6	66.7	35.6	64.4	61.4	58.4	55.5	52.7	30.0
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 Preside"t	32.4	AA	53.2	54.8	99.2	0.8	64.1	34.6	65.4	64.4	61.2	58.1	55.0	26.8
2012 ti over"or	32.4	AA	55.1	53.8	99.0	1.0	62.6	37.3	62.7	65.8	62.8	59.8	56.8	23.2
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 8	44.9	AA	50.0	7.4	55.3	44.7	4.4	43.0	57.0	50.7	50.1	49.5	48.8	44.0
2016														
2016 ti over"or	32.4	AA	52.0	12.2	78.1	21.9	7.2	34.2	65.8	61.8	59.7	57.5	55.1	24.9
2016 At" i e"eral	32.4	AA	61.4	11.7	71.9	28.1	6.8	22.5	77.5	53.7	51.4	48.9	46.3	42.2
2016 o (of a"or	32.4	AA	50.5	11.5	62.3	37.7	6.7	41.9	58.1	54.8	53.8	52.8	51.7	27.7
2016 #reasurer	32.4	AA	51.3	11.4	55.1	44.9	6.9	43.1	56.9	50.6	50.0	49.4	48.7	45.0
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 ti over"or	32.4	AA	60.5	13.7	57.2	42.8	7.4	60.9	39.1	58.5	58.7	58.9	59.1	"ot %olarie\$
2012 o (of a"or	32.4	AA	32.9	13.1	44.3	55.7	6.7	20.3	79.7	36.2	35.1	33.9	32.6	"o clear B-P ca "\$

Table 22A

70*eso") ou"6	%ercent <A . AP of Jurisdiction"		face of < P ca "\$state		actual vote for < P ca "\$state		tur" out rate for office a "\$ercent"t vote for <ative- %referre\$ ca "\$\$ates				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 351 <A .AP 0]"	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 401 <A .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 451 <A .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 41.8 49.3 56.8	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 42.2 51.0 56.6	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 501 <A .AP	
	%ercent <A . AP of Jurisdiction"		face of < P ca "\$state		actual vote for < P ca "\$state		tur" out rate for office a "\$ercent"t vote for <ative- %referre\$ ca "\$\$ates										
	%ercent <A . AP of Jurisdiction"		face of < P ca "\$state		actual vote for < P ca "\$state		tur" out rate for office a "\$ercent"t vote for <ative- %referre\$ ca "\$\$ates										
General elections																	
2018																	
State House 46	14.5	AA	36.7	AA	36.7	12.4	51.9	48.1	35.9	39.5	60.5	42.7	42.2	41.8	41.4	94.1	
State House 47	46.2	<A	58.9	<A	58.9	16.7	79.3	20.7	30.8	38.5	61.5	52.8	51.0	49.3	47.7	42.0	
State Senate 13	26.5	;	61.5	;	61.5	17.5	53.6	46.4	35.2	57.8	42.2	56.4	56.6	56.8	56.9	"ot%olarie\$	
2016																	
2016 tlover"or	38.2	AA	51.6	AA	51.6	24.0	51.7	48.3	46.6	50.7	49.3	51.0	51.0	51.0	50.9	"ot%olarie\$	
2016 #reasurer	38.2	AA	57.8	AA	57.8	22.9	59.1	40.9	45.6	51.5	48.5	54.0	53.7	53.4	53.1	"ot%olarie\$	
2014																	
"o"e																	
2012																	
2012 Preside"t	38.2	AA	58.3	AA	58.3	28.3	60.4	39.6	53.5	60.8	39.2	60.7	60.7	60.7	60.7	"ot%olarie\$	
2012 tlover"or	38.2	AA	67.5	AA	67.5	27.3	73.8	26.2	51.8	66.1	33.9	68.8	68.4	68.1	67.8	"ot%olarie\$	

Table 22B

Jurisdiction	Race of <P ca"\$state	actual vote for <P ca"\$state	turnout rate for office a"\$%race"\$vote for <ative- %referre\$ ca"\$states		"o"-<ative A (erica" votes		% of B-P vote received if have	% of B-P vote received if have	% of B-P vote received if have	% of B-P vote received if have	% of B-P vote received if have	% of B-P vote received if have
			<ative A (erica" votes	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	<P others						
Democratic primaries												
2018												
State Se"ate 13	<A	33.1	11.2	52.3	47.7	9.0	22.7	77.3				
2016												
2016 ti over"or	:	22.3	8.5	31.6	68.4	9.9	17.0	83.0	23.7	23.0	22.3	21.6
2016 Att"ie"eral	AA	62.5	8.4	65.2	34.8	10.5	59.3	40.7	61.9	61.6	61.4	61.1
2016)o (of a"or	:	65.2	8.4	61.3	38.7	9.7	69.1	30.9	65.5	65.9	66.2	66.6
2016 #reaser	AA	67.1	8.9	72.5	27.5	10.1	59.1	40.9	65.4	64.7	64.1	63.4
State House 47	<A	58.4	11.8	52.2	47.8	9.0	62.7	37.3	56.7	57.3	57.8	58.4
2014												
State Se"ate 13	:	47.3	12.6	42.7	57.3	17.1	46.1	53.9	44.7	44.8	45.0	45.1
2012												
2012 ti over"or	AA	52.3	16.2	58.1	41.9	17.3	48.7	51.3	53.2	52.8	52.3	51.9
2012)o (of a"or	:	54.4	16.4	88.0	12.0	16.1	39.4	60.6	63.9	61.5	59.1	56.6

Certification

I certify that the statements and opinions provided in this report are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Lisa Handley

Lisa Handley, Ph.D.

9/17/2019

Date

Lisa R. Handley
CURRICULUM VITAE

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Professional Experience

Dr. Handley has over thirty years of experience in the areas of redistricting and voting rights, both as a practitioner and an academician, and is recognized nationally (as well as internationally) as an expert on these subjects. She has advised numerous jurisdictions and other clients on redistricting and has served as an expert in dozens of redistricting and voting rights court cases. Her clients have included the U.S. Department of Justice and scores of state and local jurisdictions, as well as redistricting commissions and civil rights organizations. Internationally, Dr. Handley has provided electoral assistance in more than a dozen countries, serving as a consultant on issues of democratic governance – including voting rights, electoral system design and electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) – for the United Nations, the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), IFES, and International IDEA. In addition, Dr. Handley served as Chairman of the Electoral Boundaries Commission in the Cayman Islands.

Dr. Handley has been actively involved in research, writing and teaching on the subjects of voting rights and redistricting. She has written a book, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1992) and numerous articles, as well as edited a volume (Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008) on these subjects. She has taught political science and methodology courses at several universities, most recently George Washington University. Dr. Handley is a Visiting Research Academic at Oxford Brookes University in the United Kingdom.

Dr. Handley is the President of Frontier International Consulting, a consulting firm that specializes in providing electoral assistance in transitional and post-conflict democracies. She also works as an independent election consultant for such international organizations as the United Nations.

Education

Ph.D. The George Washington University, Political Science, 1991

Present Employment

President, Frontier International Electoral Consulting LLC (since co-founding company in September of 1998).

Senior International Consultant, provides electoral assistance to such international clients as the UN, UNDP and IFES on electoral district delimitation, electoral system design and minority voting rights.

U.S. Clients since 2000

American Civil Liberties Union (expert testimony in Ohio partisan gerrymander challenge and challenge to Commerce Department inclusion of citizenship question on 2020 census form)

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (expert testimony in challenges to statewide judicial elections in Texas and Alabama)

US Department of Justice (expert witness testimony in several Section 2 and Section 5 cases)

Alaska: Alaska Redistricting Board (redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony)

Arizona: Arizona Independent Redistricting Board (redistricting consultation, expert witness)

Arkansas: expert witness for Plaintiffs in Jeffers v. Beebe

Colorado: Colorado Redistricting Board (redistricting consultation)

Connecticut: State Senate and State House of Representatives (redistricting consultation)

Florida: State Senate (redistricting consultation)

Kansas: State Senate and House Legislative Services (redistricting consultation)

Louisiana: Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus (expert witness testimony)

Massachusetts: State Senate (redistricting consultation)

Maryland: Attorney General (redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony)

Miami-Dade County, Florida: County Attorney (redistricting consultation)

Nassau County, New York: Redistricting Commission (redistricting consulting)

New Mexico: State House (redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony)

New York: State Assembly (redistricting consultation)

New York City: Redistricting Commission and Charter Commission (redistricting consultation and Section 5 submission assistance)

New York State Court: Expert to the Special Master (drew congressional lines for state court)

Ohio: State Democratic Party (redistricting litigation support, expert witness testimony)

Pennsylvania: Senate Democratic Caucus (redistricting consultation)

Rhode Island: State Senate and State House (litigation support, expert witness testimony)

Vermont: Secretary of State (redistricting consultation)

International Clients since 2000

United Nations

- Afghanistan – electoral system design and district delimitation expert
- Bangladesh (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Sierra Leone (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Liberia (UNMIL, UN peacekeeping mission) – redistricting expert
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, UN peacekeeping mission) – election feasibility mission, electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Kenya (UN) – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Haiti (UN) – election feasibility mission, electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Lead Writer on the topic of boundary delimitation (redistricting) for ACE (Administration and Cost of Elections Project)

International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)

- Afghanistan – district delimitation expert
- Sudan – redistricting expert
- Kosovo – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Nigeria – redistricting expert
- Nepal – redistricting expert
- Georgia – electoral system design and district delimitation expert
- Yemen – redistricting expert
- Lebanon – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Myanmar – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Ukraine – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Pakistan – consultant for developing redistricting software
- Principal consultant for the Delimitation Equity Project – conducted research, wrote reference manual and developed training curriculum
- Writer on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting), Elections Standards Project
- Training – developed training curriculum and conducted training workshops on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) in Azerbaijan and Jamaica

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA):

- Consultant on electoral dispute resolution systems
- Technology consultant on use of GIS for electoral district delimitation
- Training – developed training material and conducted training workshop on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) for African election officials (Mauritius)
- Curriculum development – boundary delimitation curriculum for the BRIDGE Project
- Project coordinator for the ACE project

Other international clients have included The Cayman Islands; the Australian Election Commission; the Boundary Commission of British Columbia, Canada; and the Global Justice Project for Iraq.

Previous Employment

Project Coordinator and Lead Writer on Boundary Delimitation, Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project. As Project Coordinator (1998 – 2000) of the ACE Project, Dr. Handley served as a liaison between the three partner international organizations – the United Nations, the International Foundation for Election Systems and International IDEA – and was responsible for the overall project management of ACE, a web-based global encyclopedia of election administration. She also served as Lead Writer on Boundary Delimitation for ACE.

Research Director and Statistical Analyst, Election Data Services, Inc. (1984 to 1998). Election Data Services (E.D.S.) is a Washington D.C. political consulting firm specialising in election administration. Dr. Handley's work at E.D.S. focused on providing redistricting and voting rights consulting and litigation support to scores of state and local jurisdictions.

Adjunct Professor (1986 to 1998). Dr. Handley has taught political science and methodology courses (both at the graduate and undergraduate level) at George Washington University, the University of Virginia, and the University of California at Irvine. She has served as a guest lecture at Harvard, Princeton, Georgetown, American University, George Mason University and Oxford Brookes University in the UK.

Grants

National Science Foundation Grant (2000-2001): Co-investigator (with Bernard Grofman) on a comparative redistricting project, which included hosting an international conference on "Redistricting in a Comparative Perspective" and producing an edited volume based on the papers presented at the conference.

Publications

Books:

Does Torture Prevention Work? Liverpool University Press, 2016 (served as editor and author, with Richard Carver)

Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008 (first editor, with Bernard Grofman).

Delimitation Equity Project: Resource Guide, Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance at IFES and USAID publication, 2006 (lead author).

Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1992 (with Bernard Grofman and Richard Niemi).

Academic Articles:

"Minority Success in Non-Majority Minority Districts: Finding the 'Sweet Spot'," Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics, forthcoming (with David Lublin, Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman).

"Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived its Usefulness: In a Word, "No," Legislative Studies Quarterly, volume 34 (4), November 2009 (with David Lublin, Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman).

"Delimitation Consulting in the US and Elsewhere," Zeitschrift für Politikberatung, volume 1 (3/4), 2008 (with Peter Schrott).

"Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence," North Carolina Law Review, volume 79 (5), June 2001 (with Bernard Grofman and David Lublin).

"A Guide to 2000 Redistricting Tools and Technology" in The Real Y2K Problem: Census 2000 Data and Redistricting Technology, edited by Nathaniel Persily, New York: Brennan Center, 2000.

"1990s Issues in Voting Rights," Mississippi Law Journal, 65 (2), Winter 1995 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Minority Turnout and the Creation of Majority-Minority Districts," American Politics Quarterly, 23 (2), April 1995 (with Kimball Brace, Richard Niemi and Harold Stanley).

"Identifying and Remediating Racial Gerrymandering," Journal of Law and Politics, 8 (2), Winter 1992 (with Bernard Grofman).

"The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation in Southern State Legislatures," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16 (1), February 1991 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Minority Population Proportion and Black and Hispanic Congressional Success in the 1970s and 1980s," American Politics Quarterly, 17 (4), October 1989 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Black Representation: Making Sense of Electoral Geography at Different Levels of Government," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (2), May 1989 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," Law and Policy, 10 (1), January 1988 (with Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman and Richard Niemi).

"Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans?" Journal of Politics, 49 (1), February 1987 (with Kimball Brace and Bernard Grofman).

Chapters in Edited Volumes:

“Redistricting” in Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems, Erik Herron Robert Pekkanen and Matthew Shugart (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

“Role of the Courts in the Electoral Boundary Delimitation Process,” in International Election Remedies, John Hardin Young (ed.), Chicago: American Bar Association Press, 2017.

“One Person, One Vote, Different Values: Comparing Delimitation Practices in India, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” in Fixing Electoral Boundaries in India, edited by Mohd. Sanjeer Alam and K.C. Sivaramakrishman, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015.

“Delimiting Electoral Boundaries in Post-Conflict Settings,” in Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, edited by Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

“A Comparative Survey of Structures and Criteria for Boundary Delimitation,” in Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, edited by Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

“Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Model,” in Voting Rights and Minority Representation, edited by David Bositis, published by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Washington DC, and University Press of America, New York, 2006.

“Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by Bernard Grofman; New York: Agathon Press, 1998 (with Bernard Grofman and Wayne Arden).

“Estimating the Impact of Voting-Rights-Related Districting on Democratic Strength in the U.S. House of Representatives,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by Bernard Grofman; New York: Agathon Press, 1998 (with Bernard Grofman).

“Voting Rights in the 1990s: An Overview,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by Bernard Grofman; New York: Agathon Press, 1998 (with Bernard Grofman and Wayne Arden).

“Racial Context, the 1968 Wallace Vote and Southern Presidential Dealignment: Evidence from North Carolina and Elsewhere,” in Spatial and Contextual Models in Political Research, edited by Munroe Eagles; Taylor and Francis Publishing Co., 1995 (with Bernard Grofman).

“The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations,” in The Quiet Revolution: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in the South, 1965-1990, eds. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, Princeton University Press, 1994 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Preconditions for Black and Hispanic Congressional Success," in United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, eds. Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman, Greenwood Press, 1992 (with Bernard Grofman).

Electronic Publication:

"Boundary Delimitation" Topic Area for the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project, 1998. Published by the ACE Project on the ACE website (www.aceproject.org).

Additional Writings of Note:

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, Brief of Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae, 2017 (one of more than a political scientists to sign brief)

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder, Brief of Historians and Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 2013 (one of several dozen historians and social scientists to sign brief)

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Bartlett v. Strickland, 2008 (with Nathaniel Persily, Bernard Grofman, Bruce Cain, and Theodore Arrington).

Court Cases since 2015

Ohio Philip Randolph Institute v. Larry Householder (2019) – partisan gerrymander challenge to Ohio congressional districts

State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce/ New York Immigration Coalition v. U.S. Department of Commerce (2018-2019) – challenge to inclusion of citizenship question on 2020 census form

U.S. v. City of Eastpointe (ongoing) – minority vote dilution challenge to City of Eastpointe, Michigan, at-large city council election system

Alabama NAACP v. State of Alabama (ongoing) – minority vote dilution challenge to Alabama statewide judicial election system

Lopez v. Abbott (2017-2018) – minority vote dilution challenge to Texas statewide judicial election system

Personhaballah v. Alcorn (2016-17) – racial gerrymander challenge to Virginia congressional districts

Exhibit 2

FILED

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
 WAKE COUNTY 2020 JAN 22 PM 1: 50 SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
 18 CVS 014001

WAKE CO., G.S.C.

COMMON CAUSE, *et al.*)
 Plaintiffs,)
 v.)
 Representative DAVID R. LEWIS,)
 in his official capacity as Senior)
 Chairman of the House Select)
 Committee on Redistricting, *et al.*,)
 Defendants.)

ORDER SUPPLEMENTING
 COURT ORDER OF OCTOBER 28,
 2019 WITH FINDINGS AND
 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
 COMPLIANCE OF REMEDIAL
 MAPS WITH FEDERAL VOTING
 RIGHTS ACT

THIS MATTER is before the Court following the Court’s September 3, 2019, entry of Judgment wherein the Court declared the 2017 House and Senate plans unconstitutional and permanently enjoined Legislative Defendants and State Defendants, and their respective agents, officers, and employees, from preparing for or administering the 2020 primary and general elections for House and Senate districts in certain county groupings. The Court concluded its review of the General Assembly’s enacted Remedial Maps for the House and Senate legislative districts for the 2020 election, and approved the enacted Remedial Maps by Order entered on October 28, 2019.¹

As detailed in this Court’s September 3, 2019, Judgment, the enacted Remedial Maps were required to comply with the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts. In the Court’s October 28, 2019, Order approving the Remedial Maps, the Court addressed the Remedial Maps’ compliance with the VRA as follows:

¹ On November 1, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s Order approving the Remedial Maps. Plaintiffs sought appellate review of the portions of that Order approving the remedial House districts in Forsyth and Yadkin Counties and Pender, Columbus, and Robeson Counties. On November 15, 2019, Plaintiffs withdrew their appeal, returning jurisdiction over the matter to this Court.

The Court further finds and concludes that the Remedial Maps comply with criterion (g) above, namely that the Remedial Maps comply with the Voting Rights Act and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts. In the Court's Judgment of September 3, 2019, the Court stated that any parties "may submit briefing, which may attach expert analysis, on whether the *Gingles* factors are met in particular counties and county groupings and/or the minimum BVAP needed in particular counties and county groupings for African Americans to be able to elect candidates of their choice to the General Assembly." Plaintiffs submitted such a brief, including expert analysis of Jowei Chen, Ph.D. (report dated September 17, 2019) and Lisa Handley, Ph.D. (report dated September 17, 2019). No other parties submitted briefs or expert analysis on this issue within the time allowed by the Court. The Court finds the analysis performed by Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley to be credible and adopts their conclusions. A separate Order shall be issued by this Court detailing the findings of fact that support these conclusions.

Common Cause v. Lewis, 18-CVS-014001, slip. op. at 12 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019).

Plaintiffs also requested in their brief that the Court set forth written findings as to why the Remedial Maps ultimately adopted by the Court comply with the VRA with respect to some or all revised county groupings, and in particular with respect to the following groupings: Columbus-Pender-Robeson, Cumberland, Forsyth-Yadkin, Pitt-Lenoir, Guilford, and Mecklenburg in the House, and Davie-Forsyth, Franklin-Wake, and Mecklenburg in the Senate.

As forecasted in the Court's October 28, 2019, Order, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the enacted Remedial Maps comply with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts:

I. Legal Standards

For Section 2 of the VRA to require that a legislative district have particular racial demographics, "three threshold conditions" must be met. *Cooper v. Harris*, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017). "First, a 'minority group' must be 'sufficiently large and geographically

compact to constitute a majority' in some reasonably configured legislative district." *Id.* (quoting *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986)). "Second, the minority group must be 'politically cohesive.'" *Id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 51). "And third, a district's white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate." *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Each of these conditions is a "prerequisite[]" to Section 2's application to any given district. *Id.* Where racial considerations predominate in the drawing of a district and the VRA is invoked as a justification for doing so, there must be a "strong basis in evidence" for believing that the three *Gingles* factors were present. *Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117, 167 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff'd*, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The first and third *Gingles* factors are of particular significance for present purposes. As relevant here, the first factor requires that the minority group "could" comprise a numerical majority of the voting-age population in a "reasonably compact district[]" in the relevant county grouping. *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2009) (plurality op.); *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997). It is not the case that "whenever a legislature *can* draw a majority-minority district, it *must* do so" under the VRA, as a "majority-minority district would not be required" in "areas with substantial crossover voting." *Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1472 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But for purposes of the first *Gingles* factor, it must be numerically possible that the minority group could theoretically constitute a majority of a reasonably compact district in the relevant geographic area. *See id.*

To assess whether the first *Gingles* factor is met in specific county groupings, Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Jowei Chen investigated whether it is possible to create a district (or in some cases, two or three districts) in the relevant county grouping that is majority-

minority while adhering to equal population requirements. Dr. Chen did not apply the county traversal restriction in conducting this analysis. Instead, he tested whether it would be possible to create a majority-minority district within the grouping while adhering to equal population requirements, but without regard to county traversals or splitting municipalities or VTDs. Dr. Chen also confirmed that, with one exception in the Franklin-Nash grouping in the House, his findings are the same regardless of whether he uses Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) data from the most recent American Community Survey or total Voting Age Population (VAP) statistics from the 2010 Decennial Census. *Id.* at 3; see *Pope v. Cty. of Albany*, 687 F.3d 565, 574 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012).

With respect to the third *Gingles* factor, the test is not whether there is some level of racially polarized voting, but rather whether there is “legally significant racially polarized voting,” which occurs when the ‘majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.’” *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170 (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 51, 55-56); see also *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56 (“[I]n general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white “crossover” votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting.”). Because the existence and degree of racially polarized voting will “vary” from county to county, this factor requires a localized, “district-specific assessment” of whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc “usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170-74 (internal quotation marks omitted). The need for such localized analysis is particularly acute in North Carolina because, as demonstrated below and in the accompanying expert report of Dr. Lisa Handley, the existence and extent of white bloc voting varies widely across different county groupings.

There is no bright-line rule for the level of white bloc voting that is necessary for the third *Gingles* factor to be met, but prior cases provide guidance. In particular, two recent North Carolina cases—*Cooper v. Harris*, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), and *Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff'd*, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017)—offer guidance on circumstances where the third *Gingles* factor is not met:

- In *Cooper*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was not legally significant racially polarized voting in North Carolina’s former Congressional District 1. The Court explained that, in the 20 years prior to the relevant plan’s adoption, “the district’s BVAP usually hovered between 46% and 48%,” and yet “[i]n the closest election during that period, African-Americans’ candidate of choice received 59% of the total vote; in other years, the share of the vote garnered by those candidates rose to as much as 70%.” 137 S. Ct. at 1470.
- In *Covington*, the district court held that the defendants had not presented “conclusive evidence of the third *Gingles* factor” given that, in most of the elections that the defendants’ expert analyzed, “a majority of non-African-American voters preferred the African-American voters’ candidate of choice.” 316 F.R.D. at 170. The *Covington* case involved state legislative districts in many of the same counties at issue in the remedial process of the instant case, including districts in Cumberland, Forsyth, Guilford, Wake, and Mecklenburg Counties.

In contrast, the following are examples of cases where courts have found that the third *Gingles* factor is met:

- In *Old Person v. Cooney*, 230 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held that the third *Gingles* factor was satisfied where white candidates defeated Indian candidates “in 86% of the contests in the four districts challenged on appeal.”
- In *United States v. Blaine County, Montana*, 363 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding of legally significant racially polarized voting where, “[i]n five out of seven county-wide elections between an American Indian candidate and white candidate, the American Indian candidate lost despite receiving strong American Indian support.”
- In *Rodriguez v. Pataki*, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y.), *aff’d*, 543 U.S. 997 (2004), the district court found that the third *Gingles* factor was met where “the Hispanic-preferred candidate received between (an estimated) 27.1% and 39.7% of the white vote in each [endogenous] election; and each Hispanic-preferred candidate lost to the white-preferred candidate.”

- In *Flores v. Town of Islip*, 382 F. Supp. 3d 197, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), the district court held that there was legally significant polarized voting where white crossover voting ranged from 23.8% to 39% across relevant elections.

As relevant to the third *Gingles* factor, Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Handley analyzed the extent of racially polarized voting in specific county groupings using Ecological Inference (EI) modeling. Specifically, Dr. Handley ran EI analysis on state legislative and statewide elections that had an African American candidate and occurred within one or more of the counties in the relevant grouping.

II. House County Groupings

a. Alamance

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 12. Dr. Chen finds that the maximum African American CVAP possible for a non-contiguous district in this county while adhering to equal population requirements is 35.83%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, it does appear that there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. For Alamance County, Dr. Handley finds that over 96% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between 31.2% and 38.2% in these general elections. Handley Report at 14 (Table 3).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Alamance					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 64	18.5%	Lynch	Lost	42.2%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.8%	Coleman	Lost	41.8%
2016	Treasurer	18.8%	Blue III	Lost	43.2%
2012	House District 64	18.5%	McAdoo	Lost	41.0%
2012	President	18.8%	Obama	Lost	43.1%
2012	Lt. Governor	18.8%	Coleman	Lost	43.3%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 64	18.5%	Lynch	Lost	46.8%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.8%	Coleman	Won	52.3%*
2016	Treasurer	18.8%	Blue III	Won	57.4%
2016	Attorney General	18.8%	Williams	Won	51.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	18.8%	Ferguson	Won	50.3%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	18.8%	Foster	Lost	33.5%*

*Asterisks indicate that the relevant Democratic primary had more than two candidates.

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 31.7% to 37.6%. Handley Report at 14 (Table 3). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 34.4%. *Id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

b. Anson-Union

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which

African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 13. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 37.63%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 98% of African Americans have supported the same candidates in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between just 23.1% and 32.0% in these general elections. Handley Report at 14 (Table 4).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Anson-Union					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	16.5%	Coleman	Lost	33.1%
2016	Treasurer	16.5%	Blue III	Lost	34.6%
2012	President	16.5%	Obama	Lost	37.7%
2012	Lt. Governor	16.5%	Coleman	Lost	37.8%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	16.5%	Coleman	Won	40.8%*
2016	Treasurer	16.5%	Blue III	Won	56.5%
2016	Attorney General	16.5%	Williams	Won	58.3%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	16.5%	Ferguson	Won	55.3%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	16.5%	Richardson	Lost	37.2%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 38.1% to 45.7%. Handley Report at 14 (Table 4). Across the general elections she

studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 42.2%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

c. Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly Grouping

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 16. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 43.85%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 97% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between 28.1% and 38.9% in these general elections. Handley Report at 16 (Table 5).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Cabarrus-Davie-Montgomery-Richmond-Rowan-Stanly					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 82	14.1%	Steele	Lost	47.3%
2016	Lt. Governor	15.5%	Coleman	Lost	33.8%
2016	Treasurer	15.5%	Blue III	Lost	36.1%
2012	House District 83	15.2%	Fleming	Lost	37%
2012	President	15.5%	Obama	Lost	37.8%
2012	Lt. Governor	15.5%	Coleman	Lost	39.1%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	15.5%	Coleman	Won	45.2%*
2016	Treasurer	15.5%	Blue III	Won	53.6%
2016	Attorney General	15.5%	Williams	Won	55.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	15.5%	Ferguson	Won	53.6%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	15.5%	Foster	Lost	24%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 29.1% to 47.6%. Handley Report at 16 (Table 5). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 36.6%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

d. Cleveland-Gaston Grouping

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 17. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-

contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 43.63%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 95% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between just 23.1% and 30.0% in these general elections. Handley Report at 17 (Table 6).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Cleveland-Gaston					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 110	15.3%	McCleary	Lost	32.2%
2018	Senate District 43	14.8%	Price	Lost	34.8%
2016	Lt. Governor	16.2%	Coleman	Lost	33.0%
2016	Treasurer	16.2%	Blue III	Lost	36.0%
2012	House District 110	15.3%	McKoy	Lost	34.1%
2012	President	16.2%	Obama	Lost	37.1%
2012	Lt. Governor	16.2%	Coleman	Lost	39.1%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	16.2%	Coleman	Won	42.7%*
2016	Treasurer	16.2%	Blue III	Won	52.6%
2016	Attorney General	16.2%	Williams	Won	57.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	16.2%	Ferguson	Won	53.8%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	16.2%	Foster	Lost	25.8%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges

from 34.6% to 48.3%. Handley Report at 17 (Table 6). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 41.6%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

e. Columbus-Pender-Robeson Grouping

1. Native Americans

Robeson County contains a large Native American population. It is possible to create a majority Native American district in Robeson County, as the current version of House District 47 has a Native American VAP close to 50% and the prior 2011 version of the district did have a Native American VAP above 50%.

With respect to the second and third *Gingles* factors, Dr. Handley analyzed elections solely within Robeson County. Regarding the second factor, in the seven general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed in Robeson County, less than 60% of Native Americans supported the same candidate in 5 of 7 elections. Handley Report at 41 (Table 22A). Similar voting patterns exist in the primaries that Dr. Handley evaluated. *Id.* at 42 (Table 22B).

Based on the elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, the Court finds the third *Gingles* factor is not met with respect to Native Americans in Robeson County. Dr. Handley finds that a majority of non-Native Americans supported the same candidate as a majority of Native Americans in 5 of the 7 general elections she evaluated, and similar voting patterns exist in the primaries. Handley Report at 40-41 (Tables 22A & 22B). More importantly, the candidate of choice of Native Americans won every general election that Dr. Handley analyzed—all 7 of 7—and almost all of the primary elections as well. *Id.* Thus, non-Native

Americans have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat [Native Americans’] preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56.

2. African Americans

Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley also evaluated the African American community across all three counties in this grouping.

With respect to African Americans, Dr. Chen finds that it is not possible to create even a non-contiguous district that would have an African-American CVAP above 50%. Chen Report at 18. Dr. Chen finds that it may be possible to create a non-contiguous majority-African American district using total VAP from the Decennial Census rather than CVAP, but in any event, he finds that it is not possible to create a contiguous majority-African American district using total VAP. *Id.*

Dr. Handley finds that there is bloc voting in this grouping with respect to African Americans. Dr. Handley finds that over 82% of African Americans supported the same candidate in all general elections she studied. Handley Report at 18 (Table 7). And Dr. Handley calculates that between 26.3% and 46.0% of non-African Americans supported the black-preferred candidate in the general elections she studied. *Id.*

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Columbus-Pender-Robeson					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	Senate District 13	26.4%	Campbell	Lost	37.5%
2018	House District 46	24.7%	Yates-Lockamy	Lost	36.7%
2016	Lt. Governor	24.5%	Coleman	Lost	43.7%
2016	Treasurer	24.5%	Blue III	Lost	47.0%
2012	President	24.5%	Obama	Won	50.3%
2012	Lt. Governor	24.5%	Coleman	Won	57.4%
Primary Election					
2018	Senate District 13	26.4%	Campbell	Won	69.2%
2016	Lt. Governor	24.5%	Coleman	Won	41.6%*
2016	Treasurer	24.5%	Blue III	Won	64.8%
2016	Attorney General	24.5%	Williams	Won	60.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	24.5%	Ferguson	Lost	38.5%
2014	Senate District 13	26.4%	Williams	Lost	27.3%*
2012	Commissioner of Labor	24.5%	Richardson	Lost	27.9%

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 5.5% to 49.7%. Handley Report at 18 (Table 7). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice is 30.1%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

f. Cumberland

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is not possible to create three non-contiguous districts that are majority-African American in Cumberland County. Chen Report at 19.

Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 83% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county. Handley Report at 19 (Table 8A).

There is far less white bloc voting under the third *Gingles* factor, however. In 2 of the 7 general elections and 4 of the 7 Democratic primaries that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority or plurality of white voters supported the African American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House Districts 42 and 43, the 2018 Democratic primary in House District 43, the 2016 Lieutenant Governor primary, and the 2012 Lieutenant Governor and Commission of Labor primaries). Handley Report at 19-20 (Tables 8A & 8B). In the remaining general elections studied, white crossover voting ranged from 29.4% to 42.4%, with similar figures for the remaining Democratic primaries.

Election results since 2012 indicate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates” in Cumberland County. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, of the state legislative and statewide general elections in Cumberland County since 2012 that had an African American candidate, the African American candidate won 9 of the 10 elections. Like in *Cooper*, of those races that African American candidates won, the “closest election” saw an African American candidate win 57% of the vote, and African American candidates won much higher margins in most of the other elections. *Id.* at 1470. The BVAP in these elections ranged from 37.1% to 52.6%. *See id.* Similar results have occurred in Democratic primaries this decade.

Cumberland					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African American Candidate	Result for African American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 42	42.2%	Lucas, Jr.	Won	76.1%
2018	House District 43	50.0%	Floyd	Won	74.1%
2016	Senate District 19	22.5%	Morris	Lost	43.6%
2016	Lt. Governor	37.1%	Coleman	Won	57.3%
2016	Treasurer	37.1%	Blue III	Won	57.6%
2012	House District 42	52.6%	Lucas, Jr.	Won	77.5%
2012	House District 43	51.5%	Floyd	Won	69.6%
2012	President	37.1%	Obama	Won	59.9%
2012	Lt. Governor	37.1%	Coleman	Won	61.6%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 43	50.0%	Floyd	Won	79.2%
2016	Lt. Governor	37.1%	Coleman	Won	59.1%*
2016	Treasurer	37.1%	Blue III	Won	52.3%
2016	Attorney General	37.1%	Williams	Won	66.7%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	37.1%	Ferguson	Lost	46.0%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	37.1%	Richardson	Won	42.8%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in Cumberland County is 18.3%.² See Handley Report at 19-20 (Tables 8A & 8B).

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

² For purposes of calculating averages, elections in which a majority of white voters supported the African-American-preferred candidate are considered to require 0% BVAP for the African-American-preferred candidate to have won.

g. Duplin-Onslow Grouping

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 20. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 37.61%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 97% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between just 15.1% and 28.0% in these general elections. Handley Report at 21 (Table 9).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Duplin-Onslow					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6%	Love	Lost	35.7%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.5%	Coleman	Lost	34.7%
2016	Treasurer	18.5%	Blue III	Lost	35.7%
2012	President	18.5%	Obama	Lost	38.7
2012	Lt. Governor	18.5%	Coleman	Lost	41.9%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6	Love	Won	57.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	18.5%	Coleman	Won	46.7%*
2016	Treasurer	18.5%	Blue III	Won	54.9%
2016	Attorney General	18.5%	Williams	Won	64.6%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	18.5%	Ferguson	Won	51%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	18.5%	Richardson	Lost	29.1%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 31.2% to 51.7%. Handley Report at 21 (Table 9). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 42.3%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

h. Forsyth-Yadkin

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is not possible to create two contiguous districts in this grouping that are majority-African American. Chen Report at 21. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 98% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in these counties. Handley Report at 22 (Table 10).

However, with respect to the third *Gingles* factor, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in this county grouping. In 4 of 8 of general elections and 4 of 6 Democratic primaries that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of whites supported the African-American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House District 71, House District 72, and Senate District 32, in the 2014 general election in House District 71, in the 2016 Democratic primaries for Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner of Labor, and Treasurer, and in the 2012 Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor). Handley Report at 22 (Table 10); *see Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

Election results since 2012 further demonstrate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won 9 of 11 general elections and

7 of 9 Democratic primaries across these counties since 2012. In the most probative elections for present purposes—endogenous state House and state Senate races—African American candidates have won over 70% of the two-party vote in all seven general elections, even though the BVAPs of the districts involved were between just 36.6% and 47.5%. *See Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Forsyth-Yadkin					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 71	36.6%	Terry	Won	72.7%
2018	House District 72	47.5%	Montgomery	Won	79.1%
2018	Senate District 32	39.2%	Lowe	Won	72.9%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Lost	49.1%
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Lost	47.7%
2014	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	76.6%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	77.9%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	74.4%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	73.0%
2012	President	23.6%	Obama	Won	51.0%
2012	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Won	50.9%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Won	55.6%*
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Won	59.1%
2016	Attorney General	23.6%	Williams	Lost	45.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Ferguson	Won	60.5%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	51.3%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	43.6%*
2012	House District 74	10.7%	Gladman	Lost	44.1%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	60.0%*
2012	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Foster	Won	38.9%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied across these counties, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 16.9%. Handley report at 22 (Table 10). Dr. Handley also

performed her analysis for elections solely within Forsyth County and found less polarized voting when focusing just on this county. *Id.* at 38 (Table 20). Accordingly, the average minimum BVAPs necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections in Forsyth County is lower than that across the full county grouping. See *id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

i. Nash-Franklin

At trial, Dr. Chen presented an analysis showing that, while it is possible to create a majority African American district in this grouping using voting-age population data from the Decennial Census, any such district would have a Polsby-Popper scores below 0.05. PX123 at 145-47 (Chen Rebuttal Report). But Dr. Chen concludes in his newest report that it is possible to create a majority-African American district with a Polsby-Popper score above 0.05 if using CVAP statistics rather than all VAP. Chen Report at 22.

With respect to the second and third *Gingles* factors, Dr. Handley finds that over 84% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections she studied, and white crossover voting has been between 20.8% and 44.8% in these general elections. Handley Report at 23 (Table 11).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Nash-Franklin					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 25	40.73%	Gailliard	Won	53.3%
2016	Lt. Governor	33.0%	Coleman	Lost	47.3%
2016	Treasurer	33.0%	Blue III	Lost	48.7%
2016	House District 7	50.7%	Richardson	Won	67.8%
2016	House District 25	16.1%	Gailliard	Lost	31.9%
2012	President	33.0%	Obama	Lost	49.5%
2012	Lt. Governor	33.0%	Coleman	Won	51.2%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	33.0%	Coleman	Won	66.5%*
2016	Treasurer	33.0%	Blue III	Won	65.1%
2016	Attorney General	33.0%	Williams	Lost	39.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	33.0%	Ferguson	Lost	25.2%
2012	House District 7	50.7%	Bryant	Won	83.5%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	33.0%	Foster	Won	36.2%*

Dr. Handley finds that the BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred Candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 11.9% to 49.6%. Handley Report at 23 (Handley Report). Across the general elections she studied, the average BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 35.2%.

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

j. Guilford

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is clearly met, at least as to the creation of a single district, given the racial demographics of Guilford County. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 98% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county. Handley Report at 24 (Table 12A).

However, with respect to the third *Gingles* factor, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in Guilford County. In 4 of the 9 general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of white voters supported the African-American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House District 58, House District 60, and Senate District 28, and in the 2016 general election in Senate District 28). *Id.*; see *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170. And in the remaining general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, white crossover voting exceeded 40% in all but one of the elections. Handley Report at 24 (Table 12A). Similar voting patterns occurred in Democratic primaries. *Id.* at 25 (Table 12B).

Election results since 2012 further demonstrate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates” in Guilford County. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won all 12 relevant Democratic primaries since 2012 and 9 of 11 general elections. In the seven state House and state Senate general elections that African American candidates have won, the African American candidate won over 68% of the vote, including in three districts where the BVAP was between 40%-43%. See *Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Guilford					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 58	42.7%	Quick	Won	76.8%
2018	House District 60	40.1%	Brockman	Won	69.0%
2018	Senate District 2S	43.6%	Robinson	Won	75.3%
2016	Senate District 2S	56.5%	Robinson	Won	83.9%
2016	Lt. Governor	32.1%	Coleman	Won	58.2%
2016	Treasurer	32.1%	Blue III	Won	57.6%
2014	House District 61	15.3%	Weatherford	Lost	32.8%
2012	House District 58	51.1%	Adams	Won	79.9%
2012	House District 61	15.3%	Weatherford	Lost	36.2%
2012	President	32.1%	Obama	Won	58.3%
2012	Lt. Governor	32.1%	Coleman	Won	58.0%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 58	42.7%	Quick	Won	80.2%
2016	House District 58	51.1%	Quick	Won	71.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	32.1%	Coleman	Won	57.9%*
2016	Treasurer	32.1%	Blue III	Won	54.3%
2016	Attorney General	32.1%	Williams	Won	54.6%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	32.1%	Ferguson	Won	61.3%
2014	House District 58	51.1%	Johnson	Won	42.6%*
2014	House District 60	51.4%	Brockman	Won	54.2%*
2014	Senate District 2S	56.5%	Robinson	Won	59.4%
2012	House District 60	51.4%	Brandon	Won	66.2%
2012	Senate District 2S	56.5%	Robinson	Won	72.0%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	32.1%	Foster	Won	39.2%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in Guilford County is 12.8%. *See Handley Report at 24 (Table 12A).*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

k. Pitt-Lenoir

With respect to the first *Gingles* factor, Dr. Chen finds that it is possible to create a majority-African American district with a Reock score exceeding 0.15 and a Polsby-Popper score exceeding 0.05. Chen Report at 23.

Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 86% of African Americans supported the same candidate in all general elections she analyzed in this grouping. Dr. Handley also finds evidence of white bloc voting in this grouping. Handley Report at 26 (Table 13). Dr. Handley calculates white crossover voting of between 24.9% and 46.8% in the general elections she analyzed. *Id.*

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

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Pitt-Lenoir					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 8	44.9%	Smith	Won	39.7%
2018	House District 9	20.5%	Rixon	Lost	49.9%
2018	House District 12	37.4%	Graham	Lost	40.0%
2016	Lt. Governor	34.2%	Coleman	Won	51.4%
2016	Treasurer	34.2%	Blue III	Won	52.6%
2012	President	34.2%	Obama	Won	52.6%
2012	Lt. Governor	34.2%	Coleman	Won	54.7%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 8	44.9%	Smith	Won	50.0%
2016	Lt. Governor	34.2%	Coleman	Won	53.6%
2016	Treasurer	34.2%	Blue III	Won	54.6%
2016	Attorney General	34.2%	Williams	Won	61.1%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	34.2%	Ferguson	Lost	46.5%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	34.2%	Richardson	Lost	30.2%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 12.2% to 57.3%. Handley Report at 26 (Table 13). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice in this grouping is 30.4%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

1. Mecklenburg

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is clearly met, at least as to the creation of a single district, given the racial demographics of Mecklenburg County. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 89% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county. Handley Report at 27 (Table 14A).

However, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in Mecklenburg County for purposes of the third *Gingles* factor. In 14 of 19 of the general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of white voters supported the African-American-preferred candidate. Handley Report at 27 (Table 14A); *see Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

Election results since 2012 further demonstrate that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won 15 of 16 relevant Democratic primaries since 2012 and 18 of 22 general elections in that time period. In 2018, African American candidates won state House races in Mecklenburg County in districts with BVAPs as low as 6.2% and 18.2%, and other African American candidates won landslide victories in districts with BVAPs between 30% and 40%. *See Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.

Mecklenburg					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 92	30.2%	Beasley	Won	70.0%
2018	House District 99	49.5%	Majeed	Won	82.4%
2018	House District 101	50.8%	Logan	Won	78.7%
2018	House District 104	6.2%	Lofton	Won	51.8%
2018	House District 106	38.0%	Cunningham	Won	80.6%
2018	Senate District 40	38.9%	Waddell	Won	75.6%
2016	House District 92	18.2%	Beasley	Won	54.4%
2016	House District 101	51.3%	Earle	Won	76.0%
2016	House District 105	9.5%	Green-Johnson	Lost	44.7%
2016	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	79.1%
2016	Senate District 40	51.8%	Waddell	Won	82.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	30.2%	Coleman	Won	59.6%
2016	Treasurer	30.2%	Blue III	Won	58.4%
2014	House District 92	18.2%	Bradford	Lost	47.5%
2014	House District 106	51.1%	Cunningham	Won	86.6%
2014	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	79.7%
2014	Senate District 41	13.2%	McRae	Lost	39.5%
2012	House District 92	18.2%	Bradford	Lost	48.6%
2012	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	80.2%
2012	Senate District 40	51.8%	Graham	Won	84.1%
2012	President	30.2%	Obama	Won	61.3%
2012	Lt. Governor	30.2%	Coleman	Won	59.8%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 99	49.5%	Majeed	Won	57.3%*
2018	House District 101	50.8%	Logan	Won	50.0%*
2018	House District 106	38.0%	Cunningham	Won	88.9%
2018	Senate District 38	48.5%	Ford	Lost**	40.7%
2016	House District 101	51.3%	Earle	Won	78.6%
2016	House District 107	52.5%	Alexander, Jr.	Won	90.1%
2016	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	52.1%
2016	Senate District 40	51.8%	Waddell	Won	64.7%

2016	Lt. Governor	30.2%	Coleman	Won	55.2%*
2016	Treasurer	30.2%	Blue III	Won	52.7%
2016	Attorney General	30.2%	Williams	Won	55.7%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	30.2%	Ferguson	Won	57.0%
2014	Senate District 40	51.8%	Waddell	Won	41.9%*
2012	House District 101	51.3%	Earle	Won	84.9*
2012	Senate District 38	52.5%	Ford	Won	52.2%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	30.2%	Richardson	Won	40.7%*

**In the 2016 Democratic primary in Senate District 38, Dr. Handley finds that the candidate of choice of African Americans was not the African American candidate, but rather another candidate who won the election.

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

m. Buncombe

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 15. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 16.81%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in this county.

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley and, finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

n. Brunswick-New Hanover

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which

African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 14. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 35.70%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in these counties.

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

III. Senate County Groupings

a. Alamance-Guilford-Randolph

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. After removing Senate Districts 24 and 28 (which cannot be altered under the Court's order), the remainder of this county grouping does not contain enough African Americans to constitute a majority in one of the two remedial districts to be created. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 7. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in the remaining territory in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 34.06%. *Id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and finds and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

b. Davie-Forsyth

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. At trial, Dr. Chen established in unrebutted testimony that it is not “mathematically possible” to create a majority-minority district in the Davie-Forsyth county grouping. Tr. 518:4-15. Dr. Chen found that, even if creating a non-contiguous district, the maximum BVAP possible for a district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is just 81%. PX123 at 148-49 (Chen Rebuttal Report). Dr. Chen has confirmed in his most recent report that it would not be possible to create a majority African American district in this grouping if using CVAP rather than total VAP. Chen Report at 8. Dr. Chen finds that the maximum percent CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 45.55%. *Id.*

Dr. Handley’s analysis indicates that the third *Gingles* factor also is not met in this grouping. Just as was the case with the Forsyth-Yadkin grouping in the House, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in the Davie-Forsyth grouping. In 4 of 8 of the general elections and 4 of 6 primaries that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of white supported the African-American-preferred candidate (in the 2018 general elections in House District 71, House District 72, and Senate District 32, in the 2014 general election in House District 71, and in the 2016 Democratic primaries for Commissioner of Labor and Treasurer). Handley Report at 33 (Table 17); *see Covington*, Election results since 2012 confirm that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won 9 of 11 general elections and 7 of 9 Democratic primaries across these counties since 2012. In the most probative elections for present purposes—endogenous state House and state Senate races—African American candidates have won over 70% of the two-party vote in all seven general elections, even though the BVAPs of the

districts involved were between just 36.6% and 47.5%. *See Cooper*, 137 S. Ct. at 1470, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

Davie-Forsyth					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 71	36.6%	Terry	Won	72.7%
2018	House District 72	47.5%	Montgomery	Won	79.1%
2018	Senate District 32	39.2%	Lowé	Won	72.9%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.8%	Coleman	Lost	49.2%
2016	Treasurer	23.8%	Blue III	Lost	47.6%
2014	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	76.6%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	77.9%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	74.4%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	73.0%
2012	President	23.8%	Obama	Won	50.9%
2012	Lt. Governor	23.8%	Coleman	Won	50.7%
Primary Elections					
2016	Lt. Governor	23.8%	Coleman	Won	55.6%*
2016	Treasurer	23.8%	Blue III	Won	59.2%
2016	Attorney General	23.8%	Williams	Lost	45.0%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	23.8%	Ferguson	Won	60.2%
2012	House District 71	45.5%	Terry	Won	51.3%
2012	House District 72	45.0%	Hanes, Jr.	Won	43.6%*
2012	House District 74	10.7%	Gladman	Lost	44.1%
2012	Senate District 32	42.5%	Parmon	Won	60.0%*
2012	Commissioner of Labor	23.8%	Foster	Won	39.3%*

Across the general elections that Dr. Handley studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice is 15.5%. *See* Handley Report at 33 (Table 17). Dr. Handley also performed her analysis for elections solely within Forsyth County and found less polarized voting when focusing just on this county. *Id.* at 38 (Table 20). Accordingly, the average minimum BVAPs necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections in Forsyth County is lower than that across the full county grouping. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

c. Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 11. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 47.48%. *Id.*

While the first *Gingles* factor is not met, it does appear that there is racial bloc voting in this grouping. Dr. Handley finds that over 84% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied, and white crossover voting has been between 15.1% and 44.8% in these general elections. Handley Report at 34 (Table 18A).

The below table summarizes the results of each state legislative and statewide election in this grouping since 2012 that had an African-American Democratic candidate.

Johnston-Sampson-Nash-Harnett-Duplin					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6%	Love	Lost	35.7%
2018	House District 25	40.73%	Gailliard	Won	53.3%
2018	Senate District 10	24.1%	Moore	Lost	37.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Lost	38.9%
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Lost	40.6%
2012	President	23.6%	Obama	Lost	42.0%
2012	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Lost	44.4%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 4	22.6	Love	Won	57.5%
2016	Lt. Governor	23.6%	Coleman	Won	58.6%
2016	Treasurer	23.6%	Blue III	Won	59.2%
2016	Attorney General	23.6%	Williams	Won	50.5%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Ferguson	Lost	32.6%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	23.6%	Richardson	Lost	30.8%*

Dr. Handley finds that the minimum BVAP necessary for the African American-preferred candidate to have won the general elections she analyzed in these counties ranges from 11.9% to 45.0%. Handley Report at 34 (Table 18A). Across the general elections she studied, the average minimum BVAP necessary for African Americans to elect candidates of their choice is 36.1%. *See id.*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

d. Franklin-Wake

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is met, as least to the creation of a single district, given the racial demographics of these counties. The Court also finds the second *Gingles* factor is met. Regarding the second *Gingles* factor, Dr. Handley finds that over 99% of African Americans have supported the same candidate in all general elections studied in this county grouping. Handley Report at 36 (Table 19A).

However, with respect to the third *Gingles* factor, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in this grouping. In 12 of 20 primary and general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed, a majority of whites voted for the African American-preferred candidate. *Id.* at 36-37 (Tables 19A & 19B); see *Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 170. And with respect to state legislative elections in particular, a majority of whites supported the African American-preferred candidate in 6 of 8 general elections and 2 of 2 Democratic primaries. *Id.* In the few primary and general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed in this grouping where a majority of whites did not support the African American-preferred candidate, white crossover voting exceeded 40% in all but two of these elections. *Id.*

Dr. Handley also performed her analysis for elections solely within Wake County and found less polarized voting when focusing just on this county: she found that a majority of white voters supported the African American-preferred candidate in 9 of the 13 general elections she analyzed in Wake County. Handley Report at 29 (Table 15A).

Election results since 2012 confirm that whites have not voted “as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates” in this grouping. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. As depicted in the table below, African American candidates won all 12 relevant general elections and 7 of 10 primaries since 2012. In 2018, an African American candidate won a

state House race in Wake County in a district with a BVAP of just 14.3%, and other African American candidates won landslide victories in districts with BVAPs between 38% and 49%. *See id.* at 1470.

Franklin-Wake					
Year	Election	BVAP of District or Counties (for Statewide Elections)	African-American Candidate	Result for African-American Candidate in District or Counties	Share of Two-Party Vote for African-American Candidate
General Elections					
2018	House District 33	44.2%	Gill	Won	78.7%
2018	House District 37	14.3%	Batch	Won	51.1%
2018	House District 38	48.3%	Holley	Won	84.1%
2018	Senate District 14	38.9%	Blue Jr.	Won	71.4%
2016	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	84.8%
2016	Lt. Governor	21.1%	Coleman	Won	55.7%
2016	Treasurer	21.1%	Blue III	Won	55.4%
2014	House District 33	51.4%	Gill	Won	87.3%
2014	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	79.9%
2012	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	87.7%
2012	President	21.1%	Obama	Won	55.4%
2012	Lt. Governor	21.1%	Coleman	Won	54.9%
Primary Elections					
2018	House District 33	44.2%	Gill	Won	60.2%
2016	House District 33	51.4%	Gill	Won	64.1%
2016	Lt. Governor	21.1%	Coleman	Won	60.7%*
2016	Treasurer	21.1%	Blue III	Won	63.4%
2016	Attorney General	21.1%	Williams	Lost	35.4%
2016	Commissioner of Labor	21.1%	Ferguson	Lost	27.8%
2012	House District 33	51.4%	Gill	Won	78.7%
2012	House District 38	51.4%	Holley	Won	60.8%*
2012	House District 39	26.5%	Mial	Lost	29.5%
2012	Commissioner of Labor	21.1%	Foster	Won	37.7%*

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

e. Mecklenburg

The analysis for the Mecklenburg Senate county grouping is identical to that for the Mecklenburg grouping in the House. Thus, the Court finds and concludes there is insufficient evidence of legally significant white bloc voting in this Senate grouping under the third *Gingles* factor, and that this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

f. New Hanover-Bladen-Pender-Brunswick

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 9. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 28.11%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in these counties.

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

g. Buncombe-Henderson-Transylvania

The Court finds the first *Gingles* factor is not met in this grouping. Dr. Chen finds that it is impossible to create even a non-contiguous district in this grouping in which African Americans could constitute a majority. Chen Report at 10. He finds that the maximum African American CVAP that African Americans could comprise in a non-contiguous district in this grouping while adhering to equal population requirements is 10.47%. *Id.* Dr. Handley did not analyze this grouping given the relatively low number of African Americans who live in these counties.

The Court finds credible and persuasive the foregoing analysis and conclusions of Dr. Chen and Dr. Handley, and concludes this grouping complies with the VRA and other federal requirements concerning the racial composition of districts.

BASED UPON THE FOREGOING findings and conclusions, the Court finds and concludes that the House redistricting plan, N.C. Sess. Laws 2019-220 (House Bill 1020) enacted into law on September 17, 2019, and the Senate redistricting plan, N.C. Sess. Laws 2019-219 (Senate Bill 692) enacted into law on September 17, 2019, comply with the VRA and other federal requirements regarding the racial composition of districts.

SO ORDERED, this the 22nd day of January, 2020.

/s/ Paul C. Ridgeway

Paul C. Ridgeway, Superior Court Judge

/s/ Joseph N. Crosswhite

Joseph N. Crosswhite, Superior Court Judge

/s/ Alma L. Hinton

Alma L. Hinton, Superior Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the persons indicated below by emailing a copy thereof to the address below, in accordance with the March 13, 2019 Case Management Order:

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This the 22nd day of January 2020.



Kellie Z. Myers

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Exhibit 3

Senate District	Population (2010 Census)	BVAP	Black CVAP	Winner's Name	Winner's Party	Winner's Race	Loser's Race	Winner's Two-Party Vote Share	County Grouping
3	182,039	44.36%	44.89%	Erica D. Smith	D	AA	W	0.53855674	Beaufort-Bertie-Martin-Northampton-Vance-Warren
4	192,477	47.46%	49.52%	Milton F. Fitch, Jr.	D	AA	W	0.58955417	Edgecombe-Halifax-Wilson
5	189,510	32.94%	34.87%	Don Davis	D	AA	W	0.55335324	Greene-Pitt
10	183,566	24.06%	26.15%	Brent Jackson	R	W	AA	0.62456245	Duplin-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Nash-Sampson
13	192,266	26.37%	27%	Danny Earl Britt, Jr.	R	W	AA	0.62503265	Columbus-Robeson
14	194,087	38.85%	40.02%	Dan Blue	D	AA	W	0.733937	Franklin-Wake
20	184,237	40.35%	43.27%	Floyd McKissick, Jr.	D	AA	W	0.85772245	Durham-Granville-Person
21	183,514	42.15%	41.23%	Ben Clark	D	AA	W	0.70939514	Cumberland-Hoke
23	197,306	12.81%	13.13%	Valerie P. Foushee	D	AA	W	0.71291633	Chatham-Orange
28	198,114	43.64%	45.33%	Gladys Robinson	D	AA	W	0.7524575	Alamance-Guilford-Randolph
29	190,676	10.24%	10.92%	Eddie Gallimore	R	W	AA	0.71641654	Davidson-Montgomery
32	194,378	39.18%	42.39%	Paul Lowe, Jr.	D	AA	W	0.72879786	Davie-Forsyth
34	197,843	10.12%	10.61%	Vickie Sawyer	R	W	AA	0.69731082	Iredell-Yadkin
40	183,426	38.88%	45.24%	Joyce Waddell	D	AA	AA	0.75631345	Mecklenburg
43	197,035	14.75%	16.16%	Kathy Harrington	R	W	AA	0.65219572	Cleveland-Gaston-Lincoln
44	185,394	13.30%	13.42%	Ted Alexander	R	W	AA	0.68847425	Cleveland-Gaston-Lincoln

JA637

Exhibit 4

NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSE REDISTRICTING AND
SENATE REDISTRICTING AND ELECTIONS COMMITTEES

SEPTEMBER 27, 2023

PUBLIC COMMENT SESSION

Transcribed by:

Denise Myers Byrd, CSR 8340
Discovery Court Reporters and
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1 was a way for the public who was -- people who
2 were not able to be here in person to put their
3 comments on the record. That way they could use
4 a portal to put their written comments in. And
5 as far as I know, that does not exist yet.

6 Has the chair decided whether there
7 will be an opportunity for people to submit
8 their request to some sort of public record
9 through a portal?

10 SENATOR HISE: That does exist. It is
11 available on the General Assembly website and is
12 open.

13 SENATOR MARCUS: It currently is?

14 SENATOR HISE: Yes.

15 SENATOR MARCUS: Okay. I was not
16 aware. Thank you. I will look for that.

17 SENATOR HISE: I will now go through
18 the introduction of the sergeant-at-arms that
19 will be assisting us today.

20 First from the House, Terry McGraw,
21 Jonas Cherry, Todd Jordan. Many of these may
22 not be in the room because we're doing multiple
23 rooms that are here as well. Nina Long, Thomas
24 Terry, Stafford Young. Thanks for coming in.

25 And the Senate sergeant-at-arms, Terry

Exhibit 5

NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SENATE REDISTRICTING AND ELECTIONS COMMITTEES

OCTOBER 19, 2023

Transcribed by:

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1 redistricting.

2 The categories of equal population,
3 traditional redistricting principles,
4 compactness, contiguity, respect for existing
5 political subdivisions, political considerations
6 and incumbent residence should not be foreign
7 concepts to members of this committee.

8 The major difference between these two
9 documents is the use of the county grouping
10 formula related to legislative maps as required
11 by our constitution and as contained in the
12 Stephenson decision.

13 I will note -- it is important to note
14 that the chairs did not use racial data when
15 drawing the legislative and congressional maps.
16 Let me explain why.

17 The predominant use of race to draw
18 districts violates the US Constitution unless
19 doing so serves a compelling government
20 interest. In other words, if the legislature
21 draws districts predominantly based upon race
22 without a compelling interest, those districts
23 would be declared illegal racial gerrymanders.
24 We know this from the Cooper and Covington
25 cases.

1 As for the Voting Rights Act, in order
2 for the predominant use of race to be justified
3 under Section 2, there must be a strong basis in
4 evidence of three Gingles conditions. Even
5 assuming the presence of the three Gingles
6 conditions, the use of race to draw districts
7 must also be supported by the totality of the
8 circumstances.

9 Past decisions and court records
10 demonstrate that to this point nowhere in
11 North Carolina can anyone provide evidence of
12 the three Gingles preconditions. In the absence
13 of any evidence of the three Gingles
14 preconditions, the chairs elected not to use
15 race in drawing these proposed districts
16 strictly to protect the state from lawsuits
17 alleging illegal racial gerrymandering.

18 To be clear, the chairs do not believe
19 that the use of racial data would have been
20 helpful in reaching any political or other
21 legislative redistricting goal. Any political
22 considerations in line drawing have been
23 informed by political data, not racial data.

24 That said, now that the maps under
25 consideration have been filed and made public,

1 the chairs will now formally direct central
2 staff to load racial data into the Maptitude
3 software following this committee meeting and
4 apply that data layer to the proposed
5 congressional and senate maps. We ask the
6 central staff apply that racial data, update the
7 stat packs accordingly, and make that
8 information publicly available on the General
9 Assembly website as soon as possible.

10 To emphasize once again, the chairs did
11 not use racial data and statistics at any point
12 in the construction of these districts, and the
13 publication of racial statistics here does not
14 inform the placement of any residents within any
15 districts within these maps.

16 Finally, as mentioned earlier, the
17 committee will meet next week, on Monday, and
18 amendments to these bills will be considered at
19 this meeting. I do believe that meeting will be
20 at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, but notices will come
21 out.

22 The chairs at that time will consider
23 any evidence that a member of this committee or
24 a third party advocating altering plans for
25 racial reasons brings forth that provides a

1 strong basis in evidence that the Gingles
2 preconditions are present in a particular area
3 of the state. Only then will the chairs
4 consider using race in amending the districts to
5 protect the state from liability under Section 2
6 of the Voting Rights Act.

7 Are there any questions?

8 Senator Blue.

9 SENATOR BLUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 I -- especially in the explanations of the last
11 areas that you dipped into, I was reading the
12 Allen versus Milligan case, the Alabama case
13 that sort of breathed a new life into Section 2
14 challenges to redistricting plans. And it
15 points out pretty specifically that -- and I'll
16 quote generally and then I'll ask you a
17 question.

18 It says, "When it comes to considering
19 race in the context of districting, we have made
20 clear that there is a difference between being
21 aware of racial considerations and being
22 motivated by them."

23 Section 2 itself -- this is a
24 continuation of a quote.

25 "Section 2 itself demands consideration

1 heard you just say is you haven't done a racial
2 polarization study in -- to help draw these
3 maps.

4 SENATOR HISE: Studies regarding racial
5 polarization were done as part of the lawsuit a
6 year and a half ago since this data has
7 been -- since the census data has been released.

8 SENATOR MARCUS: Okay. And then I
9 guess just one follow-up. So we're to take you
10 at your word. You said a couple times here that
11 you've not used racial data to draw these maps
12 and that you're only now adding it to the state
13 system for the public to see the racial
14 implications of the map. And I'm curious if
15 we're to just take you at your word for that or
16 if you will be making your redistricting records
17 publicly available so we know what racial data
18 was used or not used in drawing these maps.

19 SENATOR HISE: I will confirm that the
20 chairs have not used racial data. You can
21 confirm yourself with central staff. It is not
22 part of the software system. The data has never
23 been uploaded to -- including the computer that
24 was provided to the Democrats in 605. Racial
25 data has not been added up to any of the systems

1 discussion only.

2 Whenever you're ready, Senator Daniels,
3 you're recognized to explain the bill.

4 SENATOR DANIEL: Thank you, Senator
5 Hise.

6 Members, and so I'm going to go through
7 the districts like Senator Hise has been doing
8 with the other maps, so this could take some
9 time. I'm not going to try to describe the
10 color schemes Senator Hise did. You'll have to
11 kind of figure that out.

12 Senate District 1 is created by the
13 county grouping choice in northeastern
14 North Carolina. The chairs chose the
15 configuration that makes Senate District 1 out
16 of the following whole counties: Northampton,
17 Bertie, Hertford, Gates, Perquimans, Pasquotank,
18 Camden, Currituck, Tyrrell and Dare. This
19 configuration leaves four of the five finger
20 counties in northeastern North Carolina in one
21 district.

22 Many of the residents of these counties
23 work or travel frequently to the Virginia
24 Tidewater area. Seven of the ten counties and
25 81 percent of the population in

1 Senate District 1 are in the Norfolk media
2 market: Dare, Currituck, Camden, Pasquotank,
3 Perquimans, Hertford and Gates, with the other
4 three divided between Greenville market, Tyrrell
5 and Bertie and Raleigh, Northampton containing
6 19 percent of the district's population.

7 All of the counties in North Carolina
8 that are in the Norfolk media market are in
9 Senate District 1 except for Chowan. The
10 incumbent in Senate District 1 is Senator Hanig
11 from Currituck.

12 Senate District 2 follows the Roanoke
13 River from Warren county to the Albemarle Sound
14 in Washington county. Chowan county, directly
15 across the Albemarle Sound from Washington
16 county, is also grouped into this district.
17 Hyde County, also on the sound, is in this
18 district as in -- as is Pamlico county along
19 with the Pamlico River and Pamlico Sound.

20 Finally, Carteret county spanning the
21 inner and Outer Banks as the southernmost county
22 in the district.

23 Five of the eight counties in the
24 district are in the Greenville media market,
25 with the other three being split between the

1 Raleigh media market, that would be Warren and
2 Halifax, and Norfolk media market, Chowan.
3 Two-thirds of the population of this district
4 live in the Greenville media market.

5 The incumbent in Senate District 2 is
6 Senator Sanderson from Pamlico.

7 Senate District 3 is unchanged from the
8 previous map but renumbered. It is created by
9 the base county grouping map: Lenoir, Craven
10 and Beaufort counties.

11 The incumbent in Senate District 3 is
12 Senator Perry from Lenoir.

13 And if I could get the
14 sergeant-at--arms to -- I don't have a paper
15 copy of the map, if someone could bring me one.

16 Senate District 4 is unchanged from the
17 previous map and is created by the base county
18 grouping map, Wayne, Wilson in Greene counties.
19 This incumbent in Senate District 4 is Senator
20 Buck Newton from Wilson county.

21 Senate District 5 is unchanged from the
22 previous map and created by the base county
23 grouping map, Edgecombe and Pitt counties. The
24 incumbent in Senate District 5 is Senator Smith
25 from Pitt county.

1 are whole in Senate District 9. Sampson county
2 is split between the two districts. One
3 precinct Plain View was moved from Senate
4 District 9 to 12, leaving the rest of Sampson
5 county in Senate District 9. The incumbent in
6 Senate District 9 is Senator Jackson from
7 Sampson county.

8 Senate District 10 is unchanged from
9 the previous map and is created by the base
10 county grouping map Johnston county. The
11 incumbent is Senator Sawrey from Johnston.

12 Senate District 11 is unchanged from
13 the previous map and is created by the base
14 county grouping map, Vance, Franklin and Nash
15 counties. The incumbent in Senate District 11
16 is Senator Barnes from Nash county.

17 Senate District 12 is made up of Lee
18 and Harnett counties, plus the Plain View
19 precinct in Sampson as described previously.
20 The incumbent in Senate District 12 is
21 Senator Burgin from Harnett county.

22 Senate District 13, Wake and Granville
23 counties form a sixth district, two-county
24 grouping in the base senate map. The overall
25 population within the county grouping is

Exhibit 6

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION

RODNEY D. PIERCE; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; *et al.*,

Defendants,

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

EXPERT REPORT OF SEAN P. TRENDE, Ph.D.

1 Expert Qualifications

1.1 Career

I serve as Senior Elections Analyst for Real Clear Politics. I joined Real Clear Politics in January of 2009 after practicing law for eight years. I assumed a fulltime position with Real Clear Politics in March of 2010. Real Clear Politics is a company of approximately 50 employees, with its main offices in Washington D.C. It produces one of the most heavily trafficked political websites in the world, which serves as a one-stop shop for political analysis from all sides of the political spectrum and is recognized as a pioneer in the field of poll aggregation. Real Clear Politics produces original content, including both data analysis and traditional reporting.

My main responsibilities with Real Clear Politics consist of tracking, analyzing, and writing about elections. I collaborate in rating the competitiveness of Presidential, Senate, House, and gubernatorial races. As a part of carrying out these responsibilities, I have studied and written extensively about demographic trends in the country, exit poll data at the state and federal level, public opinion polling, and voter turnout and voting behavior. In particular, understanding the way that districts are drawn and how geography and demographics interact is crucial to predicting United States House of Representatives races, so much of my time is dedicated to that task.

I am currently a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where my publications focus on the demographic and coalitional aspects of American Politics.

I am also a Lecturer at The Ohio State University.

1.2 Publications and Speaking Engagements

I am the author of the 2012 book *The Lost Majority: Why the Future of Government is up For Grabs and Who Will Take It*. In this book, I explore realignment theory. It argues that realignments are a poor concept that should be abandoned. As part of this analysis, I conducted a thorough analysis of demographic and political trends beginning

in the 1920s and continuing through modern times, noting the fluidity and fragility of the coalitions built by the major political parties and their candidates.

I also co-authored the 2014 Almanac of American Politics. The Almanac is considered the foundational text for understanding congressional districts and the representatives of those districts, as well as the dynamics in play behind the elections. My focus was researching the history of and writing descriptions for many of the 2012 districts, including tracing the history of how and why they were drawn the way that they were drawn. Because the 2014 Almanac covers the 2012 elections, analyzing how redistricting was done was crucial to my work. I have also authored a chapter in Larry Sabato's post-election compendium after every election dating back to 2012.

I have spoken on these subjects before audiences from across the political spectrum, including at the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the CATO Institute, the Bipartisan Policy Center, and the Brookings Institution. In 2012, I was invited to Brussels to speak about American elections to the European External Action Service, which is the European Union's diplomatic corps. I was selected by the United States Embassy in Sweden to discuss the 2016 elections to a series of audiences there and was selected by the United States Embassy in Spain to fulfill a similar mission in 2018. I was invited to present by the United States Embassy in Italy, but was unable to do so because of my teaching schedule.

1.3 Education

I received my Ph.D. in political science at The Ohio State University in 2023. I passed comprehensive examinations in both methods and American Politics. The first chapter of my dissertation involves voting patterns on the Supreme Court from 1900 to 1945; the second chapter involves the application of integrated nested LaPlace approximations to enable the incorporation of spatial statistical analysis in the study of United States elections. The third chapter of the dissertation involves the use of communities of interest in redistricting simulations. In pursuit of this degree, I also earned a Mas-

ter's Degree in Applied Statistics. My coursework for my Ph.D. and M.A.S. included, among other things, classes on G.I.S. systems, spatial statistics, issues in contemporary redistricting, machine learning, non-parametric hypothesis tests and probability theory. I also earned a B.A. from Yale University in history and political science in 1995, a Juris Doctor from Duke University in 2001, and a Master's Degree in political science from Duke University in 2001.

In the winter of 2018, I taught American Politics and the Mass Media at Ohio Wesleyan University. I taught Introduction to American Politics at The Ohio State University for three semesters from Fall of 2018 to Fall of 2019, and again in Fall of 2021. In the Springs of 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, I taught Political Participation and Voting Behavior at The Ohio State University. This course spent several weeks covering all facets of redistricting: how maps are drawn, debates over what constitutes a fair map, measures of redistricting quality, and similar topics. I also taught survey methodology in Fall of 2022 and Spring of 2024.

1.4 Prior Engagements as an Expert

A full copy of all cases in which I have testified or been deposed is included on my c.v, attached as Exhibit 1. In 2021, I served as one of two special masters appointed by the Supreme Court of Virginia to redraw the districts that will elect the Commonwealth's representatives to the House of Delegates, state Senate, and U.S. Congress in the following decade. The Supreme Court of Virginia accepted those maps, which were praised by observers from across the political spectrum. *E.g.*, "New Voting Maps, and a New Day, for Virginia," *The Washington Post* (Jan. 2, 2022), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/02/virginia-redistricting-voting-maps-gerrymandee>; Henry Olsen, "Maryland Shows How to do Redistricting Wrong. Virginia Shows How to Do it Right," *The Washington Post* (Dec. 9, 2021), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/09/maryland-virginia-redistricting/>; Richard Pildes, "Has VA Created a New Model for a Reasonably Non-Partisan Redistricting

Process,” *Election Law Blog* (Dec. 9, 2021), available at <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=126216>.

In 2019, I was appointed as the court’s expert by the Supreme Court of Belize. In that case I was asked to identify international standards of democracy as they relate to malapportionment claims, to determine whether Belize’s electoral divisions (similar to our congressional districts) conformed with those standards, and to draw alternative maps that would remedy any existing malapportionment.

I served as a Voting Rights Act expert to counsel for the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission in 2021 and 2022.

2 Scope of Engagement

I have been retained by the law firm of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, on behalf of the legislative defendants in the above-captioned action. I was asked to examine the districts drawn by Mr. Blakeman B. Esselstyn in his Nov. 22, 2023 map. To accomplish this, I used the block assignment files and shapefiles provided by plaintiffs for their Demonstration Districts, and code that I authored using the computer programming language R.

3 Analysis of the Demonstration Map

3.1 Demonstration Map A


Demonstration Map A consists only of a single illustrative district. It consists of Bertie, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, Vance, Warren and Washington counties. I have referred to a document located at <https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf>, which displays the “Stephenson groupings” for the state of North Carolina. Vance County is not within the same Stephenson grouping as are the remaining counties. I have not had sufficient time

to work out what the impact of removing Vance County from the Stephenson group that currently contains Franklin and Nash counties would be. However, Franklin and Nash counties do not have sufficient population to support a single Senate district on their own. Therefore, they will have to be combined with an additional county or with additional counties. In other words, there will be a cascade of changes that are difficult to sort out at this point.

The district contains 160,510 residents of voting age, of whom 82,610 are Black. Thus, the percent Black Voting Age Population (BVAP) of the district is 51.47%. With a population of 160,510, residents of Voting Age, the district would need to have 80,256 Black residents of voting age to be 50% + 1 Black. Because every county in the district has at least 2,364 Black residents of voting age, all counties in the map are required to achieve a majority Black district. If counties were to be split, which I understand to violate the Stephenson rule, only three precincts at the eastern end of Washington County could be removed while maintaining a BVAP of 50%, or two precincts at the western tip of Vance County could be removed.

I was first asked to create maps that would depict the racial distribution of residents of voting age in Plaintiffs' proposed districts. We begin with choropleth maps. Choropleth maps are traditional "area-based" maps, where some areal unit (here, blocks or VTDs) are shaded to correspond with some data (here, percentage of residents who are Black and of voting age ("BVAP")). We can first look at the maps at the census block level.


Figure 1: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map A, Block Level



© OpenStreetMap contributors

We can also examine the district at the VTD level:

Figure 2: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map A, Block Level




These color scales on these maps are truncated at 30% and 70% BVAP. In my experience, allowing the color scale to run from 0% to 100% risks losing a good deal of data, as differences in the crucial 40% - 60% BVAP range are blended together. This approach has been accepted in many courts in which I have testified, and has never been challenged by a court.

One of the limitations of choropleth maps, however, is that they don't reveal populations. A VTD with 10 Black residents and 10 White residents is treated the same as a VTD with 1,000 Black residents and 1,000 White residents. While there may be times where those differences are immaterial, there may also be times where the difference is important.

To account for this, I will typically employ dot density maps. Dot density maps have been utilized in cases at least back to the Bethune-Hill case, where Dr. Rodden employed them to examine the distribution of residents of districts. In a dot density map, census blocks are taken as the basis for the district. In each block, a dot is drawn

for every member of a group, or every ten members, or every 100 members, depending on the scale of the map. For these maps, I employ 1 blue dot for 10 Black Citizens of Voting Age, an orange “x” for 10 White Citizens of Voting Age, and a purple “+” for 10 members of other races. Obviously there is some rounding involved, but in the aggregate that typically does not matter. The dashed blue lines reflect county boundaries.

Figure 3: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map A, Dot Density Map. 1 blue dot = 10 Black residents of voting age, while 1 orange x = 10 White residents of voting age.




3.2 Demonstration Map B

I was also asked to consider the racial distribution of the residents of Map B. District B-1 is the purported VRA demonstration district. Its Voting Age Population is 160,306. Of those, 77,599 residents are Black, giving the district a percent BVAP of 48.4%. Over 11,000 of those Black residents live at the top of the arm of the district that extends into (and splits) Pasquotank County to take in Elizabeth City.


For this, I created two “looks.” The first depicts both District B-1, which is the Illustrative District, and District B-2, which is the other district that fills out the Stevenson grouping. The second depicts District B-1 alone.

Figure 4: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map B, Block Level




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Figure 5: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map B, Block Level




We can also view the data at a VTD level:

Figure 6: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map B, VTD Level



© OpenStreetMap contributors

Figure 7: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map B, VTD Level



© OpenStreetMap contributors

Finally, we can better see the distribution of residents using dot density maps:

Figure 8: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map B, Dot Density Map





Figure 9: Proposed VRA District in Demonstration Map B, Dot Density Map



4 Conclusion

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Ohio that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on 22 December, 2023 in Delaware, Ohio.

Sean Trends

Exhibit 1

SEAN P. TRENDE

1146 Elderberry Loop

Delaware, OH 43015

strende@realclearpolitics.com

EDUCATION

Ph.D., The Ohio State University, Political Science, 2023. Dissertation titled *Application of Spatial Analysis to Contemporary Problems in Political Science*, September 2023.

M.A.S. (Master of Applied Statistics), The Ohio State University, 2019.

J.D., Duke University School of Law, *cum laude*, 2001; Duke Law Journal, Research Editor.

M.A., Duke University, *cum laude*, Political Science, 2001. Thesis titled *The Making of an Ideological Court: Application of Non-parametric Scaling Techniques to Explain Supreme Court Voting Patterns from 1900-1941*, June 2001.

B.A., Yale University, with distinction, History and Political Science, 1995.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Law Clerk, Hon. Deanell R. Tacha, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 2001-02.

Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, Washington, DC, 2002-05.

Associate, Hunton & Williams, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, 2005-09.

Associate, David, Kamp & Frank, P.C., Newport News, Virginia, 2009-10.

Senior Elections Analyst, RealClearPolitics, 2010-present.

Columnist, Center for Politics Crystal Ball, 2014-17.

Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, 2018-present.

BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS

Larry J. Sabato, ed., *The Red Ripple*, Ch. 15 (2023).

Larry J. Sabato, ed., *A Return to Normalcy?: The 2020 Election that (Almost) Broke America* Ch. 13 (2021).

Larry J. Sabato, ed., *The Blue Wave*, Ch. 14 (2019).

Larry J. Sabato, ed., *Trumped: The 2016 Election that Broke all the Rules* (2017).

Larry J. Sabato, ed., *The Surge: 2014's Big GOP Win and What It Means for the Next Presidential Election*, Ch. 12 (2015).

Larry J. Sabato, ed., *Barack Obama and the New America*, Ch. 12 (2013).

Barone, Kraushaar, McCutcheon & Trende, *The Almanac of American Politics* 2014 (2013).

The Lost Majority: Why the Future of Government is up for Grabs – And Who Will Take It (2012).

PREVIOUS EXPERT TESTIMONY AND/OR DEPOSITIONS

Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake County) (racial gerrymandering).

Covington v. North Carolina, No. 1:15-CV-00399 (M.D.N.C.) (racial gerrymandering).

NAACP v. McCrory, No. 1:13CV658 (M.D.N.C.) (early voting).

NAACP v. Husted, No. 2:14-cv-404 (S.D. Ohio) (early voting).

Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, Case 15-cv-01802 (S.D. Ohio) (early voting).

Lee v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15-cv-357 (E.D. Va.) (early voting).

Feldman v. Arizona, No. CV-16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz.) (absentee voting).

A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Smith, No. 1:18-cv-00357-TSB (S.D. Ohio) (political gerrymandering).

Whitford v. Nichol, No. 15-cv-421-bbc (W.D. Wisc.) (political gerrymandering).

Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1026-WO-JEP (M.D.N.C.) (political gerrymandering).

Mecinas v. Hobbs, No. CV-19-05547-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz.) (ballot order effect).

Fair Fight Action v. Raffensperger, No. 1:18-cv-05391-SCJ (N.D. Ga.) (statistical analysis).

Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. Rodriguez, No. 4:20-CV-00432-TUC-JAS (D. Ariz.) (early voting).

Ohio Organizing Collaborative, et al v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al, No. 2021-1210 (Ohio) (political gerrymandering).

NCLCV v. Hall, No. 21-CVS-15426 (N.C. Sup. Ct.) (political gerrymandering).

Szeliga v. Lamone, Case No. C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct.) (political gerrymandering).

Montana Democratic Party v. Jacobsen, DV-56-2021-451 (Mont. Dist. Ct.) (early voting; ballot collection).

Carter v. Chapman, No. 464 M.D. 2021 (Pa.) (map drawing; amicus).

NAACP v. McMaster, No. 3:21-cv-03302 (D.S.C.) (racial gerrymandering).

Graham v. Adams, No. 22-CI-00047 (Ky. Cir. Ct.) (political gerrymandering).

Harkenrider v. Hochul, No. E2022-0116CV (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (political gerrymandering).

LULAC v. Abbott, Case No. 3:21-cv-00259 (W.D. Tex.) (racial/political gerrymandering/VRA).

Moore et al., v. Lee, et al., (Tenn. 20th Dist.) (state constitutional compliance).

Agee et al. v. Benson, et al., (W.D. Mich.) (racial gerrymandering/VRA).

Faatz, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al., (Cir. Ct. Mo.) (state constitutional compliance).

Coca, et al. v. City of Dodge City, et al., Case No. 6:22-cv-01274-EFM-RES (D. Kan.) (VRA).

Milligan v. Allen, Case No. 2:21-cv-01530-AMM (N.D. Ala.) (VRA).

Nairne v. Ardoin, NO. 22-178-SDD-SDJ (M.D. La.) (VRA).

Robinson v. Ardoin, NO. 22-211-SDD-SDJ (M.D. La.) (VRA).

Republican Party v. Oliver, No. D-506-CV-2022-00041 (N.M. Cir. Ct. (Lea County)) (political gerrymandering).

COURT APPOINTMENTS

Appointed as Voting Rights Act expert by Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2020)

Appointed Special Master by the Supreme Court of Virginia to redraw maps for the Virginia House of Delegates, the Senate of Virginia, and for Virginia's delegation to the United States Congress for the 2022 election cycle.

Appointed redistricting expert by the Supreme Court of Belize in *Smith v. Perrera*, No. 55 of 2019 (one-person-one-vote).

INTERNATIONAL PRESENTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

Panel Discussion, European External Action Service, Brussels, Belgium, Likely Outcomes of 2012 American Elections.

Selected by U.S. Embassies in Sweden, Spain, and Italy to discuss 2016 and 2018 elections to think tanks and universities in area (declined Italy due to teaching responsibilities).

Selected by EEAS to discuss 2018 elections in private session with European Ambassadors.

TEACHING

American Democracy and Mass Media, Ohio Wesleyan University, Spring 2018.

Introduction to American Politics, The Ohio State University, Autumns 2018, 2019, 2020, Spring 2018.

Political Participation and Voting Behavior, Springs 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023.

Survey Methodology, Fall 2022, Spring 2024.

PUBLICATIONS

James G. Gimpel, Andrew Reeves, & Sean Trende, "Reconsidering Bellwether Locations in U.S. Presidential Elections," *Pres. Stud. Q.* (2022) (forthcoming, available online at <http://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12793>).

REAL CLEAR POLITICS COLUMNS

Full archives available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/authors/sean_trende/

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION**

RODNEY D. PIERCE; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

EXPERT REPORT OF JOHN R. ALFORD, Ph.D.

December 22, 2023

SCOPE OF INQUIRY

I have been retained by counsel for Legislative Defendants, as an expert to provide analysis related to *Gingles* prongs 2 and 3, and racially polarized voting as related to the challenge to the senate maps for the State of North Carolina. I have been asked by counsel to examine and respond to the report provided by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Matt Barreto, and the associated data and materials provided in disclosure. This is a limited initial analysis that pertains to the Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. My rate of compensation in this matter is \$600 per hour and my compensation does not depend on the outcome of this lawsuit.

SUMMARY

The election analysis provided by Dr. Barreto shows that Black and White voters provide different levels of support for Republican and Democratic candidates in North Carolina elections. The election analysis does not show the same pattern in response to variation in the race of the candidates. The high cohesion demonstrated by Black voters in these elections is not a function of Black voters coalescing around Black candidates but rather is a function of cohesive Black voter preferences for Democratic party candidates. Similarly, the tendency of White voters to vote for Republican candidates running against the preferred candidates of Black voters is not reserved for opposition to Black Democratic candidates but is instead cohesive support for Republican candidates no matter whether the candidates are White or Black. In addition, while the levels of White crossover voting vary by geography, the overall levels are high enough to suggest that majority Black districts are not necessary to allow the election of Black preferred candidates.

QUALIFICATIONS

I am a tenured full professor of political science at Rice University. In my over thirty-five years at Rice University, I have taught courses on redistricting, elections, political representation, voting behavior, and statistical methods at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. I am the author of numerous scholarly works on political behavior. These works have appeared in academic journals such as the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Science*, *Annual*

Review of Political Science, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Political Psychology, and Political Research Quarterly.

Over the last thirty-five years, I have worked with numerous local governments on districting plans and on Voting Rights Act issues. I have previously provided expert reports and/or testified as an expert witness in voting rights and statistical issues in a variety of court cases in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. The details of my academic background, including all publications in the last ten years, and my work as an expert, including all cases in which I have testified by deposition or at trial in the last four years, are covered in the attached CV (Appendix A).

DATA AND SOURCES

In preparing my report, I have reviewed the reports filed by the plaintiffs' expert Dr. Matt Barreto. I have also relied for my report on the election and voter data from the North Carolina State Board of Election that is cited by Dr. Barreto as the data he used as the basis for his report (page 2). I have attempted to match as closely as possible the data and analysis assumptions described by Dr. Barreto, however, despite a request for his data files and details of his analysis, Dr. Barreto declined to provide the actual data files he utilized. He also declined to provide the details of his EI procedures and options beyond what is described in his report. This added considerable time to the effort to confirm Dr. Barreto's results through a replication process and limited the scope of analysis for this report.

METHODS

Dr. Barreto and I both utilize the statistical technique of Ecological Inference (EI), developed originally by Professor Gary King.¹ EI is a more efficient technique intended specifically to improve on ecological regression (ER), the analysis technique previously used in

¹ King, Gary. (1997). *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*. Princeton Univ. Press.

VRA lawsuits to assess voter cohesion and polarization. In a nutshell, traditional ecological regression is a mathematical technique for estimating the single best-fitting straight line that could be drawn to describe the relationship between two variables in a scatter plot. Applied to voting rights cases, the logic of ecological regression analysis is to determine to what degree, if any, the vote for a candidate increases in a linear fashion as the concentration of voters of a given ethnicity in the precincts increases. In contrast, King's EI procedure utilizes a method of bounds analysis, combined with a more traditional statistical method, to improve on standard ecological regression. While the details are mathematically complex, the differences mostly center on utilizing deterministic bounds information contained in individual precinct results that would not be exploited in ecological regression. In addition, EI relaxes the linear constraint that a traditional ecological regression analysis would impose on the pattern across precincts. This combination in EI of relaxing some assumptions and utilizing more information typically yields a more efficient estimation of cohesion and polarization when compared to standard ecological regression, although in many cases the results from EI are not substantively different than ER results for the same election data.

In its original form, King's EI could only be used to estimate voter support when there were two racial groups (e.g., White and Black) and two candidates, hence the label "2 x 2 EI" often applied to the original form. Often there are more than two racial groups (e.g., White, Black, and Latino), or more than two possible vote choices. To accommodate these situations, one would have to run an independent 2 x 2 EI analysis for each race of interest and for each candidate of interest (and for the no voting category), an approach suggested by King and labeled the 'iterative' approach to "R x C" (Rows by Columns) estimation.

Shortly after suggesting the iterative method, King published a more advanced theoretical approach to R x C estimation using a Multinomial-Dirichlet Bayesian technique. A fully Bayesian implementation of this approach was viewed by King and his coauthors as computationally impractical, given that it could take as long as a week or more to run a single model on the

computers available at that time, and they provided instead an implementation that relied on nonlinear least-squares.² Finally, in 2007 Lau and colleagues, taking advantage of advancements in computing technology, implemented the fully Bayesian estimation procedure outline by King, et al and provided a software module called “eiPack” that included the module ‘ei.MD.bayes’ that allowed for the estimation of the true Bayesian approach.³ This is the implementation of EI R x C that I have relied on here, and is also one of the techniques relied on by Dr. Barreto for his analysis in this case.

ELECTION ANALYSIS

Dr. Barreto’s report includes only a limited election analysis. It is typical in these cases to provide analysis covering the most recent decade of elections (here that would mean going back to at least 2014), but Dr. Barreto only covers 2020 and 2022, the two most recent general election cycles. In these two election years, Dr. Barreto provided individual election analysis results for 7 exogenous statewide elections in 2022, and 20 exogenous statewide elections in 2020. He reports EI estimates for “Republicans” and “Democrats” in state legislative elections, including the endogenous state Senate elections, only in two combined categories that he labels “NC State House” and “NC State Senate,” without providing results for any individual election contests. In addition, Dr. Barreto provides no analysis of Democratic primary elections, something that is commonly included (see for example Appendix B, Dr Lisa Handley’s inclusion of North Carolina Democratic primary elections in her 2019 expert report in *Common Cause v. Lewis*), Dr. Barreto also focuses on a limited geographic area. He reports statewide analysis, and analysis in what he terms the “10-county Northeast region,” but he provides no discussion of how these 10 counties were selected, and no RPV analysis for any other areas or any existing districts.

Dr. Barreto sets the stage for his election analysis by offering his definition of Racially

² See Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner., *Bayesian and Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: The R x C Case*, 55 STATISTICA NEERLANDICA 134 (2001).

³ See Lau, Olivia, Ryan T. Moore, and Michael Kellermann. "eiPack: Ecological Inference and Higher-Dimension Data Management," R News, vol.7, no. 2 (October 2007).

Polarized Voting. As he says “we next examine whether voters of different racial/ethnic backgrounds tend to prefer different or similar candidates in a wide range of electoral settings. The phenomenon called racially polarized voting (RPV) is defined as voters of different racial or ethnic groups exhibiting different candidate preferences in an election” (page 7). In line with this presumably social science definition, Dr. Barreto refers at several points (see paragraphs 11, 22, and 28 for example) to finding that there is “statistically significant” racially polarized voting in North Carolina. In contrast, he does not specifically discuss how his definition of statistically significant racially polarized voting might connect to any definition of *legally* significant racial polarized voting.

I began my analysis with an attempt to replicate selected results of the RxC Ecological Inference (EI) analysis provided by Dr. Barreto in this case, using the election and voter data sources he cited.⁴ My initial replication results are substantively similar to those reported by Dr. Barreto, but do not match as precisely as would be expected based on my experience in multiple similar cases. This is not unexpected given the uncertainties occasioned by the above-mentioned absence of any disclosed input data files or any details of the EI analytical options used by Dr. Barreto for his report. To avoid confusion over whether my conclusions detailed below depend in any way on methodological or data differences, I will confine my analysis to the various numerical EI RxC results produced by Dr. Barreto in his report and appendices for my discussion throughout this report.

A. A Comparison of Two U.S. Senate Elections

In Table 1 below, I report the results for the two U.S. Senate elections included in Dr. Barreto’s RPV analysis. The EI RxC estimates in Table 1 are taken directly from Dr. Barreto’s Appendix A, Table A2, on pages 17-19 of his report.⁵ The 2020 contest features a White Democrat

⁴ The data programming required for the EI RxC analysis for this report was performed by my Rice colleague Dr. Randy Stevenson under my direction and control.

⁵ In this table, and the tables that follow, the geographic groupings of Northeast 1, Northeast 2, and Pitt/Edgecombe are those defined and utilized by Dr. Barreto in his report.

running against a White Republican, while in the 2020 contest, a Black Democrat is running against a White Republican. In both contests Black voters are highly supportive of the Democratic candidate and White voters are supporting the Republican candidate. This is consistent with a polarized response to the party affiliation indicated on the ballot.

Table 1: U.S Senate Election EI RxC Estimates from Barreto's Appendix A

Year	Office	Candidate	Party	Race	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
					White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2020	U.S. Senate	Tillis	R	W	74	1	88	1	85	1	81	1
		Cunningham	D	W	26	99	12	99	15	99	18	99
2022	U.S. Senate	Budd	R	W	68	1	87	1	83	1	77	1
		Beasley	D	B	32	99	13	99	18	99	23	99
Same Race Candidate Advantage					-6	0	-1	0	-2	0	-5	0

In contrast to the strong impact of candidate party affiliation, the race of the candidates does not appear to have a polarizing impact on vote choice. While we might expect Black voters to provide significantly more support to a Black candidate, Black voters are only three-tenths of one percent more supportive of the Black Democrat compared to the White Democrat statewide (and support is similarly essentially identical in the regional results). While we might expect White voters to show increased opposition to a Black candidate, White voters are not more likely to oppose a Black Democrat compared to a White Democrat, and in fact, are if anything slightly more supportive of the Black Democrat in 2022 compared to the White Democrat in 2020. Even these slight differences may reflect only the differences in the election context between a specific off-year like 2022 and an on-year like 2020.

B. A Comparison of Three State Court Elections

Table 2 below is similar to Table 1, but here the results are for the three 2020 State Supreme Court elections included in Dr. Barreto's RPV analysis. The EI RxC estimates in Table 2 are taken directly from Dr. Barreto's Appendix A, Table A2, on pages 17-19 of his report. While the U.S. Senate elections in Table 1 were in different years, these three State Supreme Court elections hold the election context constant, as all three are for the same office, on the same ballot, and in the

same November 2020 election. The contests for Seat #2 and Seat #4 feature a White Democrat running against a White Republican, while in the Seat #1 contest, a Black Democrat is running against a White Republican. In all three contests, Black voters are highly supportive of the Democratic candidate and White voters are supporting the Republican candidate. This is consistent with a polarized response to the party affiliation indicated on the ballot.

Table 2: State Supreme Court Elections EI RxC Estimates from Barreto's Appendix A

Year	Office	Candidate	Party	Race	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
					White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2020	Supreme Court #1	Newby	R	W	73	1	87	1	83	1	80	1
		Beasley	D	B	27	99	13	99	17	99	20	99
2020	Supreme Court #2	Berger	R	W	74	1	87	1	84	1	81	1
		Inman	D	W	26	99	12	99	16	99	19	99
2020	Supreme Court #4	Barringer	R	W	75	1	87	1	84	1	80	0
		Davis	D	W	25	99	14	99	17	99	20	99
		Average for White Democrats			26	99	13	99	16	99	19	99
		Black Democrat			27	99	13	99	17	99	20	99
		Same Race Candidate Advantage			-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

In contrast to the strong impact of candidate party affiliation, here, as was the case for the U.S. Senate elections, the race of the candidates does not appear to have a polarizing impact on vote choice. While we might expect Black voters to provide significantly more support to a Black candidate, Black voter support for the Black Democrat compared to the average Black voter support for the White Democrats, statewide and in the regional results, is essentially identical. While we might expect White voters to show increased opposition to a Black candidate, White voters are not more likely to oppose a Black Democrat compared to a White Democrat, with support for the Black Democrat essentially identical to the support for the White Democrats in these contests.

C. A Comparison of Five State Appeals Court Elections

Table 3 below is similar to Tables 1 and 2, but here the results are for the five 2020 State Appeals Court elections included in Dr. Barreto's RPV analysis. The EI RxC estimates in Table 3 are again taken directly from Dr. Barreto's Appendix A, Table A2, on pages 17-19 of his report. Again, these five State Appeals Court elections hold the election context constant, as all five are

for the same office, on the same ballot, and in the same November 2020 election. The contests for Seats #4, #6, and #13 feature a White Democrat running against a White Republican. The Seat #7 contest features a Black Democrat running against a White Republican, while the Seat #5 contest features a White Democrat running against a Black Republican. In all five contests, Black voters are highly supportive of the Democratic candidate and White voters are supporting the Republican candidate. This is again consistent with a polarized response to the party affiliation indicated on the ballot.

Table 3: State Appeals Court Elections EI RxC Estimates from Barreto's Appendix A

Year	Office	Candidate	Party	Race	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
					White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2020	Appeals Court #4	Wood	R	W	75	1	88	1	85	1	83	1
		Shields	D	W	25	98	11	99	14	99	17	99
2020	Appeals Court #6	Dillon	R	W	76	1	88	1	85	1	83	1
		Styers	D	W	24	99	11	99	14	99	18	99
2020	Appeals Court #13	Griffin	R	W	75	1	87	1	85	1	81	1
		Brook	D	W	25	99	13	99	15	99	19	99
		White /White Republican Average			75	1	88	1	85	1	82	1
		White /White Democratic Average			25	99	12	99	15	99	18	99
2020	Appeals Court #7	Carpenter	R	W	75	1	88	1	85	1	82	1
		Young	D	B	25	99	12	99	15	99	18	99
2020	Appeals Court #5	Gore	R	B	75	1	88	1	85	1	82	1
		Cabbage	D	W	25	99	12	99	15	99	18	99

The almost exact similarity of the voting patterns here is notable. The Black Republican candidate in the Seat #5 contest gets no more Black voter support and no less White voter support than does the average White Republican candidate. The Black Democratic candidate in the Seat #7 contest gets no more Black voter support and no less White voter support than does the average White Democratic candidate.

D. All 2020 and 2022 Elections

Table 4 below is similar to Tables 1, 2, and 3, but here the results are for all of the 2020 election contests included in Dr. Barreto's RPV analysis. The EI RxC estimates in Table 4 are again taken directly from Dr. Barreto's Appendix A, Table A2, on pages 17-19 of his report. Three of the contests (Appeals Court #7, Labor Commissioner, and Supreme Court #1) feature a Black Democrat running against a White Republican. The Appeals Court #5 contest features a Black

Republican running against a White Democrat. The Lt. Governor contest features a Black Democrat running against a Black Republican. The remaining election contests involve White candidates from each party, except for the Treasurer contest, with an Asian Democrat, and the President/Vice President contest, where the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate is Black (these two contests are not included in computing the average vote shares for White Democrats reported at the bottom of Table 4, and similarly the combined State House and State Senate contests are not included in any of the summary calculations as there is no racial information for the multiple candidates involved in these reported estimates).

In all 20 contests, Black voters are highly supportive of the Democratic candidate and White voters are supporting the Republican candidate. This is again consistent with a polarized response to the party affiliation indicated on the ballot. In contrast to the strong impact of candidate party affiliation, here, as was the case for the selected elections in the previous tables, the race of the candidates does not appear to have a polarizing impact on vote choice. In fact, the impact of the race of the candidates on both Black and White voters is essentially undetectable. The almost exact similarity of the voting patterns here is notable. The Black Republican candidates get no more Black voter support and no less White voter support than the average White Republican candidate. The Black Democratic candidates get no more Black voter support and no less White voter support than the average White Democratic candidate.

Table 4: All 2020 Elections EI RxC Estimates from Barreto's Appendix A

Year	Office	Candidate	Party	Race	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
					White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2020	Attorney General	O'Neill	R	W	73	1	86	1	83	1	79	1
		Stein	D	W	28	99	14	99	17	99	21	99
2020	Agriculture Commission	Troxler	R	W	78	1	92	1	88	1	86	1
		Wadsworth	D	W	22	99	8	99	11	99	14	99
2020	Appeals Court #13	Griffin	R	W	75	1	87	1	85	1	81	1
		Brook	D	W	25	99	13	99	15	99	19	99
2020	Appeals Court #4	Wood	R	W	75	1	88	1	85	1	83	1
		Shields	D	W	25	98	11	99	14	99	17	99
2020	Appeals Court #5	Gore	R	B	75	1	88	1	85	1	82	1
		Cabbage	D	W	25	99	12	99	15	99	18	99
2020	Appeals Court #6	Dillon	R	W	76	1	88	1	85	1	83	1
		Styers	D	W	24	99	11	99	14	99	18	99
2020	Appeals Court #7	Carpenter	R	W	75	1	88	1	85	1	82	1
		Young	D	B	25	99	12	99	15	99	18	99
2020	Auditor	Street	R	W	72	1	83	1	79	1	74	1
		Wood	D	W	29	99	17	99	22	99	26	99
2020	Governor	Forest	R	W	70	1	85	1	81	1	78	1
		Cooper	D	W	31	100	15	99	19	99	22	99
2020	Insurance Commission	Causey	R	W	76	1	86	1	84	1	83	1
		Goodwin	D	W	25	99	14	99	16	99	18	99
2020	Labor Commission	Dobson	R	W	74	1	87	1	84	1	81	1
		Holmes	D	B	26	99	13	99	16	99	19	99
2020	Lt. Governor	Robinson	R	B	75	1	89	1	86	1	83	1
		Holley	D	B	25	99	11	99	14	99	17	99
2020	President	Trump/Pence	R	W/W	73	1	89	1	85	1	81	1
		Biden/Harris	D	W/B	27	99	11	99	15	99	19	99
2020	Sec. of State	Sykes	R	W	71	1	83	1	80	1	77	1
		Marshall	D	W	29	99	17	99	20	99	23	99
2020	State Superintendent	Truitt	R	W	75	1	88	1	84	1	81	0
		Mangrum	D	W	25	98	12	99	15	99	19	99
2020	Supreme Court #1	Newby	R	W	73	1	87	1	83	1	80	1
		Beasley	D	B	27	99	13	99	17	99	20	99
2020	Supreme Court #2	Berger	R	W	74	1	87	1	84	1	81	1
		Inman	D	W	26	99	12	99	16	99	19	99
2020	Supreme Court #4	Barringer	R	W	75	1	87	1	84	1	80	0
		Davis	D	W	25	99	14	99	17	99	20	99
2020	Treasurer	Folwell	R	W	76	1	89	1	86	1	81	1
		Chatterji	D	A	24	99	11	99	14	99	19	99
2020	U.S. Senate	Tillis	R	W	74	1	88	1	85	1	81	1
		Cunningham	D	W	26	99	12	99	15	99	18	99
2020	NC State House	Republicans	R	x	75	1	84	1	83	1	82	1
		Democrats	D	x	25	99	16	99	17	99	18	99
2020	NC State Senate	Republicans	R	x	75	1	88	1	84	1	80	1
		Democrats	D	x	26	99	12	99	16	99	20	99
		All Republicans			74	1	87	1	84	1	81	1
		White Republicans			74	1	87	1	84	1	81	1
		Black Republicans			75	1	89	1	86	1	83	1
		All Democrats			26	99	13	99	16	99	19	99
		White Democrats			26	99	13	99	16	99	19	99
		Black Democrats			26	99	13	99	16	99	19	99

Table 5 below is similar to Table 4, but here the results are for all of the 2022 election

contests included in Dr. Barreto's RPV analysis. The EI RxC estimates in Table 5 are again taken directly from Dr. Barreto's Appendix A, Table A2, on pages 17-19 of his report. Three of the contests (U.S. Senate, State Appeals Court #8, and State Appeals Court #10) feature a Black Democrat running against a White Republican. The remaining four election contests involve White candidates from each party (the combined State House and State Senate contests are not included in any of the summary calculations as there is no racial information for the multiple candidates involved in these reported estimates).

Table 5: All 2022 Elections EI RxC Estimates from Barreto's Appendix A

Year	Office	Candidate	Party	Race	Statewide		Northeast-1		Northeast-2		Pitt/Edgecombe	
					White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
2022	Appeals Court # 10	Tyson	R	W	70	1	88	1	83	1	79	1
		Adams	D	B	30	99	12	99	17	99	22	99
2022	Appeals Court # 11	Stading	R	W	70	1	87	1	83	1	78	1
		Jackson	D	W	30	99	13	99	17	99	22	99
2022	Appeals Court #8	Flood	R	W	69	1	86	1	83	1	78	1
		Thompson	D	B	31	99	14	99	17	99	22	99
2022	Appeals Court #9	Stroud	R	W	72	1	89	1	85	1	80	1
		Salmon	D	W	28	99	11	99	16	99	20	99
2022	Supreme Court #3	Dietz	R	W	69	1	87	1	83	1	79	1
		Inman	D	W	31	99	13	99	17	99	21	99
2022	Supreme Court #5	Allen	R	W	69	1	86	2	82	1	77	0
		Ervin	D	W	31	99	14	98	18	99	22	99
2022	U.S. Senate	Budd	R	W	68	1	87	1	83	1	77	1
		Beasley	D	B	32	99	13	99	18	99	23	99
2022	NC State House	Republicans	R	x	66	1	84	3	80	1	77	1
		Democrats	D	x	34	99	16	98	20	99	23	99
2022	NC State Senate	Republicans	R	x	62	18	88	1	83	1	79	1
		Democrats	D	x	38	82	12	99	17	99	22	99
		All Democrats			31	99	13	99	17	99	22	99
		White Democrats			30	99	13	99	17	99	21	99
		Black Democrats			31	99	13	99	17	99	22	99

In all 7 contests, Black voters are highly supportive of the Democratic candidate and White voters are supporting the Republican candidate. This is again consistent with a polarized response to the party affiliation indicated on the ballot. In contrast to the strong impact of candidate party affiliation, here, as was the case in the previous tables, the race of the candidates does not appear to have a polarizing impact on vote choice. In fact, the impact of the race of the candidates on both Black and White voters is essentially undetectable. The almost exact similarity of the voting patterns here is notable. The Black Republican candidates get no more Black voter support and no

less White voter support than the average White Republican candidate. The Black Democratic candidates get no more Black voter support and no less White voter support than the average White Democratic candidate.

F. District Performance

On pages 12 and 13 of his report, Dr. Barreto comments on the performance of various adopted and demonstration districts. As noted above, all of the Black-preferred candidates are also the Democratic candidates in the general elections Dr. Barreto considers. As such his assessment of the performance is simply the expected Democratic share of the general election vote in the district. Democratic majority districts will ‘perform’, and Republican majority districts will not. No where does he address the related issue of whether a 50% Black district (or any other Black population share threshold) is necessary for the district to perform for Black voters.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Barreto’s report provided a limited analysis that showed that Black voters cohesively support candidates and that those candidates do not receive support from the majority of White voters. With no indication of the race or partisan affiliation of these candidates, it is difficult to determine anything more from his results. However, with that information added to his EI results, as was done for the tables above, it is clear that Black voters cohesively support Democratic candidates, and that the majority of White voters support Republican candidates.

In contrast, it is not the case that Dr. Barreto’s election analysis supports the conclusion that Black voters cohesively support Black candidates, as they are no more likely to support a Black Democratic candidate than they are to support a White Democratic candidate, and similarly, no less likely to oppose a Black Republican candidate than they are to oppose a White Republican candidate. Similarly, it is not the case that a majority of White voters regularly oppose Black candidates, as they are no more likely to oppose a Black Democratic candidate than they are to oppose a White Democratic candidate, and similarly, no less likely to support a Black Republican candidate than they are to support a White Republican candidate.

Dr. Barreto suggests that somehow these highly apparent facts coming directly from his own analysis must by definition be ignored. In his discussion of racially polarized voting on page 7 of his report he states:

The phenomenon called racially polarized voting (RPV) is defined as voters of different racial or ethnic groups exhibiting different candidate preferences in an election. It means simply that voters of different racial or ethnic groups are voting in polar opposite directions, rather than in a multi-racial or multiethnic coalition. If some groups of voters are voting in coalition, RPV analysis will identify such a trend. Voters may vote for their candidates of choice for a variety of reasons, and RPV analysis is agnostic as to why voters make decisions. RPV analysis simply reports how voters are voting.

But as the tables above make clear, an RPV analysis need not be limited in what it can reveal by arbitrarily blocking out useful information like the race and party affiliation of the candidates. Dr. Barreto may not believe those facts are relevant as a legal matter, but that does not alter the fact that they are conclusions that can be drawn reliably from an RPV analysis. This may be an inconvenient truth, but it is a truth, nonetheless. Dr. Barreto clearly believes that this fact pattern has, or at least should have, no legal significance, but that is not entirely clear. A Fifth Circuit appeals panel in *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831 (Fifth Cir. 1993), explored this legal issue in some detail, writing:

A central issue here, one that divided the panel and one over which the parties vigorously disagree, concerns Gingles' white bloc voting inquiry and the closely related Zimmer factor directing courts to examine "the extent to which voting . . . is racially polarized." S.Rep. 417 at 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News at 206. As the Court in Gingles held, the question here is not whether white residents tend to vote as a bloc, but whether such bloc voting is "legally significant." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 55, 106 S.Ct. at 2768; Salas v. Southwest Texas Jr. College Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1553 (5th Cir. 1992). In finding a violation of § 2 in each of the nine challenged counties, the district court held that plaintiffs need only demonstrate that whites and blacks generally support different candidates to establish legally significant white bloc voting. Because "it is the difference between choices made by blacks and whites alone . . . that is the central inquiry of § 2," the court excluded evidence tending to prove that these divergent voting patterns were attributable to factors other than race as "irrelevant" and "legally [in]competent."

On appeal, defendants contend that the district court erred in refusing to consider the nonracial causes of voting preferences they offered at trial. Unless the tendency among minorities and whites to support different candidates, and the accompanying losses by


minority groups at the polls, are somehow tied to race, defendants argue, plaintiffs' attempt to establish legally significant white bloc voting, and thus their vote dilution claim under § 2, must fail. When the record indisputably proves that partisan affiliation, not race, best explains the divergent voting patterns among minority and white citizens in the contested counties, defendants conclude, the district court's judgment must be reversed.

*We agree. The scope of the Voting Rights Act is indeed quite broad, but its rigorous protections, as the text of § 2 suggests, extend only to defeats experienced by voters "on account of race or color." Without an inquiry into the circumstances underlying unfavorable election returns, courts lack the tools to discern results that are in any sense "discriminatory," and any distinction between deprivation and mere losses at the polls becomes untenable. In holding that the failure of minority-preferred candidates to receive support from a majority of whites on a regular basis, without more, sufficed to prove legally significant racial bloc voting, the district court loosed § 2 from its racial tether and fused illegal vote dilution and political defeat. In so doing, the district court ignored controlling authorities: *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971), which established a clean divide between actionable vote dilution and "political defeat at the polls"; the 1982 amendments, enacted to restore a remedy in cases "where a combination of public activity and private discrimination have joined to make it virtually impossible for minorities to play a meaningful role in the electoral process," *Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1367-68 (statement of Prof. Drew Days) (emphasis added); and Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), where a majority of the Justices rejected the very test employed by the district court as a standard crafted to shield political minorities from the vicissitudes of "interest-group politics rather than a rule hedging against racial discrimination." *Id.* at 83, 106 S.Ct. at 2782 (*White, J., concurring*); *id.* at 101, 106 S.Ct. at 2792 (*O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring*). We must correct these errors.*

Other courts and other circuits have reached different conclusions, and the issue of whether these concerns are relevant only at the Senate factors, or the totality of the circumstances, phase also remains a divided issue. The origin of Dr. Barreto's view of this as a legal matter is largely centered on Justice Brennan's *Gingles*' opinion, but as multiple courts have pointed out, that section of his opinion failed to unite a majority of the Court even then.

Whatever the legal significance, or lack of it, the analysis proved by Dr. Barreto, limited as it is in time and space, clearly demonstrates that the party affiliation of the candidates is sufficient to fully explain the divergent voting preferences of Black and White voters in the 2020 and 2022 North Carolina elections.

December 22, 2023.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John R. Alford", is written over a horizontal line.

John R. Alford, Ph.D

Appendix A

John R. Alford

Curriculum Vitae

December 2023

Dept. of Political Science
Rice University - MS-24
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, Texas 77251-1892
713-348-3364
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Employment:

Professor, Rice University, 2015 to present.
Associate Professor, Rice University, 1985-2015.
Assistant Professor, University of Georgia, 1981-1985.
Instructor, Oakland University, 1980-1981.
Teaching-Research Fellow, University of Iowa, 1977-1980.
Research Associate, Institute for Urban Studies, Houston, Texas, 1976-1977.

Education:

Ph.D., University of Iowa, Political Science, 1981.
M.A., University of Iowa, Political Science, 1980.
M.P.A., University of Houston, Public Administration, 1977.
B.S., University of Houston, Political Science, 1975.

Books:

Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, and the Biology of Political Differences. New York: Routledge, 2013. Co-authors, John R. Hibbing and Kevin B. Smith. (2nd Edition under contract)

Articles:

“Political Orientations Vary with Detection of Androstenone,” with Amanda Friesen, Michael Gruszczynski, and Kevin B. Smith. **Politics and the Life Sciences.** (Spring, 2020).

“Intuitive ethics and political orientations: Testing moral foundations as a theory of political ideology.” with Kevin Smith, John Hibbing, Nicholas Martin, and Peter Hatemi. **American Journal of Political Science.** (April, 2017).

“The Genetic and Environmental Foundations of Political, Psychological, Social, and Economic Behaviors: A Panel Study of Twins and Families.” with Peter Hatemi, Kevin Smith, and John Hibbing. **Twin Research and Human Genetics.** (May, 2015.)

“Liberals and conservatives: Non-convertible currencies.” with John R. Hibbing and Kevin B. Smith. **Behavioral and Brain Sciences** (January, 2015).

“Non-Political Images Evoke Neural Predictors Of Political Ideology.” with Woo-Young Ahn, Kenneth T. Kishida, Xiaosi Gu, Terry Lohrenz, Ann Harvey, Kevin Smith, Gideon Yaffe, John Hibbing, Peter Dayan, P. Read Montague. **Current Biology.** (November, 2014).

“Cortisol and Politics: Variance in Voting Behavior is Predicted by Baseline Cortisol Levels.” with Jeffrey French, Kevin Smith, Adam Guck, Andrew Birnie, and John Hibbing. **Physiology & Behavior**. (June, 2014).

“Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations in Political Ideology.” with Kevin B. Smith and John R. Hibbing. **Behavioral and Brain Sciences**. (June, 2014).

“Negativity bias and political preferences: A response to commentators Response.” with Kevin B. Smith and John R. Hibbing. **Behavioral and Brain Sciences**. (June, 2014).

“Genetic and Environmental Transmission of Political Orientations.” with Carolyn L. Funk, Matthew Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith, Nicholas R. Eaton, Robert F. Krueger, Lindon J. Eaves, John R. Hibbing. **Political Psychology**, (December, 2013).

“Biology, Ideology, and Epistemology: How Do We Know Political Attitudes Are Inherited and Why Should We Care?” with Kevin Smith, Peter K. Hatemi, Lindon J. Eaves, Carolyn Funk, and John R. Hibbing. **American Journal of Political Science**. (January, 2012)

“Disgust Sensitivity and the Neurophysiology of Left-Right Political Orientations.” with Kevin Smith, John Hibbing, Douglas Oxley, and Matthew Hibbing, **PlosONE**, (October, 2011).

“Linking Genetics and Political Attitudes: Re-Conceptualizing Political Ideology.” with Kevin Smith, John Hibbing, Douglas Oxley, and Matthew Hibbing, **Political Psychology**, (June, 2011).

“The Politics of Mate Choice.” with Peter Hatemi, John R. Hibbing, Nicholas Martin and Lindon Eaves, **Journal of Politics**, (March, 2011).

“Not by Twins Alone: Using the Extended Twin Family Design to Investigate the Genetic Basis of Political Beliefs” with Peter Hatemi, John Hibbing, Sarah Medland, Matthew Keller, Kevin Smith, Nicholas Martin, and Lindon Eaves, **American Journal of Political Science**, (July, 2010).

“The Ultimate Source of Political Opinions: Genes and the Environment” with John R. Hibbing in **Understanding Public Opinion**, 3rd Edition eds. Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wilcox, Washington D.C.: CQ Press, (2010).

“Is There a ‘Party’ in your Genes” with Peter Hatemi, John R. Hibbing, Nicholas Martin and Lindon Eaves, **Political Research Quarterly**, (September, 2009).

“Twin Studies, Molecular Genetics, Politics, and Tolerance: A Response to Beckwith and Morris” with John R. Hibbing and Cary Funk, **Perspectives on Politics**, (December, 2008). This is a solicited response to a critique of our 2005 APSR article “Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?”

“Political Attitudes Vary with Physiological Traits” with Douglas R. Oxley, Kevin B. Smith, Matthew V. Hibbing, Jennifer L. Miller, Mario Scalora, Peter K. Hatemi, and John R. Hibbing, **Science**, (September 19, 2008).

“The New Empirical Biopolitics” with John R. Hibbing, **Annual Review of Political Science**, (June, 2008).

“Beyond Liberals and Conservatives to Political Genotypes and Phenotypes” with John R. Hibbing and Cary Funk, **Perspectives on Politics**, (June, 2008). This is a solicited response to a critique of our 2005 APSR article “Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?”

"Personal, Interpersonal, and Political Temperaments" with John R. Hibbing, **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, (November, 2007).

"Is Politics in our Genes?" with John R. Hibbing, **Tidsskriftet Politik**, (February, 2007).

"Biology and Rational Choice" with John R. Hibbing, **The Political Economist**, (Fall, 2005)

"Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" with John R. Hibbing and Carolyn Funk, **American Political Science Review**, (May, 2005). (The main findings table from this article has been reprinted in two college level text books - Psychology, 9th ed. and Invitation to Psychology 4th ed. both by Wade and Tavris, Prentice Hall, 2007).

"The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior" with John R. Hibbing, **Perspectives on Politics**, (December, 2004).

"Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators" with John R. Hibbing, **American Journal of Political Science**, (January, 2004).

"Electoral Convergence of the Two Houses of Congress" with John R. Hibbing, in **The Exceptional Senate**, ed. Bruce Oppenheimer, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, (2002).

"We're All in this Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1996." in **What is it About Government that Americans Dislike?**, eds. John Hibbing and Beth Theiss-Morse, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2001).

"The 2000 Census and the New Redistricting," **Texas State Bar Association School Law Section Newsletter**, (July, 2000).

"Overdraft: The Political Cost of Congressional Malfeasance" with Holly Teeters, Dan Ward, and Rick Wilson, **Journal of Politics** (August, 1994).

"Personal and Partisan Advantage in U.S. Congressional Elections, 1846-1990" with David W. Brady, in **Congress Reconsidered** 5th edition, eds. Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, CQ Press, (1993).

"The 1990 Congressional Election Results and the Fallacy that They Embodied an Anti-Incumbent Mood" with John R. Hibbing, **PS** 25 (June, 1992).

"Constituency Population and Representation in the United States Senate" with John R. Hibbing, **Legislative Studies Quarterly**, (November, 1990).

"Editors' Introduction: Electing the U.S. Senate" with Bruce I. Oppenheimer. **Legislative Studies Quarterly**, (November, 1990).

"Personal and Partisan Advantage in U.S. Congressional Elections, 1846-1990" with David W. Brady, in **Congress Reconsidered** 4th edition, eds. Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, CQ Press, (1988). Reprinted in *The Congress of the United States, 1789-1989*, ed. Joel Silby, Carlson Publishing Inc., (1991), and in *The Quest for Office*, eds. Wayne and Wilcox, St. Martins Press, (1991).

"Can Government Regulate Fertility? An Assessment of Pro-natalist Policy in Eastern Europe" with Jerome Legge. **The Western Political Quarterly** (December, 1986).

"Partisanship and Voting" with James Campbell, Mary Munro, and Bruce Campbell, in **Research in Micropolitics. Volume 1 - Voting Behavior**. Samuel Long, ed. JAI Press, (1986).

"Economic Conditions and Individual Vote in the Federal Republic of Germany" with Jerome S. Legge. **Journal of Politics** (November, 1984).

"Television Markets and Congressional Elections" with James Campbell and Keith Henry. **Legislative Studies Quarterly** (November, 1984).

"Economic Conditions and the Forgotten Side of Congress: A Foray into U.S. Senate Elections" with John R. Hibbing, **British Journal of Political Science** (October, 1982).

"Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House" with John R. Hibbing, **Journal of Politics** (November, 1981). Reprinted in *The Congress of the United States, 1789-1989*, Carlson Publishing Inc., (1991).

"The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who is Held Responsible?" with John R. Hibbing, **American Journal of Political Science** (August, 1981).

"Comment on Increased Incumbency Advantage" with John R. Hibbing, Refereed communication: **American Political Science Review** (March, 1981).

"Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example" with Michael Lewis-Beck, **American Political Science Review** (September, 1980).

Awards and Honors:

CQ Press Award - 1988, honoring the outstanding paper in legislative politics presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Awarded for "The Demise of the Upper House and the Rise of the Senate: Electoral Responsiveness in the United States Senate" with John Hibbing.

Research Grants:

National Science Foundation, 2009-2011, "Identifying the Biological Influences on Political Temperaments", with John Hibbing, Kevin Smith, Kim Espy, Nicolas Martin and Read Montague. This is a collaborative project involving Rice, University of Nebraska, Baylor College of Medicine, and Queensland Institute for Medical Research.

National Science Foundation, 2007-2010, "Genes and Politics: Providing the Necessary Data", with John Hibbing, Kevin Smith, and Lindon Eaves. This is a collaborative project involving Rice, University of Nebraska, Virginia Commonwealth University, and the University of Minnesota.

National Science Foundation, 2007-2010, "Investigating the Genetic Basis of Economic Behavior", with John Hibbing and Kevin Smith. This is a collaborative project involving Rice, University of Nebraska, Virginia Commonwealth University, and the Queensland Institute of Medical Research.

Rice University Faculty Initiatives Fund, 2007-2009, "The Biological Substrates of Political Behavior". This is in assistance of a collaborative project involving Rice, Baylor College of Medicine, Queensland Institute of Medical Research, University of Nebraska, Virginia Commonwealth University, and the University of Minnesota.

National Science Foundation, 2004-2006, "Decision-Making on Behalf of Others", with John Hibbing. This is a collaborative project involving Rice and the University of Nebraska.

National Science Foundation, 2001-2002, dissertation grant for Kevin Arceneaux, "Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Voting Behavior in the Context of U.S. Federalism."

National Science Foundation, 2000-2001, dissertation grant for Stacy Ulbig, "Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Sub-national Contextual Influences on Political Trust."

National Science Foundation, 1999-2000, dissertation grant for Richard Engstrom, "Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Electoral District Structure and Political Behavior."

Rice University Research Grant, 1985, Recent Trends in British Parliamentary Elections.

Faculty Research Grants Program, University of Georgia, Summer, 1982. Impact of Media Structure on Congressional Elections, with James Campbell.

Papers Presented:

"The Physiological Basis of Political Temperaments" 6th European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland (2011), with Kevin Smith, and John Hibbing.

"Identifying the Biological Influences on Political Temperaments" National Science Foundation Annual Human Social Dynamics Meeting (2010), with John Hibbing, Kimberly Espy, Nicholas Martin, Read Montague, and Kevin B. Smith.

"Political Orientations May Be Related to Detection of the Odor of Androstenone" Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2010), with Kevin Smith, Amanda Balzer, Michael Gruszczynski, Carly M. Jacobs, and John Hibbing.

"Toward a Modern View of Political Man: Genetic and Environmental Transmission of Political Orientations from Attitude Intensity to Political Participation" Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (2010), with Carolyn Funk, Kevin Smith, and John Hibbing.

"Genetic and Environmental Transmission of Political Involvement from Attitude Intensity to Political Participation" Annual meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, San Francisco, CA (2010), with Carolyn Funk, Kevin Smith, and John Hibbing.

"Are Violations of the EEA Relevant to Political Attitudes and Behaviors?" Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2010), with Kevin Smith, and John Hibbing.

"The Neural Basis of Representation" Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada (2009), with John Hibbing.

“Genetic and Environmental Transmission of Value Orientations” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada (2009), with Carolyn Funk, Kevin Smith, Matthew Hibbing, Pete Hatemi, Robert Krueger, Lindon Eaves, and John Hibbing.

“The Genetic Heritability of Political Orientations: A New Twin Study of Political Attitudes” Annual Meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Dublin, Ireland (2009), with John Hibbing, Cary Funk, Kevin Smith, and Peter K Hatemi.

“The Heritability of Value Orientations” Annual meeting of the Behavior Genetics Association, Minneapolis, MN (2009), with Kevin Smith, John Hibbing, Carolyn Funk, Robert Krueger, Peter Hatemi, and Lindon Eaves.

“The Ick Factor: Disgust Sensitivity as a Predictor of Political Attitudes” Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2009), with Kevin Smith, Douglas Oxley Matthew Hibbing, and John Hibbing.

“The Ideological Animal: The Origins and Implications of Ideology” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA (2008), with Kevin Smith, Matthew Hibbing, Douglas Oxley, and John Hibbing.

“The Physiological Differences of Liberals and Conservatives” Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2008), with Kevin Smith, Douglas Oxley, and John Hibbing.

“Looking for Political Genes: The Influence of Serotonin on Political and Social Values” Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2008), with Peter Hatemi, Sarah Medland, John Hibbing, and Nicholas Martin.

“Not by Twins Alone: Using the Extended Twin Family Design to Investigate the Genetic Basis of Political Beliefs” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2007), with Peter Hatemi, John Hibbing, Matthew Keller, Nicholas Martin, Sarah Medland, and Lindon Eaves.

“Factorial Association: A generalization of the Fulker between-within model to the multivariate case” Annual meeting of the Behavior Genetics Association, Amsterdam, The Netherlands (2007), with Sarah Medland, Peter Hatemi, John Hibbing, William Coventry, Nicholas Martin, and Michael Neale.

“Not by Twins Alone: Using the Extended Twin Family Design to Investigate the Genetic Basis of Political Beliefs” Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2007), with Peter Hatemi, John Hibbing, Nicholas Martin, and Lindon Eaves.

“Getting from Genes to Politics: The Connecting Role of Emotion-Reading Capability” Annual Meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Portland, OR, (2007.), with John Hibbing.

“The Neurological Basis of Representative Democracy.” Hendricks Conference on Political Behavior, Lincoln, NE (2006), with John Hibbing.

“The Neural Basis of Representative Democracy” Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA (2006), with John Hibbing.

“How are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted? A Research Agenda” Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago Illinois (2006), with John Hibbing.

"The Politics of Mate Choice" Annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA (2006), with John Hibbing.

"The Challenge Evolutionary Biology Poses for Rational Choice" Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (2005), with John Hibbing and Kevin Smith.

"Decision Making on Behalf of Others" Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (2005), with John Hibbing.

"The Source of Political Attitudes and Behavior: Assessing Genetic and Environmental Contributions" Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago Illinois (2005), with John Hibbing and Carolyn Funk.

"The Source of Political Attitudes and Behavior: Assessing Genetic and Environmental Contributions" Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago Illinois (2004), with John Hibbing and Carolyn Funk.

"Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators" Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (2002), with John Hibbing

"Can We Trust the NES Trust Measure?" Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (2001), with Stacy Ulbig.

"The Impact of Organizational Structure on the Production of Social Capital Among Group Members" Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia (2000), with Allison Rinden.

"Isolating the Origins of Incumbency Advantage: An Analysis of House Primaries, 1956-1998" Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia (2000), with Kevin Arceneaux.

"The Electorally Indistinct Senate," Norman Thomas Conference on Senate Exceptionalism, Vanderbilt University; Nashville, Tennessee; October (1999), with John R. Hibbing.

"Interest Group Participation and Social Capital" Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (1999), with Allison Rinden.

"We're All in this Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1996." The Hendricks Symposium, University of Nebraska, Lincoln. (1998)

"Constituency Population and Representation in the United States Senate," Electing the Senate; Houston, Texas; December (1989), with John R. Hibbing.

"The Disparate Electoral Security of House and Senate Incumbents," American Political Science Association Annual Meetings; Atlanta, Georgia; September (1989), with John R. Hibbing.

"Partisan and Incumbent Advantage in House Elections," Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association (1987), with David W. Brady.

"Personal and Party Advantage in U.S. House Elections, 1846-1986" with David W. Brady, 1987 Social Science History Association Meetings.

"The Demise of the Upper House and the Rise of the Senate: Electoral Responsiveness in the United States Senate" with John Hibbing, 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

"A Comparative Analysis of Economic Voting" with Jerome Legge, 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

"An Analysis of Economic Conditions and the Individual Vote in Great Britain, 1964-1979" with Jerome Legge, 1985 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association.

"Can Government Regulate Fertility? An Assessment of Pro-natalist Policy in Eastern Europe" with Jerome Legge, 1985 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association.

"Economic Conditions and the Individual Vote in the Federal Republic of Germany" with Jerome S. Legge, 1984 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.

"The Conditions Required for Economic Issue Voting" with John R. Hibbing, 1984 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

"Incumbency Advantage in Senate Elections," 1983 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

"Television Markets and Congressional Elections: The Impact of Market/District Congruence" with James Campbell and Keith Henry, 1982 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.

"Economic Conditions and Senate Elections" with John R. Hibbing, 1982 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. "Pocketbook Voting: Economic Conditions and Individual Level Voting," 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

"Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House," with John R. Hibbing, 1981 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Other Conference Participation:

Roundtable Participant – Closing Round-table on Biopolitics; 2016 UC Merced Conference on Bio-Politics and Political Psychology, Merced, CA.

Roundtable Participant “Genes, Brains, and Core Political Orientations” 2008 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Las Vegas.

Roundtable Participant “Politics in the Laboratory” 2007 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Short Course Lecturer, "What Neuroscience has to Offer Political Science" 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Panel chair and discussant, "Neuro-scientific Advances in the Study of Political Science" 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Presentation, "The Twin Study Approach to Assessing Genetic Influences on Political Behavior" Rice Conference on New Methods for Understanding Political Behavior, 2005.

Panel discussant, "The Political Consequences of Redistricting," 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Panel discussant, "Race and Redistricting," 1999 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Invited participant, "Roundtable on Public Dissatisfaction with American Political Institutions", 1998 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association.

Presentation, "Redistricting in the '90s," Texas Economic and Demographic Association, 1997.

Panel chair, "Congressional Elections," 1992 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.

Panel discussant, "Incumbency and Congressional Elections," 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Panel chair, "Issues in Legislative Elections," 1991 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Panel chair, "Economic Attitudes and Public Policy in Europe," 1990 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association

Panel discussant, "Retrospective Voting in U.S. Elections," 1990 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Co-convenor, with Bruce Oppenheimer, of Electing the Senate, a national conference on the NES 1988 Senate Election Study. Funded by the Rice Institute for Policy Analysis, the University of Houston Center for Public Policy, and the National Science Foundation, Houston, Texas, December, 1989.

Invited participant, Understanding Congress: A Bicentennial Research Conference, Washington, D.C., February, 1989.

Invited participant--Hendricks Symposium on the United States Senate, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, October, 1988

Invited participant--Conference on the History of Congress, Stanford University, Stanford, California, June, 1988.

Invited participant, "Roundtable on Partisan Realignment in the 1980's", 1987 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.

Professional Activities:

Other Universities:

Invited Speaker, Annual Lecture, Psi Kappa -the Psychology Club at Houston Community College, 2018.

Invited Speaker, Annual Allman Family Lecture, Dedman College Interdisciplinary Institute, Southern Methodist University, 2016.

Invited Speaker, Annual Lecture, Psi Sigma Alpha – Political Science Dept., Oklahoma State University, 2015.

Invited Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, 2014.

Invited Speaker, Annual Lecture, Psi Kappa -the Psychology Club at Houston Community College, 2014.

Invited Speaker, Graduate Student Colloquium, Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2013.

Invited Keynote Speaker, Political Science Alumni Evening, University of Houston, 2013.

Invited Lecturer, Biology and Politics Masters Seminar (John Geer and David Bader), Department of Political Science and Biology Department, Vanderbilt University, 2010.

Invited Lecturer, Biology and Politics Senior Seminar (John Geer and David Bader), Department of Political Science and Biology Department, Vanderbilt University, 2008.

Visiting Fellow, the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2007.

Invited Speaker, Joint Political Psychology Graduate Seminar, University of Minnesota, 2007.

Invited Speaker, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, 2006.

Member:

Editorial Board, Journal of Politics, 2007-2008.

Planning Committee for the National Election Studies' Senate Election Study, 1990-92.

Nominations Committee, Social Science History Association, 1988

Reviewer for:

American Journal of Political Science

American Political Science Review

American Politics Research

American Politics Quarterly

American Psychologist

American Sociological Review

Canadian Journal of Political Science

Comparative Politics

Electoral Studies

Evolution and Human Behavior

International Studies Quarterly

Journal of Politics
Journal of Urban Affairs
Legislative Studies Quarterly
National Science Foundation
PLoS ONE
Policy Studies Review
Political Behavior
Political Communication
Political Psychology
Political Research Quarterly
Public Opinion Quarterly
Science
Security Studies
Social Forces
Social Science Quarterly
Western Political Quarterly

University Service:

Member, University Senate, 2021-2023.

Member, University Parking Committee, 2016-2022.

Member, University Benefits Committee, 2013-2016.

Internship Director for the Department of Political Science, 2004-2018.

Member, University Council, 2012-2013.

Invited Speaker, Rice Classroom Connect, 2016.

Invited Speaker, Glasscock School, 2016.

Invited Speaker, Rice Alumni Association, Austin, 2016.

Invited Speaker, Rice Alumni Association, New York City, 2016.

Invited Speaker, Rice TEDxRiceU , 2013.

Invited Speaker, Rice Alumni Association, Atlanta, 2011.

Lecturer, Advanced Topics in AP Psychology, Rice University AP Summer Institute, 2009.

Scientia Lecture Series: "Politics in Our Genes: The Biology of Ideology" 2008

Invited Speaker, Rice Alumni Association, Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles, 2008.

Invited Speaker, Rice Alumni Association, Austin, Chicago and Washington, DC, 2006.

Invited Speaker, Rice Alumni Association, Dallas and New York, 2005.

Director: Rice University Behavioral Research Lab and Social Science Computing Lab, 2005-2006.

University Official Representative to the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1989-2012.

Director: Rice University Social Science Computing Lab, 1989-2004.

Member, Rice University Information Technology Access and Security Committee, 2001-2002

Rice University Committee on Computers, Member, 1988-1992, 1995-1996; Chair, 1996-1998, Co-chair, 1999.

Acting Chairman, Rice Institute for Policy Analysis, 1991-1992.

Divisional Member of the John W. Gardner Dissertation Award Selection Committee, 1998

Social Science Representative to the Educational Sub-committee of the Computer Planning Committee, 1989-1990.

Director of Graduate Admissions, Department of Political Science, Rice University, 1986-1988.

Co-director, Mellon Workshop: Southern Politics, May, 1988.

Guest Lecturer, Mellon Workshop: The U.S. Congress in Historical Perspective, May, 1987 and 1988.

Faculty Associate, Hanszen College, Rice University, 1987-1990.

Director, Political Data Analysis Center, University of Georgia, 1982-1985.

External Consulting:

Expert Witness, Shafer et al v. Pearland ISD, racially polarized voting analysis, 2023.

Expert Witness, Nairne et al v. Ardoin, (Louisiana) racially polarized voting analysis, 2023.

Expert Witness, Petteway v. Galveston County, racially polarized voting analysis, 2023.

Expert Witness, Dixon v. Lewisville ISD, racially polarized voting analysis, 2022.

Expert Witness, Soto Palmer v. Hobbs, (Washington State), racially polarized voting analysis, 2022.

Expert Witness, Pendergrass v. Raffensperger, (Georgia State House and Senate), racially polarized voting analysis, 2022.

Expert Witness, LULAC, et al. v. Abbott, et al., Voto Latino, et al. v. Scott, et al., Mexican American Legislative Caucus, et al. v. Texas, et al., Texas NAACP v. Abbott, et al., Fair Maps Texas, et al. v. Abbott, et al., US v. Texas, et al. (consolidated cases) challenges to Texas Congressional, State Senate, State House, and State Board of Education districting, 2022.

Expert Witness, Robinson/Galmon v. Ardoin, (Louisiana), racially polarized voting analysis, 2022.

Expert Witness, Christian Ministerial Alliance et al v. Arkansas, racially polarized voting analysis, 2022.

Expert Witness, Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2022.

Expert Witness, Rivera, et al. v. Schwab, Alonzo, et al. v. Schwab, Frick, et al. v. Schwab, (consolidated cases) challenge to Kansas congressional map, 2022.

Expert Witness, Grant v. Raffensperger, challenge to Georgia congressional map, 2022

Expert Witness, Brooks et al. v. Abbot, challenge to State Senate District 10, 2022.

Expert Witness, Elizondo v. Spring Branch ISD, 2022.

Expert Witness, Portugal v. Franklin County, et al., challenge to Franklin County, Washington at large County Commissioner's election system, 2022.

Consulting Expert, Gressman Math/Science Petitioners, Pennsylvania Congressional redistricting, 2022.

Consultant, Houston Community College – evaluation of election impact for redrawing of college board election districts, 2022.

Consultant, Lone Star College – evaluation of election impact for redrawing of college board election districts, 2022.

Consultant, Killeen ISD – evaluation of election impact for redrawing of school board election districts, 2022.

Consultant, Houston ISD – evaluation of election impact for redrawing of school board election districts, 2022.

Consultant, Brazosport ISD – evaluation of election impact for redrawing of school board election districts, 2022.

Consultant, Dallas ISD – evaluation of election impact for redrawing of school board election districts, 2022.

Consultant, Lancaster ISD – redrawing of all school board member election districts including demographic analysis and redrawing of election districts, 2021.

Consultant, City of Baytown – redrawing of all city council member election districts including demographic analysis and redrawing of election districts, 2021.

Consultant, Goose Creek ISD – redrawing of all board member election districts including demographic analysis and redrawing of election districts, 2021.

Expert Witness, Bruni et al. v. State of Texas, straight ticket voting analysis, 2020.

Consulting Expert, Sarasota County, VRA challenge to district map, 2020.

Expert Witness, Kumar v. Frisco ISD, TX, racially polarized voting analysis, 2019.

Expert Witness, Vaughan v. Lewisville ISD, TX, racially polarized voting analysis, 2019.

Expert Witness, Johnson v. Ardoin, (Louisiana), racially polarized voting analysis, 2019.

Appendix B

Exhibit A

Providing Black Voters with an Opportunity to Elect Candidates of Choice to the North Carolina State Legislature: A Jurisdiction-Specific, Functional Analysis of Select House and Senate County Grouping

Lisa Handley

September 17, 2019

I. Scope of Report

I was asked by counsel for Plaintiffs in this matter to conduct an analysis of voting patterns in select state House and Senate county groupings in North Carolina and, if voting in an election contest is racially polarized, to calculate the percent black voting age population necessary to provide black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. In one county (Robeson County), I also performed these calculations for the Native American population.

The district-specific, functional analysis I performed is specific to those counties and districts presented in this report. Particularly given the differences in voting patterns that exist across North Carolina, my analysis cannot be extrapolated to other counties and districts not analyzed in this report, including districts that currently have African American representatives that I did not evaluate.

II. Professional Experience

I have over thirty years of experience as a voting rights and redistricting expert. I have advised scores of jurisdictions and other clients on minority voting rights and redistricting-related issues and have served as an expert in more than 25 voting rights cases. My clients have included state and local jurisdictions, the U.S. Department of Justice, national civil rights organizations, and such international organizations as the United Nations.

I have been actively involved in researching, writing and teaching on subjects relating to voting rights, including minority representation, electoral system design and redistricting. I co-authored a book, *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), and co-edited a volume, *Redistricting in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford University Press, 2008), on these subjects. In addition, my research on these topics has appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as *Journal of Politics*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*,

American Politics Quarterly, *Journal of Law and Politics*, and *Law and Policy*, as well as in edited books and law reviews.

I am one of the co-authors of the 2001 *North Carolina Law Review* article, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,”¹ relied on by one of Defendants’ experts in this case, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis. In addition to writing this piece, I have used the approach outlined in it to conduct numerous district-specific, functional analyses both for interested jurisdictions and in the context of litigation. For example, most recently, I was asked to ascertain the percent black voting age population that would allow black voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in the challenged 3rd Congressional District in Virginia,² and the 11th Congressional District in Ohio.³

I have been a principal of Frontier International Electoral Consulting since co-founding the company in 1998. Frontier IEC provides electoral assistance in transitional democracies and post-conflict countries. In addition, I am a Visiting Research Academic at Oxford Brookes University in Oxford, United Kingdom. Attached to the end of this report is a copy of my *curriculum vitae*. I am being compensated at a rate of \$300 an hour for my work in this case.

III. County Groupings and Elections Examined

Conclusions about racially polarized voting and the minority population percentage needed to elect minority-preferred candidates in the context of polarization should be drawn from as many elections as applicable and feasible. It is well-established that racial voting patterns in elections that include minority candidates are the most probative for determining if voting is racially polarized.⁴ In addition, elections for the office at issue in a lawsuit – in this

¹ Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

² *Personhuballah v. Alcorn*, No. 3:13-cv-678 (E.D. Va.).

³ *Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder*, No. 1:18-CV-357 (S.D. Ohio).

⁴ See, for example, *League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements*, 999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993); *Nipper v. Smith*, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994).

case, state House and state Senate seats – are the most relevant,⁵ both for determining if voting is usually polarized and for calculating the percent minority population needed to elect minority-preferred candidates to the office if voting is racially polarized.

I analyzed all contested state legislative general and Democratic primary election contests since 2014 that included an African American candidate in the state Senate and state House county groupings at issue in this case.⁶ I also examined all recent statewide state and federal elections – general elections and Democratic primaries – that included an African American candidate. A statewide analysis of voting patterns in two of these contests, the 2016 primary elections for Governor and Supervisor of Public Instruction, indicated that voting was not polarized – both black and white voters supported the winning white candidate.⁷ I therefore focused my analysis on the following 2016 statewide contests for each state House and Senate grouping at issue: the general elections for Lieutenant Governor and State Treasurer and the Democratic primaries for Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Commissioner of Labor and Treasurer. In addition, I analyzed the 2012 general elections for U.S. President and Lieutenant Governor, and the 2012 Democratic primaries for Lieutenant Governor and Commissioner of Labor. While these contests were polarized statewide, they were not necessarily polarized in every given county grouping. Some of the primary elections considered had three or more candidates; although black voters often coalesced around a single candidate in some of these contests, in other instances they did not and determining a candidate of choice was not possible.

The 13 state House groupings I examined were: (1) Alamance; (2) Anson and Union; (3) Cabarrus, Davie, Montgomery, Richmond, Rowan and Stanly; (4) Cleveland and Gaston; (5) Columbus, Pender and Robeson; (6) Cumberland; (7) Duplin and Onslow; (8) Forsyth and Yadkin; (9) Franklin and Nash; (10) Guilford; (11) Lenoir and Pitt; (12) Mecklenburg; and (13)

⁵ Courts have long held that endogenous elections are more probative in assessing minority vote dilution. Examples include *Bone Shirt V. Hazeltine* 461 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2006); *Clay v. Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis*, 90 F.3d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1996); *Magnolia Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Lee* 994 F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th Cir. 1993); *Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. School 25 Dist. Bd. of Educ.* 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1993); *Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, La.* 834 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1987); *Rodriguez v. Harris Cnty, Texas* 964 19 F. Supp. 2d 686, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

⁶ In North Carolina, most black voters choose to vote in Democratic primaries as opposed to Republican primaries.

⁷ This report does not address the extent to which the 2016 Democratic primaries for Governor and Supervisor of Public Instruction were racially polarized in any specific county grouping.

Wake. The 5 state Senate county groupings were: (1) Alamance, Guilford and Randolph; (2) Davie and Forsyth; (3) Duplin, Harnett, Johnson, Lee, Nash and Sampson; (4) Franklin and Wake; and (5) Mecklenburg.⁸

IV. Success Rates of African American State Legislative Candidates

While African American state legislators have generally been elected from legislative districts with substantial black populations within the county groupings at issue here, these districts are usually not majority black in voting age population and in many cases are below or substantially below 40% in voting age population. Table 1 lists all state Senate districts under the 2017 Senate Plan that had a BVAP greater than 30% and encompass at least one county at issue in the remedial phase of this case. The table also shows the results of the 2018 election in each of these districts.

Table 1: State Senators Elected from Districts with Black Voting Age Populations Greater the 30% in Relevant Counties

2017 Senate Plan District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	State Senator	Race	Party	Share of two-party vote in 2018 general election	Senate County Grouping
38	48.46%	Mujtaba Mohammed	O	D	81.7%	Mecklenburg
28	43.64%	Gladys Robinson	AA	D	75.2%	Alamance-Guilford-Randolph
37	42.73%	Jeff Jackson	W	D	79.6%	Mecklenburg
21	42.15%	Ben Clark	AA	D	70.9%	Cumberland-Hoke
32	39.18%	Paul Lowe, Jr.	AA	D	72.9%	Davie-Forsyth
40	38.88%	Joyce Waddell	AA	D	75.6%	Mecklenburg
14	38.85%	Dan Blue	AA	D	73.4%	Franklin-Wake
7	33.93%	Louis Milford Pate, Jr.	W	R	53.9%	Lenoir-Wayne
5	32.94%	Don Davis	AA	D	55.3%	Greene-Pitt
19	31.69%	Kirk DeViere	W	D	50.4%	Cumberland-Hoke

If the Democratic candidate represented the candidate of choice for African Americans in each of the general elections listed in Table 1, then African Americans were able to elect the

⁸ Mecklenburg results are reported under the state House grouping but the discussion of course holds for the state Senate as well.

candidate of their choice in 9 of the 10 districts with a BVAP in excess of 30% in relevant Senate county groupings, and the majority of these successful candidates were African Americans. To be clear, Table 1 merely displays past election results; this analysis is not meant to suggest that a BVAP of 30% is a bright-line percentage that is either necessary or sufficient for African Americans to elect a candidate of their choice, either in the county groupings depicted in Table 1 or in other counties not in Table 1. Indeed, Table 1 does not include results for numerous counties across the State because those counties do not currently have state Senate districts with a BVAP above 30% or are not at issue in the remedial phase of this lawsuit. The results could differ significantly for such other counties.

Table 2 provides the same information as Table 1 for all state House districts under the 2017 House Plan that had a BVAP greater than 30% and encompass at least one county at issue in the remedial phase of this case.

Table 2: State Representative Elected from Districts with Black Voting Age Populations Greater the 30% in Relevant Counties

2017 House Plan District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	State Representative	Race	Party	Share of two-party vote in 2018 general election	House County Grouping
101	50.8%	Carolyn Logan	AA	D	78.7%	Mecklenburg
43	50.0%	Elmer Floyd	AA	D	74.1%	Cumberland
99	49.5%	Nasif Majeed	AA	D	82.4%	Mecklenburg
107	49.4%	Kelly Alexander	AA	D	100.0%	Mecklenburg
38	48.3%	Yvonne Lewis Holley	AA	D	84.1%	Wake
72	47.5%	Derwin Montgomery	AA	D	79.1%	Forsyth-Yadkin
8	44.9%	Kandie D. Smith	AA	D	64.6%	Lenoir-Pitt
33	44.2%	Rosa U. Gill	AA	D	78.7%	Wake
102	43.9%	Becky Carney	W	D	83.4%	Mecklenburg
58	42.7%	Amos Quick	AA	D	76.8%	Guilford
42	42.2%	Marvin W. Lucas	AA	D	78.1%	Cumberland
25	40.7%	James D. Gailliard	AA	D	53.3%	Franklin-Nash
61	40.3%	Mary Price Harrison	W	D	73.3%	Guilford
60	40.1%	Cecil Brockman	AA	D	69.0%	Guilford
21	39.0%	Raymond Smith Jr.	AA	D	52.6%	Bladen-Greene-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Sampson-Wayne
88	38.4%	Mary G. Belk	W	D	75.6%	Mecklenburg
57	38.4%	Ashton Clemmons	W	D	67.6%	Guilford
106	38.0%	Carla Cunningham	AA	D	80.6%	Mecklenburg
12	37.4%	Chris Humphrey	W	R	56.1%	Lenoir-Pitt

2017 House Plan District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	State Representative	Race	Party	Share of two-party vote in 2018 general election	House County Grouping
71	36.6%	Evelyn Terry	AA	D	72.7%	Forsyth-Yadkin
39	35.5%	Darren Jackson	W	D	67.9%	Wake
100	32.1%	John Autry	W	D	70.8%	Mecklenburg
44	31.8%	Billy Richardson	W	D	56.6%	Cumberland
22	31.5%	William Brisson	W	R	43.3%	Bladen-Greene-Harnett-Johnston-Lee-Sampson-Wayne
92	30.2%	Chaz Beasley	AA	D	70.0%	Mecklenburg

As in the Senate, if the Democratic candidate represented the candidate of choice for African Americans in each of the general elections listed in Table 2, then African Americans were able to elect the candidate of their choice in 23 of the 25 districts with a BVAP in excess of 30% in relevant House county groupings, and the majority of these successful candidates were African Americans. In addition to the African American state representatives listed above, there are two elected from districts that do not have substantial black populations: Sydney Batch is elected from a 14.3% BVAP district in Wake County, and Brandon Lofton is elected from a 6.2% BVAP district in Mecklenburg County. The same clarifications apply, however, for this analysis as with the Senate. This analysis is not meant to suggest that a BVAP of 30% is a bright-line percentage that is either necessary or sufficient for African Americans to elect a candidate of their choice, either in the county groupings depicted in Table 2 or in other counties not in Table 2. As before, Table 2 does not include results for numerous counties across the State because those counties do not currently have state House districts with a BVAP above 30% or are not at issue in the remedial phase of this lawsuit, and the results could differ significantly for such other counties.

V. Analyzing Voting Patterns by Race

In addition to the above analysis, I have conducted a systematic analysis to determine what percent BVAP would be required to provide black voters the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in state legislative as well as statewide contests in relevant county groupings. For each election analyzed, I report the participation rates of black and white voters, as well as the percentage of black and white support for the black-preferred candidate. If the

contest is polarized, with black and white voters supporting different candidates, I indicate the percentage BVAP required, given the participation rates and voting patterns of black and white voters, for the black-preferred candidate to win in the given election contest.

In this report, I discuss black and white voting behavior but in reality the analysis considers black and non-black voting behavior. While in most areas of the state, non-black voters are mostly white, this is not true of Roberson County, which has a substantial Native American population. I consider not only blacks and non-blacks, but Native Americans and non-Native Americans for this county.

The voting patterns of black and white voters must be estimated using statistical techniques because direct information about how individuals have voted is simply not available – the race of the voter is not, of course, obtainable from the ballot. I used a standard statistical technique to produce estimates, King’s ecological inference (EI).⁹ Developed by Professor Gary King in the 1990s and later refined, this statistical method utilizes the method of bounds and incorporates maximum likelihood statistics to produce estimates of voting patterns by race.¹⁰ King’s EI has been introduced and accepted in numerous district court proceedings.¹¹

The database used for this analysis matched demographic data for each election precinct – white, black and Native American VAP, based on the 2010 census – with the election results for the precinct.¹² The use of VAP data made sense in this case since participation as a product

⁹ The statistical package I used was r for the ecological regression analysis and eiCompare for r for the ecological inference analysis.

¹⁰ The following is an example of how the method of bounds works: if a given precinct has 100 voters, of which 75 are black and 25 are white, and the African American candidate received 80 votes, then at least 55 of the black voters (80 – 25) voted for the African American candidate and at most all 75 did. (The method of bounds is less useful for calculating estimates for white voters, as anywhere between none of the white voters and all of the white voters could have voted for the candidate.) These bounds are used when calculating EI estimates but not when using ecological regression.

¹¹ A list of cases in which King’s EI was used can be found in Justin de Benedictis-Kessner, “Evidence in Voting Rights Litigation: Producing Accurate Estimates of Racial Voting Patterns,” *Election Law Journal*, vol.14 (4), 2015. This article also discusses other statistical approaches to analyzing voting patterns by race in voting rights litigation, including homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression (ER).

¹² Some of the precinct VAP data could not be matched with election results. The degree to which this occurred varied by county, with some counties assigning early and absentee votes back to the election precinct and other counties not doing this. In addition, if counties combined or split election precincts for an election, these results could not be matched up to the correct demographic data.

of VAP is required to determine the percentage of black VAP necessary for the candidate of choice of black voters to win the given election.

VI. Calculating the Percent Black Voting Age Population Needed to Elect Black-Preferred Candidate

The percentage minority population needed to create a district that provides minorities with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice varies depending on the specific location of the district – there is no single universal or statewide target that can be applied. A district-specific, functional analysis that considers the participation rates and voting patterns of whites and minorities must be conducted to determine the percentage of the minority population that is needed to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Relying on the estimates of black and white voting behavior produced by the racial bloc voting analysis I conducted, in each election contest that was polarized, I calculated the percent BVAP needed for the candidate of choice of African Americans to win. When voting is not racially polarized in a given election and area, we need not calculate the percent BVAP needed for the black-preferred candidate to win since black and white voters in that instance support the same candidate.

A. Equalizing Turnout

Black turnout as a percentage of BVAP is generally somewhat lower than white turnout as a percentage of WVAP in the general elections analyzed. For example, according to Table 3, below, in Alamance in the 2016 general election for Lieutenant Governor, 44.7% of blacks of voting age turned out and cast a vote, while 70.6% of whites of voting age cast a vote.¹³ Using these turnout percentages, I can calculate the percent black VAP needed to ensure that black voters

¹³ In this example, turnout actually refers to the percent of black and white VAP voting for the highest statewide office on the ticket that included an African American candidate in the general election – the race for Lieutenant Governor.

comprise at least 50 percent of the voters for this election.¹⁴ The equalizing percentage is calculated mathematically by solving the following equation:

Let

M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is black
 $W = 1 - M$ = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is white
 A = the proportion of the black voting age population that turned out to vote
 B = the proportion of the white voting age population that turned out to vote

Therefore,

$M(A)$ = the proportion of the population that is black and turned out to vote (1)
 $(1 - M)B$ = the proportion of total population that is white and turned out to vote (2)

To find the value of M that is needed for (1) and (2) to be equal, (1) and (2) are set as equal and we solve for M algebraically:

$$\begin{aligned} M(A) &= (1 - M)B \\ M(A) &= B - M(B) \\ M(A) + M(B) &= B \\ M(A + B) &= B \\ M &= B / (A + B) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, for the example above, $A = .447$, $B = .706$ and $M = .706 / (.447 + .706)$. Therefore, a 61.2% BVAP district would produce equalized black and white turnout in the 2016 general election in this county grouping.

The equalizing percentage for BVAP in Democratic primaries in North Carolina is much lower than in general elections. This is because most black voters choose to vote in Democratic primaries while white voters tend to divide their votes between the Democratic and Republican primaries. For example, for the same county (Alamance), black turnout as a percentage of BVAP was 14.9 and white turnout as a percentage of WVAP was 8.3.¹⁵ (See Table 3, below.) The percentage BVAP required to equalize black and white turnout in the Democratic primary in this instance is only 35.8%.

¹⁴ For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, "Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.

¹⁵ Turnout in this example is actually the percent of black and white VAP voting for the highest statewide office on the ticket that included an African American candidate in the statewide Democratic primary – the race for Lieutenant Governor.

Equalizing the number of black and white voters who vote in an election would only be necessary to ensure that minority voters had the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice if white voters are rarely willing to vote for black-preferred candidates. If a sufficient percentage of white voters, consistently demonstrate a willingness to support black-preferred candidates, then the number of black voters need not equal the number of white voters who vote in a given election – white voters will “crossover” and help elect the black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in the turnout rates of black and white voters, but also the voting patterns of white and black voters.¹⁶

B. Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting

Estimates of voting patterns by race for of the elections analyzed for this report indicate that many were not racially polarized – black voters and white voters supported the same candidates. When black and white voters support different candidates, however, close attention must be paid not only to the turnout rates of black and white voters, but to the percentage of white voters who are willing to support black-preferred candidates, as well as how cohesive black voters are in their support of these candidates. When there are very high levels of minority cohesion and consistent, sufficient white crossover voting, the district need not be majority black in composition to provide black voters with a realistic opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to office.

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 2000 persons of voting age, 50% of whom are black and 50% of whom are white. Using the estimates of black and white turnout and support for the black-preferred candidate in the 2016 general election in Alamance County for Lieutenant Governor, black turnout is lower than white turnout: 44.7% of blacks of voting age and 70.6% of whites of voting age turned out to vote. (See Table 3, below.) This means that, for our illustrative election, there will be 447 black voters and 706 white voters. As indicated by Table 3, 99.3% of the black voters supported the black-preferred candidate (Linda

¹⁶ For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

Coleman) and 31.2% of the white voters supported her in this election.¹⁷ Thus, in our example, black voters will cast 444 of their 447 votes for the black-preferred candidate and their other 3 votes for the other candidates; white voters will cast 220 of their 706 votes for the black-preferred candidate and 486 votes for the other candidates. The black-preferred candidate will receive 57.6% of the vote under these conditions:

Black and White Voters	Votes for Black-Preferred Candidate	Votes for Other Candidates
Black 1000 x .447 = 447	447 x .993 = 444	447 x .007 = 3
White 1000 x .706 = <u>706</u>	706 x .312 = <u>220</u>	706 x .688 = <u>486</u>
1153	664	486

The black-preferred candidate will garner a total of 664 votes (444 from black voters and 220 from white voters), while the other candidates will receive 486 votes (3 from black voters and 486 from white voters). The black-preferred candidate will win the election with 664 of the 1153 votes cast in the contest, or 57.6% of the vote in this hypothetical 50% black VAP district. The black-preferred candidate in this election actually received only 40.5% of the vote in Alamance County because the county is slightly less than 19% black in VAP. But as the column labeled “percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP” indicates, Coleman would have received 57.6% of the vote if the BVAP was 50%. And, as the last column in Table 3 indicates, in a district with at least 37.6% BVAP, the black-preferred candidate would win.¹⁸

The Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor in 2016 in Alamance was not racially polarized. (There were 4 candidates and thus, while Coleman received only 43% of the white vote, she was the top choice of white voters; she received 87% of the black votes cast.) However, the 2016 Democratic primary race for Attorney General was polarized in the county so this will serve as the basis for the illustrative example. (See Table 3, below.) The turnout rate for

¹⁷ The 2016 general election for Lieutenant Governor included three candidates: Dan Forest, a white Republican, Linda Coleman, an African-American Democrat, and Libertarian candidate Jacki Cole. Dan Forest won the election with 51.8% of the statewide vote.

¹⁸

Black and White Voters	Votes for Black-Preferred Candidate	Votes for Other Candidates
Black 376 x .447 = 168	168 x .993 = 167	168 x .007 = 1
White 624 x .706 = <u>441</u>	441 x .312 = <u>138</u>	441 x .688 = <u>303</u>
609	305	304

blacks was 14.4%; for whites it was 8.4%. Marcus Williams, the African American candidate, received 99.4% of the black vote and 39.0% of the white vote. However, because black turnout was so much higher than white turnout (many white voters cast ballots in the Republican primary rather than the Democratic primary), Williams would have received over 77% of the vote (176 out of 228 votes) in a 50% BVAP district:

Black and White Voters	Black-Preferred Candidate Votes	White-Preferred Candidate Votes
Black 1000 x .144 = 144	144 x .994 = 143	144 x .006 = 1
White 1000 x .084 = <u>84</u>	84 x .390 = <u>33</u>	84 x .610 = <u>67</u>
228	176	52

Williams carried Alamance County, which has a 18.9% BVAP, with 51.1% of the vote and would have won the primary in any district with at least 11.5% BVAP under these conditions.

VII. Results of Analysis

Tables 3 through 22 report the results of my racial bloc voting analysis and, if the contest is racially polarized, indicate the percentage of vote a black-preferred candidate would receive in each House and Senate grouping of interest, given the turnout rates of blacks and whites and the degree of black cohesion and white crossover voting for each election, in a 50%, 45%, 40% and 35% black VAP district. Each table considers a different state House county grouping (Tables 3-15) or state Senate county grouping (Tables 16-19). In each table, the first column indicates the relevant election, the second column indicates either the BVAP of the House or Senate district (for state legislative elections) or the BVAP of the entire counties that comprise the county grouping (for the statewide elections analyzed). The third and fourth columns then reflect the race and share of the vote received by the candidate of choice of African Americans.

Of significance, the column with the headers “black voters: B-P” and “white voters: B-P” represent my calculations of the share of black voters and white voters who supported the black-preferred candidate (i.e. the “B-P” candidate) in that election. If the numbers in these columns are both greater than 50%, it means that voting in that particular election was not racially polarized because a majority of blacks and whites both supported the candidate of choice of

African Americans. The final column calculates that percent BVAP needed for the black-preferred candidate to have won the election if that election was racially polarized.¹⁹

In addition to analyzing polarized voting across each of the county groupings at issue, I also analyzed racially polarized voting within specific individual counties, including Forsyth County (Table 20) and Pitt County (Table 21). Moreover, I conducted a racial polarization analysis for Robeson County, but for Native Americans rather than African Americans (Table 22). For this analysis, I divided all voters into Native Americans and non-Native Americans and then analyzed whether and to what extent voting was polarized between these two groups.

VIII. Conclusion

My analysis of voting patterns by race in recent statewide and state legislative contests in select North Carolina state House and Senate county groupings indicates that a number of election contests were not racially polarized. When the election contest was polarized, I used the estimates of black and white turnout, and black and white votes for the black-preferred candidate to calculate the percent BVAP required for black voters to elect their preferred candidate in that election. The black percentage needed varies both by grouping – hence the importance of conducting a district-specific analysis – and the contest considered. In some county groupings such as Guilford, Cumberland, Forsyth-Yadkin, and Mecklenburg in the House, as well as Franklin-Wake, Davie-Forsyth, and Mecklenburg in the Senate, there are many elections that were not racially polarized because a majority of whites supported the candidate of choice of African Americans. Substantially greater white bloc voting was found in other county groupings.

¹⁹The column titled “actual vote of B-P candidate” represent the raw percentage of the vote received by that candidate as reported by the State Board of Elections, and not the share of the two-party vote.

Table 3

House District Alabama	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P Candidate	Actual vote for B-P candidate	Turnout rate for office		White votes		% of B-P votes received if have district OAS	% of B-P votes received if have district OAS	% of B-P votes received if have district OAS	% of B-P votes received if have district OAS	% of total votes for B-P candidate (just for AP)		
				B-P	Others	B-P	Others							
General elections														
2018														
State House 64		AA	42.2	24.5	96.7	3.3	55.7	38.2	61.8	56.1	53.7	51.5	49.4	36.5
2016														
2016 Treasurer		AA	40.5	44.7	99.3	0.7	70.6	31.2	68.8	57.6	54.4	51.4	48.5	37.6
2016 Treasurer		AA	43.2	43.2	99.9	0.1	68.1	34.5	65.5	59.9	56.8	53.9	51.2	32.9
2012														
2012 President		AA	42.7	46.0	99.5	0.5	67.4	33.1	66.9	60.0	56.9	53.9	50.9	33.3
2012 Treasurer		AA	43.3	45.3	99.9	0.1	65.2	33.9	66.1	61.0	57.8	54.8	51.9	31.7
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 64		AA	46.8	5.4	87.8	12.2	3.5	35.9	64.1	67.4	64.9	62.2	59.5	19.5
2016														
2016 Treasurer		AA	52.3	14.9	87.0	13.0	8.3	43.0	57.0	71.3	69.2	67.0	64.6	11.5
2016 Treasurer		AA	51.1	14.4	99.4	0.6	8.4	39.0	61.0	77.1	74.3	71.2	68.0	11.5
2016 Treasurer		AA	50.3	14.1	83.6	16.4	8.4	40.7	59.3	67.6	65.5	63.4	61.1	14.2
2016 Treasurer		AA	57.4	14.7	60.2	39.8	8.4	54.7	45.3	58.2	57.9	57.7	57.4	14.2
2012														
2012 Treasurer		AA	49.2	10.3	52.8	47.2	9.7	48.6	51.4	50.8	50.6	50.3	50.1	32.0
2012 Treasurer		AA	33.5	10.3	58.6	41.4	9.1	26.5	73.5	43.5	41.9	40.3	38.7	70.7

Table 4

House !rou%!"+, A"so" a"\$ 3"i0"	%ercent *lac- . AP of iurissitio"	race of B-P ca"\$ \$ate	actual vote for B-P ca"\$ \$ate	tur"out rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac-- %referre\$ ca"\$ \$ates				%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 501 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 401 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 351 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 251 *lac- .AP	
				*lac- votes	white votes	votes cast for office	all others					votes cast for office
General elections												
2018												
"0"e												
2016												
2016 t !over"or	16.5	AA	32.2	100.0	0.0	75.1	23.1	76.9	55.9	48.6	45.1	42.0
2016 #reasurer	16.5	AA	34.6	99.6	0.4	73.4	27.3	72.7	58.1	51.3	48.0	38.1
2014												
"0"e												
2012												
2012 Preside"t	16.5	AA	37.4	98.3	1.7	70.6	30.0	70.0	52.5	46.9	44.3	45.7
2012 t !over"or	16.5	AA	39.1	99.0	1.0	68.0	32.0	68.0	54.0	48.5	46.0	42.9
Democratic primaries												
2018												
"0"e												
2016												
2016 t !over"or	16.5	AA	40.8	87.4	12.6	6.2	10.6	89.4	71.1	68.4	61.8	22.1
2016 Att"ie"eral	16.5	AA	58.3	92.7	7.3	6.1	48.1	51.9	82.8	81.1	77.2	1.3
2016)o (of a*or	16.5	AA	55.3	22.9	63.5	5.9	49.7	50.3	60.7	60.2	59.7	0.6
2016 #reasurer	16.5	AA	56.5	19.4	84.3	15.7	5.9	47.6	75.7	74.4	72.8	2.1
2014												
"0"e												
2012												
2012 t !over"or	16.5	AA	47.2	25.0	63.2	4.6	34.7	65.3	58.8	58.0	55.9	17.6
2012)o (of a*or	16.5	AA	37.2	25.0	51.7	4.1	26.9	73.1	48.2	47.6	45.9	69.0

Table 6

House !rou%"+,)levela "\$ a "\$! asto "	%ercent *lac- . AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state	turnout rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac-- %referres ca "\$states						%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 50.1 *lac-. AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 40.1 *lac-. AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 35.1 *lac-. AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 43.5 46.5
				votes cast for office	*lac- votes	0hite votes		all others					
				votes cast for office	*lac- votes	votes cast for office	all others	B-P	others				
General elections													
2018													
State House 110	15.3	AA	32.2	29.5	95.7	4.3	52.7	27.8	72.2	52.2	49.1	46.3	43.5 46.5
State Senate 43	14.8	AA	33.8	20.8	100.0	0.0	29.8	26.4	73.6	56.7	53.2	49.8	46.5 40.3
2016													
2016 tlover"or	16.2	AA	31.8	37.1	99.6	0.4	63.9	23.1	76.9	51.2	47.7	44.4	41.3 48.3
2016 #reasurer	16.2	AA	36.0	37.2	99.6	0.4	61.8	27.0	73.0	54.3	51.0	47.8	44.8 43.5
2014													
"o"e													
2012													
2012 Preside"t	16.2	AA	37.6	45.7	99.8	0.2	59.7	28.1	71.9	59.2	55.7	52.3	49.0 36.5
2012 tlover"or	16.2	AA	39.1	43.7	100.0	0.0	57.9	30.0	70.0	60.1	56.7	53.4	50.2 34.6
Democratic primaries													
2018													
"o"e													
2016													
2016 tlover"or	16.2	AA	44.4	17.7	81.4	18.6	4.5	23.5	76.5	69.7	67.7	65.4	62.8 17.7
2016 At"le"eral	16.2	AA	57.5	17.7	95.5	4.5	4.4	29.6	70.4	82.4	80.1	77.6	74.7 10.0
2016 o((of a*or	16.2	AA	53.8	17.3	64.3	35.7	4.3	49.7	50.3	61.4	60.9	60.3	59.7 0.5
2016 #reasurer	16.2	AA	52.6	17.3	59.5	40.5	4.4	47.2	52.8	57.0	56.6	56.1	55.6 7.0
2014													
"o"e													
2012													
2012 tlover"or	16.2	AA	59.0	13.6	55.1	44.9	7.5	58.8	41.2	56.4	56.6	56.8	57.0 "ot%olarit&e\$
2012 o((of a*or	16.2	AA	32.0	12.8	40.8	59.2	7.0	31.3	68.7	37.4	37.0	36.5	36.0 "o clear B-P ca "\$

Table 7

House (*us "Pe"Ser a "\$ To*eso "	AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$State	actual vote for B-P ca "\$State	turnout rate for office a "\$ %erce"t vote for *lac-				all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others	all others
				*lac- votes	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	votes cast for office															
General elections																						
2018																						
State House 46	24.7	AA	36.7	27.0	82.3	17.7	36.3	26.3	73.7	50.2	47.5	44.9	42.3	49.7								
State Se"ate 13	26.4	AA	37.5	30.5	88.3	11.7	34.7	20.8	79.2	52.4	49.0	45.7	42.5	46.4								
2016																						
2016 tlover"or	24.5	AA	43.0	48.4	92.4	7.6	47.5	28.0	72.0	60.5	57.3	54.1	50.8	33.7								
2016 #reasurer	24.5	AA	47.0	45.8	94.1	5.9	47.1	33.9	66.1	63.6	60.6	57.6	54.6	27.3								
2014																						
"o"e																						
2012																						
2012 Pres\$e"t	24.5	AA	49.9	63.9	93.8	6.2	46.3	36.6	63.4	69.8	66.9	64.0	61.0	18.1								
2012 tlover"or	24.5	AA	57.4	61.8	99.6	0.4	44.7	46.0	54.0	77.1	74.4	71.7	68.9	5.5								
Democratic primaries																						
2018																						
State Se"ate 13	26.4	AA	69.2	11.3	94.4	5.6	5.4	52.3	47.7	80.8	78.9	76.8	74.6	"ot%olaries\$								
2016																						
2016 tlover"or	24.5	AA	41.5	12.8	59.8	40.2	8.7	31.5	68.5	48.3	47.0	45.5	44.0	56.2								
2016 At"ie"eral	24.5	AA	60.1	12.7	86.3	13.7	8.8	46.5	53.5	70.0	68.0	66.0	63.9	6.3								
2016)o (of a"or	24.5	AA	38.5	12.9	51.6	48.4	8.7	32.6	67.4	43.9	43.0	42.0	41.0	88.0								
2016 #reasurer	24.5	AA	64.8	12.9	81.5	18.5	8.7	52.7	47.3	69.9	68.5	67.0	65.5	"ot%olaries\$								
2014																						
State Se"ate 13	26.4	AA	27.3	20.3	46.5	53.5	12.8	19.3	80.7	36.0	34.7	33.3	31.8	4 ca"\$s" o clear B-P ca"\$								
2012																						
tlover"or	24.5	AA	50.5	25.6	54.5	45.5	12.0	50.2	49.8	53.1	52.9	52.7	52.5	"ot%olaries\$								
)o (of a"or	24.5	AA	27.9	21.6	39.7	60.3	11.5	26.8	73.2	35.2	34.6	34.0	33.3	"o clear B-P ca"\$								

Table 8A

House (row) (+,) u (*erla "\$	%ercent *lac-. AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac--				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$ ca "\$ 0ouls\$				
				*lac- votes		White votes									
				votes cast for office	B-P others	votes cast for office	B-P others								
General elections															
2018															
State House 42	42.2	AA	76.1	100.0	0.0	37.8	56.8	43.2	79.1	76.9	74.7	72.5	72.5	72.5	72.5
State House 43	50.0	AA	74.1	99.3	0.7	36.8	50.1	49.9	74.6	72.1	69.7	67.2	67.2	67.2	67.2
2016															
2016 t ! over"or	37.1	AA	55.8	99.5	0.5	60.2	32.7	67.3	62.1	58.8	55.7	52.6	52.6	52.6	30.8
2016 #treasurer	37.1	AA	58.0	99.9	0.1	58.9	36.6	63.4	64.8	61.7	58.7	55.7	55.7	55.7	25.1
State Se "ate 19	22.5	AA	43.6	83.8	16.2	57.4	29.4	70.6	54.3	51.6	49.0	46.4	46.4	46.4	42.0
2014															
"o"e															
2012															
2012 Preside"t	37.1	AA	59.5	99.9	0.1	55.8	39.7	60.3	69.8	66.8	63.8	60.7	60.7	60.7	17.1
2012 t ! over"or	37.1	AA	61.6	99.6	0.4	54.3	42.4	57.6	71.3	68.4	65.6	62.7	62.7	62.7	13.0

Table 8B

House (row) +) u (*erla"\$	%ercent *lac- . AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$State	actual vote for B-P ca "\$State	turnout rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac-		%ercent vote for *lac-		%ercent vote for *lac-		%ercent vote for *lac-		%ercent *lac- . AP (ust e/cees for B-P ca "\$State b 0!"		
				*lac- votes	Ohie votes	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	votes cast for office			
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 43	50	AA	79.2	7.3	94.4	5.6	6.8	65.0	35.0	80.2	78.7	77.3	75.8	" of %olarikes\$ " of %olarikes\$
2016														
2016 ti over"or	37.1	AA	59.1	15.4	72.1	27.9	9.9	48.6	51.4	62.9	61.8	60.6	59.3	" of %olarikes\$ 1st choice sa (e
2016 Att" i e"eral	37.1	AA	66.7	15.3	90.7	9.3	9.8	43.2	56.8	72.2	69.8	67.4	64.9	9.7
2016)o (of a*or	37.1	AA	46.0	15.4	63.1	36.9	9.8	34.8	65.2	52.1	50.7	49.3	47.8	42.5
2016 #reasurer	37.1	AA	52.3	15.3	74.5	25.5	11.0	39.2	60.8	59.7	58.0	56.2	54.3	24.1
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 ti over"or	37.1	AA	70.7	11.9	73.5	26.5	12.8	68.5	31.5	70.9	70.7	70.4	70.2	" of %olarikes\$
2012)o (of a*or	37.1	AA	42.8	11.5	43.7	56.3	10.0	42.2	57.8	43.0	42.9	42.9	42.8	" of %olarikes\$ 1st choice sa (e

Table 9

House /rou%"+, 4u%lf" a "\$ 8 " slo0	%ercent *lac- . AP of jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$ \$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$ \$state	turnout rate for office a "\$ %ercent "t vote for *lac- %referre\$ ca "\$ \$states						%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 50.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 40.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 35.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as 41.9 45.0	
				*lac- votes		0hite votes		all others	all others					
				votes cast for office	B-P others	votes cast for office	B-P others							
General elections														
2018														
State House 4	22.6	AA	34.9	29.7	99.0	1.0	34.1	15.1	84.9	54.2	50.0	45.9	41.9	45.0
2016														
2016 tlover"or	18.5	AA	33.5	32.4	99.2	0.8	53.3	18.0	82.0	48.7	45.0	41.4	38.0	51.7
2016 #reasurer	18.5	AA	35.7	32.1	99.6	0.4	51.2	21.1	78.9	51.4	47.7	44.2	40.9	48.2
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 Preside"t	18.5	AA	38.3	47.6	98.7	1.3	47.0	22.7	77.3	60.9	57.1	53.3	49.5	35.6
2012 tlover"or	18.5	AA	41.9	46.1	97.3	2.7	44.9	28.0	72.0	63.1	59.6	56.2	52.7	31.2
Democratic primaries														
2018														
2016														
2016 tlover"or	18.5	AA	46.7	11.1	91.4	8.6	4.9	32.5	67.5	73.4	70.8	67.9	64.9	15.7
2016 At" le"eral	18.5	AA	64.6	11.0	92.8	7.2	4.6	43.4	56.6	78.2	76.1	73.8	71.2	6.1
2016)o((of a*or	18.5	AA	51.0	11.1	71.5	28.5	4.6	46.0	54.0	64.0	62.9	61.7	60.4	7.2
2016 #reasurer	18.5	AA	54.9	11.2	94.9	5.1	4.6	41.9	58.1	79.5	77.2	74.7	72.0	6.9
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 tlover"or	18.5	AA	52.2	19.3	59.9	40.1	4.8	47.6	52.4	57.5	57.0	56.6	56.0	5.7
2012)o((of a*or	18.5	AA	24.8	18.9	39.8	60.2	4.2	28.5	71.5	37.7	37.4	37.0	36.5	"o clear B-P ca "\$

Table 10

House	Year	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	*lac- votes		White votes		% of total votes received if B-P	% of total votes received if B-P	% of total votes received if B-P	% of total votes received if B-P	% of total votes received if B-P		
				all	others	all	others							
House 100	2018	AA	72.7	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6	71.3	70.1	100.0
State House 71	2018	AA	72.7	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6	71.3	70.1	100.0
State House 72	2018	AA	79.1	31.8	99.6	0.4	49.4	69.6	30.4	81.3	79.9	78.6	77.3	100.0
State Senate 32	2018	AA	72.9	28.5	99.2	0.8	50.5	65.0	35.0	77.3	75.8	74.3	73.0	100.0
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	48.2	40.5	99.3	0.7	70.9	29.1	70.9	54.6	51.5	48.5	45.6	42.6
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	47.7	40.1	99.5	0.5	69.6	28.2	71.8	54.3	51.0	48.0	45.1	43.3
State House 71	2012	AA	76.6	25.8	99.3	0.7	39.6	62.6	37.4	77.1	75.4	73.7	72.1	100.0
2012 President	2012	AA	50.6	48.9	98.8	1.2	47.0	32.7	67.3	66.4	63.1	59.8	56.4	25.4
2012 Treasurer	2012	AA	50.9	46.4	98.5	1.5	44.9	34.3	65.7	66.9	63.7	60.5	57.3	23.9
Democratic primaries														
2018	2018													
2016	2016													
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	55.6	14.6	81.3	18.7	11.4	44.3	55.7	65.1	63.2	61.3	59.4	100.0
2016 Attorney General	2016	AA	45.1	14.5	66.2	33.8	11.0	38.0	62.0	54.0	52.6	51.2	49.7	36.0
2016 Treasurer	2016	AA	60.5	14.0	84.0	16.0	11.3	52.0	48.0	69.7	68.1	66.5	64.8	100.0
2014	2014	AA	59.1	14.6	71.1	28.9	10.5	53.2	46.8	63.6	62.7	61.8	60.9	100.0
2012	2012	AA	58.2	16.1	75.3	24.7	9.3	50.8	49.2	66.3	65.2	63.9	62.6	100.0
2012 Treasurer	2012	AA	38.9	15.1	51.6	48.4	8.9	33.5	66.5	44.9	44.0	43.1	42.1	85.9

Table 11

House / Governor / Treasurer / State House / State / Democratic primaries	Year	% of total votes for B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office				% of total votes for B-P		% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P	% of total votes for B-P
				all	B-P	others	votes cast for office	all	others							
General elections																
2018																
State House 25	40.7	AA	51.5	35.4	98.1	1.9	64.2	34.2	65.8	56.9	54.1	51.4	48.8	37.3		
2016																
2016 Governor	33.0	AA	46.5	51.3	99.9	0.1	70.5	24.0	76.0	56.0	52.3	48.8	45.4	41.7		
2016 Treasurer	33.0	AA	48.7	53.5	100.0	0.0	68.3	26.8	73.2	59.0	55.4	51.9	48.5	37.2		
State House 7	50.7	AA	67.8	52.9	99.5	0.5	68.3	44.8	55.2	68.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	11.9		
State House 25	16.1	AA	31.9	53.8	84.6	15.4	62.8	20.8	79.2	50.2	47.1	44.0	40.9	49.6		
2014																
2014 Governor																
2012																
2012 President	33.0	AA	48.6	53.8	99.1	0.9	64.4	26.6	73.4	59.6	56.0	52.5	49.1	36.3		
2012 Governor	33.0	AA	51.2	52.5	99.1	0.9	62.8	30.3	69.7	61.6	58.2	54.9	51.7	32.4		
Democratic primaries																
2018																
2018 Governor																
2016																
2016 Governor	33.0	AA	66.5	17.4	94.9	5.1	8.6	35.7	64.3	75.3	72.6	69.7	66.6	13.6		
2016 Treasurer	33.0	AA	39.5	17.9	63.1	36.9	8.1	29.5	70.5	52.6	51.1	49.5	47.8	41.5		
2016 Governor (of a*)	33.0	AA	74.8	17.0	72.5	27.5	8.8	75.7	24.3	73.6	73.7	73.9	74.1	14.0		
2016 Treasurer	33.0	AA	65.1	17.7	88.0	12.0	8.7	37.4	62.6	71.3	69.0	66.5	63.9	14.0		
2014																
2014 Governor																
2012																
2012 Governor	33.0	AA	58.2	16.8	68.3	31.7	10.3	50.8	49.2	61.6	60.8	59.9	59.0	95.9		
2012 Governor (of a*)	33.0	AA	36.2	16.0	50.8	49.2	9.7	19.1	80.9	38.8	37.3	35.7	34.0	95.9		

Table 12A

House district	Year	Race of B-P candidate	Actual vote for B-P candidate	Turnout rate for office at %		White votes		% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 50.1% of total votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 45.1% of total votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 40.1% of total votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 35.1% of total votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 30.1% of total votes		
				B-P	Others	B-P	Others							
General elections														
2018														
State House 58		AA	76.8	38.0	99.4	0.6	47.8	62.8	37.2	79.0	77.2	75.5	73.8	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 30.1% of total votes
State House 60		AA	69.0	35.2	98.9	1.1	52.5	57.1	42.9	73.9	71.9	70.0	68.2	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 30.1% of total votes
State Senate 28		AA	75.3	34.9	99.2	0.8	58.0	64.5	35.5	77.5	75.9	74.4	73.0	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 30.1% of total votes
2016														
2016 Governor		AA	56.6	44.1	98.7	1.3	78.4	42.8	57.2	62.9	60.4	58.0	55.8	20.8
2016 Treasurer		AA	57.6	42.1	99.3	0.7	76.9	44.9	55.1	64.1	61.7	59.4	57.3	15.9
State Senate 28		AA	83.9	59.7	99.4	0.6	59.7	62.3	37.7	80.9	79.0	77.1	75.3	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received 30.1% of total votes
2014														
State House 61		AA	32.8	38.1	98.6	1.4	63.8	24.3	75.7	52.1	48.7	45.5	42.4	47.0
2012														
2012 President		AA	57.8	49.6	99.9	0.1	76.4	43.7	56.3	65.8	63.2	60.7	58.3	16.3
2012 Governor		AA	58.0	47.3	100.0	0.0	74.0	44.3	55.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	58.6	15.1

Table 12B

House / Governor / Lieutenant Governor	% of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P	Actual vote for B-P	Turnout rate for office				% of votes received if have B-P	% of votes received if have B-P	% of votes received if have B-P	% of votes received if have B-P
				*lac- votes		White votes					
				votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office				
Democratic primaries											
2018											
State House 58	42.7	AA	80.2	10.0	98.4	1.6	7.3	65.2	34.8	84.4	
2016											
2016 Governor	32.1	AA	57.9	19.2	71.8	28.2	13.5	49.2	50.8	62.5	
2016 Attorney General	32.1	AA	54.6	18.9	86.5	13.5	13.2	38.3	61.7	66.7	
2016 Lieutenant Governor	32.1	AA	61.3	18.9	78.5	21.5	12.3	49.6	50.4	67.1	
2016 Treasurer	32.1	AA	54.3	18.4	63.7	36.3	12.5	46.2	53.8	56.6	
State House 58	51.1	AA	71.5	15.3	89.4	10.6	10.4	52.3	47.7	74.4	
2014											
State House 58	51.1	AA	42.6	12.2	59.4	40.6	7.2	16.8	83.2	43.6	
State House 60	51.4	AA	54.2	9.9	66.5	33.5	4.9	32.7	67.3	55.3	
State Senate 28	56.5	AA	59.4	12.1	71.4	34.1	6.0	34.7	65.3	57.1	
2012											
2012 Governor	32.1	AA	58.6	14.6	66.5	33.5	12.4	54.3	45.7	60.9	
2012 Lieutenant Governor	32.1	AA	39.2	13.7	52.6	47.4	10.6	30.9	69.1	43.1	

Table 13

House (row 1, e"oir a"\$ Pit	%ercent *lac- . AP of Jurisdiction	race of B-P ca"\$ State	actual vote for B-P ca"\$ State	turnout rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac- %refer\$ ca"\$ Sales		*lac- votes		0thie votes		%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 50 1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 45 1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 40 1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 35 1 *lac- . AP	%ercent *lac- . AP (ust el/ce\$ for B-P ca"\$ State to 0")
				votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
General elections														
2018														
State House 8	44.9	AA	64.7	26.7	98.3	1.7	56.2	46.8	53.2	63.4	61.2	59.2	57.3	12.2
State House 9	20.5	AA	40.0	20.1	86.1	13.9	57.6	33.1	66.9	46.8	44.9	43.1	41.5	57.3
State House 12	37.4	AA	43.9	27.0	96.6	3.4	45.8	24.9	75.1	51.5	48.2	45.1	42.2	47.7
2016														
2016 tlover"or	34.2	AA	50.2	39.4	97.9	2.1	65.1	42.8	57.2	63.6	61.0	58.6	56.3	19.9
2016 #reasurer	34.2	AA	52.6	38.8	98.6	1.4	63.2	44.9	55.1	65.3	62.9	60.5	58.2	14.6
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 Preside"t	34.2	AA	52.3	52.3	99.0	1.0	60.6	30.7	69.3	62.3	59.0	55.6	52.4	31.3
2012 tlover"or	34.2	AA	52.9	51.6	98.6	1.4	59.3	32.0	68.0	63.0	59.7	56.5	53.2	29.9
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 8	44.9	AA	50.0	7.4	55.3	44.7	4.4	43.0	57.0	50.7	50.1	49.5	48.8	44.0
2016														
2016 tlover"or	34.2	AA	53.6	17.2	73.7	26.3	7.8	34.2	65.8	61.4	59.6	57.7	55.6	23.2
2016 Att"ie"eral	34.2	AA	61.1	16.5	86.9	13.1	7.2	32.5	67.5	70.4	68.0	65.4	62.5	17.1
2016 o (of a *or	34.2	.	46.5	16.7	55.6	44.4	7.7	38.0	62.0	50.0	49.3	48.4	47.5	49.7
2016 #reasurer	34.2	AA	54.6	16.5	53.6	46.4	7.2	52.7	47.3	53.3	53.3	53.2	53.2	ot%olar%e\$
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 tlover"or	34.2	AA	61.1	18.1	69.2	30.8	10.2	52.3	47.7	63.1	62.3	61.5	60.6	ot%olar%e\$
2012 o (of a *or	34.2	AA	29.9	18.0	35.2	64.8	9.5	26.1	73.9	32.1	31.6	31.2	30.7	o clear B-P ca"\$

Table 14A

House !rou%"+, 5ec-le"*ur+	%ercent *lac- . AP of jurisdiction	race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state				turnout rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac- %referre\$ ca "\$states				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls have receives\$ if \$istrict 0as 50.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls have receives\$ if \$istrict 0as 40.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls have receives\$ if \$istrict 0as 35.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls have receives\$ if \$istrict 0as (ust e/cees\$ for B-P ca "\$state to 0i"
			*lac- votes		0 hite votes		*lac- votes		0 hite votes					
			votes cast for office	B-P others	all cast for office	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	B-P others	votes cast for office	votes cast for office				
General elections														
2018														
State House 92	30.2	AA	70.0	26.4	98.3	1.7	65.5	63.2	36.8	73.3	71.9	70.6	69.5	"ot %olarie\$
State House 99	49.5	AA	82.4	42.9	98.0	2.0	51.4	66.8	33.2	81.0	79.5	78.0	76.5	"ot %olarie\$
State House 101	50.8	AA	78.7	34.5	98.5	1.5	62.4	61.3	38.7	74.5	72.9	71.3	69.8	"ot %olarie\$
State House 104	6.2	AA	51.8	20.0	99.6	0.4	64.5	51.9	48.1	63.2	61.6	60.1	58.7	"ot %olarie\$
State House 106	38.0	AA	80.6	28.1	99.0	1.0	55.8	72.6	27.4	81.4	80.3	79.2	78.2	"ot %olarie\$
State Se"ate 40	38.9	AA	75.6	20.8	99.3	0.7	59.1	63.3	36.7	72.7	71.3	70.1	69.0	"ot %olarie\$
2016														
2016 tlover"or	30.2	AA	58.4	39.9	98.5	1.5	78.1	46.1	53.9	63.8	61.5	59.4	57.4	"ot %olarie\$
2016 #reasurer	30.2	AA	58.4	42.2	99.0	1.0	74.6	47.9	52.1	66.4	64.1	61.9	59.8	7.0
State House 92	18.2	AA	54.4	39.8	96.1	3.9	56.6	45.2	54.8	66.2	63.8	61.4	59.2	12.9
State House 101	51.3	AA	76.0	50.7	99.2	0.8	69.1	53.6	46.4	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5	"ot %olarie\$
State House 105	9.5	AA	44.7	42.3	97.5	2.5	63.2	41.1	58.9	63.7	61.1	58.5	56.0	21.9
State Se"ate 38	52.5	AA	79.1	45.4	98.7	1.3	61.9	57.9	42.1	75.2	73.2	71.3	69.5	"ot %olarie\$
State Se"ate 40	51.8	AA	82.5	53.8	98.5	1.5	42.6	56.1	43.9	79.8	77.6	75.5	73.3	"ot %olarie\$
2014														
State House 92	18.2	AA	47.5	26.9	95.2	4.8	33.8	36.7	63.3	62.6	59.8	57.0	54.2	27.0
State House 106	51.1	AA	86.6	30.8	89.2	10.8	30.1	78.6	21.4	84.0	83.4	82.9	82.4	"ot %olarie\$
State Se"ate 38	52.5	AA	79.7	31.6	99.2	0.8	35.2	60.4	39.6	78.8	76.8	74.9	73.0	"ot %olarie\$
State Se"ate 41	13.2	AA	39.5	25.5	98.5	1.5	49.9	34.4	65.6	56.1	53.3	50.7	48.2	38.6
2012														
2012 Preste"it	30.2	AA	60.8	43.4	98.7	1.3	73.9	51.9	48.1	69.2	67.1	65.1	63.1	"ot %olarie\$
2012 tlover"or	30.2	AA	59.8	42.9	99.9	0.1	70.7	50.1	49.9	68.9	66.6	64.4	62.4	"ot %olarie\$

Table 14B

House District 5-cir-UR+	Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca	Actual vote for B-P ca	Turnout rate for office a		White votes		% of B-P ca		% of B-P ca		% of B-P ca		% of total
				votes cast for office	B-P others	votes cast for office	B-P others	received if have	received if have	received if have	received if have			
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 99	AA	57.3	9.8	73.8	26.2	5.9	44.2	55.8	62.7	61.3	59.8	58.2	12.8	
State House 101	AA	50.0	7.8	60.2	39.8	6.5	39.4	61.5	50.5	49.5	48.4	47.3	47.4	
State House 106	AA	88.9	9.4	91.3	8.7	7.5	85.2	14.8	88.6	88.3	88.0	87.7	10.0	
State Seate 38	8	51.9	12.1	60.3	39.7	5.4	32.6	67.4	51.8	50.5	49.2	47.7	43.0	
2016														
2016 Governor	AA	55.2	19.8	65.2	34.8	11.0	48.6	51.4	59.3	58.5	57.7	56.8	10.0	
2016 Attorney General	AA	56.7	19.6	86.6	13.4	10.9	31.8	68.2	67.0	64.4	61.7	58.8	21.7	
2016 Governor	AA	57.0	16.9	75.7	24.3	11.2	46.8	53.2	64.2	62.8	61.3	59.8	7.6	
2016 Treasurer	AA	52.7	19.0	59.6	40.4	10.7	47.1	52.9	55.1	54.5	53.9	53.2	14.5	
State House 101	AA	78.6	14.1	92.5	7.5	9.1	50.3	49.7	75.9	73.9	71.7	69.5	10.0	
State House 107	AA	90.1	26.0	93.4	6.6	10.5	85.7	14.3	91.2	90.9	90.5	90.1	10.0	
State Seate 38	AA	52.1	18.9	54.3	45.7	13.1	48.6	51.4	52.0	51.7	51.4	51.1	18.4	
State Seate 40	AA	64.7	19.3	66.7	33.3	9.1	63.2	36.8	65.6	65.4	65.3	65.1	10.0	
2014														
State Seate 40	AA	41.9	10.1	48.5	51.5	6.1	27.5	72.5	40.6	39.6	38.5	37.4	10.0	
2012														
2012 Governor	AA	67.6	11.7	61.5	38.5	9.2	70.3	29.7	65.4	65.8	66.3	66.7	10.0	
2012 Governor	AA	40.7	11.7	54.3	45.7	7.2	30.5	69.5	45.2	44.1	42.9	41.6	73.6	

Table 15A

House ! rou%!" , ; a-e	%ercent *lac- . AP of Juris\$ictio"	race of B-P ca"\$ \$ate	actual vote for B-P ca"\$ \$ate	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac-- %referre\$ ca"\$ \$ates				%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca"\$ \$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as *lac- . AP (ust e/cees\$ for B-P ca"\$ \$ate to 0!"						
				*lac- votes		0hite votes										
				votes cast for office	B-P	others	votes cast for office				B-P	others				
General elections																
2018																
State House 33	44.2	AA	78.7	49.7	100.0	0.0	49.3	63.2	36.8	81.7	79.8	76.1	78.0	76.1	76.1	" ot %olar!ke\$
State House 37	14.3	AA	49.9	30.4	99.2	0.8	67.3	46.7	53.3	63.0	60.9	57.0	58.9	57.0	57.0	12.9
State House 38	48.3	AA	81.9	31.5	99.1	0.9	65.4	69.4	30.6	79.1	77.8	75.5	76.6	75.5	75.5	" ot %olar!ke\$
State Se"ate 14	38.9	AA	71.4	32.0	99.2	0.8	67.9	63.3	36.7	74.8	73.3	70.6	71.9	70.6	70.6	" ot %olar!ke\$
2016																
2016 tlover"or	20.7	AA	54.7	56.9	98.6	1.4	67.8	46.2	53.8	70.1	67.5	62.5	65.0	62.5	62.5	" ot %olar!ke\$
2016 #reasurer	20.7	AA	56.1	61.1	99.2	0.8	65.3	48.3	51.7	72.9	70.4	65.4	67.9	65.4	65.4	3.6
State House 38	51.4	AA	84.8	42.1	96.9	3.1	50.9	73.8	26.2	84.3	83.1	80.9	82.0	80.9	80.9	" ot %olar!ke\$
2014																
State House 33	51.4	AA	87.3	37.0	99.3	0.7	50.0	75.4	24.6	85.6	84.4	82.2	83.3	82.2	82.2	" ot %olar!ke\$
State Se"ate 38	51.4	AA	79.9	43.9	99.1	0.9	43.2	66.5	33.5	82.9	81.3	78.0	79.7	78.0	78.0	" ot %olar!ke\$
2012																
2012 Preside"t	20.7	AA	55.1	41.6	99.3	0.7	70.7	47.0	53.0	66.4	64.0	59.6	61.7	59.6	59.6	9.4
2012 tlover"or	20.7	AA	55.3	39.8	99.7	0.3	68.7	47.3	52.7	66.5	64.2	59.8	61.9	59.8	59.8	8.6

Table 15B

House (row) (of state)	Percentage of AP of jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca	actual vote for B-P ca	turnout rate for office a		White votes		Percentage of vote B-P ca have received if district Oas .AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca have received if district Oas .AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca have received if district Oas .AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca have received if district Oas .AP	Percentage of vote B-P ca have received if district Oas .AP		
				*fac- votes	votes cast for office	votes cast for office	B-P others							
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 33	44.2	AA	60.2	11.7	61.8	38.2	8.4	58.9	41.1	60.6	60.4	60.3	60.1	" of %olarikes\$
2016														
2016 (over)	20.7	AA	60.3	22.4	82.2	17.8	17.8	51.4	48.6	68.6	67.0	65.5	63.8	" of %olarikes\$
2016 (over)	20.7	AA	35.0	22.0	60.4	39.6	17.8	28.4	71.6	46.1	44.5	42.9	41.2	62.7
2016 (of a*)	20.7	AA	72.2	18.8	72.1	27.9	21.9	74.7	25.3	73.5	73.6	73.8	73.9	" of %olarikes\$
2016 #reaser	20.7	AA	63.2	19.9	89.2	10.8	20.7	52.9	47.1	70.7	68.9	67.1	65.3	" of %olarikes\$
State House 33	51.4	AA	64.1	18.5	80.6	19.4	17.7	54.3	45.7	67.7	66.4	65.1	63.8	" of %olarikes\$
2014														
" o" e														
2012														
2012 (over)	20.7	AA	59.7	19.4	68.0	32.0	16.6	53.7	46.3	61.4	60.7	60.0	59.2	" of %olarikes\$
2012 (of a*)	20.7	AA	37.9	19.2	54.1	45.9	13.6	31.3	68.7	44.6	43.5	42.4	41.1	76.4

Table 16A

Se"ate ! rou%!" , Ala (a "ce' ! uilfor\$' a "\$ 7 a "\$o!%h	%ercent *lac- . AP of jurisdiction"	race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac- -- % referre\$ ca "\$states						%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou!\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as \$lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou!\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as \$lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou!\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as \$lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou!\$ have received\$ if \$istrict 0as \$lac- . AP	
				*lac- votes		0hite votes		all others	B-P					others
				votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office							
General elections 2018														
State House 64 -Ala (a "ce>	18.5	AA	42.2	24.5	96.7	3.3	55.7	38.2	61.8	56.1	53.7	51.5	49.4	36.5
State House 58 - ! uilfor\$>	42.7	AA	76.8	38.0	99.4	0.6	47.8	62.8	37.2	79.0	77.2	75.5	73.8	"ot %olar!&\$
State House 60 - ! uilfor\$>	40.1	AA	69.0	35.2	98.9	1.1	52.5	57.1	42.9	73.9	71.9	70.0	68.2	"ot %olar!&\$
State Se"ate 28 - ! uilfor\$>	43.6	AA	75.3	34.9	99.2	0.8	58.0	64.5	35.5	77.5	75.9	74.4	73.0	"ot %olar!&\$
<i>insert</i>														
2016														
2016 t l over" or	24.8	AA	47.8	43.6	96.6	3.4	72.2	38.1	61.9	60.1	57.4	54.9	52.5	29.7
2016 #treasurer	24.8	AA	49.2	43.8	99.5	0.5	70.1	42.3	57.7	64.3	61.6	59.1	56.7	19.9
State Se"ate 28 - ! uilfor\$>	56.5	AA	83.9	59.7	99.4	0.6	59.7	62.3	37.7	80.9	79.0	77.1	75.3	"ot %olar!&\$
2014														
State House 61 - ! uilfor\$>	15.3	AA	32.8	38.1	98.6	1.4	63.8	24.3	75.7	52.1	48.7	45.5	42.4	47.0
2012														
2012 Pres!&e"t	24.8	AA	49.8	45.0	99.2	0.8	67.8	40.0	60.0	63.6	60.8	58.2	55.6	23.4
2012 t l over" or	24.8	AA	50.2	43.5	98.4	1.6	66.9	43.5	56.5	65.1	62.6	60.1	57.7	17.1

Table 16B

Se "ate i rou%" +, Ala (a "ce" i uilfor\$ a "\$ 7a" \$o%h	%erce"t *lac- . AP of Juris\$ictio"	race of B-P ca "\$ \$ate	actual vote for B-P ca "\$ \$ate	tur" out rate for office a "\$ %erce" vote for *lac- %referre\$ ca "\$ \$ates				%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 501 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 451 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 401 *lac- .AP	%erce"t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict Oas 351 *lac- .AP	%erce"t *lac- .AP (ust/e/ce\$ for B-P ca "\$ \$ate to 0)"		
				*lac- votes	White votes	votes cast for office	all others						votes cast for office	all others
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 64 = Ala (a "ce)	18.5	AA	46.8	5.4	87.8	12.2	3.5	35.9	64.1	67.4	64.9	62.2	59.5	19.5
State House 58 = i uilfor\$)	42.7	AA	80.2	10.0	98.4	1.6	7.3	65.2	34.8	84.4	82.7	81.0	79.3	"ot %olar&\$
2016														
2016 ti over"or	24.8	AA	56.0	21.2	74.6	25.4	11.2	47.0	53.0	65.1	63.8	62.4	60.9	"ot %olar&\$
2016 Att" i e"eral	24.8	AA	53.1	20.9	87.9	12.1	10.9	38.5	61.5	71.0	68.7	66.2	63.6	13.7
2016)o ((of a *or	24.8	AA	58.8	20.6	79.5	20.5	10.3	49.5	50.5	69.5	68.1	66.6	65.1	0.8
2016 #treasurer	24.8	AA	54.2	20.5	61.3	38.7	10.5	54.3	45.7	58.9	58.6	58.3	57.9	"ot %olar&\$
State House 58 = i uilfor\$)	51.1	AA	71.5	15.3	89.4	10.6	10.4	52.3	47.7	74.4	72.6	70.7	68.7	"ot %olar&\$
2014														
State House 58 = i uilfor\$)	51.1	AA	42.6	12.2	59.4	40.6	7.2	16.8	83.2	43.6	41.5	39.4	37.1	67.6
State House 60 = i uilfor\$)	51.4	AA	54.2	9.9	66.5	33.5	4.9	32.7	67.3	55.3	53.8	52.1	50.3	34.2
State Se"ate 28 = i uilfor\$)	56.5	AA	59.4	12.1	71.4	34.1	6.0	34.7	65.3	57.1	55.6	54.0	52.3	28.9
2012														
2012 ti over"or	24.8	AA	56.7	16.9	66.7	33.3	9.8	52.1	47.9	61.3	60.6	59.9	59.1	"ot %olar&\$
2012)o ((of a *or	24.8	AA	36.8	15.7	54.4	45.6	8.4	27.8	72.2	45.1	43.9	42.6	41.1	73.0

Table 17

Se"ate !rou%"+, 4avie a"\$9ors6th	%ercent *lac-. AP of jurissitio"	race of P-P ca "\$sate	actual vote for B-P ca "\$sate	tur" out rate for office a "\$%ercent vote for *lac-- %referr\$ ca "\$sates				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 50.1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 40.1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if istrict 0as 35.1 *lac- .AP (ust \$sate to 0)"
				*lac- votes	votes cast for office	B-P others	white votes			
General elections										
2018										
State House 71 =9ors6th	36.6	AA 72.7	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6
State House 72 =9ors6th	47.5	AA 79.1	31.8	99.6	0.4	49.4	69.6	30.4	81.3	79.9
State Se"ate 32 =9ors6th	39.2	AA 72.9	28.5	99.2	0.8	50.5	65.0	35.0	77.3	75.8
2016										
2016 t !over" or	23.8	AA 48.2	32.6	99.4	0.6	72.9	34.8	65.2	54.8	52.1
2016 #reasurer	23.8	AA 41.2	29.9	100.0	0.0	71.2	34.3	66.7	53.7	51.1
2014										
State House 71	45.5	AA 76.6	25.8	99.3	0.7	39.6	62.6	37.4	77.1	75.4
2012										
2012 Preside"t	23.8	AA 50.5	47.8	99.3	0.7	69.8	40.6	59.4	64.5	61.7
2012 t !over" or	23.8	AA 50.7	46.4	99.1	0.9	69.5	42.3	57.7	65.0	62.4
Democratic primaries										
2018										
"o"e										
2016										
2016 t !over" or	23.8	AA 55.6	20.0	79.9	20.1	11.4	45.2	54.8	67.3	65.7
2016 Alt" le"eral	23.8	AA 45.0	20.9	68.9	31.1	11.1	36.3	63.7	57.6	56.1
2016)o (of a*or	23.8	AA 60.3	19.1	84.7	15.3	10.6	51.2	48.8	72.7	71.2
2016 #reasurer	23.8	AA 59.1	20.5	70.5	29.5	10.6	53.6	46.4	64.7	64.0
2014										
"o"e										
2012										
2012 t !over" or	23.8	AA 58.5	16.1	76.5	23.5	10.4	51.8	48.2	66.8	65.6
2012)o (of a*or	23.8	AA 39.3	15.1	47.9	52.1	8.9	35.8	64.2	43.4	42.8

Table 18A

Se "ate i rou%"+, 4U%!!" Har"ett"oh"so"t" ee' <ash" a"\$ Sa (%so"	Jurisdiction		Race of B-P ca "\$State		Actual vote for B-P ca "\$State		Turnout rate for office a "\$ %erce "t vote for *lac-- %refere\$ ca "\$States				%erce "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas .AP		%erce "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas .AP		%erce "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas .AP		%erce "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ou\$ have receiv\$ if \$istrict Oas .AP		%erce "t lac- . AP (ust e/ce\$ for B-P ca "\$State to 0!"	
	*lac- votes	White votes	votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others	have	have	have	have	have	have	have	have				
General elections																				
2018																				
State House 4 =4U%!!">	22.6	AA	34.5	29.7	99.0	1.0	34.1	15.1	84.9	54.2	50.0	45.9	41.9	45.0						
State House 25 =<ash>	40.7	AA	51.5	35.4	98.1	1.9	64.2	34.2	65.8	56.9	54.1	51.4	48.8	37.3						
State Se "ate 10	24.1	AA	37.5	30.7	99.8	0.2	33.2	16.6	83.4	56.6	52.4	48.3	44.3	42.0						
2016																				
2016 t i over"or	23.3	AA	38.7	55.9	99.8	0.2	60.1	21.1	78.9	59.0	55.1	51.2	47.4	38.4						
2016 #reasure	23.3	AA	41.5	54.8	99.8	0.2	58.4	29.7	70.3	63.6	60.1	56.7	53.2	30.3						
State House 7 =<ash>	50.7	AA	67.8	52.9	99.5	0.5	68.3	44.8	55.2	68.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	11.9						
State House 25 =<ash>	16.1	AA	31.9	53.8	84.6	15.4	62.8	20.8	79.2	50.2	47.1	44.0	40.9	49.6						
2014																				
"o"e																				
2012																				
2012 Presi\$e "t	23.3	AA	41.8	58.3	99.2	0.8	64.7	23.9	76.1	59.6	55.9	52.2	48.5	37.1						
2012 t i over"or	23.3	AA	44.8	57.1	99.1	0.9	63.6	28.4	71.6	61.8	58.3	54.9	51.4	32.9						

Table 18B

Se"ate ! rou%" +, 4u%ll" Har"ett ?oh "so"t ee' <ash" a "\$ Sa (%so"	%ercent *lac-. AP of Jurisdiction"	Race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state	turnout rate for office a "\$ercent vote for *lac-- %referre\$ ca "\$states				%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 50.1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 40.1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas 35.1 *lac- .AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have received\$ if \$istrict Oas (ust e/ce\$ for B-P ca "\$state to 0l"
				*lac- votes		0 hite votes					
				votes cast for office	B-P others	votes cast for office	B-P others				
Democratic primaries											
2018											
"o"e											
2016											
2016 tlover"or	23.3	AA	57.8	19.0	94.1	5.9	40.2	59.8	80.4	78.2	73.2
2016 At" le"eral	23.3	AA	49.3	18.9	64.5	35.5	42.3	57.7	58.5	57.6	55.5
2016)o ((of a*or	23.3		67.7	18.6	64.9	35.1	69.3	30.7	66.1	66.2	66.6
2016 #reasurer	23.3	AA	60.1	18.8	82.7	17.3	48.4	51.6	73.8	72.4	69.2
2014											
"o"e											
2012											
2012 tlover"or	23.3	AA	51.3	24.9	56.4	43.6	7.9	56.2	56.4	56.3	56.3
2012)o ((of a*or	23.3	AA	16.9	23.9	38.5	61.5	6.9	18.4	34.0	33.3	31.5

Table 19A

State	Year	Office	Party	Actual Vote	Turnout Rate for Office		White Votes	All Others	% of Total	% of Total	% of Total	% of Total	% of Total		
					B-P	Others									
General elections															
2018															
State House 33	2018	AA	44.2	78.7	49.7	100.0	0.0	49.3	63.2	36.8	81.7	79.8	78.0	76.1	% of total
State House 37	2018	AA	14.3	49.9	30.4	99.2	0.8	67.3	46.7	53.3	63.0	60.9	58.9	57.0	% of total
State House 38	2018	AA	48.3	81.9	31.5	99.1	0.9	65.4	69.4	30.6	79.1	77.8	76.6	75.5	% of total
State Senate 14	2018	AA	38.9	71.4	32.0	99.2	0.8	67.9	63.3	36.7	74.8	73.3	71.9	70.6	% of total
2016															
State House 33	2016	AA	21.1	54.0	58.3	99.6	0.4	85.8	44.1	55.9	66.6	63.9	61.4	59.0	% of total
State House 37	2016	AA	21.1	55.4	57.3	99.5	0.5	84.3	46.4	53.6	67.9	65.4	63.0	60.6	% of total
State House 38	2016	AA	50.7	67.8	52.9	99.5	0.5	68.3	44.8	55.2	68.7	66.0	63.4	60.9	% of total
State Senate 14	2016	AA	51.4	84.8	42.1	96.9	3.1	50.9	73.8	26.2	84.3	83.1	82.0	80.9	% of total
2014															
State House 33	2014	AA	51.4	87.3	37.0	99.3	0.7	50.0	75.4	24.6	85.6	84.4	83.3	82.2	% of total
State Senate 14	2014	AA	51.4	79.9	43.9	99.1	0.9	43.2	66.5	33.5	82.9	81.3	79.7	78.0	% of total
2012															
State House 33	2012	AA	21.1	54.7	54.7	99.5	0.5	68.3	42.1	57.9	67.6	64.8	62.1	59.4	% of total
State House 37	2012	AA	21.1	54.9	53.6	99.3	0.7	67.1	44.0	56.0	68.6	65.9	63.2	60.6	% of total

Table 19B

Se "ate !rou%"+, 9ra "-l" a"\$; a-e	%ercent *lac- . AP of Jurisdiction	Race of B-P ca "\$\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$\$state	tur "outrate for office a "\$ %ercent "t vote for *lac-- %t referre\$ ca "\$\$states				%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict 0as 501 *lac- .AP	%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict 0as 401 *lac- .AP	%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict 0as 351 *lac- .AP	%ercent "t of vote B-P ca "\$ 0ouls\$ have receive\$ if \$istrict 0as (uste/cees\$ for B-P ca "\$\$state to 0"			
				*lac- votes	votes cast for office	all others	votes cast for office					White votes	all others	
Democratic primaries														
2018														
State House 33	44.2	AA	60.2	11.7	61.8	38.2	8.4	58.9	41.1	60.6	60.4	60.3	60.1	" ot %olarit&e\$
2016														
2016 t !over"or	21.1	AA	60.7	17.6	84.7	15.3	13.3	51.3	48.7	70.3	68.7	67.0	65.2	" ot %olarit&e\$
2016 At" !e"eral	21.1	AA	35.4	17.0	63.2	15.4	13.0	32.4	67.6	56.7	54.3	51.9	49.5	36.0
2016)o (of a*or	21.1		72.2	17.0	68.6	31.4	11.6	74.7	25.3	71.1	71.4	71.7	72.0	" ot %olarit&e\$
2016 #reasurer	21.1	AA	63.4	17.3	90.0	10.0	12.4	53.5	46.5	74.8	73.0	71.1	69.2	" ot %olarit&e\$
State House 33	51.4	AA	64.1	18.5	80.6	19.4	17.7	54.3	45.7	67.7	66.4	65.1	63.8	" ot %olarit&e\$
2014														
"o"e														
2012														
2012 t !over"or	21.1	AA	59.8	19.4	77.0	23.0	16.6	54.9	45.1	66.8	65.7	64.6	63.4	" ot %olarit&e\$
2012)o (of a*or	21.1	AA	37.7	19.2	56.1	43.9	13.6	31.3	68.7	45.8	44.6	43.3	42.0	68.5

Table 20

Jurisdiction	Year	Type of Race	Actual Vote for B-P Candidate	Turnout rate for office a "Statewide"		White votes		% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes	% of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes				
				B-P	Others	B-P	Others									
General elections	2018	State House 71	36.6	24.7	98.7	1.3	57.0	63.4	36.6	74.1	72.6	71.3	70.1	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"		
		State House 72	47.5	31.8	99.6	0.4	49.4	69.6	30.4	81.3	79.9	78.6	77.3	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"		
		State Senate 32	39.2	28.5	99.2	0.8	50.5	65.0	35.0	77.3	75.8	74.3	73.0	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"		
		2016	2016 Treasurer	25.9	25.9	42.6	98.8	1.2	73.5	42.3	63.0	60.5	58.0	55.7	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"	
		2014	2014 Treasurer	25.9	25.9	39.2	99.0	1.0	72.0	42.8	62.6	60.1	57.8	55.5	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"	
		2012	2012 State House 71	45.5	25.8	99.3	0.7	39.6	62.6	37.4	77.1	75.4	73.7	72.1	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"	
	Democratic primaries	2012	2012 Presidential	25.9	25.9	44.5	99.8	0.2	70.2	43.6	65.4	62.8	60.3	57.9	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"	
			2012 State House 71	25.9	25.9	44.2	100.0	0.0	68.3	44.2	66.1	63.5	61.0	58.6	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"	
			2016	2016 Treasurer	25.9	25.9	19.5	79.5	20.5	12.5	45.6	66.3	64.6	62.9	61.1	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"
			2016	2016 State House 71	25.9	25.9	18.9	69.5	30.5	12.1	35.0	56.0	54.4	52.6	50.8	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"
			2016	2016 State Senate 32	25.9	25.9	17.8	84.2	15.8	11.7	52.0	71.4	69.9	68.2	66.5	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"
			2014	2014 Treasurer	25.9	25.9	18.9	69.4	30.6	11.7	54.4	63.7	62.9	62.2	61.4	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"
2012	2012 State House 71	25.9	25.9	15.1	66.5	33.5	11.2	52.9	47.1	60.0	59.3	58.6	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"			
	2012 State Senate 32	25.9	25.9	14.2	49.4	50.6	9.5	35.5	64.5	43.1	42.4	41.7	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"			
	2012	2012 Treasurer	25.9	25.9	14.2	49.4	50.6	9.5	35.5	64.5	43.1	42.4	41.7	" of total votes received if B-P candidate had received all votes"		

Table 21

Pitt) ou"16	%ercent *lac- . AP of Jurisdiction	race of B-P ca "\$state	actual vote for B-P ca "\$state	turn"out rate for office a "\$ %ercent vote for *lac-						%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 50.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 40.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 35.1 *lac- . AP	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 59.2	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 43.1	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 61.2	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 44.9	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 63.4	%ercent of vote B-P ca "\$ 0oul\$ have received if \$istrict Oas 46.8		
				*lac- votes		White votes		all others	B-P										office	votes cast for office
				B-P	others	B-P	others													
General elections																				
2018																				
State House 8	44.9	AA	64.7	26.7	98.3	1.7	56.2	46.8	53.2					61.2	59.2	63.4	46.8	57.3	12.2	
State House 9	20.5	AA	40.0	20.1	86.1	13.9	57.6	33.1	66.9					44.9	43.1	46.8	33.1	41.5	57.3	
2016																				
2016 tlover"or	32.4	AA	51.0	47.4	98.6	1.4	68.1	33.2	66.8					56.9	53.9	60.0	33.2	51.0	33.2	
2016 #reasurer	32.4	AA	53.0	45.3	99.4	0.6	66.7	35.6	64.4					58.4	55.5	61.4	35.6	52.7	30.0	
2014																				
"o"e																				
2012																				
2012 Preside"t	32.4	AA	53.2	54.8	99.2	0.8	64.1	34.6	65.4					61.2	58.1	64.4	34.6	55.0	26.8	
2012 tlover"or	32.4	AA	55.1	53.8	99.0	1.0	62.6	37.3	62.7					62.8	59.8	65.8	37.3	56.8	23.2	
Democratic primaries																				
2018																				
State House 8	44.9	AA	50.0	7.4	55.3	44.7	4.4	43.0	57.0					50.1	49.5	50.7	43.0	48.8	44.0	
2016																				
2016 tlover"or	32.4	AA	52.0	12.2	78.1	21.9	7.2	34.2	65.8					59.7	57.5	61.8	34.2	55.1	24.9	
2016 Alt"le"eral	32.4	AA	61.4	11.7	71.9	28.1	6.8	22.5	77.5					51.4	48.9	53.7	22.5	46.3	42.2	
2016 o((of a*or	32.4	AA	50.5	11.5	62.3	37.7	6.7	41.9	58.1					53.8	52.8	54.8	41.9	51.7	27.7	
2016 #reasurer	32.4	AA	51.3	11.4	55.1	44.9	6.9	43.1	56.9					50.0	49.4	50.6	43.1	48.7	45.0	
2014																				
"o"e																				
2012																				
2012 tlover"or	32.4	AA	60.5	13.7	57.2	42.8	7.4	60.9	39.1					58.7	58.9	58.5	60.9	59.1	ot%olati&e\$	
2012 o((of a*or	32.4	AA	32.9	13.1	44.3	55.7	6.7	20.3	79.7					35.1	33.9	36.2	20.3	32.6	"o clear B-P ca "\$	

Table 22A

Jurisdiction	Type of election	Year	Total number of voters	Total number of seats	Actual votes for <P>	Turnout rate for office		Percentage of voters who preferred <P>		Percentage of voters who preferred <P> if they had received the vote		Percentage of voters who preferred <P> if they had received the vote		Percentage of voters who preferred <P> if they had received the vote				
						<P>	Others	<P>	Others	<P>	Others	<P>	Others					
General elections	2018	State House 46	14.5	AA	36.7	12.4	51.9	48.1	35.9	39.5	60.5	42.7	42.2	41.8	41.4	94.1		
		State House 47	46.2	<A	58.9	16.7	79.3	20.7	30.8	38.5	61.5	52.8	51.0	49.3	47.7	42.0		
		State Senate 13	26.5	:	61.5	17.5	53.6	46.4	35.2	57.8	42.2	56.4	56.6	56.8	56.9	0		
		2016																
		2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	
		2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016
		2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016
		2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016
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		2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016
2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012		
2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012		
2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012		
2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012		

Certification

I certify that the statements and opinions provided in this report are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Lisa Handley

Lisa Handley, Ph.D.

9/17/2019

Date

Lisa R. Handley
CURRICULUM VITAE

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Telephone: ++1.301.765.5024

Professional Experience

Dr. Handley has over thirty years of experience in the areas of redistricting and voting rights, both as a practitioner and an academician, and is recognized nationally (as well as internationally) as an expert on these subjects. She has advised numerous jurisdictions and other clients on redistricting and has served as an expert in dozens of redistricting and voting rights court cases. Her clients have included the U.S. Department of Justice and scores of state and local jurisdictions, as well as redistricting commissions and civil rights organizations. Internationally, Dr. Handley has provided electoral assistance in more than a dozen countries, serving as a consultant on issues of democratic governance – including voting rights, electoral system design and electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) – for the United Nations, the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), IFES, and International IDEA. In addition, Dr. Handley served as Chairman of the Electoral Boundaries Commission in the Cayman Islands.

Dr. Handley has been actively involved in research, writing and teaching on the subjects of voting rights and redistricting. She has written a book, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1992) and numerous articles, as well as edited a volume (Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008) on these subjects. She has taught political science and methodology courses at several universities, most recently George Washington University. Dr. Handley is a Visiting Research Academic at Oxford Brookes University in the United Kingdom.

Dr. Handley is the President of Frontier International Consulting, a consulting firm that specializes in providing electoral assistance in transitional and post-conflict democracies. She also works as an independent election consultant for such international organizations as the United Nations.

Education

Ph.D. The George Washington University, Political Science, 1991

Present Employment

President, Frontier International Electoral Consulting LLC (since co-founding company in September of 1998).

Senior International Consultant, provides electoral assistance to such international clients as the UN, UNDP and IFES on electoral district delimitation, electoral system design and minority voting rights.

U.S. Clients since 2000

American Civil Liberties Union (expert testimony in Ohio partisan gerrymander challenge and challenge to Commerce Department inclusion of citizenship question on 2020 census form)

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (expert testimony in challenges to statewide judicial elections in Texas and Alabama)

US Department of Justice (expert witness testimony in several Section 2 and Section 5 cases)

Alaska: Alaska Redistricting Board (redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony)

Arizona: Arizona Independent Redistricting Board (redistricting consultation, expert witness)

Arkansas: expert witness for Plaintiffs in Jeffers v. Beebe

Colorado: Colorado Redistricting Board (redistricting consultation)

Connecticut: State Senate and State House of Representatives (redistricting consultation)

Florida: State Senate (redistricting consultation)

Kansas: State Senate and House Legislative Services (redistricting consultation)

Louisiana: Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus (expert witness testimony)

Massachusetts: State Senate (redistricting consultation)

Maryland: Attorney General (redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony)

Miami-Dade County, Florida: County Attorney (redistricting consultation)

Nassau County, New York: Redistricting Commission (redistricting consulting)

New Mexico: State House (redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony)

New York: State Assembly (redistricting consultation)

New York City: Redistricting Commission and Charter Commission (redistricting consultation and Section 5 submission assistance)

New York State Court: Expert to the Special Master (drew congressional lines for state court)

Ohio: State Democratic Party (redistricting litigation support, expert witness testimony)

Pennsylvania: Senate Democratic Caucus (redistricting consultation)

Rhode Island: State Senate and State House (litigation support, expert witness testimony)

Vermont: Secretary of State (redistricting consultation)

International Clients since 2000

United Nations

- Afghanistan – electoral system design and district delimitation expert
- Bangladesh (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Sierra Leone (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Liberia (UNMIL, UN peacekeeping mission) – redistricting expert
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, UN peacekeeping mission) – election feasibility mission, electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Kenya (UN) – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Haiti (UN) – election feasibility mission, electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Lead Writer on the topic of boundary delimitation (redistricting) for ACE (Administration and Cost of Elections Project)

International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)

- Afghanistan – district delimitation expert
- Sudan – redistricting expert
- Kosovo – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Nigeria – redistricting expert
- Nepal – redistricting expert
- Georgia – electoral system design and district delimitation expert
- Yemen – redistricting expert
- Lebanon – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Myanmar – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Ukraine – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Pakistan – consultant for developing redistricting software
- Principal consultant for the Delimitation Equity Project – conducted research, wrote reference manual and developed training curriculum
- Writer on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting), Elections Standards Project
- Training – developed training curriculum and conducted training workshops on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) in Azerbaijan and Jamaica

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA):

- Consultant on electoral dispute resolution systems
- Technology consultant on use of GIS for electoral district delimitation
- Training – developed training material and conducted training workshop on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) for African election officials (Mauritius)
- Curriculum development – boundary delimitation curriculum for the BRIDGE Project
- Project coordinator for the ACE project

Other international clients have included The Cayman Islands; the Australian Election Commission; the Boundary Commission of British Columbia, Canada; and the Global Justice Project for Iraq.

Previous Employment

Project Coordinator and Lead Writer on Boundary Delimitation, Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project. As Project Coordinator (1998 – 2000) of the ACE Project, Dr. Handley served as a liaison between the three partner international organizations – the United Nations, the International Foundation for Election Systems and International IDEA – and was responsible for the overall project management of ACE, a web-based global encyclopedia of election administration. She also served as Lead Writer on Boundary Delimitation for ACE.

Research Director and Statistical Analyst, Election Data Services, Inc. (1984 to 1998). Election Data Services (E.D.S.) is a Washington D.C. political consulting firm specialising in election administration. Dr. Handley's work at E.D.S. focused on providing redistricting and voting rights consulting and litigation support to scores of state and local jurisdictions.

Adjunct Professor (1986 to 1998). Dr. Handley has taught political science and methodology courses (both at the graduate and undergraduate level) at George Washington University, the University of Virginia, and the University of California at Irvine. She has served as a guest lecture at Harvard, Princeton, Georgetown, American University, George Mason University and Oxford Brookes University in the UK.

Grants

National Science Foundation Grant (2000-2001): Co-investigator (with Bernard Grofman) on a comparative redistricting project, which included hosting an international conference on "Redistricting in a Comparative Perspective" and producing an edited volume based on the papers presented at the conference.

Publications

Books:

Does Torture Prevention Work? Liverpool University Press, 2016 (served as editor and author, with Richard Carver)

Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008 (first editor, with Bernard Grofman).

Delimitation Equity Project: Resource Guide, Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance at IFES and USAID publication, 2006 (lead author).

Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1992 (with Bernard Grofman and Richard Niemi).

Academic Articles:

"Minority Success in Non-Majority Minority Districts: Finding the 'Sweet Spot'," Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics, forthcoming (with David Lublin, Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman).

"Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived its Usefulness: In a Word, "No," Legislative Studies Quarterly, volume 34 (4), November 2009 (with David Lublin, Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman).

"Delimitation Consulting in the US and Elsewhere," Zeitschrift für Politikberatung, volume 1 (3/4), 2008 (with Peter Schrott).

"Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence," North Carolina Law Review, volume 79 (5), June 2001 (with Bernard Grofman and David Lublin).

"A Guide to 2000 Redistricting Tools and Technology" in The Real Y2K Problem: Census 2000 Data and Redistricting Technology, edited by Nathaniel Persily, New York: Brennan Center, 2000.

"1990s Issues in Voting Rights," Mississippi Law Journal, 65 (2), Winter 1995 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Minority Turnout and the Creation of Majority-Minority Districts," American Politics Quarterly, 23 (2), April 1995 (with Kimball Brace, Richard Niemi and Harold Stanley).

"Identifying and Remediating Racial Gerrymandering," Journal of Law and Politics, 8 (2), Winter 1992 (with Bernard Grofman).

"The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation in Southern State Legislatures," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16 (1), February 1991 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Minority Population Proportion and Black and Hispanic Congressional Success in the 1970s and 1980s," American Politics Quarterly, 17 (4), October 1989 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Black Representation: Making Sense of Electoral Geography at Different Levels of Government," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (2), May 1989 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," Law and Policy, 10 (1), January 1988 (with Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman and Richard Niemi).

"Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans?" Journal of Politics, 49 (1), February 1987 (with Kimball Brace and Bernard Grofman).

Chapters in Edited Volumes:

“Redistricting” in Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems, Erik Herron Robert Pekkanen and Matthew Shugart (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

“Role of the Courts in the Electoral Boundary Delimitation Process,” in International Election Remedies, John Hardin Young (ed.), Chicago: American Bar Association Press, 2017.

“One Person, One Vote, Different Values: Comparing Delimitation Practices in India, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” in Fixing Electoral Boundaries in India, edited by Mohd. Sanjeer Alam and K.C. Sivaramakrishman, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015.

“Delimiting Electoral Boundaries in Post-Conflict Settings,” in Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, edited by Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

“A Comparative Survey of Structures and Criteria for Boundary Delimitation,” in Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, edited by Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

“Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Model,” in Voting Rights and Minority Representation, edited by David Bositis, published by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Washington DC, and University Press of America, New York, 2006.

“Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by Bernard Grofman; New York: Agathon Press, 1998 (with Bernard Grofman and Wayne Arden).

“Estimating the Impact of Voting-Rights-Related Districting on Democratic Strength in the U.S. House of Representatives,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by Bernard Grofman; New York: Agathon Press, 1998 (with Bernard Grofman).

“Voting Rights in the 1990s: An Overview,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, edited by Bernard Grofman; New York: Agathon Press, 1998 (with Bernard Grofman and Wayne Arden).

“Racial Context, the 1968 Wallace Vote and Southern Presidential Dealignment: Evidence from North Carolina and Elsewhere,” in Spatial and Contextual Models in Political Research, edited by Munroe Eagles; Taylor and Francis Publishing Co., 1995 (with Bernard Grofman).

“The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations,” in The Quiet Revolution: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in the South, 1965-1990, eds. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, Princeton University Press, 1994 (with Bernard Grofman).

"Preconditions for Black and Hispanic Congressional Success," in United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, eds. Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman, Greenwood Press, 1992 (with Bernard Grofman).

Electronic Publication:

"Boundary Delimitation" Topic Area for the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project, 1998. Published by the ACE Project on the ACE website (www.aceproject.org).

Additional Writings of Note:

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, Brief of Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae, 2017 (one of more than a political scientists to sign brief)

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder, Brief of Historians and Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 2013 (one of several dozen historians and social scientists to sign brief)

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Bartlett v. Strickland, 2008 (with Nathaniel Persily, Bernard Grofman, Bruce Cain, and Theodore Arrington).

Court Cases since 2015

Ohio Philip Randolph Institute v. Larry Householder (2019) – partisan gerrymander challenge to Ohio congressional districts

State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce/ New York Immigration Coalition v. U.S. Department of Commerce (2018-2019) – challenge to inclusion of citizenship question on 2020 census form

U.S. v. City of Eastpointe (ongoing) – minority vote dilution challenge to City of Eastpointe, Michigan, at-large city council election system

Alabama NAACP v. State of Alabama (ongoing) – minority vote dilution challenge to Alabama statewide judicial election system

Lopez v. Abbott (2017-2018) – minority vote dilution challenge to Texas statewide judicial election system

Personhaballah v. Alcorn (2016-17) – racial gerrymander challenge to Virginia congressional districts

Exhibit 8

EXHIBIT F

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
21 CVS 015426
21 CVS 500085

NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF
CONSERVATION VOTERS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his
official capacity as Chair of the House
Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.,

Defendants.

REBECCA HARPER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.



REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his
official capacity as Chair of the House
Standing Committee on Redistricting, et al.,

Defendants.

**EXPERT REPORT OF
DR. JEFFREY B. LEWIS**

Pursuant to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the Case Management Orders of the Court in the above-captioned matter, I, Jeffrey B. Lewis, provide the following written report:

1. I am a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). I am also the past department chair of UCLA's political science department and past president of the Society for Political Methodology. I have been a member of the UCLA faculty since 2001. Prior to that, I was an Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University from 1998 to 2001. I earned my B.A. in Political



Science and Economics from Wesleyan University in 1990 and my Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1998. My main area of specialization is quantitative political methodology with a focus on making inferences about preferences and behavior from the analysis of voting patterns in the mass public and in legislatures. I have published on the topic of ecological inference – the challenge that arises when one wants to know how individuals of different types voted in an election, but one can only observe electoral data aggregated to the precinct, county or other summary level. A true, accurate, and complete copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit A.

2. I have previously been retained as an expert in relation to nine court cases: one involving allegations of voting machine failure in Florida (*Jennings v. Elections Can-vassing Commission of State of Florida*), four involving claims of minority vote dilution in California (*Avitia v. Tulare Local Healthcare District*; *Satorre et al. v. San Mateo County Board of Supervisors et al.*; *Ladonna Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara*); and *Pico Neighborhood Association and Maria Loya v. City of Santa Monica*), one involving claims of minority vote dilution in Texas (*Perez, et al. v. Abbott, et al.*), one involving claims of minority vote dilution in North Carolina (*Common Cause, et al. v. Lewis*), one involving claims of minority vote dilution in Washington (*Aguilar v. Yakima County*), and one involving the compactness of legislative districts in Illinois (*Radogno et al v. Illinois State Board of Elections, et al.*). I testified as an expert in the cases of *Ladonna Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara* and *Pico Neighborhood Association and Maria Loya v. City of Santa Monica*.
3. I am being compensated at a rate of \$550/hour.
4. In the attached tables and spreadsheet, at Exhibit B, I present summaries of the results of North Carolina general and Democratic primary election contests held in 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020. In particular, I consider how each contest would have turned out if only the votes of those residing in each current and in each enacted State House, State Senate, and Congressional district had been counted.
5. This exercise allows us to consider the voting strength of the Black voters in each existing and proposed legislative district.

6. For each of these “reconstituted” election contest in each district, I used weighted ecological regression (ER) to estimate the degree of Black voter cohesion and non-Black voter crossover (hereafter “white crossover”). In some cases, the number of voting precincts available for the analysis was too small or Black share of voters was too small to meaningfully apply ER. I omit such contest-district combinations.
7. I further narrow the set of contests to partisan races for executive and legislative offices. And, I only “reconstitute” a given contest within a given district if the data indicate that at least 80 percent of the voters in the given election who resided the district, voted in the given contest.
8. I identify the “Black-preferred” candidate in each contest as the candidate estimated by ER to have received the largest share of Black votes in the given contest or, in the case of single-candidate elections, that candidate if they are a Democrat (single-candidate elections without a Democrat are considered not to have a Black-preferred candidate).
9. I also note whether each candidate is Black and whether each contest includes at least one Black candidate.
10. The tabulations and estimates are based on datasets that I downloaded from the North Carolina Board of Elections (SBOE) website with the exception of a crosswalk between the current and enacted legislative districts and voting precincts used in the 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 elections and estimates of Black Voting-Age population (VAP) by district that were provided by Clark Bensen of POLIDATA.
11. The race of each candidate was determined by looking up each candidate listed in the SBOE’s candidate list datasets on the North Carolina voter list (also from the SBOE). In some cases, a candidate’s race could not be determined because: their legal name matched no voter on the voter list, no race was indicated on the voter list, or they were matched to several voters of different races on the voter list. In total, over 1,800 Black candidates were identified (including many competing in contests not subsequently analyzed for the reasons described above).
12. The demographic composition of voters from each precinct needed to perform ER was derived by merging vote history records from the SBOE to the precinct election returns. Because some counties do not allocate “One Stop” and absentee votes back to precincts (and for other reasons), not all voters can be matched to a voting precinct and not all

precincts can be placed in legislative districts. Where One Stop and absentee ballots were allocated to regular voting precincts, the voting and demography within each precinct was broken down by voting method when performing ER. This is possible because the vote history records (which are used to estimate the fraction of voters in each precinct who were Black) are broken down by voting method (as sometimes are the election returns within each precinct). When a county reported One Stop or absentee votes without allocating them to precincts and where feasible, I aggregated the One Stop and absentee votes in the election returns and the One Stop and absentee voters into a single One Stop and a single absentee precinct. Given the need to break down the votes by legislative district, this was only feasible in counties that fall entirely within a single State House, State Senate, or Congressional district.

13. The attached tables summarize the reconstituted elections analysis. For each district, the tables show averages of many of the quantities described above as well as: the Black-preferred candidate “win rate” (the fraction of Black-preferred candidates who would have won if the contest had only been held in the given district); the percent of Black-preferred candidates who were Democrats; the average number of major-party candidates in the reconstituted contests; the average fraction of voters who were Black; and, an estimate of the average minimum fraction of those voting in the district that would have had to be Black in order for the Black-preferred candidate to expect to get at least 50 percent of the vote (based on the ER estimates and only applied in contests involving two major-party candidates).
14. The tables present separate results for primary and general elections. Separate tallies are also presented that include only those contests that included at least one Black candidate.
15. The attached spreadsheet *minority_preferred_candidates.csv* identifies the minority-preferred candidate in each of the reconstituted contests considered. It includes the following fields:
 - a. *district*, an identifier of the district including its chamber, plan, and number in which the contest is reconstituted.
 - b. *election_date*, the date of the election
 - c. *election_type*, primary or general
 - d. *contest*, the electoral contest being reconstituted.

- e. *minority_preferred_candidate*, the name of the minority preferred candidate (as identified by ER).
 - f. *minority_preferred_party*, the party of the minority-preferred candidate.
 - g. *cand_is_black*, whether the Black-preferred candidate is Black.
 - h. *has_minority_candidate*, whether the contest included a Black candidate.
 - i. *wonlost*, identifies the Black-preferred candidate as a “winner” or “loser” of the reconstituted election (highest-vote getter).
 - j. *pct_vote*, percent of vote won by the Black-preferred candidate in the reconstituted contest.
 - k. *ER.pct_black*, average share of voters in the ER analyses who were Black.
 - l. *ER.black_cohesion*, weighted Ecological Regression (ER) estimates of support for Black-preferred candidate among Black voters in the reconstituted election.
 - m. *ER.white_crossover*, weighted Ecological Regression (ER) estimates of support for the Black-preferred candidate among white (non-Black) voters in the reconstituted election.
 - n. *ER.black_pct_needed_for_majority*, Uses the ER estimates to infer the minimum share of the voters in the reconstituted election that would generate majority support for the minority-preferred candidate in the reconstituted election. Note that this is the estimated average percentage of Black voters in the contest needed for a majority, not the percentage of Black VAP existing in the district.
 - o. *Coverage*, the ratio of the total votes cast in the reconstituted election to the most votes cast in any reconstituted contest in the same district and election expressed as a percentage. In many cases, eligibility to participate in a particular contest will only partially overlap with the district in which the reconstituted election is considered. Because the area of overlap may encompass a set of voters who are not representative of the voters a district as whole when the overlap is small, I consider only contests for which this overlap or “coverage” exceeds 80 percent (for example, this include contests for statewide offices).
 - p. *number_of_candidates*, The number of major-party candidates in the contest.
16. This analysis goes beyond Professor Dunchin’s analysis to consider not just 4 primary and 4 general election contests, but over 420 individual contests including over 190 that

include a Black candidate. These contests include both endogenous and exogenous contests for legislative and executive offices ranging from a Recorder of Deeds to the US President. The analysis also expands on Professor Duchin's analysis by estimating the rate of support of each candidate in each contest within each district to capture variation in Black voter cohesion and white cross-over voting across the districts (whereas Professor Duchin estimates a single rate of cohesion and of cross-over voting statewide for the 8 contests that she considers).

17. Using (without endorsing) Professor Duchin's definition of "effective" Black districts (greater than 75 percent Black preferred win rate in races with minority candidates combined with greater than 25 percent Black voting-age population), an analysis of this larger set of election contests identifies as "effective" the enacted districts that Professor Duchin enumerates (with the exceptions of State Senate District 12 and State House District Districts 066 which do not exhibit a 75 percent win rate in the larger dataset and House District 039 for which too few data precinct points were available to apply ER to identify the Black-preferred candidates). It also identifies as "effective" by Duchin's definition as many as seven additional State House districts and four additional State Senate districts. *See* Table 1.
18. Relaxing Professor Duchin's requirement that an "effective" district must have more than 25 percent Black voting-age population, my more expansive analysis suggests the existence of one additional "effective" Congressional district, four additional "effective" State House districts, and two additional "effective" State Senate districts.
19. Further relaxing the definition of "effective" to those districts in which the Black preferred win rate exceeds 66 percent suggests the existence of seven more "effective" State Senate districts and 16 additional "effective" State House districts. *See* Table 1.
20. Increasing the set of contests considered to include contests without Black candidates further lifts the number of apparently "effective" districts under Duchin's definition.
21. Only two of the "effective" districts (by any of the above definitions) are majority Black VAP. Districts with Black-preferred win rates of over 75 percent in the reconstituted elections include two districts with Black voting-age populations below 7 percent and five districts with Black voting-age populations below 20 percent.


Table 1 – Duchin “Effective” Black Districts in Enacted Plans

	House	Senate	Congress
Number of “Effective” Black Districts in enacted plans using Duchin definition	29	12	2
Number of “Effective” Black Districts in enacted plans using Duchin definition but relaxing 25% BVAP and applying win rate of 66%	49	21	5
Number of “Effective” Black Districts in enacted plans using Duchin definition but relaxing 25% BVAP and applying win rate of 50%	88	40	11

22. In no district, enacted or in 2020, does it appear that a majority Black VAP is needed for that district to regularly generate majority support for minority-preferred candidates in the reconstituted elections.
23. Black voters constitute a powerful political force in North Carolina electoral politics because of their numerical size and highly cohesive voting as well as the sizeable white (non-Black) cross-over vote for Black-preferred candidates that exists particularly in areas of the state in which Black voters are concentrated. As Professor Duchin documents, contemporary Black voting power in North Carolina is such that it is now even possible to draw a set of districts in which Black voters would have effective control (by her definition) of a share of the state’s legislative districts that meaningfully exceeds the size of the Black population.
24. I reviewed the “Addendum to Primary Expert Report of Jonathan C. Mattingly, Ph.D.” Dr. Mattingly appears to have reconstituted election results in different county cluster options and identified Black VAP in those same clusters. Dr. Mattingly’s Addendum is not a racially polarized voting analysis.

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the statements and opinions provided in this report are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jeffrey Lewis", with a long horizontal line extending to the right from the end of the signature.

Jeffrey B. Lewis, Ph.D.

December 28, 2021

Date

Exhibit A

JEFFREY B. LEWIS

Political Science Department
Bunche Hall, UCLA
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2330 Pelham Ave.
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310.467.7685
email:jblewis@ucla.edu

Education Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA
Ph.D., Department of Political Science, February 1998.

Wesleyan University Middletown, CT
B.A., Political Science and Economics with Honors in General Scholarship.
June 1990.

Academic Experience

University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA
Professor of Political Science. July 2012–present.

University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA
Director, Center for American Politics and Public Policy. July 2017–July
2018.

University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA
Chair, Department of Political Science. July 2011–June 2017.

University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA
Associate Professor of Political Science. July 2007–June 2012.

University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA
Assistant Professor of Political Science. July 2001–June 2007.

Dartmouth College,
Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences Hanover, NH
Research Fellow. July 2000–June 2001.

Princeton University Princeton, NJ
Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs. July 1997–July 2001.

Teaching Interests

Quantitative methods
Elections & Direct democracy
California politics

Grants & Awards

Fellow, Society for Political Methodology, Elected 2019.

Research grant, “For Modernizing the VoteView Website And Software.”
Madison Initiative. William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (Grant #2016-
3870). January 2016. \$200k.

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Conference/training grant, “Support for Conferences and Mentoring of Women and Underrepresented Groups in Political Methodology,” National Science Foundation (NSF-SBE-1628102 with Kosuke Imai), \$308k.

Research grant. “Collaborative Research on Dynamic Models of Roll Call Voting.” National Science Foundation (NSF-SBS-0611974, with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal). July 2006. \$394k total (\$182k UCLA).

Brian P. Copenhaver Award for Innovation in Teaching with Technology, College of Letters and Sciences, University of California Los Angeles. 2007.

Warren Miller Prize for best article in volume 11 of *Political Analysis*. 2003 (article co-authored with Ken Schultz).

Research grant. “Empirical Testing of Crisis Bargaining Models.” National Science Foundation (NSF-SBS-0241647, with Ken Schultz). February 2003. \$200k.

Research grant, “Term limits in California.” John Randolf and Dora Haynes Foundation, May 2000. \$27k.

Research grant, Princeton University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, May 1998.

Harvard/MIT Research Training Group for Positive Political Economy Dissertation Fellowship, 1995-1996.

Sigma Xi Honorary Society, Wesleyan University, 1990.

White Prize for excellence in economics, Wesleyan University, 1990.

Ford Foundation Summer Research Fellowship, Wesleyan University, 1988.

Publications “The new Voteview.com: preserving and continuing Keith Poole’s infrastructure for scholars, students and observers of Congress,” *Public Choice*. 2018, 176:17–32 (with Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet).

“Recovering a Basic Space from Issue Scales in R.” *Journal of Statistical Software*. 2016, 69(7) (Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal, James Lo, Royce Carroll).

“The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting,” *American Journal of Political Science*. 2013, 56(4):1008–1028 (with Royce Carroll, James Lo, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal).

“Economic Crisis, Iraq, and Race: A Study of the 2008 Presidential Election.” (*Election Law Journal*. 2010, 9(1): 41–62 (with Michael Herron and Seth Hill).

“Comparing NOMINATE and IDEAL: Points of difference and Monte Carlo tests.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 2009, 34:555–592 (with Royce Carroll, James Lo, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal).

“Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap”, *Political Analysis*. 2009, 17(3):261–275 (with Royce Carrol, James Lo, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal).

“poLCA: An R Package for Polytomous Variable Latent Class Analysis.” *Journal of Statistical Software*. 2011, 42(10) (with Drew A. Linzer).

“Scaling Roll Call Votes with Wnominat in R.” *Journal of Statistical Software*. 2011, 42(14) (with Keith Poole, James Lo, and Royce Carroll).

“Ballot Formats, Touchscreens, and Undervotes: A Study of the 2006 Midterm Elections in Florida.” *Election Law Journal*. 2008. 7(1):25–47 (with Laurin Frisana, Michael C. Herron, and James Honaker).

“An Estimate of Risk Aversion in the U.S. Electorate.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 2007, 2(2):139–154. (with Adam J. Berinsky).

“Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators.” *Journal of Politics*. 2007, 69(3):823–843 (with Thad Kousser and Seth Masket).

“Did Ralph Nader Spoil a Gore Presidency? A Ballot-Level Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 2007, 2(3):205–226 (with Michael Herron).

“A Return to Normalcy? Revisiting the Effects of Term Limits on Competitiveness and Spending in California Assembly Elections” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*. 2007, 7(1):20–38 (with Seth Masket).

“Learning about Learning: A Response to Wand.” *Political Analysis*. 2006, 14: 121-129 (with Kenneth Schultz).

“Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on Estimates” *Political Analysis*. 2005, 13(4) (with Drew A. Linzer)

“Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Representation.” *Journal of Political Economy*. 2004, 106(6):1364–1383 (with Liz Gerber).

“Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap.” *Political Analysis*. Spring 2004. 12:105–127 (with Keith Poole)

“Extending King’s Ecological Inference Model to Multiple Elections using Markov Chain Monte Carlo,” Chapter in Gary King, Ori Rosen, and Martin Tanner, Eds. *Ecological Inference: New Methodological Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004.

“Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.” *Political Analysis*. 2003, 11(4):345–365 (with Kenneth A. Schultz).

“Understanding King’s Ecological Inference Model: A Method-of-moments Approach,” *Historical Methods*. 2001, 34(4):170–188.

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“Estimating Voter Preference Distributions from Individual-Level Voting Data,” *Political Analysis*. 2001, 9(3):275-297.

“No Evidence on Directional vs. Proximity Voting,” *Political Analysis*. 1999, 8(1):21-33 (with Gary King).

“Reevaluating the Effect of N-Ach (Need for Achievement) on Economic Growth,” *World Development*. 1991, 19(9):1269–1274.

Other Publications

Comment on “McCue, K. F. (2001), ‘The Statistical Foundations of the EI method,’ *The American Statistician*. 2002, 55(3):250.

“Veteran’s Adjustment.” Chapter in *After the Cold War: Living with Lower Defense Spending*, Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-ITE-524. 1992.

Working Papers

Has Joint Scaling Solved the Achen Objection to Miller and Stokes? (with Christopher Tausanovitch, under revision).

Residual Votes in the 2008 Minnesota Senate Race (with Jonathan W. Chipman and Michael C. Herron)

From Punchcards to Touchscreens: Some Evidence from Pasco County, Florida on the Effects of Changing Voting Technology (with Michael C. Herron)

Voting in Low Information Elections: Bundling and Non-Independence of Voter Choice (with Liz Gerber, April 2002)

Dangers of Measurement Error in Non-linear Models: The Case of Directional versus Proximity Voting (April 2002)

A Reply to McCue’s Reply to My Comment on “The Statistical Foundations of the EI method”

PhD Students

Committees Chaired or Co-chaired: Ryan Enos (Harvard), Seth Hill (UCSD), James Lo (USC), stonegarden grindlife.

Currently chairing or co-chairing five committees.

Committee member on over 35 PhD students (including as an outsider member in Economics and Statistics).

Conference Presentations

American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, September 2016.

Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2014.

Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2011.

Summer Meetings of the Political Methodology Society, New Haven, 2009

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Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2006.
 American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004.
 American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, September 2003.
 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2003.
 Summer Meeting of the Political Methodology Society, Seattle, 2002
 Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society, Houston, San Diego, 2002.
 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2002.
 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2001.
 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2000.
 Summer Meeting of the Political Methodology Society, College Station Texas, 1999.
 Annual Meetings of the Social Science History Association, Chicago, November 1998.
 American Political Science Association, Boston, September 1998.
 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1997.
 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 1996.
 Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society, Houston, April 1996.
 American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 1989.

Software

Voteview: US Roll call votes and legislator ideologies, 1789–2021: Provides interactive search and visualization of every roll call vote ever taken in the United States Congress. See <https://voteview.com>.

WNominate (v1.2): R package implementing Poole and Rosenthal's W-Nominate estimator co-authored with Keith Poole and James Lo. (<http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/wnominate/index.html>)

PoLCA (v1.4.1): R package for Polytomous Variable Latent Class Analysis. Co-authored with Drew Linzer. (<http://dlinzer.github.io/poLCA/>)

Data collections

US Congressional roll call voting and related data, 1789–2021: Provides data on every roll call vote ever taken in the United States Congress. See <https://voteview.com>.

US Congressional District Boundaries, 1789–2017. Detailed GIS descriptions of every district in US history (with Brandon DeVine (UCLA), Lincoln Pritcher (UCLA), and Ken Martis (UWV)). See <http://cdmaps.polisci.ucla.edu/>.

109th – 114th Congress Data Project. UCLA. Webpage allows download of up to the hour roll call voting matrices for the current US Congress [Now included in the Voteview project].

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California Roll Call Project. UCLA. Collection of roll call voting data from the California Assembly from 1850 to the present. Ongoing (with Seth Masket).

Crisis Bargaining Data Base. UCLA. Codings of post-World War I international crises outcomes in terms of a simple game theoretic model of coercive diplomacy (supported by NSF-SBS-0241647) (with Ken Schultz).

Record of American Democracy Project Harvard University. One of several project leaders. Summer 1995.

University Service

Chair: Executive Committee, Faculty of Letters and Science, UCLA (September 2019–Present)

Vice Chair: Executive Committee, Faculty of Letters and Science, UCLA (2018–2019)

Member: Executive Committee, Faculty of Letters and Science, UCLA (2017–2018); Council on Academic Planning and Budget, UCLA (2019–Present); Classroom Advisory Committee, UCLA (2018–2020); Pathways to Commencement Task Force, UCLA (2013–2014).

Professional Experience

President: Society for Political Methodology (2015–2017).

Vice President/President elect: Society for Political Methodology (2013–2015).

Co-editor: *The American Political Science Review* July 2008–July 2011; *The Political Methodologist*, the APSA Methodology section newsletter. 2004–2007 (with Adam Berinsky and Michael Herron).

Editorial Board Member: *Journal of Politics*, 2005–2008; *Political Analysis* 2005–present.

Panelist: National Science Foundation ad hoc peer review panels (June 2004, February 2008, October 2010); National Science Foundation Political Science Panel (2009–2010).

Departmental review visiting committee member: University of Colorado, 2013; London School of Economics, 2015; University of Michigan, 2015.

Nominations committee member: American Political Science Association, 2011–12, 2012–13.

Program committee member: American Political Science Association Annual Meetings 2003, Political Methodology division head.

Anonymous Referee: *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Law and Economics*, *World Politics*, *Political Analysis*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *Sociological Methods Review*,

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Journal of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics, and Political Behavior, Perspectives on Politics, Public Opinion Quarterly, Journal of Political Economy.

Discussant/Panel Chair Political Methodology Conference (1997, 2004, 2005, 2015), Midwest Political Science Association meetings (1998, 2005, 2006). American Political Science Association meetings (1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2016). Public Choice Society (1996, 2002)

Work Experience

Polimetrix Palo Alto, CA
Director of Statistics, 2003–2007.

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress Washington, DC
Research Analyst, Industry Technology and Employment program. October 1990 – August 1992.

Selected Invited Lectures

American Politics Seminar, Political Science Department, Columbia University, 1998

Political Economy Seminar, Political Science Department, Michigan University, 1999

Political Economy Seminar, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1999

Political Economy Seminar, Politics & Economics Departments, Princeton University, 1998

Southern California Methods Program, UC Riverside, November 2001.

Ideal-Point Estimation Conference, Washington University St. Louis, September 2002.

American Politics Seminar, Political Science Department, Yale University, 2003.

Political Economy Seminar, Politics & Economics Departments, Princeton University, Spring 2004.

Political Economy Seminar, Politics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 2004.

Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models Program, Washington University, St. Louis, June 2004.

Multilevel Methods Conference, Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, October 2004.

Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models Program, University of California Berkeley (one week module co-taught with Kenneth A. Schultz). June 2005.

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Roll Call Voting Conference, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. May 2006.

Measures of Legislators' Policy Preferences and the Dimensionality of Policy Spaces Conference Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis. November 2007.

Causal Inference. Business School. University of Southern California. June 2010.

How to Scrape Web Pages. Summer Methods Program. Department of Sociology. Stanford University, July 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.

Lectures on Ecological Inference. Summer Methods Training Program, Academia Senica, Taipei, Taiwan. July 2010.

Applied Statistics Workshop. Department of Government. Harvard University, April 2011.

Methods Workshop. Department of Political Science, Stanford University. June 2011.

Conference on "Political Representation: Fifty Years After Miller & Stokes." Vanderbilt University, March 2013

Center for the Study of Democratic Politics (CSDP) Workshop, Princeton University, April 2015.

Ideal Point Models in Political Science Workshop, MIT, April 2015.

Interdisciplinary Seminar in Quantitative Methods (ISQM) Workshop, University of Michigan, September 2015.

Political Economy Seminar, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, April 2019,

March 25, 2021

Exhibit B

Table 1: General Elections

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
CD20-001	41.9	17	100	2.0	100	56	39	100	24	35
CD20-002	18.2	35	100	2.0	43	49	14	100	41	15
CD20-003	18.7	18	100	2.0	0	38	18	99	24	35
CD20-004	24.4	17	100	2.0	100	68	22	94	40	19
CD20-005	10.7	16	100	2.0	0	34	10	100	25	33
CD20-006	32.0	17	100	2.0	100	60	30	100	42	14
CD20-007	15.4	17	100	2.0	0	42	13	93	33	29
CD20-008	25.9	19	100	2.0	11	48	29	100	27	32
CD20-009	17.4	18	100	2.0	0	44	15	100	32	27
CD20-010	10.1	17	100	2.0	0	32	11	100	26	33
CD20-012	34.1	22	100	1.9	100	72	39	100	54	6
CD20-013	13.9	17	100	2.0	0	33	12	100	23	35
CD21-001	22.4	19	100	2.0	0	39	19	97	25	35
CD21-002	39.1	16	100	2.0	94	55	35	100	25	33
CD21-003	15.7	17	100	2.0	0	43	14	95	33	27
CD21-004	27.5	16	100	2.0	38	49	34	100	27	31
CD21-005	23.2	35	100	2.0	46	50	18	100	39	17
CD21-006	20.4	17	100	2.0	100	66	17	100	42	13
CD21-007	15.3	17	100	2.0	0	39	13	100	27	31
CD21-008	16.5	17	100	2.0	0	40	14	100	29	30
CD21-009	36.3	22	100	1.9	100	75	42	100	58	2
CD21-010	16.2	16	100	2.0	0	35	12	100	24	34
CD21-011	19.2	16	100	2.0	0	37	16	100	27	31
CD21-012	17.1	16	100	2.0	0	43	18	100	33	25
CD21-013	14.8	16	100	2.0	0	38	14	100	29	30
LD20-001	36.6	19	100	2.0	21	48	28	100	20	37
LD20-002	25.7	20	100	2.0	5	43	25	100	25	33
LD20-003	19.2	24	100	2.0	4	41	19	98	28	31
LD20-004	20.6	20	100	2.0	0	38	17	100	17	39

Table 1: General Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-005	41.0	20	100	2.0	100	56	34	100	20	37
LD20-006	7.1	21	100	2.0	0	36	7	84	28	43
LD20-007	22.4	27	100	2.0	15	46	24	100	29	29
LD20-008	42.5	23	100	2.0	65	54	35	100	30	31
LD20-009	27.9	23	100	2.0	9	45	21	100	31	31
LD20-010	22.0	20	100	2.0	0	37	21	100	17	40
LD20-011	15.4	37	100	2.0	89	57	13	100	50	5
LD20-012	36.9	23	100	2.0	39	49	38	100	18	39
LD20-013	7.9	11	100	2.0	0	30	9	95	22	39
LD20-014	17.8	14	100	2.0	0	40	19	100	26	33
LD20-015	10.7	14	100	2.0	0	32	12	100	22	36
LD20-016	18.3	22	100	2.0	0	37	17	95	25	36
LD20-017	10.1	33	100	2.0	0	37	10	88	31	33
LD20-018	21.1	24	100	1.9	100	66	21	100	56	5
LD20-019	6.3	8	100	2.0	0	39	6	100	35	22
LD20-020	5.5	1	100	1.0	100	100	3	.	.	.
LD20-021	37.4	22	100	2.0	36	47	32	99	23	36
LD20-022	29.3	19	100	2.0	11	45	29	100	19	38
LD20-023	50.6	19	100	2.0	100	62	37	100	18	39
LD20-024	38.2	21	100	2.0	95	55	36	100	26	32
LD20-025	42.6	13	100	2.0	15	43	34	100	18	39
LD20-026	16.5	25	100	2.0	0	32	11	100	24	34
LD20-027	51.6	23	100	1.9	100	67	45	100	29	35
LD20-028	15.8	23	100	2.0	0	29	10	100	21	37
LD20-029	37.2	26	100	1.8	100	82	40	100	70	0
LD20-030	28.2	19	100	1.9	100	60	25	100	47	12
LD20-031	39.8	24	100	1.8	100	80	48	100	62	1
LD20-032	48.1	25	100	1.9	100	67	50	100	35	29
LD20-033	39.9	36	100	2.0	100	64	37	100	43	12

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-034	11.5	36	100	2.0	19	43	6	100	39	16
LD20-035	18.0	37	57	2.0	43	45	11	66	43	31
LD20-036	7.5	14	50	2.0	50	52	6	65	52	16
LD20-037	11.3	36	100	2.0	0	36	9	100	30	28
LD20-038	39.4	43	100	1.9	100	77	42	98	62	2
LD20-040	11.3	38	100	2.0	8	40	7	100	35	22
LD20-041	7.1	13	92	2.0	46	50	6	88	47	8
LD20-042	38.1	25	100	1.9	100	71	49	100	40	24
LD20-043	33.9	23	100	2.0	30	50	29	100	30	32
LD20-044	48.1	26	100	1.9	100	75	54	100	45	19
LD20-045	31.4	26	100	2.0	65	52	32	99	30	32
LD20-046	25.0	21	100	2.0	29	45	27	98	25	33
LD20-047	23.8	30	100	1.9	47	55	24	98	42	25
LD20-048	35.5	19	100	2.0	100	56	40	100	28	30
LD20-049	12.3	36	100	2.0	61	52	7	100	49	7
LD20-050	17.5	17	100	2.0	12	43	23	89	28	34
LD20-052	11.0	26	100	2.0	0	29	10	99	22	36
LD20-054	12.9	30	53	2.0	3	44	9	91	39	21
LD20-055	26.2	20	100	2.0	0	43	23	100	23	35
LD20-056	10.2	36	100	1.7	100	79	10	100	76	0
LD20-057	39.7	30	100	1.9	100	66	39	99	45	17
LD20-058	43.1	29	100	1.9	100	73	44	98	54	6
LD20-059	28.6	26	100	2.0	0	39	23	100	21	36
LD20-060	34.6	26	100	2.0	96	60	36	100	36	21
LD20-061	40.0	30	100	1.9	100	70	32	100	55	6
LD20-062	13.7	28	100	2.0	0	36	11	100	28	30
LD20-063	24.8	28	100	2.0	39	49	24	100	33	25
LD20-064	15.1	27	100	2.0	0	40	14	100	30	29
LD20-065	19.6	26	100	2.0	0	36	19	99	22	37

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-066	24.0	18	100	2.0	11	44	20	100	25	33
LD20-067	7.9	23	100	2.0	0	23	6	100	17	39
LD20-068	8.4	24	100	2.0	0	35	8	100	30	28
LD20-069	11.6	25	100	2.0	0	35	11	100	27	32
LD20-070	7.2	30	100	2.0	0	24	6	100	19	38
LD20-071	40.3	25	100	2.0	100	73	46	99	50	4
LD20-072	34.4	25	100	2.0	100	71	34	100	56	1
LD20-073	14.6	21	100	2.0	0	36	19	100	28	31
LD20-074	11.4	26	100	2.0	0	45	11	100	38	19
LD20-075	15.3	26	100	2.0	0	38	15	100	27	31
LD20-076	21.6	23	100	2.0	0	41	20	100	26	32
LD20-077	7.3	20	100	2.0	0	26	6	100	19	38
LD20-078	6.1	1	100	2.0	0	24	7	100	19	38
LD20-079	22.3	23	100	2.2	4	37	16	98	19	39
LD20-080	9.5	24	100	2.0	0	23	8	100	16	40
LD20-081	9.6	25	100	2.0	0	26	8	100	20	38
LD20-082	20.2	13	100	1.9	8	45	18	100	34	30
LD20-083	19.5	24	100	2.0	46	48	12	100	26	32
LD20-084	14.1	26	100	2.0	0	32	13	100	22	36
LD20-086	6.0	28	100	2.0	4	36	6	100	31	27
LD20-088	16.0	19	100	1.9	100	59	18	100	51	4
LD20-089	7.9	24	100	2.0	0	28	7	100	22	36
LD20-091	4.8	12	100	2.0	0	23	6	100	17	40
LD20-092	40.2	24	100	1.8	100	76	46	100	55	7
LD20-095	9.6	24	100	2.0	0	33	8	100	28	31
LD20-096	8.9	24	100	2.0	0	36	7	100	30	28
LD20-098	9.2	27	100	2.0	7	43	9	100	38	20
LD20-099	36.0	20	100	2.0	100	64	42	100	38	19
LD20-100	30.5	24	100	1.8	100	76	35	100	63	0

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-101	48.0	27	100	1.9	100	78	55	100	51	13
LD20-102	33.8	25	100	1.8	100	82	39	99	71	0
LD20-103	14.2	21	100	2.0	19	48	13	100	40	17
LD20-104	12.0	25	100	2.0	20	46	10	100	41	16
LD20-105	12.9	20	100	2.0	50	50	13	100	42	14
LD20-106	46.3	30	100	1.7	100	87	59	99	71	1
LD20-107	53.6	26	100	1.8	100	82	57	100	60	3
LD20-108	19.5	31	100	2.0	6	40	17	100	28	32
LD20-109	15.3	30	100	2.0	7	39	12	100	31	30
LD20-110	14.6	19	100	2.0	0	28	13	100	18	39
LD20-111	22.8	29	100	2.0	3	41	23	100	24	35
LD20-112	9.2	36	100	2.0	0	31	8	99	25	34
LD20-115	6.9	12	100	2.0	100	61	6	100	49	6
LD20-116	7.2	10	100	2.0	60	53	7	100	49	5
LD21-001	17.7	21	100	2.0	0	38	15	93	25	37
LD21-002	23.7	22	100	2.0	9	43	23	99	26	32
LD21-003	19.4	22	100	2.0	5	41	17	99	29	30
LD21-004	24.9	17	100	2.0	0	35	20	100	19	38
LD21-005	37.5	20	100	2.0	85	53	32	100	19	38
LD21-007	22.2	27	100	2.0	15	46	23	100	30	29
LD21-008	44.2	23	100	2.0	87	57	37	100	32	29
LD21-009	24.6	24	100	2.0	4	41	19	97	28	36
LD21-010	33.1	23	100	2.0	4	41	28	99	19	38
LD21-011	14.2	36	100	2.0	81	55	11	100	49	5
LD21-012	37.7	18	100	2.0	11	47	34	100	19	38
LD21-013	8.3	21	100	2.0	0	30	7	96	24	36
LD21-014	17.8	14	100	2.0	0	40	19	100	26	33
LD21-015	10.6	14	100	2.0	0	32	13	100	22	36
LD21-016	13.2	25	100	2.0	0	34	14	93	24	38

Table 1: General Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-017	10.3	33	100	2.0	0	38	10	88	32	32
LD21-018	21.6	24	100	1.9	100	66	22	100	57	5
LD21-019	5.1	8	100	2.0	0	37	5	100	33	25
LD21-020	5.3	1	100	1.0	100	100	3	.	.	.
LD21-021	10.8	35	100	2.0	0	38	7	92	34	28
LD21-022	27.7	20	100	2.0	0	41	26	100	19	38
LD21-023	52.5	19	100	2.0	100	62	39	100	17	39
LD21-024	36.6	21	100	2.0	86	54	36	100	26	32
LD21-025	40.0	21	100	2.0	33	46	29	100	18	39
LD21-027	50.8	21	100	2.0	100	64	48	100	27	31
LD21-028	16.2	22	100	2.0	0	28	11	100	19	38
LD21-029	38.3	24	100	1.8	100	80	44	100	65	0
LD21-030	33.0	23	100	1.8	100	81	35	100	71	0
LD21-031	38.1	5	100	1.0	100	100	45	.	.	.
LD21-032	42.4	19	100	1.9	100	63	43	100	35	31
LD21-033	29.8	43	100	1.9	100	77	30	100	67	0
LD21-034	18.2	36	100	2.0	56	51	13	100	44	11
LD21-036	8.0	9	100	2.0	0	36	7	100	31	28
LD21-038	43.6	2	100	1.0	100	100	47	.	.	.
LD21-040	10.7	23	100	2.0	9	44	6	100	41	15
LD21-042	38.1	25	100	1.9	100	71	49	100	40	24
LD21-043	34.8	23	100	2.0	43	51	30	100	31	31
LD21-044	48.1	26	100	1.9	100	75	54	100	45	19
LD21-045	30.3	25	100	2.0	32	49	31	99	26	33
LD21-046	28.5	21	100	2.0	14	44	27	100	22	36
LD21-047	21.5	29	100	1.9	48	57	23	96	45	22
LD21-048	35.5	19	100	2.0	100	56	40	100	28	30
LD21-049	13.0	36	100	2.0	47	50	8	100	46	9
LD21-050	17.9	17	100	2.0	12	44	25	90	28	34

Table 1: General Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-052	22.3	20	100	2.0	20	46	22	99	24	34
LD21-054	11.1	31	58	2.0	6	44	10	86	39	23
LD21-055	24.0	20	100	2.0	0	42	21	100	24	34
LD21-056	10.1	36	100	1.7	100	79	10	100	76	0
LD21-057	39.7	30	100	1.9	100	66	39	99	45	17
LD21-058	42.8	29	100	1.9	100	72	44	99	52	8
LD21-059	26.6	26	100	2.0	0	37	20	100	21	36
LD21-060	34.9	26	100	2.0	100	61	37	100	37	20
LD21-061	40.8	30	100	1.9	100	70	34	100	55	6
LD21-062	13.3	28	100	2.0	0	35	10	100	28	30
LD21-063	24.3	29	100	2.0	24	48	22	100	34	25
LD21-064	15.5	28	100	2.0	0	40	14	100	30	29
LD21-065	18.9	26	100	2.0	0	36	19	99	22	36
LD21-066	27.2	35	100	2.0	66	53	22	100	39	17
LD21-067	13.0	21	100	2.0	0	31	13	100	21	36
LD21-068	8.1	24	100	2.0	0	35	7	100	30	28
LD21-069	11.6	21	100	2.0	0	33	10	100	26	33
LD21-070	7.0	30	100	2.0	0	24	6	100	19	38
LD21-071	39.5	24	100	2.0	100	71	45	98	49	4
LD21-072	33.7	24	100	2.0	100	69	32	100	54	1
LD21-073	17.0	13	100	2.0	0	40	12	100	26	33
LD21-074	11.3	26	100	2.0	0	43	10	100	36	22
LD21-075	15.3	26	100	2.0	0	38	15	100	27	31
LD21-076	20.4	24	100	2.0	0	39	19	100	25	33
LD21-077	5.5	19	100	2.0	0	26	6	100	19	38
LD21-078	5.5	1	100	2.0	0	26	5	92	23	39
LD21-079	16.9	21	100	2.0	0	38	12	90	27	37
LD21-080	9.4	24	100	2.0	0	24	9	100	17	40
LD21-081	9.6	25	100	2.0	0	26	9	100	20	38

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-082	21.0	25	100	2.0	4	39	16	100	28	34
LD21-083	11.9	18	100	2.0	0	28	8	100	22	36
LD21-084	16.0	26	100	2.0	0	34	15	100	23	35
LD21-086	6.1	28	100	2.0	4	35	6	100	31	28
LD21-088	23.3	19	100	1.9	100	64	23	100	53	5
LD21-089	6.7	24	100	2.0	0	26	6	100	21	36
LD21-091	14.1	19	100	2.0	0	37	19	100	31	28
LD21-092	39.1	24	100	1.8	100	74	44	100	54	10
LD21-095	7.6	24	100	2.0	0	32	5	100	28	30
LD21-096	9.9	25	100	2.0	0	36	9	100	30	28
LD21-098	7.5	27	100	2.0	0	41	7	100	37	20
LD21-099	46.8	28	100	1.8	100	82	57	100	59	2
LD21-100	31.0	24	100	1.8	100	76	35	100	63	0
LD21-101	46.8	26	100	1.8	100	76	52	100	51	13
LD21-102	37.6	26	100	1.8	100	84	44	99	73	0
LD21-103	11.8	22	100	2.0	0	43	12	99	35	23
LD21-104	8.5	26	100	2.0	0	45	7	100	41	15
LD21-105	12.2	24	100	2.0	42	49	13	100	42	13
LD21-106	43.4	27	100	1.8	100	83	54	99	64	1
LD21-107	47.4	23	100	1.8	100	77	49	100	55	9
LD21-108	19.3	30	100	2.0	3	38	16	100	26	32
LD21-109	16.8	17	100	1.9	6	42	14	100	33	31
LD21-110	15.7	19	100	2.0	0	34	19	100	19	38
LD21-111	16.4	19	100	2.0	0	31	14	100	20	38
LD21-112	27.8	22	100	1.9	100	74	37	100	59	1
LD21-113	6.8	18	100	2.0	0	33	6	96	27	33
LD21-114	7.6	13	100	1.9	100	67	7	100	66	0
LD21-115	6.3	7	100	2.0	29	49	5	100	46	7
SD20-001	24.6	20	100	2.0	0	45	19	96	25	34

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD20-002	14.1	21	100	2.0	0	35	15	99	25	34
SD20-003	42.2	18	100	2.0	100	55	42	100	23	35
SD20-004	46.5	19	100	2.0	100	60	40	100	24	35
SD20-005	34.8	20	100	2.0	100	54	29	100	26	32
SD20-006	14.5	22	100	2.0	0	34	16	98	21	38
SD20-007	33.6	19	100	2.0	5	47	36	100	20	38
SD20-008	12.6	18	100	2.0	0	38	11	86	31	34
SD20-009	12.0	22	100	1.9	64	57	10	100	52	8
SD20-010	20.1	20	100	2.0	0	39	20	100	18	39
SD20-011	27.5	20	100	2.0	25	48	22	100	22	35
SD20-012	18.8	22	100	2.0	0	42	16	100	24	34
SD20-013	25.1	20	100	2.0	40	47	25	99	27	31
SD20-014	32.1	37	100	2.0	100	65	31	100	49	6
SD20-015	18.1	35	100	2.0	37	45	12	100	38	19
SD20-016	12.9	37	100	2.0	46	50	9	100	45	10
SD20-017	8.8	36	100	2.0	0	39	7	90	35	27
SD20-018	24.4	20	100	2.0	5	44	22	100	28	30
SD20-019	33.6	22	100	2.0	77	53	32	100	32	30
SD20-020	35.4	24	100	1.8	100	78	40	100	64	1
SD20-021	41.2	20	100	2.0	100	67	50	100	34	24
SD20-022	30.0	16	100	2.0	38	49	27	100	29	29
SD20-023	11.1	25	56	1.9	56	56	10	82	52	14
SD20-024	22.0	22	100	2.0	0	44	20	100	31	28
SD20-025	23.4	19	100	2.0	5	43	24	100	23	35
SD20-026	12.6	25	100	2.0	0	26	8	100	19	38
SD20-027	24.0	26	100	2.0	23	44	20	100	30	28
SD20-028	43.9	28	100	1.9	100	72	42	100	53	8
SD20-029	10.5	22	100	2.0	0	28	9	100	19	39
SD20-030	14.7	19	100	2.0	0	33	17	99	21	37

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD20-031	22.0	19	100	2.0	5	45	23	100	30	29
SD20-032	23.9	23	100	2.0	96	57	23	100	45	10
SD20-033	14.4	18	100	2.0	0	31	12	100	22	36
SD20-034	10.1	21	100	2.0	0	31	10	100	25	33
SD20-035	12.2	22	100	2.0	0	36	12	100	28	31
SD20-036	17.9	24	100	2.0	0	41	12	100	24	34
SD20-037	13.8	17	100	2.0	65	50	12	100	43	11
SD20-038	42.8	26	100	1.8	100	82	50	99	65	0
SD20-039	21.3	18	100	2.0	100	57	24	100	44	11
SD20-040	38.7	24	100	1.8	100	77	48	100	56	6
SD20-041	29.1	21	100	2.0	100	58	30	100	40	16
SD20-042	7.9	18	100	2.0	0	31	6	100	26	33
SD20-043	17.4	29	100	2.0	7	38	15	100	28	33
SD20-044	13.1	22	100	2.0	0	32	16	100	21	37
SD20-046	5.5	1	100	2.0	0	28	5	100	26	32
SD20-049	6.4	11	100	2.0	100	61	6	100	53	2
SD21-001	28.8	18	100	2.0	22	47	20	96	24	35
SD21-002	29.3	16	100	2.0	12	46	23	100	26	32
SD21-003	25.9	18	100	2.0	0	43	26	100	23	35
SD21-004	34.1	17	100	2.0	35	49	33	100	23	35
SD21-005	39.3	19	100	2.0	100	57	31	100	26	33
SD21-006	13.8	22	100	2.0	0	32	15	99	20	38
SD21-007	11.5	22	100	1.9	64	57	10	100	52	8
SD21-008	13.9	17	100	2.0	0	38	11	85	31	35
SD21-009	23.1	16	100	2.0	0	38	20	99	23	36
SD21-010	15.9	22	100	2.0	0	38	10	100	21	36
SD21-011	35.7	17	100	2.0	71	52	32	100	27	31
SD21-012	19.6	22	100	2.0	0	42	16	100	24	34
SD21-013	20.5	18	100	2.0	0	43	22	99	28	31

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-014	41.5	35	100	2.0	100	63	39	100	39	17
SD21-015	13.9	36	100	2.0	67	54	9	100	50	6
SD21-016	8.1	36	100	2.0	33	46	6	100	43	12
SD21-017	10.1	36	100	2.0	0	36	8	99	31	28
SD21-018	21.5	36	100	2.0	53	51	16	100	41	14
SD21-019	45.0	24	100	1.9	100	70	46	100	44	23
SD21-020	26.2	21	81	2.0	81	55	16	88	48	8
SD21-021	18.3	18	100	2.0	0	39	21	99	23	35
SD21-022	33.2	18	100	2.0	100	62	30	100	46	9
SD21-023	16.0	16	100	2.0	100	65	24	84	35	26
SD21-024	28.4	17	100	2.0	59	53	31	98	30	29
SD21-025	17.1	22	100	2.0	5	40	16	100	29	30
SD21-026	16.8	22	100	2.0	0	34	16	100	22	36
SD21-027	26.2	25	100	2.0	68	52	22	99	39	18
SD21-028	49.5	26	100	1.9	100	74	50	99	50	11
SD21-029	17.3	16	100	2.0	0	35	13	100	21	37
SD21-030	8.8	18	100	2.0	0	25	7	100	19	38
SD21-031	11.5	20	100	2.0	0	37	12	100	29	29
SD21-032	33.8	24	100	2.0	100	68	35	99	51	2
SD21-033	14.4	18	100	2.0	0	32	13	100	22	36
SD21-034	18.9	24	100	2.0	21	45	13	100	25	33
SD21-035	11.1	22	100	2.0	0	35	10	100	28	31
SD21-037	10.7	22	100	2.0	0	33	10	100	26	32
SD21-038	33.4	19	100	2.0	100	62	35	100	42	13
SD21-039	39.0	23	100	1.8	100	76	48	100	55	8
SD21-040	47.5	25	100	1.8	100	86	59	97	69	0
SD21-041	10.0	20	100	2.0	0	44	9	100	38	19
SD21-042	20.3	18	100	1.9	100	62	20	100	53	2
SD21-043	17.9	29	100	2.0	7	39	15	100	28	32

Table 1: General Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-044	12.7	22	100	2.0	0	33	15	100	20	37
SD21-045	7.1	21	100	2.0	0	31	7	100	26	32
SD21-049	6.9	12	100	1.9	100	65	6	100	54	1

Table 2: Primary Elections

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
CD20-001	41.9	17	100	4.0	100	61	62	69	47	10
CD20-002	18.2	22	100	3.6	68	56	25	69	52	16
CD20-003	18.7	18	100	3.9	78	55	40	66	48	19
CD20-004	24.4	20	100	3.8	80	61	33	67	57	9
CD20-005	10.7	19	100	3.8	58	52	22	64	48	14
CD20-006	32.0	18	100	4.1	72	53	47	60	46	19
CD20-007	15.4	20	100	3.8	80	53	29	63	50	4
CD20-008	25.9	17	100	4.0	76	54	52	60	48	17
CD20-009	17.4	20	100	4.3	60	50	32	64	45	10
CD20-010	10.1	18	100	3.9	72	52	25	62	49	24
CD20-011	3.7	2	100	3.5	50	50	5	82	46	26
CD20-012	34.1	23	100	3.6	87	61	54	69	51	17
CD20-013	13.9	18	100	3.9	78	56	33	61	53	11
CD21-001	22.4	18	100	3.9	78	55	42	66	48	16
CD21-002	39.1	17	100	4.0	100	61	60	70	47	11
CD21-003	15.7	22	100	3.7	68	53	27	66	46	11
CD21-004	27.5	17	100	4.0	71	54	55	61	47	17
CD21-005	23.2	21	100	3.6	71	58	32	69	54	16
CD21-006	20.4	18	100	4.3	61	50	24	74	45	19
CD21-007	15.3	18	100	3.9	67	52	31	62	48	22
CD21-008	16.5	18	100	3.9	72	52	35	63	46	22
CD21-009	36.3	23	100	3.6	83	61	55	69	51	17
CD21-010	16.2	18	100	3.9	78	53	35	62	48	22
CD21-011	19.2	17	100	4.0	71	53	35	64	47	20
CD21-012	17.1	19	100	3.8	74	53	36	63	48	18
CD21-013	14.8	20	100	3.9	80	54	31	65	49	10
CD21-014	3.6	2	100	3.5	50	50	5	82	46	26
LD20-001	36.6	18	100	3.9	89	57	57	73	38	17
LD20-002	25.7	18	100	3.9	89	58	46	71	47	10

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-003	19.2	22	100	3.6	64	54	41	66	44	22
LD20-004	20.6	18	100	3.9	89	58	52	70	45	10
LD20-005	41.0	20	100	3.7	95	61	61	69	47	15
LD20-006	7.1	16	100	4.1	75	52	15	64	51	6
LD20-007	22.4	23	100	3.5	96	66	49	81	52	2
LD20-008	42.5	19	100	3.8	95	60	59	67	49	12
LD20-009	27.9	19	100	3.8	79	58	38	67	52	8
LD20-010	22.0	17	100	4.0	76	54	44	72	36	15
LD20-011	15.4	22	100	3.6	50	47	15	70	42	25
LD20-012	36.9	18	100	3.9	89	60	61	67	48	5
LD20-013	7.9	17	100	4.0	65	52	22	66	47	9
LD20-014	17.8	16	100	4.1	94	56	47	62	51	11
LD20-015	10.7	16	100	4.1	75	52	38	62	46	8
LD20-016	18.3	19	100	3.8	79	52	39	61	46	4
LD20-017	10.1	22	100	3.6	73	55	25	64	51	12
LD20-018	21.1	19	100	3.8	79	56	35	62	53	11
LD20-019	6.3	20	100	3.8	55	51	10	64	49	10
LD20-020	5.5	15	100	4.1	60	54	8	77	52	5
LD20-021	37.4	23	100	3.6	87	56	63	62	45	15
LD20-022	29.3	23	100	3.7	91	58	56	70	43	7
LD20-023	50.6	21	100	3.8	86	61	66	67	46	11
LD20-024	38.2	19	100	3.8	95	63	63	68	52	10
LD20-025	42.6	12	100	4.2	92	57	69	63	46	10
LD20-026	16.5	19	100	3.8	63	53	35	66	46	24
LD20-027	51.6	23	100	3.6	78	57	59	71	37	30
LD20-028	15.8	19	100	3.8	95	56	35	65	51	7
LD20-029	37.2	24	100	3.6	67	61	37	78	50	12
LD20-030	28.2	23	100	3.6	70	59	32	73	52	13
LD20-031	39.8	24	100	3.6	92	63	57	73	49	14

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-032	48.1	20	100	3.7	100	68	65	78	51	8
LD20-033	39.9	23	100	3.6	83	62	58	74	48	16
LD20-034	11.5	22	100	3.6	32	42	12	73	38	39
LD20-035	18.0	24	100	3.5	71	58	31	67	55	18
LD20-036	7.5	24	100	3.5	58	52	13	62	50	13
LD20-037	11.3	23	100	3.6	57	52	23	63	49	13
LD20-038	39.4	22	100	3.5	77	60	52	68	53	22
LD20-040	11.3	21	100	3.6	43	47	17	70	42	25
LD20-041	7.1	22	100	3.6	41	46	11	73	43	23
LD20-042	38.1	10	100	3.0	90	61	76	67	42	12
LD20-043	33.9	19	100	3.9	79	52	51	59	46	26
LD20-044	48.1	19	100	3.9	84	56	76	60	44	32
LD20-045	31.4	20	100	3.9	75	54	60	62	43	25
LD20-046	25.0	18	100	4.0	89	52	41	61	46	11
LD20-047	23.8	24	100	3.7	75	51	23	68	46	8
LD20-048	35.5	22	100	3.7	91	58	63	67	44	16
LD20-049	12.3	22	100	3.6	32	42	10	68	39	37
LD20-050	17.5	20	100	3.8	60	51	28	61	48	13
LD20-052	11.0	18	100	3.9	72	56	26	62	54	9
LD20-054	12.9	18	100	3.9	67	55	18	63	54	0
LD20-055	26.2	20	100	4.1	75	52	51	74	35	21
LD20-056	10.2	22	100	3.8	36	42	8	77	40	29
LD20-057	39.7	20	100	3.9	80	56	56	63	46	18
LD20-058	43.1	21	100	3.8	76	55	60	62	46	25
LD20-059	28.6	21	100	3.9	76	55	60	64	41	19
LD20-060	34.6	20	100	3.9	85	58	60	64	48	12
LD20-061	40.0	20	100	3.9	70	54	35	63	49	17
LD20-062	13.7	21	100	3.8	67	51	27	64	46	9
LD20-063	24.8	20	100	3.8	80	55	43	62	49	13

Table 2: Primary Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-064	15.1	20	100	3.9	65	52	30	60	48	24
LD20-065	19.6	18	100	3.9	89	56	44	66	49	16
LD20-066	24.0	18	100	4.1	78	52	42	63	43	10
LD20-067	7.9	18	100	3.9	61	50	22	70	44	13
LD20-068	8.4	19	100	4.1	84	57	25	65	54	4
LD20-069	11.6	19	100	3.9	79	54	31	64	49	5
LD20-070	7.2	18	100	3.9	83	56	19	67	53	16
LD20-071	40.3	23	100	3.7	87	58	62	63	50	14
LD20-072	34.4	23	100	3.7	70	54	40	65	46	20
LD20-073	14.6	18	100	4.0	72	51	36	64	44	21
LD20-074	11.4	19	100	3.9	63	50	23	64	46	8
LD20-075	15.3	20	100	3.8	75	52	37	65	44	24
LD20-076	21.6	19	100	3.8	95	56	42	61	53	19
LD20-077	7.3	19	100	3.9	79	54	23	62	51	8
LD20-078	6.1	18	100	3.9	67	53	19	62	51	12
LD20-079	22.3	19	100	4.1	84	55	41	68	46	13
LD20-080	9.5	18	100	3.9	83	56	26	63	53	16
LD20-081	9.6	18	100	3.9	78	56	24	62	54	9
LD20-082	20.2	10	100	2.8	100	61	42	70	55	7
LD20-083	19.5	18	100	3.9	78	53	37	64	46	25
LD20-084	14.1	18	100	3.9	89	52	31	64	47	9
LD20-086	6.0	20	100	3.7	65	54	14	66	52	16
LD20-087	5.1	19	100	3.8	74	52	13	66	49	11
LD20-088	16.0	14	100	4.3	64	55	24	67	51	13
LD20-089	7.9	17	100	4.0	88	55	23	61	54	1
LD20-090	3.3	17	100	3.9	53	47	8	70	45	19
LD20-091	4.8	19	100	3.8	63	53	13	65	50	29
LD20-092	40.2	21	100	3.6	81	60	64	67	48	12
LD20-094	5.7	23	100	3.8	52	46	12	58	44	14

Table 2: Primary Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-095	9.6	18	100	3.9	67	51	22	61	48	11
LD20-096	8.9	17	100	4.0	71	50	17	59	48	16
LD20-097	5.5	18	100	3.9	61	55	15	67	52	8
LD20-098	9.2	18	100	3.9	56	54	18	63	52	21
LD20-099	36.0	23	100	3.6	87	62	65	70	47	15
LD20-100	30.5	20	100	3.7	80	57	41	66	51	19
LD20-101	48.0	21	100	3.6	90	62	72	69	44	19
LD20-102	33.8	19	100	4.2	84	59	46	68	52	15
LD20-103	14.2	18	100	3.9	67	53	24	64	49	21
LD20-104	12.0	17	100	3.9	53	46	15	66	43	33
LD20-105	12.9	18	100	4.1	78	55	24	65	52	9
LD20-106	46.3	26	100	3.7	100	64	72	72	44	12
LD20-107	53.6	24	100	3.6	96	64	72	72	44	12
LD20-108	19.5	19	100	3.8	74	53	41	69	43	14
LD20-109	15.3	20	100	3.7	75	53	30	62	49	8
LD20-110	14.6	19	100	3.8	84	53	37	64	47	12
LD20-111	22.8	21	100	3.8	90	57	46	71	45	9
LD20-112	9.2	20	100	3.8	70	51	19	66	47	11
LD20-115	6.9	17	100	4.2	59	54	7	66	54	13
LD20-116	7.2	20	100	4.0	65	56	8	63	55	18
LD20-117	3.6	22	100	3.7	59	51	5	67	50	4
LD21-001	17.7	17	100	4.0	100	56	35	70	49	9
LD21-002	23.7	18	100	3.9	72	56	37	63	52	22
LD21-003	19.4	21	100	3.7	62	52	35	68	43	22
LD21-004	24.9	18	100	4.0	83	56	53	66	45	7
LD21-005	37.5	19	100	3.8	95	59	60	68	45	20
LD21-007	22.2	23	100	3.5	96	66	48	81	52	3
LD21-008	44.2	19	100	3.8	95	60	59	67	48	10
LD21-009	24.6	17	100	4.0	71	56	39	61	52	16

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-010	33.1	18	100	3.9	94	57	58	65	47	16
LD21-011	14.2	22	100	3.6	45	46	14	71	42	31
LD21-012	37.7	17	100	4.0	94	59	60	68	46	6
LD21-013	8.3	18	100	3.9	72	54	19	66	50	14
LD21-014	17.8	16	100	4.1	94	56	47	62	51	11
LD21-015	10.6	17	100	4.1	71	51	39	60	45	6
LD21-016	13.2	17	100	4.0	71	52	38	61	47	6
LD21-017	10.3	23	100	3.6	70	53	25	62	49	12
LD21-018	21.6	20	100	3.9	70	54	35	60	50	11
LD21-019	5.1	20	100	3.8	70	53	10	64	51	11
LD21-020	5.3	14	100	4.1	64	56	8	77	54	5
LD21-021	10.8	22	100	3.6	59	51	16	63	49	15
LD21-022	27.7	21	100	3.8	90	56	55	69	45	10
LD21-023	52.5	19	100	3.8	89	63	67	70	46	11
LD21-024	36.6	18	100	3.9	94	61	61	66	51	11
LD21-025	40.0	19	100	3.8	100	62	63	74	45	13
LD21-026	16.8	10	100	2.8	80	60	37	75	52	30
LD21-027	50.8	22	100	3.7	86	60	62	73	49	14
LD21-028	16.2	20	100	3.8	90	55	36	64	50	7
LD21-029	38.3	24	100	3.6	79	62	43	77	51	12
LD21-030	33.0	23	100	3.6	74	60	30	74	54	13
LD21-032	42.4	18	100	3.9	94	62	60	80	34	15
LD21-033	29.8	22	100	3.6	73	61	34	74	55	8
LD21-034	18.2	22	100	3.6	50	50	18	67	46	28
LD21-036	8.0	8	100	5.2	50	42	13	53	40	0
LD21-040	10.7	22	100	3.6	41	45	14	76	41	28
LD21-042	38.1	10	100	3.0	90	61	76	67	42	12
LD21-043	34.8	19	100	3.9	79	52	52	59	46	26
LD21-044	48.1	19	100	3.9	84	56	76	60	44	32

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-045	30.3	18	100	4.0	78	54	60	63	41	22
LD21-046	28.5	20	100	3.9	80	51	42	64	42	8
LD21-047	21.5	25	100	3.7	80	51	26	66	47	5
LD21-048	35.5	22	100	3.7	91	58	63	67	44	16
LD21-049	13.0	22	100	3.6	27	40	14	77	34	28
LD21-050	17.9	19	100	3.8	63	52	30	61	48	13
LD21-052	22.3	18	100	4.0	78	56	38	62	51	12
LD21-053	18.8	10	100	2.9	90	64	40	68	60	12
LD21-054	11.1	26	100	3.4	38	45	17	58	42	25
LD21-055	24.0	20	100	4.1	75	51	49	74	36	21
LD21-056	10.1	22	100	3.8	36	42	8	77	40	29
LD21-057	39.7	20	100	3.9	80	56	56	63	46	18
LD21-058	42.8	21	100	3.8	76	55	60	63	45	25
LD21-059	26.6	20	100	3.9	75	55	58	65	41	18
LD21-060	34.9	20	100	3.9	85	58	60	64	48	12
LD21-061	40.8	20	100	3.9	70	54	37	63	49	17
LD21-062	13.3	21	100	3.8	67	51	26	64	46	9
LD21-063	24.3	18	100	3.9	78	53	40	63	46	19
LD21-064	15.5	19	100	3.8	68	53	30	61	50	24
LD21-065	18.9	18	100	3.9	89	56	42	66	49	16
LD21-066	27.2	21	100	3.6	76	58	40	66	54	12
LD21-067	13.0	17	100	4.0	76	51	35	68	41	21
LD21-068	8.1	17	100	4.9	82	59	24	66	56	4
LD21-069	11.6	18	100	4.0	78	52	30	63	47	6
LD21-070	7.0	19	100	3.9	79	53	18	67	50	17
LD21-071	39.5	23	100	3.7	87	58	60	63	50	15
LD21-072	33.7	22	100	3.7	68	55	39	65	47	16
LD21-073	17.0	10	100	2.8	90	57	35	72	49	20
LD21-074	11.3	19	100	3.9	68	52	23	64	48	8

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-075	15.3	20	100	3.8	75	52	37	65	44	24
LD21-076	20.4	20	100	3.7	95	57	41	61	54	7
LD21-077	5.5	20	100	3.9	75	52	20	60	50	8
LD21-078	5.5	18	100	3.9	72	53	17	59	51	8
LD21-079	16.9	18	100	3.9	83	57	30	66	53	3
LD21-080	9.4	19	100	3.9	84	54	27	62	51	16
LD21-081	9.6	19	100	3.8	79	55	24	61	54	10
LD21-082	21.0	18	100	3.9	89	56	37	63	52	12
LD21-083	11.9	17	100	4.0	82	53	31	69	45	20
LD21-084	16.0	18	100	3.9	83	52	35	63	46	10
LD21-086	6.1	20	100	3.7	65	54	13	67	51	18
LD21-087	4.9	19	100	3.8	58	51	11	63	49	31
LD21-088	23.3	14	100	4.3	71	55	28	64	52	13
LD21-089	6.7	17	100	4.0	76	52	19	64	49	2
LD21-090	3.5	19	100	3.8	58	49	8	69	47	13
LD21-091	14.1	18	100	3.9	72	51	33	65	46	20
LD21-092	39.1	20	100	3.7	80	59	62	66	48	10
LD21-094	5.3	20	100	3.8	65	51	11	62	50	12
LD21-095	7.6	16	100	4.2	69	50	14	62	48	17
LD21-096	9.9	17	100	4.0	76	53	21	59	51	16
LD21-097	5.5	18	100	3.9	61	54	15	67	52	8
LD21-098	7.5	18	100	3.9	50	50	14	66	48	28
LD21-099	46.8	27	100	3.7	96	62	74	69	44	15
LD21-100	31.0	20	100	3.7	80	57	41	65	51	19
LD21-101	46.8	21	100	3.8	90	60	70	67	43	16
LD21-102	37.6	22	100	3.9	86	59	51	68	50	19
LD21-103	11.8	20	100	3.8	70	53	25	66	49	22
LD21-104	8.5	17	100	3.9	35	40	12	67	37	47
LD21-105	12.2	18	100	4.1	78	55	24	63	52	9

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-106	43.4	27	100	3.7	100	63	68	73	45	13
LD21-107	47.4	23	100	3.6	96	65	68	72	47	14
LD21-108	19.3	19	100	3.8	74	53	38	67	44	15
LD21-110	15.7	19	100	4.0	95	56	46	68	46	11
LD21-111	16.4	19	100	4.0	74	52	33	65	47	10
LD21-112	27.8	20	100	3.7	75	58	48	67	49	18
LD21-113	6.8	19	100	4.0	63	49	13	59	47	3
LD21-114	7.6	19	100	4.4	63	53	7	61	52	9
LD21-115	6.3	17	100	4.2	53	50	6	62	49	13
LD21-117	3.5	10	100	2.8	70	58	5	65	57	4
SD20-001	24.6	17	100	4.0	94	56	41	66	48	10
SD20-002	14.1	20	100	3.9	60	50	32	67	46	23
SD20-003	42.2	18	100	3.9	94	64	61	77	45	7
SD20-004	46.5	18	100	4.1	94	59	65	68	49	12
SD20-005	34.8	17	100	4.0	82	56	49	64	49	21
SD20-006	14.5	17	100	4.0	82	55	45	64	47	10
SD20-007	33.6	20	100	3.8	95	57	62	64	48	7
SD20-008	12.6	21	100	3.7	62	51	27	64	44	20
SD20-009	12.0	18	100	3.9	72	54	20	62	53	13
SD20-010	20.1	19	100	3.9	89	57	47	65	49	14
SD20-011	27.5	18	100	3.9	89	60	52	69	48	14
SD20-012	18.8	21	100	3.7	67	54	41	62	47	5
SD20-013	25.1	25	100	3.9	72	52	32	64	47	4
SD20-014	32.1	22	100	3.6	82	61	44	73	52	8
SD20-015	18.1	22	100	3.5	64	55	23	64	53	12
SD20-016	12.9	22	100	3.6	41	45	15	75	40	24
SD20-017	8.8	22	100	3.6	55	49	15	63	47	21
SD20-018	24.4	20	100	3.8	90	63	46	74	53	11
SD20-019	33.6	18	100	4.0	78	53	56	59	45	16

Table 2: Primary Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD20-020	35.4	24	100	3.6	71	61	42	74	52	13
SD20-021	41.2	21	100	3.8	76	57	73	61	46	16
SD20-022	30.0	21	100	3.9	76	59	41	66	55	0
SD20-023	11.1	23	100	3.9	48	48	13	58	47	6
SD20-024	22.0	18	100	3.9	83	55	43	63	49	18
SD20-025	23.4	18	100	4.0	67	53	44	62	46	20
SD20-026	12.6	17	100	4.0	82	55	29	63	51	5
SD20-027	24.0	21	100	3.8	76	54	45	62	48	5
SD20-028	43.9	20	100	3.9	70	55	50	64	46	17
SD20-029	10.5	18	100	3.9	78	56	28	63	53	10
SD20-030	14.7	18	100	3.9	78	51	38	60	47	22
SD20-031	22.0	19	100	3.8	79	54	49	64	45	24
SD20-032	23.9	21	100	3.7	62	51	35	65	44	25
SD20-033	14.4	19	100	3.8	95	55	35	63	52	8
SD20-034	10.1	19	100	4.0	74	51	24	60	48	10
SD20-035	12.2	19	100	3.9	84	55	32	62	51	6
SD20-036	17.9	18	100	3.9	83	53	37	65	46	17
SD20-037	13.8	16	100	4.2	56	46	18	62	43	29
SD20-038	42.8	25	100	3.7	92	62	63	69	50	17
SD20-039	21.3	20	100	3.8	80	55	40	66	48	15
SD20-040	38.7	24	100	3.8	88	62	65	69	47	16
SD20-041	29.1	23	100	3.6	83	60	50	69	51	17
SD20-042	7.9	17	100	4.0	82	52	18	60	51	2
SD20-043	17.4	19	100	3.8	79	54	36	65	47	8
SD20-044	13.1	18	100	3.9	72	54	35	66	48	10
SD20-045	3.3	1	100	2.0	0	38	6	72	33	44
SD20-046	5.5	20	100	3.7	65	54	12	63	52	7
SD20-047	5.1	18	100	3.9	39	45	9	65	42	23
SD20-049	6.4	19	100	4.2	68	56	6	63	55	11

Table 2: Primary Elections (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-001	28.8	17	100	4.0	88	57	46	67	47	7
SD21-002	29.3	17	100	4.0	94	60	48	70	49	9
SD21-003	25.9	21	100	4.0	90	57	46	70	46	10
SD21-004	34.1	17	100	4.0	88	59	59	66	48	12
SD21-005	39.3	17	100	4.0	94	59	56	65	50	12
SD21-006	13.8	18	100	4.1	83	55	44	63	48	9
SD21-007	11.5	17	100	4.1	71	54	19	62	53	14
SD21-008	13.9	20	100	3.8	65	51	25	64	46	15
SD21-009	23.1	17	100	4.0	94	56	50	66	46	5
SD21-010	15.9	20	100	3.8	80	54	35	65	48	13
SD21-011	35.7	19	100	4.0	84	61	59	74	45	12
SD21-012	19.6	20	100	3.8	65	53	42	62	46	18
SD21-013	20.5	18	100	3.9	78	60	37	66	56	0
SD21-014	41.5	22	100	3.6	86	62	61	75	43	21
SD21-015	13.9	22	100	3.6	36	43	12	72	39	32
SD21-016	8.1	22	100	3.6	45	45	11	76	42	21
SD21-017	10.1	22	100	3.6	64	54	20	62	52	6
SD21-018	21.5	22	100	3.5	64	56	27	64	53	12
SD21-019	45.0	19	100	3.9	74	54	69	58	45	17
SD21-020	26.2	21	100	3.8	67	55	33	76	47	14
SD21-021	18.3	18	100	3.9	61	50	41	59	44	5
SD21-022	33.2	23	100	3.6	74	60	37	73	52	14
SD21-023	16.0	24	100	3.6	58	51	21	60	50	18
SD21-024	28.4	23	100	3.8	78	53	42	69	44	6
SD21-025	17.1	19	100	3.8	84	56	34	62	53	15
SD21-026	16.8	18	100	3.9	78	54	39	62	50	25
SD21-027	26.2	21	100	3.9	67	53	36	62	47	12
SD21-028	49.5	20	100	3.9	85	57	65	63	46	17
SD21-029	17.3	17	100	4.0	76	50	39	67	41	21

Table 2: Primary Elections (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-030	8.8	18	100	3.9	83	56	24	62	54	10
SD21-031	11.5	19	100	3.9	68	49	30	64	42	23
SD21-032	33.8	22	100	3.7	68	54	46	63	45	24
SD21-033	14.4	20	100	3.8	95	56	34	62	53	7
SD21-034	18.9	20	100	3.7	85	55	38	63	50	4
SD21-035	11.1	18	100	4.0	83	54	30	62	50	7
SD21-036	4.2	18	100	3.9	56	48	10	65	46	14
SD21-037	10.7	17	100	4.0	71	52	23	62	49	11
SD21-038	33.4	23	100	3.6	91	61	55	71	49	15
SD21-039	39.0	24	100	3.5	92	63	65	70	47	14
SD21-040	47.5	24	100	3.8	100	64	71	70	49	16
SD21-041	10.0	17	100	3.9	65	51	20	66	47	20
SD21-042	20.3	18	100	4.1	72	56	26	64	53	10
SD21-043	17.9	19	100	3.8	79	54	37	65	47	9
SD21-044	12.7	19	100	4.0	74	53	35	67	45	11
SD21-045	7.1	17	100	4.0	82	55	18	61	53	1
SD21-046	4.6	17	100	4.0	59	52	7	72	50	7
SD21-048	5.2	20	100	3.9	55	47	9	60	45	3
SD21-049	6.9	19	100	4.2	68	56	7	62	55	11

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
CD20-001	41.9	4	100	2.0	100	54	38	100	21	37
CD20-002	18.2	6	100	2.0	17	47	14	99	38	19
CD20-003	18.7	5	100	2.0	0	36	18	98	22	37
CD20-004	24.4	3	100	2.0	100	68	21	93	39	21
CD20-005	10.7	3	100	2.0	0	33	10	100	24	34
CD20-006	32.0	3	100	2.0	100	60	30	100	41	15
CD20-007	15.4	3	100	2.0	0	41	13	91	32	30
CD20-008	25.9	4	100	2.0	0	48	30	100	26	32
CD20-009	17.4	4	100	2.0	0	43	16	100	31	28
CD20-010	10.1	3	100	2.0	0	31	11	100	25	33
CD20-012	34.1	7	100	1.7	100	76	39	99	62	7
CD20-013	13.9	3	100	2.0	0	32	12	100	22	36
CD21-001	22.4	5	100	2.0	0	38	19	98	22	37
CD21-002	39.1	3	100	2.0	100	53	34	100	23	35
CD21-003	15.7	3	100	2.0	0	42	14	93	32	29
CD21-004	27.5	3	100	2.0	0	48	34	100	26	32
CD21-005	23.2	6	100	2.0	33	47	18	99	36	22
CD21-006	20.4	3	100	2.0	100	65	17	100	40	17
CD21-007	15.3	3	100	2.0	0	38	12	100	27	32
CD21-008	16.5	4	100	2.0	0	40	14	100	28	30
CD21-009	36.3	7	100	1.7	100	79	43	99	64	3
CD21-010	16.2	3	100	2.0	0	34	11	100	23	35
CD21-011	19.2	3	100	2.0	0	34	15	100	25	33
CD21-012	17.1	3	100	2.0	0	42	18	100	32	26
CD21-013	14.8	3	100	2.0	0	37	14	100	27	32
LD20-001	36.6	4	100	2.0	0	47	28	100	18	39
LD20-002	25.7	5	100	2.0	0	43	25	100	24	34
LD20-003	19.2	7	100	2.0	0	39	19	100	25	33
LD20-004	20.6	4	100	2.0	0	36	15	100	16	41

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-005	41.0	3	100	2.0	100	55	33	100	18	39
LD20-006	7.1	5	100	2.0	0	34	7	84	25	49
LD20-007	22.4	4	100	2.0	0	43	23	100	26	32
LD20-008	42.5	6	100	2.0	33	51	33	100	26	32
LD20-009	27.9	4	100	2.0	0	43	21	100	27	31
LD20-010	22.0	5	100	2.0	0	35	23	100	15	41
LD20-011	15.4	6	100	2.0	83	54	13	100	48	6
LD20-012	36.9	7	100	2.0	14	47	38	100	15	41
LD20-013	7.9	2	100	2.0	0	27	9	94	18	42
LD20-014	17.8	5	100	2.0	0	40	20	100	25	33
LD20-015	10.7	5	100	2.0	0	31	12	100	22	36
LD20-016	18.3	5	100	2.0	0	36	17	95	24	37
LD20-017	10.1	11	100	2.0	0	37	11	90	30	34
LD20-018	21.1	3	100	2.0	100	62	21	100	51	5
LD20-019	6.3	1	100	2.0	0	37	6	100	33	25
LD20-021	37.4	5	100	2.0	20	44	29	100	21	37
LD20-022	29.3	4	100	2.0	0	43	28	100	18	39
LD20-023	50.6	6	100	2.0	100	60	38	100	16	41
LD20-024	38.2	8	100	2.0	100	56	37	100	28	29
LD20-025	42.6	4	100	2.0	0	40	34	99	14	42
LD20-026	16.5	5	100	2.0	0	31	11	100	22	36
LD20-027	51.6	6	100	2.0	100	63	44	100	20	37
LD20-028	15.8	5	100	2.0	0	27	10	100	19	38
LD20-029	37.2	10	100	1.6	100	87	40	100	78	0
LD20-030	28.2	4	100	2.0	100	59	25	100	45	11
LD20-031	39.8	8	100	1.6	100	84	48	100	71	0
LD20-032	48.1	10	100	2.0	100	63	50	100	28	31
LD20-033	39.9	6	100	2.0	100	61	38	99	38	19

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-034	11.5	6	100	2.0	0	40	6	100	36	22
LD20-035	18.0	6	67	2.0	33	46	12	64	44	39
LD20-036	7.5	3	33	2.0	67	56	6	59	56	15
LD20-037	11.3	6	100	2.0	0	34	10	100	27	31
LD20-038	39.4	10	100	1.6	100	83	42	98	72	2
LD20-040	11.3	6	100	2.0	0	38	7	100	33	25
LD20-041	7.1	3	100	2.0	0	43	6	94	40	16
LD20-042	38.1	6	100	2.0	100	66	48	100	36	22
LD20-043	33.9	6	100	2.0	0	47	29	100	26	32
LD20-044	48.1	5	100	2.0	100	71	52	100	40	16
LD20-045	31.4	7	100	2.0	57	50	32	100	27	32
LD20-046	25.0	5	100	2.0	20	42	27	99	21	37
LD20-047	23.8	6	100	2.0	17	43	24	98	26	32
LD20-048	35.5	6	100	2.0	100	56	40	100	29	30
LD20-049	12.3	6	100	2.0	50	49	7	100	45	10
LD20-050	17.5	3	100	2.0	0	41	24	92	25	37
LD20-052	11.0	4	100	2.0	0	26	10	100	18	38
LD20-054	12.9	8	50	2.0	0	43	9	91	38	22
LD20-055	26.2	5	100	2.0	0	42	25	100	22	36
LD20-056	10.2	7	100	2.0	100	71	10	100	66	0
LD20-057	39.7	5	100	2.0	100	58	38	98	33	25
LD20-058	43.1	8	100	2.0	100	69	45	96	47	8
LD20-059	28.6	5	100	2.0	0	37	24	100	17	40
LD20-060	34.6	8	100	2.0	88	59	38	100	34	24
LD20-061	40.0	8	100	2.0	100	64	31	100	48	8
LD20-062	13.7	5	100	2.0	0	32	11	100	24	34
LD20-063	24.8	4	100	2.0	0	48	24	100	32	27
LD20-064	15.1	4	100	2.0	0	39	14	100	29	30

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-065	19.6	5	100	2.0	0	33	19	94	19	43
LD20-066	24.0	4	100	2.0	0	42	21	100	22	36
LD20-067	7.9	7	100	2.0	0	21	6	100	16	40
LD20-068	8.4	5	100	2.0	0	36	7	100	31	27
LD20-069	11.6	5	100	2.0	0	34	11	100	26	32
LD20-070	7.2	4	100	2.0	0	24	6	100	19	38
LD20-071	40.3	7	100	1.9	100	76	46	99	56	4
LD20-072	34.4	8	100	2.0	100	71	34	100	56	1
LD20-073	14.6	3	100	2.0	0	35	19	100	28	31
LD20-074	11.4	6	100	2.0	0	45	11	100	38	19
LD20-075	15.3	5	100	2.0	0	38	15	100	27	32
LD20-076	21.6	7	100	2.0	0	41	20	100	26	32
LD20-077	7.3	4	100	2.0	0	26	7	100	19	38
LD20-079	22.3	7	100	2.6	14	34	16	98	15	41
LD20-080	9.5	7	100	2.0	0	23	8	100	16	40
LD20-081	9.6	5	100	2.0	0	26	8	100	19	38
LD20-082	20.2	1	100	2.0	0	40	18	100	27	32
LD20-083	19.5	5	100	2.0	60	48	12	100	24	34
LD20-084	14.1	6	100	2.0	0	31	13	100	21	37
LD20-086	6.0	4	100	2.0	0	32	6	100	28	31
LD20-088	16.0	4	100	2.0	100	56	18	99	47	6
LD20-089	7.9	4	100	2.0	0	27	7	100	22	36
LD20-091	4.8	2	100	2.0	0	23	6	100	16	40
LD20-092	40.2	9	100	1.7	100	80	47	100	63	9
LD20-095	9.6	6	100	2.0	0	32	8	100	26	32
LD20-096	8.9	4	100	2.0	0	35	7	100	30	30
LD20-098	9.2	6	100	2.0	0	41	8	100	36	22
LD20-099	36.0	6	100	2.0	100	63	42	99	38	20

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black preferred win rate	Average Black preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-100	30.5	8	100	1.6	100	82	36	100	71	0
LD20-101	48.0	10	100	1.7	100	82	55	99	60	12
LD20-102	33.8	9	100	1.6	100	87	40	98	79	0
LD20-103	14.2	4	100	2.0	0	47	14	100	38	19
LD20-104	12.0	6	100	2.0	0	47	10	100	41	16
LD20-105	12.9	6	100	2.0	50	49	13	100	41	14
LD20-106	46.3	15	100	1.5	100	91	60	99	79	2
LD20-107	53.6	10	100	1.6	100	87	58	99	70	4
LD20-108	19.5	8	100	2.0	0	38	17	100	25	33
LD20-109	15.3	8	100	2.0	0	35	12	100	27	32
LD20-110	14.6	3	100	2.0	0	28	13	100	17	39
LD20-111	22.8	6	100	2.0	0	38	22	100	20	37
LD20-112	9.2	4	100	2.0	0	28	8	100	22	36
LD20-115	6.9	1	100	2.0	100	59	6	100	44	11
LD20-116	7.2	1	100	2.0	0	49	7	100	46	7
LD21-001	17.7	5	100	2.0	0	35	15	91	22	42
LD21-002	23.7	5	100	2.0	20	43	23	99	26	32
LD21-003	19.4	6	100	2.0	0	38	18	100	25	34
LD21-004	24.9	3	100	2.0	0	33	19	100	17	40
LD21-005	37.5	3	100	2.0	67	51	30	100	17	40
LD21-007	22.2	4	100	2.0	0	43	22	100	27	32
LD21-008	44.2	6	100	2.0	83	54	36	100	28	30
LD21-009	24.6	5	100	2.0	0	37	19	98	23	37
LD21-010	33.1	5	100	2.0	0	38	26	100	17	40
LD21-011	14.2	6	100	2.0	83	52	11	100	46	8
LD21-012	37.7	5	100	2.0	0	45	34	100	16	41
LD21-013	8.3	6	100	2.0	0	28	7	97	22	37
LD21-014	17.8	5	100	2.0	0	40	20	100	25	33

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-015	10.6	5	100	2.0	0	32	13	100	22	36
LD21-016	13.2	5	100	2.0	0	34	14	95	23	38
LD21-017	10.3	11	100	2.0	0	37	11	90	31	32
LD21-018	21.6	3	100	2.0	100	62	21	100	52	4
LD21-019	5.1	1	100	2.0	0	34	5	100	31	28
LD21-021	10.8	6	100	2.0	0	35	7	87	31	37
LD21-022	27.7	4	100	2.0	0	39	26	100	17	40
LD21-023	52.5	6	100	2.0	100	61	39	100	15	41
LD21-024	36.6	8	100	2.0	100	55	37	100	28	29
LD21-025	40.0	5	100	2.0	20	42	30	99	14	42
LD21-027	50.8	8	100	2.0	100	64	48	100	26	32
LD21-028	16.2	5	100	2.0	0	26	10	100	17	40
LD21-029	38.3	8	100	1.6	100	85	44	100	74	0
LD21-030	33.0	7	100	1.6	100	87	34	100	80	0
LD21-031	38.1	3	100	1.0	100	100	44	.	.	.
LD21-032	42.4	4	100	2.0	100	57	43	100	26	32
LD21-033	29.8	10	100	1.6	100	83	31	99	76	0
LD21-034	18.2	6	100	2.0	33	48	13	100	41	15
LD21-036	8.0	2	100	2.0	0	36	7	100	30	28
LD21-038	43.6	2	100	1.0	100	100	47	.	.	.
LD21-040	10.7	4	100	2.0	0	39	6	100	35	23
LD21-042	38.1	6	100	2.0	100	66	48	100	36	22
LD21-043	34.8	6	100	2.0	17	49	30	100	27	31
LD21-044	48.1	5	100	2.0	100	71	52	100	40	16
LD21-045	30.3	7	100	2.0	29	49	31	100	26	33
LD21-046	28.5	4	100	2.0	0	40	28	100	17	39
LD21-047	21.5	6	100	2.0	17	46	23	97	30	28
LD21-048	35.5	6	100	2.0	100	56	40	100	29	30

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-049	13.0	6	100	2.0	33	47	8	100	42	13
LD21-050	17.9	3	100	2.0	0	42	26	93	25	37
LD21-052	22.3	4	100	2.0	0	44	22	100	21	36
LD21-054	11.1	8	50	2.0	0	45	10	84	40	22
LD21-055	24.0	5	100	2.0	0	41	22	100	23	35
LD21-056	10.1	7	100	2.0	100	71	10	100	66	0
LD21-057	39.7	5	100	2.0	100	58	38	98	33	25
LD21-058	42.8	8	100	2.0	100	68	44	98	45	11
LD21-059	26.6	5	100	2.0	0	35	22	100	17	40
LD21-060	34.9	8	100	2.0	100	59	38	100	34	23
LD21-061	40.8	8	100	2.0	100	64	32	100	48	8
LD21-062	13.3	5	100	2.0	0	31	10	100	23	34
LD21-063	24.3	4	100	2.0	0	47	22	100	32	26
LD21-064	15.5	4	100	2.0	0	39	14	100	29	30
LD21-065	18.9	5	100	2.0	0	33	19	94	19	43
LD21-066	27.2	6	100	2.0	50	51	23	100	36	22
LD21-067	13.0	5	100	2.0	0	29	13	100	19	38
LD21-068	8.1	5	100	2.0	0	36	7	100	31	27
LD21-069	11.6	4	100	2.0	0	34	10	100	26	32
LD21-070	7.0	4	100	2.0	0	23	6	100	18	39
LD21-071	39.5	6	100	2.0	100	71	46	98	49	4
LD21-072	33.7	7	100	2.0	100	68	32	100	53	2
LD21-073	17.0	2	100	2.0	0	36	13	100	22	36
LD21-074	11.3	6	100	2.0	0	43	11	100	36	22
LD21-075	15.3	5	100	2.0	0	38	15	100	27	32
LD21-076	20.4	7	100	2.0	0	40	20	100	26	33
LD21-077	5.5	3	100	2.0	0	24	6	100	18	39
LD21-079	16.9	5	100	2.0	0	36	12	92	23	40

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-080	9.4	7	100	2.0	0	24	9	100	17	40
LD21-081	9.6	5	100	2.0	0	26	9	100	19	38
LD21-082	21.0	5	100	2.0	0	34	15	100	23	35
LD21-083	11.9	3	100	2.0	0	27	7	100	21	37
LD21-084	16.0	6	100	2.0	0	33	15	100	22	36
LD21-086	6.1	4	100	2.0	0	31	6	100	27	32
LD21-088	23.3	5	100	1.8	100	67	23	100	57	6
LD21-089	6.7	4	100	2.0	0	25	6	100	20	38
LD21-091	14.1	3	100	2.0	0	36	19	100	30	28
LD21-092	39.1	9	100	1.7	100	79	44	100	62	12
LD21-095	7.6	6	100	2.0	0	31	5	100	27	32
LD21-096	9.9	4	100	2.0	0	36	9	100	30	30
LD21-098	7.5	6	100	2.0	0	39	7	100	35	23
LD21-099	46.8	13	100	1.7	100	85	58	99	65	3
LD21-100	31.0	8	100	1.6	100	82	36	99	71	0
LD21-101	46.8	9	100	1.7	100	81	52	99	62	13
LD21-102	37.6	9	100	1.6	100	89	45	98	81	0
LD21-103	11.8	4	100	2.0	0	42	12	100	34	24
LD21-104	8.5	6	100	2.0	0	45	7	100	41	16
LD21-105	12.2	7	100	2.0	43	48	13	100	41	15
LD21-106	43.4	11	100	1.6	100	86	55	99	71	2
LD21-107	47.4	8	100	1.6	100	82	50	99	65	10
LD21-108	19.3	8	100	2.0	0	37	16	100	25	34
LD21-109	16.8	4	100	2.0	0	39	14	100	28	30
LD21-110	15.7	3	100	2.0	0	33	18	100	18	39
LD21-111	16.4	3	100	2.0	0	30	13	100	19	38
LD21-112	27.8	7	100	1.7	100	78	38	99	65	2
LD21-113	6.8	3	100	2.0	0	32	6	97	25	34

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-114	7.6	1	100	2.0	100	60	7	100	58	0
LD21-115	6.3	1	100	2.0	0	46	5	100	43	12
SD20-001	24.6	4	100	2.0	0	42	18	98	21	38
SD20-002	14.1	6	100	2.0	0	33	15	99	23	35
SD20-003	42.2	5	100	2.0	100	53	42	100	21	37
SD20-004	46.5	6	100	2.0	100	59	40	100	22	36
SD20-005	34.8	4	100	2.0	100	54	29	100	25	33
SD20-006	14.5	6	100	2.0	0	34	16	100	20	38
SD20-007	33.6	3	100	2.0	0	46	35	100	18	39
SD20-008	12.6	3	100	2.0	0	37	10	86	31	35
SD20-009	12.0	3	100	2.0	67	55	10	100	49	6
SD20-010	20.1	5	100	2.0	0	37	20	100	16	40
SD20-011	27.5	4	100	2.0	0	48	23	100	20	38
SD20-012	18.8	3	100	2.0	0	40	15	100	22	36
SD20-013	25.1	4	100	2.0	25	43	26	100	22	35
SD20-014	32.1	7	100	1.9	100	67	32	99	53	10
SD20-015	18.1	6	100	2.0	17	43	12	100	34	23
SD20-016	12.9	6	100	2.0	33	47	9	100	42	13
SD20-017	8.8	6	100	2.0	0	37	7	88	33	32
SD20-018	24.4	3	100	2.0	0	43	21	100	27	32
SD20-019	33.6	5	100	2.0	100	51	31	100	29	30
SD20-020	35.4	8	100	1.6	100	83	40	100	72	0
SD20-021	41.2	4	100	2.0	100	67	49	100	35	23
SD20-022	30.0	3	100	2.0	33	47	27	100	27	32
SD20-023	11.1	7	57	2.0	57	54	10	79	49	13
SD20-024	22.0	3	100	2.0	0	44	19	100	31	27
SD20-025	23.4	4	100	2.0	0	43	26	100	21	37
SD20-026	12.6	4	100	2.0	0	24	7	100	18	39

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD20-027	24.0	5	100	2.0	0	41	21	100	25	33
SD20-028	43.9	7	100	2.0	100	67	41	99	45	11
SD20-029	10.5	5	100	2.0	0	27	9	100	18	39
SD20-030	14.7	3	100	2.0	0	32	18	100	19	38
SD20-031	22.0	3	100	2.0	0	45	23	100	29	30
SD20-032	23.9	6	100	2.0	100	57	23	100	44	10
SD20-033	14.4	4	100	2.0	0	30	12	100	20	38
SD20-034	10.1	5	100	2.0	0	30	10	100	23	35
SD20-035	12.2	4	100	2.0	0	36	11	100	28	31
SD20-036	17.9	5	100	2.0	0	40	12	100	23	35
SD20-037	13.8	4	100	2.0	50	49	12	100	42	14
SD20-038	42.8	10	100	1.6	100	87	53	99	73	0
SD20-039	21.3	5	100	2.0	100	57	24	100	43	12
SD20-040	38.7	9	100	1.7	100	81	49	99	65	6
SD20-041	29.1	5	100	2.0	100	58	30	100	39	17
SD20-042	7.9	4	100	2.0	0	29	6	100	24	34
SD20-043	17.4	8	100	2.0	0	35	15	100	24	34
SD20-044	13.1	5	100	2.0	0	31	16	99	19	39
SD20-049	6.4	1	100	2.0	100	58	6	100	48	4
SD21-001	28.8	3	100	2.0	0	46	20	97	21	38
SD21-002	29.3	3	100	2.0	0	45	22	100	24	34
SD21-003	25.9	5	100	2.0	0	41	26	99	20	38
SD21-004	34.1	4	100	2.0	0	48	34	100	21	37
SD21-005	39.3	4	100	2.0	100	56	30	100	25	34
SD21-006	13.8	6	100	2.0	0	32	15	100	20	38
SD21-007	11.5	3	100	2.0	67	55	10	100	50	6
SD21-008	13.9	3	100	2.0	0	38	11	84	31	36
SD21-009	23.1	3	100	2.0	0	37	20	99	22	37

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-010	15.9	5	100	2.0	0	37	10	100	19	38
SD21-011	35.7	3	100	2.0	67	51	32	100	25	33
SD21-012	19.6	3	100	2.0	0	40	16	100	22	36
SD21-013	20.5	3	100	2.0	0	42	22	100	26	32
SD21-014	41.5	6	100	2.0	100	61	40	100	34	22
SD21-015	13.9	6	100	2.0	50	52	10	100	47	8
SD21-016	8.1	6	100	2.0	17	44	6	100	40	16
SD21-017	10.1	6	100	2.0	0	33	8	99	28	31
SD21-018	21.5	6	100	2.0	50	48	16	100	38	19
SD21-019	45.0	5	100	2.0	100	65	45	100	37	21
SD21-020	26.2	5	60	2.0	60	51	14	85	45	13
SD21-021	18.3	3	100	2.0	0	38	22	100	22	36
SD21-022	33.2	4	100	2.0	100	64	30	100	48	9
SD21-023	16.0	3	100	2.0	100	65	24	87	31	32
SD21-024	28.4	4	100	2.0	50	51	31	98	28	31
SD21-025	17.1	3	100	2.0	0	38	15	100	28	31
SD21-026	16.8	3	100	2.0	0	33	16	100	20	37
SD21-027	26.2	6	100	2.0	50	50	23	99	35	23
SD21-028	49.5	5	100	2.0	100	68	49	98	39	18
SD21-029	17.3	3	100	2.0	0	33	13	100	19	38
SD21-030	8.8	4	100	2.0	0	24	8	100	18	39
SD21-031	11.5	4	100	2.0	0	37	12	100	29	30
SD21-032	33.8	6	100	2.0	100	69	36	99	51	3
SD21-033	14.4	4	100	2.0	0	31	12	100	21	37
SD21-034	18.9	5	100	2.0	20	45	13	100	23	35
SD21-035	11.1	4	100	2.0	0	35	10	100	28	30
SD21-037	10.7	6	100	2.0	0	32	10	100	24	34
SD21-038	33.4	5	100	2.0	100	62	35	100	42	14

Table 3: General Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-039	39.0	8	100	1.6	100	82	48	100	66	9
SD21-040	47.5	10	100	1.6	100	89	60	97	76	0
SD21-041	10.0	5	100	2.0	0	44	9	100	38	19
SD21-042	20.3	4	100	2.0	100	59	20	100	49	3
SD21-043	17.9	8	100	2.0	0	36	15	100	24	34
SD21-044	12.7	5	100	2.0	0	31	15	99	19	39
SD21-045	7.1	4	100	2.0	0	30	7	100	25	33
SD21-049	6.9	1	100	2.0	100	59	6	100	50	0

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
CD20-001	41.9	14	100	4.1	100	61	62	69	48	12
CD20-002	18.2	15	100	4.1	67	55	26	71	50	14
CD20-003	18.7	15	100	4.0	73	54	40	66	47	22
CD20-004	24.4	16	100	3.9	75	59	34	68	55	12
CD20-005	10.7	16	100	3.9	56	51	21	62	48	15
CD20-006	32.0	15	100	4.2	67	51	47	59	44	23
CD20-007	15.4	15	100	4.0	73	52	30	62	47	5
CD20-008	25.9	14	100	4.1	79	54	52	60	48	20
CD20-009	17.4	16	100	4.6	56	46	33	63	42	13
CD20-010	10.1	15	100	4.0	73	52	25	62	48	27
CD20-011	3.7	1	100	5.0	100	54	5	100	47	.
CD20-012	34.1	20	100	3.6	85	60	54	68	50	18
CD20-013	13.9	14	100	4.1	71	54	33	59	52	14
CD21-001	22.4	15	100	4.0	73	55	41	66	47	18
CD21-002	39.1	14	100	4.1	100	61	60	70	47	13
CD21-003	15.7	16	100	4.1	56	48	28	65	40	17
CD21-004	27.5	14	100	4.1	71	54	55	60	48	20
CD21-005	23.2	14	100	4.1	71	59	32	71	54	12
CD21-006	20.4	15	100	4.5	60	52	25	76	47	10
CD21-007	15.3	14	100	4.1	57	49	32	61	44	30
CD21-008	16.5	14	100	4.1	64	48	36	62	41	29
CD21-009	36.3	20	100	3.6	80	60	56	68	50	19
CD21-010	16.2	14	100	4.1	86	54	35	63	50	15
CD21-011	19.2	14	100	4.1	64	51	35	63	46	24
CD21-012	17.1	16	100	3.9	75	53	36	63	47	21
CD21-013	14.8	17	100	3.9	76	53	31	64	48	11
CD21-014	3.6	1	100	5.0	100	54	5	100	47	.
LD20-001	36.6	14	100	4.1	93	58	58	73	40	19
LD20-002	25.7	15	100	4.1	87	57	45	70	47	12

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black preferred win rate	Average Black preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-003	19.2	19	100	3.7	63	53	41	66	43	24
LD20-004	20.6	15	100	4.0	93	58	52	69	46	12
LD20-005	41.0	17	100	3.8	94	60	61	68	47	16
LD20-006	7.1	13	100	4.3	69	51	15	63	49	8
LD20-007	22.4	15	100	4.1	93	63	49	78	49	4
LD20-008	42.5	15	100	4.1	93	58	59	66	47	16
LD20-009	27.9	14	100	4.1	71	56	38	64	50	13
LD20-010	22.0	14	100	4.1	79	54	44	72	36	18
LD20-011	15.4	15	100	4.1	47	45	16	67	40	29
LD20-012	36.9	15	100	4.1	87	59	61	67	46	6
LD20-013	7.9	14	100	4.1	57	50	22	65	45	10
LD20-014	17.8	13	100	4.2	92	56	47	61	51	12
LD20-015	10.7	13	100	4.2	77	52	38	62	45	9
LD20-016	18.3	15	100	4.0	73	50	39	60	44	4
LD20-017	10.1	16	100	3.9	69	53	26	64	49	6
LD20-018	21.1	14	100	4.1	71	55	35	61	51	14
LD20-019	6.3	15	100	4.0	53	49	10	66	47	13
LD20-020	5.5	12	100	4.4	58	50	8	79	47	7
LD20-021	37.4	17	100	3.9	88	56	62	63	46	15
LD20-022	29.3	18	100	3.9	94	58	55	72	42	9
LD20-023	50.6	16	100	4.0	100	64	66	70	50	12
LD20-024	38.2	16	100	3.9	94	63	63	68	52	11
LD20-025	42.6	8	100	5.2	100	58	68	68	40	24
LD20-026	16.5	15	100	4.0	60	53	35	67	46	27
LD20-027	51.6	18	100	3.8	78	57	59	72	36	36
LD20-028	15.8	15	100	4.0	93	57	35	66	51	8
LD20-029	37.2	20	100	3.7	65	61	38	79	50	7
LD20-030	28.2	19	100	3.7	68	59	33	73	52	8

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-031	39.8	20	100	3.7	95	64	58	74	49	7
LD20-032	48.1	16	100	3.9	100	68	66	78	52	6
LD20-033	39.9	16	100	4.0	88	65	58	75	52	0
LD20-034	11.5	15	100	4.1	33	42	12	71	38	39
LD20-035	18.0	15	100	4.0	67	57	31	68	52	13
LD20-036	7.5	16	100	4.0	50	49	13	62	47	18
LD20-037	11.3	16	100	4.0	62	52	24	62	50	6
LD20-038	39.4	15	100	4.0	73	61	53	69	54	21
LD20-040	11.3	14	100	4.1	43	46	17	69	41	31
LD20-041	7.1	15	100	4.1	40	44	11	70	41	28
LD20-042	38.1	9	100	2.8	89	60	76	66	44	12
LD20-043	33.9	16	100	4.0	75	51	51	58	44	30
LD20-044	48.1	16	100	4.0	81	56	76	60	44	36
LD20-045	31.4	17	100	3.9	71	54	60	62	42	29
LD20-046	25.0	15	100	4.1	93	52	41	60	47	13
LD20-047	23.8	18	100	4.1	67	47	24	66	41	10
LD20-048	35.5	18	100	3.8	94	58	63	67	43	18
LD20-049	12.3	15	100	4.1	33	41	10	68	38	38
LD20-050	17.5	16	100	3.9	56	50	28	60	47	16
LD20-052	11.0	15	100	4.1	67	55	26	62	52	10
LD20-054	12.9	14	100	4.1	57	52	18	62	50	0
LD20-055	26.2	17	100	4.2	71	49	51	72	34	24
LD20-056	10.2	14	100	4.5	43	45	8	76	42	21
LD20-057	39.7	16	100	4.1	75	54	56	62	43	24
LD20-058	43.1	17	100	4.0	71	54	60	61	43	32
LD20-059	28.6	17	100	4.1	71	53	60	62	39	24
LD20-060	34.6	16	100	4.1	81	56	60	63	44	16
LD20-061	40.0	16	100	4.1	62	52	35	62	46	23

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black preferred win rate	Average Black preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-062	13.7	17	100	4.0	65	50	27	65	44	11
LD20-063	24.8	15	100	4.1	73	52	43	60	45	20
LD20-064	15.1	16	100	4.1	62	51	30	59	48	31
LD20-065	19.6	15	100	4.0	87	55	43	66	48	18
LD20-066	24.0	15	100	4.3	80	50	42	61	42	12
LD20-067	7.9	14	100	4.1	64	47	22	70	41	18
LD20-068	8.4	15	100	4.3	80	54	24	63	51	5
LD20-069	11.6	15	100	4.1	73	51	31	61	47	6
LD20-070	7.2	15	100	4.1	80	56	19	65	53	19
LD20-071	40.3	19	100	3.8	84	58	63	62	50	17
LD20-072	34.4	19	100	3.8	68	53	41	65	44	24
LD20-073	14.6	15	100	4.1	73	50	36	64	43	24
LD20-074	11.4	16	100	4.0	62	50	23	65	45	9
LD20-075	15.3	17	100	3.9	76	52	37	65	44	27
LD20-076	21.6	15	100	4.0	93	55	42	60	51	25
LD20-077	7.3	15	100	4.1	73	52	24	61	49	11
LD20-078	6.1	15	100	4.1	60	52	19	62	50	14
LD20-079	22.3	16	100	4.2	81	54	41	68	44	15
LD20-080	9.5	14	100	4.1	79	55	26	62	52	21
LD20-081	9.6	14	100	4.1	71	54	24	61	52	12
LD20-082	20.2	8	100	2.6	100	61	42	69	56	8
LD20-083	19.5	14	100	4.1	71	51	37	64	44	33
LD20-084	14.1	14	100	4.1	93	52	32	63	47	11
LD20-086	6.0	15	100	4.0	67	54	14	65	52	12
LD20-087	5.1	15	100	4.0	80	52	13	66	50	2
LD20-088	16.0	11	100	4.5	55	52	24	65	49	16
LD20-089	7.9	14	100	4.1	86	54	23	60	52	1
LD20-090	3.3	14	100	4.1	50	46	8	69	44	21

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD20-091	4.8	16	100	3.9	56	52	13	64	50	33
LD20-092	40.2	18	100	3.7	78	60	65	65	49	14
LD20-094	5.7	19	100	3.9	47	45	12	57	43	15
LD20-095	9.6	14	100	4.1	64	51	22	61	49	13
LD20-096	8.9	14	100	4.1	64	48	17	57	47	18
LD20-097	5.5	14	100	4.1	57	54	14	65	51	11
LD20-098	9.2	14	100	4.2	50	51	18	62	49	29
LD20-099	36.0	20	100	3.6	85	61	65	69	46	17
LD20-100	30.5	17	100	3.8	76	56	42	65	49	21
LD20-101	48.0	18	100	3.7	89	61	72	67	44	21
LD20-102	33.8	16	100	4.3	81	58	47	66	51	18
LD20-103	14.2	14	100	4.2	57	49	24	63	44	30
LD20-104	12.0	12	100	4.4	50	44	16	61	42	37
LD20-105	12.9	15	100	4.2	73	54	24	64	50	10
LD20-106	46.3	23	100	3.7	100	64	73	71	45	13
LD20-107	53.6	21	100	3.7	95	64	72	71	44	14
LD20-108	19.5	16	100	3.9	69	52	41	67	42	16
LD20-109	15.3	17	100	3.8	71	52	30	62	48	9
LD20-110	14.6	15	100	4.0	87	53	37	64	47	14
LD20-111	22.8	16	100	4.1	94	54	46	67	42	13
LD20-112	9.2	14	100	4.1	79	50	19	64	48	10
LD20-115	6.9	12	100	4.5	58	57	7	68	56	20
LD20-116	7.2	12	100	4.8	58	55	8	67	54	16
LD20-117	3.6	17	100	3.8	59	52	5	68	51	5
LD21-001	17.7	14	100	4.1	100	55	35	69	47	11
LD21-002	23.7	15	100	4.0	67	55	37	62	51	25
LD21-003	19.4	18	100	3.8	61	51	35	68	41	25
LD21-004	24.9	15	100	4.1	87	56	54	65	45	9

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-005	37.5	16	100	3.9	94	59	60	67	46	22
LD21-007	22.2	15	100	4.1	93	63	48	78	49	4
LD21-008	44.2	15	100	4.1	93	58	59	66	46	13
LD21-009	24.6	14	100	4.1	64	55	38	61	52	19
LD21-010	33.1	14	100	4.1	100	58	58	64	49	12
LD21-011	14.2	15	100	4.1	40	44	15	67	40	39
LD21-012	37.7	14	100	4.1	100	59	60	68	46	7
LD21-013	8.3	15	100	4.1	67	53	19	64	49	16
LD21-014	17.8	13	100	4.2	92	56	47	61	51	12
LD21-015	10.6	14	100	4.3	71	50	40	60	44	7
LD21-016	13.2	14	100	4.1	64	51	38	59	46	7
LD21-017	10.3	17	100	3.9	65	51	26	62	47	7
LD21-018	21.6	15	100	4.1	67	52	35	60	48	14
LD21-019	5.1	15	100	4.0	60	50	10	64	48	15
LD21-020	5.3	11	100	4.4	64	52	8	80	50	7
LD21-021	10.8	15	100	4.1	60	50	16	63	47	22
LD21-022	27.7	17	100	3.9	94	57	54	70	46	12
LD21-023	52.5	15	100	4.0	100	65	67	71	50	13
LD21-024	36.6	15	100	4.0	93	61	61	67	50	13
LD21-025	40.0	15	100	4.0	100	63	62	77	43	17
LD21-026	16.8	9	100	2.6	78	61	37	75	54	30
LD21-027	50.8	18	100	3.9	89	60	62	75	49	17
LD21-028	16.2	15	100	4.0	93	57	35	67	51	8
LD21-029	38.3	20	100	3.7	80	63	44	78	51	7
LD21-030	33.0	19	100	3.7	74	61	30	74	55	8
LD21-032	42.4	14	100	4.1	93	61	61	78	35	12
LD21-033	29.8	15	100	4.1	73	62	34	75	57	0
LD21-034	18.2	15	100	4.1	53	49	18	69	45	29

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-036	8.0	6	100	6.2	50	39	13	52	37	0
LD21-040	10.7	14	100	4.1	36	43	14	75	39	33
LD21-042	38.1	9	100	2.8	89	60	76	66	44	12
LD21-043	34.8	16	100	4.0	75	51	52	58	44	30
LD21-044	48.1	16	100	4.0	81	56	76	60	44	36
LD21-045	30.3	15	100	4.1	73	54	60	63	41	25
LD21-046	28.5	16	100	4.0	81	50	41	64	40	9
LD21-047	21.5	19	100	4.1	84	50	27	63	45	2
LD21-048	35.5	18	100	3.8	94	58	63	67	43	18
LD21-049	13.0	15	100	4.1	27	38	14	75	32	28
LD21-050	17.9	15	100	4.1	60	51	30	61	47	18
LD21-052	22.3	15	100	4.1	80	55	38	61	50	14
LD21-053	18.8	9	100	2.7	89	65	40	67	63	12
LD21-054	11.1	19	100	3.7	37	42	18	57	39	23
LD21-055	24.0	17	100	4.2	71	49	49	72	34	25
LD21-056	10.1	14	100	4.5	43	45	8	76	42	21
LD21-057	39.7	16	100	4.1	75	54	56	62	43	24
LD21-058	42.8	17	100	4.0	71	54	61	62	43	32
LD21-059	26.6	16	100	4.1	69	53	58	64	38	22
LD21-060	34.9	16	100	4.1	81	56	60	63	45	16
LD21-061	40.8	16	100	4.1	62	52	37	62	46	23
LD21-062	13.3	17	100	4.0	65	50	26	64	44	12
LD21-063	24.3	14	100	4.1	71	51	40	62	43	25
LD21-064	15.5	15	100	4.0	67	52	30	60	49	31
LD21-065	18.9	15	100	4.0	87	55	42	66	48	18
LD21-066	27.2	14	100	4.1	79	59	41	65	55	8
LD21-067	13.0	14	100	4.1	79	49	35	68	40	25
LD21-068	8.1	13	100	5.5	77	57	24	64	54	6

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-069	11.6	15	100	4.1	73	51	30	61	47	6
LD21-070	7.0	16	100	4.0	75	53	18	64	50	20
LD21-071	39.5	19	100	3.8	84	58	61	62	50	18
LD21-072	33.7	18	100	3.9	67	53	40	65	45	19
LD21-073	17.0	8	100	2.6	88	58	35	73	49	25
LD21-074	11.3	16	100	4.0	69	51	23	64	47	10
LD21-075	15.3	17	100	3.9	76	52	37	65	44	27
LD21-076	20.4	16	100	3.9	94	55	41	60	52	9
LD21-077	5.5	16	100	4.1	75	49	20	57	48	11
LD21-078	5.5	15	100	4.1	67	51	17	59	50	9
LD21-079	16.9	14	100	4.1	79	55	30	64	50	4
LD21-080	9.4	15	100	4.2	80	53	27	61	50	22
LD21-081	9.6	15	100	4.1	73	54	24	60	52	14
LD21-082	21.0	14	100	4.1	86	55	38	62	52	16
LD21-083	11.9	14	100	4.1	79	52	31	68	45	23
LD21-084	16.0	14	100	4.1	93	52	36	63	46	11
LD21-086	6.1	15	100	4.0	67	54	13	66	52	13
LD21-087	4.9	15	100	4.0	67	51	11	64	49	27
LD21-088	23.3	11	100	4.5	64	53	28	61	50	17
LD21-089	6.7	14	100	4.1	71	50	19	63	47	2
LD21-090	3.5	16	100	3.9	56	48	8	69	47	15
LD21-091	14.1	15	100	4.0	73	51	33	65	45	23
LD21-092	39.1	17	100	3.8	76	58	63	64	49	11
LD21-094	5.3	17	100	3.9	65	51	11	61	50	14
LD21-095	7.6	12	100	4.5	58	48	14	62	46	22
LD21-096	9.9	14	100	4.1	71	52	21	58	50	18
LD21-097	5.5	14	100	4.1	57	53	15	64	51	11
LD21-098	7.5	14	100	4.2	43	47	14	64	44	40

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
LD21-099	46.8	24	100	3.8	96	61	75	67	44	17
LD21-100	31.0	17	100	3.8	76	56	42	64	49	21
LD21-101	46.8	18	100	3.9	89	59	70	66	43	18
LD21-102	37.6	19	100	3.9	84	58	52	66	50	21
LD21-103	11.8	15	100	4.1	60	49	25	64	44	30
LD21-104	8.5	12	100	4.4	33	38	12	64	35	58
LD21-105	12.2	15	100	4.2	73	54	25	64	50	10
LD21-106	43.4	24	100	3.7	100	63	68	72	46	14
LD21-107	47.4	20	100	3.6	95	64	68	71	47	16
LD21-108	19.3	16	100	3.9	69	52	38	66	44	17
LD21-110	15.7	16	100	4.1	100	55	46	66	46	12
LD21-111	16.4	16	100	4.1	75	51	32	62	47	11
LD21-112	27.8	17	100	3.8	71	57	49	66	48	20
LD21-113	6.8	14	100	4.1	57	49	12	57	48	4
LD21-114	7.6	12	100	5.1	67	56	6	62	56	22
LD21-115	6.3	12	100	4.5	42	49	6	64	48	20
LD21-117	3.5	8	100	2.6	75	60	5	64	60	4
SD20-001	24.6	14	100	4.1	100	55	40	66	48	12
SD20-002	14.1	17	100	3.9	53	48	32	66	44	26
SD20-003	42.2	15	100	4.0	93	64	61	77	46	8
SD20-004	46.5	15	100	4.3	93	59	64	69	50	14
SD20-005	34.8	14	100	4.1	79	55	49	64	48	24
SD20-006	14.5	14	100	4.1	86	54	45	64	46	11
SD20-007	33.6	15	100	4.0	100	59	61	67	48	9
SD20-008	12.6	15	100	4.0	60	49	28	64	41	17
SD20-009	12.0	13	100	4.3	69	53	20	61	51	18
SD20-010	20.1	16	100	4.1	88	57	47	64	49	16
SD20-011	27.5	14	100	4.1	93	62	52	71	49	4

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates	Average Number of Candidates	Black preferred win rate	Average Black preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD20-012	18.8	17	100	3.9	65	52	41	60	47	7
SD20-013	25.1	20	100	4.2	65	48	33	62	43	5
SD20-014	32.1	15	100	4.1	80	62	45	74	53	0
SD20-015	18.1	15	100	4.0	67	56	23	64	53	7
SD20-016	12.9	15	100	4.1	40	43	15	73	38	29
SD20-017	8.8	15	100	4.1	47	46	16	62	43	34
SD20-018	24.4	15	100	4.1	87	62	47	73	51	16
SD20-019	33.6	15	100	4.1	80	53	56	59	45	18
SD20-020	35.4	20	100	3.7	70	62	43	75	52	7
SD20-021	41.2	17	100	3.9	71	56	74	60	46	19
SD20-022	30.0	17	100	4.1	71	56	41	66	52	0
SD20-023	11.1	16	100	4.3	44	44	14	61	44	11
SD20-024	22.0	14	100	4.1	79	53	43	62	47	24
SD20-025	23.4	15	100	4.1	67	51	44	60	46	23
SD20-026	12.6	14	100	4.1	79	54	29	62	50	6
SD20-027	24.0	17	100	4.0	71	53	45	61	45	6
SD20-028	43.9	16	100	4.1	62	53	51	62	43	23
SD20-029	10.5	14	100	4.1	71	54	28	62	51	14
SD20-030	14.7	15	100	4.0	73	50	37	60	45	25
SD20-031	22.0	16	100	3.9	81	54	50	64	44	28
SD20-032	23.9	17	100	3.8	59	50	36	65	41	31
SD20-033	14.4	15	100	4.0	100	55	35	62	52	10
SD20-034	10.1	15	100	4.2	73	50	25	60	47	12
SD20-035	12.2	15	100	4.1	80	53	32	59	50	8
SD20-036	17.9	14	100	4.1	79	51	37	64	44	22
SD20-037	13.8	13	100	4.5	46	43	18	61	39	37
SD20-038	42.8	22	100	3.8	91	61	64	68	49	19
SD20-039	21.3	17	100	3.8	76	54	40	66	46	17

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD20-040	38.7	21	100	3.8	86	61	65	68	46	18
SD20-041	29.1	20	100	3.6	80	59	50	68	50	18
SD20-042	7.9	14	100	4.1	79	51	18	59	49	3
SD20-043	17.4	16	100	3.9	75	53	36	64	47	10
SD20-044	13.1	14	100	4.1	71	52	35	63	46	14
SD20-045	3.3	1	100	2.0	0	38	6	72	33	44
SD20-046	5.5	15	100	4.0	67	54	12	64	53	10
SD20-047	5.1	13	100	4.2	38	43	8	63	41	25
SD20-049	6.4	12	100	4.8	67	56	6	66	55	15
SD21-001	28.8	14	100	4.1	93	57	45	67	48	8
SD21-002	29.3	14	100	4.1	93	60	48	71	49	10
SD21-003	25.9	18	100	4.1	89	56	46	71	44	11
SD21-004	34.1	14	100	4.1	93	59	59	66	48	14
SD21-005	39.3	14	100	4.1	93	58	56	65	49	14
SD21-006	13.8	15	100	4.2	87	54	44	62	48	11
SD21-007	11.5	12	100	4.5	67	53	19	62	51	22
SD21-008	13.9	15	100	4.0	53	47	26	63	41	20
SD21-009	23.1	14	100	4.1	93	55	50	66	45	6
SD21-010	15.9	16	100	3.9	81	54	35	66	49	15
SD21-011	35.7	16	100	4.1	81	60	58	74	43	14
SD21-012	19.6	16	100	4.0	62	51	42	61	44	24
SD21-013	20.5	14	100	4.1	79	59	37	66	55	0
SD21-014	41.5	15	100	4.1	87	64	62	76	46	7
SD21-015	13.9	15	100	4.1	33	42	12	71	38	33
SD21-016	8.1	15	100	4.1	40	43	11	73	40	25
SD21-017	10.1	15	100	4.1	67	53	20	61	52	6
SD21-018	21.5	15	100	4.0	67	56	27	64	53	7
SD21-019	45.0	16	100	4.1	75	54	69	58	45	20

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (*continued*)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Black Voters	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-020	26.2	17	100	4.0	65	55	34	77	47	8
SD21-021	18.3	15	100	4.1	60	49	41	60	43	6
SD21-022	33.2	19	100	3.7	74	61	38	74	52	8
SD21-023	16.0	17	100	4.1	47	46	23	58	44	30
SD21-024	28.4	18	100	4.1	78	51	43	70	41	9
SD21-025	17.1	14	100	4.1	79	53	34	60	50	22
SD21-026	16.8	15	100	4.0	73	54	39	61	49	29
SD21-027	26.2	16	100	4.1	62	52	36	63	45	16
SD21-028	49.5	16	100	4.1	81	55	65	62	42	23
SD21-029	17.3	14	100	4.1	79	49	39	64	40	25
SD21-030	8.8	14	100	4.1	79	55	24	61	53	13
SD21-031	11.5	16	100	4.0	69	48	30	64	41	26
SD21-032	33.8	18	100	3.9	67	52	47	63	43	30
SD21-033	14.4	15	100	4.0	100	55	35	62	52	9
SD21-034	18.9	16	100	3.9	81	54	38	62	49	4
SD21-035	11.1	15	100	4.1	80	53	30	60	50	8
SD21-036	4.2	15	100	4.0	53	48	10	64	45	16
SD21-037	10.7	14	100	4.1	64	51	24	60	48	13
SD21-038	33.4	20	100	3.6	90	61	56	70	49	16
SD21-039	39.0	21	100	3.6	90	62	66	69	47	15
SD21-040	47.5	21	100	3.8	100	63	72	68	48	18
SD21-041	10.0	12	100	4.4	50	44	20	63	40	32
SD21-042	20.3	15	100	4.2	67	55	27	64	52	12
SD21-043	17.9	16	100	3.9	75	53	37	64	47	10
SD21-044	12.7	15	100	4.3	73	51	35	64	43	14
SD21-045	7.1	14	100	4.1	79	54	18	59	52	2
SD21-046	4.6	14	100	4.1	57	51	7	69	49	8
SD21-048	5.2	15	100	4.0	53	46	9	58	45	3

Table 4: Primary Elections (contests with Black candidate) (continued)

District	Percent Black Voting Age Population	Number of Contests	Percent of Black-preferred candidates Democratic	Average Number of Candidates	Black-preferred win rate	Average Black-preferred candidate vote share	Avg. Pct. Voters Black	Avg. ER Black cohesion (pct.)	Avg. ER White crossover support (pct.)	Pct. Black needed for majority
SD21-049	6.9	12	100	4.8	67	56	7	65	55	15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE, et al.,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
v.)	STATE BOARD
)	DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO
)	PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF)	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ELECTIONS, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

Defendants, the North Carolina State Board of Elections, and Alan Hirsch, Jeff Carmon, III, Stacy Eggers, IV, Kevin N. Lewis, and Siobhan O’Duffy Millen, named in their official capacities (“State Board Defendants”), hereby respond to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [D.E. 16].

State Board Defendants take no position on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Rather, this response is provided to inform the Court and the parties about the schedule for the upcoming 2024 elections and related administrative considerations. In addition to the information below, State Board Defendants stand ready to provide the Court with any additional information the Court requires at the request of the Court or at a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, should one occur.

SCHEDULE FOR THE 2024 ELECTIONS

Candidate filing for the March 5, 2024, statewide primary election began at noon on December 4, 2023, and ended at noon on December 15, 2023. *See* N.C.G.S. § 163-106.2(a). Contests on the ballot include the U.S. President, U.S. House of Representatives, the Governor and all other Council of State Members, the N.C. General Assembly, state judicial contests at all levels, district attorneys, clerks of court, and county offices. *See* North Carolina State Board of Elections webpage, “Upcoming Election | NCSBE”, <https://www.ncsbe.gov/voting/upcoming->

[election](#), last visited December 11, 2023. Absentee ballots will be distributed on January 19, 2024, and in-person early voting begins on February 15, 2024. *Id.*; N.C.G.S. § 163-22(k) and 227.10(a); *see also* N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Resolution on Absentee Ballot Distribution for the March 2024 Primary (Nov. 28, 2023);¹ and *see* 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A); N.C. Sess. Laws 2023-140, sec. 27(b), § 163-166.40.

The State Board is currently working with the county boards of elections to meet these deadlines. The assignment of voters to their correct State Senate, State House, and Congressional districts, following the enactment of those districts by the General Assembly in October 2023, has been completed as of this filing. *See* North Carolina State Board of Elections webpage, Voting Maps/Redistricting, <https://www.ncsbe.gov/results-data/voting-maps-redistricting/>, last visited December 11, 2023; *see also* the Declaration of Karen Brinson Bell, ¶ 5. As soon as the candidate filing period was completed on December 15, numerous tasks began that are necessary to prepare and proof the official ballots, to have certified vendors print and deliver those ballots to the county board offices, and to have county board staff create outgoing absentee ballot packages for each eligible absentee ballot requester. *See* N.C.G.S. §§ 163-165.3, -229, -230.1(a1) & (c); *see also* 08 NCAC 06B .0103; *see also* Bell Decl., ¶ 6.

Originally, these processes needed to be accomplished by January 12, 2024, to comply with state law. N.C.G.S. § 163-227.10 (requiring absentee ballots to be mailed 50 days prior to election day); *see also* Bell Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8. Under that schedule, the Board would have had 16 business days to complete the tasks set forth above after the candidate-filing window closed on

¹ Available at

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Orders/Resolutions/20231128%20Resolution%20for%2045-day%20absentee%20distribution.pdf, last visited December 12, 2023.

December 15. However, the Board was concerned that 16 business days was not enough time to complete the necessary tasks, especially given the many state holidays occurring between the end of candidate filing and January 12.² Bell Decl., ¶ 9. Thus, the State Board voted on November 28, 2023, to extend the deadline for distributing absentee ballots by 5 days, the maximum possible extension it could grant itself under state law while still remaining compliant with the federal law deadline for absentee-ballot distribution.³ *Id.*; see 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A) (requiring absentee ballots to be mailed 45 days prior to election day). This shifted the absentee-ballot distribution deadline from January 12 to January 19 and gave the State Board 20 business days to accomplish the necessary tasks. See Bell Decl., ¶ 9.

IMPACT OF THIS LITIGATION ON THE ELECTIONS CALENDAR

If this Court (or any other) orders new State Senate districts to be drawn, the impact on the elections calendar will depend on the timing of that order.

To start, to accommodate a new map without moving the dates for any elections contests, the State Board would need to receive the new map in sufficient time for candidate filing for the affected districts to begin during the first week of January. *Id.*, ¶¶ 10-14. The length of the candidate-filing period would depend on the court order, but the filing period could conclude no later than January 10 for the State Board and county boards to complete ballot preparation by the January 19 deadline. In that scenario, the State Board and relevant county boards would need to reassign voters to the new districts simultaneous with candidate filing. *Id.*, ¶ 11. After candidate

² December 25, 2023, December 26, 2023, December 27, 2023, January 1, 2024, and January 15, 2024 are state holidays falling within this time period. See <https://oshr.nc.gov/state-employee-resources/benefits/leave/holidays>.

³

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Orders/Resolutions/20231128%20Resolution%20for%2045-day%20absentee%20distribution.pdf.

filing, the boards would need to complete the same essential tasks set forth above—preparing and proofing the ballots, printing and delivering the ballots, and creating the absentee ballot packages. *Id.*, ¶ 12. That process is obviously ongoing for all other contests for the March primary. As noted above, if candidate filing for any affected districts concluded by the middle of the second week of January, there would still be enough time (7 business days) to revise the ballots and get them ready for distribution before the absentee-ballot distribution deadline, assuming the court-ordered remedy affected only a limited number of state senate districts. *Id.*

If a new map is needed but is not ordered by the time described above,⁴ the State Board recommends moving the affected election contests to May 14, 2024, the date currently set for a second primary (i.e., runoffs for any primary contests that do not surpass the requisite threshold). N.C.G.S. § 163-111; *see* Bell Decl., ¶ 13. To make this timeline work, candidate filing for any remedial districts would need to be complete before canvass of the March primary on March 15, 2024. This would leave 9 business days for the State Board and county boards to prepare ballots before the absentee-ballot distribution deadline for the second primary (March 28, 2024). *See* Bell Decl., ¶ 14. If a remedial map were not provided in sufficient time for candidate filing to occur in early March, mailing absentee ballots by March 28—and, thus, holding the contests for the affected State Senate districts on May 14, 2024⁵—would not be administratively possible. *Id.*

⁴ If voting in certain contests were enjoined after ballots are printed for the March primary, the State Board would recommend an order prohibiting the State and county boards from reporting any results from those contests, similar to a remedy that was in place during the primary election in 2016. *See* Numbered Memo 2016-03, https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/sboe/numbermemo/2016/Numbered_Memo_2016-03.pdf, last visited December 20, 2023.

⁵ Again, this is because the law requires a 45-day absentee-voting period. The State Board could attempt to narrow the absentee-voting window, but if there are any federal contests on the ballot, that would require a waiver from the federal government.

Finally, if a new map is provided after the aforementioned deadlines, the affected races could be held on some date after the canvass is completed for any May 14, 2024 second primaries that are needed. The State and county boards would need to ensure that they could begin distributing ballots at least 45 days in advance, and that they had 5 to 10 business days for candidate filing and at least 9 business days for ballot preparation before that. Given these necessities, the best option would likely be July 23, 2024, ten weeks after the May 14 primary. *Id.*, ¶ 15.

Holding delayed elections is not without costs, most of which are borne by the county boards of elections. These costs can be particularly significant if a court-ordered remedy requires the State and county boards to hold a special election that otherwise would not occur, as would likely be the case on July 23, 2024. However, moving the date for a limited number of contests is administratively feasible, and has been done with some frequency in North Carolina in recent years.⁶

CONCLUSION

As stated above, the State Board Defendants take no position on the merits but stand ready to provide any and all additional information required by the Court regarding the election schedule, relevant deadlines, and practical administrative considerations.

⁶ For example, this occurred in 2016 and 2022. *See* Numbered Memo 2016-03, https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/sboe/numbermemo/2016/Numbered_Memo_2016-03.pdf, last visited December 20, 2023; *see also* the February 9, 2022 North Carolina State Board of Elections Press Release, “Candidate Filing for 2022 Elections to Resume on February 24,” <https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2022/02/09/candidate-filing-2022-elections-resume-february-24>, last visited December 22, 2023.

Respectfully submitted this the 22nd day of December, 2023.

N.C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

/s/ Terence Steed

Terence Steed

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE, et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
v.)
)
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF)
ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

**DECLARATION OF
KAREN BRINSON BELL**

I, Karen Brinson Bell, declare under penalty of perjury, that the following information is true to the best of my knowledge and state as follows:

1. I am over 18 years old. I am competent to give this declaration, and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. I have consulted with senior staff at the State Board in the preparation of this declaration.

2. I currently serve as the Executive Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (the "State Board"). I became Executive Director of the State Board effective June 1, 2019. My statutory duties as Executive Director include staffing, administration, and execution of the State Board's decisions and orders. I am also the Chief State Elections Official for the State of North Carolina under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and N.C.G.S. § 163-27. As Executive Director, I am responsible for the administration of elections in the State of North Carolina. The State Board has supervisory responsibilities for the 100 county boards of elections, and as Executive Director, I provide guidance to the directors of the county boards.

3. Candidate filing for the March 5, 2024, statewide primary election began at noon on December 4, 2023, and ended at noon on December 15, 2023. See N.C.G.S. § 163-106.2(a). Absentee ballots will be distributed on January 19, 2024, and in-person early voting begins on

February 15, 2024. *Id.*; N.C.G.S. § 163-22(k) and 227.10(a); *see also* N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Resolution on Absentee Ballot Distribution for the March 2024 Primary (Nov. 28, 2023);¹ and *see* 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A); N.C. Sess. Laws 2023-140, sec. 27(b), § 163-166.40.

4. In our state, the county boards of elections administer elections in each county, which includes, among other things, providing for the distribution of voting systems, ballots, and pollbooks, training elections officials, conducting absentee and in-person voting, and tabulation and canvassing of results. The State Board is responsible for development and enhancement of our State Elections Information Management System (“SEIMS”), which includes managing functions that assign voters to their relevant voting districts, a process known as “geocoding.” The State Board also supports the county boards and their vendors in the preparation and proofing of ballots.

5. County board staff, with assistance from State Board staff, have completed the geocoding process of assigning voters to their correct State Senate, State House, and Congressional districts following redistricting this fall. For North Carolina electoral districts, the geocoding process starts when the State Board receives district shapefiles from the legislature, which include geographic data setting the boundaries for legislative districts. The State Board’s staff then works with county board staff to use the shapefiles to update the voting jurisdictions that are assigned to particular addresses in SEIMS. State Board staff and county board staff perform multiple audits of the geocoding to ensure its accuracy before ballot preparation. The

¹ Available at

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Orders/Resolutions/20231128%20Resolution%20for%2045-day%20absentee%20distribution.pdf, last visited December 12, 2023.

amount of time required for geocoding generally corresponds with the number of district boundaries that are redrawn within the counties and, especially, the number of voting districts that split precinct lines.

6. The process of generating and proofing ballots is complex and involves multiple technical systems and quality-control checkpoints that precede ballot printing and the coding of voting machines. This includes the preparation and proofing of official ballots, certified vendors printing and delivering those ballots to the county board offices, and county board staff creating outgoing absentee ballot packages for each eligible absentee ballot requester. *See* N.C.G.S. §§ 163-165.3, -229, -230.1(a1) & (c); *see also* 08 NCAC 06B .0103. All of this must be completed prior to the absentee distribution deadline.

7. Under N.C.G.S. § 163-227.10(a), the State Board must begin mailing absentee ballots 50 days prior to the primary election day, unless the State Board authorizes a reduction to 45 days or there is “an appeal before the State Board or the courts not concluded, in which case the board shall provide the ballots as quickly as possible upon the conclusion of such an appeal.” The federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) requires that absentee ballots that include elections for federal office be made available by 45 days before a primary election, *see* 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A), unless I request a waiver of this requirement based on a legal contest delaying the preparation of ballots (or another enumerated hardship), and that waiver is granted by the federal official designated to administer UOCAVA, *see id.* § 20302(g). The state requesting a waiver must present a comprehensive plan that provides absentee UOCAVA voters sufficient time to receive and submit absentee ballots they have requested in time to be counted in the federal election.²

² https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/EO/2012_waiver_guidance.pdf.

8. Based on the primary date of March 5, 2023, 50 days before the primary election falls on January 15, 2023; but because that day is a holiday, the county boards would need to be prepared to begin distributing absentee ballots on the prior business day, which is January 12, 2023. The 45-day federal deadline falls on January 20, 2023, but because that is a weekend day, the county boards would need to be prepared to begin distributing absentee ballot on the prior business day, which is January 19, 2023.

9. On November 28, 2023, the State Board voted to move the absentee ballot distribution deadline from 50 to 45 days, because the 50-day deadline would have made it difficult to complete these tasks, especially given the holidays between the end of candidate filing and the distribution deadline.^{3,4} The 16 business days between the end of candidate filing and the absentee distribution deadline may have been possible, but it would have placed a considerable strain on staff. Accordingly, the State Board altered the distribution deadline in order to provide staff with 20 business days for this work to occur. While this is an adequate amount of time for these tasks, it still requires staff to work overtime and on non-business days.

10. If the State Board needed to implement new State Senate districts, per a court order, staff would need to reassign voters to the new districts and reopen candidate filing for the affected districts. Typically, candidate filing occurs over a period of 10 business days, but a shorter period such as 5 business days, is administrable. The work of reassigning voters into new districts can be accomplished at the same time as any candidate filing period.

3

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Orders/Resolutions/2023/11/28%20Resolution%20for%2045-day%20absentee%20distribution.pdf.

⁴ December 25, 2023, December 26, 2023, December 27, 2023, January 1, 2024, and January 15, 2024 are state holidays falling within this time period. See <https://oshr.nc.gov/state-employee-resources/benefits/leave/holidays>.

4

11. Following candidate filing and assignment of voters, the ballot preparation process must begin. If only State Senate ballot items are being prepared, this reduces the initial ballot preparation and proofing time, but not the printing and delivery time, or the preparation of ballot packages at the county board office. State Board staff estimates the overall ballot preparation for any court-ordered State Senate districts for the 18 counties at issue would take approximately 9 business days following the close of candidate filing, if this were occurring for a separate election for State Senate districts. If a remedial map involved more counties that could add time to ballot preparation. However, if ballot preparation is already ongoing for other contests, as it is now for the March primary, any new State Senate candidates could be folded into ongoing ballot preparation, as long as such candidates are known 7 business days prior to the absentee ballot distribution deadline.

12. Thus, if any court-ordered remedial map only affected two state senate districts, and candidate filing was completed by January 10, State Board staff estimates that the agency and affected counties could incorporate new candidates for the affected districts into ongoing ballot preparation work, in time to meet the current absentee distribution deadline of January 19, 2024.

13. If a new map is needed but is not ordered in time to complete the tasks above before January 19, the affected election contests would need to be moved to May 14, 2024, the date currently set for a second primary (i.e., runoffs for any primary contests that do not surpass the requisite threshold). N.C.G.S. § 163-111.

14. To make this timeline work, candidate filing for any remedial districts would need to be complete before canvass of the March primary on March 15, 2024, leaving 9 business days to prepare ballots before distributing absentee ballots by March 28, 2024. If a court-ordered

remedial map were not provided in sufficient time for candidate filing to occur in early March, holding the contests for the affected State Senate districts on May 14, 2024, would not be administratively possible, unless the absentee voting period were reduced to fewer than 45 days, which state law would permit but, if there are any federal contests on the ballot on May 14, federal law would not permit this absent a waiver from the federal government.

15. Finally, if a court-ordered map is provided after the aforementioned deadlines, the affected races could be held on some date after the canvass is completed for any May 14, 2024, second primaries that are needed. The State and county boards would need to ensure that they could begin distributing ballots at least 45 days in advance, and that they had at least 5 business days for candidate filing and at least 9 business days for ballot preparation before that. Given these necessities, the best option would likely be July 23, 2024, ten weeks after the May 14 primary. Holding an election at any time later than August 6, 2024, would make it difficult to canvass the election and prepare ballots in advance of the general election ballot distribution date of September 6, 2024. *See* N.C.G.S. § 163-227.10(a).

This concludes my declaration.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), I verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Affidavit is true and correct in substance and in fact to the best of my knowledge and belief.

This the 22nd day of December, 2023.


Karen Brinson Bell, Executive Director
N.C. State Board of Elections

Exhibit 1

Affidavit of Senator Dan Blue

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION

RODNEY D. PIERCE and
MOSES MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, ALAN HIRSCH, in his
official capacity as Chair of the North
Carolina State Board of Elections, JEFF
CARMON III in his official capacity as
Secretary of the North Carolina State
Board of Elections, STACY "FOUR"
EGGERS IV in his official capacity as a
member of the North Carolina State Board
of Elections, KEVIN N. LEWIS in his
official capacity as a member of the North
Carolina State Board of Elections,
SIOBHAN O'DUFFY MILLEN in her
official capacity as a member of the North
Carolina State Board of Elections, PHILIP
E. BERGER in his official capacity as
President Pro Tem of the North Carolina
Senate, and TIMOTHY K. MOORE in his
official capacity as Speaker of the North
Carolina House of Representatives,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN BLUE

Dan Blue, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I have served as a member of the North Carolina General Assembly for more than 38 years. From 1980 to 2002 and from 2006 to 2009, I served as a member of the House of Representatives; since 2009 I have served as a member of the Senate. From 1991 to 1994 I served two terms as Speaker of the House, and at present I am Minority Leader of the Senate. This year I celebrated my 50th year practicing law.

2. During my legislative tenure, the General Assembly has enacted 13 House redistricting maps¹, 12 Senate redistricting maps² and 10 congressional maps³. I have participated in the enactment of each of those 35 maps as an appointed member of one or more redistricting committees and in other leadership roles. Many of these maps were drawn or redrawn in the context of litigation and in response to orders of the state or federal courts. At least once over each of the five decades I served in the General Assembly, the General Assembly has redrawn one or more redistricting maps during the period between February and May of the election years for legislative and congressional elections and held primaries for those offices between May and September of those years.

- a. On March 8, 1984, the General Assembly adopted four acts redrawing the legislative districts invalidated by the Gingles district court. 1983 SL 1es, 2es, 3es and 4es. On that same day, the General Assembly bifurcated the 1984 election schedules for the Senate and House districts covered by these four acts from the election schedules for all other Senate and House districts. The elements of this bifurcation included: voiding the filing period already completed in the revised districts; establishing new filing periods for election in those districts for April and May; and rescheduling primaries in those districts for June and July. 1983 SL 2es2.
- b. On May 21, 1998, in the context of the Shaw litigation the General Assembly redrew the State's congressional map for the 2008

¹ 1981 SL 5es2; 1984 SL 6; 1991 SL 5es; 2001 SL 458; 2002 SL 1; 2003 SL 434 2009 SL 78; 2011 SL 402; 2017 SL 207; 2019 SL 219; 2021 SL 173; 2022 SL 2; 2023 SL 146.

² 1981 SL --; 1984 SL 4 and 5; 1991 SL 5es; 2001 SL 458; 2002 SL 1; 2003 SL 434; 2011 SL 404; 2017 SL 208; 2019 SL 220; 2021 SL 175; 2022 SL 4; 2023 SL 149.

³ 1981 SL 7es2; 1992 SL 7; 1997 SL 11; 1998 SL 2; 2001 SL 479; 2016 SL 1; 2019 SL 249; 2021 SL 174; 2022 SL 3; 2023 SL 145.

elections. 1998 SL 2. The 1998 primary elections for the 1998 congressional elections were held on September 15.

- c. On May 20, 2002, in the context of the Stephenson litigation, the General Assembly redrew the House and Senate maps for the 2002 elections. 2002 SL 1. The primary elections for the General Assembly in 2002 were held on September 10.
- d. On February 19, 2016, in the context of the Harris v. Cooper litigation, the General Assembly redrew the State's congressional map for the 2016 elections. 2016 SL 1. The 2016 primary elections for Congress were held on June 9, 2016.
- e. On February 17, 2022, in the context of the Harris v. Hall litigation, the General Assembly redrew the State Senate map, 2022 SL 2, and the State House map, 2022 SL 4, and the primary elections were held on May 17, 2022.

3. The 2024 primary elections for the State Senate and House are scheduled for March, but March is an atypical time for primaries in recent years. Since 1990, there have been 17 primary elections for the State Senate and House. Twelve of those primaries (2022, 2018, 2014, 2012, 2010, 2008, 2006, 2000, 1996, 1994, 1992 and 1990) were held in May. Only two were held in March (2020 and 2016); one was held in July (2004); and two in September (1998 and 2002).

4. The General Assembly has expressly anticipated the need to revise the 2023 Senate districts and alter the 2024 election schedule. On the same day the General Assembly enacted the 2023 Senate map, it also enacted an adjournment resolution. That resolution provides that the General Assembly will reconvene on December 20, 2023, January 17, 2024, February 14, 2024, March 13, 2024, April 4, 2024, and April 10, 2024 and

that on each of those days it may consider “bills responding to actions related to litigation challenging the legality of legislative enactments” and “bills relating to elections laws including bills concerning the districts for Congressional, State House and State Senate.” Resolution 2023-11.

5. North Carolina’s courts have also redrawn districts on occasion over my years of service in the General Assembly. Most notably, on April 30, 2002, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Stephenson invalidated the House and Senate redistricting plans enacted by the General Assembly in November 1991 following the 2000 census. 1991 SL 451 and 458. Two weeks later on May 17, 2002, the General Assembly enacted new maps (2002 SL 1), but those maps were invalidated by the trial court, and the 2002 House and Senate elections were held under maps drawn by the trial judge. The trial judge’s legislative maps were precleared on July 12, 2002 by the United States Department of Justice for use for the 2002 elections; the primaries were held on September 15; and the general elections were held in November. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301 (2003).

6. During the 2023 session of the General Assembly, I served as Minority Leader in the Senate. On April 28, 2023, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and voided earlier Supreme Court decisions which had invalidated the House and Senate maps enacted in 2021. Harper v. Hall. ---NC---. Following that decision, the General Assembly could have simply readopted the 2021 House and Senate maps for this decade, but it instead choose to draw new House and Senate maps. These newly redrawn maps were first made public on October 18, 2023. I and other Democratic legislators saw the new maps for the first time on October 18 at the same time they were released to the public. One week later on October 25 those redrawn maps were adopted for the decade on a straight party-line vote. 2023 SL 146 and 149. During the almost six-month interim between April 28 and October 25 the General Assembly enacted more than 120 new laws. In May and June, the

Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee met five times and considered bills but not any redistricting bill.

7. There is no legitimate basis for the General Assembly's almost 6-month delay in adopting new maps. Time and time again the General Assembly, even in the days before high-speed computers and fancy algorithms, has demonstrated the ability to redraw maps in short order. Indeed, there was a wide-spread belief among members of the General Assembly in the Spring of 2023 that the Senate and House maps were revised soon after the April 28, 2023 North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Harper v. Hall allowing revision. The more-than-five month-delay-month delay in presenting revised maps for adoption was a political ploy designed by the Republican super-majority in the General Assembly to corral the ability of the courts to order new maps prior to the 2024 elections. In conversations in May with Senator Berger and members of his team, I was informed that they were awaiting the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Allen v. Milligan before adopting new maps. Allen v. Milligan came down on June 8. Maps did not come for another 18 1/2 weeks.

This the 20th of December, 2023.


Dan Blue

Sworn to and Subscribed Before me this 20th day of December, 2023


Notary Public

Sandra J. Chrisawn
My Commission Expires:

12-4-2025



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:23-CV-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE and)
MOSES MATTHEWS,)
)
 Plaintiffs,)
)
 v.)
)
 THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE)
 BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
 Defendants.)

ORDER

On November 20, 2023, Rodney D. Pierce (“Pierce”) and Moses Matthews (“Matthews”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and its five members in their official capacities (collectively “the Board defendants”), Philip E. Berger in his official capacity as President pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate (“Berger”), and Timothy K. Moore in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives (“Moore”) (collectively “the legislative defendants”) alleging that North Carolina Senate Bill 758 (“SB 758”), which establishes new state Senate districts for North Carolina, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (“Section 2”) [D.E. 1]. Plaintiffs ask the court to (1) “[d]eclare that SB 758 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act;” (2) “[g]rant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring Defendants . . . from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 as drawn in SB 758, including barring Defendants from conducting any Senate elections using those district boundaries;” (3) “[t]ake actions necessary to order the adoption of a valid state Senate plan that includes a minority opportunity district in

northeastern North Carolina, while leaving intact the current district comprised of Pitt and Edgecombe Counties, in time to use the remedial plan in the 2024 Senate elections (and, as part of the remedial order, waive the one-year residency requirement for candidates under N.C. Const. art. II, § 6, for newly drawn remedial districts);” and (4) “[g]rant such other or further relief the [c]ourt deems appropriate, including but not limited to an award of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs.” Id. at 21.

On November 20, 2023, plaintiffs filed an “emergency motion” to expedite briefing and the court’s decision on plaintiffs’ as yet not filed motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 5]. Specifically, plaintiffs wanted (1) to require the legislative defendants to file a response to plaintiffs’ as yet not filed motion for a preliminary injunction on November 27, 2023 (the Monday after Thanksgiving weekend), (2) to have plaintiffs file a reply on November 28, 2023, (3) to have the court hold a hearing on the as yet not filed motion for a preliminary injunction on November 29, 2023, and (4) to have the court resolve the motion for a preliminary injunction by December 1, 2023. See id. at 1–2. On November 22, 2023, the legislative defendants responded in opposition to plaintiffs’ “emergency motion” to expedite [D.E. 12].

On November 22, 2023, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint [D.E. 13], moved to enjoin SB 758 [D.E. 16], and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 17] and expert reports totaling 406 pages [D.E. 17-1, 17-2, 17-3]. On November 27, 2023, the court denied as meritless plaintiffs’ “emergency motion” to expedite [D.E. 23]. In that order, the court observed that plaintiffs failed to explain their slothfulness for waiting 26 days after the General Assembly enacted SB 758 to file suit and waiting 28 days after the General Assembly enacted SB 758 to file a motion for a preliminary injunction. See id. at 2–3. Plaintiffs’ “emergency motion” also proposed an unfair schedule and ignored this court’s caseload. See id. The court also stated that it “will hold a hearing in due course

if one is needed to resolve plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction." Id. at 4.

On December 6, 2023, the legislative defendants moved for an extension of time until December 22, 2023, to respond to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 25]. On December 7, 2023, plaintiffs responded in opposition [D.E. 26] and the legislative defendants replied [D.E. 27]. On December 8, 2023, the court granted the motion for an extension of time until December 22, 2023. See [D.E. 28]. On December 11, 2023, plaintiffs filed a letter with the court citing "this case[']s . . . extraordinary public importance" and requesting that the court resolve plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction by December 29, 2023. [D.E. 29] 1. On December 22, 2023, the legislative defendants responded in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 39] and filed exhibits totaling 340 pages [D.E. 39-1 to 39-8]. On December 22, 2023, the Board defendants informed the court of their schedule concerning the 2024 North Carolina elections and took no position on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 40, 41]. On December 26, 2023, plaintiffs replied and asked the court to resolve their motion for a preliminary injunction by December 28, 2023 [D.E. 42].

The court is reviewing plaintiffs' motion, plaintiffs' exhibits, the legislative defendants' response and exhibits, the Board defendants' schedule, and plaintiffs' reply. "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits and to establish the other three requirements for a preliminary injunction is not as clear as plaintiffs suggest. See, e.g., [D.E. 17] 14 (arguing plaintiffs are "overwhelmingly likely to prevail" and will "easily satisfy" the governing standard). As for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiffs must

demonstrate, *inter alia*, that the minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 18 (2023) (cleaned up). “A district will be reasonably configured . . . if it comports with traditional districting criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact.” Id. The minority group also must show that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986); see Allen, 599 U.S. at 18. Courts refer to this Gingles factor as “racially polarized voting.” See, e.g., Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 169 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge court), aff’d, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017). The parties hotly dispute whether plaintiffs’ minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district, particularly in light of the North Carolina Constitution’s Whole County Provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 7–14 (2009) (plurality opinion); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 381–86, 562 S.E.2d 377, 396–98 (2002); compare [D.E. 17] 15–18, and [D.E. 17-1], and [D.E. 42] 2–7, with [D.E. 39] 13–18, and [D.E. 39-6]. The parties also hotly dispute whether racially polarized voting exists in the counties in Senate District 1 and Senate District 2 in SB 758. Compare [D.E. 17] 18–20, and [D.E. 17-2] ¶¶ 11, 16–31, and [D.E. 42] 7–9, with [D.E. 39] 18–23, and [D.E. 39-7] 2, 5–15. In 2016, a three-judge district court examined this same region of North Carolina and found no evidence of racially polarized voting. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 624–25 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge court), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017). In fact, according to the three-judge court that reviewed the issue of racially polarized voting, “precisely the opposite occurred . . . [and] significant crossover voting by white voters supported the African-American candidate.” Id. at 625. The parties also hotly dispute whether plaintiffs can show, under the totality of the circumstances,

“that the political process is not equally open to minority voters.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 18 (quotation omitted); compare [D.E. 17] 20–26, and [D.E. 42] 9–10, with [D.E. 39] 23–25. Finally, the parties hotly dispute whether plaintiffs have met the other requirements for a preliminary injunction and how Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam), applies. Compare [D.E. 17] 27–30, and [D.E. 42] 11–12, with [D.E. 39] 25–29. In light of these disputes, and now that the motion is fully briefed, the court finds that a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction would aid the court’s decisionmaking process.

On November 20, 2023, plaintiffs initially asked this court to resolve their as yet unfiled motion for a preliminary injunction by December 1, 2023. See [D.E. 5] 2. On November 27, 2023, the court rejected as meritless plaintiffs’ “emergency motion” to expedite. See [D.E. 23]. On December 11, 2023, plaintiffs then asked the court to resolve their motion for a preliminary injunction by December 29, 2023. See [D.E. 29]. On December 26, 2023, plaintiffs asked the court to resolve their motion for a preliminary injunction by December 28, 2023. See [D.E. 42] 3.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina is the busiest United States District Court in the Fourth Circuit and the fourth-busiest United States District Court in the United States by weighted filings per judgeship. See U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics, September 2023, <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-court-management-statistics-september-2023> (last visited Dec. 29, 2023). Each judge on this court has over 1,000 cases. The court declines plaintiffs’ invitation to rush to a decision on the merits by December 28, 2023. Indeed, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was not fully briefed until 9:26 p.m. on December 26, 2023. Instead, the court will employ a judicious deliberative process, including holding a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The hearing will permit the court to hear from the advocates and to have the advocates answer the court’s questions after the

court has had sufficient time to review the 835 pages of filings¹ concerning plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

In sum, the court SHALL HOLD a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 16] on Wednesday, January 10, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom one of the Terry Sanford Federal Building, 310 New Bern Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina.

SO ORDERED. This 29 day of December, 2023.



JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge

¹ This figure does not include the brief of proposed amicus curiae Governor Roy A. Cooper and Attorney General Joshua H. Stein. See [D.E. 31-1]. Responses to that motion [D.E. 31] are due on January 2, 2024.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION**

RODNEY D. PIERCE and
MOSES MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs Rodney D. Pierce and Moses Matthews appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from this Court's constructive denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (D.E. 16). *See* Order, D.E. 43 (December 29, 2023); Order, D.E. 28 (December 8, 2023); Order, D.E. 23 (November 27, 2023); *see also District of Columbia v. Trump*, 959 F.3d 126, 131-32 (4th Cir. 2020) (a district court's "unreasonable or inexplicable delay" in ruling on a time-sensitive motion can be "tantamount to a denial" that can be appealed); *see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc.*, 103 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A showing of unjustifiable delay coupled with irreparable injury if an immediate appeal is not allowed is enough to make a constructive denial appealable, if a formal denial would be.")

Dated: December 29, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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POYNER SPRUILL LLP

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919.783.6400

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**Special Appearance*

***Notice of Special Appearance forthcoming*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel and parties registered in said system.

Dated: December 29, 2023

/s/ R. Stanton Jones

R. Stanton Jones

FILED: January 9, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2317
(4:23-cv-00193-D-RN)

RODNEY D. PIERCE; MOSES MATTHEWS

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; ALAN HIRSCH, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; JEFF CARMON, III, in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; STACY FOUR EGGERS, IV, in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; KEVIN N. LEWIS, in his official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; SIOBHAN O'DUFFY MILLEN, in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; PHILLIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President Pro Tem of the North Carolina Senate; TIMOTHY K. MOORE, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives

Defendants - Appellees

O R D E R

Upon consideration of appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, the court grants the motion. We know the trial court will be mindful of

the time-sensitive nature of the VRA suits as it proceeds.

The appellant's motion to expedite is denied as moot.

Entered at the direction of Judge Wilkinson, with the concurrence of Judge Gregory and Judge Rushing.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:23-CV-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE and)
MOSES MATTHEWS,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
v.)
)
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE)
BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

ORDER

The court has reviewed the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissing appellants' appeal and reviewed the Fourth Circuit's judgment. Although the Fourth Circuit's judgment indicates that it will not issue its mandate for 21 days, this court is mindful of the time sensitive nature of the issues in this case. Thus, the court will proceed with the scheduled hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, January 10, 2024. The court also is aware of the severe weather on the East Coast and how that weather may disrupt air travel. Thus, any counsel in this case outside North Carolina may appear at tomorrow's hearing via videoconference technology. If counsel plans to do so, counsel should notify the court and contact Stephanie Mann at stephanie_mann@nced.uscourts.gov for technical information.

SO ORDERED. This 9 day of January, 2024.


JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DR. MATT BARRETO

On January 10, 2024 plaintiffs' lawyers contacted me to inquire about Table B1, page 20 of my original declaration dated November 21, 2023, specifically the last two rows of the table regarding the performance analysis for the enacted districts at issue in this case using results from the 2022 State Senate elections.

Senate District 2 in the 2023 enacted map contains portions of multiple districts from the prior State Senate map which was used in the 2022 elections, specifically prior districts 1 and 3. Upon inspection of the data for the 2022 State Senate elections, I noticed that only one of those prior districts (district 3) had a contested State Senate election in 2022, meaning the 2022 election in that prior district featured two candidates competing against each other. In the other prior district (district 1), large portions of which are now part of enacted Senate District 2, the 2022 State Senate election was uncontested.

The portion of current Senate District 2 that had a contested State Senate election in 2022 consists of only Halifax, Warren, and Martin counties. All of the other counties within current Senate District 2 were part of the prior district in which only a Republican candidate ran unopposed. Those counties, which comprise a majority of current Senate District 2, are Chowan, Washington, Hyde, Pamlico, and Carteret. Because most of the counties within current Senate District 2 did not have a contested State Senate election in 2022, it is not feasible to conduct a full performance analysis for current Senate District 2 using the 2022 State Senate elections. However it is possible using other statewide elections such as U.S Senate or Supreme Court positions which can be easily analyzed for performance results.

The vote shares in Table B1 of my original declaration include only the results of contested elections; uncontested elections are excluded. Accordingly, the row showing the performance analysis for current Senate District 2 using the 2022 State Senate elections is reporting only the 2022 vote shares in Halifax, Warren, and Martin counties. The vote shares in this row do not include any of the votes for State Senate in 2022 from any of the other counties within current Senate District 2. Thus, all this row shows is that a hypothetical district containing only Halifax, Warren, and Martin counties would perform for Black-preferred candidates based on the 2022 State Senate elections.

This is important because Halifax, Warren and Martin counties represent a heavily African American portion of current Senate District 2. In these three counties combined, African Americans constitute 48.4% of the voting age population (VAP) compared to 44.5% White according to the U.S. Census 2020 decennial survey PL 94-171. By contrast, the entirety of current Senate District 2 is only 30% African American VAP. This explains why the election in prior district 1 was uncontested in 2022: that district was so heavily Republican that no Democratic candidate ran.

Thus, if we tally the total votes cast across all of the 2022 State Senate elections, not just the contested elections as reported in Table B1, current Senate District 2 will not perform for Black-preferred candidates. When all 2022 State Senate elections are counted across both contested and uncontested races in the counties now within current Senate District 2, 51,019 ballots were


cast for white-preferred (Republican) State Senate candidates, while only 16,877 ballots were cast for Black-preferred (Democratic) State Senate candidates. Overall, 75.1% of ballots cast in 2022 State Senate elections went to Republican State Senate candidates in enacted Senate District 2, compared to only 24.9% for Black-preferred candidates. These results are consistent with all other elections in 2022 in which current Senate Districts 1 and 2 do not perform for Black-preferred candidates using any prior election.

Given that the majority of counties within current Senate District 2 were part of a prior district where the Republican candidate ran unopposed in 2022, the results of the 2022 State Senate elections are less probative in analyzing the performance of current Senate District 2. Instead, it is far more probative to analyze the performance of current Senate District 2 using 2022 statewide elections which were contested in all counties now within Senate District 2. My Table B1 reported this performance analysis using 7 statewide elections in 2022, and under all of those elections, current Senate Districts 1 and 2 do not perform for Black-preferred candidates.

This question about conducting performance analysis using 2022 State Senate elections does not affect my conclusion that current Senate Districts 1 and 2 will not perform for Black-preferred candidates. Nor does it affect any of my other conclusions in my original declaration.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge.

January 12, 2024



Dr. Matt A. Barreto

Agoura Hills, California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:23-CV-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE and)
MOSES MATTHEWS,)
)
 Plaintiffs,)
)
 v.)
)
 THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE)
 BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
 Defendants.)


ORDER

On December 29, 2023, plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal in this case which divested this court of jurisdiction [D.E. 44]. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 262 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2001). On January 16, 2024, jurisdiction returned to this court when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its mandate [D.E. 56]. See Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 239; Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033, 1035 (4th Cir. 1977). In the order accompanying the mandate, the Fourth Circuit observed that issuing “the mandate is not intended to impair the trial court’s own considered review of those filings relevant to plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.” Pierce v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 23-2317, [D.E. 52] 2 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 2024).

At the court’s hearing on January 10, 2024, concerning plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties discussed plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Matthew Barreto’s estimated election outcomes in Senate Districts 1 and 2. At the hearing, the court granted plaintiffs’ request to file a supplement from Dr. Barreto. On January 12, 2024, plaintiffs submitted a supplemental declaration from Dr. Barreto. See [D.E. 55]. As part of this court’s considered review of the record, the court

ORDERS that the legislative defendants and the Board defendants may file any response to Dr. Barreto's supplemental declaration [D.E. 55] no later than Monday, January 22, 2024.

SO ORDERED. This 17 day of January, 2024.



JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 4:23-CV-00193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE and MOSES
MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, ALAN HIRSCH, in his
official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina
State Board of Elections, JEFF CARMON III in
his official capacity as Secretary of the North
Carolina State Board of Elections, STACY
“FOUR” EGGERS IV in his official capacity
as a member of the North Carolina State Board
of Elections, KEVIN N. LEWIS in his official
capacity as a member of the North Carolina
State Board of Elections, SIOBHAN O’DUFFY
MILLEN in her official capacity as a member
of the North Carolina State Board of Elections,
PHILIP E. BERGER in his official capacity as
President Pro Tem of the North Carolina
Senate, and TIMOTHY K. MOORE in his
official capacity as Speaker of the North
Carolina House of Representatives,

Defendants.

ANSWER OF LEGISLATIVE
DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFFS’
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants Philip E. Berger and Timothy K. Moore (“Legislative Defendants”)

answer the specific allegations of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as follows:

“FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLATORY RELIEF”

1. Legislative Defendants admit that the statutes cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 1.

2. Legislative Defendants admit that SB 758 was ratified on October 25, 2023. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 2.

3. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 3.

4. Legislative Defendants admit the geography of Senate District 2 speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 4.

5. Legislative Defendants admit that Plaintiffs are seeking the relief stated in paragraph 5, but specifically deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief whatsoever. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 5.

“JURISDICTION AND VENUE”

6. Legislative Defendants admit that the statutes cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 6.

7. Legislative Defendants admit that the statutes cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves and that the Court has jurisdiction. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 7.

8. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 8.

9. Legislative Defendants admit that the court has the authority to grant declarator or injunctive relief, but specifically deny that any such relief is appropriate here. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 9.

“PARTIES”

10. Legislative Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations of paragraph 10.

11. Legislative Defendants deny that black voters in Senate District 2 lack an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates of choice. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations of paragraph 11.

12. Legislative Defendants deny that black voters in Senate District 2 lack an opportunity to elect their preferred candidate of choice. In all other respects Legislative Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations of paragraph 12.

13. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 13.

14. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 14.

15. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 15.

16. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 16.

17. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 17.

18. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 18.

19. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 19.

20. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 20.

“LEGAL BACKGROUND”

21. Legislative Defendants admit that the statutes and case cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 21.

22. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 22.

23. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 23.

24. Legislative Defendants admit that the statute and senate report cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 24.

25. Legislative Defendants admit that the “Senate factors” cited in the Senate report speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25.

26. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 26.

27. Legislative Defendants admit that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“Section 2”), sections of the North Carolina Constitution, and the decision in *Stephenson v. Bartlett*, 562 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 2002) (“*Stephenson I*”) cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 27.

28. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 28.

“FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. North Carolina’s 2023 Redistricting Process”

29. Legislative Defendants admit that the 2021 redistricting process is a matter of public record and speaks for itself. Legislative Defendants also admit that the *Harper* litigation and the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 29.

30. Legislative Defendants admit the cited cases speak for themselves. Legislative Defendants also admit that remedial North Carolina House and Senate districts imposed by a court were used for the 2022 elections. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 30.

31. Legislative Defendants admit the cited case speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 31.

32. Legislative Defendants admit the cited case speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 32.

33. Legislative Defendants admit the cited case and statutes speak for themselves and that the 2023 districting plans were enacted in October 2023. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 33.

34. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 34.

35. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 35.

“B. The 2023 State Senate Redistricting Plan”

36. Legislative Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations of paragraph 36.

37. Legislative Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about which counties are located within the so-called “Black Belt.” Legislative Defendants admit that the Black voting age population (“BVAP”) for the counties listed by Plaintiffs and the State of North Carolina are a matter of public record which speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 37.

38. Legislative Defendants admit that it received the 2020 census data for the State of North Carolina and a letter received from the Southern Coalition for Social Justice (“SCSJ”) which speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 38.

39. Legislative Defendants admit that the results of the 2022 elections for the 2022 versions of Senate Districts 3 and 4 were and are a matter of public record and that they speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 39.

40. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 40.

41. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 41.

42. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 42.

43. Legislative Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 43.

44. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 44.

“C. Black North Carolinians in the Black Belt Counties Are Sufficiently Numerous and Geographically Compact to Constitute a Majority-Minority District”

45. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 45.

46. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 46.

47. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 47.

48. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 48.

49. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 49.

50. Legislative Defendants admit that Plaintiffs Demonstrative Districts B-1 and B-2 include all of the counties included in the 2023 versions of Senate Districts 1 and 2. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 50.

“D. Voting in the Relevant Area is Racially Polarized”

51. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 51.

52. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 52.

53. Legislative Defendants admit that the counties included in the 2022 version of Senate District 3 and the racial composition of these counties are matters of public record. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 53.

54. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 54.

55. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 55.

56. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 56.

57. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 57.

“E. The Totality of the Circumstances Establishes That the Enacted Plan Has the Effect of Denying Black Voters an Equal Opportunity To Participate in the Political Process and To Elect Candidates of Their Choice”

58. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 58.

“1. North Carolina’s History of Racial Discrimination”

59. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 59.

60. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 60.

61. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 61.

62. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 62.

63. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speaks for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 63.

64. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 64.

65. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 65.

66. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 66.

67. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 67.

“2. North Carolina’s History of Unlawful Race-Based Redistricting”

68. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 68.

69. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 69.

70. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speak for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 70.

71. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 71.

72. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 72.

“3. Ongoing Effects of North Carolina’s History of Discrimination”

73. Legislative Defendants admit that the cases cited by Plaintiffs speaks for themselves. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 73.

74. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 74.

75. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 75.

76. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 76.

77. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 77.

“4. History of Racial Appeals in North Carolina Political Campaign

78. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 78.

79. Legislative Defendants admit that the case cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 79.

80. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 80.

81. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 81.

82. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 82.

83. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 83.

“CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

**Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—Vote Dilution
52 U.S.C.”**

84. Legislative Defendants incorporate their responses to paragraphs 1-83 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

85. Legislative Defendants admit that the statute cited by Plaintiffs speaks for itself. In all other respects, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 85.

86. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 86.

87. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 87.

88. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 88.

89. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 89.

90. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 90.

“COUNT II

**Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—Vote Dilution
42 U.S.C. § 1983”**

91. Legislative Defendants incorporate their responses to paragraphs 1-90 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

92. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 92.

93. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 93.

94. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 94.

95. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 95.
96. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 96.
97. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 97.
98. Legislative Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 98.

“PRAYER FOR RELIEF”

No response is required to the allegations in the Prayer for Relief. To the extent this Court requires a response, Legislative Defendants deny the allegations in the Prayer for Relief and deny Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief sought in the Complaint, including those items listed in paragraphs A-D of the Prayer for Relief.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs Complaint, in whole or in part, fails state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE

The relief sought by Plaintiffs would involve unconstitutional racial gerrymanders because they request districts in which racial considerations predominate over traditional districting criteria.

THIRD DEFENSE

It would be inequitable to afford Plaintiffs relief so soon before the 2024 elections.

FOURTH DEFENSE

Section 2, properly construed, does not support a claim for vote dilution based on a challenge to a districting plan.

FIFTH DEFENSE

To the extent that Section 2 requires North Carolina to draw districts with predominate considerations of race, Section 2 is unconstitutional.

SIXTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because the districts they propose are racial gerrymanders that are illegal under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

SEVENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because the districts they propose do not satisfy the *Gingles* criteria.

EIGHTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because the districts they propose violate the Whole County Provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.

NINTH DEFENSE

Any allegations in paragraphs 1-98 of the Complaint not specifically admitted are denied.

TENTH DEFENSE

Race did not predominate in the drawing of any district.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE

The General Assembly did not “crack” or “pack” minority voters in its Senate districting plan.

TWELFTH DEFENSE

The demonstrative districts proposed by Plaintiffs are inconsistent with traditional districting criteria and fail to properly defer to the North Carolina General Assembly’s primary role in the redistricting process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Legislative Defendants respectfully request that the court enter an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, and that Legislative Defendants be awarded their costs and attorneys’ fees and such other relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January, 2024.

**NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP**

/s/ Phillip J. Strach

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Counsel for Legislative Defendants

** Notice of Special Appearance filed*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Phillip J. Strach, hereby certify that I have this day electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will provide electronic notification to counsel of record.

This the 19th day of January, 2024.

**NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP**

/s/ Phillip J. Strach

Phillip J. Strach

N.C. State Bar No. 29456

evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

4. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

5. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny this allegation to the extent the allegation states Plaintiffs' request for relief. As to remainder of the allegation, State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny this allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. Admitted upon information and belief.

7. Admitted.

8. Admitted upon information and belief.

9. Admitted.

PARTIES

10. Admitted upon information and belief.

11. State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph.

12. State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph.

13. Admitted.

14. Admitted.

15. Admitted.

16. Admitted.

17. Admitted.

18. Admitted.

19. Admitted upon information and belief.

20. Admitted upon information and belief.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

21. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the legal authorities cited are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions.

22. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

23. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

24. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the legal authorities cited are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions.

25. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the content of the allegation is derived from legal authority that is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

26. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

27. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

28. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. North Carolina's 2023 Redistricting Process

29. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

30. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

31. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

32. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

33. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board

Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the legislative history cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, and is the best evidence of its content.

34. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the legal authority cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

35. Neither admitted nor denied as this allegation is not directed at State Board Defendants. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the legislative history cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, and is the best evidence of its content.

B. The 2023 State Senate Redistricting Plan

36. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

37. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

38. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

39. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

40. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

41. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

42. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

43. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the legislation cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, and is the best evidence of its content.

44. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the materials referenced are matters of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their contents. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

C. Black North Carolinians in the Black Belt Counties Are Sufficiently Numerous and Geographically Compact To Constitute a Majority- Minority District

45. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

46. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the materials referenced are matters of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their contents. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

47. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

48. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the materials referenced are matters of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their contents. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

49. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the materials referenced are matters of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their contents. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegation.

50. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the materials referenced are matters of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their contents. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a

response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

D. Voting in the Relevant Area Is Racially Polarized

51. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

52. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

53. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

54. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

55. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory

allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

56. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

57. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

E. The Totality of the Circumstances Establishes That the Enacted Plan Has the Effect of Denying Black Voters an Equal Opportunity To Participate in the Political Process and To Elect Candidates of Their Choice

58. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the allegation cites legal authorities that are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

1. North Carolina's History of Racial Discrimination

59. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

60. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

61. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

62. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the cases cited are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions.

63. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

64. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

65. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

66. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

67. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

2. North Carolina's History of Unlawful Race-Based Redistricting

68. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent this conclusory allegation is based upon historical records or cases, neither admitted nor denied as such records are matters of public record, speaks for

themselves, and are the best evidence of their content. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations, and therefore deny the same.

69. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

70. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the cases cited are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions.

71. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

72. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

3. Ongoing Effects of North Carolina's History of Discrimination

73. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

74. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

75. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

76. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the cases cited are matters of public record, speak for themselves, are the best evidence of their contents, and contain legal conclusions.

77. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining

allegations, and therefore deny the same.

4. History of Racial Appeals in North Carolina Political Campaigns

78. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that the case cited is a matter of public record, speaks for itself, is the best evidence of its content, and contains legal conclusions.

79. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants and references matters that are of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their content.

80. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants and references matters that are of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their content.

81. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants and references matters that are of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their content.

82. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

83. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants and references matters that are of public record, speak for themselves, and are the best evidence of their content. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**COUNT I****Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—Vote Dilution
52 U.S.C. § 10301**

84. State Board Defendants incorporate their previous responses.

85. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content.

86. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations content.

87. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

88. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

89. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

90. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations

COUNT II

Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—Vote Dilution 42 U.S.C. § 1983

91. State Board Defendants incorporate their previous responses.

92. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content.

93. Neither admitted nor denied to the extent that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content.

94. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

95. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

96. State Board Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegation as it is not directed at State Board Defendants. To the extent that this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining

allegations.

97. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

98. Because this paragraph contains argument or conclusory allegations, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, State Board Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the argument, conclusory allegations, or any remaining allegations.

ANY AND ALL OTHER ALLEGATIONS MADE IN PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, INCLUDING THE RELIEF REQUESTED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED ABOVE, ARE HEREBY DENIED.

FURTHER ANSWERING THE COMPLAINT AND AS FOR ANY DEFENSES THERETO, DEFENDANTS ASSERT THE FOLLOWING:

State Board Defendants reserve the right to assert defenses against Plaintiff that may become apparent during the course of litigation and discovery.

Respectfully submitted this the 19th day of January, 2023.

NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

/s/ Terence Steed
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Attorneys for the State Board

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION**

RODNEY D. PIERCE; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

**LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL
DECLARATION OF DR. BARRETO**

During the January 10, 2024, hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this Court questioned counsel for both Plaintiffs and Legislative Defendants on Dr. Barreto's finding in Appendix B, Table B1 that the 2023 Enacted Senate District 2 would elect the black preferred candidate according to past Senate election results reconstituted within SD2. [D.E. 17-2 p. 21]. To be precise, Dr. Barreto's analysis shows that the 2022 Democratic Senate slate he used would have won 54.1% of the vote in SD2, a robust margin over the 45.9% of the vote share for whatever Republican slate he used. [*Id.*] Because endogenous elections, or elections for the office at issue, are "more probative than exogenous elections," *Johnson v. Hamrick*, 196 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999), this evidence—in Plaintiffs' own sponsored report—that black-preferred candidates can prevail in SD2 defeats Plaintiffs' ability to make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the third *Gingles* precondition (even as Plaintiffs construe it).

Quick to believe this was a typo Plaintiffs asked for leave to file a supplemental report, which this Court allowed. On January 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental report from Dr. Barreto. [D.E. 55-1]. Once the Fourth Circuit returned the mandate after it dismissed Plaintiffs' failed pre-ruling appeal, [D.E. 56], this Court allowed Defendants to respond to Dr. Barreto's supplemental report by January 22, 2024. [D.E. 57].

Dr. Barreto's supplemental declaration raises more questions than it answers, casts doubt on all Dr. Barreto's conclusions, and defeats Plaintiffs' motion.

1. Far from a typo, Dr. Barreto's supplemental declaration acknowledges that his original calculations projecting a victory for the black preferred candidate in 2023 Enacted Senate District 2 in Senate contests are correct. Perhaps in response to this Court's questions at the hearing about the legal significance of those calculations, Dr. Barreto uses the rest of his declaration to explain away this finding. What he says makes little sense, and the flaws he announces (if true) cannot be cabined to the portion of his analysis he dislikes.

To begin, Dr. Barreto declares that his table includes only vote shares in Halifax, Warren, and Martin counties. That signals that something has gone wrong or at least that Dr. Barreto is doing something unusual that requires further vetting. Table B1 purports to be a reconstituted election analysis, which "is a relatively simple method that extracts actual election results from a variety of statewide and local races that subsume the area being analyzed and determines, precinct-by-precinct within the [evaluated] district, the racial composition of the vote and the 'winner' within the [evaluated] district." *Rodriguez v. Bexar Cnty., Tex.*, 385 F.3d 853, 861 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, under a legitimate reconstituted election analysis, a representation that 54.1% of the vote in "Senate District 2" went to the Democratic candidate(s) is a representation about all the precincts in SD2—not just some of them. Dr. Barreto's new disclosure that his analysis "is reporting only

the 2022 vote shares in Halifax, Warren, and Martin counties,” [D.E. 55-1 p. 2], is a new admission that he either made an error in the analysis or at least that he conducted it in a way that is unusual (and hence requires further evaluation). Notably, these claims appear nowhere in his original declaration. Dr. Barreto’s choice to make this disclosure in a belated and self-serving fashion undermines his credibility. The Court should not trust Dr. Barreto’s analysis under these circumstances.

Moreover, Dr. Barreto’s new representation cannot seem to be cabined to the contests he would prefer the Court ignore. Table B1 represents that the same “Senate District 2” is utilized as to *all* elections Dr. Barreto plugged into his reconstituted election analysis, including the exogenous races that purport to show Republican victories.¹ Dr. Barreto cannot credibly ask the Court to discount the results as to 2022 Senate contests on the ground that only three counties are accounted for, and at the same time ask the Court to credit the remaining outcomes. Either Table 1 is credible or it is not.

Dr. Barreto’s other assertions likewise raise more questions than answers. Dr. Barreto opines, without any evidentiary support, that the reason there was no contested election in former Senate District 1 in 2022 is because “that district was so heavily Republican that no Democratic candidate ran.”² [D.E. 55-1 p. 2]. That is difficult to understand: Dr. Barreto’s table shows that whatever Democratic candidate or candidates he used for the analysis prevailed, so some Democratic candidate must have been on some relevant ballot. He also claims that his analysis excludes uncontested elections, [*id.*], but that would not seem to provide a basis to discount the

¹ As noted, these races are less probative than Senate races. *Johnson*, 196 F.3d at 1222.

² This is an especially odd claim since the districts used in the 2022 elections were subjected to significant testing on so-called “partisan fairness” metrics, under the, now defunct, requirements of *Harper v. Hall*, 383 N.C. 89, 108, 881 S.E.2d 156, 170 (N.C. 2022).

Senate results, since uncontested elections are not generally regarded as probative. That would seem to be a respect in which Dr. Barreto correctly performed that analysis and not a basis to (selectively) throw out the results. In any event, if that choice somehow undermines the outcome as to SD2 in Senate elections, then this effect cannot be cabined to the contests Dr. Barreto would prefer the Court ignore.

Then, Dr. Barreto purports to perform back-of-the napkin math adding up “tally the total votes cast across all of the 2022 State Senate elections,” including in uncontested races, [D.E. 55-1 p. 2], but if that were the right way to do the analysis, why did Dr. Barreto not do that initially? And why not across the board? It is a mystery what elections he is using or how he is using them, because he does not show his work and did not disclose his backup data.³ And it is a mystery how Dr. Barreto can concoct all types of new ways to perform this “relatively simple method,” *Rodriguez*, 385 F.3d at 861, only after being questioned about it. What other new revelations, methods, admissions, errors, and shifts might Dr. Barreto disclose if questioned about his report further?

That, ultimately, is the problem. These sorts of conflicting and unsubstantiated claims are the precise reason that redistricting litigation should not be “a game of ambush,” *In re Landry*, 83 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023), and why experts in these cases should be subject to vigorous cross examination and thorough expert rebuttal reports—none of which were available to Legislative

³ Legislative Defendants maintain that they did not receive the entirety of Dr. Barreto’s backup data. For example, while the North Carolina election results speak for themselves, and do show that Senate District 1 was uncontested in 2022, those results do not allow them to verify Dr. Barreto’s now competing assertions as to whether that election was used, and if so, how it was used. With the short time available to them, Legislative Defendants chose to use their expert’s limited time to produce a report, instead of arguing about more fulsome backup data that would have come too late to be of any use. As this case proceeds, Legislative Defendants intend to seek these materials, including via motion to the Court, if required.

Defendants with the lightning speed Plaintiffs demanded of this proceeding. The Court should not permit Plaintiffs to demand proceedings at this unreasonable pace, to proffer expert opinion that undermines their claim, proffer yet more expert opinion that attacks the prior opinion on a selective and confusing basis, and then declare “[t]his case involves an egregious and clear-cut violation of Section 2.” [D.E. 17 p. 1]. If anything has become clear at this stage, it is that nothing is clear about Plaintiffs’ claim.⁴

2. Nothing in Dr. Barreto’s report suggests a need for Senate District 2 to have a 50% BVAP level or higher for the black preferred candidate to prevail.⁵ This is likely because Dr. Barreto only found “statistically significant” racially polarized voting, not “legally significant racially polarized voting” as required under the third *Gingles* prong. *See e.g.* Legislative Defendants Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [D.E. 39 pp. 18-21].

In short, Dr. Barreto’s supplemental declaration bolsters only the clear deficiencies in Plaintiffs claims, and does nothing to improve the likelihood that they succeed on the merits. For these reasons, and the reasons further stated in Legislative Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and at the oral argument, Legislative Defendants’ respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

⁴ For that reason, if Plaintiffs were to respond that Legislative Defendants have somehow misunderstood Dr. Barreto’s supplemental declaration, such an assertion would only prove the point. The Court needs more time with this case to get real answers to these questions.

⁵ Notably Legislative Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alford, reached the conclusion that it was unlikely any of these districts needed 50% BVAP for a black preferred candidate to prevail, [D.E. 39-7 p. 3], a conclusion corroborated by figures 3 and 4 in Dr. Barreto’s original report. This is also corroborated by evidence submitted in other cases showing that black democrats won in senate districts with less than 50% BVAP in the Northeastern portion of the state. [D.E. 39-3; 39-8].

Respectfully submitted, this the 22nd day of January, 2024.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Phillip J. Strach, hereby certify that I have this day electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will provide electronic notification to counsel of record.

This the 22nd day of January, 2024.

**NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
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/s/ Phillip J. Strach _____

Phillip J. Strach

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:23-CV-193-D

RODNEY D. PIERCE and)
MOSES MATTHEWS,)
)
 Plaintiffs,)
)
 v.)
)
 THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE)
 BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,)
)
 Defendants.)

ORDER

“Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (“Shaw I”). “Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions” Id. “[I]t threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.” Id. Thus, “race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.” Id.

This case does not involve the North Carolina General Assembly engaging in race-based districting. Indeed, the record demonstrates that when the General Assembly created the Senate districts in North Carolina Senate Bill 758 (“SB 758”) in October 2023 for use in the 2024 elections, the General Assembly did not have racial data in the computer. The General Assembly did not have racial data in the computer in 2023, in part, because federal litigation from 2011 to 2016 helped to show that there was not legally significant racially polarized voting in North Carolina, including in the counties in northeast North Carolina at issue in this case. See Covington v. North Carolina, 316

F.R.D. 117, 124, 128, 142–65, 167–74 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge court), aff'd, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017); Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 624–25 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017).

This case involves two plaintiffs who contend that the General Assembly violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by not engaging in race-based districting and not creating a racially gerrymandered majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 13] ¶¶ 4, 5, 84–98. On November 20, 2023, plaintiffs filed suit. On November 22, 2023, plaintiffs moved for the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory preliminary injunction. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs ask the court to enjoin the use of SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections and mandate the creation of remedial Senate districts in North Carolina (including a racially gerrymandered majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina). Plaintiffs make this extraordinary request even though (1) the 2024 Senate elections are underway in North Carolina, (2) plaintiffs presented no evidence that anyone provided the General Assembly in 2023 a strong basis in evidence to believe that Section 2 required the General Assembly to create a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina, and (3) insufficient evidence shows that Section 2 requires a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina.

The Supreme Court has described “sort[ing] voters on the basis of race” as “odious.” Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398, 401 (2022) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has assumed that complying with Section 2 of the VRA is a compelling state interest that permits the “race-based sorting of voters” where such sorting “is narrowly tailored to comply with the” Voting Rights Act. Id.

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires an extraordinary, mandatory preliminary injunction compelling the race-based sorting of voters for the

2024 Senate elections in North Carolina. On the current record, plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claim and are not likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the requested extraordinary, mandatory preliminary injunction. Moreover, the balance of hardships does not tip in plaintiffs' favor, and the requested mandatory preliminary injunction is not in the public interest. In fact, the requested injunction would constitute a textbook violation of Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–6 (2006) (per curiam), and its progeny. The 2024 Senate elections in North Carolina are underway. Absentee ballots are in the mail. Purcell teaches that a federal court in a case involving state elections should not enjoin a state redistricting plan “just weeks before an election,” much less enjoin an ongoing state election. Id. at 4. Such federal injunctions result in voter confusion and chaos and are not warranted especially where the facts in the case are “hotly contested.” Id. at 4–5. The court declines plaintiffs' invitation to issue the requested extraordinary, mandatory preliminary injunction and thereby inflict voter confusion and chaos on the 2024 Senate elections in North Carolina. Thus, the court denies plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

I.

A.

On November 20, 2023, Rodney D. Pierce (“Pierce”) and Moses Matthews (“Matthews”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and its five members in their official capacities (collectively “the Board defendants”), Philip E. Berger in his official capacity as President pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate (“Berger”), and Timothy K. Moore in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives (“Moore”) (collectively “the legislative defendants”) alleging that SB 758, which establishes new state Senate districts for North Carolina, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) of 1965, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (“Section 2”) [D.E. 1]. Plaintiffs ask the court to (1) “[d]eclare

that SB 758 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act;” (2) “[g]rant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring Defendants . . . from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 as drawn in SB 758, including barring Defendants from conducting any Senate elections using those district boundaries;” (3) “[t]ake actions necessary to order the adoption of a valid state Senate plan that includes a minority opportunity district in northeastern North Carolina, while leaving intact the current district comprised of Pitt and Edgecombe Counties, in time to use the remedial plan in the 2024 Senate elections (and, as part of the remedial order, waive the one-year residency requirement for candidates under N.C. Const. art. II, § 6, for newly drawn remedial districts);” and (4) “[g]rant such other or further relief the [c]ourt deems appropriate, including but not limited to an award of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs.” *Id.* at 21.

On November 22, 2023, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint [D.E. 13], moved to enjoin SB 758 [D.E. 16], filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 17], and filed expert reports totaling 406 pages [D.E. 17-1, 17-2, 17-3]. On December 22, 2023, the legislative defendants responded in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 39] and filed exhibits (including expert reports) totaling 340 pages [D.E. 39-1 to 39-8]. On December 22, 2023, the Board defendants informed the court of their schedule concerning the 2024 North Carolina elections and took no position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 40, 41]. On December 26, 2023, plaintiffs replied [D.E. 42]. On December 29, 2023, the court scheduled a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction for January 10, 2024 [D.E. 43].

On December 29, 2023, plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal and argued that the court’s decision to schedule a hearing constituted a de facto denial of their motion [D.E. 44]. On January 9, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal [D.E. 50] but did not issue the mandate. *See* [D.E. 51]. Thus, jurisdiction did not return to this court.

Nonetheless, on January 10, 2024, with the parties' consent, the court held its scheduled hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 53].

On January 12, 2024, plaintiffs submitted a supplemental declaration from Dr. Matthew Barreto ("Dr. Barreto"). See [D.E. 55-1]. On January 16, 2024, the Fourth Circuit issued its mandate and jurisdiction returned to this court. See [D.E. 56]. On January 17, 2024, the court permitted defendants to respond to plaintiffs' supplemental information from Dr. Barreto. See [D.E. 57]. On January 19, 2024, the legislative defendants answered the amended complaint. See [D.E. 58]. On January 22, 2024, the legislative defendants submitted a response to Dr. Barreto's supplemental declaration. See [D.E. 60].

B.

Pierce is a black voter who resides in Halifax County, North Carolina. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Matthews is a black voter who resides in Martin County, North Carolina. See id. at ¶ 12. Bertie, Hertford, Edgecombe, Northampton, and Halifax Counties have majority-black voting age populations. See id. at ¶ 37. Vance, Warren, Martin, and Washington Counties have black voting age populations exceeding 40 percent. See id. Gates and Chowan Counties have black voting age populations between 31 and 32 percent. See id.

On October 25, 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted SB 758, which establishes new state Senate districts for North Carolina. See id. at ¶¶ 1–2. In SB 758, Senate District 1 ("SD1") contains Northampton, Hertford, Bertie, Gates, Perquimans, Pasquotank, Camden, Currituck, Tyrrell, and Dare Counties. See id. at ¶ 44. Senate District 2 ("SD2") contains Warren, Halifax, Martin, Chowan, Washington, Hyde, Pamlico, and Carteret Counties. See id. Senate District 5 includes Edgecombe and Pitt Counties. See id. Senate District 11 includes Vance, Franklin, and Nash Counties. See id.

Plaintiffs allege that the electoral boundaries in northeast North Carolina dilute black voters' votes in violation of Section 2. See id. at ¶¶ 84–98. Plaintiffs contend that Section 2 requires a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. See id. Thus, plaintiffs contend that the General Assembly violated Section 2 when it enacted SB 758 without a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 84–98; [D.E. 17] 26, 30.

Section 2 does not require the General Assembly to employ “race-based districting” unless the General Assembly has “a strong basis in evidence for concluding that” Section 2 required such race-based districting. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 292–93 (2017) (quotation omitted); see Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 278 (2015). Without a contemporaneous strong basis in evidence in 2023 that Section 2 required the General Assembly to create a VRA district by grouping citizens by race in order to form a majority-black Senate district, the General Assembly would have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018); Cooper, 581 U.S. at 322–23; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907–09 (1996) (“Shaw II”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927–28 (1995); Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 178. Section 2 does not require crossover districts. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (principal opinion). Thus, in order for Section 2 to have required the General Assembly to create a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina, the legislative record in 2023 must contain a strong basis in evidence for such remedial action before the General Assembly enacted SB 758. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 304 (“To have a strong basis in evidence to conclude that § 2 demands . . . race-based steps, the State must carefully evaluate whether a plaintiff could establish the Gingles preconditions We see nothing in the legislative record that fits that description.”).¹

¹ See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

For example, on October 19, 2021, the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Alabama, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (“LDF”), Alabama State Conference of the NAACP, and Greater Birmingham Ministries sent a letter to the members of the Alabama Legislative Reapportionment Committee detailing Section 2’s requirements and how the Gingles factors required two majority-black congressional districts in Alabama. See Milligan v. Allen, No. 2:21-cv-1530 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2021), [D.E. 53] ¶¶ 86–87. The letter noted that “a Congressional redistricting plan that includes only one majority-minority district likely violates the Voting Rights Act.” LDF et al., Re: Duty to Comply with the U.S. Constitution and Voting Rights Act in Alabama’s Redistricting Process 4, available at <https://www.aclualabama.org/en/press-releases/civil-rights-groups-send-letter-legislature-ahead-redistricting-special-session> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). Alabama ultimately enacted a congressional redistricting plan that included just one majority-black congressional congressional district. See Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 935 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (three-judge court) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023). In Singleton, after an extensive preliminary injunction hearing, the three-judge court held that the plaintiffs were “likely to establish that [Alabama’s redistricting plan] violates Section Two of the Voting Rights Act.” Id. at 936. The Supreme Court affirmed. See Milligan, 599 U.S. at 9–10.

Absent a contemporaneous strong basis in evidence, the General Assembly would have committed the same mistake in 2023 that it did in Covington in 2011 when it created numerous majority-black House and Senate districts and in Harris in 2011 when it created two majority-black Congressional districts without a strong basis in evidence that Section 2 required the General Assembly to group citizens by race and to create such majority-black districts. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 124, 128, 142–65, 167–74; Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 624–25. Instead of making that same mistake in 2023, the General Assembly did not have race in the computer when it created the Senate,

House, and Congressional redistricting plans in 2023. See [D.E. 39-5] 4–5. Thus, in 2023, the General Assembly did not sort any citizens by race. See id.

As for SD1 and SD2 in particular, the General Assembly considered the North Carolina Constitution’s Whole County Provision, communities of interest, and traditional redistricting principles in creating SD1 and SD2. SD1 kept together four of North Carolina’s five finger counties. See [D.E. 39-5] 8. Moreover, many SD1 residents in these counties “work or travel frequently to the Virginia Tidewater” region. Id. Furthermore, seven of SD1’s ten counties and 81% of SD1’s population are in the Norfolk, Virginia media market. See id. at 8–9. SD2 follows the Roanoke River from Warren County to Washington County. See id. at 9. Five of SD2’s eight counties are in the Greenville, North Carolina media market. See id. And, SD1 and SD2 both include their respective incumbent senator’s residence. See id. at 9–10.

Plaintiffs cite no evidence that anyone submitted information to the General Assembly before the General Assembly enacted SB 758 in 2023 that Section 2 required a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. Cf. [D.E. 39] 10 & n.4. Unlike, for example, in Milligan, where the NAACP notified the Alabama legislature that it would violate Section 2 if it did not create two majority-black congressional districts, plaintiffs cite no evidence that they or anyone else submitted comparable information to the General Assembly before it enacted SB 758 in October 2023.

Before the General Assembly enacted SB 758 in October 2023, the General Assembly held public hearings throughout North Carolina, including one in Elizabeth City in northeast North Carolina, to gather public input on the proposed Senate districts. See [D.E. 39] 9. The General Assembly also accepted public comments through an online portal on the General Assembly’s website. See [D.E. 39-4] 3. Moreover, before the General Assembly enacted SB 758 in October 2023, the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee Co-Chairman, Senator Ralph Hise (“Senator

Hise”), recognized that “in order for the predominant use of race to be justified under Section 2, there must be a strong basis in evidence of three Gingles conditions” and “the use of race to draw districts must also be supported by the totality of the circumstances.” [D.E. 39-5] 4. Senator Hise observed that court decisions “demonstrate that to this point nowhere in North Carolina can anyone provide evidence of the three Gingles preconditions.” Id. Senator Hise stated that “the chairs elected not to use race in drawing these proposed [Senate] districts [in SB 758] strictly to protect the state from lawsuits alleging illegal racial gerrymandering.” Id.

After the Senate prepared SB 758 without racial data in the computer and before the General Assembly enacted SB 758, Senator Hise then directed the General Assembly’s central staff “to load racial data into the Maptitude software” for the first time and “make that information publicly available on the General Assembly website as soon as possible.” Id. at 5. Senator Hise noted that the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee would meet again the following week to “consider any evidence that a member of this committee or a third party advocating altering plans for racial reasons brings forth that provides a strong basis in evidence that the Gingles preconditions are present in a particular area of the state.” Id. at 5–6. “Only then [would] the chairs consider using race in amending the districts to protect the state from liability under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” Id. at 6.

Despite Senator Hise’s invitation, the Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee did not receive any evidence that the three Gingles preconditions could be satisfied anywhere in North Carolina. See [D.E. 39] 10 n.4. The Southern Coalition for Social Justice “asked that the county grouping for SD 1 and 2 be changed to the alternate county grouping used in 2022” but “did not request any majority-minority districts.” Id.

The need for plaintiffs to cite a strong basis in evidence when the General Assembly enacted SB 758 in October 2023 for concluding that Section 2 required a majority-black Senate district in order to get their requested mandatory preliminary injunction for the 2024 Senate elections finds support “in the need for workable standards and sound judicial and legislative administration” and the standard needed to get the requested injunction. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 17; see Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (describing standard needed for a preliminary injunction); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing preliminary showing needed for a federal court to consider issuing a mandatory preliminary injunction). Nonetheless, plaintiffs now allege a Section 2 violation without citing a contemporaneous strong basis in evidence in front of the General Assembly in 2023 before it enacted SB 758. Plaintiffs also propose a remedial redistricting plan for the 2024 Senate elections that creates a majority-black Senate district by altering the boundaries of SD1 and SD2 to group Warren, Halifax, Martin, Bertie, Chowan, Northampton, Hertford, Gates, and a portion of Pasquotank Counties within the same Senate district and to group Camden, Currituck, Dare, Tyrrell, Washington, Hyde, Pamlico, Carteret, and a portion of Pasquotank Counties in another Senate district. See Am. Compl. ¶ 48.

Plaintiffs make this extraordinary request notwithstanding the findings in Covington and Harris concerning the absence of legally significant racially polarized voting in North Carolina. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 124, 128, 142–65, 167–74; Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 624–25. Plaintiffs also make this extraordinary request even though the 2003 Senate redistricting plan did not have any majority-black Senate districts, yet black Senators were regularly elected in North Carolina (including in northeast North Carolina). See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 126. Likewise, although the General Assembly enacted ten majority-black Senate districts in the 2011 redistricting cycle and

justified them in part on Section 2 and Section 5 of the VRA, the Covington court held that the General Assembly lacked a strong basis in evidence for race-based districting due to the absence of a strong basis in evidence to believe that legally significant racially polarized voting existed in North Carolina. See id. at 167–76. The remedial Senate districting plan after Covington included no majority-black Senate districts. See Covington v. North Carolina, No. 1:15-CV-399, [D.E. 184-6] 22, [D.E. 220] 22, 33, 36, [D.E. 242] 2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2018). Moreover, in the November 2022 Senate elections, North Carolina citizens elected nine black Senators out of 50 Senators, including a black Senator from Edgecombe and Pitt Counties. See N.C. Gen. Assembly, North Carolina Senators, <https://www.ncleg.gov/Members/MemberList/S> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). Edgecombe and Pitt Counties are in northeast North Carolina. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that black Senators were not elected under the Covington remedial Senate districting plan and no evidence that any of the nine black Senators who were elected in November 2022 were elected from Senate districts containing a majority black voting age population.

II.

Redistricting “is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,” and “[f]ederal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915 (cleaned up). The “good faith of [the] state legislature must be presumed.” Id. “Because the States do not derive their reapportionment authority from the Voting Rights Act, but rather from independent provisions of state and federal law, the federal courts are bound to respect the States’ apportionment choices unless those choices contravene federal requirements.” Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (cleaned up).

Section 2 places the burden of “proving an apportionment’s invalidity squarely on plaintiffs’ shoulders.” Id. at 155. “Before courts can find a violation of § 2, . . . they must conduct an intensely

local appraisal of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 19 (quotation omitted). “Courts cannot find § 2 effects violations on the basis of uncertainty.” Perez, 138 S. Ct. at 2333 (emphasis in original).

“The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). The notice requirement ensures the adverse party has “a fair opportunity to oppose the application and to prepare for such opposition.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 432 n.7 (1974). Rule 65 does not expressly require an evidentiary hearing and oral argument. See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Anderson, Civ. No. 13-1708, 2015 WL 2340831, at *1 (D. Md. May 13, 2015) (unpublished). Where the parties dispute facts, however, hearings are “highly desirable,” if not “necessary,” before a court resolves a motion for a preliminary injunction. Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1988); see Rosario-Urdaz v. Rivera-Hernandez, 350 F.3d 219, 223 (1st Cir. 2003); GlaxoSmithKline, LLC v. Brooks, No. 8:22-cv-364, 2022 WL 2916170, at *2 (D. Md. July 25, 2022) (unpublished).

A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. “The rationale behind a grant of a preliminary injunction has been explained as preserving the status quo so that a court can render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.” Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 788 (4th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). A mandatory preliminary injunction, however, “alter[s] the status quo.” League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). “Mandatory preliminary injunctive relief,” which “goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite,” is “disfavored, and warranted only in the most extraordinary circumstances.” Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 270 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted); see In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d at 525. “That is to say, a mandatory preliminary injunction must be necessary both to protect against

irreparable harm in deteriorating circumstances created by the defendant and to preserve the court's ability to enter ultimate relief on the merits of the same kind." *Id.* at 526. "If that need is not presented, then a preliminary injunction should not be considered." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Challenges to the process of state elections that come "immediately before or immediately after the preparation and printing of ballots [are] particularly disruptive and costly for state governments." *Perry v. Judd*, 471 F. App'x 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished); see *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4–6; *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879–82 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). "[T]here must be a substantial regulation of elections if . . . some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (quotation omitted). A federal court should be "loath to reach a result that would only precipitate a more disorderly [election] process." *Perry*, 471 F. App'x at 225.

In election cases, state actions "establish the status quo." *Wise v. Circosta*, 978 F.3d 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Thus, the General Assembly established the status quo when it enacted SB 758 in October 2023 and the Board began the detailed process of working with North Carolina's 100 county boards of elections to assign voters to their correct Senate districts through geocoding, generating and proofing ballots, coding voting machines, and training election officials. *Cf.* [D.E. 41] ¶¶ 3–6 (declaration of Executive Director Karen Brinson Bell of the North Carolina State Board of Elections).

Mandatory preliminary injunctive relief is particularly extraordinary where plaintiffs seek a remedial electoral districting plan which would "sort voters on the basis of race" because such districting plans "are by their very nature odious." *Wis. Legislature*, 595 U.S. at 401 (quotation omitted). Of course, the Supreme Court has "assumed that complying with the VRA is a compelling interest." *Id.* Nonetheless, the party seeking to use race as the predominant factor to place voters

in or out of a district bears “the burden of showing that the design of that district withstands strict scrutiny.” Id. A party “can satisfy strict scrutiny if it proves that its race-based sorting of voters is narrowly tailored to comply with the VRA.” Id.

If plaintiffs demonstrate the “need to protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the litigation to preserve the court’s ability in the end to render a meaningful judgment on the merits,” then a district court may exercise its “discretion” and determine whether plaintiffs have demonstrated the four requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction. In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d at 526. Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction must “demonstrate that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips in their favor, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013); see Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Courts consider each factor separately, and the movant must prove each factor “as articulated.” Pashby, 709 F.3d at 320–21 (quotation omitted).

III.

A.

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances needed for a mandatory preliminary injunction. See In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d at 526; Taylor, 34 F.3d at 270 n.2. They have failed to demonstrate “a need to protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the litigation to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d at 526. Rather, plaintiffs wish to disrupt the status quo that exists from the General Assembly enacting SB 758 in October 2023 and the 2024 North Carolina Senate elections moving forward consistent with North Carolina law.

Notably, on December 15, 2023, candidate filing ended for the 2024 North Carolina primary elections. See [D.E. 40] 1. On January 19, 2024, North Carolina’s 100 county boards of elections began distributing absentee ballots. See id. at 2. On February 15, 2024, in-person early voting begins. See id. March 5, 2024, is primary election day. See id. at 1. Accordingly, absentee voting throughout North Carolina already has begun. In-person early voting begins 20 days after the court issues this order. Primary election day is just 39 days after the court issues this order.

A mandatory preliminary injunction is not necessary to preserve the status quo and “preserve the court’s ability in the end to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d at 526. Rather, after discovery and a trial on the merits, the court could render a meaningful judgment concerning plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim and grant relief for the 2026 Senate elections and beyond if plaintiffs were able to prove their Section 2 claim. Because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances needed for the court to consider issuing the requested mandatory preliminary injunction, the court need not consider whether plaintiffs have demonstrated the four requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction. See id.; Taylor, 34 F.3d at 270 n.2; AVX Corp. v. Corning Inc., No. 5:15-CV-543, 2020 WL 2527936, at *3–4 (E.D.N.C. May 18, 2020) (unpublished); Wheelihan v. Bingham, 345 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553–54 (M.D.N.C. 2004).

B.

Alternatively, the court considers whether plaintiffs have demonstrated the four requirements for a preliminary injunction. As for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, Section 2 provides that no state may impose a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). To establish a Section 2 violation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that, based on the totality of the circumstances,

“the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected class] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Id. § 10301(b).

Under Section 2, plaintiffs who allege impermissible vote dilution must demonstrate, first, that their minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (cleaned up). “A district will be reasonably configured . . . if it comports with traditional districting criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact.” Id. “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. Third, plaintiffs must show that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id.; see Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18. Courts refer to this third Gingles factor as “racially polarized voting.” See, e.g., Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 167. “Finally, a plaintiff who demonstrates the three preconditions must also show, under the totality of circumstances, that the political process is not equally open to minority voters.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (quotation omitted); see Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–38.

C.

As for the first Gingles precondition, plaintiffs must prove their minority group (i.e., African-Americans) “is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (cleaned up); see Wis. Legislature, 595 U.S. at 402; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. This precondition requires plaintiffs “to establish that the minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 556 U.S. at 15–16; Grove v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). A minority group

is “sufficiently large” if plaintiffs show that their minority voting-age population exceeds 50 percent. See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 19–20; Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 429–30 (4th Cir. 2004). Section 2 “does not require crossover districts,” which are districts in which black voters are “not a majority of the voting-age population” but “could get enough support from crossover [white] voters to elect” the black voters’ preferred candidate. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 9, 23. “A district will be reasonably configured . . . if it comports with traditional districting criteria” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18; see id. at 43 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91–92 (1997). “[T]raditional race-neutral districting principles” include “compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, incumbency protection, and political affiliation.” Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 272 (cleaned up).

Plaintiffs offer two demonstration districts that they contend meet the first Gingles precondition: Demonstration District A and Demonstration District B-1. See [D.E. 17] 15–17. Plaintiffs’ expert Blakeman Esselstyn (“Esselstyn”) drew these demonstration districts. See id.; [D.E. 17-1] ¶¶ 33–37.

Plaintiffs’ Demonstration District A includes Vance, Warren, Halifax, Northampton, Hertford, Bertie, Martin, and Washington Counties. See [D.E. 17-1] ¶ 33. According to plaintiffs, Demonstration District A has a 51.47% black voting-age population (“BVAP”) and a 53.12% black citizen voting-age population (“CVAP”). See id. at fig. 6, table 3. Plaintiffs rely on Demonstration District A to meet the first Gingles precondition. See [D.E. 42] 5 (“Plaintiffs are not urging adoption of Demonstration District A for use in any election—it is presented solely for illustrative purposes to satisfy Gingles One.”); [D.E. 17-1] ¶ 52 (Esselstyn opining that “it is possible to create a majority-Black State Senate district in northeastern North Carolina that splits no counties or VTDs and is in accordance with other traditional redistricting principles”).

Esselstyn also drew Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2. Demonstration District B-1 contains Bertie, Chowan, Gates, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Northampton, and Warren Counties in their entirety and a portion of Pasquotank County. See [D.E. 17-1] ¶ 35. According to plaintiffs, Demonstration District B-1 has a 48.41% BVAP and a 50.19% black CVAP. See id. at fig. 7, table 4. Plaintiffs' Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2 are solely composed of the counties that constitute SD1 and SD2 in SB 758, but they split Pasquotank County and rearrange the counties within SD1 and SD2. See id. at ¶ 35; [D.E. 17] 16.

1.

The legislative defendants contend that Demonstration District A is not reasonably configured in light of North Carolina's Whole County Provisions ("WCP"). See [D.E. 39] 14–18. Plaintiffs reply that "the VRA trumps" the WCP. [D.E. 42] 4–5. Both parties chide the other for "circular" logic. See [D.E. 39] 15; [D.E. 42] 5. The parties' dispute concerns how to interpret Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d 377 (2002) ("Stephenson I"), and Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 582 S.E.2d 247 (2003) ("Stephenson II").

a.

In Stephenson I, the Supreme Court of North Carolina analyzed the interplay between the North Carolina Constitution and federal law in the apportionment of House and Senate districts in North Carolina. The North Carolina Constitution specifically enumerates four limitations upon the redistricting and reapportionment authority of the General Assembly in drawing Senate and House

districts. See N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 5.² In Stephenson I, the Supreme Court of North Carolina summarized them as follows:

- (1) Each Senator and Representative shall represent, as nearly as possible, an equal number of inhabitants.
- (2) Each senate and representative district shall at all times consist of contiguous territory.
- (3) No county shall be divided in the formation of a senate or representative district.
- (4) Once established, the senate and representative districts and apportionment of Senators and Representatives shall remain unaltered until the next decennial census of population taken by order of Congress.

Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 362–63, 562 S.E.2d at 384; see N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 5. The third limitation is known as the Whole County Provision (“WCP”). Id. at 363, 562 S.E.2d at 384. The Stephenson I court noted that federal law required the General Assembly to comply with (1) “one-person, one-vote” principles requiring some measure of population equality between state legislative districts as articulated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and their progeny; and (2) the Voting Rights Act of 1965, including Section 2 of the VRA and Section 5 of the VRA. See Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 363–64, 562 S.E.2d at 384–85.³

The Stephenson I court reviewed the significant historical roles of counties as political subdivisions of the State of North Carolina. See id. at 364–66, 562 S.E.2d at 385–86. The Stephenson I court described the “long-standing tradition of respecting county lines during the

² The Governor of North Carolina has no veto power under the North Carolina Constitution concerning the redistricting and reapportionment of the General Assembly. See N.C. Const. art. II, § 22(5)(b)–(c).

³ Since Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013), North Carolina and the 40 North Carolina counties previously covered under Section 5 need not comply with the coverage formula in Section 5 of the VRA.

redistricting process.” *Id.* at 366, 562 S.E.2d at 386. The Stephenson I court then reviewed the development of redistricting jurisprudence in North Carolina from 1965 to 1983. *See id.* at 366–68, 562 S.E.2d at 386–88. The Stephenson I court explained why the WCP remains enforceable throughout North Carolina to the extent not preempted or otherwise superseded by federal law. *See id.* at 369–72, 562 S.E.2d at 388–90. The Stephenson I court observed that the North Carolina Constitution’s limitations “upon redistricting and apportionment uphold what the United States Supreme Court has termed traditional districting principles, including compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” *Id.* at 371, 562 S.E.2d at 389 (cleaned up). The Stephenson I court noted the Supreme Court of the United States’ observation that “those criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required—they are not—but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.” *Id.*, 562 S.E.2d at 389 (quotation omitted). The Stephenson I court then observed that “the right of the people of this State to legislative districts which do not divide counties is not absolute,” but the WCP is not “rendered a legal nullity if its beneficial purposes can be preserved consistent with federal law and reconciled with other state constitutional guarantees.” *Id.*, 562 S.E.2d at 389.

The Stephenson I court invalidated the 2001 House redistricting plan and the 2001 Senate redistricting plan and held that “the WCP remains valid and binding upon the General Assembly during the redistricting and reapportionment process . . . , except to the extent superseded by federal law.” *Id.* at 371, 562 S.E.2d at 390. The Stephenson I court held that where “the primary purpose of the WCP can be effected to a large degree without conflict with federal law, it should be adhered to by the General Assembly to the maximum extent possible.” *Id.* at 374, 562 S.E.2d at 391. The Stephenson I court observed that “[a]lthough no federal law has preempted this Court’s authority to

interpret the WCP as it applies statewide, we acknowledge that complete compliance with federal law is the first priority before enforcing the WCP.” *Id.* at 374 n.4, 562 S.E.2d at 391 n.4.

The *Stephenson I* court then provided its remedial analysis. *See id.* at 375–86, 562 S.E.2d at 392–98. As part of that analysis, the *Stephenson I* court held that the North Carolina Constitution required single-member House and Senate districts. *Id.* at 382, 562 S.E.2d at 396. As for federal law, the *Stephenson I* court observed that “operation of federal law does not preclude states from recognizing traditional political subdivisions when drawing their legislative districts.” *Id.* at 381, 562 S.E.2d at 396. Rather, federal law “preempts the State Constitution only to the extent that the WCP actually conflicts with the VRA and other federal requirements relating to state legislative redistricting and reapportionment.” *Id.*, 562 S.E.2d at 396 (emphasis added).

With respect to reconciling the WCP, the rest of the North Carolina Constitution, and federal law, the *Stephenson I* court held that “the boundaries of single-member districts . . . may not cross county lines except as outlined” in *Stephenson I*. *Id.* at 382, 562 S.E.2d at 396. The *Stephenson I* court directed the trial court to ensure that legislative districts “required by” Section 2 or Section 5 of the VRA are “formed prior to the creation of non-VRA districts.” *Id.* at 383, 562 S.E.2d at 396–97.⁴ The *Stephenson I* court also instructed that “[t]o the maximum extent practicable, such VRA districts shall also comply with the legal requirements of the WCP, as herein established for all redistricting plans and districts throughout the State.” *Id.*, 562 S.E.2d at 397. As for the federal one-person, one-vote requirement, “any deviation from the ideal population for a legislative district shall be at or within plus or minus five percent.” *Id.*, 562 S.E.2d at 397.

⁴ The *Stephenson I* court then discussed Section 5 and non-retrogression. *See id.*, 562 S.E.2d at 397. As mentioned, under *Shelby County*, the coverage formula in Section 5 no longer applies. *See Shelby Cnty.*, 570 U.S. at 557.

The Stephenson I court held that in counties having a census population “sufficient to support the formation of one non-VRA legislative district falling at or within plus or minus five percent deviation from the ideal population consistent with ‘one-person, one-vote’ requirements, the WCP requires that the physical boundaries of any such non-VRA legislative district not cross or traverse the exterior geographic line of any such county.” Id., 562 S.E.2d at 397. The Stephenson I court also held that:

When two or more non-VRA legislative districts may be created within a single county, which districts fall at or within plus or minus five percent deviation from the ideal population consistent with “one-person, one-vote” requirements, single-member non-VRA districts shall be formed within said county. Such non-VRA districts shall be compact and shall not traverse the exterior geographic boundary of any such county.

Id., 562 S.E.2d at 397.

As for “counties having a non-VRA population pool which cannot support at least one legislative district at or within plus or minus five percent of the ideal population for a legislative district or, alternatively, counties having a non-VRA population pool which, if divided into districts, would not comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent ‘one-person, one-vote’ standard,” then

the requirements of the WCP are met by combining or grouping the minimum number of whole, contiguous counties necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent “one-person, one-vote” standard. Within any such contiguous multi-county grouping, compact districts shall be formed, consistent with the at or within plus or minus five percent standard, whose boundary lines do not cross or traverse the “exterior” line of the multi-county grouping; provided, however, that the resulting interior county lines created by any such groupings may be crossed or traversed in the creation of districts within said multi-county grouping but only to the extent necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent “one-person, one-vote” standard.

Id. at 383–84, 562 S.E.2d at 397. The Stephenson I court emphasized that the “intent underlying the WCP must be enforced to the maximum extent possible.” Id. at 384, 562 S.E.2d at 397 (emphasis

added). “[T]hus, only the smallest number of counties necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent ‘one-person, one-vote’ standard shall be combined, and communities of interest should be considered in the formation of compact and contiguous electoral districts.” Id., 562 S.E.2d at 397 (emphasis added).

Finally, the Stephenson I court directed that “any new redistricting plans, . . . , shall depart from strict compliance with the legal requirements set forth herein only to the extent necessary to comply with federal law.” Id., 562 S.E.2d at 397. The Stephenson I court closed by observing that “[e]nforcement of the WCP will, in all likelihood, foster improved voter morale, voter turnout, and public respect for State government, and specifically the General Assembly as an institution.” Id. at 385, 562 S.E.2d at 398. The Stephenson I court also opined that enforcing the WCP “will assist election officials in conducting elections at lower cost to the taxpayers of this State,” and “will instill a renewed sense of community and regional cooperation within the respective countywide or regionally formed legislative delegations mandated by the WCP.” Id., 562 S.E.2d at 398.

In Stephenson II, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the trial court’s decision that the General Assembly’s 2002 revised redistricting plans failed to attain “strict compliance with the legal requirements set forth in Stephenson I and are unconstitutional.” Stephenson II, 357 N.C. at 314, 582 S.E.2d at 254 (quotation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Stephenson II court explained how in Stephenson I, “this Court harmonized the provisions of Article I, Sections 2, 3, and 5, and the WCP of Article II, Sections 3(3) and 5(3) of the State Constitution and mandated that in creating legislative districts, counties shall not be divided except to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, including the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle and the VRA.” Id. at 309, 582 S.E.2d at 251. The General Assembly’s deficiencies in 2002 included “excessive division of

counties; deficiencies in county groupings; and substantial failures in compactness, contiguity, and communities of interest.” Id., 582 S.E.2d at 252.

This court construes Stephenson I and Stephenson II to require harmonizing the VRA and the WCP (including the requirement of county groupings). See id. at 309–14, 582 S.E.2d at 251–54; Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 369–75, 381–86, 562 S.E.2d at 388–92, 396–98. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held in Stephenson I that the WCP gives way when “required by the VRA.” Id. at 383, 562 S.E.2d at 396–97 (emphasis added). Thus, the court must examine Section 2 to determine whether Section 2 requires a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. See id., 562 S.E.2d at 396–97.

b.

This conclusion that a court must examine Section 2 to determine whether Section 2 requires a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina comports with Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 649 S.E.2d 364 (2007), aff’d sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). In Pender County, the Supreme Court of North Carolina revisited the interplay between Section 2 of the VRA and the North Carolina Constitution’s WCP and confirmed that redistricting must comport with federal law. See id. at 493, 649 S.E.2d at 366. State constitutional limits (such as the WCP), however, “are binding upon the General Assembly except to the extent superseded by federal law.” Id., 649 S.E.2d at 366 (quotation omitted). “Although federal law is supreme, when the primary purpose of the WCP can be effected to a large degree without conflict with federal law, it should be adhered to by the General Assembly to the maximum extent possible.” Id., 649 S.E.2d at 366 (quotation omitted). “Moreover, the WCP cannot be applied in isolation or in a manner that fails to comport with other requirements of the State Constitution.” Id., 649 S.E.2d at 366 (quotation omitted).

The Pender County court stated that the first Gingles precondition requires that a minority group of voting age citizens be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. See id. at 503–06, 649 S.E.2d at 372–73. The Pender County court noted that its interpretation of Section 2 comported with Section 2, provided a “bright line rule,” and provided a safe harbor for the General Assembly for determining when the first Gingles condition is met. Id. at 504–05, 649 S.E.2d at 373. The Pender County court also noted the tension between the first Gingles precondition and the third Gingles precondition if crossover districts were permitted to satisfy Section 2’s requirements. See id. at 506, 649 S.E.2d at 373–74. After all, “a high level of crossover voting is inconsistent with the majority bloc voting defined in the third Gingles precondition and weakens the possibility of vote dilution.” Id., 649 S.E.2d at 374. Because black voters in the House district at issue in Pender County were not a numerical majority of citizens of voting age, such black voters lacked the power to decide independently the outcome of an election, and their voting power was not diluted by the lack of a majority-black legislative district. See id. at 506–07, 649 S.E.2d at 374. Accordingly, the Pender County court held that the first Gingles precondition was not satisfied. See id., 649 S.E.2d at 374.

In finding that the House district at issue did not meet the first Gingles precondition, the Pender County court noted that the district contained a black voting age population of 39.36 percent, and the record did “not reveal the number of voting-age African-Americans who are citizens, [but] that number cannot exceed the total minority voting age population.” Id. at 507, 649 S.E.2d at 374. The Pender County court then observed that “the formation of legislative districts must comport with the requirements of our State Constitution, unless federal law supercedes those provisions.” Id., 649 S.E.2d at 374. Because Section 2 did not require the formation of the House district at issue, Section 2 did not control the formation of that district or supercede the requirements of the North Carolina

Constitution, including the WCP and its county grouping rule. See id. at 507–09, 649 S.E.2d at 375. Thus, the House district had to be “drawn in accordance with the WCP and the Stephenson I requirements.” Id. at 509, 649 S.E.2d at 375.

The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 26. In Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, joined by Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts and joined separately in the judgment by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that “[o]nly when a geographically compact group of minority voters could form a majority in a single-member district has the first Gingles requirement been met.” Id. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion, in part, to avoid the obvious tension that a contrary statutory interpretation of Section 2 would create between the first Gingles precondition and the third Gingles precondition. See id. at 16–17. The Supreme Court also found “support for the majority-minority requirement in the need for workable standards and sound judicial and legislative administration.” Id. at 17.

The Supreme Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance in construing Section 2 to require the majority-minority standard for the first Gingles precondition. See id. at 21–22. After all, “the moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause, and racial classifications are permitted only as a last resort.” Id. at 21 (cleaned up). “Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.” Id. (quotation omitted).

c.

The legislative defendants argue that Demonstration District A fails the first Gingles precondition because it is not “reasonably configured” in light of the WCP and the county grouping rule under the WCP. See [D.E. 39] 14–15; Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18, 20; id. at 43 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Gingles requires the creation of a majority-minority district only when, among other things, . . . a plaintiff’s proposed alternative map and proposed majority-minority district are reasonably configured—namely, by respecting compactness principles and other traditional districting criteria such as county, city, and town lines.” (quotation omitted)); Perez, 138 S. Ct. at 2332–33 (Texas did not have to break the “County Line Rule” in the Texas Constitution in order to create a second Section 2 Latino district with a portion of Nueces County voters); Abrams, 521 U.S. at 91–92 (the first Gingles precondition requires a “reasonably compact” district and “the § 2 compactness inquiry should take into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries” (quotation omitted)); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917.

As discussed, the North Carolina Constitution prohibits any county from being “divided in the formation of a senate district.” N.C. Const. art. II, § 3(3); see id. art. II, § 5(3) (same for House districts). If a county’s population is too small to form a district alone, then the North Carolina Constitution (as construed in Stephenson I) requires the General Assembly to meet the WCP requirements “by combining or grouping the minimum number of whole, contiguous counties necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent ‘one-person, one-vote’ standard.” Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383–84, 562 S.E.2d at 397. After each decennial census, in order to comply with Stephenson I and its progeny, the General Assembly uses an algorithm to determine county groupings for each chamber in the General Assembly to minimize the number of counties traversed by district lines. See [D.E. 17-1] ¶ 20.

After the 2020 U.S. Census, mathematicians (including Esselstyn) produced two optimal county groupings for Senate districts in northeast North Carolina. See id. at fig. 3; Christopher Cooper, et al., NC General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census 2, available at <https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). Both optimal groupings keep Warren, Halifax, and Martin Counties together. See [D.E. 17-1] fig. 3. Neither optimal grouping includes Vance County. See id. The algorithm groups Vance County with Franklin and Nash Counties. See Cooper, NC General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census 1.

Demonstration District A (which Esselstyn drew) groups Vance County with Warren, Halifax, and Martin Counties. See id. at fig. 6; cf. id. at ¶ 40. Legislative defendants' expert Dr. Sean P. Trende ("Dr. Trende") examined Demonstration District A and observed that "Franklin and Nash [C]ounties do not have sufficient population to support a single Senate district on their own." [D.E. 39-6] 7. Accordingly, under the WCP as interpreted in Stephenson I, Stephenson II, and Pender County, Dr. Trende opined that the General Assembly would have to combine Franklin and Nash Counties with another county or counties, leading to "a cascade of changes that are difficult to sort out." Id. In other words, under North Carolina law, Demonstration District A would reset the county grouping algorithm and necessitate a new statewide Senate districting plan. Cf. [D.E. 39] 15.⁵ In so doing, the legislative defendants argue that Demonstration District A would disrupt North Carolina's traditional redistricting principles, including respect for county groupings under Stephenson I and II. See Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 371, 385, 562 S.E.2d at 389, 398. The legislative defendants also argue that Section 2 does not require such a district. See Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18,

⁵ Esselstyn's expert report does not explain his decision to create Demonstration District A by ignoring the county grouping algorithm that he helped to prepare.

20; *see, e.g., Perez*, 138 S. Ct. at 2332–34; *Abrams*, 521 U.S. at 91–92; *Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 917; *see also Milligan*, 599 U.S. at 43 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And, according to the legislative defendants, *Stephenson I*, *Stephenson II*, and *Pender County* do not either. *See Stephenson I*, 355 N.C. at 383, 562 S.E.2d at 396–97 (holding the WCP only gives way in drafting districts when “required by the VRA” (emphasis added)); *see, e.g., Pender Cnty.*, 361 N.C. at 507, 649 S.E.2d at 374 (holding that a district “not required by Section 2” must comply with *Stephenson I* and its progeny); *Stephenson II*, 357 N.C. at 309, 314, 582 S.E.2d at 251, 254.

The legislative defendants also argue that plaintiffs have not proven that Demonstration District A can be part of a reasonably configured Senate plan in North Carolina. *See* [D.E. 39] 16. According to the legislative defendants, plaintiffs seeking Section 2 relief customarily present an entire redistricting plan including any majority-minority districts that Section 2 allegedly requires, instead of presenting simply a single district. *See, e.g., Milligan*, 599 U.S. at 19–21. The legislative defendants argue that plaintiffs must present Demonstration District A within the confines of an entire Senate redistricting plan due to the county grouping rule under *Stephenson I* to ensure that the proposed majority-black Senate district is reasonably configured itself and does not turn the entire plan into a “monstrosity.” *Id.* at 28 (quoting *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 909). Because plaintiffs failed to present an entire Senate redistricting plan with Demonstration District A and because the county-grouping rule under *Stephenson I* and its progeny governs the entire state, the legislative defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to meet the first *Gingles* precondition of being reasonably configured. *See* [D.E. 39] 17.

In support of this latter argument, the legislative defendants note that the enacted SD1 and SD2 border SD5 in northeast North Carolina, which has a BVAP of 40.35% and likely qualifies as

a crossover district. See id.⁶ Neighboring SD11 also may qualify as a crossover district with a BVAP of 36.65%. See id. According to the legislative defendants, “[a]lthough §2 does not mandate crossover districts, states may create them ‘as a matter of legislative choice or discretion’ [under Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 23], and §2 can ‘be satisfied by crossover districts,’ Cooper, 581 U.S. at 305.” Id. According to the legislative defendants, Demonstration District A “dismantles SD 1, 2, and 11,” reconfigures the county groupings under Stephenson I and its progeny in the other 92 counties, and may, in turn, “dismantle districts like SD 5 that currently provide equal minority opportunity.” Id. at 17–18. Moreover, according to the legislative defendants, “dismantling one district for some minority voters (in SD5) to create another district for other minority voters (Demonstrative A) is improper.” Id. at 18 (citing Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1019). “Without establishing the impact of Demonstration District A on minority opportunity elsewhere, [Demonstration District A merely shows] ‘that lines could have been drawn elsewhere, nothing more.’” Id. (quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1015).

The legislative defendants’ arguments concerning whether Demonstration District A is a “reasonably configured district” under the first Gingles precondition have force. Nonetheless, the court need not resolve the merits of those arguments in order to resolve plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Instead, the court assumes without deciding that Demonstration District A meets the first Gingles precondition.

⁶ SD5 includes Edgecombe County and Pitt County. Senator Kandie Smith (an African-American Democrat) currently represents this Senate district. See N.C. Gen. Assembly, Senator Kandie D. Smith (Dem), <https://www.ncleg.gov/Members/Biography/S/447> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024).

2.

As for Demonstration District B-1, the legislative defendants contend that it “does not satisfy the numerosity requirement” because “its BVAP of 48.4% is ‘shy of 50%.’” [D.E. 39] 13 (quoting [D.E. 17] 17). Plaintiffs reply that black CVAP “is a proper statistic in this context,” and Demonstration District B-1 has a black CVAP over 50%; therefore, plaintiffs argue that Demonstration District B-1 meets the first Gingles precondition. [D.E. 42] 5–6. The parties’ dispute concerns whether the court should consider BVAP or black CVAP when evaluating Demonstration District B-1 under the first Gingles precondition.

Some courts decline to use CVAP in redistricting cases when “there is no evidence of a significant noncitizen population.” Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 1:11-CV-736, 2014 WL 316703, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014) (unpublished); *see, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago*, 141 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding courts should use voting-age population where “noncitizens [are] not a significant part of the relevant population”); Negron v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Of course, [a previous Section 2 decision] did not address [CVAP], because there was no indication in that case that there was any disparity between black and white citizenship rates. Nor is there likely to be any disparity in citizenship rates, except in a case, such as this one, where the minority population includes a substantial number of immigrants.”); *cf. United States v. Village of Port Chester*, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (requiring CVAP statistics for a Hispanic community within a geographic area that was more than one-third noncitizen). Here, as in Pope, plaintiffs cite no significant black noncitizen population in the counties at issue in this case. See Pope, 2014 WL 316703, at *13.

CVAP relies on the United States Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (“ACS”). See [D.E. 17-1] ¶ 33 n.6. The “ACS is based on a sample, rather than all housing units and people.”

U.S. Census Bureau, Understanding and Using American Community Survey Data: What All Data Users Need to Know 1, available at <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/library/handbooks/general.html> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). Thus, “ACS estimates have a degree of uncertainty associated with them” called sampling error. *Id.* The Census Bureau designed ACS “to provide estimates of the characteristics of the population, not to provide counts of the population in different . . . population subgroups.” U.S. Census Bureau, Understanding and Using American Community Survey Data: What State and Local Government Users Need to Know 5, available at <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/library/handbooks/state-local.html> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). Accordingly, “CVAP data is less reliable than VAP.” *Pope*, 2014 WL 316703, at *13. Indeed, the Census Bureau has warned users that ACS data is “not intended to be used in redistricting.” *Id.* at *13 n.22.

In any event, even if the court were to entertain using black CVAP to evaluate Demonstration District B-1, this court agrees with the Supreme Court of North Carolina that “the number of voting-age African-Americans who are citizens . . . cannot exceed the total minority voting age population” in this case. *Pender Cnty.*, 361 N.C. at 506–07, 649 S.E.2d at 374. Plaintiffs do not explain why black CVAP is higher than BVAP in Demonstration District B-1. *Cf. Perez v. Abbott*, No. 11-cv-360, 2017 WL 1406379, at *56 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2017) (unpublished) (explaining that white CVAP was higher than white VAP in a district because the Hispanic VAP included “many Mexican nationals”).⁷

⁷ Likewise, plaintiffs fail to explain how CVAP in Demonstration District A is higher than BVAP in Demonstration District A. Although Demonstration District A’s BVAP exceeds 50%, Demonstration District A’s black CVAP suffers the same deficiencies as Demonstration District B-1’s black CVAP. *See Pender Cnty.*, 361 N.C. at 506–07, 649 S.E.2d at 374.

The court recognizes its discretion to use either black CVAP or BVAP when evaluating whether Demonstration District B-1 satisfies the first Gingles precondition of being a majority-black district. See, e.g., Barnett, 141 F.3d at 705; Negron, 113 F.3d at 1568; Pope, 2014 WL 316703, at *13. In exercising that discretion, the court has reviewed Esselstyn's black CVAP calculations upon which plaintiffs rely. The Redistricting Data Hub disaggregated the U.S. Census Bureau's block-group-level CVAP data. See Redistricting Data Hub, https://redistrictingdatahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/readme_nc_cvap_2020_2020_b.txt (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). Esselstyn used the Redistricting Data Hub's disaggregated CVAP data to calculate black CVAP totals at the precinct level for the black CVAP statistics in his report. See [D.E. 17-1] 35. Esselstyn and the Redistricting Data Hub rely on the U.S. Census Bureau's CVAP Special Tabulation from the 2016–2020 5-Year American Community Survey. See id. at 34–35; Redistricting Data Hub, 2020 Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Data for North Carolina from the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates (2016–2020) Disaggregated to 2020 Census Blocks, https://redistrictingdatahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/readme_nc_cvap_2020_2020_b.txt; see also U.S. Census Bureau, Citizen Voting Age Population by Race and Ethnicity, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.2020.html> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024).

The median margin of error in the U.S. Census Bureau's block group level data is 57.6%. See U.S. Census Bureau, BlockGr.csv, available at <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.2020.html> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024).⁸ The average margin of error in the U.S. Census Bureau's block group level data is 85.5%. See id. The maximum

⁸ The court only has access to the U.S. Census Bureau's data in CSV format, which does not include the entire nationwide dataset because the dataset is too large for Microsoft Excel. The court's calculations in this paragraph do not include block groups with zero estimated citizens of voting age.

margin of error in the U.S. Census Bureau's block group level data is 4,475%. See id. The Redistricting Data Hub does not discuss these margins of error or explain how it took the margins of error into account when it disaggregated the U.S. Census Bureau's CVAP block group level data. Esselstyn does not discuss these margins of error or explain how he took the margins of error into account when he reaggregated the data to calculate precinct-level black CVAP in his report. Plaintiffs do not discuss these margins of error in their briefs. In light of these margins of error, this court has no confidence in relying on Esselstyn's black CVAP conclusions when considering the black CVAP in either Demonstration District A or B-1.

After discovery, plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate why the court should use black CVAP and why black CVAP is higher than BVAP in Demonstration District B-1. At this preliminary stage, however, the court declines to use black CVAP instead of BVAP as an appropriate measure of whether plaintiffs' minority group is "sufficiently large" to constitute a majority in Demonstration District B-1 in light of CVAP's questionable reliability and plaintiffs' failure to explain how they arrived at their black CVAP figures. See Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18; Strickland, 556 U.S. at 12; Hall, 385 F.3d at 430; Barnett, 141 F.3d at 705; Negron, 113 F.3d at 1568; Pope, 2014 WL 316703, at *13.

In opposition to this conclusion, plaintiffs cite the Supreme Court of North Carolina decision in Pender County, which the Supreme Court affirmed in Strickland. In Pender County, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not have black CVAP figures and instead relied on BVAP. See Pender Cnty., 361 N.C. at 506–07, 649 S.E.2d at 374. Plaintiffs also cite Holloway v. City of Va. Beach, 531 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (E.D. Va. 2021), vacated and remanded, 42 F.4th 266 (4th Cir. 2022), to support their use of black CVAP. In Holloway, black CVAP and BVAP data produced the same results. See Holloway, 531 F. Supp. 3d at 1057. Thus, the court did not need to decide which

measure was more appropriate. Regardless, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court opinion in Holloway. See Holloway v. City of Va. Beach, 42 F.4th 266, 278 (4th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the court rejects plaintiffs' argument and declines to use black CVAP to evaluate whether Demonstration District B-1 meets the first Gingles precondition.

Demonstration District B-1 has a 48.41% BVAP. See [D.E. 17-1] table 4. Thus, black voters in Demonstration District B-1 would need "support from crossover [white] voters to elect" their preferred candidate. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 9. Section 2 does not require such districts, and such districts do not meet the first Gingles precondition. See id. at 23. Accordingly, Demonstration District B-1 fails the first Gingles precondition. See id. Thus, plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the first Gingles precondition with Demonstration District B-1.

D.

As for the second Gingles precondition, plaintiffs must show that their minority group is "politically cohesive." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51; see Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18. Plaintiffs may show political cohesion by "showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56. "Unlike the first Gingles prong, which has an established bright-line test of 50%+, there is no cutoff for political cohesion." Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 94 F. Supp. 3d 302, 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (quotation and alteration omitted). Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Barreto notes that black voters in North Carolina "vote for candidates of choice by roughly a 9-to-1 margin or greater." [D.E. 17-2] ¶ 22. Dr. Barreto also observes that in North Carolina elections he analyzed, black voters voted "for the same candidates of choice with clear support in the 95% range." Id. at ¶ 24. In some elections, over 98% of black voters voted for the same candidates. Id. at ¶ 26.

The legislative defendants do not contest political cohesion. See [D.E. 39] 13–25. Accordingly, plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the second Gingles precondition. See, e.g., Milligan, 599 U.S. at 22; Pope, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 333–36.

E.

As for the third Gingles precondition, plaintiffs must show that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51; see Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18. The third Gingles precondition “requires racial bloc voting that is ‘legally significant.’” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 167. In other words, as the Covington court explained, “a general finding regarding the existence of any racially polarized voting, no matter the level, is not enough.” Id.; see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 994 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (observing that a party “cannot simply rely on generalized assumptions about the prevalence of racial bloc voting”). Accordingly, courts must consider “whether racial bloc voting is operating at such a level that it would actually minimize or cancel minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice if no remedial district were drawn.” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 168 (cleaned up). When considering this precondition, courts should ask “merely whether . . . voters are racially polarized,” not “why.” United States v. Charleston Cnty., 365 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2004). “[C]ausation is relevant,” but only “in the totality of the circumstances inquiry,” not the three Gingles preconditions. Id. at 347–48; see Lewis v. Alamance Cnty., 99 F.3d 600, 615–16 & n.12 (4th Cir. 1996).⁹

⁹ The legislative defendants contend that “North Carolina voting patterns lack legal significance for the additional reason that they reflect a partisan, not a racial, divide.” [D.E. 39] 22. The legislative defendants cite their expert, Dr. John Alford (“Dr. Alford”). See id. at 22–23; [D.E. 39-7] (Dr. Alford’s report). The court considers Dr. Alford’s report as part of the totality of the circumstances. See Charleston Cnty., 365 F.3d at 347–49; Lewis, 99 F.3d at 615–16 & n.12.

Dr. Barreto conducted racially polarized voting analysis in North Carolina. See [D.E. 17-2] ¶ 11. Dr. Barreto used election results and voter file data obtained from the Board. See id. at ¶ 20. Dr. Barreto used eiCompare software to conduct ecological inference (“EI”) analysis. See id. at ¶¶ 20–21. Courts frequently review EI analysis in vote dilution cases. See, e.g., Balt. Cnty. Branch of Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Balt. Cnty., No. 21-cv-3232, 2022 WL 657562, at *8 n.4 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2022) (unpublished); Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 169 & n.47.

Dr. Barreto performed “more than 350 ecological inference statistical models . . . across 31 recent elections in 2020 and 2022.” [D.E. 17-2] ¶ 23. In “elections most closely resembling endogenous elections,” i.e., elections in northeast North Carolina, Dr. Barreto’s “EI models report that 98–99% of Black voters are cohesive in voting for their candidates of choice” in the 2020 and 2022 elections. Id. at ¶ 26. By contrast, Dr. Barreto’s EI model reports that between 80–88% of white voters in northeast North Carolina vote against black voters’ candidate of choice. Id. Dr. Barreto opined that “white voters vote in the exact opposite direction [as black voters] in every one of these elections” he analyzed. Id. at ¶ 27. Dr. Barreto evaluated plaintiffs’ demonstration districts. See id. at App’x B. According to Dr. Barreto’s evaluation, black voters’ candidates of choice would have won Demonstration District A and Demonstration District B-1 in every election if those districts were in place in 2020 and 2022. See id. By contrast, black voters’ candidates of choice would have lost SD1 and SD2 in all but one election if those districts were in place in 2020 and 2022. See id. Notably, according to Dr. Barreto, the one election a black-voter-preferred candidate would have won in SB 758’s districts was the 2022 North Carolina Senate race in SD2. See id. at 21, table B1. Moreover, Dr. Barreto’s analysis of SD2 in 2022 was one of just four elections Dr. Barreto analyzed that most directly concerned whether black voters can elect Senate candidates of choice in SD1 or SD2, and one of the two Senate districts that plaintiffs attack in this case. See id.

The court asked about this startling piece of plaintiffs' evidence concerning SD2 at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hamrick, 196 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that endogenous elections are "more probative than exogenous elections"). Plaintiffs responded that this figure must have been a typo and asked to supplement Dr. Barreto's report. The court granted the request. On January 12, 2024, plaintiffs filed a supplemental declaration from Dr. Barreto in which he stated that this figure was not a typo. See [D.E. 55-1]. Instead, Dr. Barreto opined that his model estimated a victory for the black-preferred candidate in the SD2 race in 2022 because he excluded consideration of votes cast in other uncontested elections. See id. at 1–2. Dr. Barreto opined that if his model incorporated the uncontested elections, the figure in his table would reflect a loss for the black-preferred candidate. See id.

On January 22, 2024, the legislative defendants responded to Dr. Barreto's supplemental declaration. See [D.E. 60]. The legislative defendants note that Dr. Barreto "declares that his table includes only vote shares in Halifax, Warren, and Martin" Counties. Id. at 2; cf. [D.E. 55-1] 1. That admission shows that Dr. Barreto is doing an unusual form of reconstituted election analysis. See [D.E. 60] 2–3; cf. Rodriguez v. Bexar Cnty., 385 F.3d 853, 861 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Reconstituted election analysis is a relatively simple method that extracts actual election results from a variety of statewide and local races that subsume the area being analyzed and determines, precinct-by-precinct within the new district, the racial composition of the vote and the 'winner' within the new district."). The legislative defendants also correctly argue that Dr. Barreto's new representation "cannot seem to be cabined to the contests he would prefer the Court ignore." [D.E. 60] 3. The legislative defendants also chide Dr. Barreto for performing "back-of-the napkin math" in his supplemental declaration to support his ultimate conclusion that black-preferred candidates cannot win in SD1 or SD2. Id. at 4. The legislative defendants understandably ask why Dr. Barreto did not do that

analysis in his initial report or across the board in his supplemental declaration if “that were the right way to do the analysis.” Id. The legislative defendants contend that Dr. Barreto’s supplemental declaration, at a minimum, shows “why experts in [redistricting] cases should be subject to vigorous cross examination and thorough expert rebuttal reports.” Id.

The court agrees with the legislative defendants. Dr. Barreto’s belated explanation undercuts all of Dr. Barreto’s conclusions by demonstrating that fuller data sets could change his estimated outcomes. Dr. Barreto does not explain the profound discrepancies between the methods of analysis he performed in his initial report and in his supplemental declaration. Dr. Barreto also fails to explain why the court should credit any of his estimated outcomes for elections in SD2 in light of his supplemental declaration. These figures have important implications for the third Gingles precondition in plaintiffs’ case. Accordingly, Dr. Barreto’s unpersuasive explanation demonstrates, at a minimum, that this case would greatly benefit from discovery, including, for example, Dr. Barreto’s deposition and Dr. Barreto producing his complete data files to the legislative defendants. This hotly contested factual issue weighs in favor of the court preserving the status quo ante litem. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5–6; Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980).

Dr. Barreto opined that “there is a clear, consistent, and statistically significant finding of racially polarized voting in North Carolina statewide as well as within the Northeast region in particular.” [D.E. 17-2] at ¶ 22. Dr. Barreto also opined that the population of black voters “in the northeast region of North Carolina is large and geographically compact and can form a majority-Black State Senate district that will elect Black candidates of choice.” Id. at ¶ 32. Notwithstanding his own analysis of SD2 in 2022, Dr. Barreto also opined that black voters’ “candidates of choice cannot win office in either Senate District 1 or 2.” Id. at ¶ 33.

The legislative defendants respond that Dr. Barreto found “statistically significant” racially polarized voting but not “legally significant” racially polarized voting because Dr. Barreto did not conduct the proper analysis. [D.E. 39] 20–21 (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs disagree. See [D.E. 42] 8.

Courts have emphasized the “crucial difference between legally significant and statistically significant racially polarized voting.” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 170 (emphasis in original). The term “racially polarized voting” only means “different racial groups ‘vote in blocs for different candidates.’” Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62); see [D.E. 17-2] ¶ 16 (defining “racially polarized voting” as “voters of different racial or ethnic groups exhibiting different candidate preferences in an election”). As the Covington court explained, courts reject statistically significant racially polarized voting to show the third Gingles precondition because that label “applies equally well where there is only a minimal degree of polarization.” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 170. Instead, the third Gingles precondition “is concerned only with legally significant racially polarized voting, which occurs when the majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id. (cleaned up); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 55–56.

To demonstrate legally significant racially polarized voting, an expert must engage in a “district effectiveness analysis,” which is “a district-specific evaluation used to determine the minority voting-age population level at which a district becomes effective in providing a realistic opportunity for . . . voters of that minority group to elect candidates of their choice.” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 168 n.46. In other words, an expert must determine if black voters’ candidates of choice “would usually be defeated without a VRA remedy.” Id. at 168. As discussed, Section 2 does not require crossover districts. See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 23. Thus, a proper district effectiveness analysis supporting plaintiffs’ challenge must show that black voters’ candidates of choice cannot

win elections unless BVAP in the contested districts exceeds 50% plus one vote. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 194–95 (2017); Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 170.

As an example of such a district effectiveness analysis, the legislative defendants submitted the expert report of Dr. Lisa Handley that Dr. Handley submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs in Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18-cvs-14001, 2019 WL 4569584 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019), abrogated by Harper v. Hall, 384 N.C. 292, 886 S.E.2d 393 (2023) (“Harper III”). In Lewis, the plaintiffs challenged the General Assembly’s legislative districts on a theory of partisan gerrymandering. See id. at *1–2. The defendants (members of the General Assembly) raised Section 2 as a federal defense. See id. at *100–03. The Lewis court held that the General Assembly failed to “establish the existence of legally sufficient racially polarized voting in any area of North Carolina, or any particular House or state Senate district.” Id. at *100 (emphasis added). Instead, the Lewis court had evidence from Dr. Handley demonstrating a lack of legally significant racially polarized voting across every legislative district she analyzed because her district effectiveness analyses showed black voters’ candidates of choice could win the challenged districts with less than 50% BVAP. See [D.E. 39-7] 33–75.

Plaintiffs correctly note that Dr. Handley cabined the value of her report in Lewis, noting that her “analysis cannot be extrapolated to other counties and districts not analyzed in this report.” Id. at 33; see [D.E. 42] 9. Dr. Handley, however, completed a district effectiveness analysis. See [D.E. 39-7] 33–75. Dr. Barreto did not. Thus, Dr. Handley’s report demonstrates another deep flaw in Dr. Barreto’s report.

At the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs contended that, under Covington, they could meet their burden to show legally significant racially polarized voting through either a district effectiveness analysis or a statistically significant racially polarized voting

analysis plus an analysis of election results in the Senate districts they challenge. Plaintiffs are incorrect. In Covington and Common Cause (among other cases), the General Assembly raised Section 2 as a defense to racial and partisan gerrymandering claims. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 124; Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *100–01, *131–32. Thus, the General Assembly had to show legally significant racially polarized voting that justified its use of race to create majority-black districts. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 167–68; Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *131–32. The courts held that the General Assembly failed to meet its burden to justify using race to create majority-black House and Senate districts because the General Assembly presented no evidence that majority-black districts were necessary for black-preferred candidates usually to win. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 168–69; Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *100–01.

The method to determine whether a majority-black district is necessary under Section 2 is through a proper district effectiveness analysis. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 168–69 & n.46. Just as a legislature cannot use Section 2 to justify creating a majority-black district without a proper district effectiveness analysis, a plaintiff cannot either. See *id.*; see also Cooper, 581 U.S. at 306 (“We by no means insist that a state legislature, when redistricting, determine precisely what percent minority population § 2 of the VRA demands. But neither will we approve a racial gerrymander whose necessity is supported by no evidence” (cleaned up)); Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 194–95.

At the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs conceded that Dr. Barreto failed to provide a district effectiveness analysis. Dr. Barreto merely compared hypothetical election results between plaintiffs’ demonstration districts and Senate Districts 1 and 2. See [D.E. 17-2] 21–23. Dr. Barreto did not find the level of BVAP in Demonstration Districts A and B-1 below which black voters’ candidates of choice stop winning elections and start losing them. Cf. [D.E. 39-7] 33–74 (Dr. Handley’s analysis). Indeed, as discussed, plaintiffs’ Demonstration District

B-1 has a BVAP below 50%. See [D.E. 17] 17. Dr. Barreto, however, estimated that black voters' candidates of choice would have won every election in Demonstration District B-1 in 2020 and 2022. See [D.E. 17-2] 21–23. Thus, when using the BVAP of 48.4%, Dr. Barreto's analysis undermines plaintiffs' challenge to SB 758 by demonstrating that Demonstration District B-1 is a crossover district. Moreover, the scatterplots in Dr. Barreto's report show that black voters' candidates of choice begin winning precincts in the North Carolina counties at issue in this case when BVAP meets or exceeds 30–40%. See id. at 12–13. Although Dr. Barreto did not do a district effectiveness analysis, his report suggests that a proper district effectiveness analysis for plaintiffs' demonstration districts likely would yield a “minority voting-age population level” below 50% which provides “a realistic opportunity for . . . voters of that minority group to elect candidates of their choice.” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 168 n.46.

Tellingly, plaintiffs ask the court to issue an extraordinary mandatory preliminary injunction but leave Senate District 5 intact because it is a “minority opportunity district.” See, e.g., [D.E. 17] 16. Senate District 5 in northeast North Carolina combines Edgecombe County and Pitt County and has a 40.35% BVAP. See [D.E. 17-1] 11.¹⁰ Thus, plaintiffs implicitly concede that legally significant racially polarized voting does not exist in Senate District 5. See id.; Strickland, 556 U.S. at 9.

Other evidence further undermines plaintiffs' attempt to satisfy the third Gingles precondition. In 2022, North Carolina courts approved a new electoral redistricting plan for North Carolina's congressional districts to be used in the 2022 congressional elections. See Order, N.C. League of Women Voters, Inc. v. Hall, No. 21 CVS 15426 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2022). In that

¹⁰ As mentioned, Senator Kandie Smith (an African-American Democrat) currently represents Senate District 5.

redistricting plan, North Carolina's First Congressional District ("CD1") contains all of the counties at issue in this case and is composed of Bertie, Chowan, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gates, Greene, Halifax, Hertford, Martin, Nash, Northampton, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Tyrrell, Vance, Warren, Washington, and Wilson Counties and a portion of Pitt County. See N.C. Gen. Assembly, North Carolina Congressional District Plan, <https://www.ncleg.gov/Redistricting/DistrictPlanMap/C2022C> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). CD1 has a BVAP of approximately 40%. Cf. U.S. Census Bureau, My Congressional District, <https://www.census.gov/mycd/?st=37&cd=01> (last visited Jan. 25, 2024) (listing demographic data for congressional districts used in the 2022 elections). Nonetheless, in 2022, Don Davis—an African-American Democrat—won CD1. See North Carolina State Board of Elections, 11/08/2022 Official General Election Results - Statewide, https://er.ncsbe.gov/contest_details.html?election_dt=11/08/2022&county_id=0&contest_id=1364 (last visited Jan. 25, 2024). The 2022 election results in CD1 provide additional evidence of white crossover voting in northeast North Carolina, including in the counties at issue in plaintiffs' proposed remedial majority-black Senate district.¹¹

"If the lesson of Gingles is that society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that should not obscure the fact that there are communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a single district in order

¹¹ Congressman Davis's experience with North Carolina voters is not unique. Congresswoman Alma Adams represents the people in Congressional District 12, which encompasses a portion of Mecklenburg County and Cabarrus County. Congresswoman Valerie Foushee represents the people in Congressional District 4, which encompasses Alamance County, Durham County, Granville County, Orange County, Person County, and a portion of Caswell County. Congresswoman Adams and Congresswoman Foushee are African-American Democrats. They were elected in districts in 2022 with a black voting-age population below 50%.

to elect candidates of their choice.” De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020. On the current record, the court finds that the black voting-age population in the counties at issue in this case live and work in such communities. Likewise, on the current record, the court finds that the white voting-age population in the communities at issue do not vote as a bloc against black-preferred candidates to enable the white bloc usually to defeat the black-preferred candidates.

Of course, the court recognizes that not every candidate in every election represents “perfection to every minority voter, but minority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which is not to be slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics.” Id. On the current record, the court finds the black and white voting-age populations in the counties at issue in this case do “pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground.” Id.

At this stage of the case, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate legally significant racially polarized voting in northeast North Carolina in the counties at issue in this case. See, e.g., Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 169. Where plaintiffs fail “to demonstrate Gingles’ third precondition—sufficient white majority bloc voting to frustrate the election of the minority group’s candidate of choice,” then “it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect their chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters.” Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 158 (quotation omitted). Thus, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate they are likely to succeed on the merits of the third Gingles precondition.

F.

Generally, courts consider whether a violation of Section 2 has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances only after a party has established the three Gingles preconditions. See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 11–12; see Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 167. As discussed, plaintiffs fail to satisfy all three Gingles preconditions; therefore, they fail to show a likelihood of success on the

merits of their Section 2 claim. Nonetheless, in the alternative, the court considers the parties' arguments about the totality of the circumstances.

Plaintiffs who prove the three Gingles preconditions also must prove, "under the totality of the circumstances, that the political process is not equally open to minority voters." Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (quotations omitted); see 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011–12 ("[I]f Gingles so clearly identified the three [preconditions] as generally necessary to prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly declined to hold them sufficient [C]ourts must also examine other evidence in the totality of circumstances"); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45–46; Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 125. The Gingles inquiry is "peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case." Milligan, 599 U.S. at 19 (quotation omitted). Thus, courts "must conduct an intensely local appraisal of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality." Id. (quotation omitted); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79; Charleston Cnty., 365 F.3d at 349.

1.

Among other local considerations, courts consider: (1) the extent of the state's historical discrimination concerning the right to vote against plaintiffs' minority group; (2) the extent of racially polarized voting; (3) the extent to which the state has adopted other voting practices that may exacerbate discrimination against the minority group; (4) whether members of plaintiffs' minority group have been denied access to a candidate slating process; (5) whether members of plaintiffs' minority group in the state "bear the effects of discrimination" in education, employment, or health, hindering their ability to participate in the political process; (6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to which members of plaintiffs' minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; (8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness by the state's elected officials to the "particularized needs" of plaintiffs'

minority group; and (9) whether the state's policy underlying its use of the challenged voting procedure is tenuous. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–38; S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982). Courts refer to Gingles's non-exclusive list as the “Senate factors.” See, e.g., Milligan, 599 U.S. at 69–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Charleston Cnty., 318 F. Supp. 2d 302, 321 (D.S.C. 2002).

Plaintiffs discuss each Senate factor. First, plaintiffs contend that North Carolina historically discriminated against black voters. See [D.E. 17] 21–23. In support, plaintiffs cite very old voting practices and cases. See id. Plaintiffs cite just one case from the last 30 years in which a court found the General Assembly acted with discriminatory intent when it enacted a voting law. See id. (citing N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 238 (4th Cir. 2016)). The court gives little weight to plaintiffs' overwhelmingly outdated evidence.

As for the second Senate factor, plaintiffs repeat their argument that North Carolina voters are “highly racially polarized.” [D.E. 17] 23. As discussed, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate legally significant racially polarized voting. See, e.g., Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 169. Instead, the record, including plaintiffs' own evidence, demonstrates “substantial crossover voting” in North Carolina. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 24; see Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 128, 142–65, 167–74; see also [D.E. 17-2] 12–13, 21–23. Accordingly, the court rejects this argument. This factor weighs in favor of the legislative defendants.

Third, plaintiffs argue that North Carolina has designed voting practices to discriminate against black voters “since the 19th century.” [D.E. 17] 23. The legislative defendants respond that this factor focuses on “whether the challenged scheme interacts with other [voting] mechanisms in the present to enhance the discriminatory impact of the challenged system.” [D.E. 39] 24 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs reply that the legislative defendants' argument is “incorrect on [its] own terms.” [D.E. 42] 9.

Courts construe the third Senate factor to consider whether the jurisdiction presently employs voting practices designed to discriminate against minority voters. See, e.g., Ala. State Conf. of Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 612 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1306–07 (M.D. Ala. 2020); Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People, Spring Valley Branch v. East Ramapo Sch. Dist., 462 F. Supp. 3d 368, 400–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Luna v. Cnty. of Kern, 291 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1135–36 (E.D. Cal. 2018); Montes v. City of Yakima, 40 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 1410–12 (E.D. Wash. 2014); United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 607–08 (N.D. Ohio 2008). Indeed, plaintiffs' argument (if accepted) would render the third Senate factor superfluous in light of the first Senate factor. Plaintiffs fail to cite evidence that North Carolina presently employs other voting practices that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against black voters. See [D.E. 17] 23. Accordingly, this factor favors the legislative defendants.

Fourth, North Carolina does not use a candidate slating process. See id. Accordingly, this factor does not apply. See, e.g., Montes, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 1412–13.

Fifth, plaintiffs contend that “North Carolina’s discrimination has produced severe socioeconomic disparities” between black and white North Carolinians. See [D.E. 17] 23–25. In support, plaintiffs cite the opinion of their expert Dr. Traci Burch. See id.; [D.E. 17-3] (Dr. Burch’s report). Dr. Burch’s report, however, contains no statistical analysis demonstrating that race discrimination by North Carolina caused the socioeconomic disparities that Dr. Burch discusses in her report. Accordingly, this factor does not help plaintiffs.

Sixth, plaintiffs contend “North Carolina political campaigns feature racial appeals.” [D.E. 17] 25–26. In support, plaintiffs cite: (1) the “campaign tactics of U.S. Senate candidate Jesse Helms in 1984 and 1990”; (2) a comment from then-candidate for the House of Representatives Madison Cawthorn in 2020 that Cawthorn’s Democratic opponent allegedly associated himself “with

people who wanted to ruin white males”; and (3) an advertisement then-Congressman Ted Budd ran involving former Supreme Court of North Carolina Chief Justice Cheri Beasley in 2022 that “blamed Beasley for crimes committed by individuals after early release from prison.” Id.; see [D.E. 17-3] 20–21. The legislative defendants contend that “the evidence does not support” plaintiffs’ argument. [D.E. 39] 25.

Racial appeals can take various forms. See City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 610; Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1360 n.119 (N.D. Tex. 1990). The court gives little weight to Jesse Helms’s campaign tactics in 1984 and 1990 because they occurred “decades ago.” Luna, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. The court finds that Ted Budd’s 2022 advertisement, which “never explicitly mention[ed] race,” [D.E. 17-3] 20, was not a racial appeal. Thus, plaintiffs are left with Madison Cawthorn’s statement in a 2020 congressional campaign in western North Carolina. See id. at 20–21. North Carolina, however, has hosted hundreds of thousands of political campaigns since 1965 at the federal, state, and local levels. Assuming without deciding plaintiffs’ example constitutes an overt or subtle racial appeal, it does not “characterize” North Carolina campaigns in 2023 and 2024. See, e.g., Rose v. Raffensperger, No. 1:20-cv-2921, 2022 WL 670080, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2022) (unpublished) (“[T]hese two examples [from 2020] are simply not sufficient to show that political campaigns in Georgia are ‘characterized’ by such odious appeals.”); City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (finding “the evidence in this case refers to two disparate pieces of literature, from different sources, put out decades apart” and was “not . . . particularly compelling”). Thus, this factor does not support plaintiffs’ argument.

Seventh, plaintiffs contend that black North Carolinians “are slightly underrepresented in some offices relative to their share of the State’s population.” [D.E. 17] 26. The legislative defendants respond that Section 2 does not require proportional representation. See [D.E. 39] 24.

“Forcing proportional representation is unlawful and inconsistent with this Court’s approach to implementing [Section] 2.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 28; see 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 133 n.13. Instead, courts consider whether “no members of a minority group have been elected to office over an extended period of time.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28 n.115. The election of just “a few minority candidates,” however, does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the minority group’s vote. Id. Dr. Burch concedes that the current Lieutenant Governor of North Carolina is a black Republican and that black members of the General Assembly are “close to parity” with the share of black people in North Carolina’s population. [D.E. 17-3] 22–23. Moreover, Senator Blue is the minority leader of the North Carolina Senate, and Representative Reives is the minority leader of the North Carolina House of Representatives. Senator Blue and Representative Reives are African-American Democrats. In addition, numerous black candidates consistently have won election to statewide appellate judgeships. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that few black candidates have won elections in North Carolina. This factor favors the legislative defendants. Cf. Ala. State Conf. of NAACP, 612 F. Supp. 3d at 1311–15.

Eighth, plaintiffs cite “the persistent and dramatic socioeconomic disparities” between black and white North Carolinians as evidence that North Carolina elected officials are “not responsive” to black voters. [D.E. 17] 26. The court, however, “cannot accept the plaintiffs’ argument that only unresponsiveness—and not responsiveness—is relevant to a [Section] 2 inquiry.” N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1023 (2d Cir. 1995). Instead, this Senate factor “involves review of tangible efforts of elected officials and the impact of these efforts on particular members of the community.” Id. at 1023 n.24. Plaintiffs offer no evidence of elected officials’ responsiveness or unresponsiveness to black voters. See [D.E. 17] 26. Instead, plaintiffs ask the court to infer that North Carolina elected officials are unresponsive to black voters based on socioeconomic inequality

between black and non-black North Carolinians. See id. The court declines to draw that unjustified inference. See, e.g., Rose, 2022 WL 670080, at *3. Accordingly, this factor does not support plaintiffs' argument.

Ninth, plaintiffs contend that “no legitimate governmental interest justifies” SB 758. [D.E. 17] 26. As discussed, however, the legislative defendants enacted SB 758 to comply with federal law and the WCP and in light of traditional redistricting principles of “compactness, contiguity, respect for existing political subdivisions, political considerations[,] and incumbent residence.” [D.E. 39-5] 3; see Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383, 562 S.E.2d at 396–97. Accordingly, the court rejects plaintiffs' argument and finds that this factor weighs in favor of the legislative defendants.

2.

The legislative defendants contend that, under the totality of circumstances, voting is politically polarized, not racially polarized, and cite Dr. Alford's report in support. See [D.E. 39] 22–23. Plaintiffs do not meaningfully respond to this argument. See [D.E. 42] 8. Instead, plaintiffs contend it is “irrelevant.” Id.

Courts properly consider whether partisanship drives polarization rather than race when considering the totality of the circumstances. See Charleston Cnty., 365 F.3d at 347–48; see, e.g., Cooper, 581 U.S. at 307–08 (discussing a “partisanship defense” when plaintiffs accuse a state of impermissible racial gerrymandering); cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (rejecting plaintiffs' position that, where black voters had equal opportunity to participate in the political process, “invidious discrimination” resulted when “Democrats[] suffer[ed] the disaster of losing too many elections”). In other words, “[t]he Voting Rights Act does not guarantee that nominees of the Democratic Party will be elected, even if black voters are likely to favor that party's candidates.” Baird v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). Courts, of course, must

engage in “a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality” and can, after that evaluation, conclude that divergent voting patterns between black and white voters are better explained by party affiliation instead of racial bloc voting. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 860–61 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

Dr. Barreto failed to provide Dr. Alford with the data files and EI procedures that Dr. Barreto used to prepare his report. See [D.E. 39-7] 3.¹² Nonetheless, Dr. Alford reviewed Dr. Barreto’s report and attempted to “match as closely as possible the data and analysis assumptions described” in Dr. Barreto’s report. Id. Dr. Alford used the same EI methods as Dr. Barreto to analyze the same elections as Dr. Barreto. See id. at 3–6. Dr. Alford observes that Dr. Barreto “provides no analysis of Democratic primary elections, something that is commonly included” in these analyses. Id. at 5; see, e.g., id. at 46–50, 52–55 (Dr. Handley’s report).

Dr. Alford first analyzed the U.S. Senate elections in North Carolina in 2020 (featuring a white Republican (Thom Tillis) against a white Democrat (Cal Cunningham)) and in 2022 (featuring a white Republican (Ted Budd) against a black Democrat (Cheri Beasley)). See id. at 6–7. Dr. Alford opined that black voters were “only three-tenths of one percent more supportive of the Black Democrat compared to the White Democrat statewide (and support is similarly essentially identical in the regional results).” Id. at 7. Moreover, white voters were “not more likely to oppose a Black Democrat compared to a White Democrat” and were actually “slightly more supportive of the Black Democrat in 2022 compared to the White Democrat in 2020.” Id.

¹² At the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs explained that the legislative defendants asked plaintiffs for Dr. Barreto’s underlying Excel spreadsheet files. Plaintiffs reported that the software package that Dr. Barreto uses does not produce those. Plaintiffs directed the legislative defendants to Dr. Barreto’s footnotes to find Dr. Barreto’s input data from publicly available sources and replicate Dr. Barreto’s statistical methods. During discovery, defendants are entitled to have Dr. Barreto produce his input data.

Next, Dr. Alford analyzed three 2020 state supreme court elections. See id. at 7–8. Two elections featured white Republicans against white Democrats, and one election featured a white Republican against a black Democrat. See id. at 8. Dr. Alford opined that black voters’ support for black Democrats and white Democrats was “essentially identical.” Id. Moreover, white voters were “not more likely to oppose a Black Democrat compared to a White Democrat.” Id.

Next, Dr. Alford analyzed five 2020 state appellate court elections. See id. at 8–9. Three elections featured white Republicans against white Democrats, one election featured a white Republican against a black Democrat, and one election featured a black Republican against a white Democrat. See id. Dr. Alford opined that the “almost exact similarity of the voting patterns” is “notable.” Id. at 9. The black Republican candidate received no more black voter support and no less white voter support than the average white Republican candidate. See id. The black Democratic candidate received no more black voter support and no less white voter support than the average white Democratic candidate. See id.

Next, Dr. Alford analyzed all 2020 and 2022 elections. See id. at 9–13. Dr. Alford observed that black voters were highly supportive of Democrats and white voters were supportive of Republicans. See id. at 10. This observation comports “with a polarized response to the party affiliation indicated on the ballot.” Id. The “race of the candidates does not appear to have a polarizing impact on vote choice” and is “essentially undetectable.” Id.; see id. at 12–13.

Dr. Alford opined that “it is clear that Black voters cohesively support Democratic candidates, and that the majority of White voters support Republican candidates.” Id. at 13. According to Dr. Alford, Dr. Barreto’s analysis does not support the conclusion that black voters support black candidates while white voters support white candidates. See id. Dr. Alford concluded that Dr. Barreto’s analysis “clearly demonstrates that the party affiliation of the candidates is

sufficient to fully explain the divergent voting preferences of Black and White voters in the 2020 and 2022 North Carolina elections.” Id. at 15.

Plaintiffs respond that minority-preferred candidates need not themselves be members of the minority group. See [D.E. 42] 8; Lewis, 99 F.3d at 606. True. Dr. Alford, however, demonstrates that when the model accounts for a candidate’s race, partisanship better explains polarized voting in North Carolina than race. In Charleston County, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Charleston County’s argument that partisanship drove polarized voting because “there was no systematic proof to support [the county’s] claim.” Charleston Cnty., 365 F.3d at 352. The trial court had found that in Charleston County, South Carolina, “minority voters g[a]ve more cohesive support to minority Democratic candidates than to white Democratic candidates.” Id. at 353. The trial court also found that the opposite was true for white voters in Charleston County, South Carolina. See id. The Fourth Circuit held that these trial court findings were not clearly erroneous. See id.

By contrast, Dr. Alford persuasively shows that black North Carolinians are not more likely to support black Democratic candidates than white Democratic candidates. See, e.g., [D.E. 39-7] 7–10, 12–13. Dr. Alford also persuasively shows that white North Carolinians are not less likely to support black Democratic candidates than white Democratic candidates. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, on the current record, under the totality of circumstances, plaintiffs fail to show that the political process “is not equally open to minority voters.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 18 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434, 999 F.2d at 860–61 (concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish a Section 2 claim where the evidence “unmistakably shows that divergent voting patterns among white and minority voters are best explained by partisan affiliation”).

In analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the court notes that the General Assembly did not enact SB 758 in a vacuum. In 2003, the General Assembly enacted a new legislative redistricting plan for the General Assembly that departed from the WCP. See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 7–8. The Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that Section 2 did not justify that departure. See id. at 23; Pender Cnty., 361 N.C. at 510, 649 S.E.2d at 376. In 2011, the General Assembly again redistricted and hired an expert to conduct a polarized voting study to determine North Carolina’s obligations under Section 2. See Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 168–69. The expert concluded that voting was racially polarized in certain places in North Carolina; therefore, the General Assembly drew 28 majority-black House and Senate districts in order to comply with Section 2. See id. at 132–33, 142–65. In Covington, in 2016, the three-judge court enjoined North Carolina’s 2011 legislative redistricting plan for the General Assembly, in part, because there was no evidence of legally significant racially polarized voting. Thus, Section 2 did not justify using race to draw majority-black districts. See id. at 167–74. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the three-judge court’s opinion. See North Carolina v. Covington, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017).

In Harris, in 2016, a three-judge court enjoined North Carolina’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan in part because there was no evidence of racially polarized voting in northeast North Carolina that justified using Section 2 to engage in race-based districting and create a majority-black congressional district in northeast North Carolina, including in the counties at issue in this case. See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 611–15, 622–25. As the Harris court observed, “the composition and election results under earlier versions of CD1 vividly demonstrate that, though not previously a majority-BVAP district, the white majority did not vote as a bloc to defeat African-Americans’ candidate of choice.” Id. at 625 (emphasis added). “In fact, precisely the opposite

occurred [in CD1]: significant crossover voting by white voters supported the African-American candidate.” Id. (emphasis added). The Harris court then noted that Section 2 does not “require racial balkanization where, as here, citizens have not voted as racial blocs, [and] where crossover voting has naturally occurred.” Id.

The Supreme Court in Cooper affirmed. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 322–23. In affirming, the Supreme Court upheld the three-judge court’s finding, in relevant part, that the same portion of northeast North Carolina at issue in this case had “a longtime pattern of white crossover voting” and lacked evidence of “effective white bloc-voting” to defeat the African-Americans’ candidate of choice. Id. at 304. As the Supreme Court in Cooper observed, “electoral history [in CD1] provided no evidence that a § 2 plaintiff could demonstrate the third Gingles prerequisite—effective white bloc-voting.” Id. at 302. Moreover, with respect to the third Gingles precondition in northeast North Carolina, the Supreme Court in Cooper rejected North Carolina’s Section 2 defense to the majority-black CD1 as “downplay[ing] the significance of white crossover voting in the area that would form the core of redrawn [Congressional] District 1.” Id. at 304 (cleaned up).

In 2018, plaintiffs (represented by the same counsel representing plaintiffs in this case) challenged the General Assembly’s 2017 redistricting plan based on alleged partisan gerrymandering. See Lewis, 2019 WL 4569584, at *1–2. In Lewis, the court restricted the General Assembly’s consideration of race during redistricting. See id. at *133. In 2021, the General Assembly drew a new redistricting plan without using racial data. See N.C. League of Conservation Voters, Inc. v. Hall, Nos. 21 CVS 15426, 21 CVS 500085, 2022 WL 124616, at *9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished), rev’d, Harper v. Hall, 380 N.C. 317, 868 S.E.2d 499 (2022) (“Harper I”), abrogated by Harper III, 384 N.C. 292, 886 S.E.2d 393 (2023). Plaintiffs challenged that redistricting plan as a partisan gerrymander. See id. at *1. The Supreme Court of North Carolina

invalidated that redistricting plan for partisan gerrymandering. See Harper I, 380 N.C. at 403–04, 868 S.E.2d at 559–60. In Harper’s remedial phase, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that Section 2 liability would not arise from the General Assembly’s remedial districts because federal law “do[es] not require the General Assembly to create functioning crossover districts.” Harper v. Hall, 383 N.C. 89, 124, 881 S.E.2d 156, 180 (2022) (“Harper II”), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, Harper III, 384 N.C. 292, 886 S.E.2d 393 (2023). The Supreme Court of North Carolina ultimately reheard Harper, reversed its prior ruling, held that partisan gerrymandering claims were not justiciable, and permitted the General Assembly to redraw North Carolina’s legislative and congressional districts in 2023. See Harper III, 384 N.C. at 378–79, 886 S.E.2d at 448–49. On October 25, 2023, the General Assembly responded to Harper III by enacting SB 758. The General Assembly enacted SB 758 after it conducted public hearings across North Carolina and accepted online comments. See [D.E. 39] 8–9.

When the General Assembly enacted SB 758 in October 2023, state and federal courts had repeatedly affirmed that the General Assembly must draw legislative districts without reference to race because legally significant racially polarized voting did not exist in North Carolina. Accordingly, the General Assembly did so. See, e.g., [D.E. 39-5] 3–5 (invoking Harris and Covington). In drawing the Senate, House, and Congressional redistricting plans in 2023, the General Assembly used only “political data, not racial data.” Id. at 4.

At this preliminary stage of the case, the totality of the circumstances do not support plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim or their request for a mandatory preliminary injunction to sort voters by race in order to form a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. As noted, sorting “voters on the basis of race” is “by [its] very nature odious.” Wis. Legislature, 595 U.S. at 401. Sorting voters based on the color of their skin risks “engaging in the offensive and demeaning

assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (cleaned up); Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 604. Anyone who wants to sort voters on the basis of race in a legislative district must show “that the design of [the] district withstands strict scrutiny.” Wis. Legislature, 595 U.S. at 401. A party “can satisfy strict scrutiny if it proves that its race-based sorting of voters is narrowly tailored to comply with the VRA.” Id. On the current preliminary and hotly contested record, plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the totality of the circumstances under Section 2.

As the case progresses, the parties will be able to enjoy the benefit of written discovery, depositions, and vigorous cross examination of the witnesses. At trial, the court will enjoy the benefit of a more fulsome record. At present, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their Section 2 claim.

IV.

As for irreparable harm, “plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs contend that “they will be irreparably harmed if they are forced to vote in a district that dilutes their votes in violation of the VRA.” [D.E. 17] 27.

Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate they will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction against SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections. See, e.g., Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 365 (4th Cir. 2022); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott, 601 F. Supp. 3d 147, 183 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (three-judge court); Dhillon v. Wobensmith, 475 F. Supp. 3d 456, 462 (D. Md. 2020); Talleywhacker, Inc. v. Cooper, 465 F. Supp. 3d 523, 542 (E.D.N.C. 2020); Aslanturk v. Hott, 459 F. Supp. 3d 681, 700 (E.D. Va. 2020).

V.

A.

As for the balance of equities and the public interest, “[t]hese factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009); see Miranda, 34 F.4th at 365. Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate that the General Assembly had a strong basis in evidence for concluding in October 2023 that Section 2 required a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina, plaintiffs seek “an extraordinary remedy” enjoining SB 758 for use in the 2024 Senate elections and mandating that the General Assembly redraw a new Senate redistricting plan with a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina for use in the 2024 Senate elections. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.

“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 579 (2017). When a court sits in equity, it “look[s] to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973) (plurality opinion). In so doing, the court considers that “equity ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep upon their rights.” Perry, 471 F. App’x at 224 (quotation omitted); see Curtin v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 463 F. Supp. 3d 653, 659–60 (E.D. Va. 2020).

The court has considered these equitable principles and the practicalities of “sound . . . legislative administration.” Strickland, 556 U.S. at 17. Plaintiffs waited 26 days after the General Assembly enacted SB 758 to file suit and 28 days to seek a preliminary injunction concerning the 2024 elections. See [D.E. 23] 2. Plaintiffs then proposed a completely unreasonable schedule for the court and the other parties. See id. After this court scheduled a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for

a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs then filed an interlocutory appeal, which divested this court of jurisdiction to act upon their motion for a preliminary injunction. See [D.E. 44].

Once the Fourth Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal but did not issue the mandate, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. See [D.E. 53]. The record presented to the court for its consideration at the hearing reflected that neither plaintiffs nor anyone else presented a strong basis in evidence to the General Assembly in 2023 that Section 2 required a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina. Likewise, after considering the evidence that the parties presented concerning plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claim or that they will suffer irreparable injury absent the requested mandatory preliminary injunction. By contrast, "enjoining North Carolina (through its public officials) from enforcing [SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections] would constitute a form of irreparable injury." Sharma v. Hirsch, No. 5:23-CV-506, 2023 WL 7406791, at *14 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2023) (unpublished); see Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); Law v. Gast, 641 F. Supp. 3d 580, 604 (S.D. Iowa 2022).

Inequity would result if the court enjoined the use of SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that (1) the General Assembly had a strong basis in evidence when it enacted SB 758 in 2023 that Section 2 required a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina or (2) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claim. Thus, the balance of equities and the public interest weigh in favor of the legislative defendants and against a mandatory preliminary injunction. See, e.g., N. Va. Hemp & Agric. LLC v. Virginia, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2023 WL 7130853, at *13 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30, 2023); Sharma, 2023 WL 7406791, at *14; see

also Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. at 579; Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–6; Lemon, 411 U.S. at 200–01; Perry, 471 F. App'x at 224–28; Curtin, 463 F. Supp. 3d at 659–61.

B.

Alternatively, even if the plaintiffs satisfied all three Gingles preconditions (and they have not), demonstrated the totality of the circumstances under Section 2 weighed in their favor (and they have not), and showed irreparable injury (and they have not), the Purcell principle teaches that a federal court should not issue the requested mandatory federal preliminary injunction of North Carolina's 2024 Senate elections. Under Purcell, “federal district courts ordinarily should not enjoin state election laws in the period close to an election.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 879 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–6; Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 152. The Purcell principle allows elections to proceed and “provide[s] the courts with a better record on which to judge” the challenged statute. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 6 (Stevens, J., concurring).

The Purcell principle is not new. In Reynolds, plaintiffs moved to enjoin a primary election that was over a month away. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 542. The three-judge district court “stat[ed] its tentative views that an injunction was not required” before the primary election and, two weeks later, declined to enjoin the primary before fully ruling on the merits of the case. Id. The Supreme Court held that the district court “acted wisely in declining to stay the impending primary election.” Id. at 586.

In Merrill, Justices Kavanaugh and Alito wrote that “the Purcell principle requires that we stay the District Court’s injunction” where “the primary elections begin (via absentee voting) just seven weeks from now.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 879, 882 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has made clear that the Purcell principle is not just a yellow caution light for federal courts considering an injunction against a redistricting plan when elections under the redistricting plan are

imminent. In such circumstances, the Purcell principle is a heavy gate with flashing red lights amplified by loud sirens reminding federal courts not to alter such a state redistricting plan in the period close to a state election. Thus, the Supreme Court routinely stays such disruptive federal injunctions in the period close to a state election. See, e.g., Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 25, 25 (2020) (staying a September 30, 2020 injunction issued 34 days before the November 2020 elections); Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2020) (staying a September 18, 2020 injunction ahead of the November 2020 elections); id. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (invoking the Purcell principle); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (concurring in the denial of the application to vacate a stay of an injunction entered “just six weeks before the November [2020] election and after absentee voting had already begun”).

“[I]t is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct apportionment” Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 156. Thus, if a federal court were to decide to enjoin the use of SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections, the court “must provide the North Carolina General Assembly with a reasonable opportunity to draw remedial districts in the first instance.” Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 177 (quotation omitted); see North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S.Ct. 2548, 2554–55 (2018) (per curiam) (“[A] legislature’s freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional, either as a whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of federal law.” (cleaned up)); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).

In this counterfactual scenario where a federal court enjoined the use of SB 758 for use in the 2024 Senate elections and accepted plaintiffs’ argument that the General Assembly would first have to draw a majority-black VRA district in northeast North Carolina before drawing “non-VRA districts using other state-law redistricting principles and rules, including county grouping or

clustering requirements” under Stephenson I, [D.E. 17] 15 (quotations omitted), then the General Assembly could draw Demonstration District A as the remedial VRA majority-black district. If the General Assembly chose to enact Demonstration District A as a VRA-required majority-black Senate district, it would thereby remedy the alleged Section 2 violation and meet its obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that the remedy is narrowly tailored. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917; cf. [D.E. 39] 15; [D.E. 39-6] 7.¹³ In this counterfactual scenario, the General Assembly would then have to regroup the remaining 92 counties under Stephenson I and its progeny and redraw all other Senate districts.

As discussed, on December 15, 2023, candidate filing ended for the North Carolina primary elections. See [D.E. 40] 1. On January 19, 2024, North Carolina’s 100 county boards of elections began distributing absentee ballots. See id. at 2. On February 15, 2024, in-person early voting begins. See id. March 5, 2024, is primary election day. See id. at 1. Accordingly, absentee voting throughout North Carolina already has begun. In-person early voting begins 20 days after the court issues this order. Primary election day is just 39 days after the court issues this order.

If a federal court were to issue a mandatory preliminary injunction enjoining the use of SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections and requiring the General Assembly to enact a new Senate redistricting plan with a majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina, then county boards of elections would have to discard completed absentee ballots, including the ballots of the numerous North Carolina citizens in the United States military who are deployed overseas. The

¹³ Plaintiffs ask the court enjoin only “use of Senate Districts 1 and 2 in the 2023 enacted map, and order use of Plaintiffs’ proposed remedial districts (Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2) instead.” [D.E. 17] 31. The court, however, may not circumscribe the General Assembly’s “freedom of choice” when it draws remedial districts. Covington, 138 S.Ct. at 2554–55; see Wise, 437 U.S. at 540.

Board would have to conduct its geocoding process again to reassign voters to the proper districts. See [D.E. 41] ¶¶ 4–5, 10. Candidates would have to refile. See id. at ¶ 10. The Board would have to regenerate and proof new ballots, which “is complex and involves multiple technical systems and quality-control checkpoints” including “preparation and proofing of official ballots, certified vendors printing and delivering those ballots to the county board offices, and county board staff creating outgoing absentee ballot packages.” Id. at ¶ 6. The Board would also have to redistribute those new ballots. See id. The Board would have to move March primary elections to May or later and create a new runoff date in July or August. See id. at ¶¶ 12–13; cf. [D.E. 40] 3–4. A new Senate redistricting plan would adversely affect the ongoing 2024 Senate elections in numerous primary elections across North Carolina. Thus, Purcell teaches that a federal court should not issue a mandatory federal injunction against SB 758 for the 2024 Senate elections. See, e.g., Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–6; Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 879, 882 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Notably, on December 19, 2023, Common Cause and the North Carolina NAACP filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging, inter alia, the General Assembly violated federal law by drawing various House and Senate districts, including SD1 and SD2. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Berger, No. 1:23-cv-1104 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2023), [D.E. 1] ¶¶ 138–45. Plaintiffs in that suit did not seek a mandatory preliminary injunction to change the House and Senate district boundaries for the 2024 elections. That suit provides additional evidence that, under Purcell, a federal court should not issue mandatory preliminary injunctive relief in this case because the case comes too late to justify mandatory preliminary injunctive relief in North Carolina during the 2024 Senate election cycle.

In opposition to this conclusion, plaintiffs contend that “in the last two North Carolina election cycles, maps were finalized within 24 hours before—or on the day of—candidate filing.”

[D.E. 17] 28. Plaintiffs also contend the court could “pause or postpone the candidate filing deadline” or delay the March 2024 Senate primary elections in North Carolina. See id. at 28–29. North Carolina state courts, however, issued the orders plaintiffs cite to support their argument. See id. By contrast, “Purcell is about federal court intervention,” not state court intervention. Wise, 978 F.3d at 99 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court rejects this argument.

At oral argument, plaintiffs also argued that their proposed remedy involving Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2 would affect only two Senate districts. Cf. [D.E. 17] 31. Thus, according to plaintiffs, Purcell should not apply if the General Assembly affirmatively chooses to adopt Demonstration District A and redraw the entire Senate redistricting plan.

Plaintiffs misunderstand Purcell and its progeny. Plaintiffs concede that if a federal court enjoined the use of SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections, the court must give the General Assembly the first opportunity to redraw state Senate districts, including any majority-black Senate district in northeast North Carolina that Section 2 requires. See Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 156; Wise, 437 U.S. at 540; Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 177. Therefore, under plaintiffs’ reading of Stephenson I, the General Assembly would have the discretion to draw new Senate districts after drawing the one VRA-mandated majority-black Senate district. See Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383–85, 562 S.E.2d at 396–98. As discussed, the General Assembly could choose to enact Demonstration District A as its remedial majority-black Senate district. If it did, the root cause of any ensuing upheaval would be the federal court injunction prohibiting the use of SB 758 in the 2024 Senate elections and requiring the General Assembly to remedy an alleged Section 2 violation in northeast North Carolina for the 2024 Senate elections. Such a federal court injunction would be a textbook violation of Purcell. See, e.g., Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–6; Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring);

Wise, 978 F.3d at 99. After all, absent the federal court injunction, the 2024 Senate elections in North Carolina would continue to proceed as they are currently proceeding and without disruption.

C.

Alternatively, even if plaintiffs had demonstrated that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claim (and they have not) and even if the General Assembly chose just to rearrange the Senate district boundaries within the 18 counties encompassing SD1 and SD2 in response to a federal court injunction (and it need not), such a federal court mandatory preliminary injunction also would violate the Purcell principle. If a federal court were to enter a mandatory preliminary injunction concerning SB 758 for the 2024 Senate elections, the General Assembly could choose to configure the remedial majority-black Senate district differently than plaintiffs' Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2, or the General Assembly could choose to enact Demonstration Districts B-1 and B-2. See, e.g., Covington, 138 S.Ct. at 2554–55; Wise, 437 U.S. at 540. Either way, the Board would have to reassign voters and candidates would have to refile, which could result in contested primaries in the two new Senate districts. See [D.E. 41] ¶¶ 4, 5, 10. The Board would have to generate, proof, and distribute new ballots. See id. at ¶ 6, 11. The Board would have to schedule any contested primary elections in these districts in May 2024 or later. See id. at ¶¶ 12–13; cf. [D.E. 40] 3–4. If a runoff were needed, the Board would have to schedule and hold a special election in July or August 2024. Cf. [D.E. 41] ¶ 15. The federal court injunction would be the cause of all this disruption.

The Purcell principle teaches that a federal court should not sow such chaos and voter confusion in Senate elections within the 18 North Carolina counties encompassing SD1 and SD2. Moreover, such a federal court preliminary injunction (which would require scheduling new primary elections and setting a special runoff election if needed) would contradict the Supreme Court's

repeated and clear admonition against a federal court ordering special elections absent a compelling justification. See Covington, 581 U.S. at 488–89. Accordingly, even if plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Section 2 claim (and they are not) and even if the General Assembly were to limit its remedy in 2024 to the counties within SD1 and SD2 (and it need not), the court rejects plaintiffs’ arguments concerning Purcell. Instead, this court heeds Purcell’s heavy gate, blaring sirens, and flashing red lights and declines to sow chaos and voter confusion in North Carolina given that the 2024 Senate elections are underway. See, e.g., Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–6; Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

D.

Finally, plaintiffs contend that “even where Purcell applies, it ‘might be overcome . . . if a plaintiff establishes at least the following: (i) the underlying merits are entirely clearcut in favor of the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (iii) the plaintiff has not unduly delayed bringing the complaint to court; and (iv) the changes in question are at least feasible before the election without significant cost, confusion, or hardship.’” [D.E. 17] 30 (quoting Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)).

On the current record, the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim are not “entirely clearcut in favor of the” plaintiffs. Rather, plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claim and would not suffer irreparable harm absent the requested mandatory preliminary injunction. Moreover, plaintiffs unduly delayed bringing this case by waiting 26 days after the General Assembly enacted SB 758 to file suit and waiting 28 days after the General Assembly enacted SB 758 to seek a preliminary injunction. “[E]quity ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep upon their rights.” Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affs., 60 F.3d 867, 879 (1st Cir. 1993). Furthermore, as discussed, any remedial changes to North Carolina’s 2024 Senate

districting plan at this stage would come with extraordinary cost, confusion, and hardship. See, e.g., Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–6; Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881–82 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The Purcell principle controls. Thus, the balance of equities and public interest weigh against a federal court issuing the requested mandatory preliminary injunction.

E.

On December 12, 2023, the Solicitor General of North Carolina filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief on behalf of Governor Roy A. Cooper, III and Attorney General Joshua H. Stein in support of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 31]. The accompanying brief [D.E. 32] recounts the self-evident political interest that Governor Cooper and Attorney General Stein have in the requested mandatory preliminary injunction. The brief, however, adds no new evidence concerning the legal issues. For example, the brief does not contain any contemporaneous correspondence that Governor Cooper, Attorney General Stein, or the North Carolina Solicitor General sent to the General Assembly before it enacted SB 758 explaining why they believed that a strong basis in evidence existed to group citizens by race in northeast North Carolina in order to create a majority-black Senate district. Likewise, as for the legal analysis, the brief merely parrots the conclusions in the plaintiffs’ brief and fails to provide any legal analysis or to grapple with the profound deficiencies in plaintiffs’ efforts to establish the Gingles preconditions or the totality of the circumstances under Section 2. The brief also fails to grapple with Covington or Harris and the findings in 2016 that white voters in North Carolina (including in the relevant counties in northeast North Carolina) do not “vote as a bloc to defeat African-Americans’ candidate of choice.” Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 625; see Covington, 316 F.R.D. at 142, 167–74. Although the court grants Governor Cooper’s and Attorney General Stein’s motion to file an amicus brief, the court rejects their arguments as factually and legally unsupported.

VI.

In sum, the court GRANTS the motion of Governor Roy A. Cooper, III and Attorney General Joshua H. Stein to file an amicus brief [D.E. 31] and DENIES plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction [D.E. 16]. The parties SHALL meet and confer. The parties SHALL submit a proposed scheduling order no later than February 16, 2024. If the parties cannot agree on a proposed schedule, the joint submission shall contain the proposed schedule of each party for each topic in the scheduling order.

SO ORDERED. This 26 day of January, 2024.



JAMES C. DEVER III
United States District Judge

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION**

RODNEY D. PIERCE and
MOSES MATTHEWS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:23-cv-193-D

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs Rodney D. Pierce and Moses Matthews appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from this Court's Order (D.E. 61) denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (D.E. 16). *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (courts of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals from orders denying injunctions).

Dated: January 26, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel and parties registered in said system.

Dated: January 26, 2024

/s/ R. Stanton Jones

R. Stanton Jones

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 5, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document and accompanying materials with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ R. Stanton Jones

R. Stanton Jones

Counsel for Appellants