No. _____

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Petitioner,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Washington, and the STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner Benancio Garcia III challenged Washington State's Legislative District 15 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The three-judge district court panel dismissed his claim as moot after a single-judge district court in a different case, *Soto Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, No. 3:22-cv-05035 (W.D. Wash.), enjoined the use of the map that created Legislative District 15 and ordered the State to draw a replacement district.

This Court vacated and remanded with instructions to enter a fresh judgment from which an appeal may be taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The three-judge Panel amended its judgment accordingly, and Petitioner appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The question presented is:

Whether a plaintiff's Equal Protection Clause racial gerrymandering claim is rendered moot when the challenged legislative district is replaced in a different proceeding by a judicial remedy that intensifies the plaintiff's racial classification injury, and which is subject to ongoing appellate review.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The Petitioner Benancio Garcia III was the Plaintiff before the district court and Plaintiff-Appellant before the Ninth Circuit.

Respondents the State of Washington and Steven Hobbs in his official capacity as the Washington Secretary of State, were Defendants before the district court and Defendants-Appellees before the Ninth Circuit.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

- *Soto Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, No. 3:22-cv-05035, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Judgment entered Aug. 11, 2023 (merits); Mar. 15, 2024 (remedy).

- *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, No. 3:22-cv-05152, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Judgment entered Sept. 8, 2023; amended judgment entered Mar. 25, 2024.

- *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, No. 23-467, U.S. Supreme Court. Judgment entered Feb. 20, 2024.

- *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, No. 24-2603, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judgment entered Aug. 27, 2025.

- *Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, No. 23-35595 (merits) & 24-1602 (remedy), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judgment entered Aug. 27, 2025.

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The memorandum opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (No. 24-2603) is available at *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, 2025 WL 2466997, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22059 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025). This memorandum opinion is also reproduced at App. 1–3.

The opinion and order of the three-judge district court Panel (No. 3:22-cv-05152) is available at *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, 691 F. Supp. 3d 1254 (W.D. Wash. 2023). This opinion and order, as well as Judge VanDyke's dissenting opinion, is reproduced at App. 6–54.

JURISDICTION

The three-judge Panel entered its final judgment dismissing Petitioner's claim on September 8, 2023. App. 55–56. Petitioner timely noticed his appeal to this Court on September 28, 2023.

On February 20, 2024, this Court vacated and remanded with instructions to enter a fresh judgment suitable for appeal to the Ninth Circuit. *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, 144 S. Ct. 994 (2024). The three-judge Panel reissued its judgment on March 25, 2024, App. 4–5, and Petitioner timely noticed his appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the three-judge panel on August 27, 2025. App. 1–3.

On October 28, 2025, Justice Kagan granted Petitioner's unopposed application for a 60-day extension of time to file this petition. This Court thus properly has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from an Equal Protection Clause challenge to Washington State's Legislative District 15 ("LD-15"). Petitioner Benancio Garcia III ("Petitioner" or "Mr. Garcia"), a Hispanic resident of LD-15, alleged that Washington's independent, bipartisan redistricting commission sorted him into the district on the basis of his race. The evidence at trial confirmed what Mr. Garcia already knew—he was indeed sorted on the basis of his Hispanic ethnicity, as part of a plan to create a majority Hispanic Citizen Voting-Age Population ("HCVAP") district in the Yakima Valley region of central Washington State. But Mr. Garcia never received a ruling on the merits of that claim.

Instead, his case was dismissed as moot. A single district court judge, presiding over a separate challenge to LD-15 under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), ruled first—even though both cases were heard simultaneously, with the judge in the separate VRA challenge also sitting on the three-judge panel in this case—and ordered the State to redraw LD-15 with even more racial sorting. The three-judge panel presiding over Mr. Garcia's constitutional claim then held that this VRA remedy "mooted" Mr. Garcia's racial gerrymandering challenge, even though the remedy intensified the very constitutional injury of which he complained. The Ninth Circuit affirmed without addressing Mr. Garcia's principal arguments.

The result is paradoxical. Mr. Garcia was first sorted into LD-15 on the basis of his Hispanic ethnicity. He was then sorted out of LD-15—and into

a new district, LD-14—for the same reason. His injury has not been remedied; if anything, it has only increased in magnitude. Yet, no court has ever addressed whether sorting him by race violated his constitutional rights.

A. The Washington State Redistricting Commission and Legislative District 15

Under Washington state law, congressional and legislative districts are redrawn by an independent and bipartisan redistricting commission (the "Commission") every ten years. *See* Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(1); App. 18–20 (VanDyke, J., dissenting) (describing Washington's redistricting process). The Commission consists of four voting members (each, a "Commissioner") and one non-voting member, with each voting member appointed by the "legislative leader of the two largest political parties in each house of the legislature." Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(2). The four voting members, in turn, select the nonvoting chair by majority vote. *Id.* At least three of the four voting members must approve a redistricting map. *Id.* art. II, § 43(6).

Following the 2020 Census, the Commission's voting members were duly appointed: "The House Democratic leadership selected April Sims, the Senate Democratic leadership selected Brady Piñero Walkinshaw, the Senate Republican leadership selected Joe Fain, and the House Republican leadership selected Paul Graves." App. 19 (VanDyke, J., dissenting). Together, these voting Commissioners elected Sarah Augustine as the nonvoting Chairwoman of the Commission. App. 19–20.

Per state statute, the Commissioners were tasked with creating compact and convenient districts with as-equal-as-practicable populations that respected communities of interest, minimized the splitting of existing county and town boundaries, and encouraged electoral competition. *See* Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(5); Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.090. The Commissioners were required to agree by majority vote on a map by November 15, 2021, and then transmit the proposed plan to the Legislature. *See* Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(1). At that point, the state legislature would have thirty days from the beginning of its next legislative session to adopt limited amendments to the map by a two-thirds supermajority vote of both chambers, or else the Commission's plan would become the final enacted plan. Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(7); Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(2). In any event, the state legislature would not be empowered to reject the map. *See* Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(7).

At the beginning of negotiations on the map in September 2021, each of the four Commissioners released his or her own legislative redistricting proposal. App. 20 (VanDyke, J., dissenting). During those early stages, none of the four proposals contained a majority-Hispanic district anywhere in the State, including in the Yakima Valley region. *Id.* The following month, Commissioners Sims and Walkinshaw—the two Democratic Party appointees—sought the assistance of Dr. Matt Barreto, a well-known Democratic Party consultant, University of California, Los Angeles professor, and advisor on VRA compliance. According to Dr. Barreto—who prepared a PowerPoint slide deck for Commissioners Sims and Walkinshaw containing a scatterplot of demographic

figures and precinct-level results for some statewide races—all four initial redistricting proposals were illegal under Section 2 of the VRA because they failed to include a majority-Hispanic district in the Yakima Valley region. *See id.*

"From the circulation of this slideshow onward, the racial composition of the Yakima Valley district became an enduring focus of the Commission." *Id.* On October 25, 2021—just three weeks before the redistricting deadline—Commissioners Sims and Walkinshaw released new draft legislative map proposals that each included a majority-HCVAP, majority-Democrat legislative district in the Yakima Valley region. *See* Proposed Pretrial Order at Ex.1, ¶¶ 79–81, *Garcia*, No. 3:22-cv-05152 (May 24, 2023), DE 64. The two Republican Commissioners, knowing that three votes were needed to pass any map, concluded that no map without such a majority-minority district could garner a majority of the Commission. *See* App. 21–22 (VanDyke, J., dissenting). As such, with just seconds to go before Washington's constitutional deadline, the Commissioners agreed to send the state legislature a map with a majority-HCVAP legislative district in the Yakima Valley region (the "Enacted Map"). *See* App. 24–25.

This agreement specified the HCVAP proportion of LD-15, but did not stipulate the racial composition of any other district. *See id.* The Commission's final map resulted in LD-15, have a racial composition of 51.5% HCVAP, according to 2020 U.S. Census figures. *See Soto Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, 686 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2023). LD-15 did not contain any whole counties, but instead pulled in narrow slivers of dense Hispanic populations on opposite sides of the

district—the City of Yakima in the northwest and Pasco to the southeast—even though those distinct areas had never been included in the same legislative district in Washington's history. *See* Am. Compl. at ¶ 4, *Garcia*, No. 3:22-cv-05152 (June 9, 2022), DE 14. After a few minor tweaks (which resulted in no population change to LD-15), the state legislature adopted the map on an up-or-down vote. App. 25 (VanDyke, J., dissenting).

B. Mr. Garcia's Racial Gerrymandering Claim

Due to the obvious racial gerrymandering of LD-15, Mr. Garcia, a resident of the district, sued Secretary of State Hobbs and the State of Washington on March 15, 2022. In his amended complaint, Mr. Garcia alleged that the Commission violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by drawing LD-15 in a manner that sorted voters on the basis of their race without sufficient justification. *See* Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 72–77, *Garcia*, No. 3:22-cv-05152 (June 9, 2022), DE 14. Mr. Garcia asked for the following relief: (1) a declaration that LD-15 was an illegal racial gerrymander; (2) a permanent injunction against the Secretary using LD-15 in further elections; (3) an order for a remedial map that did not violate Mr. Garcia's Equal Protection Clause rights; and (4) attorneys' fees. *Id.* at ¶ 78. As a constitutional challenge to a legislative map, Mr. Garcia's claim triggered 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and a three-judge district court panel—consisting of Ninth Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke, District Court Judge Robert Lasnik, and Chief District Judge David Estudillo—was empaneled to hear his case. *See* App. 6.

Shortly before Mr. Garcia filed his suit, a separate group of voters challenged LD-15 under Section 2 of the VRA, alleging that the Commission intentionally configured LD-15 "to be a *façade* of a Latino opportunity district" and "dilute Hispanic and/or Latino voters' ability to elect candidates of choice." Compl. for Declar. and Inj. Relief, *Soto Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, No. 3:22-cv-05035 (Jan. 19, 2022), DE 1. That case was assigned to Judge Lasnik, and as a result, the three-judge district court that was empaneled to hear *Garcia* (which also included Judge Lasnik) consolidated *Soto Palmer* and *Garcia* for trial. *See* App. 7 n.2.

At the joint trial, the three-judge panel heard testimony from the Commissioners and their staffers on their purposes in crafting LD-15 and the Enacted Map, as well as the evidence they had before them on the need for a "VRA Compl[ia]nt" district in the Yakima Valley region. App. 20–25 (VanDyke, J., dissenting). According to Commissioners Graves and Fain—the two Republican appointees—a majority-HCVAP LD-15 was a "very important component of th[e] negotiation," which they felt they needed to support to secure the votes of Commissioners Sims and Walkinshaw. *See* App. 20–21, 47–48. Although Commissioners Graves and Fain (and the legal expert on which they relied) did not personally believe that a majority-HCVAP district was necessary to comply with the VRA, *see* App. 24, they recognized such a district was a de facto "requirement" for a final agreement. App. 22–23.

Commissioner Sims's testimony supported this characterization. She noted that reaching at least 50% HCVAP in LD-15 was a "priorit[y]" for her, without

which she was not "going to reach an agreement" with the other Commissioners. App. 21. Commissioner Walkinshaw, who had proposed a new map containing a majority-HCVAP district following the release of Dr. Barreto's PowerPoint, agreed that the majority-HCVAP LD-15 reflected a bipartisan compromise, and a member of his staff confirmed that a district which "perform[ed] for Latino voters" was "nonnegotiable." App. 46. Notably, Commissioner Walkinshaw and his staff also testified that the map the Commission adopted just moments before their constitutional deadline was actually an unwritten, handshake "framework," which mostly specified the political and geographic makeup of the new legislative districts, but with respect to LD-15 only—and no other legislative district—stipulated a racial composition. App. 24–25.

During the consolidated trial, the three-judge panel presided over all portions that addressed the role of the Commission in drawing LD-15. Once the trial concluded, the two courts (consisting of three judges in total) began their deliberations, assisted by the parties' July 12, 2023 post-trial briefs. *See* Closing Trial Brief by All Plaintiffs, *Garcia*, No. 3:22-cv-05152 (July 12, 2023), DE 79. For his part, Mr. Garcia asked the three-judge panel to find that "LD-15 was an unjustified and unconstitutional racial gerrymander," *id.* at 31, and to order a new map that would "not sort Washington voters on the basis of their race or ethnicity." *Id.* at 1.

C. The *Soto Palmer* Decision and the Three-Judge Panel's Mootness Holding

On August 10, 2023, Judge Lasnik—sitting alone in *Soto Palmer*—issued a decision finding that LD-15 violated Section 2 of the VRA. *Soto Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, 686 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2023). The court enjoined the use of LD-15 and ordered the State to redraw the district by February 7, 2024. *Id.* at 1235–36.

Nearly one month after the *Soto Palmer* decision, on September 8, 2023, a majority of the three-judge panel in this case dismissed Mr. Garcia's constitutional claim as moot. App. 6–16. The majority reasoned that, because the *Soto Palmer* decision had already invalidated LD-15 and ordered the State to craft a new legislative map, the court could "[]not provide any more relief to Plaintiff." App. 8. The majority further reasoned that Mr. Garcia "lacks a specific, live grievance" because he "does not assert that any new district drawn by the [Commission] would be a 'mere continuation[] of the old, gerrymandered district[],'" *id.* (quoting *North Carolina* v. *Covington*, 585 U.S. 969, 976 (2018)), and also invoked constitutional avoidance principles that it reasoned "counsel against resolving Plaintiff's Equal Protection Clause claim." App. 8–9 ("[T]he court's decision in *Soto Palmer* makes any decision in the instant case superfluous.").

Judge VanDyke dissented. App. 17–54 (VanDyke, J., dissenting). He explained that "[n]ot only is the case not moot, but the panel should have acknowledged the map was enacted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, found in favor of Garcia, and

directed the State of Washington to redraw the maps in a way that does not violate the Constitution." App. 26–27.

On mootness, Judge VanDyke identified a critical asymmetry between the two cases: "the correct decision in *Garcia* would moot *Soto Palmer*, but a decision in *Soto Palmer*, regardless of the result, does not moot *Garcia*." App. 30. This was because Mr. Garcia and the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs were on opposite sides of the fundamental legal question—although both challenged LD-15, Mr. Garcia sought relief from racial sorting, while the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs complained that LD-15 "did not *consider race enough*." App. 31 (emphasis in original). As such, an order in the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs' favor could not, by definition, eliminate Mr. Garcia's racial gerrymandering injury. App. 31–34. To the contrary, the *Soto Palmer* remedy "ensures that [Mr. Garcia] will not receive what he argues is a constitutionally valid legislative map," such that his "claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it is almost certain to repeat itself." App. 36.

On the merits, Judge VanDyke concluded that the record established that "[r]ace clearly predominated the considerations of the 2021 Redistricting Commission when it drew LD-15." App. 45. Per their own testimony, "[a]ll the Commissioners, for varying reasons, elevated the racial composition of LD-15 to be a nonnegotiable criterion around which other factors and passage of the map itself must fall." *Id.* And this predominating consideration of race fails strict scrutiny, as "a majority of the voting Commissioners did not 'judg[e]' the gerrymander 'necessary' under the VRA" when it approved the

Enacted Map. App. 50 (alteration in original) (quoting *Wis. Legis.* v. *Wis. Elections Comm'n*, 595 U.S. 398 (2022)). This failure, Judge VanDyke concluded, rendered the Enacted Map void *ab initio*, which in turn rendered the *Soto Palmer* decision an impermissible advisory opinion that "never should have been issued." App. 18.

D. The Subsequent Proceedings Below

Mr. Garcia filed a notice of appeal directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. On February 20, 2024, this Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions that the three-judge panel enter a "fresh judgment" suitable for appeal to the Ninth Circuit. *Garcia* v. *Hobbs*, 144 S. Ct. 994 (2024).

On March 25, 2024, the three-judge panel reissued its mootness dismissal. App. 4–5. Mr. Garcia timely appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On August 27, 2025, after full briefing and oral argument, the Ninth Circuit issued a three-page unpublished memorandum opinion affirming the mootness dismissal. App. 1–3.

Throughout this process, the parallel *Soto Palmer* case continued. Although the district court had ordered the State to adopt a new map by February 7, 2024, Washington's Democratic governor and the Democratic majorities in both legislative chambers ultimately declined to reconvene the Commission (the sole method for changing or establishing legislative districts under state law, *see* Wash Const. art. II, § 43(11)), or even convene a special session of the state legislature to debate whether to reconvene the Commission. *See* Order Regarding Remedy, *Soto*

Palmer, No. 3:22-cv-05035, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50419, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2024). The district court thus initiated its own process for crafting a remedial map, and adopted one on March 15, 2024 (the "Remedial Map"). *See id.* at *16.

According to the *Soto Palmer* court, the "fundamental goal of the remedial process" was to "unite the Latino community of interest in the Yakima Valley region." *Id.* at *10 n.7, *15. It accomplished this by "start[ing] with" the Enacted Map, and then redrawing LD-15 (renamed as LD-14) to bring in the "Latino community of interest that stretches from East Yakima, through the smaller Latino population centers along the Yakima River, to Pasco." *Id.* at *7. In the words of the primary line-drawer, this specifically involved "unif[ying] the population centers from East Yakima to Pasco that form a community of interest, including cities in the Lower Yakima Valley like Wapato, Toppenish, Granger, Sunnyside, Mabton, and Grandview." Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs at ¶ 7, *Soto Palmer*, No. 3:22-cv-05035 (Dec. 1, 2023), DE 245-1.

The result was a map that, according to the *Soto Palmer* Intervenors' expert, resembled "an octopus slithering on the ocean floor." Expert Report of Sean P. Trende, Ph.D. at 41, *Soto Palmer*, No. 3:22-cv-05035 (Dec. 22, 2023), DE 251. And for Mr. Garcia—a Hispanic resident of Grandview—the result was a map that, once again, sorted him on the basis of race. The *Soto Palmer* court purported to cure Hispanic vote dilution by further diluting the Hispanic vote—the court actually *decreased* the Hispanic CVAP in the challenged region.

The *Soto Palmer* Intervenor-Defendants appealed the district court's merits decision and remedial order, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed both on the same day it affirmed the three-judge panel's dismissal of Mr. Garcia's claim. *See Palmer* v. *Hobbs*, 150 F.4th 1131 (9th Cir. 2025).

Mr. Garcia thus remains subject to ongoing racial classification. He was first sorted *into* LD-15 by the Commission on the basis of his Hispanic ethnicity, and then sorted *out of* LD-15 and into LD-14 by the *Soto Palmer* district court for the same reason. Far from remedying his constitutional injury, the *Soto Palmer* proceedings intensified it. Yet, because of the mootness holdings below, Mr. Garcia has never received a ruling on the merits of his Equal Protection claim. He now respectfully petitions this Court to grant certiorari and correct the egregious errors below.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

As it currently stands, Mr. Garcia has been racially gerrymandered twice—first into LD-15, and then into LD-14—yet no court has ruled on whether his constitutional rights were violated. The lower courts dismissed his claim as "moot," reasoning that a VRA remedy requiring *more* racial sorting somehow provided "complete relief" to a plaintiff *challenging* racial sorting. That conclusion defies logic and this Court's precedents.

Certiorari is warranted for two reasons. First, the decision below directly conflicts with this Court's mootness jurisprudence, including *North Carolina* v. *Covington* and *Moore* v. *Harper*. The Ninth Circuit either misapplied or ignored both cases, despite Mr. Garcia's extensive explanation of their applicability in the proceedings below.

Second, the question presented is important and recurring. The tension between Section 2 of the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause has generated parallel litigation across the country, and the decision below creates an alarming roadmap for evading constitutional review through strategic docket manipulation. This Court's intervention is necessary to restore clarity to an increasingly turbulent area of law.

I. THE DECISION BELOW DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S MOOTNESS PRECEDENTS

Mr. Garcia's claim is not moot for two independent reasons. First, a racial gerrymandering plaintiff's claim does not become moot when a remedial map

continues—and indeed intensifies—the racial sorting he challenges. Under *North Carolina* v. *Covington*, 585 U.S. 969 (2018), "it is the segregation of the plaintiffs—not the legislature's line-drawing as such—that gives rise to their claims." *Id.* at 976. Here, the *Soto Palmer* remedy did not eliminate Mr. Garcia's segregation. Rather, it exacerbated and entrenched it. The Ninth Circuit's contrary holding fundamentally misunderstands this Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence.

Second, a case cannot be moot until the entire appellate process has concluded. Under *Moore* v. *Harper*, 600 U.S. 1 (2023), a challenge to an invalidated map is not moot so long as reversal could cause the map to snap back into effect. *Id.* at 15. The State even admitted below that reversal of *Soto Palmer* would "resuscitate" Mr. Garcia's claim—and yet the Ninth Circuit did not even mention *Moore*, let alone explain why its straightforward rule would not apply in this case.

Either error independently warrants this Court's review.

A. A Remedy That Intensifies a Constitutional Injury Does Not Moot the Claim

Mr. Garcia's racial classification injury under the Equal Protection Clause remains live because the Enacted Map's racial gerrymander persists through the Remedial Map. In fact, the *Soto Palmer* court did not even purport to try to eliminate the use of race in the Enacted Map when it crafted the Remedial Map. Instead, it piled *more* consideration of race atop the

Enacted Map, such that Mr. Garcia still faces the same constitutional injury at the core of his suit. This means Mr. Garcia's claim cannot be moot under the precedents of this Court.

As this Court has repeatedly held, "[a] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party." *Knox* v. *Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000*, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (quoting *Erie* v. *Pap's A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant inquiry in determining mootness is not whether a court can afford "fully satisfactory" relief, or simply "return the parties to the *status quo ante*," *Church of Scientology of Cal.* v. *United States*, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)—rather, it is whether "a court can fashion *some* form of meaningful relief" under the circumstances. *Id.*; *see also id.* at 13 n.6 ("[W]e are concerned only with the question whether *any* relief can be ordered.").

This "impossibility" inquiry for mootness exists because the Court is particularly wary of attempts to avoid judicial review by taking advantage of the Article III case-or-controversy provision. These attempts often take the form of "voluntary compliance"—*i.e.*, when a defendant seeks to "automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued," *Already, LLC* v. *Nike, Inc.*, 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (citing *City of Mesquite* v. *Aladdin's Castle, Inc.*, 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982))—but can also occur when a plaintiff "attempt[s] to manipulate the Court's jurisdiction to insulate a favorable decision from review." *Erie* v. *Pap's A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2000) (citations omitted). In any event, an Article III court's interest in avoiding

artificial mootness is clear, regardless of who is responsible for the putative mooting. As such, "as long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot." *Knox*, 567 U.S. at 307–08 (quoting *Ellis* v. *Railway Clerks*, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)).

A result of this doctrine is that where—as here—a plaintiff asserts a racial gerrymandering claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the case *cannot* be moot as long as the racial segregation that gives rise to the claim continues. *Covington*, 585 U.S. at 975–76. As this Court held in *Covington*, this is true even where the original district at issue is replaced by a court-ordered remedial district, insofar as the plaintiff asserts "that they remained segregated on the basis of race" in the new district. *Id.* at 976. This is because "it is the segregation of the plaintiffs—not the legislature's line-drawing as such—that gives rise to their claims." *Id.* In other words, "the racial classification itself is the relevant harm." *Alexander* v. *S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP*, 602 U.S. 1, 38 (2024).

Here, Mr. Garcia faces an even more robust situation than the plaintiffs in *Covington* did. In *Covington*, the plaintiffs' claims were not moot because they argued that the remedial districts were "mere continuations of the old, gerrymandered districts." 585 U.S. at 976. By contrast, the Remedial Map here is not merely a continuation of the Enacted Map's racial gerrymander—it is an *intensification*. Indeed, the *Soto Palmer* court took the Enacted LD-15 as its baseline and then layered additional race-based sorting on top of it, with the express "fundamental goal" of "unit[ing] the Latino

community of interest in the region." *Soto Palmer*, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50419, at *10. All of the original race-based sorting of the Enacted Map thus persists in the Remedial Map—the *Soto Palmer* court made no attempt to expunge it, as that was explicitly not its purpose—and the court added yet more race-based sorting of its own devising. As a result, Mr. Garcia was first sorted *into* LD-15 on the basis of his Hispanic ethnicity, and then sorted *out of* LD-15 into the new LD-14 for the same exact reason. This is *a fortiori Covington*.

The Ninth Circuit, however, disregarded the Remedial Map's explicit racial-gerrymander intensification and held that Mr. Garcia's claim was moot because "LD 14 has replaced LD 15." App. 2. The court acknowledged that *Covington* would foreclose a mootness holding if LD-14 was indeed a "continuation of LD 15," but held that this was not the case because—even though Mr. Garcia argued that he faced an ongoing injury of racial segregation—he could not "specifically argue[]" this "continuation" point. *Id.*

This reasoning fundamentally misunderstands *Covington* and this Court's treatment of racial gerrymandering injuries. The question is not whether the specific boundaries of LD-15 have been replaced, nor is it whether Mr. Garcia "specifically argued" that the new district is a literal "continuation[]" of the old one. *Compare id.* (finding mootness on those grounds), *with Covington*, 585 U.S. at 976 ("[T]he plaintiffs' claims that they were organized into legislative districts on the basis of their race did not become moot simply because the General Assembly drew new district lines around them."). Rather, the question is

whether "the segregation of the plaintiff[] . . . that gives rise to [his] claim[]" persists, *Covington*, 585 U.S. at 976, and if it does, whether it is now "impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever." *Knox*, 567 U.S. at 307 (internal quotation omitted). And the answer is plainly no: a court could (and should) order the State to redraw Mr. Garcia's district without unconstitutional racial sorting, thereby remedying his constitutional injury in a manner that has yet to occur. *Cf.* App. 33 (VanDyke, J., dissenting) ("The majority's position is thus that an order directing the State to consider race *more* has 'granted . . . complete relief' to a plaintiff who complains the State shouldn't have considered race *at all*. This kind of logic should make us wonder if this case is really moot." (emphasis in original)).

The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that, even if Mr. Garcia's segregation-based injury continues, his claim was moot because "LD 14 was crafted by an entirely different party—the district court—from the Commission, the party that drew LD 15." App. 3. According to the court, this change in map-drawer meant that the "character of the system" had been "alter[ed] significantly," *id.* (quoting *Fusari* v. *Steinberg*, 419 U.S. 379, 386–87 (1975)), such that "it is no longer permissible to say that the [Commission's] challenged conduct continues." *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

There are at least two significant errors embedded within this reasoning. First, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on *Fusari* is entirely misplaced. There, this Court remanded for further consideration because the challenged state procedures had been "significantly revised" in an explicit effort to remedy the

constitutional problems the lower court identified—something that simply did not happen here. *Fusari* v. *Steinberg*, 419 U.S. 379, 380–85 (1975). If anything, *Fusari* thus stands for the opposite of what the Ninth Circuit said: The "character of the system" is defined by the injury, not the identity of the actor inflicting it.

Second, the Ninth Circuit completely misconstrued this Court's test for when it is "permissible to say that the [] challenged conduct continues." App. 3 (quoting *Chem. Producers & Distribs. Ass'n* v. *Helliker*, 463 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2006)). Indeed, as this Court stated in *Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors* v. *Jacksonville*, 508 U.S. 656, 662 n.3 (1993)—the original source of the Ninth Circuit's *Helliker* quote—"the question [is] whether the new [law] is sufficiently similar to the repealed [law] that it is permissible to say that the challenged conduct continues." The question does not, as the Ninth Circuit suggests, turn on the label attached to the change, or who is responsible for it.

Regardless, even if the Ninth Circuit's preoccupation with the map-drawer's identity was warranted, several factors underscore the error of its ultimate conclusion. First, the same Defendants—the Secretary of State and the State of Washington—continue to enforce and implement the Remedial Map's racial gerrymander. Second, as the *Soto Palmer* district court explained, "[i]t is only because the State declined to reconvene the Redistricting Commission—with its expertise, staff, and ability to solicit public comments—that the Court was compelled to step in" and draw the Remedial Map. 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50419, at *15–16. The State's refusal to act is the

reason for the change in the map-drawer's identity. Third, and most critically, the Remedial Map did not emerge from a clean slate; it incorporated and built upon the Enacted Map's racial considerations, using an already racially gerrymandered LD-15 to craft an even more racially gerrymandered LD-14. In these circumstances, the "character of the system" was not "altered significantly"—it was entrenched.

At bottom, the Ninth Circuit's decision creates an untenable rule: a constitutional claim can be rendered moot by a statutory remedy that makes the underlying constitutional injury even worse. That is simply not how this Court's mootness doctrine works. Certiorari is therefore warranted to correct the Ninth Circuit's egregious errors in this regard.

B. A Claim Cannot Be Moot When the Path to Complete Relief Runs Through an Incomplete Appellate Process

The Ninth Circuit's error is compounded by its complete failure to address *Moore* v. *Harper*, 600 U.S. 1 (2023), which provides an independent basis for rejecting mootness. Mr. Garcia squarely presented this argument below, yet the Ninth Circuit's three-page memorandum does not mention *Moore* at all—even though the case establishes a straightforward rule that applies directly here.

In *Moore*, this Court held that a challenge to a redistricting map invalidated by a lower court is not moot so long as appellate reversal could cause the challenged map to "again take effect." 600 U.S. at 15. There, the North Carolina Supreme Court had struck down the State's 2021 congressional maps as an

unconstitutional gerrymander, enjoining its use and remanding to the lower court to oversee the redrawing of remedial maps. *See Harper* v. *Hall*, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022). Although the court "overruled" its decision on rehearing, it did not "negate the force of its order striking down the 2021 plans." *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 13 (citation omitted). "As a result, the legislative defendants' path to complete relief [ran] through this Court," which had the power to reverse the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment and, in turn, trigger a North Carolina statutory provision that would make the 2021 maps "again become 'effective.'" *Id.* at 15–16 (quoting 2022 N.C. Sess. Laws p. 10, § 2).

Such a snapback potential, the Court reasoned, is "sufficient to avoid mootness under Article III." *Id.* at 16 (citing *Hunt* v. *Cromartie*, 526 U.S. 541, 546 n.1 (1999)). This is due to the straightforward principle that, as long as a final appellate decision could reinstate a challenged electoral map that a lower court previously invalidated, "[t]he parties [] continue to have a 'personal stake in the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit'" throughout the appellate process. *Id.* at 15–16 (quoting *Chafin* v. *Chafin*, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)).

In this sense, *Moore* did not announce a new rule. It applied the same principle this Court recognized in *Hunt* v. *Cromartie*, 526 U.S. 541, 546 n.1 (1999), where it held the case was not moot because "the State will revert to the 1997 districting plan upon a favorable decision of this Court," and which other circuits have faithfully applied. *See Thomas* v. *Bryant*, 938 F.3d 134, 144 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that an appeal was not moot because, "if [the State] prevails

on appeal, it could then revert to using its original map," remedial map notwithstanding), *on reh'g en banc sub nom. Thomas* v. *Reeves*, 961 F.3d 800, 801 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that the case became moot once it was "undisputed" that the "district lines will neither be used nor operate as a base for any future election").[1]

The same analysis applies here. If this Court grants certiorari in *Trevino* v. *Hobbs*—the Intervenors' appeal of the *Soto Palmer* judgment—and reverses, the injunction against the Enacted Map

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[1] Other circuits faithfully apply this principle in a variety of contexts as well. *See, e.g.*, *Moore* v. *Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ.*, 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014) (waiting until the Louisiana Supreme Court had affirmed the trial court's decision declaring the federally challenged law unconstitutional to find the case moot); *Gagliardi* v. *TJCV Land Trust*, 889 F.3d 728, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding moot a constitutional challenge based on a Florida circuit court's invalidation of a project only because "Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal denied a writ of certiorari, *and there the case ended*, inasmuch as the parties did not seek certiorari review in the Florida Supreme Court" (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); *Enrico's, Inc.* v. *Rice*, 730 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding moot a federal challenge to California rule only once the petition for certiorari was denied in state court case holding the rule invalid); *International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 639* v. *Airgas, Inc.*, 885 F.3d 230, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding a case mooted by a "*final and binding arbitration award*" because the finality of the arbitrator's decision made any relief in the federal case "impossible"); *Medici* v. *City of Chi.*, 856 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding a case mooted by arbitration award because the losing party "elected not to appeal the arbitration award," thereby rendering it final); *Oklahoma* v. *Hobia*, 775 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2014) (declining to find case mooted by agency action because the action was not "final agency action," such that the alleged harm would be impossible).

will be vacated, and LD-15 will snap back into effect. Mr. Garcia's "path to complete relief" in challenging LD-15 thus "runs through" the federal appellate process, and his "personal stake" in that challenge continues until its "ultimate disposition" before this Court. *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 15. Put differently, the *Soto Palmer* district court decision was not a walk-off home run that dramatically ended the season; the ball is still in the air, and Mr. Garcia can still win depending on where it lands.

The State effectively conceded as much in the proceedings below. In its briefing, it agreed with Mr. Garcia that, if an appellate court "were to reverse the liability ruling in *Soto Palmer*, so that the originally enacted LD 15 came back into effect, then Garcia's claim would present a live controversy." Appellee State of Washington's Answering Brief at 21, *Garcia*, No. 24-2603 (Oct. 16, 2024), DE 23.1; *see also id.* at 34 (noting that the "decision in *Soto Palmer* could resuscitate [Mr. Garcia's] claim"). The only point of disagreement on this issue between Mr. Garcia and the State is thus what this dynamic means for the case's current status. For Mr. Garcia, the fact that his "path to complete relief" vis-à-vis LD-15 has yet to run its course through a conclusive ruling means his claim is not moot. *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 15; *see also Knox*, 567 U.S. at 307. For the State, on the other hand, this just means that Mr. Garcia's claim is moot *now*, but could eventually become *un*-moot, depending on how this Court rules.

Mr. Garcia is correct. Mootness is binary; a case is either moot or not moot. If appellate reversal could revive a claim, it was never "impossible" to grant

effective relief in the first place—and the case was therefore never moot. *Knox*, 567 U.S. at 307.

The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to address *any* of these arguments in its decision. Despite the parties' extensive discussion of *Moore*'s applicability, the court offered no explanation for why *Moore*'s snapback doctrine should not apply, made no attempt to distinguish the case, and provided no acknowledgment that the State essentially conceded the dispositive "impossibility" point. This silence cannot be reconciled with *Moore*'s clear holding, just as what the Ninth Circuit did say cannot be reconciled with this Court's other mootness cases. *See supra* Section I.A.

This Court's review is warranted to correct the Ninth Circuit's disregard of directly applicable precedent. When a court of appeals ignores a controlling Supreme Court decision squarely raised by a party—particularly one where the opposing party has conceded the critical factual predicate—certiorari is appropriate to ensure the uniform application of this Court's jurisprudence.

II. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING IMPORTANT AND RECURRING ISSUES

A. The Decision Below Invites Strategic Manipulation of Constitutional Litigation

The procedural history of the decision below creates a roadmap for litigants and courts to circumvent the three-judge court procedure Congress mandated for constitutional redistricting challenges.

In effect, the Ninth Circuit signed off on the single-judge *Soto Palmer* court's attempt to divest the three-judge panel of its Article III jurisdiction through strategic docket manipulation. This failure warrants this Court's review, as it has profound consequences for both Mr. Garcia and all other similarly situated plaintiffs.

As Judge VanDyke noted in his district court dissent, the panel majority's decision amounted to "forcefully pulling the plug on a case" that was "presented in the first instance to a district court with a non-discretionary obligation to adjudicate it." App. 53, 36 (VanDyke, J., dissenting). This was accomplished not through well-reasoned constitutional principles, but through strategic docket management. Indeed, the *Soto Palmer* court undertook "a nine-factor indeterminate balancing test" to resolve the statutory VRA claim in just twenty-nine days, and then leveraged that resolution to "kill[] Garcia's entire case . . . before any court had the opportunity to review its merits." App. 38, 28.

As Judge VanDyke further observed, this order of operations was hardly accidental. It did not make sense, "as a matter of prudence," to first "undertake a complicated test that involves indeterminate balancing when a simpler threshold basis exists for resolving the matter." App. 28. After all, the two cases did not share a "symmetrical relationship," where "a decision in one would necessarily moot the other case, and vice versa." App. 30. Instead, the relationship was one-sided: a ruling for Mr. Garcia on his Equal Protection claim would have definitively mooted the *Soto Palmer* VRA claim—if the Enacted Map was unconstitutional from the moment of enactment,

there was no valid map for the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs to challenge. *See Collins* v. *Yellen*, 594 U.S. 220, 225 (2021) ("[A]n unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law.") But the reverse was never true: the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs asked for—and eventually received—"*even more* racial gerrymandering," which by definition could not eliminate Mr. Garcia's injury. App. 34 (VanDyke, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). It thus stands to reason that this procedural posture was deliberately designed to guarantee Mr. Garcia's constitutional claim would never be heard.

This is a significant problem. *See Page* v. *Bartels*, 248 F.3d 175, 191 (3d Cir. 2001) (warning of the "danger that the single district judge's conclusions with regard to the statutory claims—particularly his or her factual findings—might well have the effect of dictating the outcome of the constitutional claims, thereby thwarting the expressed congressional policy of requiring a specialized three-judge court for the disposition of such singularly important matters"). If left unresolved, it risks repetition in other jurisdictions across the country, where redistricting maps are increasingly subject to parallel challenges under Section 2 of the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause.[2] As with the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs and Mr. Garcia, these claims often push in opposite directions: VRA plaintiffs typically seek *more* race-conscious redistricting to remedy vote dilution, while Equal

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[2] *See generally Redistricting Litigation Roundup*, Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/redistricting-litigation-roundup-0 (last updated Dec. 17, 2025) (collecting cases).

Protection plaintiffs challenge *excessive* racial sorting. *See* Travis Crum, *The Riddle of Race-Based Redistricting*, 124 Colum. L. Rev. 1823, 1825 (2024) (discussing the "Goldilocks problem" of racial considerations in drawing redistricting plans); *Abbott* v. *Perez*, 585 U.S. 579, 587 (2018) ("Since the Equal Protection Clause restricts consideration of race and the VRA demands consideration of race, a legislature attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is vulnerable to 'competing hazards of liability.'" (citation omitted)).

While this has been true for some time, the 2020 redistricting cycle has produced an unprecedented wave of such parallel litigation. In Louisiana, a Section 2 challenge led to a remedial map that was then challenged as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and which is now pending before this Court. *See Louisiana* v. *Callais*, Nos. 24-109 & 24-110. In Michigan, voters brought both VRA and Equal Protection Clause claims in the same lawsuit, and the three-judge panel resolved the constitutional claim first—holding the maps were racial gerrymanders—without reaching the VRA claims. *See Agee* v. *Benson*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227283, at *169 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2023). And in Alabama, multiple consolidated cases have raised both types of challenges to the same congressional maps. *See generally Singleton* v. *Allen*, 690 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 2023).

The decision below creates perverse incentives for the future litigation that will inevitably continue to come before the courts. If a VRA plaintiff can moot a pending constitutional challenge that seeks a different form of relief simply by winning as quickly as possible, litigants have every reason to do whatever

they can to secure favorable sequencing. Likewise, courts would have every reason to manipulate their dockets to reach preferred outcomes without confronting constitutional questions. This dynamic is not sustainable, but it will continue to proliferate without this Court's intervention.

B. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle

Mr. Garcia's case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the complex procedural and legal issues it raises. The trial record is complete, with extensive testimony from the Commissioners who drew LD-15 about their purposes and motivations, and the remedial process in *Soto Palmer* has yielded its own robust record regarding the adequacy of the LD-14 remedy. All arguments were preserved below.

Additionally, the three-judge panel already indicated how it would rule on the merits. App. 10–11 ("This testimony weighs heavily against finding that race predominated in the drawing of LD 15 and against finding an Equal Protection violation."). And Judge VanDyke's detailed dissent provides a roadmap for reversal. App. 38 (VanDyke, J., dissenting) ("My criticism that the *Soto Palmer* decision is an advisory opinion depends, of course, on my conclusion that the State of Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause. I thus turn now to that question. It is not a hard one on this record.").

Accordingly, this case—as well as the significant issues it raises—can be resolved by answering a straightforward question. Indeed, both the panel majority and the Ninth Circuit adopted the position "that an order directing the State to consider race

more has 'granted . . . complete relief' to a plaintiff who complains the State shouldn't have considered race *at all*." App. 33. As Judge VanDyke aptly observed, "[t]his kind of logic should make us wonder if this case is really moot." *Id.* This Court should grant certiorari to answer that question.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, this Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

FILED 8/27/2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2603

BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Washington and STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV. Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding.

Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM

Benancio Garcia III sued the State of Washington and its Secretary of State, Steven Hobbs, alleging that Legislative District 15 ("LD 15"), drawn by an independent state redistricting commission (the "Commission"), was an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Submission was vacated pending this court's resolution of *Palmer, et al. v. Trevino, et al.*, Nos. 23-35595 & 24-1602, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22068. Because the court has issued its

decision in *Palmer v. Trevino*, we now turn to the merits of this appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the district court's dismissal for mootness, *Rosemere Neighborhood Ass'n v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency*, 581 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009), we affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we need not recount them here.

In *Palmer v. Trevino*, we affirmed the district court's invalidation of LD 15 and the adoption of a remedial map that invalidated LD 15 and replaced it with a new legislative district, Legislative District 14 ("LD 14"). No. 23-35595, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22068 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025). Garcia's action, which challenges LD 15 on equal protection grounds, is therefore moot.

"[T]he repeal, amendment, or expiration of challenged legislation is generally enough to render a case moot . . . ." *Teter v. Lopez*, 125 F.4th 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting *Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers*, 941 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). Garcia, citing *North Carolina v. Covington*, 585 U.S. 969, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 201 L. Ed. 2d 993 (2018), argues that even though LD 14 has replaced LD 15, he experiences a "continuing injury" of racial segregation. To avoid mootness, the plaintiffs in *Covington* specifically argued "that some of the new districts were *mere continuations* of the old, gerrymandered districts." *Covington*, 585 U.S. at 976 (emphasis added).

To determine whether LD 14 is a continuation of LD 15, "the case or controversy giving rise to

jurisdiction is the touchstone." *Chem. Producers & Distribs. Ass'n v. Helliker*, 463 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2006), *overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare*, 941 F.3d 1195. At the district court, this case was centered entirely on the Commission's actions. The operative complaint alleged that "[r]ace was the predominant factor motivating the Commission's decision to draw the lines encompassing Legislative District 15." At trial, the parties submitted extensive trial exhibits, including expert reports, proposed maps, communications between commissioners, recordings of committee meetings, and notes from negotiations. Such evidence is plainly directed towards the intent of the Commission and does not bear on whether the district court similarly considered race as a predominant factor in drawing LD 14.

LD 14 was crafted by an entirely different party—the district court—from the Commission, the party that drew LD 15, and thus the "character of the system" has been "alter[ed] significantly." *Fusari v. Steinberg*, 419 U.S. 379, 386-87, 95 S. Ct. 533, 42 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1975). Consequently, it is no longer "permissible to say that the [Commission's] challenged conduct continues." *Chem. Producers & Distribs.*, 463 F.3d at 875 (internal quotations omitted). The case is moot.

AFFIRMED.

FILED: 3/25/2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Washington, and the STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendants.

AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

_____ **Jury Verdict.** This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

__X__ **Decision by Court.** This action came to consideration before the Court. The issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered.

This action is again before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court with instructions to enter a fresh judgment from which an appeal can be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The issues were previously considered and a decision was rendered.

THE COURT HAS ORDERED that:

This case is dismissed as moot.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2024.

RAVI SUBRAMANIAN,
Clerk of the Court

By: */s/ Victoria Ericksen*
Deputy Clerk

FILED: 9/8/2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

BENANCIO GARCIA III,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Washington, and the STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AS MOOT

Chief District Judge David G. Estudillo authored the majority opinion, in which District Judge Robert S. Lasnik joined. Circuit Judge Lawrence J.C. VanDyke filed a dissenting opinion.[1]

Plaintiff Benancio Garcia III brings suit arguing that Washington Legislative District 15 ("LD 15") in the Yakima Valley is an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

[1] Because Plaintiff "challeng[ed] the constitutionality of the apportionment" of a "statewide legislative body" under 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit designated a three-judge panel to hear Plaintiff's constitutional claim. (*See* Dkt. No. 18.)

Fourteenth Amendment. The Panel sat for a three-day trial from June 5th to June 7th to hear evidence regarding Plaintiff's Equal Protection Clause claim.[2] In light of the court's decision in *Soto Palmer*, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claim as moot.

I. MOOTNESS

"[T]he judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies.'" *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968). "There is thus no case or controversy, and a suit becomes moot, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." *Chafin v. Chafin*, 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013) (cleaned up). Article III's case-or-controversy requirement prevents federal courts from issuing advisory opinions. *See id.* A party must have "a specific live grievance," and cannot seek to litigate an "abstract disagreement over the constitutionality" of a law or other government action. *Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp.*, 494 U.S. 472, 479, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1990) (cleaned up).

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[2] The Panel heard evidence for the *Garcia* case concurrent with evidence presented for parallel litigation in *Soto Palmer v. Hobbs*, No. 3:22-cv-5035-RSL (W.D. Wash.). For purposes of judicial economy, the Court refers the reader to the procedural and factual background in *Soto Palmer*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2023) and this Court's prior order (Dkt. No. 56). The Court presumes reader familiarity with the facts of this case. This order only addresses Plaintiff Benancio Garcia III's Equal Protection claim.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of LD 15 is moot given the *Soto Palmer* court's finding that LD 15 violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief determining that LD 15 "is an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and an injunction "enjoining Defendant from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of [] [LD 15], including an injunction barring Defendant from conducting any further elections for the Legislature based on [] [LD 15]." (Dkt. No. 14 at 18.) Plaintiff further requests the Court order a new legislative map be drawn. (*Id.*)

The *Soto Palmer* court determined that LD 15 violated § 2 of the VRA's prohibition against discriminatory results. *See Soto Palmer*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *11. In so deciding, the court found LD 15 to be invalid and ordered that the State's legislative districts be redrawn. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, [WL] at *13. Since LD 15 has been found to be invalid and will be redrawn (and therefore not used for further elections), the Court cannot provide any more relief to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not assert that any new district drawn by the Washington State Redistricting Commission ("Commission") would be a "mere continuation[] of the old, gerrymandered district[]." *North Carolina v. Covington*, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 201 L. Ed. 2d 993 (2018). Plaintiff therefore lacks a specific, live grievance, and his case is moot.

Traditional principles of judicial restraint also counsel against resolving Plaintiff's Equal Protection Clause claim. "A fundamental and longstanding

principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." *Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n*, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988); *see also Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng'g, P.C.*, 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S. Ct. 2267, 81 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1984) ("It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them."). The court's decision in *Soto Palmer* makes any decision in the instant case superfluous. A new Commission will draw new legislative districts in the Yakima Valley and, if challenged thereafter, the propriety of the new districts will be decided by analyzing the motivations and decisions of new individuals who constitute the Commission.[3] The Court cannot and will not presume that the new Commission will be motivated by the same factors that motivated its predecessor. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and to unnecessarily decide a constitutional issue where there are alternate grounds available or where there is an absence of a case or controversy is to overstep our "proper, limited role in our Nation's governance." *Biden v. Nebraska*, 600 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2384, 216 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2023) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Our dissenting colleague disagrees that the instant case is moot. In his view, the Commissioners

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[3] In the event that the Commission fails to draw a new map by the deadline set by the *Soto Palmer* court, the parties will submit proposed maps to the *Soto Palmer* court and the court will adopt and enforce a new redistricting plan. *See Soto Palmer*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13.

racially gerrymandered the 2021 Washington Redistricting Map in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and therefore "the map was 'void *ab initio*.'" Additionally, the dissent argues that longstanding principles of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance are inapplicable here because the decision in *Soto Palmer* does not completely moot the relief sought by Plaintiff. These arguments are uncompelling.

First, the view that LD 15 was void *ab initio* presupposes that Plaintiff established an Equal Protection violation. To the contrary, a full analysis of the record presented does not yield such a result. The Court declines to issue an advisory opinion on the validity of Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim, however. Rather, it is sufficient to note only that we disagree with the dissent's summary and interpretation of the facts surrounding the creation of LD 15. Importantly, the Commissioners' testimony on the specific issue of whether race predominated in the formation of LD 15 is absent from the dissent's summary of the facts, and the Court encourages readers to examine the Commissioners' testimony in full.[4] This testimony

[4] Commissioner April Sims, for example, specifically disclaimed that race was the most important factor. (*See* Dkt. No. 73 at 77.) As she testified, "I would not agree that [race] [] was the most important factor. But that it was a factor." (*Id.*) Commissioner Brady Walkinshaw similarly noted that the Commissioners discussed a number of factors, including race, but "none of those [factors] were predominant." (*Id.* at 124.) He further emphasized the impact that the Commissioners' desire to unify the Yakama Nation into one legislative district had on the map (*see id.*), a factor that all Commissioners attested was important but is conspicuously absent from our colleague's analysis.

weighs heavily against finding that race predominated in the drawing of LD 15 and against finding an Equal Protection violation.[5]

Commissioner Joe Fain testified that his overriding interest in drawing maps for LD 15 was to ensure "competitiveness." (*See* Dkt. No. 74 at 48, 58.) He also testified that he believed Commissioner Walkinshaw would have voted for a map in LD 15 that would not have had a majority Latino Citizen Voting Age Population ("CVAP"). (*Id.* at 51.) Finally, Commissioner Paul Graves testified that "race and the partisan breakdown of the district were" tied in his mind as the most important factors. (Dkt. No. 75 at 85.)

[5] The dissent's "ab initio" argument leads to the surprising assertion that the *Soto Palmer* court should have declined to issue an opinion in that case. *Soto Palmer* was the first-filed challenge to the redistricting map, and it presented a clearly justiciable case and controversy. Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them," *Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S.*, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976), and our dissenting colleague makes no effort to show that one of the "exceptional" circumstances that could justify a district court's refusal to exercise or postponement of the exercise of its jurisdiction existed, *Id.* at 813 and 817. Although the intervenors in *Soto Palmer* twice requested that the case be stayed, they did so on the ground that judicial efficiency would be served by waiting for the Supreme Court's decision in *Allen v. Milligan*, 599 U.S. 1, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2023). At no point prior to the dissemination of the dissent did anyone suggest that a decision in *Soto Palmer* would be advisory or otherwise improper.

More importantly, the suggestion that the VRA claim should have been stayed or held in abeyance while the Equal Protection claim was resolved is not supported by case law or legal analysis. The dissent does not discuss whether a stay of *Soto Palmer* would have been appropriate pending the resolution of *Garcia* under the rubric established in *Landis v. N. Am. Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 254-56, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936), nor does it cite any cases

It is also erroneous to argue that "resolving *Soto Palmer* in the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs' favor does not moot *Garcia*." As noted, LD 15 will be redrawn and will not be used in its current form for any future election. The *Soto Palmer* court has therefore granted Plaintiff complete relief for purposes of our mootness analysis. *See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, New York*, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2020) (vacating judgment as moot where New York City amended its laws to grant "the precise relief that petitioners requested in the prayer for relief in their complaint" notwithstanding requests for declaratory and injunctive relief from future constitutional violations).[6]

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in which a decision on a VRA claim was postponed because of a related Equal Protection challenge. *Milligan* itself presented just such a confluence of claims, and the Supreme Court addressed the appropriateness of injunctive relief on the VRA claim without considering, much less prioritizing, the pending Equal Protection challenge. *See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 410, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 165 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2006) (resolving VRA claims without reaching the companion Equal Protection claim); *Singleton v. Allen*, 2:21-cv-1291-AMM-SM-TFM, Dkt. # 272 at 7-8, 194-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2023) (resolving VRA claims and reserving ruling on Equal Protection claims in light of the fundamental and longstanding principles of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance).

[6] The dissent attempts to distinguish *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n*, but the petitioners in that case argued, like our colleague, that an intervening change to New York City's firearms laws did not moot their request for declaratory and injunctive relief because of the continued possibility of future harm from New York City's unconstitutional firearms licensing scheme. *See* Petitioners' Response to Respondents' Suggestion of

Our colleague argues that this case is not moot because Plaintiff may obtain partial injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, the Court could declare that LD 15 was an illegal racial gerrymander and enjoin the state from "performing an illegal racial gerrymander when it redraws the map." This type of relief is insufficient to avoid a finding of mootness. It goes without saying that a federal court may only direct parties to undertake activities that comply with the Constitution, and the *Soto Palmer* court's directive to the State to redraw LD 15 properly presumes that the State will comply with the Constitution when it does so lest the future district be challenged once again. *Cf. Holloway v. City of Virginia Beach*, 42 F.4th 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2022) (rejecting argument that VRA case was not moot and Plaintiffs were entitled to court order "directing implementation of a new system that 'compl[ies] with Section 2'" of the VRA in light of changes to state law that provided otherwise complete relief).

The dissent asserts that "the order in *Soto Palmer* ensures that [Garcia] will not receive what he argues

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Mootness at 15-17, *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n*, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798. As the petitioners noted in their brief, "nothing in the City's revised rule precludes the previous version of the rule, which governed for nearly two decades, from having continuing adverse effects." *Id.* at 16. The petitioners specifically sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that "that the City's longstanding restrictive [firearms] licensing scheme is incompatible with the Second Amendment" and that any attempt to impose a licensing scheme was "null and void ab initio." *Id.* The Supreme Court, however, rejected the petitioners' argument and held that the case was moot notwithstanding the continued possibility of constitutional harm from the newly revised rule.

is a constitutionally valid legislative map" because his "claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it almost is certain to repeat itself." In the dissent's opinion, Garcia will most certainly suffer injury because *Soto Palmer* "ordered that the State engage in *even more* racial gerrymandering" than that claimed by Garcia in this case. But this claimed injury from a future legislative district is speculative because compliance with § 2 of the VRA, as ordered in *Soto Palmer*, would not result in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. *See Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 306, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 197 L. Ed. 2d 837 (2017) ("States enjoy leeway to take race-based actions reasonably judged necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA."); *see also Milligan*, 143 S. Ct. at 1516-17 ("[F]or the last four decades, this Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied the effects test of § 2 as interpreted in *Gingles* and, under certain circumstances, have authorized race-based redistricting as a remedy for state districting maps that violate § 2.").

As the dissent concedes, "the Supreme Court has given States 'leeway' to draw lines on the basis of race in redistricting when States have good reasons, based in the evidence, to believe the racial gerrymander necessary under the VRA." The *Soto Palmer* court detailed in depth why a VRA compliant district is required for the Yakima Valley. *See, e.g.*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *5-6, 11 (finding that the three *Gingles* factors were met and that the State had "impair[ed] the ability of Latino voters in [] [the Yakima Valley] to elect their candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters"). The dissent would find that the prior

Commissioners failed to judge a VRA district necessary, and therefore any racial prioritization that the Commissioners engaged in would not survive strict scrutiny. But this determination is necessarily fact-specific and only applicable to the actions of the prior Commission. By the dissent's own admission, so long as the State judges the use of race necessary to comply with the VRA it is not unlawful for the State to create a district with a higher Latino CVAP.

The dissent also argues the case is not moot because Plaintiff may want to appeal this case to the Supreme Court. Whether Plaintiff may desire to utilize this litigation to "challenge current precedent that considers compliance with the VRA a sufficient reason to racially gerrymander" is immaterial to the issue of whether a case is moot. Neither *Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n*, 595 U.S. 398, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 212 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2022), nor *Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace Officers Ass'n*, 38 F.4th 68 (9th Cir. 2022), stands for the proposition that a trial court, in deciding whether a case is moot, should consider how a party might utilize the litigation to challenge established Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, such an argument reinforces the majority's finding that the case is moot because a desire to appeal binding Supreme Court precedent, untethered from any specific injury, is far removed from a specific, live controversy.[7] It "would [also] reverse the canon of [constitutional] avoidance . . . [by addressing] divisive

[7] The dissent, like the State of Alabama, might wish for a different interpretation of § 2 of the VRA than that which has prevailed in this country for nearly forty years. The United States Supreme Court, however, recently rejected Alabama's invitation to do so in *Milligan*.

constitutional questions that are both unnecessary and contrary to the purposes of our precedents under the Voting Rights Act." *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1, 23, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 173 L. Ed. 2d 173 (2009).

This Court "is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it." *People of State of California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co.*, 149 U.S. 308, 314, 13 S. Ct. 876, 37 L. Ed. 747 (1893). The fact remains that the *Soto Palmer* court has ordered the State to redraft legislative districts in the Yakima Valley. Having done so, the relief Plaintiff seeks in this litigation is now moot.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES as moot Plaintiff's claim that LD 15 violates the Equal Protection Clause. A judgment will be entered concurrent with this order.

Dated this 8th day of September, 2023.

/s/ David G. Estudillo
David G. Estudillo
United States District Judge

/s/ Robert S. Lasnik
Robert S. Lasnik
United States District Judge

Garcia v. Hobbs et al., No 3:22-cv-5152 (W.D. Wash.)
VANDYKE, J., dissenting,

In 2021, the State of Washington redistricted its state legislature electoral map. In the process, the State, acting through its Redistricting Commission, made the racial composition of Legislative District 15 (LD-15), a district in the Yakima Valley, a nonnegotiable criterion. In other words, the Commission racially gerrymandered. *See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 580 U.S. 178, 189, 137 S. Ct. 788, 197 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2017). This discrimination means the map was enacted in violation of the U.S. Constitution unless the Commission had a "strong basis in evidence" to believe, and in fact believed, that the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) required the Commission to perform such racial gerrymandering. *See Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n*, 595 U.S. 398, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1250, 212 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2022) (quotation omitted). A majority of the Commissioners did not believe the VRA required racial gerrymandering, so the map was drawn—and later enacted—in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

In a parallel case before a single district court judge, *Soto Palmer v. Hobbs*, plaintiffs also challenged the 2021 map as invalid. ___ F.Supp.3d___, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, No. 3:22-cv-5035 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2023). But they alleged the map violated the VRA, which presented a more challenging question than the relatively straightforward one presented in this matter. Nonetheless, instead of waiting for this case to be decided, which would have mooted *Soto Palmer*, the

court in *Soto Palmer* undertook a complicated analysis involving multiple expert witnesses and an indeterminate nine-factor balancing test and opined that the map violated the VRA and must be redrawn. Worse than undertaking a needless analysis, the court necessarily assumed that the map was not enacted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But it was. And because the map violated the Equal Protection Clause, it was "void *ab initio*." *Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS*, 879 F.2d 561, 570 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); *see Collins v. Yellen*, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1788-89, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2021). As it was void ab initio, the *Soto Palmer* decision amounts to an advisory opinion on whether a void map would violate the VRA if it existed. That decision should never have been issued.

Even putting aside the advisory nature of the *Soto Palmer* decision, it does not moot this case. Garcia is seeking relief that the court in *Soto Palmer* never provided, and he can still assert arguments not foreclosed by *Soto Palmer*. I thus respectfully dissent from my colleagues' conclusion to dismiss this case based on mootness.

BACKGROUND

I. In 2021, the State of Washington Drew New Legislative and Congressional Electoral Maps Following the Federal Census.

Under Washington law, the State of Washington redistricts its "state legislative and congressional districts" after the decennial federal census and

congressional reapportionment. Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(1); *see* U.S. Const., art. I, § 2. Washington performs this redistricting through a Redistricting Commission consisting of four voting Commissioners and one non-voting Commission Chair. *See* Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(2). The "legislative leader of the two largest political parties in each house of the legislature" each appoints one Commissioner. *Id.* The four voting Commissioners then select by majority vote a nonvoting chairperson of the Commission. *Id.* "The commission shall complete redistricting as soon as possible following the federal decennial census, but no later than November 15th of each year ending in one." *Id.* § 43(6). The "redistricting plan" must be approved by "[a]t least three of the voting members." *Id.* After the Commission approves a plan, a supermajority of two-thirds of the Washington State Legislature may make minor amendments to the plan or do nothing—either way, the map is enacted after "the end of the thirtieth day of the first session convened after the commission ... submitted its plan to the legislature." *Id.* § 43(7). And in neither event can the Legislature reject the map. *See id.*

After the 2020 decennial census, Washington law called for the appointment of a Redistricting Commission to redistrict Washington's "state legislative and congressional districts." *Id.* § 43(1). The House Democratic leadership selected April Sims, the Senate Democratic leadership selected Brady Piñero Walkinshaw, the Senate Republican leadership selected Joe Fain, and the House Republican leadership selected Paul Graves. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 58-59. These four voting

Commissioners selected Sarah Augustine as the Commission chairperson. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 60.

On September 21, 2021, each of the voting Commissioners released proposed redistricting maps. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 62. According to 2020 American Community Survey 5-year estimates, every Commissioner's September legislative map proposal included a legislative district in the Yakima Valley area of Washington made up of less than 50% Hispanic Citizen Voting Age Population (HCVAP). *Soto Palmer* Dkt. No. 191 at ¶¶ 75-78, 87. The Yakima Valley area, which is in southcentral Washington and encompasses areas in Yakima, Adams, Benton, Grant, and Franklin counties, would ultimately contain LD-15, the district challenged in this case and in *Soto Palmer*. *Soto Palmer* Dkt. No. 191 at ¶ 88.

Around a month later, the Commission received a slideshow presentation file from the Washington State Senate Democratic Caucus. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 68. The presentation was prepared by Matt Barreto, PhD, who opined that there was "racially polarized voting" in the Yakima Valley area and that the Republican Commissioners' maps "crack[ed]" the Latino population into multiple districts. Ex. 179 at 17-18. The presentation also offered two alternative, "VRA Complaint," maps. Ex. 179 at 22-23.

From the circulation of this slideshow onward, the racial composition of the Yakima Valley district became an enduring focus of the Commission. Unlike with any other district, the Commission focused intensely on the racial composition of LD-15. As Commissioner Fain put it, although the racial composition of districts was a topic generally

discussed for "many districts," "it was more widely discussed with regards to the Yakima Valley area." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 86-87. For LD-15, the "racial composition" was "a very important component of that negotiation" and there were not "other districts where [racial composition] was as important of a component." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 87.

Commissioner Sims confirmed in her testimony that without a "majority Hispanic ... CVAP in LD 15," she "[wasn't] going to reach an agreement on LD 15." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 440. More broadly, one of Commissioner Sims's "priorities with the Redistricting Commission[] was to create a majority-minority district for Hispanic and Latino voters in the Yakima Valley," specifically, "to create a majority CVAP Hispanic district in the Yakima Valley." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 37. One of Commissioner Walkinshaw's draft maps included a note that the map "[c]reate[d] a majority Hispanic district" in the Yakima Valley. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 132; Ex. 150 at 17. And a member of Walkinshaw's staff confirmed in her testimony that a district that "perform[ed] for Latino voters" "should be nonnegotiable." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 111.

Commissioner Fain paid attention to the "Hispanic CVAP measurement" "through the various iterations of maps, in most cases." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 49. He "belie[ved]" that "the Hispanic CVAP was a metric that was important to Democratic commissioners" and he was "willing to give [an increase in Hispanic CVAP in LD-15] in order to secure support for a final compromise map." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 49-50. Ultimately, "creating more minority-majority, or majority-minority districts" was important to Fain "as

part of the negotiation in getting a final map." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 61. Fain testified that "[he] tried to prioritize greater CVAP districts" and that one of the things he was "willing to do" was "of course ... most definitely increasing minority-majority districts." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 84.

Commissioner Graves testified that he thought a majority Hispanic CVAP district in LD-15 would be required to obtain both Commissioner Sims and Commissioner Walkinshaw's votes. He "had [it] in mind" that he "would need to draw a major[ity] Hispanic CVAP district in the 15th LD[] if [he] wanted to secure [Commissioner Walkinshaw's] vote for the final plan." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 67. Based on a variety of indicia, Graves believed that a majority Hispanic CVAP district in LD-15 "would probably be a go, no-go decision point for [Commissioner Walkinshaw]." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 67-68. Graves also thought that a majority Hispanic CVAP LD-15 was necessary "to get Commissioner Sims's vote for a final plan." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 70. It was "[v]ery hard for [Commissioner Graves] to see three of the voting commissioners voting for a map that did not have a majority Hispanic CVAP district in the Yakima Valley." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 73.

Anton Grose, one of Commissioner Graves's staffers, testified that "[a]s time went on, it became apparent that a Yakima Valley district that was majority Hispanic, by citizens of voting age population, ... would be a requirement to get support from both Republicans and Democrats." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 153. Grose testified that for LD-15, in particular, [HCVAP data] was very, very important to our kind of counterparts, and it was [thus] very

important to us." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 153-54. LD-15, "in particular, certainly was far more race-focused than [Grose] th[ought] any other district on the map." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 155. "[T]here were some other considerations neglected in the drawing of the 15th," Grose thought, "race predominantly being ... the major focus of that district." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 153. When drawing proposed maps, Grose was "cognizant" of racial compositions because Commissioner Graves wanted a majority HCVAP district so that he could get a map that passed. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 186-87.

The Commission had a November 15 deadline to agree to a redistricting plan. Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(6). As the negotiations got underway, the Commissioners split up for negotiations into two groups of two. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 17, 49. Commissioners Graves and Sims were primarily responsible for negotiating the legislative map, while Commissioners Walkinshaw and Fain were primarily responsible for the congressional map. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 49. Several days before a final agreement was reached on November 15, Commissioners Graves and Sims "agreed to ... make the district 50 percent Latino CVAP." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 31; *see also id.* at 91 (noting that before the November 15th deadline, Commissioner Graves had reached an agreement with Commissioner Sims that LD- 15 "would be a majority Hispanic district[] by eligible voters"). There was "an agreement ... between [Commissioner Graves] and Commissioner Sims that this district would be greater than 50 percent [Hispanic] CVAP." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 32. The partisan balance of LD-15 was still "up in the air," but however that turned out, the district

would contain above 50% Hispanic CVAP. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 32.

Commissioner Sims appears to have made a Hispanic CVAP district a nonnegotiable criterion because she believed such a district was required by the VRA. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 51. Commissioner Walkinshaw might have believed this, but his testimony on the point was less clear. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 135. Commissioners Graves and Fain did not think that the VRA required a legislative district in the Yakima Valley containing a majority HCVAP. *Garcia* Dkt. Nos. 75 at 71 (Graves); 74 at 50 (Fain).

When November 15 finally arrived, the Commissioners moved their negotiations to a hotel in Federal Way, Washington. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 30. There the Commissioners reached what they referred to as a "framework agreement." *Garcia* Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42. Although they did not vote on specific maps before the deadline, they voted on an agreement that they testified could be turned into a legislative map. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 41 (Commissioner Graves confirming that he stated in a press conference "that the framework that had been agreed to was sufficiently detailed that, without discretion, it could be turned into a map"). The framework agreement was "that [LD-15] would be that 50.1 Hispanic CVAP number." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 42. The framework agreement did not "stipulate the racial composition of any other district[] besides the 15th." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 72.

After the Commissioners shook on their framework agreement in the evening of November 15, the Commissioners and their staff began turning the

framework agreement into an actual map. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 192. This process went late through the night and into the morning of November 16. During this time, the map drawers tweaked the racial composition (*i.e.*, the percentage of Hispanic citizens of voting age) of LD-15, bringing it as close as reasonably possible to 50% while staying barely above a 50/50 split. Ex. 487 at 7 (comparing Commissioner Graves's November 12 map, with a 50.2% Hispanic CVAP, to the enacted map, with a 50.02% Hispanic CVAP). While drawing the maps in the early morning hours of November 16, Grose was "also trying to ensure the district was majority Hispanic by CVAP." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 205. It is clear the map drawers were aware of the nonnegotiable criteria that LD-15 must be over 50% HCVAP.

On November 16, 2021, the Commission transmitted its final maps to the Washington State Legislature. Ex. 123. The Legislature made minor amendments to the maps, changing only a few census blocks that resulted in no change in the population of LD-15, and voted to enact the maps in February 2022. *See* H. Con. Res. 4407, 67th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 2:35-36, 71:9-77:26.

II. Following Redistricting, Two Challenges Were Brought Against the Enacted 2021 Legislative Map.

On January 19, 2022, several plaintiffs—including lead plaintiff Susan Soto Palmer—filed a lawsuit against the Washington Secretary of State alleging that the legislative map ratified by the legislature in February, the "2021 Legislative Map," was enacted in

violation of the VRA because (i) the map diluted the voting power of Hispanic residents of LD-15 and because (ii) the Commission drew the map with discriminatory intent. *Soto Palmer* Dkt. No. 70 at 39-40. On March 15, 2022, Benancio Garcia, III, filed a lawsuit against the Washington Secretary of State alleging that the Commission, in drawing LD-15, racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 14 at 17. Pursuant to Garcia's request under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, a three-judge panel was drawn consisting of my colleagues in the majority and me. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 18. The court in both cases joined the State of Washington as a defendant, and the court in *Soto Palmer* granted several individuals' motion to intervene and defend the map. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 13; *Soto Palmer* Dkt. Nos. 68-69. The court consolidated the cases for trial, which was held the week of June 5, 2023.[1] On August 10, the court in *Soto Palmer* issued a decision finding in favor of the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs and directing the State of Washington to redraw the legislative map. *Soto Palmer*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13.

ANALYSIS

The majority dismisses this case as moot. It is not. Not only is the case not moot, but the panel should have acknowledged the map was enacted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, found in favor of

[1] *Soto Palmer* also included an additional trial day on June 2, 2023.

Garcia, and directed the State of Washington to redraw the maps in a way that does not violate the Constitution. That would have mooted the VRA challenge in *Soto Palmer* and avoided the issuance of an advisory opinion in that case.

I. This Case Is Not Moot.

The majority concludes Garcia's lawsuit is "moot" because, in the panel's opinion, the court in *Soto Palmer* concluded that the 2021 map violated the VRA and ordered the State of Washington to redraw it. That opinion was advisory, should never have been rendered, and even putting that aside, does not moot this case.

The *Soto Palmer* decision should never have been issued. Because the 2021 map violates the Equal Protection Clause, it was "void *ab initio*." *Mester Mfg. Co.*, 879 F.2d at 570 (citation omitted). "An act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Indeed, as the Supreme Court put it recently, "an unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law (because the Constitution automatically displaces any conflicting statutory provision from the moment of the provision's enactment)." *Collins*, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89. In deciding the claim in *Soto Palmer*— while necessarily aware of this challenge against the map on constitutional grounds—the *Soto Palmer* court simply ignored the unconstitutionality of the map and jumped ahead to decide whether a hypothetically constitutional map would violate the VRA.

In other words, the *Soto Palmer* court issued an advisory opinion. *See Hall v. Beals*, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S. Ct. 200, 24 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1969) (declining to address the constitutionality of a statute that was no longer legally extant on other grounds because of the need to "avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law"). Opining on "important" but hypothetical "questions of law" is not a function within the "exercise of [the] judicial power" granted in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. *United States v. Evans*, 213 U.S. 297, 300-01, 29 S. Ct. 507, 53 L. Ed. 803 (1909). Indeed, "[federal courts] are constitutionally forbidden from issuing advisory opinions." *United States v. Guzman-Padilla*, 573 F.3d 865, 879 (9th Cir. 2009); *see also United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell*, 330 U.S. 75, 89, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) ("[F]ederal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions.").

Beyond the jurisdictional reason to avoid deciding the VRA claim, there is also an important prudential reason that the court in *Soto Palmer* should have at least deferred resolution of the VRA claim until this panel resolved the Equal Protection claim. The VRA claim in *Soto Palmer* was complex and involved the application of a nine-factor indeterminate balancing test. *See Soto Palmer*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *6-11. As a matter of prudence, it makes little sense to undertake a complicated test that involves indeterminate balancing when a simpler threshold basis exists for resolving the matter.

The majority cites to *Landis v. North American Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936), as a possible reason not to have prioritized this panel's

Equal Protection claim. First, it's not clear *Landis* is even relevant. *Landis* considered a court's power to grant a *motion* for a stay, whereas the issue here involves a court's *internal* docket management. *See id.* at 256. I do not suggest, as the majority believes, that *Soto Palmer* should have been formally "held in abeyance." Different considerations come into play when a court is assessing its own order-of-business than when a court is considering an application for a formal stay or for a case to be held in abeyance. But even assuming *Landis* did govern, it was no bar to the court in *Soto Palmer* appropriately deferring. "Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment, the individual may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted." *Id.*

Similarly, despite the majority's assertion otherwise, the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Allen v. Milligan* does not indicate that a court should undertake a many-factored VRA analysis ahead of a simple Equal Protection analysis that would moot the VRA claim. 599 U.S. 1, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2023). The Supreme Court in *Allen* granted review on only one question: "Whether the State of Alabama's 2021 Redistricting Plan ... violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." The Court did not grant review on any Equal Protection claim. There was thus no Equal Protection claim pending before the Court that would have potentially mooted the case and which it could have answered before addressing the VRA question. The Supreme Court's discretionary docket allows it to limit itself just to a question granted. *See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips*

Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 28, 114 S. Ct. 425, 126 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1993). But we, of course, are not the Supreme Court.

While my colleagues in the majority opine that the *Soto Palmer* decision was not advisory because of the principle of constitutional avoidance, that principle has no application here. That discretionary principle indicates that a nonconstitutional decision should usually be preferred to a constitutional decision when the nonconstitutional decision would render the constitutional decision unnecessary. *See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.*, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936); *see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n*, 485 U.S. 439, 446, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988) (explaining that, "before addressing [a] constitutional issue," courts should consider "whether a decision on that question could have entitled respondents to relief beyond that to which they were entitled on their statutory claims"). Perhaps if there were a symmetrical relationship between the *Soto Palmer* and *Garcia* cases, such that a decision in one would necessarily moot the other case, and vice versa, there might be a better argument for constitutional avoidance in *Garcia*. But that is not the case. There is instead an asymmetry, where the correct decision in *Garcia* would moot *Soto Palmer*, but a decision in *Soto Palmer*, regardless of the result, does not moot *Garcia*.

Resolving *Garcia* in the plaintiff's favor would have mooted *Soto Palmer*. It would have meant recognizing that the map challenged in *Soto Palmer* has never legally existed—enacted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, there never was a constitutionally valid map that could possibly violate

the VRA. *See Collins*, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89; *Mester Mfg. Co.*, 879 F.2d at 570. That recognition would leave no map for the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs to challenge, and thus moot their action.

By contrast, resolving *Soto Palmer* in the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs' favor does not moot *Garcia*. The majority disagrees, stating that because LD-15 is now gone as a result of the decision in *Soto Palmer*, the *Garcia* plaintiff got what he wanted. But he didn't, of course. Consider what happened: In this case, Plaintiff Garcia complains that the State considered race unlawfully in drawing the legislative map. In *Soto Palmer*, the plaintiff complained that the State violated the VRA because LD-15 did not *consider race enough*—that is, that the final LD-15 contains too few Hispanic voters. The Court in *Soto Palmer* agreed with the plaintiff that there were not enough Hispanic voters in LD-15 to comply with the VRA and directed the State to go redraw the map in a way that complies with the VRA. The State will do this by placing *more* Hispanic voters in LD-15, a task which necessarily requires the State to consider race.[2]

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[2] The majority cites a recent order in the now-remanded *Milligan* litigation as support for its decision to dismiss Garcia's claims as moot. *See Milligan v. Allen*, 2:21-cv- 1530-AMM, Dkt. No. 272 at 7-8, 194-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2023). But the relationship between the VRA and constitutional claims in *Milligan* is noticeably different from the relationship between *Soto Palmer*'s VRA claim and *Garcia*'s constitutional claim. Thus, *Milligan* does not support the majority's reliance on constitutional avoidance here.

The *Milligan* litigation involves several consolidated cases, but among those with constitutional claims are the aforementioned

Milligan case and the *Singleton v. Allen* case. The *Milligan* plaintiffs argue that Alabama's remedial proposal fails to remedy the VRA violation, and because Alabama's racial gerrymandering cannot otherwise survive strict scrutiny, it also violates the Equal Protection Clause. *See id.*, Dkt. No. 200 at 16-19, 23-26. As the *Milligan* plaintiffs have presented their arguments, their VRA and Equal Protection claims seek the same thing, and both depend on their underlying theory that Alabama has an affirmative obligation to use race properly to satisfy the demands of the VRA. Thus, their constitutional claims effectively serve as a backstop to their VRA claims, and so relief on the latter necessarily eliminates any need to reach the former. That is a textbook application of mootness. Garcia's argument here, in contrast, is that the Equal Protection Clause requires the State to abstain from considering race, which is, of course, directly at odds with the *Soto Palmer* plaintiffs' arguments that the State must consider race more. Unlike in *Milligan*, where plaintiffs received all the relief they sought (under either of their claims) when the district court tossed Alabama's remedial maps based on the VRA, the majority here cannot avoid Garcia's constitutional claim based on *Soto Palmer*, which does not offer relief that redresses Garcia's claim.

The *Singleton* plaintiffs, who are advancing only constitutional claims, have taken a different view of the Alabama redistricting dispute. They have offered alternative congressional maps that they contend comply with the VRA without taking race into consideration at all. *See Singleton v. Allen*, 2:21-cv-1291-AMM, Dkt. No. 147 at 19-20, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998. If race need not be considered to satisfy the demands of the VRA, they argue, then Alabama's admitted consideration of race must violate the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at 17-18. Because the Alabama court again granted relief on VRA grounds, it had no need to separately consider *at this point in the litigation* the *Singleton* plaintiffs' claim that VRA compliance can be achieved without resort to racial gerrymandering. But that reasoning has no purchase here, where Garcia's claim that the State is improperly using race is neither addressed nor resolved by the *Soto Palmer* court's admonition that the State needs to double down on its use of race to comply with the VRA's demands.

The majority's position is thus that an order directing the State to consider race *more* has "granted . . . complete relief" to a plaintiff who complains the State shouldn't have considered race *at all*. This kind of logic should make us wonder if this case is really moot.

It is not, for at least two reasons. First, the plaintiff in this case may wish to appeal this matter to the Supreme Court to challenge current precedent that considers compliance with the VRA a sufficient reason to racially gerrymander. *See Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1248; *Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace Officers Ass'n*, 38 F.4th 68, 70 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that the appellants "concede[d] that binding precedent forecloses" one of their arguments "and only seek to preserve that claim for further appellate review"). While that issue is currently foreclosed by current Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiff in *Garcia* could ask the Supreme Court to revisit that precedent. Even assuming success in that endeavor is a longshot, that doesn't *moot* this case. I agree with the majority that, *if* Garcia had no ongoing injury, he could not litigate a case with simply the hope that he

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And in any event, while it is true that, when faced with both VRA and constitutional claims, the Alabama court in its recent *Milligan* order decided only the VRA claims, the court neither ultimately rejected the constitutional claims nor took any other action preventing their future adjudication. Instead, it merely "reserve[d] ruling" on them. *Milligan v. Allen*, 2:21-cv-1530-AMM, Dkt. No. 272 at 8, 194, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155998. Especially in view of the *Singleton* plaintiffs' claim, which—not unlike Garcia's—do not wholly depend on the outcome of the VRA claim, the Alabama court's decision was a measured and constrained course of action that undercuts rather than supports the majority's severe and terminal decision here.

could persuade the Supreme Court to revisit one of its precedents. But he still has injury. He claims injury from past racial gerrymandering. The decision in *Soto Palmer* ordered that the State engage in *even more* racial gerrymandering. That does not somehow eliminate Garcia's injury.

Secondly, even putting aside the possibility of *Garcia* seeking relief from the Supreme Court, the *Garcia* case is also not moot because, notwithstanding the finding of a VRA violation in *Soto Palmer* and the resulting invalidation of the redistricting maps, "there is still a live controversy" in *Garcia* "as to the adequacy of" the remedy in *Soto Palmer* in addressing all of the relief sought by Garcia in this case. *Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000*, 567 U.S. 298, 307-08, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 183 L. Ed. 2d 281 (2012). "A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party. As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot." *Id.* (cleaned up). And "the burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one." *Los Angeles Cnty. v. Davis*, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S. Ct. 1379, 59 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1979) (cleaned up). Moreover, a case is not moot simply because the exact remedy sought by the plaintiff cannot be fully given. The existence of a possible partial remedy "is sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot." *Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States*, 506 U.S. 9, 13, 113 S. Ct. 447, 121 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1992).

In this case, Garcia seeks a declaration "that Legislative District 15 is an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause" *and* an order from this court that the State create a "new

valid plan for legislative districts ... that does not violate the Equal Protection Clause." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 14 at 18. Although the decision in *Soto Palmer* might moot some of the relief that Garcia sought to obtain in this case, the court in *Soto Palmer* did not issue an order directing the State to avoid performing an illegal racial gerrymander when it redraws the map—that is, to avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause. *See Soto Palmer*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139893, 2023 WL 5125390, at *13. Garcia requested the map be redrawn without violating the Equal Protection Clause, and this unfulfilled request for relief "is sufficient to prevent this case from being moot." *Church of Scientology*, 506 U.S. at 13.

The majority disagrees because "a federal court may only direct parties to undertake activities that comply with the Constitution." Thus, the panel "presumes" that the court in *Soto Palmer* "direct[ed] the State to redraw LD 15" in a way that complies with the Constitution. The source of this presumption is unclear. Although courts obviously should avoid intentionally directing parties to violate the Constitution, there is little reason to presume that the court's order in *Soto Palmer* implicitly instructed the State not to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The State had earlier violated the Equal Protection Clause *by unlawfully considering race*, and the court's order directs the State to consider race *more*. It doesn't set any limit for how much more. Garcia has still not received a court order directing the State to redraw the map in a way that does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The majority is therefore wrong that there remains no "availability of any meaningful injunctive relief."

The majority relies on *New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York* to support its belief that the mere fact that the *Soto Palmer* court directed the map be redrawn is enough to moot this case. *See* 140 S. Ct. 1525, 206 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2020) (per curiam). The Supreme Court in *New York* said no such thing. The Court instead concluded that a case was partially moot when plaintiffs challenged a rule that was subsequently amended by state and local authorities during litigation. *See id.* at 1526. In this case, however, Garcia requested not just that the old map be held invalid but that a new map be drawn in a way that does not violate the Constitution. He is still seeking that relief and has not received it from the order in *Soto Palmer*. Indeed, the order in *Soto Palmer* ensures that he will not receive what he argues is a constitutionally valid legislative map. Garcia's claimed injury is not merely capable of repetition; it is almost certain to repeat itself.

The majority's insistent portrayal of this case as indistinguishable from *New York* glosses over the starkly different procedural postures of the two cases and ignores the practical consequences of its own decision to dismiss Garcia's claim as moot. In *New York*, petitioners' constitutional claims were considered on a discretionary basis by a court of last resort. Here, Garcia's constitution claim was presented in the first instance to a district court with a non-discretionary obligation to adjudicate it, and that distinction makes a difference.

After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in *New York*, "the State of New York amended its firearm licensing statute, and the City amended the [challenged] rule" to provide "the precise relief that

petitioners requested[.]" 140 S. Ct. at 1526. In response to New York's argument that the amendments mooted their claims, the petitioners noted (1) that the new rule shared some of the old rule's constitutional problems and (2) raised the prospect of saving their complaint by amending it to seek damages. *Id.* at 1526-27.

While the Supreme Court concluded that petitioners' old claims were moot, its subsequent vacatur *and remand* (which, it bears noting, is nowhere near the same thing as this court *finally dismissing* this case for mootness) affirmatively disclaimed neither of petitioners' arguments. As to the petitioners' first argument, the Supreme Court gave no indication that it disagreed with their contention that New York's replacement rule might have constitutional problems of its own. Instead, it ordered the lower court to address that argument in the first instance. And then, just two years later, the Supreme Court vindicated that exact argument from the very same petitioners. *See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022). And as to petitioners' second argument that they might amend their challenge to the old rule and avoid mootness by adding a damages claim, the Supreme Court *again* merely sent that argument back to the lower court to address in the first instance. *New York*, 140 S. Ct. at 1527. It did not, like the majority does here, reject and dismiss that claim. In short, while the Supreme Court in *New York* did conclude the petitioners' challenge to the old rule was "moot" for purposes of the Supreme Court's own continued review, the Court's actions taken in response to that conclusion bear no resemblance to the

majority's decision here. Instead, the Supreme Court merely exercised its unique discretion to have the lower courts address all the remaining non-moot issues in the first instance.

But it bears repeating: we are not the Supreme Court. A three-judge district court panel has nowhere to remand the remaining non-moot issues in this case. The Supreme Court's unique method of managing its own discretionary appellate docket, which in *New York* kept alive the prospect that petitioners' non-moot claims would receive substantive review, provides no support for the majority's broad mootness decision here, which kills Garcia's entire case—including the parts that aren't moot—before any court had the opportunity to review its merits.

In sum, the panel is wrong on the narrow question of mootness in this case. More broadly—and more disconcerting—the court in *Soto Palmer* was incorrect to issue an advisory opinion opining on whether, assuming LD-15 had been enacted in compliance with the Constitution and was thus legally extant, the district would have violated the VRA. My criticism that the *Soto Palmer* decision is an advisory opinion depends, of course, on my conclusion that the State of Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause. I thus turn now to that question. It is not a hard one on this record.

II. The State of Washington Violated the Equal Protection Clause by Racially Gerrymandering Without a Compelling Interest.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a State from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "[A]bsent extraordinary justification," this clause prohibits a State from "segregat[ing] citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools." *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 911, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995) (internal citations omitted). Such sifting is odious to the Constitution and our Republic. It is no less so when a "State assigns voters on the basis of race" and "engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.'" *Id.* at 911-12 (quoting *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993)). These "[r]ace-based assignments embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution." *Id.* In short, "[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race are by their very nature odious" and "cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest." *Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1248 (cleaned up).

When a plaintiff has shown that a State racially gerrymandered in drawing a particular district, the burden shifts to the State to show that the gerrymander was "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest." *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 904; *see also Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1248. A State may have a compelling interest to draw lines on the basis of race when, "at the time of imposition," it has a "strong basis in evidence" to believe the racial gerrymander was necessary to comply with the VRA and in fact "judg[ed] [such gerrymandering] necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA." *Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-50.[3]

In this case, the 2021 Washington State Redistricting Commission (1) racially gerrymandered in drawing LD-15 and (2) a majority of the Commission did not, "at the time of imposition, judge [such a gerrymander] necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA." *Id.* (cleaned up). Because

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[3] The majority mischaracterizes me as "admi[tting]" that "so long as the State judges the use of race necessary to comply with the VRA it is not unlawful for the State to create a district with a higher Latino CVAP." That is incorrect. The mere fact that a State (through its officials) "judges the use of race necessary to comply with the VRA" is decidedly *not* the correct standard for policing the line between racial discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause and racial discrimination that complies with the VRA. It is one thing to subject a State that is racially gerrymandering to "the burden of showing that the design of th[e] district withstands strict scrutiny." *Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1249. It is quite another to bless a State's racial discrimination any time "the State judges the use of race necessary to comply with the VRA." While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the former approach, it has never endorsed the latter, and for good reason.

the Commission racially gerrymandered without a compelling interest, the 2021 Redistricting Map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and was "void *ab initio*." *Mester Mfg. Co.*, 879 F.2d at 570; *see also Collins*, 141 S. Ct. at 1788-89. But before discussing the evidence showing the Commission grouped voters on the basis of race and that its racial sorting was not in furtherance of a compelling interest, a threshold question must first be considered. Specifically, the parties dispute whether the Commission or the Washington Legislature is the entity whose intent matters for determining whether the State violated the Equal Protection Clause. The answer is not difficult: it is the Commission's intent that matters.

A. The Redistricting Commission's Intent Matters for Garcia's Equal Protection Claim.

"Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." *Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977). To establish his prima facie case that the State of Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause in enacting the 2021 map, Garcia must thus show that the State intentionally racially gerrymandered. But whose intent? The State of Washington argues it is the Washington Legislature's intent. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 78 at 30. Because Washington law structurally makes the Redistricting Commission primarily responsible for redistricting and because the Legislature made only minor changes to the map submitted by the 2021 Redistricting Commission—none of which affected the racial composition of LD-15

imposed by the Commission—the State is incorrect. It is the Commission's intent that is legally relevant.

"[Supreme Court] precedent teaches that redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include," for example, the popular "referendum and the Governor's veto." *Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n*, 576 U.S. 787, 808, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 192 L. Ed. 2d 704 (2015). Accordingly, it is important to first attend to what institution Washington law makes responsible for redistricting. Structurally, Washington law delegates redistricting to the Redistricting Commission, leaving only a minor role for the Washington Legislature.

The Washington Constitution provides that "redistricting of state legislative and congressional districts" shall be performed by "a commission." Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(1). "The legislature may amend the redistricting plan but must do so by a two-thirds vote of the legislators elected or appointed to each house of the legislature." *Id.* § 43(7). "After submission of the plan by the commission, the legislature shall have the next thirty days during any regular or special session to amend the commission's plan." Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(2). The Legislature's amendments "may not include [a change of] more than two percent of the population of any legislative or congressional district." *Id.* Moreover, if the Legislature fails to timely make any amendments, the Commission's plan automatically becomes "the state districting law." Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(7).

It is plain from these state constitutional and statutory requirements that Washington law delegates primary redistricting responsibility to the Commission, leaving only tightly circumscribed discretion for a supermajority of the Legislature to make minor changes to the map. Because Washington law delegates almost all responsibility to the Redistricting Commission, the Commission is at least presumptively responsible for performing the "legislative function" of redistricting and is thus the entity whose intent matters for evaluating an Equal Protection claim. *Ariz. State Legislature*, 576 U.S. at 808.

Even assuming that presumption could be overcome in some case, it was not here. The Legislature minimally amended LD-15, the district that Garcia contends was drawn discriminatorily, changing only a few census blocks that resulted in no change in population to LD-15. *See* H. Con. Res. 4407, 67th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 2:35-36, 71:9-77:26. Moreover, the House and Senate majority leaders both explained that they viewed the Commission as the entity responsible for drawing the maps, with the Legislature playing a minor role. The House Majority Leader discussed the changes as "technical in nature" and explained that "[i]f we do nothing, then the maps come into being without our vote" but that the maps would then "come into being without [certain] changes that were recommended by the county commissioners." Ex. 1065 at 5:04-22. The Senate Majority Leader explained that adopting the maps "is not an approval of the redistricting map and the redistricting plans; it's not an endorsement of that plan. The Legislature does not have the power to

approve or endorse the redistricting plan that the Redistricting Commission approved." Ex. 126 at 2:10-2:38.

The intent of the 2021 Redistricting Commission is the intent we must consider when evaluating Garcia's Equal Protection claim.

B. Race Predominated the Commission's Considerations in Drawing LD-15.

Garcia claims that the 2021 Redistricting Commission racially gerrymandered when it drew LD-15. The evidence establishes that he is right. "[A] plaintiff alleging racial gerrymandering bears the burden 'to show ... that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.'" *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 187 (quoting *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 916). "Race may predominate even when a reapportionment plan respects traditional principles ... if race was the criterion that, in the State's view, could not be compromised, and race-neutral considerations came into play only after the race-based decision had been made." *Id.* at 189 (cleaned up) (quoting *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 907, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996)).[4] Finally, it is no excuse that a government

[4] The Supreme Court recently reinforced that when a State makes the racial composition of a district the criterion on which it will not compromise, it has elevated race to a position of predominance. *See Allen v. Milligan*, 143 S. Ct. at 1510-12 (plurality op.) (obtaining only a minority of the justices for an

racially sorted voters so that it could accomplish an ultimate non-race objective. *See Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 291 n.1, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 197 L. Ed. 2d 837 (2017).

Race clearly predominated the considerations of the 2021 Redistricting Commission when it drew LD-15. The racial composition of LD-15 featured heavily in the Commissioner's negotiations over the legislative map. *Garcia* Dkt. Nos. 73 at 117, 153-54, 177; 75 at 30-31. And in the ramp-up to final negotiations, the Commissioners reached an agreement to racially gerrymander LD-15 to be at least a bare majority Hispanic CVAP. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 30, 91. This initial agreement to make LD-15 a majority HCVAP district was then cemented in the final framework agreement among the Commissioners. *Garcia* Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42, 72. This agreement was the primary criterion for LD-15, contrasting with the other districts where the Commission was aware of racial demographics but nonetheless did not make race a nonnegotiable criterion. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 42.

All the Commissioners, for varying reasons, elevated the racial composition of LD-15 to be a nonnegotiable criterion around which other factors and passage of the map itself must fall. Commissioner Sims believed that a majority HCVAP in LD-15 was required by the VRA and also believed that the Commission must follow the law. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73

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analysis opining that race does not necessarily predominate when a State crafts a district with an objective of a specific racial composition).

at 48, 51. One of Commissioner Walkinshaw's draft maps included a note that the map "[c]reate[d] a majority Hispanic district" in the Yakima Valley. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 132. And one of Walkinshaw's staff stated that a district that "perform[ed] for Latino voters" should be nonnegotiable." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 110-11. Making LD-15 a majority HCVAP was critical to Commissioner Fain because he "belie[ved] that "the Hispanic CVAP was a metric that was important to Democratic commissioners" and he was "willing to give [an increase in Hispanic CVAP in LD-15] in order to secure support for a final compromise map." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 49-50. Commissioner Graves wanted LD-15 to be a majority HCVAP so that he could get a map that obtained a majority of the Commissioners' votes; it was "[v]ery hard for [Commissioner Graves] to see three of the voting commissioners voting for a map that did not have a majority Hispanic CVAP district in the Yakima Valley." *Garcia* Dkt. Nos. 73 at 186-87; 75 at 73. Commissioners Fain and Graves may have wanted LD-15 to be a majority HCVAP district for reasons unrelated to their own concerns about race, but the government may not "elevate[] race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including political ones." *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 291 n.1.

The Commissioners then transformed these intents into an agreement that, come what may, LD-15 would be a majority HCVAP district. In the days leading up to the Commission's deadline to agree on maps, the two Commissioners responsible for negotiating the legislative map (as opposed to the congressional map) reached an agreement that LD-15 "would be a majority Hispanic district by eligible

voters." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 91. They "agreed to ... make the district 50 percent Latino CVAP." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 31. The district's partisan makeup was still "up in the air," but it was agreed that the district would be majority HCVAP.[5] *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 32. And finally, when November 15 arrived, all the Commissioners reached a framework agreement on how the maps would be drawn, which included that LD-15 would be a majority HCVAP district. *Garcia* Dkt. Nos. 73 at 16-17; 74 at 71; 75 at 42, 72.

Underlining that race predominated the Commission's drawing of LD-15 is the fact that the Commission did not elevate race to be the predominant factor in drawing other districts. Grose, one of Commissioner Graves's staffers, testified that LD-15, "in particular," was "certainly ... far more race-focused than [Grose] th[ought] any other district on the map." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 155. Commissioner Fain testified that the "racial composition" of LD-15 was "a very important component of that negotiation" and confirmed that there were not "other districts where [racial composition] was as important of a component." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 87. In making the racial composition of LD-15 nonnegotiable—the

[5] The State of Washington notes that Commissioner Fain did not remember the racial composition of LD-15 being a part of the framework agreement. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 78 at 32 n.12. But Commissioner Fain's lack of memory is hardly surprising given that he was negotiating the congressional map, not the legislative map. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 49. And his inability to remember this part of the framework agreement is unpersuasive evidence of whether the agreement contained this nonnegotiable criterion, in light of testimony from one of the legislative map negotiators that it was part of the agreement.

"criterion that ... could not be compromised"—the Commission elevated race, and it predominated the drawing of LD-15. *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 189 (cleaned up).

The majority does not dispute that the racial composition of LD-15 was nonnegotiable for the Commission. The majority instead argues that race did not predominate because the Commissioners considered other factors when drawing the legislative map and because the Commissioners later denied that race predominated their considerations. The reason several of the Commissioners gave for believing that race did not predominate is the same reason relied on by the majority: simply that, in addition to considering race a nonnegotiable criterion, they also considered other factors.

It is of course not surprising at all that the Commissioners considered other factors. But it is also irrelevant. When a map drawer elevates a specific racial composition as "a "criterion that, in the [map drawer's] view, could not be compromised," race predominates. *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 189. If the mere consideration of other factors *in addition* to making race nonnegotiable meant race no longer predominated, then race would literally never predominate. Map drawers always consider more than just race, even when they operate with the express purpose of meeting a racial target. Take a simple example. Map drawers always attempt to comply with the Constitution's requirement that states' legislative maps be drawn with "equality of population among the districts." *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 321, 93 S. Ct. 979, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320, *modified*, 411 U.S. 922, 93 S. Ct. 1475, 36 L. Ed. 2d

316 (1973). If the mere consideration of other factors could stop race from predominating when a map drawer makes racial composition a nonnegotiable criterion, then it would make little sense for the Court to repeatedly state that race predominates when it is a "criterion that ... could not be compromised." *Shaw*, 517 U.S. at 907; *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 189.

By the basic nature of their task, drawers of legislative districts always take a number of essential considerations into account. The ever-present nature of such considerations cannot somehow dilute the constitutional taint of a map drawer who makes race a nonnegotiable criterion in drawing a map. *See Lee v. City of Los Angeles*, 908 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that "traditional redistricting principles are 'numerous and malleable'" and "a legislative body 'could construct a plethora of potential maps that look consistent with traditional, raceneutral principles'") (quoting *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 190). That the Commission here unsurprisingly considered "traditional, race-neutral principles" *in addition* to making race a nonnegotiable requirement does not mean those other factors somehow sufficiently watered-down race as the Commission's predominant consideration in drawing LD-15. *Id.* The racial composition of LD-15—specifically, that it be majority HCVAP—was a "criterion that, in the [Commission's] view, could not be compromised," and thus "race-neutral considerations came into play only after the race-based decision had been made." *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 189 (quoting *Shaw*, 517 U.S. at 907).

C. The 2021 Legislative Map Fails Strict Scrutiny.

Race predominated the Commission's decision to draw LD-15 as it did. For the map to nonetheless be constitutional, the State must show that it survives strict scrutiny. Specifically, the State must show that the map is "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest." *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 904. The State argues the gerrymander was justified under the VRA. *Garcia* Dkt. No. 78 at 34. The Supreme Court has held that complying with the VRA can be a compelling state interest, but only if the State, "at the time of imposition, judge[d] [the racial gerrymander] necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA." *Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1248, 1250 (cleaned up). Because a majority of the voting Commissioners did not "judg[e]" the gerrymander "necessary" under the VRA at the time that the Commission approved the 2021 Legislative Map, the map fails strict scrutiny. *Id.*

Commissioner Graves testified that he was "entirely uncertain" of whether the VRA required "a Hispanic CVAP district." He thought "that the law was entirely unclear on that particular question." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 71. When asked if he had a "clear understanding of what the VRA required[] in the Yakima Valley," Commissioner Graves answered that he was "not sure the VRA itself has a clear understanding of exactly what it requires in the Yakima Valley." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 75 at 58. It is evident that Commissioner Graves's decision to racially gerrymander LD-15 was not because he thought that it was required by the VRA.

So too Commissioner Fain. When he was asked point-blank at trial whether he believed the Hispanic CVAP majority in LD-15 was "required[] by the Voting Rights Act," Commissioner Fain answered: "No." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 74 at 50.

Commissioner Walkinshaw was less direct but also unclear as to whether he believed a majority HCVAP was necessary in LD-15. He certainly believed complying with the VRA was important, calling it "mission critical." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 106. After he received the slideshow prepared by Dr. Barreto, Commissioner Walkinshaw released a new map that included an explanation that "[n]ow that we have this information, we as Commissioners should not consider legislative district maps that don't comply with the VRA." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 135. But his general statement that the Commission should comply with the law does not clearly evince that he actually believed the racial gerrymander ultimately embodied in the final legislative map was *necessary* under the VRA. It is possible that Commissioner Walkinshaw believed the VRA required a racial gerrymander, but his testimony and the record are ambiguous.

Ultimately, only Commissioner Sims clearly believed the racial gerrymander performed in LD-15 was required by the VRA. Commissioner Sims straightforwardly answered "Yes" when asked whether she "believe[d] that the VRA required the Commission to create a majority Hispanic CVAP district[] in the Yakima Valley." *Garcia* Dkt. No. 73 at 51.

The State bears the burden of showing that the 2021 Legislative map survives strict scrutiny. *See Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 292. Even giving the State the benefit of the doubt (which, of course, would not be particularly *strict* scrutiny), and thus assuming Commissioner Walkinshaw believed the VRA required that LD-15 be racially gerrymandered, the State cannot show that a majority of commissioners racially gerrymandered because they intended to comply with the VRA. Two of four commissioners do not constitute a majority of the Commission, *see* Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(6), and thus there was no majority of the Commission who, "at the time of imposition, judge[d] [the racial gerrymander] necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA," *Wis. Legislature*, 142 S. Ct. at 1250 (cleaned up). The judgment of only two Commissioners was not enough to demonstrate that the Commission in any official sense believed racial sorting was necessary to comply with the VRA.

State governments may not arrange people into districts based on race and then hope to justify it by simply pantomiming at the VRA as an interest that could have justified their gerrymander. "What matters is 'the actual considerations that provided the essential basis for the lines drawn, not post hoc justifications the legislative body in theory could have used but in reality did not.'" *Lee*, 908 F.3d at 1182 (cleaned up) (quoting *Bethune-Hill*, 137 S. Ct. at 799). For good or ill, the Supreme Court has given States "leeway" to draw lines on the basis of race in redistricting when States have good reasons, based in the evidence, to believe the racial gerrymander necessary under the VRA. *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 306; *see*

Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1250. But the Supreme Court also understandably requires that states *actually* judge such segregation necessary under the VRA, not just hope that they can find good experts and good lawyers to make post hoc arguments if someone challenges it as violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State of Washington took the latter approach and so fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. The State thus enacted the 2021 Legislative Map in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

* * *

My colleagues in the majority are not properly dismissing an already dead case as moot. Instead, after improperly (and unsuccessfully) trying to indirectly kill this case from a distance in *Soto Palmer*, they are forcefully pulling the plug on a case that—even now—still has some life in it. And had they properly reached the merits, a straightforward analysis shows both that race predominated in the drawing of LD-15 in the 2021 Legislative Map and that, because a majority of the Commission did not judge such racial ordering necessary under the VRA at the time the map was adopted, the map cannot survive strict scrutiny. We should have found in favor of Garcia and directed the State of Washington to redraw the Legislative Map without violating the Equal Protection Clause. And then *that* map could be properly evaluated for compliance with the VRA, instead of the advisory analysis provided in the *Soto Palmer* decision. I thus respectfully dissent.

Dated this 8th day of September, 2023.

/s/ Lawrence VanDyke
Lawrence VanDyke
United States Circuit Judge

FILED: 9/8/2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

BENANCIO GARCIA III,
Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Washington, and the STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

- **Jury Verdict.** This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

- **Decision by Court.** This action came to consideration before the Court. The issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered.

THE COURT HAS ORDERED that:

This case is dismissed as moot.

Dated September 8, 2023.

Ravi Subramanian
Clerk of Court

s/ Michael Williaims
Deputy Clerk